Pick your poison: banking regulations, macroeconomic management, and moral hazard in OECD economies Public Deposited
Downloadable ContentDownload PDF
- Last Modified
- March 21, 2019
Winecoff, William Kindred
- Affiliation: College of Arts and Sciences, Department of Political Science
- This paper argues that banks operating in systems where monetary and regulatory authority are unified in a central bank expect and receive preferential policies, and so act less prudently than do banks in other systems. This moral hazard arises when the natural tension between counter-cyclical monetary policy and pro-cyclical regulatory policy is relaxed. I test the hypothesis using a time series cross-sectional econometric analysis of OECD countries from 1990-2007. The results strongly support the claim that there is a relationship between prudential behaviors of banks and the location of regulatory authority, and provides evidence that moral hazard exists when regulatory and monetary authority are unified. I conclude by discussing the implications of the analysis for governance at the domestic and international levels.
- Date of publication
- August 2010
- Resource type
- Rights statement
- In Copyright
- "... in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in the Department of Political Science."
- Mosley, Layna
- Degree granting institution
- University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
- Place of publication
- Chapel Hill, NC
- Open access
This work has no parents.
|Pick your poison : banking regulations, macroeconomic management, and moral hazard in OECD economies||2019-04-11||Public||