

**SOHP Series: Bill Friday Documentary Film Project****Transcript: Julius Chambers Transcript**

**Interviewee:** Julius Chambers

**Date:** Tuesday, March 6, 2007

**Location:** Chapel Hill, NC

**Interviewer:** Judith Van Wyk

**Interview Length:** approx. 46 minutes

**Special notes:** See also the "Abstract and Field Notes" document in the interview folder.

**Transcribed by/date:** Carrie Blackstock/ March, 2007

**Transcriptionist Notes:** The interviewee tended to mumble and was suffering a bad cold. Parentheses denote words and phrases that can not be understood. This interview was videotaped and for that reason, timecode is included throughout the transcript.

**02:17:52 Introduction:**

**Judith Van Wyk:** This is an interview with Julius Chambers, and he's a renowned civil

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rights lawyer. It is March the sixth, 2007, in the law school of the University of North Carolina. My name is Judy Van Wyk. This interview is for a documentary that we are producing about Bill Friday and his presidency, and we are archiving this for the Southern Oral History Program in Chapel Hill. We are here to talk to Mr. Chambers about his relationship with the university over the years, and his involvement in civil rights litigation against the university. That's it, and so we're just going to begin. The first thing I'd like to know, I'd just like to know a little bit about your background, where you born, how you grew up, the school you ( fades out ).

**02:18:59**

**Julius Chambers:** I was born in North Carolina in a little town called Mount Gilead, sort of central Piedmont part of North Carolina. I grew up there and was in Mount Gilead, I guess, until I was eighteen and went away to college. I didn't get of this town that much, and I grew up as a little country boy. Still am.

JVW: So you grew up on a farm.

JC: Not—he did some, but he didn't do any farming. We did some. We were like contracted out to do some farming, but we didn't do any farming much. My father ran the garage and service station, and I worked with him.

**Camera is briefly turned off to deal with a technical issue**

**02:19:57**

JVW: Did you always know you were going to go to college? I mean, there were not very many kids going to college in those days, much less African-American kids.

JC: Now, my father was interested in all his children going to college. He was committed. He was disturbed that he never had that opportunity, and he wanted to make sure that all of us would get our degree.

JVW: So you went to North Carolina Central?

JC: Yes.

JVW: Graduated in what year?

JC: Oh uh. I think it was 1958. [He coughs] I graduated in 1958 with a degree in history, and then went to Michigan and got a master's in history in 1959. Then I came here and studied law for three years and got a JD degree in 1962.

JVW: What made you decide to go into law?

**02:21:03**

JC: I had had the experience with my father, who wanted to bring a lawsuit against a person who wouldn't pay him. Because he was black and the person he wanted to sue was white, he couldn't find a lawyer who would bring a proceeding for him. So I was unable to go away to boarding school as a result, and I had determined back then that I ought to go to law school and provide some assistance for people who were deprived of rights and unable to retain a lawyer, find a lawyer to represent them.

**02:21:43 We hear voice off camera saying, "Hang on a second."...**

JVW: And you were a—. We are rolling?

[Camera person]: Yes.

JVW: —a founding member of the first integrated law firm in North Carolina?

**02:21:55**

JC: Yes, um-hmm. We started a firm back in—. What was it? 1967? Which Adam Stein and Jim Ferguson and another white attorney named Lou Le Saile. (sp?)

JVW: I'm just curious. Why did you choose to start an—? Why did you want to have an integrated law firm as opposed to—? You were all interested in school rights work, right?

**02:22:29**

JS: Yes. Well, we wanted a law firm, and we had some individuals who were interested in the kind of work we were doing and who wanted to join with us in the firm. So we didn't set out with a blueprint to organize an integrated law firm. We wanted to set up a law firm that would provide the kind of representation that we were pursuing.

JVW: 1969, you became involved in representing some of the cafeteria workers. Can you tell us about how you got involved with that case?

[Cafeteria Workers Strike (taken from the Virtual Museum of the Archives of UNC-Chapel Hill.) In February 1969, university cafeteria workers struck for higher wages and better working conditions. Black and white students staged various protests in support, including a slowdown of the cafeteria serving lines. In March, students overturned some tables, and Governor Robert Scott placed state police around Lenoir Hall. Students then started a Soul Food Cafeteria as an alternative to Lenoir Hall, and Governor Scott threatened to evict them.

