Freedom in Speech:
Freedom and Liberty in U.S. Presidential Campaign Discourse, 1952-2004

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A thesis submitted to the faculty of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master in the Department of Sociology.

Chapel Hill
2006

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ABSTRACT

(Under the direction of Andrew Perrin)

“Freedom” is a flexible and powerful word in the United States. Yet it has multiple, mutually exclusive definitions depending on who is invoking it and why. Franklin D. Roosevelt’s “freedom from want” in the New Deal era suggests something quite different from “freedom from taxes” espoused by politicians in the ‘90s. To identify the varieties of freedom and liberty in American presidential campaign discourse and differences across political parties and over time, I analyzed 88 speeches from 28 Republican and Democratic presidential nominating conventions (1952-2004). About half of the 760 terms were defined in opposition to foreign enemies (usually Communist), and very few were critical of liberty. Republicans used freedom terminology more often than Democrats, and there was evidence that the two parties defined freedom differently. I found no linear trends in the quantity or type of freedom usage over time, but there appeared to be cyclical rises and falls.
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

DP    - Democratic Nominee for President
RP    - Republican Nominee for President
DVP   - Democratic Nominee for Vice-President
RVP   - Republican Nominee for Vice-President
DKN   - Democratic Keynote Speaker
RKN   - Republican Keynote Speaker
“Freedom” is a flexible and powerful word in the United States. Yet it has multiple, mutually exclusive definitions depending on who is invoking it and why. Franklin D. Roosevelt’s “freedom from want” in the New Deal era suggests something quite different from “freedom from taxes” espoused by politicians in the ‘90s. Because freedom has such a positive value in American political culture, a speaker who invokes freedom or defines something as the opposite of freedom can be said to be engaging in social action: using “freedom” as a tool to construct reality. To catalog the varieties of freedom as described in politics, I conduct a content analysis of 88 speeches delivered at 28 Republican and Democratic political conventions in the United States from 1952 to 2004. For the first time, types of freedom are identified and mapped onto a systematic sample of speeches, and hypotheses about their relationship to political party and time are statistically tested.

**Freedom as a Cultural Tool in American Politics**

I theorize the use of freedom as a “cultural tool” in American politics, following Ann Swidler (1986). Framing issues in terms of freedom and liberty can be seen as a tool for politicians who seek to persuade their listeners. Such a strategy is likely to be effective across the American political spectrum because freedom and liberty are powerful, positive concepts for Americans generally (Foner 1998, Fischer 2005, Patterson 2001, McCloskey & Zaller 1984, Rokeach 1973). Freedom and liberty arguably connect to individualism and personal authenticity, as opposed to equality or community orientation (Eliasoph 1997, Bellah et al. 1985, Taylor 1992, Rokeach 1973). Freedom words can be seen as part of a public “code” or “language” in American civic culture (Alexander & Smith 1993). Liberty
and freedom are tied to icons of American historical memory such as the Liberty Bell, the
Statue of Liberty, the American Revolution and the Civil War, and linked with concepts such
as independence and democracy.

The use of freedom discourse in politics can be seen as a specific kind of cultural
tool: a “frame.” As a recent overview of political framing put it, “all political players use
language to give influential cues about how an issue is to be interpreted… to define and give
meaning to issues… [to] set the boundaries of public policy debates” (Callaghan & Schnell
2005, p. 2). The concept of “framing” is originally Erving Goffman’s, and emphasizes the
way frames organize experience:

I assume that definitions of a situation are built up in accordance with principles of
organization which govern events – at least social ones – and our subjective
involvement in them; frame is the word I used to refer to such of these basic elements
as I am able to identify… “frame analysis” is a slogan to refer to the examination in
these terms of the organization of experience. (Goffman 1986 [1974], p. 11)

Robert Entman (1993) specified framing as follows: “To frame is to select some aspects of a
perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to
promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or
treatment recommendation for the item described” (p. 52, italics removed). Frames also omit
potential problem definitions, explanations, evaluations and recommendations (Entman
1993).¹ Some theorists describe processes similar to framing but use terms such as
“metaphor” and “symbolic action” (Lakoff 2003, Schlesinger & Lau 2000, Edelman 1971). I
follow Gamson and Modigliani and understand a metaphor to be a type of frame (Gamson &
Modigliani 1989, fn 1).

¹ There is also a tradition in psychology that is concerned with framing but I do not examine that here
(Kahneman, Slovic & Tversky 1982).
In this paper, I focus on two words and their variations. This approach to framing is therefore informed more by cognitive linguistics than by media studies, sociology and political science, because the latter do not focus on words alone (e.g. Gitlin 1980, Snow et alia 1986, Iyengar 2005). For cognitive linguist Lakoff, every word evokes a frame, such that the word “relief” in “tax relief” evokes taxes as burdens: “For there to be relief there must be an affliction, an afflicted party, and a reliever who removes the affliction and is therefore a hero” (Lakoff 2004, p. 3). I propose that “freedom” also evokes a set of “entailments,” to use his language: a restriction and a restricted party, though not necessarily a liberator to remove the restriction. This proposal reflects the ordinary usage of the word “freedom” (Parekh 2005), and allows for differences in the way the term is used. This project brings framing together with cultural studies of keywords (Williams 1983, Bennett et al. 2005) and critical discourse analysis (Fairclough 1992, Kress & Hodge 1979 cited in Fairclough 1992), in which a single word or signifier is examined over time for the purpose of noting shifts in its usage and meaning. These approaches focus on the “rewording”, “relexicalization” or rearticulation of signifiers in relation to social changes such as globalization, industrialization, modernization and post-modernization. In this paper, I understand the rearticulation of the signifier “freedom” to be a type of framing done for the purpose of appealing to listeners.

Framing in terms of freedom can also be seen as an example of “value-framing,” or using a value such as freedom, compassion, or equality to frame an issue. Brewer (2001) defines “value-framing” as “an association between a value and an issue that carries an evaluative implication: It presents one position on an issue as being right (and others as wrong) by linking that position to a specific core value” (p. 46). Snow et alia (1986) included “value amplification” as a subset of frame amplification, one of the framing
processes he and others observed in the leadership of social movements, as when a peace
movement repeatedly appeals to fundamental values such as equality and liberty in the
promotion of its agenda. Not surprisingly, people who study value framing have observed
that the same frame can be used in diverse ways. For example, Brewer (2001) studied how
compassion could be used to advocate for welfare as well as to criticize welfare, with tough
love as a kind of compassion (also see Barker 2005).

Many students of framing are interested not in documenting the usage of frames by
political speakers, but whether and how frames affect listeners and their opinions (Gamson
on the “supply side” of framing: those who do the framing. This does not mean that I assume
that listeners will be “seduced” by the frames offered, using only their “lizard brains”
(Brewer 2001) to process information uncritically and automatically (see Gamson 1992 and
Brewer 2001 for theoretical overviews of frame-receivers as passive and active). Receivers
may resist the meanings assumed for or imposed on them, combine the meanings with other
contradictory meanings, “use” cultural objects for their own rational ends, ignore them or
simply misunderstand them (see discussions by Griswold 1994, Schudson 1989, Druckman
2001).

Nevertheless, I follow Schudson (1989) and argue that televised speeches are worth
analyzing as cultural objects because they are likely to have high cultural power according to
several of his criteria: many people will see them in their original or edited forms (they are
retrievable and retained by institutions) and they are carefully designed and therefore likely
to have both resonance and rhetorical force. As Schudson writes, “even if an examination of
‘objects’ does not exhaust the study of culture, it is certainly a key part of the study and,
methodologically, the objects offer privileged access to culture” (p. 155). My project focuses
on patterns in the use of freedom or liberty by widely broadcast political speeches, which is only a part – but a key part – of the study of American political culture. The metaphors used in politics are designed to influence how voters perceive parties, policies, and people, and a close examination of how these metaphors change is still a study of social action even if the results of the action are unknown. I do not further define that social action and agency; the persuasion that is the “core” of politics (Mutz 1996, p. 1) may be for the purpose of manipulating with propaganda (Lazarsfeld & Stanton 1941, Sproule 1987), pandering to and pleasing the public (Canes-Wrone 2006), establishing the trust necessary for large-scale democratic deliberation (Allen 2004), or something else.

**Value-Framing and Political Parties**

Ideological differences between Democrats and Republicans are likely to be reflected in their respective discourses about freedom. Like democracy, freedom can be called an “essentially contested concept” (Gallie 1955-56) because it is positively valued but capable of being defined in a variety of ways by different people at different times for different purposes. For example, the word “freedom” is used differently by socialists, who would insist that a “free society must also ensure requisite resources to all its members”, and libertarians, who would not (Parekh 2005, p. 133). McGee argues that the word “liberty” is an “ideograph” because in some of its uses it is practically identical to ideology: “a one-term summary of one aspect of a people’s historical ideology… [that of] the English-speaking world” (McGee 2001).² Political scientists differ about whether American political parties

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²“A formal definition of ‘ideograph,’… would list the following characteristics: An ideograph is an ordinary-language term found in political discourse. It is a high-order abstraction representing collective commitment to a particular but equivocal and ill-defined normative goal. It warrants the use of power, excuses behavior and belief which might otherwise be perceived as eccentric or antisocial, and guides behavior and belief into channels easily recognized by a community as acceptable and laudable… Ideographs are culture-bound, though some terms are used in different signification across cultures. Each member of the community is socialized,
have stable ideologies (Gerring 1998), governing moral metaphors (Lakoff 2002) and
cultures (Kelley 1977), or not (Wattenberg 1998; also see Gerring for discussion p. 257 ff,
has had a stable ideology since 1928: neo-liberalism. He characterizes its central dichotomy
as “the state versus the individual”, and its primary themes as antistatism, free market
capitalism, individualism, and right-wing populism. Expression of these themes in terms of
freedom would likely involve freedom of individuals from government, freedom of the
market from regulation, and other more specific freedoms related to right-wing populism.
According to Gerring, the Democratic party’s ideology since 1952 has been “universalism”,
with a central dichotomy of “inclusion versus exclusion” and the themes of civil rights, social
welfare, redistribution, and inclusion. In terms of freedom, these themes might involve
freedom from discrimination, poverty, and inequality, freedom to participate in a given
activity rather than be excluded from it. Lakoff’s (2002) account of “how liberals and
conservatives think” (mapped onto Democrats and Republicans), Petrocik et alia’s list of
issues “owned” by each party (Petrocik, Benoit & Hansen 2003) and the likely wishes of
each party’s base or coalition during this time period also support these predictions about
freedom.

In this paper I assume that speeches intended for a wide television audience are
carefully designed to appeal to both partisan and uncommitted viewers. Therefore,
differences in the speeches ought to reflect differences in speechmakers’ sense of what will
appeal to these viewers. Whether the speech is created by the speaker or by professional
speech-writers and other campaign personnel, it reflects choices of how to frame issues in

conditioned, to the vocabulary of ideographs as a prerequisite for ‘belonging’ to the society…” (McGee 1980, p. 15).
ways that will most appeal to their actual or prospective supporters. Research shows (and
common sense suggests) that some value-frames are more salient to certain groups, including
political parties. Those who use frames to influence people – such as political speakers - are
therefore likely to choose frames they think will work for the audience. Barker (2005) asserts
that “Republicans and Democrats cling to different chronically accessible value constructs,
with Republicans being more likely to wear individualistic lenses and Democrats more likely
to wear egalitarian ones.” (p. 378). Political scientists have systematically compared
freedom language across political party and time, using computerized text-searching and
methods familiar to sociologists. These have focused on particular words and sets of words
in American political speeches in order to quantify differences in content or style. Some of
these studies have included the terms freedom and liberty in measures of “ideal-value”
(Smith et al. 1966) or measures of patriotism and individualism, constructed in opposition to
communitarianism or “commonality” values (Hart 2000). The Smith et al. study found that
Republican presidential nomination acceptance speeches during the period 1928-1964 had
more references to individual initiative, liberty, and freedom from centralized authority than
Democratic speeches. Hart found that Republicans tended to use words from the word sets
that also included freedom and liberty, which suggests that the frequency of liberty discourse
will be higher for Republicans. Barker (2005) would likely argue that his findings about
individualism would generalize to freedom talk; in his measurement of the salience of
individualism among Republicans, his survey instrument used questions about freedom to
measure individualism.

My study adds more nuance than the above studies, without losing the breadth made
possible by quantitative sociological methods, because in addition to counting words I also
assess how the words are used. Using this method I cannot approach the complexity of study
of a single speech, speaker, political convention, or political movement (e.g. Frye & Krohn 1977, Roberts & Golan 2005), but my larger sample enables me to discern patterns in usage across parties and over time.

**Time and Value-Framing**

If value-framing is designed to take advantage of the salience and “chronic accessibility” of certain values to a group of people, value-framing could change over time. Events could change the salience and meaning of a value such as freedom. The framing of those events could change that salience for audiences as well, as when a particular frame becomes dominant and alternative framing becomes more difficult. There may be periods of struggle by opposing camps for “possession” of a value-frame, and strategic attempts to make some frames more salient. Speakers may try to be salient to new groups, resulting in a change in speakers’ value-framing to address what is salient to them. Ideological and cultural shifts could affect the way issues are framed. The meaning of words also changes over time, which would affect how they are used in framing and how salient they are.

