Ending Economic Coercion and the Consequences of Sanctions Removal Public Deposited

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  • March 21, 2019
  • Cilizoglu, Menevis
    • Affiliation: College of Arts and Sciences, Department of Political Science
  • Economic sanctions have been increasingly used to advance a range of foreign policy goals. Research on economic sanctions has produced significant advancement on our understanding of the causes and effects of the usage of these tools. However, less attention has been paid to the decision to end sanctions and the consequences of this decision. This dissertation aims to fill this gap by asking three interrelated questions. First, how do economic sanctions end? To answer this question, I present a formal theory of the process through which sanctions are lifted. Specifically, I identify the obstacles to end sanctions and demonstrate how these obstacles can be overcome. I find that sanctions are more likely to end if imposers of sanctions can successfully monitor their targets' compliance behavior, but only if targets find promised sanctions relief attractive. Second, what are the consequences of ending sanctions and how do the domestic and economic environment created by sanctions removal influence the possibility of sanctions recurrence? I show that sanctions recurrence is not always a reaction to the policies adopted by the target following sanctions removal, but is primarily driven by domestic politics of the imposer country. Finally, how does ending sanctions influence the investment decisions of private firms based in the imposer country? To answer this question, I examine how firms assess risk when considering investing in economies that were previously targeted with sanctions by their home governments. I show that firms based in the sender country increase their investment in target countries following sanctions removal only if they receive credible assurances from their home government and host government that sanctions will not recur. To test the hypotheses generated in each chapter, I employ a variety of statistical tools and use several data sources, including the Threats and Impositions of Economic Sanctions (TIES), Change in Source of Leader Support (CHISOLS), and Correlates of War (COW) datasets, among others.
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Rights statement
  • In Copyright
  • Bata, Navin
  • Crescenzi, Mark
  • Ballard-Rosa, Cameron
  • Bassi, Anna
  • Gent, Stephen
  • Doctor of Philosophy
Degree granting institution
  • University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Graduate School
Graduation year
  • 2018

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