Explaining Judicial Independence in The East Asian Developmental States: The Case of Taiwan Public Deposited

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  • March 19, 2019
  • Ma, David
    • Affiliation: College of Arts and Sciences, Department of Political Science
  • Taiwan presents an intriguing case regarding the emergence of judicial independence in new democracies since it cannot be conveniently explained by the existing theories. In this paper, I offer a model of judicial independence to resolve the puzzle, highlighting the role of private corporations having close ties with the government that is characteristic of the East Asian countries. Within this framework, despite single party dominance the ruling party is motivated to grant unconditional judicial independence to the court, allowing it to effectively check against the growing power of the corporations. It is also predicted that the dominant party would pursue strategies that can promote unconditional judicial independence by overcoming the credible commitment problem arisen from its unique relation with the corporate sector. This would include a three-part solution that involves formal rules, communications strategies, and appointment strategies. The theory finds support from an in-depth case study.
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  • In Copyright
  • Vanberg, Georg
  • Huber, Evelyne
  • Robertson, Graeme
  • Master of Arts
Degree granting institution
  • University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Graduate School
Graduation year
  • 2015
Place of publication
  • Chapel Hill, NC
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