Entrenchment and the Kripke-Wittgenstein paradox Public Deposited

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  • March 22, 2019
Creator
  • Dorst, Chris
    • Affiliation: College of Arts and Sciences, Department of Philosophy
Abstract
  • Surprisingly little attention has been paid to Goodman's own entrenchment-based solution to his New Riddle of Induction. Ostensibly, this is because Goodman views the problem presented by the New Riddle differently than most contemporary philosophers; Goodman sees the problem as one of codifying the acceptable inductive inferences rather than justifying why those inferences are acceptable. I argue that if we share his perspective, Goodman's own solution to the New Riddle is undermined: the linguistic facts about the entrenchment of predicates are no more accessible than facts about which classes are relevant to nature. The result is that Goodman's arguments leave us in a predicament very much like that presented by the Kripke-Wittgenstein paradox about meaning.
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  • In Copyright
Advisor
  • Lange, Marc
Degree
  • Master of Arts
Graduation year
  • 2014
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