Epistemic evaluation and the aim of belief Public Deposited

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  • March 21, 2019
Creator
  • Nolfi, Kate
    • Affiliation: College of Arts and Sciences, Department of Philosophy
Abstract
  • In this paper, I articulate a popular and, I think, promising methodological approach to developing an account of epistemic evaluation. I then sketch the account of epistemic evaluation that I argue results from properly implementing this methodological approach. In so doing, I argue that if one accepts the methodological approach I articulate here, then one should also accept that the constitutive aim of belief is not, as many philosophers have assumed, appropriately cashed out in terms of truth. Rather, one should endorse the claim that beliefs aim at being well-suited to serve in practical reasoning that yields successful action. Finally, I briefly address two lines of resistance to the pragmatically driven characterization of the constitutive aim of belief and the resulting account of epistemic evaluation that I develop here.
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  • In Copyright
Advisor
  • Neta, Ram
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  • Open access
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