Competition in Markets with Network Externalities Public Deposited

Downloadable Content

Download PDF
Last Modified
  • March 22, 2019
Creator
  • Gunay, Fatma Busra
    • Affiliation: College of Arts and Sciences, Department of Economics
Abstract
  • This paper analyzes the effects of network externalities on an incumbent's advantage in a duopoly models where an entrant and an incumbent strategically set prices. A Global Games approach is used as an equilibrium refinement, where consumers receive both a public and a private signal about the entrant's quality. While a unique equilibrium is not guaranteed in all of the cases, the incumbent's advantage arises in specific cases depending on the relative precision of the signals. As an extension, I show in a model of endogenous advertisement choice that the multiple equilibria problem is resolved because the entrant prefers an advertisement level which makes the private signal precise enough to generate a unique equilibrium.
Date of publication
Keyword
DOI
Resource type
Rights statement
  • In Copyright
Advisor
  • Biglaiser, Gary
Degree
  • Doctor of Philosophy
Degree granting institution
  • University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
Graduation year
  • 2013
Language
Publisher
Parents:

This work has no parents.

Items