Sensations, concepts and understanding Public Deposited

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  • March 21, 2019
  • Reines, Maria Francisca
    • Affiliation: College of Arts and Sciences, Department of Philosophy
  • In this paper I argue that at least some of our concepts include phenomenal content. We could not understand the temperature talk of creatures that made non-inferential temperature ascriptions on the basis of a kind of temperature-vision rather than by touch. We could not understand them because we don't share the same sensations. If this is correct then it suggests that some concepts may be partially constituted by phenomenal content. This suggests in turn, that radically different phenomenology might make for conceptual differences sufficiently significant to constitute a difference in conceptual scheme. However, this possibility poses no threat to intra-specific understanding. The kind of phenomenal difference that can make for a difference in concept is limited primarily to creatures with different sense organs. Two creatures with radically different sense organs will have different conceptual schemes.
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  • Bar-On, Dorit
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  • University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
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