Historical studies show that some meanings of freedom and liberty dominate certain eras, though not without contestation (Rodgers 1987, Foner 1998, Fischer 2005). Some types of freedom only make sense in certain contexts and times, such as freedom from Communism during the Cold War. I expect to find shifts in both parties during particular eras, such as the Cold War and the Civil Rights era, because even though party ideologies may have remained the same, the relevant freedoms may be more urgent and salient to listeners. I expect that despite different ideologies, the two parties may change in similar ways over time, reflecting national rather than party-specific discourse. For example, as the United States has moved from the New Deal era to the dismantling of the welfare state (Somers & Block 2005), there may be a decrease in discourse about freedom from poverty.
and an increase in discourse about freedom from taxation for social programs. I expect this phenomenon to affect both parties.

Observers of political language have paid careful attention to the nuances of freedom discourse, but have not studied it systematically over time. Historians, sociologists and others have attended to freedom and liberty and their changing meanings over time (Rodgers 1987, Patterson 1991, Foner 1998, Fischer 2005, Williams 1983) but without using methods such as sampling, quantifiable coding, and multiple regression.

Hypotheses

I hypothesize that I will find differences between Republicans and Democrats in both the frequency and types of freedom-liberty terms, for reasons described above. The first two hypotheses concern the frequency of these terms as a dependent variable, no matter what kind of freedom is discussed. This is an imprecise dependent variable because it comprises different ways of using the words, but results will exclude negative uses of the word (such as “free ride”) as irrelevant to the research question. Nevertheless two hypotheses are proposed:

H1: Republican → use of freedom words (of any type)

H2: Cold War Era → use of freedom words (of any type)

The remaining hypotheses concern the specific types of freedom invoked by a speaker, which are more nuanced dependent variables created through qualitative coding.

H3: Republican → types of freedom
   H3a: freedom from government intervention,
   H3b: free enterprise/market

H4: Democrat → types of freedom
   H4a: freedom from poverty
   H4b: freedom from discrimination

Based on previous studies of Republicans and Democrats, I predict that Republicans are more likely than Democrats to use freedom-liberty terms to invoke economic freedoms (such
as freedom from taxation, the free market, and free enterprise), and freedom of individuals from government interventions (such as welfare programs, regulation, and other interference). I predict that Democrats are more likely than Republicans to use freedom-liberty terms to describe freedom from prejudice and poverty.

**H5: Time → type of freedom**

- **H5a:** Freedom of individuals from government intervention
- **H5b:** More free enterprise/market
- **H5c:** Less freedom from poverty

With greater distance from the New Deal, I predict more discourse about free enterprise and the free market, and freedom from government programs. I also predict less discourse about freedom from poverty. Additional hypotheses will be generated based on the types of freedom identified in qualitative coding, and nonlinear trends over time will be explored visually but not tested.

**Methods**

**Sample**

I take a purposive sample of political party convention speeches to represent a broader “population” of politically partisan speech generally. From each Republican and Democratic convention since 1952, I sample the presidential nomination acceptance, vice-presidential nomination acceptance, and keynote speech(es) because these are intended for a national audience and are likely to be seen, heard, or read by more people than other convention speeches. Campaign speeches delivered before or after the convention are often intended for a more local audience and may therefore be less representative and comparable, as they may be influenced by local interests (e.g. agricultural subsidies in a rural state). Occurring every four years convention speeches are less frequent than annual State of the Union addresses, but they include important speakers from both parties at approximately the same historical
time and under similar conditions, thereby permitting comparison of parties while holding
time constant. My sample will include the nominees for president and vice-president, as well
as all keynote speakers, as they are scheduled to speak during prime time television
broadcasts and have been entrusted with representing the party and candidates for a wide
audience. Differences found there are likely to appear in other forms of political speech.

I restricted the sample to speeches given in 1952 and beyond to maximize
comparability of speeches across time in terms of their process of production (Griswold
1994): beginning in 1952 both conventions received on-site television coverage (Jamieson
1996) and were simultaneously transmitted to the entire country (Valley 1968 p. 105).
Several political scientists have noted that 1952 inaugurated a time when speeches were
increasingly engineered to some extent by campaign consultants with a television audience in
mind, and were decreasingly dedicated to the conduct of actual party business such as
choosing (rather than legitimating) the candidates for president and vice-president (Trent &
given between 1952 and 2004 are assumed to be more or less comparable, though speeches at
later times will have been more engineered.3 Sampled speeches also differ in whether they
were written by the nominee alone or by one or more speechwriters, in the degree to which
speakers take into account the recommendations of media experts, and in the amount of time
available to prepare speeches, because earlier nominees were less likely to know in advance
whether they were nominated (Valley 1988).

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3Greater engineering does not appear to affect freedom talk as measured in this paper. I regressed every
dependent variable on a linear year variable controlling for total words, and only freedom related to
Communism and non-Communism showed a significant linear trend over time (decrease and increase
respectively). It is more likely that these trends are due to changes in American enemies than in the production
of conventions.
The sample consists of 88 speeches (43 Republican, 45 Democrat) given by candidates for president and vice-president, as well as one or more designated keynote speakers at the 28 political conventions between 1952 and 2004 (designated according to Congressional Quarterly 2001). The 88 speeches were obtained from a variety of sources: 23 from a CD-ROM on campaign discourse (Annenberg 2000), 26 from the journal *Vital Speeches of the Day*, 26 through various internet archives, and 13 from convention proceedings (for more specific information, refer to Appendix B). In order to be searchable using a program designed for qualitative analysis (QSR N6), all speeches were converted to text (.txt) format. Of the 88 speeches, 49 were already in text format (CD-ROM and internet sources), and the remaining 39 were converted from portable document format (.pdf) or hard copy formats to text files using optical character recognition software (OmniPage Pro). Once in text format, transcripts received additional editing in order to standardize the transcripts to ensure comparability of word count across speeches (e.g. transcripts were edited to exclude descriptions of audience reactions and topical subheadings provided by some transcriptionists).

**Measurement**

Decisions about measurement were made when encountering the data, not before. My interaction with the material led to decisions about which codes to create and how many, when a subcode was warranted, and which passages were relevant to the research questions. Similarly, the quantification of these codes for regression analysis was also informed by the distribution of the codes and whether the research questions were best served by constructing them as raw frequencies or controlling for total word count or total freedom words. Therefore, this Measurement section departs from convention by including both empirical data and quasi-theoretical discussion.
Independent variables

Although the primary focus of this paper is the coding of themes in freedom discourse, a secondary focus is whether freedom discourse (both the frequency and type of discourse) is statistically related to political party and time. Political party is measured not by the speaker’s political affiliation, but by the political party of the convention at which he or she spoke, with Republican party coded as 1 and Democratic party as 0. (Third parties are not considered in this analysis because I focus on differences between parties over time; third parties are not important for every year in my sample and they change from year to year.) Almost all speakers at political conventions were members of that party. The year of the convention is the raw material for a variety of time-related variables: a variable representing the Cold War Era captures all speakers at conventions from 1952 to 1988, and a continuous trend variable represents the passage of time from 1952-2004. For year-level data, Republican and Democratic conventions are combined such that one year represents both conventions. The total word count for each speech was obtained using Microsoft Word and serves as a control variable. It was divided by 1000 and not transformed further because a scatterplot of total words and freedom words produced an acceptably straight lowess curve. The total word count was not correlated with year (Pearson’s correlation coefficient was .09, also see Figure A-1, Appendix A).

Dependent Variables: Freedom-liberty terms

Frequency of Freedom Terms Assessment of the frequency of freedom discourse required several steps. I used a text search function in N6 to identify all sentences containing the words “freedom” and “liberty”, as well as almost all words containing the root letters
“free-“ and “liber-“. \(^4\) Compound words and phrases such as “free trade,” “tax-free” and the “Statue of Liberty” were left in. Linguistically unrelated words found by the text search were excluded (such as “freeze” and “deliberation”). In order to assess frequency of freedom-liberty terms, I used N6’s count of lines containing the terms. To prevent undercounting of terms, lines with more than one freedom word were split into multiple lines such that each contained one term. Freedom terms were categorized into types through qualitative coding, described later.

The question of whether one party or time period produces more discourse about freedom or a specific type of freedom is not as straightforward as it seems. Different ways of measuring “more” will produce different results. The simplest way is to count the number of terms used by speakers. But if some speeches are longer than others, freedom words (like all words) have more chances of being uttered if the process is random. If the total words of a speech were not controlled, effects attributed to the independent variables might be spurious. Total word count should be included in a model if the total word count “causes” the number of freedom terms. But a reverse causal model is also plausible. Because speakers are not allotted a certain number of words, they have some control over how many words they want to say. It is possible that a freedom message might take longer to communicate for some reason, such that a freedom message might “cause” the total word count. If the latter is true, then total word count would not need to be included in the models as an independent variable.

In this paper I use three approaches to assess frequency of freedom types: the raw frequency and the frequency controlled by total word count (already discussed), as well as

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\(^4\) Exceptions were the words “liberal” and “Libertarian” because these are labels for political perspectives and their linguistic connection to liberty is less important than other associations.
the frequency controlled by the use of all freedom terms. The latter examines each type of freedom as a proportion of total freedom terms. When speakers from one party use freedom terms, do they tend to rely on some kinds of freedom more than others? Thinking about the “freedom pie” for each speech, do some types of freedom make up a larger slice than others? (A fourth approach, not used here, is to measure whether a freedom type is mentioned at all, without regard to how often it may have been used.) In practical terms, these three kinds of “measurement” are achieved simply by including or excluding word count and freedom word count variables in the models. Total freedom terms (any type) are not excessively collinear with total terms; Pearson’s correlation coefficient was .51.5

**Qualitative Coding of Freedom Terms** To capture thematic differences in freedom discourse, each of the 760 freedom-liberty terms in the 88 speeches was classified as one and only one freedom type. Mutually exclusive codes were developed iteratively; they changed as coding proceeded and speeches were revisited to ensure consistency. To further maximize consistency, one coder applied all codes.6 Codes were both “etic” (based on concepts of interest to the investigator) and “emic” (based on material encountered in the speeches).

Codes were organized hierarchically, enabling analysis at different levels of aggregation. Figure 1 (Results section) shows all codes. The first level of codes categorized freedom terms as relevant or not based on the topic of the paper: positively valued freedom

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5 Variance inflation factors, a method for testing whether collinearity poses problems for a multivariate model, could not be analyzed with negative binomial regression but they were quite low in linear regression.

6 To assess whether these codes were reproducible, I measured the reliability of the codes when used by other coders, even though I would be the only coder. Two additional coders (undergraduates with several hours of training) applied codes to 10-20% of the freedom terms, and kappa scores were calculated for all codes intended as dependent variables in regression analysis. Cohen’s kappa is a conservative measure of agreement. Most codes exhibited “moderate” reliability or better (kappa>.4) but some did not reach this standard. This may be due to varying levels of historical knowledge for the two coders, insufficient training, or the interpretive nature of the task. Because the same person applied all codes, it is likely that reliability is greater than for two raters, though it may cast doubt on the reproducibility and validity of these data (Krippendorff 2004).
as a cultural tool or persuasive frame. Relevant terms were categorized as foreign, domestic, or ambiguous. Foreign and Domestic codes were subdivided by one or two levels of sub-codes depending on conceptual variety found. Sub-codes were created for two reasons: 1) to capture freedom types relevant to the hypotheses and 2) to describe themes shared by ten or more terms. If a freedom type was relevant to a hypothesis (such as individual political liberty) but contained within it identifiable subtypes (such as a focus on the Bill of Rights or government bureaucracy), I describe the variety but do not create sub-codes to quantify it. If a discernible freedom type was shared by fewer than 10 terms, it was grouped with other rare freedom types in one of four “other” categories corresponding to its context (foreign, domestic, and sub-codes thereof). All codes are described in the presentation of results for qualitative data. In the presentation of results of quantitative analysis, I focus only on the subset of codes relevant to my research questions.

Each freedom term was classified as one freedom type. In order to clarify how the freedom term was being defined in context, I asked myself who or what agent was free, what freedom seemed to entail, and what the opposite of freedom was: was there a binary opposition in which the agent was free from something, or freedom was threatened by something, or did context contrast freedom with something that was not free? If such information was not available, I categorized the term according to its immediate context in the speech but recognized that it was “vague.” For example, if a term occurred in a passage about U.S. politics, I coded it as “Domestic, Political, Vague”; even this small amount of information contributed to a classification of the term. Even a name such as “Statue of Liberty” could take place in a context that evoked some sense of the definition of liberty. I attempted to take texts at their face value; I focus on the words of the speaker rather than my
analysis of their essential or fundamental character, such as liberal or conservative freedoms, positive or negative freedoms in Berlin’s sense (Berlin 1969), true or false freedoms.

If two or more freedom types were apparent from the context but one seemed dominant, I coded the dominant type. Dominance was determined by the context of the speech as well as a “pecking order” of codes. Some codes overlap conceptually, such as individual liberty and discrimination if one’s right to vote is violated because of racial discrimination. Therefore some codes took precedence over others: if discrimination or crime was important to the freedom term, the freedom term is coded accordingly even if political and economic themes are also present. Similarly, a discussion of economic liberty in the Soviet Union is coded as relevant to Communism rather than domestic economic liberty, even though conceptually the liberty is the same. The alternative would have been an exhaustive system of sub-codes and their cross-classifications (for example, “individual liberty & economic freedom & discrimination”), which would improve logical consistency but add complexity and drastically reduce cell sizes for quantitative analysis. The number of codes reflects my interpretation of which conceptual differences are most important and which freedom terms should be lumped together or split apart. If no dominant type could be identified, the term was usually coded as “vague.”

