Excluding inclusive public reason Public Deposited
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- March 20, 2019
- Affiliation: College of Arts and Sciences, Department of Philosophy
- John Rawls is well known for making a distinction in his political philosophical writings between what he calls ideal and non-ideal theory. In ideal theory, the task is to work out a theory for what constitutes political justice in a liberal democratic society under certain plausible simplifying assumptions. In non-ideal theory, one applies the ideal theory to cases where some of these assumptions are abandoned to see what the theory says when conditions closer to those found in the actual world are present. In this thesis I argue against a particular application of Rawls's ideal political theory. This application concerns whether or not in certain non-ideal cases the duty of citizens to both be able and willing to offer justifications for their political support in terms that they expect their fellow citizens can understand and accept can be suspended. I will show that this obligation cannot be suspended in these cases.
- Date of publication
- August 2008
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- Boxill, Bernard
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|Excluding inclusive public reason||2019-04-11||Public||