The Failing Agenda

The Failing Agenda Public Deposited

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Creator

Weinberg, Neil
- Affiliation: College of Arts and Sciences, Department of Political Science

Abstract

Scholars of the presidency have focused their attention on the factors that correlate with legislative success while also assuming that presidents want to avoid legislative failures at all costs. However, researchers have yet to advance an explanation for why presidential policy proposals succeed at such a low rate when presidents should be able to avoid these types of failures if they wished based on their knowledge of those correlates of success. This paper examines previous work on presidential success in Congress and hypothesizes about factors that could lead presidents to intentionally pursue items that are likely to fail. Those hypotheses are then used to develop a theory of presidential motivation - that presidents seek the maximum possible effect on public policy outcomes - by which we can better evaluate American presidents. I conclude by discussing the implications of this theory for future study of the presidency.

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