This coding scheme simplified the data to enable quantitative analysis, but by necessity overlooked important nuances of freedom discourse and the act of interpretation. Many of the terms could be interpreted differently depending on the coder’s sense of what context was

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7 The following “pecking orders” also prevented the proliferation of codes because some codes are only used if the term cannot be categorized in another way. In domestic codes, prosperity as freedom is only used if no other economic freedom type applies, and personal achievement as freedom is only used if no other domestic liberty type applies. In international codes, if there are multiple foreign opposites of freedom and one of them is Communist, the freedom term is coded as Communist. For international and domestic codes, if there are multiple freedom types relevant to a term and none is dominant, the type is coded as “unspecified” because it is not clear which type it is.
relevant, meaning not only the immediate context of the speech as a text but also the historical context. Decision rules about how much context to take into account were attempted and abandoned, and I drew on whatever text and historical knowledge seemed relevant to interpret the speech. Such a process challenges reliability as coders vary in their opinions about what is relevant depending on their knowledge and interests. Having a single coder improves consistency, but problems persist if a term has more than one valid interpretation. In such cases, one coder might vacillate about which code best captured the dominant themes, despite the “pecking order” of codes. This project may be particularly vulnerable to such problems because language about freedom in a political speech can be deliberately multivalent in order to accomplish multiple goals and appeal to multiple audiences.\(^8\) To avoid forcing a multivalent freedom term into a univalent code, I categorized terms as vague if no dominant meaning could be discerned.

The coding focused not on concepts but on *words* and their changing definitions within the context of speeches. I only interpreted passages containing the terms of interest, even though other passages may have been well captured by some of the codes. I assume that the term freedom has no single underlying meaning, though I draw on a general definition of freedom as involving an agent or other entity that is free from some obstacle or free to do, be or have something.\(^9\) Even if a speaker explicitly asserted that there is one underlying freedom and illustrated her point by joining or equating several freedom types, I code the

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\(^8\) For example, “As we work together to shape our future, there are keystones from the past we must treasure — an emphasis on freedom, to be sure, but a freedom with concern and compassion for all, whatever their capabilities, and a continued recognition that the driving force behind our past success has been freedom's incentives for each person to do it on his own” (Glenn 1976 - DKN ) (“DKN = Democratic Keynote”)

\(^9\) In this I resemble political philosopher Gerald MacCallum, who proposed a “triadic” classification of freedom: “\(x\) is (is not) free from \(y\) to do (not do, become, not become) \(z\)” (1967, p. 314).
terms separately and do not capture the conceptual connections between the various types of freedom.  

Analysis

To assess relationships between political party, time, and freedom terms, I use negative binomial regression. The number of freedom terms is a count variable and should therefore be analyzed using Poisson or negative binomial regression rather than linear regression, which would produce “inefficient, inconsistent, and biased estimates” (Long 1997, p. 217). The distribution of count variables is not likely to be normal because with “rare events” such as the utterance of a certain type of freedom term, zero values are common and the distribution shifts to the left. Poisson regression requires “equidispersion” or equality of the variance and the mean. Frequently with count variables there is “overdispersion”, in which the variance is greater than the mean, and negative binomial regression must be used instead of Poisson regression to estimate standard errors correctly (Long 1997). Overdispersion is identified by a statistically significant “dispersion parameter”. Because exploratory analysis showed that the dispersion parameters for freedom terms were significant, I use negative binomial regression in all regressions of

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10 For example, Nixon linked freedoms that I coded separately: unspecified domestic political freedom (1st term), individual liberty (2nd term), freedom defined by its international opposite, specifically Communism (3rd – 6th term, multiple wars coded as Communism because they include the Korean War, see footnote 4), and finally an unspecified ambiguous freedom (7th term) because it combines many domestic and international freedoms. “What is the greatness and the nobility of America? Well first of all it is the love of freedom and independence that inspired the men of Valley Forge as they broke from a foreign tyranny. It is that freedom which is grounded in an abiding faith in the dignity of the individual-- faith embodied in that magnificent charter that we call the Bill of Rights. It is that love of freedom that three times in this century sent American soldiers abroad to help other men keep their freedom and their liberty. And it is that same love of freedom that today impels us to sacrifice—sacrifice willingly—so that the flood tide of communism will not blot out decency from the face of the earth. Our greatness then is in our love of freedom, and our people are great too because we have courage.” (1956, RVP) (RVP=Republican Vice Presidential Nominee)

11 The statistical test of the dispersion parameter α involves a likelihood ratio test of the Poisson regression model (PRM) and the negative binomial regression model (NBRM). $G^2 = 2\ln L_{\text{NBRM}} - \ln L_{\text{PRM}}$, where $L$ is the Log likelihood for the PRM or the NBRM. When α is zero the NBRM reduces to the PRM (Long 1997, p. 237) Stata tests the hypothesis $H_0: \alpha = 0$ using this likelihood ratio test in every negative binomial regression (Long and Freese 2001).
count variables regression (Long 1997). I report the results of negative binomial regression using “incidence rate ratios”, which reflect the factor change in the expected count for a unit increase of the independent variable. I do not report coefficients because they provide less information.

For most analyses, the speech is the unit of observation (n=88). To describe trends over time I aggregate the speeches such that the unit of observation is the year (n=14 corresponding to conventions from 1952-2004).

Results

In the first section of results (“Types of Freedom”), I present results from qualitative coding: the coding scheme developed to capture the types of freedom, examples from the speeches, and how often each code was used. In the second section (“Analysis of Freedom Terms, Party, and Time”), I present several models regressing freedom-liberty terms on political party and time variables and illustrate their rises and falls over time.

I. Types of Freedom

Overview of General Categories

At the highest, most general level of coding, freedom terms were classified as either relevant or not to the research topic: freedom as a positively valued frame or cultural tool. (See Figure 1 for an overview of all codes). Forty-one of the 760 terms were not relevant and therefore not coded with the others, either because freedom was actually portrayed in a negative way (n=36) or more rarely because the word was used in a way that seemed irrelevant to the project (n=5). In the latter category, 3 used the term “free” or “freely” to suggest generosity and were therefore not related to the themes of this paper, such as “we have given freely of
our treasure” (Church 1960 - DKN\textsuperscript{12}). Two were titles: “Operation Enduring Freedom” (Miller 2004 - RKN) and “Woodrow Wilson’s New Freedom” (Kennedy 1960 - DP). However, titles such as “Statue of Liberty” and “North American Free Trade Agreement” were deemed relevant because context could plausibly define a type of freedom.

Figure 1: Overview of Codes as Hierarchy

Undesirable Liberty Although nearly all references to freedom and liberty were positive, there were 36 examples of freedom as negative, imperfect, or insufficient in 20

\textsuperscript{12} I use a 3-letter acronym to designate party (R or D) and role at convention (P for Presidential nominee, VP for Vice-presidential nominee, and KN for Keynote speaker).
speeches. About half of these were variations on a theme of freedom as anarchic. Most concerns about anarchy centered on the dangers of uncontrolled free enterprise or free trade.

Suppose these rugged [Republican] individualists abandoned the farmer to the ravages of uncontrolled free enterprise, and the toiler to the mercies of the sweatshop employer of other days! (Dever 1952 - DKN)

We have learned painfully at times that freedom does not automatically correct the inequities, the injustices, and the human failings of any society. Freedom does not automatically create concern, understanding and compassion in all citizens. And so we have learned that freedom does not work. (Muskie 1968 – DVP)

We must welcome and promote truly free trade. But I say to you: it must be fair trade. We must set standards to end child labor, to prevent the exploitation of workers and the poisoning of the environment. Free trade can and must be -- and if I am President, will be -- a way to lift everyone up, not bring anyone down to the lowest common denominator. (Gore 2000 - DP)

Some of these were concerned about anarchic threats to public order and “license.”

Voices of angry protest are heard throughout the land, crying for all manner of freedoms. Yet our political leaders are picketed and some who cry loudest for freedom have sought to prevent our President, our Vice President and Cabinet officers from speaking in public. (Inouye 1968 - DKN)

Freedom balanced so that order lacking liberty will not become the slavery of the prison cell; balanced so that liberty lacking order will not become the license of the mob and of the jungle. (Goldwater 1964 - RP, only the second freedom term is coded as negatively valued)

Other undesirable versions of liberty were mostly variations on the theme of fiscal irresponsibility: free-spenders, free-loaders, free lunches, and free rides. A few concerned criminals who should not go free, and a few were about false freedom, as when the Soviet Union masquerades as a champion of liberty and freedom.

After removal of negatively valued and irrelevant uses of the terms, there remained 719 relevant terms. These were about evenly divided between foreign and domestic codes, with 328 terms coded as foreign and 334 coded as domestic (see Table 1). Fifty-seven could not be easily classified as one or the other and coded as “Vague Ambiguous”.

22
Table 1. Relevant Terms: Number of terms (Percentage)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Foreign</th>
<th>Domestic</th>
<th>Vague</th>
<th>Total Relevant Terms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>328 (46)</td>
<td>334 (46)</td>
<td>57 (8)</td>
<td>719 (100)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Foreign Freedom Types**

To be coded as foreign, the freedom term had to be defined in the context of or by contrast to a foreign country, system or other entity. Usually this occurred in reference to enemies of the United States, in which the U.S. and its allies stood for or defended freedom against another specific system, government, or other entity. This included descriptions of the U.S. and its allies as “free nations” or part of the “free world” in contrast to another country, the liberation of people or nations threatened or oppressed by those regimes, and freedom from fear of war or weapons. Freedom could also be defined in contrast to countries that were not military enemies such as South Africa under apartheid. Usually it was clear from context which nation or system provided the contrast to freedom, but when it was not clear the term was coded as “Vague”. When speakers talked of freedom in an international context, they tended not to describe it in as much detail as they did in a domestic context. Therefore, sub-codes for freedom in a foreign context do not specify whether the freedom is political, economic, or something else, even if occasionally speakers were more specific.

Table 2. Foreign Terms: Number of Terms (Percentage)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Communist</th>
<th>Not Communist</th>
<th>Vague Foreign</th>
<th>Total Foreign Terms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>236 (72)</td>
<td>50 (15)</td>
<td>42 (13)</td>
<td>328 (100)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Percentages do not add up 100 because of rounding error.

**Communism** The majority of the 328 terms coded as foreign referred to Communism or Communist countries or leaders (see Table 2). Speakers used phrases such as “free
world”\textsuperscript{13}, “free nations”, “free men”, and “free peoples” when discussing the U.S. and its allies in contrast to Communism, particularly the Soviet Union. For example, “[t]he strength of the free world lies not in cementing the free world into a second monolithic mass to compete with that of the Communists” (Eisenhower 1956 - RP). Free people included those described as threatened by the Soviet Union or at risk of becoming Communist, as with “free people of Asia and the Middle East” (MacArthur 1952 - RKN), “free China” (Dever 1952 - DKN), “freedom fighters” in Afghanistan and “free Latin American states” (Reagan 1980, 1984 - RP). Speakers also referred to freedom in their discussions of other Communist-associated countries (such as North Korea, North Vietnam, Grenada, East Germany, and Cuba) and anti-Communist phenomena (such as the Marshall Plan and NATO). If nuclear weapons were mentioned in relation to freedom, this implied Communism because the Soviet Union and China were the only non-allies to have them. The following excerpt illustrates how freedom can be defined by contrast to several of these phenomena:

During four futile years the Administration which we shall replace has distorted and lost that faith. It has talked and talked and talked and talked the words of freedom but it has failed and failed and failed in the works of freedom. Now failure cements the wall of shame in Berlin; failures blot the sands of shame at the Bay of Pigs; failures marked the slow death of freedom in Laos; failures infest the jungles of Vietnam, and failures haunt the houses of our once great alliances and undermine the greatest bulwark ever erected by free nations, the NATO community. (Goldwater 1964 - RP)

If multiple foreign entities were mentioned and one was associated with Communism, the term was coded as Communism. For example, the “love of freedom” in the passage below references World War I, World War II, and the Korean War, but is coded as a contrast to Communism:

\textsuperscript{13} The phrase “free world” is so strongly associated with the Cold War that it was assumed to refer to Communism even when there was no explicit reference to Communism, unless there was reason to doubt this (e.g. Miller 2004; see example at Unspecified International).
It is that love of freedom that three times in this century sent American soldiers abroad to help other men keep their freedom and their liberty. And it is that same love of freedom that today impels us to sacrifice—sacrifice willingly—so that the flood tide of communism will not blot out decency from the face of the earth (Nixon 1956 - RVP)

**Miscellaneous Non-Communist** Freedom was defined in opposition to non-Communist foreign entities far less often than to Communist ones. In 50 cases, freedom was defined in reference to non-Communist entities alone. As noted above, if they were part of a list that included Communism, the term was coded as a reference to Communism. Speakers mentioned World War II-related enemies:

> The light of freedom flickered low on the morning of Pearl Harbor. (Dever 1952 - DVP)

> A generation of Americans who stormed beaches, liberated concentration camps and delivered us from evil. (Bush 2000 - RP).

