Justification internalism, self knowledge, and mental content externalism Public Deposited

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  • March 21, 2019
  • Ross, Amber
    • Affiliation: College of Arts and Sciences, Department of Philosophy
  • At first blush, mental content externalism and justification internalism seem incompatible. If some of the content of my mental states supervenes on factors external to me, the content of these mental states might be unavailable to me. If the factors relevant to the justification of my beliefs are the relations between the contents of my beliefs, and I do not have access to these contents, then these beliefs cannot be justified internally. I propose to reconcile mental content externalism with justification internalism by taking the factors relevant to the justification of a belief to be the relations between how one would express one's beliefs, not between the contents of those beliefs. Though mental content externalism may somewhat restrict an agent's self knowledge, it could not restrict an agent from knowing how he would express his beliefs, and therefore would not hinder his access to the relevant justificatory factors.
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  • Neta, Ram
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  • University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
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