Reasons for action Public Deposited
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- Last Modified
- March 21, 2019
- Affiliation: College of Arts and Sciences, Department of Philosophy
- What is the correct relation between an agent's motivations for action and his normative reasons for action? Those who think that there is some necessary link between motivating and normative reasons are those who accept an internalist view about normative reasons. Those who reject this idea hold an externalist view about normative reasons. In this paper, I will present, analyze, and address two challenges levied against externalism from internalist perspectives. The result of my analysis will hopefully demonstrate that the first challenge against externalism does not refute externalism, and that there is not sufficient justification for adopting one notion of rationality over another. As a result, part of what is often referred to as the internalism and externalism debate appears to be merely a terminological dispute.
- Date of publication
- May 2011
- Resource type
- Rights statement
- In Copyright
- "... in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in the Department of Philosophy."
- Wolf, Susan
- Degree granting institution
- University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
- Place of publication
- Chapel Hill, NC
- Open access
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|Reasons for action||2019-04-11||Public||