Punctuated equilibrium and subnational governments

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Last Modified
  • March 21, 2019
Creator
  • Epp, Derek
    • Affiliation: College of Arts and Sciences, Department of Political Science
Abstract
  • Punctuated equilibrium is an increasingly popular theory for explaining budgetary outcomes. To date, studies that rely on punctuated equilibrium frameworks have universally uncovered evidence of government inefficiencies in budgeting. This suggests that the limitations - both cognitive and institutional - that contribute to budget punctuations may be generally immutable. This study seeks to test the limits of government inefficiencies in budgeting by applying a punctuated equilibrium methodology to study the budgets of subnational governments in the United States. I find that punctuations are relatively constant across all population levels. Small cities and counties do not appear inherently more efficient at budgeting than their larger counterparts.
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  • In Copyright
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  • "... in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in the Department of Political Science (American Politics)."
Advisor
  • Baumgartner, Frank
Degree granting institution
  • University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
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Place of publication
  • Chapel Hill, NC
Access right
  • Open access
Date uploaded
  • March 18, 2013

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