Freedom was also defined in contrast to terrorists, particularly after in 2004 but also in the 1976:

> [W]e will be able to tell the terrorists: You will lose and we will win. The future doesn't belong to fear; it belongs to freedom. (Kerry 2004 - DP)

> The terrorists are fighting freedom with all their cunning and cruelty because freedom is their greatest fear -- and they should be afraid, because freedom is on the march. I believe in the transformational power of liberty: The wisest use of American strength is to advance freedom. (Bush 2004 - RP).

> And we reject, too, the idea that this nation must sit by passively while terrorists maim and murder innocent men, women and children. In the early years of the 19th century this nation defeated the Barbary Pirates and guaranteed freedom of the seas. In the final quarter of the 20th century, we must defeat the new breed of pirates and guarantee freedom of the skies. (Mondale 1976 - DVP)

Freedom was also defined in opposition to South African apartheid, a past conflict with Spain, and contemporary Europe, because it was mired in history and tradition rather than present-oriented like the United States.
Sometimes the context did not suggest any particular foreign nation or other entity (42 mentions in 27 speeches), but nevertheless implied an international context or referent. If a speaker linked freedom to language suggestive of war, this implied that freedom was defined in contrast to a foreign entity. Some made general statements about past and future wars: “a world freed from the exhausting wars which have so plagued the past,” (MacArthur 1952 - RKN) or “freedom from the threat of successful attack or blackmail” (Carter 1976 - DP). Speakers might also refer to freedom across the world or planet without describing which countries lacked freedom.

The eyes of the world and the hopes of those who are free and those who wish to be free focus on this country (Dole 1976 - RVP)

And I can tell you that to millions of persons in other countries as well as in the United States, President Eisenhower is a living symbol of peace and freedom. (Nixon 1956 - RVP)

John Kerry… wants to be leader of the free world. (Miller 2004 - RKN)

Terms coded here often resembled some of the “Vague Ambiguous” terms: those that seemed to refer to domestic and foreign freedoms simultaneously or were so general that they could not be classified as either foreign or domestic.

**Domestic Freedom Types**

Freedom was defined in a domestic United States context 334 times in 66 speeches (See Table 3). A term was considered to be in a domestic context for reasons such as the following: if a speaker did not mention other countries or the world; if the freedom was defined in opposition to a domestic force, threat, administration or rival party; or it concerned only American citizens. Domestic freedoms were described in more detail than foreign freedoms, perhaps because less justification was needed when speaking of a common foreign enemy. If a speaker did describe a freedom in detail while referring to a foreign country,
such as the lack of a free enterprise system in another country, this was coded as foreign; thus foreign terms may resemble domestic terms (see discussion at Methods). Freedoms related to the American Revolution and founding fathers were coded as domestic, even though they were defined in contrast to British monarchy. Four major categories were created (see Table 3): Political freedoms, Economic freedoms, Freedom from Discrimination, and Freedom from Crime. The remaining domestic freedoms were classified as “Other” (several small categories) or “Vague” if they could not be described in any way other than that they occurred in a domestic context. Several of the “Vague” resembled each other enough to warrant creation of an additional category: Freedom as Individual Achievement.

Table 3. Domestic Terms: Number of terms (Percentage)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political</th>
<th>Economic</th>
<th>Crime</th>
<th>Discrim.</th>
<th>Achievement</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Unspec.</th>
<th>Total Domestic Terms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>139 (42)</td>
<td>83 (25)</td>
<td>14 (4)</td>
<td>36 (11)</td>
<td>14 (4)</td>
<td>7 (2)</td>
<td>41 (12)</td>
<td>334 (100)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Political Freedom**

*Individual Political Freedom* Political freedom was described in a domestic context 139 times in 41 speeches (political freedom was also described in an international context, see above). Most of these (97 in 33 speeches, see Table 4) concerned a variety of kinds of freedom from government control. Virtually all of these concerned the freedom of individuals, though I included 2 terms concerned with state and local governments because of thematic similarity. Occasionally specific freedoms were mentioned (free speech, freedom of the press, and freedom to own a gun), but more often the liberty invoked was a general political freedom for the individual: personal liberties, individual liberties, civil liberties, individual freedoms, “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness”, and references to the Bill of Rights. Speakers accused the opposing party of violating essential freedoms for individuals:
In this march away from our traditional American standards, few of our former liberties have been left unimpaired. Rights and powers specifically reserved to state, community and individual by constitutional mandate have been ruthlessly suppressed by a creeping Federal authority. (MacArthur 1952 - RKN)

[A] veil of secrecy has been thrown around activities and affairs of the Administration now in Washington to such an extent that the legitimate inquiries of a free press, a free people and a free communications system are denied without just cause or provocation. (Clement 1956 - DKN)

Some speakers focused on a paternalistic government that did too much for citizens and encouraged dependence.

Down through the welfare state to Statism, to more and more government largesse accompanied always by more government authority, less individual liberty and, ultimately, totalitarianism, always advanced as for our own good. The alternative is the dream conceived by our founding fathers, up to the ultimate in individual freedom consistent with an orderly society. (Reagan 1984 - RP)

Those who seek to live your lives for you, to take your liberty in return for relieving you of yours; those who elevate the state and downgrade the citizen… those who seek absolute power, even though they seek it to do what they regard as good, are simply demanding the right to enforce their own version of heaven on earth, and let me remind you they are the very ones who always create the most hellish tyranny. (Goldwater 1964 - RP)

Table 4. Political Freedom Terms: Number of terms (Percentage)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Individual political freedom</th>
<th>Other political freedom</th>
<th>Total Political Terms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>97 (70)</td>
<td>42 (30)</td>
<td>139 (100)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Other Political Freedoms* Other political freedoms (n=42) did not directly focus on individual freedom from the government. Several alluded to the nominating convention itself as an exemplar of political freedom, because of the selection of candidates in a “free and open convention” (Kefauver 1956 - DVP) in a “free assembly” (Askew 1972 - DKN), and because candidates experience “the freedom to talk about what's right for America and let the chips fall where they may” (Bush 1992 - RP). Some spoke more generally of democratic freedoms, free government, political freedom, and free institutions, citing free
elections, free democratic processes, free citizens, and free people as the creators of their own government:

…the voluntary binding together of free people to live under the law set the pattern for what was to come. Isn't it once again time to renew our compact of freedom; to pledge to each other all that is best in our lives; all that gives meaning to them--for the sake of this, our beloved and blessed land? (Reagan 1980 - RP)

A few speakers mentioned freedom in connection with the judicial system: “a judiciary free from right-wing loyalty tests” (Mondale 1980 - DP), and the need for a “Supreme Court Justice who protects liberty, rather than burden[s] liberty (Jordan 1992 - DKN). Several speakers were even more vague about political freedoms. If a speaker linked freedom to the outcome of the impending election, I classified it as a type of political freedom in the absence of more specific information.

With such a rebirth [of freedom] within you and me, and within our be-loved party, we shall deserve to be entrusted by the people with the awful responsibility of governing this great land. And they will turn to us and our country will be saved. And now let us get to work! To save freedom! Freedom everywhere! (Judd 1960 - RKN)

We must, and we shall, set the tide running again in the cause of freedom. And this party, with its every action, every word, every breath and every heart beat, has but a single resolve, and that is freedom (Goldwater 1964 - RP)

**Economic Freedom**

*Freedom of the Economic System*  Fifty terms in 27 speeches implied freedoms related to the economy in some way (see Table 5). Most of the 83 mentions of economic freedom concerned the freedom of the economic system and economic actors such as businesses and individual citizens. Often this freedom was threatened by the federal government, whose meddling jeopardized the creation of American jobs.

Do we utilize the forces of our free enterprise system to strengthen our economy and provide jobs for all Americans, as the President has done? Or do we make the government a preferred employer? (Agnew 1972 - RVP)
And in my opinion we have to free the free enterprise system. Until we get government out of the business sector, we are going to have difficulty getting people back into jobs that are real and productive. (Dole 1976 - RVP)

That’s why we need a new approach to government…. a government that understands that jobs must come from growth in a vibrant and vital system of free enterprise. I call this approach a New Covenant…. (Clinton 1992 - DP)

Economic freedom could be directly linked to political freedom:

[I]t is time to recognize we have surrendered too much of our economic liberty. I do not appreciate the value of economic liberty nearly as much for what it has done in keeping us fed as to what it's done in keeping us free. The freedom of the marketplace is not merely the best guarantor of our prosperity. It is the chief guarantor of our rights, and a government that seizes control of the economy for the good of the people ends up seizing control of the people for the good of the economy. (Dole 1996 - RP)

Several focused on freedom of individuals from government taxation: “Freedom from the shackles of high taxes” (Kean 1988 - RKN); tax-free savings for college, retirement (Clinton 1992 - DP, Gore 1996 - DVP) and healthcare (Bush 2004 - RP); tax cuts to “liberate the productive genius of the American people” (Kemp 1996 - RVP). Some advocates of free enterprise praised certain kinds of government intervention as beneficial.

I am not too much concerned with partisan denunciation, with epithets and abuse, because the workingman, the farmer, the thoughtful businessmen, all know that they are better off than ever before and they all know that the greatest danger to free enterprise in this country died with the Great Depression under the hammer blows of the Democratic party. (Stevenson 1952 - DP)

Democrats don't just preach competition, we practice it. As I said, Franklin Roosevelt, I believe, saved the free enterprise system, and American business has nearly always done better under a Democratic President. (Udall 1980 - DKN)

The term “free enterprise” was usually coded here, unless the speaker was defining it negatively.
Table 5. Economic Freedom Terms: Number of terms (Percentage)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Freedom of economic system, people</th>
<th>Freedom from poverty, etc.</th>
<th>Economic prosperity</th>
<th>National economic freedom</th>
<th>Other econ. freedom</th>
<th>Total Economic Freedom</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>50 (60)</td>
<td>9 (11)</td>
<td>12 (14)</td>
<td>8 (10)</td>
<td>4 (5)</td>
<td>83 (100)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Freedom from Poverty* It was uncommon for speakers to describe freedom as reliant on a basic level of material well-being. Freedom from poverty occurred 9 times in 5 speeches. Although many speakers linked free enterprise to material well-being via job creation, greater prosperity, and liberation from taxes, only a few specifically focused on material deprivation as the opposite of liberty.

This is the true cause of freedom. The man who is hungry, who cannot find work or educate his children, who is bowed by want--that man is not fully free. For more than thirty years, from social security to the war against poverty, we have diligently worked to enlarge the freedom of man. And as a result, Americans tonight are freer to live as they want to live, to pursue their ambitions, to meet their desires, to raise their families than at any time in all of our glorious history. (Johnson 1964 - DP)

The success of our economic system has freed [our young people today] in ever-increasing numbers from the tragedies of pre-mature mortality and early labor. (Inouye 1968 - DKN)

We will say to those on welfare: you will have and you deserve the opportunity through training and education, through childcare and medical coverage, to liberate yourself. But then, when you can, you must work, because welfare should be a second chance, not a way of life. That's what the New Covenant is all about. (Clinton 1992 - DP)

One speaker praised his party because “working men and women [were] freed from the oppression of Jimmy Carter’s inflation” (Kean 1988 – RKN). While his rhetoric often resembled rhetoric about taxation and free enterprise, it linked these to freedom from poverty in this passage: “We Republicans offer liberty not just from prejudice, but from poverty. The Democrats gave us the war on poverty — and poverty won.” (Kean 1988 – RKN. Coding is based on poverty rather than prejudice because of emphasis.)
Opportunity for Prosperity  It was more common for speakers to link prosperity and freedom, without explicitly saying that poverty made people un-free. Most of the remaining references to economic freedom simply linked freedom to economic opportunity and a chance for prosperity, but could not be categorized more specifically. This freedom was associated with individual economic opportunity and national prosperity.

Wake up America. Wake up and under the leadership of Ronald Reagan and a Republican Congress together, we can make a new beginning, we can have a new birth of freedom and opportunity. Together, we can build a greater, richer, freer America than ever before, an America where dreams can come true. (Van der Jagt 1980 - RKN)

The Republican party stands always for maximum freedom and opportunity—for every man to get ahead. (Judd 1960 - RKN)

Now, that's the American dream that we have nourished and protected for two hundred years — the dream of freedom and opportunity, the chance for a step up in life. (Bentsen 1988 – DVP)

…America is a great and powerful country because it was here that ordinary people like you and me have had more opportunity and more freedom than any other people who have ever lived on the face of the Earth. And with that opportunity and with that freedom, ordinary people like you and me have been able to do extraordinary things. (Gramm 1992 - RKN)

Sometimes the U.S. was described as “richest, freest, finest country in the world” (Langlie 1956 - RKN), offering a “fuller, richer, freer life than men have ever known in the history of mankind” (Nixon 1960 - RP). If the freedom of economic opportunity was described in a way that suggested freedom from racial or other discrimination, it was coded as freedom from prejudice because it seemed conceptually distinct.

