Locke's Ideational Account of Causation Public Deposited

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  • March 21, 2019
Creator
  • Connolly, Patrick J.
    • Affiliation: College of Arts and Sciences, Department of Philosophy
Abstract
  • Commentators have long alleged that Locke has no consistent or coherent account of causation. My purpose in this paper is to challenge this claim and present a new interpretation of Locke on causation. The key feature of my interpretation is that it situates Locke's account of causation squarely within his theory of ideas. First, I will discuss the work of previous commentators and explain why they found Locke's account to be a failure. Then, primarily through a close examination of Book II Chapter 26 of the Essay, I will offer an alternative account of Locke's view of causation. I will spend considerable time demonstrating and defending the ideational nature of this account. Finally, I will consider the implications my reading has for Lockean perception and an objection which pertains to the nature of real ideas.
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  • In Copyright
Advisor
  • Nelson, Alan Jean
Degree granting institution
  • University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
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  • Open access
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