Discretion, Managerial Incentives, and Market Conditions: The Misreporting of Hedge Fund Returns Public Deposited
- Last Modified
- March 21, 2019
- Creator
-
Green, Jeremiah R.
- Affiliation: Kenan-Flagler Business School
- Abstract
- In this study, I document patterns in hedge fund returns that suggest that reporting manipulation is significant and pervasive for hedge funds with discretion in valuing their portfolios of illiquid assets. I show that hedge funds with such discretion report Sharpe ratios that are twice as large as do funds without discretion. I document that manipulation extends beyond the small-loss-to-small-gain kink in the pooled distribution of hedge fund returns to the shoulders and tails of the distribution. I also find that contractual incentives are associated with a larger likelihood of reporting small gains and less extreme returns. Finally, I show that funds with the most discretion report monthly returns that are on average 0.8% higher than funds without discretion. During market downturns, the difference in reported returns between funds with and without discretion increases to 1.3%. These findings bear on the current debates regarding hedge fund regulation, standard-setting for fair-value accounting, and the role of information during market crises.
- Date of publication
- May 2010
- DOI
- Resource type
- Rights statement
- In Copyright
- Advisor
- Hand, John
- Language
- Access
- Open access
- Parents:
This work has no parents.
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Discretion, managerial incentives, and market conditions : the misreporting of hedge fund returns | 2019-04-09 | Public |
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