Owning up to moral luck Public Deposited

Downloadable Content

Download PDF
Last Modified
  • March 22, 2019
  • Yao, Vida
    • Affiliation: College of Arts and Sciences, Department of Philosophy
  • Many philosophers have objected to the existence of moral luck, arguing that it violates a necessary condition of holding another morally responsible for something she has done: that she could have controlled whether or not it happened. However, in spite of what seems to be our commitment to this condition, it also seems impossible to simply eliminate the attitudes that suggest moral luck exists from our evaluations of each other, and ourselves. In this paper I argue that the existence of moral luck can be vindicated in two ways. Not only can it be made consistent with the morally relevant reasons we have for emphasizing an agent's control over what has happened, our practices - upon the recognition that moral luck exists - will be able to admit of morally important phenomena that we cannot, even if we think otherwise, do without.
Date of publication
Resource type
Rights statement
  • In Copyright
  • ... in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in the Department of Philosophy.
  • Wolf, Susan
Degree granting institution
  • University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

This work has no parents.