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Local police persuaded the students to leave before a confrontation developed. ]

**02:23:08**

JC: Well, again, it was because we didn't have that many lawyers in North Carolina who were interested in working with poor and minority clients. But I had been working with the NAACP and the NAACP Legal Defense **Fund**, and with a friend in Durham whose name was Conrad Pearson, and we had been doing a lot of school cases and some employment discrimination cases and some public accommodation cases. So I guess my name and the friend's name was pretty widely known in North Carolina, and this group at UNC wanted some help in going through the efforts they were going through in trying to get some relief in the cafeteria. We also had—I did, particularly—a real interest in trying to help the cafeteria workers, because I had seen them for the years that I had been to Carolina who had limited opportunities and really needed some avenues for advancing and getting into better job positions. [02:24:34] So it was an opportunity for us to provide some assistance, and I think an opportunity for them to get some assistance in helping with what they were trying to accomplish.

JVW: So tell me about your role and how—. Did you mediate with the university? Describe your role. Tell us the story about that.

**02:25:06**

JC: We tried to meet with the university and mediate, conciliate the dispute. We threatened to file suit if we couldn't get something resolved. We had some people who wanted to meet with us and who did meet with us, and we talked. We met with the governor and we talked about the problem, and Carolina had some real problems with it. We were not following the wage and hour law. We didn't have at that time an anti-employment discrimination statute, but what we were doing was pretty objectionable, and I think most of us knew that. We fortunately found some people who wanted to talk, and the real problem with all that was the failure of the University to pay fair wages, as required by statute, had resulted in some pretty substantial exposure. Trying to bring some amount together that would be acceptable to the clients and to the university was a difficult task.

**02:26:35 Audio Off Camera**

JVW: Mr. Chambers, I wonder if you could move the paper. It's making a noise on

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mic.

JC: The paper?

JVW: Um-hmm.

JC: The microphone? OK.

JVW: ( ) Tell us just real briefly about what they were doing so they wouldn't have to pay these workers.

**02:27:08**

JC: Well, they were bringing workers in—. First of all, they would work them a limited period of time so they couldn't qualify as a kind of career—I use for want of a better way of putting it—employee. If you didn't work for a certain period of time, you didn't get certain benefits. So you worked up to the day before you would qualify, and then you'd be laid off, and they would bring you back the next day so you'd break off your time period and wouldn't get the benefits. That's one thing. They worked people hours overtime that they should not have been doing, and they were not paying them for the hours overtime that they were working. They had some people working not getting the regular hourly rate that they were supposed to be getting.

JVW: So when you say that negotiations were difficult because you exposed the university, explain that a little bit to us.

**02:28:20**

JC: Well, we pointed out that the university was not paying the fair wages, that the University was manipulating these employees in not allowing them to qualify as full-time employees in order to keep the wages low. When you worked and you don't get the overtime pay that you're entitled to, you accumulate time. And more important is the question of whether you treble your damages. When you added all that up, and you're talking about a number of years, you had a pretty substantial amount of money, the debt that they university faced. So getting them to reconcile those figures was something that was not that easy to do. They didn't want to pay out millions of dollars to these workers.

**02:29:23**

JVW: Were you able to finally mediate a solution to that?

JC: We did work out a solution, and whether it was—. It wasn't as much as we had

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hoped, but I think it was something that allowed us to resolve an issue, and I think the workers appreciated the issue being resolved.

JVW: Did you have any interaction with Bill Friday during this time? I mean—.

**02:29:50**

JC: Oh, yeah. We talked, and we kept urging the university to get involved, because we weren't interested in filing a lawsuit. We knew the exposure, we knew that we'd been in protracted litigation, and there was the potential for the university being faced with a significant award. We also knew that it just wasn't right to have the workers that upset with the university with this problem. So we talked with the administration, and included Bill Friday, about the need for sitting down and just working out the whole thing. That was one reason, too, that we met with the governor and with others about just resolving the issue. Fortunately, we were able to get it resolved.

JVW: And so that was something that you felt that you had accomplished what you needed to accomplish. Can you finish that?

**02:31:01**

JC: Well, again, we weren't as happy as we wanted to be. We felt strongly, and still do, that minorities should be in management positions, should be supervisors, should be able to move up and down the ladder without consideration of race. We felt that the cafeteria servers—. This should have been extended to all people, again without consideration of race, and we felt that those who had been working with cafeterias should be compensated for what they had missed. We were able to accomplish some of that, but it was, in my opinion, important to work something out and allow the university to rebuild the relationship it should have had with the employees and with the black community. **[02:32:02]** So that was, I thought, a significant accomplishment of the effort. More importantly, I think we had a number of black leaders to emerge from that effort, and that was important.

