Symbolic Verification of Remote Client Behavior in Distributed Systems Public Deposited

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Last Modified
  • March 20, 2019
Creator
  • Cochran, Robert
    • Affiliation: College of Arts and Sciences, Department of Computer Science
Abstract
  • A malicious client in a distributed system can undermine the integrity of the larger distributed application in a number of different ways. For example, a server with a vulnerability may be compromised directly by a modified client. If a client is authoritative for state in the larger distributed application, a malicious client may transmit an altered version of this state throughout the distributed application. A player in a networked game might cheat by modifying the client executable or the user of a network service might craft a sequence of messages that exploit a vulnerability in a server application. We present symbolic client verification, a technique for detecting whether network traffic from a remote client could have been generated by sanctioned software. Our method is based on constraint solving and symbolic execution and uses the client source code as a model for expected behavior. By identifying possible execution paths a remote client may have followed to generate a particular sequence of network traffic, we enable a precise verification technique that has the benefits of requiring little to no modification to the client application and is server agnostic; the only required inputs to the algorithm are the observed network traffic and the client source code. We demonstrate a parallel symbolic client verification algorithm that vastly reduces verification costs for our case study applications XPilot and Tetrinet.
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Rights statement
  • In Copyright
Advisor
  • Manocha, Dinesh
  • Cadar, Cristian
  • Monrose, Fabian
  • Jha, Somesh
  • Reiter, Michael
Degree
  • Doctor of Philosophy
Degree granting institution
  • University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Graduate School
Graduation year
  • 2016
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