National Economic Freedom and Other Economic Freedoms  Lastly, freedom was also mentioned in connection with free trade and miscellaneous other economic aspects of U.S. life. Eight speeches addressed the freedom of the U.S. economy from foreign influence, such as American economic dependence on foreign oil or obstacles posed to free
trade by other countries. This was included as a domestic form of freedom because it had more in common with discussions of domestic economy than discussions of foreign freedoms. In addition there were 4 other terms that connoted diverse economic freedoms.

*Freedom from Prejudice*

Domestic freedoms included more than political and economic freedoms, though these were the most common. Freedom from some type of prejudice or discrimination was mentioned 36 times in 19 speeches (see Table 3). In these passages, freedom was opposed to slavery, bigotry, hate, prejudice, persecution or limitations based on race, religion or gender. Coding was based on the words in the speech and not on the gender nor race of the speaker, nor the people he or she discussed. For example, Molinari’s reference to her daughter (1996 – RKN) was not coded as a reference to gender discrimination even though that may be a valid reading (see example below in Miscellaneous Domestic Freedom section). It will be clear from the examples below that freedom from discrimination overlaps with the more general category of civil liberties and individual rights (which is now part of “individual political freedom”). However, I interpreted such freedom to be qualitatively different when articulated in connection with themes such as American slavery, racism and religious persecution. American slavery was referred to 15 times (8 speeches), usually by Republican speakers reminding listeners that theirs was the party of Abraham Lincoln and founded in opposition to American slavery. Although a speaker might not mention race, references to slavery in the American context suggest race and so are coded with other forms of prejudice. However, references to the founding of the Republican party as a way of extending freedom are not coded this way unless slavery is explicitly mentioned and not just implied.

During the fiery trial of Lincoln's day he warned solemnly that this nation could not exist half slave, half free. The Republican party succeeded in restoring unity and
freedom to the nation. Can this whole wide world of our day go on indefinitely half slave [Communist], half free? Deep down in our hearts, we know the answer is no. (Judd 1960 - RKN; 2nd freedom term coded as a reference to Communism because of context)

One hundred years ago this summer, an ex-slave and proud Republican stood before another convention of our party. Frederick Douglass said, "A good government that can give liberty in its constitution ought to have the power to protect liberty in its administration.” (Kean 1988 - RKN)

[A]lthough my grandfather came to this country in poverty, he came without shackles; he came as a free man enjoying certain constitutional rights under the American flag. (Inouye 1968 - DKN)

Do we participate in a politics of cynicism or a politics of hope? …It’s the hope of slaves sitting around a fire singing freedom songs; the hope of immigrants setting out for distant shores…. (Obama 2004 - DKN)

Speakers linked freedom to racial and ethnic diversity without mentioning slavery 8 times.

We have faith in our capacity to defend human rights against the forces of bigotry and hate within our own country…The State is not the author of freedom. The State has a duty, however, to support and defend civil rights, the political rights, the rights of opportunity that some men in defiance of the Creator would destroy. (Hatfield 1964 - RKN)

[W]e must now accept the obligation of proving that freedom from prejudice is the heart and soul of community - - that yes, we can get along. Yes, people of all backgrounds can not only live together peacefully, but enrich one another, celebrate diversity and come together as one. Yes, we will be one people and live the dream that will make this world free. (Gore 1992 - DVP)

Sometimes the reference was oblique but still discernible as a reference to prejudice.

When we [the Democratic party] speak of freedom, the dream is Coretta King's. (Mondale 1980 - DVP)

We must prove to the world that in this voyage of America no one for reasons of race or background is ever left behind — but that everyone is on board. For all of us are crew on this ship of freedom — all of us serve, publicly or privately — at our own stations. (Kean 1988 - RKN)

Religious liberty or freedom was mentioned 5 times (4 speeches), and overlaps with civil liberties. Because it was often framed in terms of freedom from persecution I included it here.
To those concerned about the strength of American family values, as I am, I say: We are going to restore those values - love, caring, partnership - by including, and not excluding, those whose beliefs differ from our own. Because our own faith is strong, we will fight to preserve the freedom of faith for others. (Ferraro 1984 - DKN)

[T]he flame of our Statue of Liberty, like the Olympic flame carried all across America by thousands of citizen heroes, will always, always, burn brighter than the fires that burn our churches, our synagogues, our mosques. Always. (Clinton 1996 - DP)

Freedom from limitations on women was mentioned only once (Carter 1980 - DP), and the remaining 5 mentions (4 speeches) were combinations of one or more already mentioned prejudices, as in the following example:

We have faith in the forces of law and order under our constitution. Our faith challenges any who would destroy freedom whether they wrap themself in a false cloak of patriotism or an equally false cloak of religion. There are bigots in this nation who spew forth their venom of hate. They parade under hundreds of labels, including the Communist Party, the Ku Klux Klan, and the John Birch Society. They must be overcome…." (Hatfield 1964 - RKN; references to domestic Communist party are not coded as foreign references)

*Freedom from Crime*

Freedom from crime was mentioned 14 times in 9 speeches, sometimes in connection with other forms of freedom (see Table 3). Criminal activity involving drugs or guns were usually described as threatening children, particularly in schools. Clinton linked children’s freedom from crime to their free personal development: “My fellow Americans, if we're going to build that bridge to the twenty-first century we have to make our children free-- free of the vice grip of guns and gangs and drugs; free to build lives of hope.” (1996 - DP, all three are coded as crime, see footnote 6 in methods) Criminal activity also threatened basic human freedom (Carter) and civil liberties (Nixon). For Nixon, “the first civil right of every American is to be free from domestic violence, and that right must be guaranteed in this country.” (Nixon 1968 - RP, also see 1972 - RP) Nixon linked freedom from fear of
“domestic violence” (internal U.S. violence as opposed to war) to American leadership in freedom from fear in the world:

We shall reestablish freedom from fear in America so that America can take the lead in reestablishing freedom from fear in the world. And to those who say that law and order is the code word for racism, there and here is a reply: our goal is justice for every American. (Nixon 1968 - RP)

Although Carter also described illegal activity as a threat to freedom, he linked it to protection of vulnerable people, including those who break the law:

It is time for the law to be enforced. We cannot educate children, we cannot create harmony among our people, we cannot preserve basic human freedom unless we have an orderly society. Crime and lack of justice are especially cruel to those who are least able to protect themselves. Swift arrest and trial, fair and uniform punishment, should be expected by anyone who would break our laws. (Carter 1976 - DP).

**Personal Achievement**

Fourteen freedom terms invoked freedom in connection with individual development, opportunity, creativity, hopes, and dreams (see Table 3). They resembled economic freedoms described above, but because they did not mention financial rewards they could not be coded there. Again, if discrimination or crime were mentioned in thematically similar passages, they would have been classified as such.

We can restore the American dream... At the end of the day while I'm rocking Susan Ruby to sleep -- I look down and wonder what her life will be like. I want the best for her. I want ... [a] nation and a world where she is free to believe in greatness and achieve her fullest potential (Molinari 1996 - RKN)

But my grandfather had larger dreams for his son. Through hard work and perseverance my father got a scholarship to study in a magical place; America which stood as a beacon of freedom and opportunity to so many who had come before. (Obama 2004 - DKN)

I included passages that linked freedom to individual creativity at this code:

We can make this a land where opportunity is founded only on responsibility and freedom of faith, and where nothing can smother the lonely defiant spirit of the free intelligence. We can, and by our traditions as a party we will! (Stevenson 1956 - DP)
Our Republican cause is not to level out the world or make its people conform in computer-regimented sameness. Our Republican cause is to free our people. 
(Goldwater 1964 - RP)

Other Domestic Freedoms:

The remaining domestic freedom terms could not be classified in the categories above. In 7 cases the freedom described was specific but so rare that no category was created to capture it, such as “frontier freedom” (Church 1960 - DKN), “freedom from poor schools, freedom from polluted oceans” (Kean 1988 - RKN), or the ability of a Catholic presidential candidate “to render a free, fair judgment” without undue influence from the Catholic Church (Kennedy 1960 - DP).

Vague Domestic Freedom

The remaining 41 terms were so general that they could not be classified anywhere else (see Table 3). In some cases the speaker mentioned several specific kinds of freedom elsewhere in his or her speech, and very general references to freedom may have encompassed all or just some of them:

Ladies and gentlemen, you have summoned me on behalf of millions of your fellow Americans to lead a great crusade--for freedom in America…. (Goldwater 1964 - RP)

The Republican Party is committed to a set of principles. This commitment is an act of unwavering faith in the American people in the cause of freedom, in the eternal principles of morality, and there is a stark contrast in the record of the present administration. (Hatfield 1964 - RKN)

When I think of America under the leadership of George Bush, three words come to mind: Freedom. Family. Future. Freedom first, because without it, nothing else is possible. (Quayle 1988 - RVP)

So tonight, in the city where America's freedom began, only a few blocks from where the sons and daughters of liberty gave birth to our nation – here tonight, on behalf of a new birth of freedom … I accept your nomination for President of the United States. (Kerry 2004 - DP)

The story of America is the story of expanding liberty: an ever-widening circle, constantly growing to reach further and include more. (Bush 2004 - RP)
As seen in the examples above, some of these vague terms suggest freedom as an American value or ideal. There was similarity between these terms and those captured at two other codes: vague foreign and those that were not classifiable as either domestic or foreign (i.e. Vague Ambiguous); the individual interpretation of context guided the placement of such terms into either of these categories.

**Vague Ambiguous: Not Clear Whether Foreign Or Domestic**

Most freedom terms were defined in a foreign or domestic context, with approximately equal numbers in each category (see Table 1). Fifty-seven terms could not be classified as either foreign or domestic either because they were so general or because the definition of freedom suggested a global definition of freedom defined in opposition to both foreign and domestic non-freedoms (see Table 1). It was difficult to standardize this code because terms could be read in different ways. For example, “the spirit that burned with zeal in the hearts of millions of immigrants from every corner of the earth who came here in search of freedom” (Reagan 1980 - RP) can be seen as domestic because the freedom is a feature of the United States, and as foreign because this freedom is defined in opposition to the immigrants’ places of origin. If the context had suggested escape from a fascist government, or seeking one’s economic fortune in the U.S., these would have been codable elsewhere. Because the Statue of Liberty evokes immigration and connotes domestic and foreign themes, most references to it were placed here, unless the context suggested otherwise. Similarly, if the context suggested a multivalent use of the word freedom, such as “both Democrats and Republicans want a strong, free, prosperous America in a peaceful and secure world” (Judd 1960 - RKN), it was coded here; freedom defined in contrast to Communism might be the same as domestic political liberty. If a general term is used to
encompass multiple kinds of freedom, it is coded here. Some freedom terms unambiguously referred to both foreign and domestic arenas because the speaker named both the U.S. and the world:

Today, as then, but more urgently and more broadly than then, the task of preserving and enlarging freedom at home and of safeguarding it from the forces of tyranny abroad is great enough to challenge all our resources and to require all our strength… I would remind you that extremism in the defense of liberty is no vice. (Goldwater 1964 - RP)

Our nation's founding commitment is still our deepest commitment: In our world, and here at home, we will extend the frontiers of freedom. (Bush 2004 - RP)

However, most references to the “free world” were interpreted to define freedom in opposition to a foreign entity and coded as Foreign. Phrases such as the following were also coded as vague and ambiguous if the context did not suggest a particular definition of freedom: “a program of freedom for mankind” (Humphrey 1964 - DVP), having “faith in freedom” (Stevenson 1956 - DP), the U.S. as a “beacon of freedom” (Edwards 2004 - DVP). Several terms suggested a timeless, universal, or divine ideal of freedom that the U.S. exemplified for the rest of the world, making it difficult to code as a domestic freedom (though if speakers had tied the freedom to something specific it would have been coded elsewhere).

And above all, in this decade of the Sixties, this decade of decision and progress, we will witness the continued revitalization of America's moral and spiritual strength with the renewed faith in the eternal ideals of freedom and justice under God which are our priceless heritage as a people. (Nixon 1960 - RP)

I love the people of the United States of America—two hundred million strong, devoted to God, consecrated to liberty, and all crusaders for justice—all crusaders for equality of opportunity for every person on the face of this earth. (Miller 1964 - RVP)
The boundary between this code and “Vague Foreign” or “Vague Domestic” is not distinct, and I do not suggest that they represent different definitions of freedom. They are defined mainly by their lack of definition.

II. Analysis of Freedom Terms, Party, and Time

I first examine speech-level data, then year-level data. Speech-level data enable the testing of hypotheses about the effects of party and time variables on the frequency of usage in speeches for all 719 relevant freedom terms as well as selected types of freedom. Because qualitative analysis produced several types of freedom beyond those hypothesized, I explore whether some of these are also related to party and time. Year-level data are not formally tested, but graphed for the purpose of describing patterns and generating hypotheses for future research.

All Freedom Terms

Figure 2 below provides an overview of the 88 speeches presented in order of year. Freedom terms are displayed as a percentage of the total words for Republican and Democratic speeches, presented in order of year. Blue bars indicate 3-5 speeches at Democratic conventions, red bars indicate the same for Republicans, and the absence of a bar indicates a speech with zero freedom words. The percentage of freedom terms in a speech varied from 0 to 1.4 with a mean of .292 and standard deviation of .287.
The following regression analyses use as the dependent variable the raw number of freedom terms and the total number of words in the speech is examined as a control variable.

