In defense of radical empiricism Public Deposited
- Last Modified
- March 21, 2019
- Creator
-
Riegel, Joseph Benjamin
- Affiliation: College of Arts and Sciences, Department of Philosophy
- Abstract
- In this paper I evaluate arguments presented by Lawrence Bonjour, Christopher Peacocke, and George Bealer which purport to show that there as an indispensable theoretical need for a priori knowledge. Bonjour and Peacocke argue that views that deny a priori knowledge - which I call Radical Empiricist views - ultimately lead to radical forms of skepticism. Bealer argues that Radical Empiricism is incoherent in the sense that it is internally inconsistent. In this paper, I evaluate each of these arguments against Radical Empiricism and I attempt to show that each is unconvincing. The upshot of my discussion is that we have no compelling reason to posit a priori knowledge
- Date of publication
- May 2006
- DOI
- Resource type
- Rights statement
- In Copyright
- Advisor
- Neta, Ram
- Degree granting institution
- University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
- Language
- Access
- Open access
- Parents:
This work has no parents.
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