Outsourcing Counter-insurgency: State Investment in Pro-government Militias as a Response to Rebel Strength Public Deposited

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  • March 22, 2019
  • Donahue, Bailee
    • Affiliation: College of Arts and Sciences, Department of Political Science
  • In India, Nigeria, and Iraq, the government has invested in the capacity of PGMs despite the associated risks. This paper attempts to address under what conditions do governments invest in PGMs during civil wars. I argue that the degree to which a government is willing to invest in a PGM is mediated by the relative threat imposed by the rebel group(s) that the government is facing during the civil war. Governments facing relatively weak PGMs are more likely to invest in PGMs to create effective counter-insurgents. The government is less concerned that a PGM that shirks its duties or defects to the rebel group will be able to shift the war in favor of the rebels. Therefore, I argue that the likelihood of investment in PGMs increases as rebels become weaker relative to the state. Using cross-national data (1989 - 2004), I find partial support for the hypothesis that governments invest in PGMs as rebels become weaker relative to the state.
Date of publication
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Rights statement
  • In Copyright
  • Gent, Stephen
  • Bapat, Navin
  • Crescenzi, Mark J. C.
  • Master of Arts
Degree granting institution
  • University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
Graduation year
  • 2017

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