Essays on incentives in rank-order tournaments Public Deposited
- Last Modified
- March 20, 2019
- Creator
-
Joffrion, Justin L.
- Affiliation: College of Arts and Sciences, Department of Economics
- Abstract
- This dissertation explores the effect of a dynamic tournament on strategic behavior. First, I examine the relevant theory and build a model of a two-player continuation contest. I find that there are two unique equilibria including one where an underdog can take the lead. Second, I analyze the effect that an educational signal from the Air Force Academy has on distant career outcomes. Using a regression discontinuity design, I show that the distinction of Distinguished Graduate has no effect on selection to In-residence Intermediate Developmental Education. Finally, I explore the impact that the tournament structure and the prize valuation have on strategic behavior of cadets at the Air Force Academy.
- Date of publication
- December 2009
- DOI
- Resource type
- Rights statement
- In Copyright
- Advisor
- Parreiras, Sergio
- Language
- Access
- Open access
- Parents:
This work has no parents.
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Essays on incentives in rank-order tournaments | 2019-04-10 | Public |
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