Republicans uttered more freedom terms (H1), and there is modest evidence that Cold War speakers did as well (H2). Although two models (Table 6, Models 3 & 4) suggest an independent effect for Cold War (p=.038 and p=.024 for one-tailed tests), there was no effect in bivariate models nor when outliers were removed. There was no evidence of an interaction between party and speaking during the Cold War (data not shown). The mean number of freedom terms uttered by Republicans is approximately two and a half times as high as the mean number by Democrats, slightly less when the total number of words is controlled for. The reduction of the effect when total words are controlled for suggests that some of the effect of Republican party can be explained by their having longer speeches. The effect of party was robust despite the removal of six high outlier speeches, all of which were Republican. When removed, political party remained significant, albeit attenuated: the
mean freedom term usage for Republicans was 1.704 times that of Democrats, and 1.801 when controlled for total words (data not shown). Thus, the effect of party is not driven by a few anomalous Republicans who emphasized freedom; rather, the tendency was shared widely among Republicans.

Table 6. Regression of All 719 Relevant Freedom Terms on Selected Independent Variables, Incidence-Rate Ratios: 88 speeches

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variable</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>2.503 ‡†</td>
<td>2.240 ‡†</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2.235 ‡†</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cold War era</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.431 †</td>
<td>1.431 †</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Words in Speech (in 1000s)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.413 ‡†</td>
<td>1.467 ‡†</td>
<td>1.427 ‡‡</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log likelihood*</td>
<td>-268.303</td>
<td>-252.048</td>
<td>-260.852</td>
<td>-250.163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likelihood Ratio Chi² (degrees of freedom)</td>
<td>19.16(1)</td>
<td>51.67(2)</td>
<td>34.06(2)</td>
<td>55.44(3)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: † p < .05 ‡ p < .01 ‡‡ p < .001 (1-tailed tests because these are directional hypotheses)
*Log likelihood for the intercept-only model was -277.882. Intercept and dispersion parameter not shown in order to reduce data reporting. Dispersion parameters were statistically significant for all models in this table, supporting the use of negative binomial regression rather than Poisson.

These results suggest that not only the raw frequency of words but also the intensity of their usage was greater for Republicans than Democrats. The scatterplot below (Figure 3) illustrates these findings. The red dots represent Republicans, with high outliers at the top of the scatter plot, reflecting a high number of freedom terms per speech (the y-axis). In descending order they are Goldwater (1964 - RP), Judd (1960 - RKN), Nixon (1960 - RP), Bush (2004 - RP), Kean (1988 - RKN), and MacArthur (1952 - RKN). The red dots tend to be higher than the blue dots, reflecting the higher frequency of freedom terms by Republicans. In addition, Republicans appear to use them more intensively in their speeches, because the lowess curve\(^{14}\) for Republicans is steeper than that of Democrats: Republicans tend to use more freedom words given the same number of total

\(^{14}\) “Lowess” is the locally weighted regression line.
words in the speech (Model 2, Table 6). This scatterplot also shows that the amount of scatter is greater for Republicans than for Democrats: Republican speeches are more volatile in both frequency and intensity than Democratic speeches. Not only are all of the outliers Republicans, even non-outlier Republican speeches are more variable compared to Democratic speeches, which cluster together more closely.

![Figure 3. Scatterplot with Lowess Lines: Freedom Terms and Total Words per Speech. Red = Republican, Blue=Democrat.](image)

**Freedom Types**

Republicans were more likely to speak about freedom in terms of *political individualism* (H3a), even when controlling for total words. Table 7 shows that the mean Republican use of freedom terms in connection with political individualism was 4 times as high as Democratic use, and 3½ times when controlling for total words. Over time there is no evidence of a trend toward defining freedom as political individualism; H5a is not supported.
Table 7. Regression of Political Individualism on Party and Year, Incidence-Rate Ratios: 88 speeches

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variable</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>4.029‡†</td>
<td>3.496‡†</td>
<td>3.496‡†</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.920</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Words in Speech (in 1000s)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.440‡</td>
<td>1.444‡</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log likelihood*</td>
<td>-115.094</td>
<td>-110.953</td>
<td>-109.439</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likelihood Ratio Chi² (degrees of freedom)</td>
<td>10.49(1)</td>
<td>18.77(2)</td>
<td>21.80(3)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: † p < .05  ‡ p < .01  ‡‡ p < .001  (1-tailed tests because these are directional hypotheses)
*Log likelihood for the intercept-only model was -120.337. Intercept and dispersion parameter not shown in order to reduce data reporting. Dispersion parameters were statistically significant for all models in this table, supporting the use of negative binomial regression rather than Poisson.

There was no evidence of partisan or temporal differences in the use of freedom terms related to freedom of the economic system, freedom from poverty, nor discrimination (data not shown). Neither Republicans nor Democrats were significantly different in the number of times they used these types of freedom (corresponding to H3b, H4a, and H4b), whether analyzed simply as the number of times used, or controlling for the total words in a speech. The passage of time since the New Deal was not correlated with more talk of economic freedom (H5b) nor of freedom from government or political individualism (H5a). Speaking near the time of the New Deal did not increase the likelihood of speaking about freedom in terms of poverty; qualitative results showed that very few speakers defined freedom in this way, and only rarely developed the theme (Johnson 1964 - DP was an exception).

Qualitative coding identified types of economic freedom not included in my hypotheses. Some of these are useful for further exploration of differences in party rhetoric. As shown above, the economic subcode freedom of the economic system was not correlated with Republicans nor with the passage of time. However, when it was combined with the other economic subcodes (excluding the hypothetically Democratic freedom from poverty),
Republicans were statistically more likely to define freedom in economic terms. Table 8 shows that Republicans used almost twice as many freedom terms in connection with economic freedom, when defined to include free trade, prosperity and other miscellaneous economic freedoms. This was also true when total words were taken into account. There was no evidence of a correlation with time (data not shown).

Table 8. Regression of Aggregated Economic Freedom on Party, Incidence-Rate Ratios: 88 speeches

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variable</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>1.932*</td>
<td>1.704*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Words in Speech (in 1000s)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.552***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log likelihood†</td>
<td>-109.502</td>
<td>-97.184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likelihood Ratio Chi² (degrees of freedom)</td>
<td>4.36(1)</td>
<td>29.00(2)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001 (2-tailed tests)
†Log likelihood for the intercept-only model was -111.684. Intercept and dispersion parameter not shown in order to reduce data reporting. Dispersion parameters were statistically significant Model 1 but not Model 2.

Most references to freedom could be coded as either foreign or domestic (see Table 1 above). Table 9 shows party differences for aggregates of all Foreign and Domestic categories. Republicans tended to define freedom in relation to foreign entities about 3 times as much as Democrats, less when total words were controlled. They also defined freedom in relation to domestic entities almost twice as much as Democrats, again less when total words were controlled. Each of these categories contained an “vague” sub-category. As explained above, both of these “vague” sub-categories resembled material coded as “Vague Ambiguous” because all shared a lack of specificity. Results for aggregated Foreign and Domestic coding were similar regardless of whether their vague sub-categories are included (data not shown); incidence-rate ratios were lowered but their level of significance was unaltered.
### Table 9. Regression of Foreign (2 Models) and Domestic (2 Models) on Party, Incidence-Rate Ratios: 88 speeches

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variable</th>
<th>Foreign Model 1</th>
<th>Foreign Model 2</th>
<th>Domestic Model 1</th>
<th>Domestic Model 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>3.298***</td>
<td>2.911***</td>
<td>1.967**</td>
<td>1.723*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Words in Speech (in 1000s)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.526***</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.385***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log likelihood†</td>
<td>-203.239</td>
<td>-189.633</td>
<td>-212.137</td>
<td>-202.740</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likelihood Ratio Chi² (degrees of freedom)</td>
<td>19.46(1)</td>
<td>46.67(2)</td>
<td>7.72(1)</td>
<td>26.51(2)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * p < .05  ** p < .01  *** p < .001 (2-tailed tests)
†Log likelihood for the intercept-only model was -212.969 for Foreign models and -215.997 for Domestic models. Intercept and dispersion parameter not shown in order to reduce data reporting. Dispersion parameters were statistically significant for all models in this table.

Because Foreign freedom terms were defined in relation to Communist and non-Communist entities, I explore whether party is correlated with these, and whether Cold War is correlated with Communism. Republicans defined freedom in relation to Communism over 3 times as much as Democrats, and just under this when total words were taken into account (see Table 10). Speaking during the Cold War tended to yield over twice as many definitions of freedom in relation to Communism, less when total words were controlled. These effects were independent of each other; holding Cold War constant, the Republicans still invoked this freedom type nearly 3 times as often, and holding political party constant, Cold War speakers invoked it about twice as often as later speakers. Because the decision to code a freedom term as relevant to Communism was at times based on the time of the speech, this finding is not surprising and to some degree tautological. Defining freedom in relation to non-Communist foreign entities did not vary by political party (data not shown).
Table 10. Regression of Communist-related Freedom on Selected Independent Variables, Incidence-Rate Ratios: 88 speeches

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variable</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>3.286***</td>
<td>2.930***</td>
<td>2.899***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cold War</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.992*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Words in Speech (in 1000s)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.635***</td>
<td>1.620***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log likelihood†</td>
<td>-175.759</td>
<td>-165.202</td>
<td>-163.098</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likelihood Ratio</td>
<td>12.17(1)</td>
<td>33.39(2)</td>
<td>37.60(3)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * p < .05  ** p < .01  *** p < .001 (2-tailed tests)
†Log likelihood for the intercept-only model was -181.896. Intercept and dispersion parameter not shown in order to reduce data reporting. Dispersion parameters were statistically significant for all models in this table, supporting the use of negative binomial regression rather than Poisson.

Qualitative examination produced a large category of freedom terms that were characterized by a lack of specificity. Either terms were non-specific about a freedom in a foreign or domestic context, or they were so non-specific that they could not be classified as either domestic or foreign (“vague ambiguous”). Ambiguity or a lack of specificity about freedom is theoretically interesting because it could lead listeners to supply their own definitions of freedom, thereby enabling the speaker to appeal to a broader audience. Was there a difference over time or between the parties in the use of these kinds of freedom?

There was no evidence of a trend toward more or less vague freedom over time, regardless of whether the 3 codes were considered separately or combined (data not shown). However, Republicans’ mean use of vague freedom in a foreign context was nearly 4 times as high as Democrats’, even when controlling for total words and removing outliers (See Table 11, models 1 and 2). Republicans’ mean use of the “vague ambiguous” terms was also about 2 ½ times higher, but vague freedom in a domestic context was not related to party (data not shown).
Table 11. Regression of Vague Freedom in a Foreign Context on Selected Independent Variables, Incidence-Rate Ratios: 88 speeches

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variable</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3 (n=82; outliers removed)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>3.837**</td>
<td>3.846**</td>
<td>3.918**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Words in Speech (in 1000s)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.990</td>
<td>1.054</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log likelihood†</td>
<td>-76.349</td>
<td>-76.347</td>
<td>-69.509</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likelihood Ratio</td>
<td>10.08(1)</td>
<td>10.09(2)</td>
<td>10.22(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chi² (degrees of freedom)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001 (2-tailed tests)
†Log likelihood for the intercept-only model for Models 1 and 2 was -81.392, for Model 3 with n=82 it was -74.620. Intercept and dispersion parameter not shown in order to reduce data reporting. Dispersion parameters were statistically significant for all models in this table, supporting the use of negative binomial regression rather than Poisson.

Of the speeches that most often discussed vague freedoms in a foreign context (Nixon 1968 - RP, Miller 2004 - RKN, Kean 1988 - RKN, Kemp 1996 - RVP, Bentsen 1988 - DVP, Dole 1976 - RVP, and Cheney 2004 – RVP), only one was made by a Democrat. Usually these were general statements about the defense of freedom in the world without a clear enemy or enemies (see page 27 for quotations).

Table 11 shows that for the first time in the analysis of all freedom types, the total number of words was not a significant predictor of greater use of ambiguously defined freedoms, whether considered as three separate categories or as a combination. The use of vague freedom is similar in short speeches and long speeches. No speaker used more than 6 vague terms; perhaps there is an upper limit of ambiguity about freedom. In descending order, those who used 6 terms were Nixon (1968 - RP), Reagan (1984 - RP), Bush (2004 - RP), Miller (2004 - RKN), Kean (1988 - RKN); those who used 5 terms were Miller (1964 - RVP), Clinton (1996 - DP), and Ortega (1984 - RKN). Of these 8 speakers, only Clinton was a Democrat. Republican speeches were more likely to have a high number of these terms, and any given Republican speech was likely to at least one (32 out of 43 Republican...
speeches contained one or more). By contrast, only 19 out of 45 Democratic speeches contained these terms.

Another View: The Freedom Pie

The results presented so far suggest that if there are party differences, it is always Republicans who use more freedom terminology. If Republicans are using more freedom language over all (Table 7), then they are also more likely to use specific types of freedom. This Republican dominance persists even when total words are held constant. While this is an important finding, it does not tell us the following: when Republicans and Democrats use freedom terminology, do they use it in different ways? If each party has a “freedom pie” composed of all of their uses of freedom, do some freedom types have a bigger “slice” in one party’s pie compared to the other? Put differently, when talking about freedom, does one party tend to rely more on certain kinds of freedom than others?

