In Defense of "Pleasingly Ecumenical" Evidentialism Public Deposited

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Last Modified
  • March 20, 2019
Creator
  • Ramirez, Sylvie
    • Affiliation: College of Arts and Sciences, Department of Philosophy
Abstract
  • Is it ever epistemically permissible to believe, or accept as true, something one regards one’s evidence as insufficient to establish? According to evidentialism, one ought to believe only what the evidence supports. In this paper, I argue that recent evidentialist arguments fail to establish that there are no exceptions to this general rule. I then offer an account of a “pleasingly ecumenical” evidentialism, according to which it is sometimes permissible to believe beyond what one takes one’s evidence to establish.
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Rights statement
  • In Copyright
Advisor
  • Worsnip, Alex
  • Russell, Gillian
  • Kotzen, Matthew
Degree
  • Master of Arts
Degree granting institution
  • University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Graduate School
Graduation year
  • 2017
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