Transparency in doxastic deliberation Public Deposited

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  • March 22, 2019
  • Sharadin, Nathaniel P.
    • Affiliation: College of Arts and Sciences, Department of Philosophy
  • Nishi Shah and David Velleman purport to explain transparency, the phenomenon exhibited by doxastic deliberation whereby the first-personal question whether to believe that p gives way to the factual question whether p, by means of positing a constitutive norm of belief to the effect that a belief is correct if and only if it is true. I argue that the phenomenon they identify as transparency is not apt for explanation by means of a norm of belief because their explanation fails to respect a familiar feature about norms in general: the existence of a norm does not guarantee compliance with the norm. I articulate a competing interpretation of transparency and argue that this kind of transparency is fully explicable by the existence of a norm of belief.
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  • Sayre-McCord, Geoffrey
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