Entrenchment and the Kripke-Wittgenstein paradox Public Deposited
- Last Modified
- March 22, 2019
- Creator
-
Dorst, Chris
- Affiliation: College of Arts and Sciences, Department of Philosophy
- Abstract
- Surprisingly little attention has been paid to Goodman's own entrenchment-based solution to his New Riddle of Induction. Ostensibly, this is because Goodman views the problem presented by the New Riddle differently than most contemporary philosophers; Goodman sees the problem as one of codifying the acceptable inductive inferences rather than justifying why those inferences are acceptable. I argue that if we share his perspective, Goodman's own solution to the New Riddle is undermined: the linguistic facts about the entrenchment of predicates are no more accessible than facts about which classes are relevant to nature. The result is that Goodman's arguments leave us in a predicament very much like that presented by the Kripke-Wittgenstein paradox about meaning.
- Date of publication
- May 2014
- Keyword
- DOI
- Resource type
- Rights statement
- In Copyright
- Advisor
- Lange, Marc
- Degree
- Master of Arts
- Graduation year
- 2014
- Language
- Publisher
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This work has no parents.
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