Pick your poison: banking regulations, macroeconomic management, and moral hazard in OECD economies Public Deposited

Downloadable Content

Download PDF
Last Modified
  • March 21, 2019
  • Winecoff, William Kindred
    • Affiliation: College of Arts and Sciences, Department of Political Science
  • This paper argues that banks operating in systems where monetary and regulatory authority are unified in a central bank expect and receive preferential policies, and so act less prudently than do banks in other systems. This moral hazard arises when the natural tension between counter-cyclical monetary policy and pro-cyclical regulatory policy is relaxed. I test the hypothesis using a time series cross-sectional econometric analysis of OECD countries from 1990-2007. The results strongly support the claim that there is a relationship between prudential behaviors of banks and the location of regulatory authority, and provides evidence that moral hazard exists when regulatory and monetary authority are unified. I conclude by discussing the implications of the analysis for governance at the domestic and international levels.
Date of publication
Resource type
Rights statement
  • In Copyright
  • "... in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in the Department of Political Science."
  • Mosley, Layna
Degree granting institution
  • University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
Place of publication
  • Chapel Hill, NC
  • Open access

This work has no parents.