Rebels, Resources and Repression Public Deposited

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Last Modified
  • March 19, 2019
Creator
  • Estancona, Chelsea
    • Affiliation: College of Arts and Sciences, Department of Political Science
Abstract
  • This paper addresses the question of how natural resources affect rebel and state strategic behavior toward noncombatants at the municipal level. Extant research demonstrates the importance of natural resources for conflict onset, severity, and duration but an analysis of how rebel groups capitalize on resource wealth and how the state minimizes resulting rebel capacity remains lacking. I suggest that the labor needed for the state or rebels to profit from certain resources is the missing mechanism for understanding this interaction. I propose a 3-player sequential game between the state, rebels, and civilians to evaluate when rebels form economic relationships with civilians and when the state preempts this cooperation with indiscriminate violence. Initial conclusions from the model suggest that the state's provision of public goods and the value of the natural resource in question have important implications for when highly local state repression occurs in intrastate conflicts.
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  • In Copyright
Advisor
  • Bapat, Navin
  • Crescenzi, Mark J. C.
  • Gent, Stephen
Degree
  • Master of Arts
Degree granting institution
  • University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Graduate School
Graduation year
  • 2015
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Place of publication
  • Chapel Hill, NC
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