Controlling for the number of freedom terms, partisans differed in two ways: Democrats spoke more about freedom from discrimination and Republicans spoke more about vague freedoms. When speaking about freedom, Democrats were no more likely to talk about freedom from poverty, but their average use of freedom in opposition to discrimination was over 3 times that of Republicans, statistically significant in a one-tailed test (See Table 12.)

---

15 When the number of freedom terms was treated as an exposure variable, freedom from poverty was statistically more likely to be used by Democrats. Exposure variables are logged variables and because I did not see any reason to log freedom terms I do not consider these findings in this report.
Table 12. Regression of Freedom from Discrimination on All Freedom Terms, Incidence-Rate Ratios: 88 speeches

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variable</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democrat</td>
<td>3.110†</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom Words (719)</td>
<td>1.097‡</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log likelihood*</td>
<td>-66.792</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likelihood Ratio</td>
<td>10.02(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \chi^2 ) (degrees of freedom)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: † p < .05 ‡ p < .01 ‡‡ p < .001 (1-tailed test because this is a directional hypothesis)

*Log likelihood for the intercept-only model was -72.771. Intercept and dispersion parameter not shown in order to reduce data reporting. Dispersion parameters were statistically significant for all models in this table, supporting the use of negative binomial regression rather than Poisson.

When speaking about freedom, Republicans were no more likely to talk about political individualism, economic freedoms, Communism, or foreign entities than were Democrats. However, Republicans were statistically more likely to speak about freedom in vague terms (two-tailed tests). Even when controlling for freedom terms, the average Republican use of any kind of vague freedom was about 1.75 times the average Democratic use (data not shown). As above, this effect is driven by higher Republican use of vague terms in a foreign context, rather than in domestic or ambiguous contexts. When the vague code was disaggregated, only the use of vague foreign terms was statistically different: Republicans’ average use was almost 3 times higher than that of Democrats (see Table 13).
Table 13. Regression of Vague Freedom in a Foreign Context on All Freedom Terms, Incidence-Rate Ratios: 88 speeches

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variable</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>2.924*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom Words</td>
<td>1.034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(719)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log likelihood†</td>
<td>-75.242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likelihood Ratio</td>
<td>12.30(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chi² (degrees of freedom)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * p < .05  ** p < .01  *** p < .001 (2-tailed tests)  †Log likelihood for the intercept-only model was -81.392. Intercept and dispersion parameter not shown in order to reduce data reporting. Dispersion parameters were statistically significant for all models in this table, supporting the use of negative binomial regression rather than Poisson.

The “freedom pie” is therefore not very different for Democrats and Republicans; when the total number of freedom words is controlled for, they differed in their use of freedom in only two ways. In addition, the partisan differences found earlier (see Tables 7-10) disappear when the amount of freedom terminology is controlled.

These results reflect results for 88 individual speeches. However, the “freedom pie” can also be viewed at the level of the political party. Figure 4 suggests that over all, Republicans tended to use more freedom terminology related to Communism (the large blue slice, upper right) and Democrats tended to use more freedom terminology related to discrimination (the red slice, at the 9:00 position). In addition there may be differences in the use of political and economic freedom types; for Democrats economic freedom might be a larger slice and political freedom might be a smaller slice compared to Republicans. These visual observations have not been tested statistically.
Figure 4. The Freedom Pie for Democratic and Republican Parties

**Time Trends**

Thus far, I have mostly addressed patterns of freedom term usage by using data from individual speeches. In order to clarify patterns across time, I now present speech data aggregated at the level of year (n=14 convention years). Data on freedom terms are presented as the average number of terms per speech per year for the Republican convention, the Democratic convention, and both conventions combined. The average number of terms per speech is an accurate way to represent these data because the number of speeches sampled in a year varied. Most (11 out of 14) convention years had 6 speakers: a presidential candidate, vice-presidential candidate and keynote speaker at each convention. The remaining 3 convention years exceeded this number because in 1972 the Republicans had 2 keynote speakers, in 1976 the Democrats had 2 keynote speakers, and in 1992 the Democrats
had 3 keynote speakers.\textsuperscript{16} These graphs do not control for the number of total words; another choice might have been to present the average percentage of freedom terms per total words (see Figures A-2 and A-3 in Appendix A for two alternative versions of Figure 5 to assess the effect of this choice upon results, and Figure A-4 for average total words). The reader should be aware that for every graph there are only 14 observation times. The peaks and valleys of each graph represent these 14 time points alone, and would have been more faithfully represented by the use of bars. I have not done so because it was difficult to read patterns when each year has three or more bars; readers should remember this when interpreting the graphs.

\textbf{Figure 5. Average Freedom Terms per Speech}

\textsuperscript{16} Designation of keynote speakers is according to Congressional Quarterly Inc. 2001, which served as my population list.
Figure 5 shows patterns in freedom term usage across 14 convention years. The average of the two conventions (in purple) is heavily affected by patterns of Republican usage: the highest level of use (Republican and averaged across both parties) was in 1960, followed by 2004, 1964 and 1988. The lowest average use was in 2000, followed by 1972. Democratic usage was not as varied as Republican usage; the rises and falls were not as large, and the range was comparatively small: between 3 and 7.33 average uses per speech per convention. By contrast, Republicans ranged widely between 1.33 and 27 average uses per speech per convention. Republicans almost always exceeded Democrats in their reliance on freedom terms. Only in 2000 did Democratic usage exceed Republican, and they were close in 1968, 1972, 1980 and 1996. The years of greatest divergence between parties were 1960, 1964, 1988, and 2004, usually reflecting unusually high Republican usage rather than unusually low Democratic usage.

These patterns may reflect the use of certain kinds of freedom terms. From the above, I speculate that the peak of 2004 may reflect freedoms defined in relation to terrorism, and the peaks of 1960 and 1964 may reflect freedoms defined in relation to the Communism. Perhaps the valley of 1972 reflects the post-Vietnam era, in which speakers anticipated that the public would be less swayed by messages about freedom defined in terms of a foreign enemy. These hypotheses are supported by Figures 6 and 7, which show that in 1960, most of the Republican and Democratic references to freedom concerned Communism, and that in 2004, most of the Republican references to freedom concerned non-Communist entities and there was a rise in Democratic references to the same. Among Democrats (Figure 7) there are no other notable peaks and valleys. However, among Republicans (Figure 6), there were rises in freedom talk about Communism in 1988 and 1992, and then again in 2004. In 1988, all three Republican speakers addressed Communism (George H.W. Bush, Dan Quayle, and
Thomas H. Kean) linking their campaign to relevant policies of the Reagan administration.

The 1992 rise reflects a single speech by George H. W. Bush about the fall of the Berlin wall; the 2004 rise reflects a single speech by Zell Miller, in which he talks about the war on terror and Iraq war in the context of U.S. Cold War and other military actions. The 2004 rise in non-Communist freedom discourse reflects speeches by all three sampled speeches for that year (George W. Bush, Dick Cheney, and Zell Miller).

Figure 6. Republican Freedom Terms: All Freedom Terms, Terms Related to Communism, and Terms Related to Non-Communist Entities
Figure 7. Democratic Freedom Terms: All Freedom Terms, Terms Related to Communism, and Terms Related to Non-Communist Entities

Although rises and falls are more easily seen with smaller y-axis units, Figure 7 is calibrated to Figure 6 for the purpose of comparison.

Speakers were more likely to invoke foreign definitions of freedom before 1968 and after 1996. Figure 8 shows the ratio of foreign definitions to domestic definitions of freedom for all speakers (again, average terms per speaker not raw totals). Convention speeches tended to define freedom in terms of foreign issues more than domestic issues from 1952-1964 (ratio>1), then domestic issues more than foreign issues from 1968 to 1996 (ratio<1), then again with a greater emphasis on foreign issues in 2000 and 2004 (ratio>1). The fall in the relative reliance on freedom defined in a foreign context could pattern could be due to the unpopularity of the Vietnam War and the absence of major armed conflicts. The 2004 rise can be attributed to the war on terrorism and the Iraq war; many speakers focused on these themes. The 2000 rise is difficult to explain substantively, and may be an artifact of the
overall lull in freedom talk that year (see Figure 5): minor differences in freedom talk are exaggerated when presented as a ratio.\textsuperscript{17}

![Figure 8. Ratio of Foreign Freedom to Domestic Freedom, Averaged Across Both Conventions](image)

Were there any patterns in the use of other kinds of freedom, not related to international conflict? Domestic freedoms included those coded as political, economic, related to discrimination, and miscellaneous smaller categories. 1972 was a low point for freedom defined in terms of domestic freedoms, such as political domestic affairs (Figure 9). Perhaps the close association of the word “freedom” with Communism contaminated it for other uses, even when those uses were not associated with war. In 1968 and 1972, some speakers did continue to talk about freedom in relation to Communism, but domestic freedoms were more dominant. In 1968 there was a small rise in definitions of freedom as undesirable or insufficient (lavender line), but the criticism was not directed at proponents of war. Indeed, in 1968 one speaker was more critical of freedoms exercised by protesters.

\textsuperscript{17} In 2000 a total of only 14 freedom terms were used by 6 speakers at both conventions: 8 foreign and 6 domestic.
(Inouye 1968 - DKN, p. 23), and another focused on domestic issues such as inequality (Muskie 1968 - DVP, p. 23). Undesirable freedom was higher in 1976, reflecting Republican concerns about “free-spending” politicians and Democratic concerns about freedom as opposed to inequality, the common good, and miscellaneous other topics. Political freedom (orange line) was relatively high till 1964, fell in 1968 and 1972, rose in 1976 probably reflecting the bicentennial, then declined to a low point in 2000, to rise again in 2004. Freedom defined in connection with discrimination (pink line) was fairly consistent but never very popular. Economic freedom terms (green line) were almost always more common than discrimination freedom terms, but usually less common than political freedom terms except in 1980, 1988, 1996 and 2000. In 1988 economic freedom overtook political freedom due to Republican praise for “the Reagan-Bush recipe of low taxes and economic freedom” (Kean 1988 - RKN), and in 1996 it was due to Republican emphasis on similar themes (Dole 1996 - RP, see elaboration on p. 31) and Democratic tax-free savings plans. I do not present trend lines for Republican and Democratic conventions because the numbers are so small that patterns observed might be misleading.
As described in the earlier section on speech-level data, Republicans were more likely to use vague freedom terms. Year-level data show the same tendency. Although these terms are relatively rare and the scale of Figure 10 magnifies rises and falls, some patterning is clear – the highest convention level was in 2004 by Republicans. The second highest was at the 1984 Republican convention, followed by the 1988. Neither party used much of this language in the 2000 conventions. Again, a decline in freedom terminology was apparent in the 1972 election year. (For a graph of vague foreign terms only, see Figure A-5 in Appendix A. Note a rise in average vague foreign-related freedom by Republicans in 1968; this reflects 5 mentions by Nixon-RP.)
Figure 10. Vague Freedom Terms Used by Republicans and Democrats.

Discussion

Like all studies, this one has limitations. I excluded terms that were conceptually similar to liberty and freedom if they did not have the roots “free-“ and “liber-“. I used freedom and liberty words interchangeably, even though they have different linguistic roots (Fischer 2005, Patterson 1991) and some argue that they can be distinguished (Parekh 2005), though perhaps not by the average American audience (Fischer 2005). I gave equal importance to simple slogans like “tax-free” savings plan and complex meditations of the meaning of American freedom over the centuries. My analytic approach limited me to one code per freedom term, even when I saw more than one possible meaning. Future studies could take advantage of “fuzzy set” statistical analysis to analyze a term’s multiple “membership” in different code sets (Ragin 2000). Even if I had applied multiple codes to each term, my method of analysis necessitates simple categories and my large sample makes nuanced analysis impractical. I could not standardize the amount of historical nor textual
context to consider when choosing a code, and took statements at their face value rather than considering who said them (Kuklinski & Hurley 1996), nor whether statements were congruent with the speaker’s platform or actions. Although all sampled speeches were televised, I only analyze the words, not the speaker’s delivery and body language, visual imagery on stage (banners, photographs), engineered audience reactions, camera angles, and other features that are part of televisual communication. The relationships found are statistically significant but do not explain much of the variation found in these speeches; the total word count of a speech explained more of the variation in freedom talk than many (perhaps all) of the variables I examined. Lastly, the effect of these words on listeners may be negligible because factors related to the production, distribution, and reception of the speeches may matter more than the speeches themselves (Griswold 1994, Iyengar 2005).

