Examining Leverage in Civil War Mediation: A Dynamic Theory of Mediator Leverage

Examining Leverage in Civil War Mediation: A Dynamic Theory of Mediator Leverage Public Deposited

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Reid, Lindsay
- Affiliation: College of Arts and Sciences, Department of Political Science

Abstract

How does leverage vary across different mediator types and what influence does this have on mediation outcomes? Extant literature has glossed over the meaning of leverage, treating it as a static measure of material power. I argue that leverage is a dynamic concept comprised of two dimensions: capability and credibility. Capability leverage is a function of economic and military might while credibility leverage derives its influence from material, historical, religious, and cultural ties. I hypothesize that mediators with capability leverage will be more likely to achieve short-term success in the form of a negotiated settlement while mediators with credibility leverage will be more likely to achieve a more durable peace. I test my hypotheses using the universe of civil war mediation attempts from 1989-2006. My results suggest that capability leverage does indeed contribute to the achievement of a settlement while credibility leverage leads to more durable outcomes.

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