**02:32:18**

JVW: Who—? Black leaders, just like Preston Dobbins, is that who—?

JC: [Preston] Dobbins and [Howard] Lee and Howard Fuller and Ben Ruffin and Miss Brooks, and the other young lady's name slips me ( ). But we had a core of activists who would be able to continue on with the battle, and they did.

JVW: Was that because of the black student movement that was born during that

period?

**02:32:53**

JC: Well, that was one factor. I think these individuals had a real commitment to lead and to fight the battle, and they probably would have risen to the top anyway as leaders. But this experience gave them an opportunity to do some things that they were able to do, and they continued with other efforts after they resolved the issue about the wages with the cafeteria and that fight is still going on. It was a good beginning.

JVW: Can you just give us some background on the Adams case, how you got involved with that and why the Legal Defense Fund decided to sue the federal government?

**02:33:55**

JC: The Adams case. You've got to bring me up to date.

JVW: The Adams case—. [Adams v. Richardson: In October 1972 civil rights activists sued the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (DHEW), charging it with "general and calculated default" in enforcement of a law forbidding racial discrimination in the use of federal education funds.]

JC: Oh, the case in Washington.

JVW: Yeah.

JC: Oh, yeah.

JVW: Yeah, yeah, that started the whole thing.

**02:34:07**

JC: Well, we had been trying for some time to encourage colleges and universities, across the southeast region particularly, to improve the opportunities for minorities in the colleges and universities and help them get more degrees. We knew that they would likely continue with the racially separate colleges and universities, but they could do more to enhance those universities as well. So we had sort of a dual purpose. One, we wanted to make sure that more minorities would get an opportunity for a college degree, and we wanted to make sure that the HBCUs [historically black colleges and universities] would get the resources they needed to offer competitive education. We had Title VI ( the 1964 Civil Rights Act) , and I said "had" because the court now seems to have eviscerated much of that. **[02:35:14]** But Title VI prohibited discrimination by recipients of federal monies, and that



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included the university, which received a lot of money from the federal government. We had been advocating that they had to do more with the admission policies and recruitment policies and with the programs to enhance the facilities, and then they had to do more to equalize funding (uh) between the black and the white schools. We had efforts to negotiate that weren't getting very far, so we felt we had to do something with the administrative proceedings, and we did. And that's Adams. We had to begin a proceeding to encourage the Department of Education to enforce Title Six and ensure that minority kids would get a better chance to have an education. And so UNC wasn't the only school involved in that. We had a number of schools from across the South, and those efforts resulted in improved opportunities for minorities to go to colleges and universities. **02:36:46**

JVW: UNC submitted a desegregation plan to HEW in the early nineteen-seventies. Were you aware—? Or you may not know, but was accepted and then later rejected by the HEW [federal department of Health, Education and Welfare which oversees the Division of Civil Rights]. Do you know why that was?

**02:37:11**

JC: Well, I think it was largely political. The initial proposal didn't do very much to enhance the tradition of black schools, and didn't do very much to increase the enrollment of minority kids and the hiring of minority faculty members at the traditionally white institutions. Was it a goal of ten percent or something to that effect? Not very much, and the explanations that it was hard recruiting black kids, you know, hard to encourage black teachers to come work or—. And the black schools were doing much more in recruiting white students and white faculty, but we knew that they could do much better. The plan that they initially accepted was just not an effective plan.

JVW: You, in 1972, joined the [UNC] Board of Governors?

JC: Yes.

JVW: And you ( ) the Board of Governors?

JC: Uh-huh.

JVW: First of all, at that point this was right at the beginning of restructuring [In 1972, the North Carolina Legislature passed a bill restructuring the UNC system. The consolidated university was expanded to include 16 campuses across the state]. Restructuring had just occurred, and historically black institutions were brought into the fold. Was that a



good thing for the black schools?

**02:38:36**

JC: I think it was. I think it increased the monies that the black schools were able to get. They were now a real part of the university and could look at other parts of the University for comparison about the kind of funds that they should have been receiving.

**[02:38:57]** There were various academic programs that would help enhance the traditionally black schools, so I think that the merger, for want of a better way of putting it, helped the black schools, and that it also helped the black students and black faculty. You increased opportunities for black students to go to different schools, and you increased the opportunities for black faculty and staff to be hired at different locations. And so overall, I think it was a much better plan than a lot of people thought it would be in terms of actually getting black teachers and black students in schools. And so we strongly, we being the NAACP Legal Defense Fund supported the merger and still do.

