Mental Fragmentation Public Deposited

Analytics

Downloadable Content

Download PDF
Request Accessible Version
Last Modified
  • March 22, 2019
Creator
  • Berger, Dominik
    • Affiliation: College of Arts and Sciences, Department of Philosophy
Abstract
  • My goal in this paper is to offer an account of mental fragmentation. I start out by considering the different phenomena that the notion of mental fragmentation has been used to explain. Then I consider and reject an account of mental fragmentation that is found quite often in the literature, namely that mental fragmentation is what allows an agent to have incoherent attitudes of a certain kind, on the grounds that this account can’t explain all the phenomena usually connected to mental fragmentation. In particular, this popular account can’t explain why it is that agents who have incoherent beliefs and are mentally fragmented appear to be less irrational for holding the incoherent beliefs than agents who are not fragmented. I will ultimately argue that this can only be explained if we regard mental fragmentation as the result of certain structural features of an agent’s cognitive processing.
Date of publication
Keyword
DOI
Resource type
Advisor
  • Merino-Rajme, Carla
  • Worsnip, Alex
  • Neta, Ram
Degree
  • Master of Arts
Degree granting institution
  • University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Graduate School
Graduation year
  • 2018
Language
Parents:

This work has no parents.

Items

Thumbnail Title Date Uploaded Visibility Actions
Default Berger_unc_0153M_17637.pdf 2019-04-10 Public
Default PREMIS_Events_Metadata_0_696a0b8f-f83b-44d6-89ce-1d2532db0528.txt 2019-04-10 Public
Default original_metadata_file_696a0b8f-f83b-44d6-89ce-1d2532db0528.xml 2019-04-10 Public