Essays on incentives in rank-order tournaments Public Deposited

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Last Modified
  • March 20, 2019
Creator
  • Joffrion, Justin L.
    • Affiliation: College of Arts and Sciences, Department of Economics
Abstract
  • This dissertation explores the effect of a dynamic tournament on strategic behavior. First, I examine the relevant theory and build a model of a two-player continuation contest. I find that there are two unique equilibria including one where an underdog can take the lead. Second, I analyze the effect that an educational signal from the Air Force Academy has on distant career outcomes. Using a regression discontinuity design, I show that the distinction of Distinguished Graduate has no effect on selection to In-residence Intermediate Developmental Education. Finally, I explore the impact that the tournament structure and the prize valuation have on strategic behavior of cadets at the Air Force Academy.
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  • In Copyright
Advisor
  • Parreiras, Sergio
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  • Open access
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