JVW: Nevertheless, the Legal Defense Fund and HEW—was it just a matter of numbers? Did you just want more students? I mean, what were your goals in terms of what you wanted the university to do that they were not doing?

**02:40:21**

JC: We wanted more students, we wanted more graduates, we wanted more teachers. The number of black college graduates was disproportionate to the number of whites or the percentage of whites. We knew that race was a factor in much of that. We also know that faculty were not paid comparable salaries, and we knew that faculty at the HBCUs were not getting the kind of resources that the faculty were getting at the traditionally white institutions. And we thought all of that should be improved and equalized. We knew then that if you didn't have the resources, you were not exposing the kids to the kind of education they should have been receiving. So that was a major problem.

**02:41:22**

JVW: And even after the merger, that was really—.

JC: Oh, yeah.

JVW: That was not resolved.

**02:41:27**

JC: Yeah, it was not. And even now it hasn't been resolved, but we have made some

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progress in that connection. But we haven't completely resolved it.

JVW: In 1972, you joined the Board of Governors, and there was a lot of division, I understand, on the Board—there was quite a bit of division on the Board of Governors in their attitude toward integration and the HEW case. Can you talk about the division within the Board of Governors, what you observed?

**02:41:59**

JC: There were some people on the Board of Governors who were not committed to integration of the schools. Some people then even opposed an increase in black students at some of the traditionally white institutions. Some people did not support efforts to integrate faculty at the various schools. Well, in short, we were still practicing racial discrimination in ( ). Some of us on the Board advocated moving to eliminate these practices more expeditiously than the Board was doing. We knew it could be done, and the only explanation we had for why it wasn't being done faster was race. We couldn't move people but so fast, if you moved them at all, and we knew, too, that the longer you wait, the more generations would go through these schools and continue to be deprived of the kind of educational opportunities they should have. So we pressed as hard as we could to expedite the steps that the Board was supposed to take.

JVW: You really felt a sense of urgency.

**02:43:23**

JC: Yeah, I think that Dr. King (Martin Luther King Jr.) was right about why we cannot wait. You got kids going out of school. I went to a segregated school, and I know what it was like to be deprived of that kind of opportunity. I'm sure that others knew that. If we didn't have the library at NCCU (North Carolina Central University) or at A&T [North Carolina Agriculture and Technical State University is an HBCU located in Greensboro, NC], if we didn't have the research labs, if we didn't have the other facilities that one would have at Carolina, you can't help but deprive a kid of something. Then you tell the kid he or she is to come out and compete with kids who have graduated from Chapel Hill and State. It just was not fair, and fortunately, we'd begun to eliminate that.

JVW: When you were on the panel, you described having graduated from a historically black college and then going to a white school in Michigan.

JC: Um-hmm.

JVW: Can you just tell us a little bit—describe that experience for you.

**02:44:35**

JC: It was, to me, an interesting educational experience. I went to Central, and I think I did fairly well as a student at Central, but I quickly learned at Michigan that I had not been exposed to a number of the things that students need to be exposed to in order to be prepared for the market. We had problems with English, we had problems with math, we did not have the facilities that we needed in order to be able to compete in the various areas that we were being trained in. It was also of value, to me, to be exposed to a number of the other experiences that one could get at Michigan [University of Michigan] that one could not get at the historically black college that I attended. So I was sort of amazed that these kind of educational programs would be going on and we would not have those kinds of experiences. I was angry that the only reason or explanation one could give for not providing those opportunities for me and for others was race, and I knew that I had spent four years at Central and would never be able to make up for what I had lost with those experiences. **02:46:19**

JVW: During the struggle with HEW...A cough interrupts...What was Bill Friday's position during that struggle—how did he deal with the Board of Governors, which is where I guess you interacted with him? Or did you interact with him other than that as well?

**02:46:39**

JC: It was mostly on the Board of Governors. As I said the other night, I was disappointed that he was not more of an advocate for getting rid of the barriers that I thought he was. I thought we were moving too slow, and I thought he knew we were moving too slow. As I said also last night, or rather last week, I appreciate the problem that he had. He likely would not have been able to carry the Board in advocating a more expeditious desegregation than the university was pursuing. But I think we remained civil; I just disagreed with the way they were doing things and with their ability to just accept that kind of continued depravation, at least for some period of time, and I thought that was horrible.

