Firth and Hill: two dispositional ethical theories Public Deposited
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- Last Modified
- March 21, 2019
- Affiliation: College of Arts and Sciences, Department of Philosophy
- Dispositional accounts of morality seem a promising way to capture certain central features of morality. While Roderick Firth and Thomas Hill, Jr. each offer accounts of this sort, the result in each case is very different. In this paper, I will describe both views. I will criticize Firth for making reactions the central moral notion, and describe how that limits the extent to which his theory can explain moral motivation. I will show how Hill’s account can solve this problem, but argue that his view is problematic in requiring ideal legislators to be ignorant of their life situations, for this move limits the extent to which his theory can explain moral motivation. I will offer a suggestion that I think his account can easily accommodate, and briefly discuss how the resulting view is superior to Firth’s.
- Date of publication
- May 2006
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- Hill, Thomas E.
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|Firth and Hill : two dispositional ethical theories||2019-04-10||Public||