How to Draw the Right Conclusions: Logical Pluralism without Logical Normativism
Public Deposited- Last Modified
- March 20, 2019
- Creator
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Blake-Turner, Christopher
- Affiliation: College of Arts and Sciences, Department of Philosophy
- Abstract
- Logical pluralism is the view that there is more than one relation of logical consequence. Roughly, there are many distinct logics and they’re equally good. Logical normativism is the view that logic is inherently normative. Roughly, consequence relations impose normative constraints on reasoners whether or not they are aiming at truth-preservation. It has widely been assumed that logical pluralism and logical normativism go together. This thesis questions that assumption. I defend an account of logical pluralism without logical normativism. I do so by replacing Beall and Restall’s normative constraint on consequence relations with a constraint concerning epistemic goals. As well as illuminating an important, unnoticed area of dialectical space, I show that distinguishing logical pluralism from logical normativism has two further bene ts. First, it helps clarify what’s at stake in debates about pluralism. Second, it provides an elegant response to the most pressing challenge to logical pluralism: the normativity objection.
- Date of publication
- May 2017
- Keyword
- DOI
- Resource type
- Rights statement
- In Copyright
- Advisor
- Russell, Gillian
- Kotzen, Matthew
- Roberts, John
- Degree
- Master of Arts
- Degree granting institution
- University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Graduate School
- Graduation year
- 2017
- Language
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