JVW: It's my understanding that one of those things that became a major bone of contention for Bill Friday and the university, where they just went "no," is when HEW wanted them to do away with program duplication. Explain to us what you wanted, what the Legal Defense Fund and HEW wanted to achieve by doing away with program duplication.

**02:48:24**

JC: Program duplication? Well, if you provided the same program at the white and the black schools, you're just perpetuating the segregation that you were trying to address. I think everybody knew that. If I could get the same thing at Chapel Hill that I could get at Central, I would stay at Central or I would stay at Chapel Hill. [02:48:46] We knew that those duplications would simply prolong the period when we would be able to have a racially mixed university. Additionally, we also knew that the state could only afford a certain amount of programs, and we couldn't have ideal mathematics at both Chapel Hill and Central, nor science or other programs like that. We just didn't have the resources to do that. What we did was we would put the ideal programs at Chapel Hill, and the not so ideal programs at the HBCUs. So program duplication not only deterred integration of schools; it also perpetuated the inferior programs that were offered at the historically black colleges because we just didn't have enough money to duplicate the superior programs we had at Chapel Hill. 02:49:54

JVW: It's my understanding that some historically black colleges in North Carolina actually counter-sued against HEW, because they felt that by doing away with duplications that in the process you were actually threatening their very being and to do harm to them. Can you talk about that?

02:50:13

JC: Well, there has been that concern, and I think largely because people were apprehensive that if we proceeded to integrate, blacks would lose everything. There was no assurance that if we integrated the colleges and universities, the historically black colleges would remain. If we integrated the nursing program, for example, people would question why we needed a nursing program at Chapel Hill and one at Central. And since the one at Central hadn't been getting resources and would not be competitive with the one at Chapel Hill, we would eliminate the one at Central. Folks began to worry about their jobs and worry about the preservation of the colleges and universities that we've known, so I wasn't surprised that people were concerned about that and would fight to try to preserve what they had. [02:51:15] But I also knew, and I'm sure many others knew, that we weren't going to get the better facilities that we needed unless we did more to integrate and put pressure on the university to assign the facilities and funding that these HBCUs needed.

JVW: Just to play devil's advocate here, the university really felt that they did not

want government telling them how to administer education, that they were out of their arena (cough ) and that it really had nothing to do with civil rights.

**02:51:58**

JC: Well, I think that that is a rationale that the university offered. See, the university had a chance to deal with that. I don't think anybody could argue that the university was not perpetuating inferior educational programs for black kids. It was pretty obvious if you just look at it. Wasn't it Mary Berry who went around the campuses and looked at the resources and the programs? [Before being appointed to the Civil Rights Commission under President Jimmy Carter, Dr. Mary Berry was assistant secretary for education in the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.]

**Someone knocks at the door and the camera is briefly turned off.**

**02:52:42**

JVW: The University as you said before would argue the federal government had no business as bureaucrats telling them that they had the same goal, that they both wanted to integrate, but that the university—that they were actually damaging the institution and that they had no business telling them how to do it.

JC: Um-hmm.

JVW: Can you just respond to that?

**02:53:10**

JC: Yeah, that was a rationale that the university offered, but the university had an opportunity to correct the deficiencies.

**02:53:22 Chambers is interrupted by the audio person. The camera's turned off for technical reasons.**

JVW: OK.

**02:53:26**

JC: The university had many opportunities to correct the deficiencies that existed, the disparities between the black and the white schools. And again, I think everybody knew that those disparities existed, and I'm sure everybody knew that black kids were suffering as a result of the university's perpetuation of these differences. The only way we would get any relief would be for the federal government to intervene, either through the courts or through the administrative proceedings, and direct the university to do more. And that's what

happened. I don't think we would have gotten off first base if we had waited on the university to do something.

JVW: You stepped down from the Board of Governors in protest. Can you talk about that and tell us why you did that?

**02:54:34**

JC: Well, as again I said that I thought that the university and Dr. Friday were moving too slowly with the efforts to remove the barriers and to integrate the schools. I saw that more and more kids were going through these programs and coming out with the same kind of deficiencies that I had, and I thought that was really unfair and unreasonable. And so I asked about expediting efforts to desegregate. That was rejected by the Board. We even in—what is this?—2007 are still looking at universities and assigning black chancellors to black schools and white chancellors to white schools. We still treat them as white or black, and we really haven't, today, taken a serious step to eliminate the race issues that we know exists. So I felt that I could do better off the Board than on the Board. **[02:55:47]** There were also some people who questioned the appropriateness of my serving on the Board with the Legal Defense Fund handling the Adams litigation. I was not the lawyer with the Adams litigation. I did serve as the chair of the board of the Legal Defense Fund, but—. And I didn't read the conflict as some people did, and I said the best way of dealing with that is to get off the Board and proceed with the Adams litigation. So I did.

