Understanding Locke's discussion of personal identity Public Deposited
- Last Modified
- March 22, 2019
- Creator
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Driggers, Robert Kyle
- Affiliation: College of Arts and Sciences, Department of Philosophy
- Abstract
- Almost all interpreters agree that Locke's goal in Book II, Chapter 27 of the Essay is to provide a metaphysical theory of personal identity. Though there are disagreements about the details of his theory, it is almost universally agreed that Locke does not argue for a theory of personal identity that can capture our common sense beliefs about the matter. I focus on two notable objections to Locke's theory that purport to show this. I argue that Locke has reasonable responses to these objections that have been overlooked by previous commentators, who have failed to appreciate Locke's claim that person is a forensic notion.
- Date of publication
- May 2014
- Keyword
- DOI
- Resource type
- Rights statement
- In Copyright
- Advisor
- Nelson, Alan Jean
- Degree
- Master of Arts
- Graduation year
- 2014
- Language
- Publisher
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This work has no parents.
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