Can We Rationally Believe Conciliationism? Public Deposited

Analytics

Downloadable Content

Download PDF
Request Accessible Version
Last Modified
  • March 20, 2019
Creator
  • Sampson, Eric
    • Affiliation: College of Arts and Sciences, Department of Philosophy
Abstract
  • Conciliationists hold that, when an agent learns that an epistemic peer disagrees with her about p, she is rationally required to suspend judgment about p. Conciliationism has a well-known self-undermining problem (SUP): Conciliationism is itself controversial among philosophers. It thus seems to entail that it is irrational for conciliationists to believe their own view. Conciliationists have argued, in various ways, that this is not so. I argue that their defenses fail for the same reason: they depend for their success on philosophical claims that are also the subject of disagreement among conciliationists’ epistemic peers. It is therefore irrational, by conciliationists’ lights, to believe the claims conciliationists employ in their defenses. It is thus irrational, by conciliationists’ standards, to believe that their defenses succeed. So we cannot rationally believe Conciliationism. I argue, moreover, that there is excellent reason to think that this problem will afflict any future defenses of Conciliationism, too.
Date of publication
Keyword
DOI
Resource type
Rights statement
  • In Copyright
Advisor
  • Neta, Ram
  • Sayre-McCord, Geoffrey
  • Shafer-Landau, Russ
Degree
  • Master of Arts
Degree granting institution
  • University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Graduate School
Graduation year
  • 2017
Language
Parents:

This work has no parents.

Items

Thumbnail Title Date Uploaded Visibility Actions
N009w2429?file=thumbnail Sampson_unc_0153M_16930.pdf 2019-04-05 Embargo
Default PREMIS_Events_Metadata_0_0366cf63-878f-41ee-a1e5-ebf517ac978f.txt 2019-04-05 Public
Default original_metadata_file_0366cf63-878f-41ee-a1e5-ebf517ac978f.xml 2019-04-05 Public