Towards a political economy of incentives in managing for development results Public Deposited

Downloadable Content

Download PDF
Last Modified
  • March 22, 2019
Creator
  • Ford, Matthew John
    • Affiliation: College of Arts and Sciences, Department of Political Science
Abstract
  • What are the incentives and disincentives for poor-country governments to improve information systems to Manage for Development Results (MfDR)? This paper argues that the main incentive is the recognition of long-term benefits of MfDR approaches and tools for social welfare. MfDR can increase the inclusiveness of government interests, improve decision making for policy and implementation, and help address information asymmetry problems. Disincentives arise especially out of weak governance capacity and narrow interests. Narrow interests may seek to maintain the status quo creating low demand and possibly opposition. A poor country is more likely to move towards results-based management approaches if political leaders are convinced to take a long-run perspective, and bureaucrats given appropriate incentives to address short-term costs and provide security. This paper considers a range of material and non-material incentives that may either support or hinder implementation of MfDR, as influenced by local and international actors.
Date of publication
DOI
Resource type
Rights statement
  • In Copyright
Advisor
  • Oatley, Thomas H.
Degree granting institution
  • University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
Language
Access
  • Open access
Parents:

This work has no parents.

Items