Reputations, commitment problems, and partisan third party interventions Public Deposited
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- Last Modified
- March 21, 2019
Kwon, Bo Ram
- Affiliation: College of Arts and Sciences, Department of Political Science
- Various theories have explained why committing to peace may be difficult, but many questions still need to be addressed, especially in regards to how belligerents manage to cooperate when they are incapable of making credible commitments on their own accord. This study suggests that a better understanding of reputations and third party interventions may help fill this gap. A reputation for violating previous dispute settlements contaminates the bargaining environment by undermining trust and making one's commitment to peace less credible. Since military interventions affect the distribution of power in the post-settlement phase, on whose side the third party intervenes will have significant impact on the duration of war and durability of peace. A Cox model finds some evidence that crises influenced by reputations are more difficult to settle than those that are not, and that external military support may result in longer bargaining periods. A logit regression model yields mixed results in terms of how partisan third party interventions affect the durability of peace.
- Date of publication
- August 2008
- Resource type
- Rights statement
- In Copyright
- Crescenzi, Mark J. C.
- Degree granting institution
- University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
- Open access
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|Reputations, commitment problems, and partisan third party interventions||2019-04-09||Public||