This study found freedom language in most speeches. Freedom, with rare exceptions, was a positive value. It was frequently identified with the United States and its people and with the speaker’s policies and political party. Most freedom language could be classified as some “type” of freedom, because the speaker defined it explicitly or implicitly by presenting it in a certain context. Some types of freedom or liberation were largely absent from these speeches, even though they are well-known in American popular culture, past and present, such as women’s liberation, gay liberation, “free love,” Christian freedom (Foner 1998, Fischer 2005). Some types were present but rare: freedom associated with the civil rights movement was mentioned less often than I had expected, and freedom from poverty was so rare that only 5 speakers mentioned it at all. In U.S. political discourse, “freedom from poverty” is not a common concept; presumably this would be different in a non-democratic, non-capitalist society (Gallie 1955-56, Parekh 2005).
About half of the time, speakers defined freedom in opposition to a foreign enemy or in an international context. Except in 2004, this enemy was usually Communist during the 14 time points over 52 years studied. When speakers invoked freedom as opposed to foreign enemies, they usually did not specify if the desired freedom was political, economic, or something else. This led me to create different codes for foreign and domestic contexts, despite conceptual overlap. Perhaps discourse about a common enemy does not require as much specificity as discourse about a fellow American political party or candidate; listeners may need less convincing that the speaker’s version of freedom is true when the contrast is foreign. According to Edelman (1971), “In place of a complicated empirical world, men hold to a relatively few, simple, archetypal myths, of which the conspiratorial enemy and the omnicompetent hero-savior are the central ones” (p. 83). If the United States stands as the hero-savior of freedom in a dichotomized world (Bostdorff 2003, Flanagan 2004), not much explanation is needed. It may be sufficient to define ‘them’ as enemies of freedom (Lazar & Lazar 2004). Indeed, some discourse about freedom was clearly in opposition to a foreign enemy but was so vague that I could not identify who it was.

Was freedom used as a frame, the way Lakoff describes “relief” from taxes? Yes and no. I had expected freedom almost always to evoke a subject who ought to be free from obstruction or other control. For most of the freedom types it was possible to identify who ought to be free and from what, even when it was not explicit (e.g. citizens free from government power, taxation, or discrimination). Freedoms associated with prosperity and individual development, and freedom as opposed to Communism or another foreign threat could conceivably imply “obstacles” if that concept were stretched to encompass any contrary force or opposite. However, nearly 20% of freedom terms were so non-specific that they could only be described by their context (foreign or domestic) and sometimes not
even that (ambiguous). These presented freedom as a value or timeless ideal without tying it to any particular situation and cannot be thought of as frames à la Lakoff. Values and timeless ideals were used in vague and non-vague ways; when tied to specific situations I categorized them as one of the non-vague freedom types. Freedom described as an ideal value could be said to frame American purposes, policies, and people as models for or liberators of the world. Alternatively one could abandon the “frame” framework and describe them as “ideographs” and “floating signifiers” (McGee 1980), values (Rokeach 1973), cultural tools (Swidler 1986), metaphors (Edelman 1971), and symbols of peoplehood (Smith 2003, Hart 2003, Beasley 2004). In any case, vague and ambiguous uses of freedom may unify diverse meanings of freedom and liberty under one abstract umbrella. A lack of definition may be an advantage in persuasive communication because an undefined freedom can evoke multiple freedoms simultaneously, allowing the listener to fill in the details (Biemer & Lyberg 2003, Eisenberg 1984 as cited by Bettinghaus & Cody 1994).

Republicans consistently used more freedom terminology than Democrats, even when controlling for total words of the speech. Republicans also varied more than Democrats in the use of freedom terminology, contributing all of the outliers and the most dramatic rises and falls at conventions over time. Republicans at their lowest were near the average Democratic level of freedom talk; Republican volatility was due to unusually high amounts of freedom talk, not unusually low. Democratic conventions tended to include a small but consistent average number of freedom terms. Perhaps this reflects the public code of civil society posited by Alexander and Smith (1993); a minimum level of freedom talk may be appropriate for a convention (even though a few speakers used no freedom terms). If Republicans can “own” issues (Petrocik, Benoit & Hansen 2003) they may also “own” values and value-laden words. If they are perceived to own “freedom,” Democrats may avoid emphasizing freedom.
because evoking freedom might also evoke Republicanism (Lakoff 2004), or because they may not want to “sound like” Republicans, or because Democratic ideology or ideologies may favor different values (Gerring 1998, Barker 2005, Brewer 2003).

Because Republicans uttered more freedom words, they would logically be expected to invoke more of some type of freedom or another than Democrats. I found that they talked more than Democrats about freedom in terms of political individualism, foreign enemies (specifically Communism and unnamed or vague foreign enemies), and the economy, though only when the economy was broadly defined to include prosperity, free trade, inflation, and miscellaneous other economic concerns. Republicans were no more likely than Democrats to invoke the narrower definition of economic freedom as freedom of the free enterprise system, freedom from taxation and of the market from government interference. Democrats were no more likely to frame freedom as freedom from poverty or discrimination.

The framing of freedom as individual political liberty has an interesting history. Americans have traditionally held government in suspicion (Morone 1998), but the now-familiar individualist version of this was first articulated in the 1920s by Republicans in their speeches and party platforms (Gerring 1998, p. 140). Gerring writes that for Republicans before 1920, “[l]iberty and freedom… referred to the freedom of the community more often than the freedom of the individual” (Gerring 1998, p. 104). The early Republican emphasis on order as opposed to individualist anarchy recalls some of the excerpts I coded as critical of liberty, as with “the Mormons must learn that the liberty of the individual ceases where the rights of society begin” (James G. Blaine 1884, nomination acceptance letter quoted by Gerring 1998, p. 104). Present-day theorists critical of contemporary individualist freedom rhetoric might find these earlier attitudes toward liberty illuminating. The democratic vision may require more than freedom from government power because some individual sacrifice
for the common good is necessary (Allen 2004) and because government power protects the freedom of minorities. The individualist anti-government freedom message is sometimes linked to the founding fathers, though some have argued that because the founding fathers were actually federalists they might not agree (Morone 1998). Theorists from Marxian and Foucauldian traditions also destabilize a neat distinction between free and subject individuals; the concept of the politically free self is not a self free from power but a different form of power (Belsey 1998, Rose 1999). Future studies could examine freedom talk since 1790, with attention to themes such as order, self-government, individual sacrifice, community, and the benefits of government.

The most striking and consistent difference between Republicans and Democrats was the greater Republican use of vague freedom in contrast to a foreign entity. All other differences were explainable by one control variable or another (political individualism, economic freedom, Communism, discrimination). Future studies should refine the definition and measurement of “vague” freedom to the extent possible in order to confirm this finding. If this finding is valid, it suggests a number of unsettling interpretations: a nativism in which “foreign” stands in for “enemy of freedom”, a willingness to lump the other countries of the world together as an undifferentiated, un-American mass, and a “strategic ambiguity” that encourages listeners to imagine the enemy of their choice. It would be unfair to assume the worst based on these data; vague foreign freedom could simply reflect speaking for America or “narrating the nation” in very general terms (Bhabha 1990) by linking events across time as instantiations of freedom. Future research should not only confirm these findings but identify if they appear more in some circumstances than others.

I did not find an increase or decrease in any kind of freedom over time. Others have documented an increase in the privatization of civil society (Somers 2001) and “market
fundamentalism” (Somers & Block 2005), but these trends are not reflected in freedom discourse for this sample. References to Communism were higher during the 1960s-era Cold War, and references to non-Communist enemies were higher in 2004 during the Iraq War and War on Terror, and the ratio of foreign-defined to domestically-defined freedom was higher in these two periods. These findings suggest that some wartime periods generate more foreign-defined freedom talk, but only if the early Cold War were distinguished from the later 1960s and early 1970s, and from the 1980s. These findings are roughly compatible with a study of Cold War military rhetoric, in which there is a temporary lull the late 1960s and early 1970s, followed by a rise in a “second Cold War” (Dalby 1990). I speculate that the Vietnam War may have reduced the perceived persuasiveness of all kinds of freedom talk temporarily in 1968 and 1972, and in a more lasting way for foreign-defined freedom talk. Near the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1988 and 1992, Communist-related freedom talk was used extensively by Republicans but not by Democrats. Republicans may have been more inclined to emphasize it because the Wall “fell” during the Bush administration. Perhaps there is a similar pattern to the association of “progress” with nuclear power; after its dangers were apparent this frame was less often used (Gamson & Modigliani 1989). One interpretation of these data is that those whose audiences were traumatized by Vietnam personally or politically may have been inclined to avoid any freedom talk because it evoked Vietnam-related freedom talk (as with a “preemptive metaphor,” Schudson 1989). After all, in 1968 and 1972, speeches described that war as “senseless”, “savage”, “immoral” and focused on achieving peace and ending it honorably (Nixon (1968-RP) was an exception). However, this interpretation would be incorrect because it ignores the rise in freedom terminology associated with the civil rights movement (Rodgers 1987). A better interpretation might be that the popular, common meaning of freedom changed, and that presidential nominating
convention speakers endeavored to avoid that new meaning. Future research could assess whether keywords associated with traumatic events decline in use, and how popular uses of keywords diverge or converge with political uses.

 Freedoms were linked to other freedoms, past and present. When talking about the War on Terror, Republican speakers invoked freedoms defined in relation to Communism and World War II. Some speakers likened Communism to American race-based slavery. Freedom from taxation, government power, religious discrimination and other freedoms were linked to the American Revolution, and all of these were linked to foreign-defined freedom. These speakers used memories of the past to describe and legitimate the present (Noon 2004, Schudson 1989, Olick & Robbins 1998). Freedom may derive its very meaning from its association with these events, as with the concept of the “ideograph” (McGee 1980). Future studies could identify patterns in the selection of historical events to convey messages about freedom, a complement to similar studies of the changing understanding over time of a single historical figure (Schwartz & Schuman 2005 on Abraham Lincoln, Fine 1996 on Warren Harding) or event (Wagner-Pacifici & Schwartz on Vietnam War memorial).

 The language about freedom and liberty during the time period 1952-2004 is linked to the past in another way as well: it borrows from earlier rhetoric. According to Rodgers, “Roosevelt’s 1941 image of a world rent down the middle – ‘divided between human slavery and human freedom’ [was] slipped unchanged into place as the controlling metaphor of the Cold War.” (1987 p. 215, quoting Roosevelt). Before Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson’s rhetoric over the course of World War I described the U.S. not simply as an example of liberty but as the champion of liberty, sacrificing for the good of the world (Flanagan 2004). Freedom language has been a cultural tool for generating support for wars in the 20th century,
and speakers rely on language from the past as well as examples from the past to describe and presumably to justify foreign action.

The repetition of freedom language across time and the linkage of events across time via the trope of freedom combine to create a sense of a persistent, transcendent essence. Some speakers explicitly linked the United States to a divine purpose, a long tradition in American politics (Bellah 1967, Coles 2002). I felt that the sense of transcendence was communicated even in the absence of explicitly religious language because different events were united across centuries as manifestations or expressions of a single principle. This gave the sense of timelessness and eternity, and evoked a quasi-divine perspective: a god’s eye view of an underlying essence across apparently diverse manifestations. Future research could identify when speakers describe historical events as instantiations of freedom, when they link one instantiation to another, and whether religious terminology is used.

Does freedom have a meaning that persists despite being used in different ways? Most people would probably want to hold onto a meaning of freedom that is related to democracy. However, philosopher Theodor Adorno stated in 1951 that “People have so manipulated the concept of freedom that it finally boils down to the right of the stronger and richer to take from the weaker and poorer whatever they have left.” (Adorno 1993 as quoted by Foner 1998, p. xvi). Eric Foner countered that “the greatest mass movement of this century reinvigorated the language of freedom with its freedom rides, freedom schools, and the insistent cry, ‘Freedom Now.‘” (1998, p. xvi); “freedom” had retained its ability to inspire democratic political action. Rodgers predicted that, like other keywords in American

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18 Milton Rokeach defined values such as freedom to refer “to a single belief of a very specific kind. It concerns a desirable mode of behavior or end-state that has a transcendental quality to it, guiding actions, attitudes, judgments, and comparisons across specific objects and situations and beyond immediate goals to more ultimate goals” (Rokeach 1973, p. 18).
history, the use of freedom language by the non-elite Civil Rights movement would render it less useful to elites: “Appropriated by Americans far outside the corridors of power, [freedom] had been thrust back into political talk, outwardly unchanged, as the tool of radically transformed purposes - only to be blunted and spent at last.” (Rodgers 1987, p. 222). Contrary to Rodgers’s expectation, freedom language has been revitalized in elite discourse. If public dissatisfaction with the Iraq War continues, it will be interesting to see whether the term is abandoned, and whether, when and how it will be taken up again.
APPENDIX A: Additional Figures

Figure A-1. Total Word Counts for 88 Speeches.

Figure A-2: Percentage Freedom Terms per Convention. (Note that 1964 is the high point when the y-axis is percentage freedom terms per total words, rather than average freedom terms per speech. Speeches in 1964 had an unusually small number of words, see Figure A-4.)
Figure A-3. All Freedom Terms (Raw number)

Figure A-4 Average Total Words Purple = Average across both parties, Red= Republican Average Blue = Democratic Average
Figure A-5  Vague Freedom Terms, Republican and Democrat. The 1968 rise in average Republican use of vague foreign freedom reflects Nixon’s use of 5 such terms. Only one other speaker used such terms that year, and he used only one (Evans 1968 - RKN). Patterns should not be over-interpreted; small differences may be exaggerated because the y-scale is small.
APPENDIX B: Speeches Sampled


Humphrey, H. H. (1968 [1964]). Remarks of Honorable Hubert H. Humphrey, Democratic Candidate for Vice President. In Democratic National Committee (Ed.), Official report of the proceedings of the Democratic National Convention, resulting in the nomination of Lyndon B. Johnson of Texas for President, and in the nomination of Hubert H. Humphrey of Minnesota for Vice President (pp. 470-471). Atlantic City, NJ: [publisher].


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