Burge, Quine, and Initial One-word Sentences Public Deposited

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Last Modified
  • March 20, 2019
Creator
  • Lošonský, Miroslav Kneller
    • Affiliation: College of Arts and Sciences, Department of Philosophy
Abstract
  • In Chapter 7 of Origins of Objectivity, Tyler Burge argues, contra Quine, that initial one-word sentences, if they have truth conditions, must have structure. In this paper, I argue that Burge's argument is unsuccessful. I proceed by first clarifying the sense in which Quine denies that initial one-word sentences are structured. I then argue that Burge's argument fails to establish that one-word sentences must be structured in a sense that is incompatible with the sense in which Quine denies that they are structured. I also offer and reject a charitable revision of Burge's argument.
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  • In Copyright
Note
  • "... in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in the Department of Philosophy."
Advisor
  • Bar-On, Dorit
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Place of publication
  • Chapel Hill, NC
Access
  • Open access
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