JVW: What was your interaction with Bill Friday throughout this time again?

**02:56:37**

JC: Well, again, I disapproved of the pace that Dr. Friday endorsed for eliminating race discrimination in the schools, but I respected him as a person. I understood that in North Carolina at that time, one could only move at a certain pace. [To someone at the door] Sorry about that. And I thought—.

JVW: Can you just go back to that, what the constraints were?

**02:57:19**

JC: Well, I knew that in North Carolina at that time, one could only move at a certain pace. But I like to appreciate the willingness of the leader to move people along, so that's what I expected and requested. we didn't get it, so I thought it was better to get off the Board and litigate.



JVW: Again, this is just another perception (um). There were people who said that Friday did not take a public stand, really, about education, but that he worked behind the scenes and that he actually was very effective in getting the resources for infrastructure and to enhance historically black colleges. Do you have any comment about that?

**02:58:16**

JC: Well, one, I think he worked behind the scene. Two, I think he had a commitment, but I did not think that he had taken a strong stand to ensure that people would be able to go to any school and get a good education. I thought what we were doing was just, again, moving too slowly, and we didn't have any strong hand up there with a stick, moving people along. We weren't going to make any progress unless we had that.

JVW: What did you think about Bill Friday as a president generally ( Cough )

JC: I think Bill Friday has been one of the most effective presidents we've had.

**Audio person requests he begin again.**

JVW: Can you say that again? I'm sorry.

**02:59:11**

JC: I said I think Bill Friday has been one of the most effective presidents we've had, and I think he did a lot to build this university, and we all are grateful for it. The fault that I have, I guess, with Bill is I think he did not bring the HBCUs along with the others to achieve that greatness. I don't understand yet why North Carolina Central, for example, shouldn't have a number of the programs that we have at other schools that would enable North Carolina Central to compete. We did begin to get some of those programs of late, and that's been great. I thought we would be much further along had we done that back in the sixties and seventies.

JVW: Looking back, do you think—? Bill Friday would say you can only move as fast as people's hearts will allow, and you had a century old tradition of racism. Do you think that in not having achieved it then, you lost an opportunity? Was it like, you know, Title Six was hot, it was hot, the iron was hot, do it now or you've lost that opportunity to history?

**03:00:54**

JC: Well, I think more about the individuals who are exposed to these programs. I think about a number of my classmates who had to go through these programs and the effect



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that these programs have had on them and their children and those they are teaching. We've perpetuated generations of students who haven't had—.

**Audio person interrupts and requests Chambers begin again.**

JC: Generations of people who—.

JVW: I'm sorry. Yeah, let's just go. I'm not even sure if you have a little bit of audio. Yeah, talk about your—. Yeah, what they—.

**03:01:43**

JC: Well, I said we perpetuated generations of people who just haven't had the exposure that they would have had had we moved faster and done a better job in improving the educational programs that they were assigned.

JVW: Having been chancellor of NC Central yourself, did that have any influence on your perspective about higher education, the University of North Carolina?

**03:02:09**

JC: I think I appreciated more that we could have done more, and I appreciated more the differences that we've had. I appreciated how we've gone about justifying those differences, so I've been pretty bitter about that as well. We rationalize the differences in funding on the basis that one institution is the doctoral program, for example, and the other one is not. And so we pay a professor who teaches English ten dollars more than we pay a professor who teaches English at a school that is not a doctoral program. And they're both teaching English. [03:02:58] We allocate more books to the school we say offers doctoral degrees, and more equipment. I don't think we are being fair with all students who can't, for example, get into the University of North Carolina, and not all kids can get into the University of North Carolina. That's the kind of problem that I have with ( ), so again, I think there has been a gap that we have to address, and I don't question the good will of anybody. I just question their failure to assume a leadership role that is crying out for help.

**03:03:47**

JVW: Is there anything else you'd like to add that I've left out?

JC: No, no. It's fine, and I think I better get down here to this meeting. [Laughter]

JVW: I know.

[Unidentified person]: Before someone else comes to knock.

JC: Yeah. Um-hmm.

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JVW: Yeah. I appreciate—.

**03:04:04 Interview Ends: Camera person says, “We are rolling on room tone.”**