The Aretaic Significance of Moral Beliefs Public Deposited

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Last Modified
  • March 21, 2019
Creator
  • Copic, Sara
    • Affiliation: College of Arts and Sciences, Department of Philosophy
Abstract
  • I argue that a person’s moral beliefs can contribute to or detract from the quality of that person’s moral character. I argue that this happens when one’s moral beliefs result from cognitive (as opposed to conative) features that contribute to or detract from the quality of one’s moral character, and I argue that some cognitive features can do that. I also argue that moral beliefs contribute to a person’s moral character when she self-consciously acts in accordance with those beliefs. Likewise, self-consciously flouting one’s moral views detracts from a person’s moral goodness. Since I maintain that conative states also play a part in constituting quality of moral character, my view is a hybrid view. This approach contrasts with the fully desire-based account of moral goodness that Arpaly and Schroeder present in In Praise of Desire. I present the desire-based account and show that a hybrid view has some explanatory advantages.
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Rights statement
  • In Copyright
Advisor
  • Shafer-Landau, Russ
  • Hill, Thomas E.
  • Wolf, Susan
Degree
  • Master of Arts
Degree granting institution
  • University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Graduate School
Graduation year
  • 2016
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