The Europeanization of Bosnia and Herzegovina

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Abstract

Caleb Thomas Ritter: The Europeanization of Bosnia and Herzegovina
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The main forces shaping Bosnian domestic politics today are the Office of High Representative (OHR), the national level political parties, the sub-national actors, and the Bosnian people themselves. The question this thesis seeks to answer is where, to what extent and why has Europeanization succeeded or failed on Bosnia’s path towards EU membership? To do this we will evaluate the influence Europeanization has had on the domestic decision making process and the institutional structures within the four levels of governance mentioned above. The following examination of the domestic actors in Bosnia through the lens of Europeanization is done in an attempt to highlight the success and failures of each individual group. I argue that two of these main actors, the Office of High Representative and the nationalistic political parties, have stifled the process of Europeanization. However, progress has been made by the sub-national actors in initiating the process of Europeanization and that the conditions exist in which a positive discourse could have a substantial impact influencing the citizens of Bosnia.
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Introduction

The situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) is quite a precarious one. The country lies in the heart of the war-torn Balkans and even today, its ethnically divided population is a reminder of the atrocities of the past. Though the war in Bosnia and the siege of Sarajevo ended over 12 years ago, the country is still struggling to form a new identity, a European identity, and progress toward eventual EU membership has been slow. Ethnic tension runs high in certain areas of the country and the main political parties are still very nationalistic in nature. Ethnic politics and corruption gridlocks the democratic process and hampers Bosnia from making the kind of reforms that the EU and other international organization so badly desire to see. The main political parties representing the three ethnic groups in BiH are reluctant to let go of the status quo because the political elite benefit, in both power and influence, by keeping the country ethnically divided, to the detriment of the citizens they represent. In many respects, it is still the International Community (IC) that effectively governs the country. Fearing that the political situation will slip back towards an aggressive confrontation, control of the country has yet to be restored to the Bosnian people.

The main forces shaping Bosnian domestic politics today are the Office of High Representative (OHR), the national level political parties, the sub-national actors, and the Bosnian people themselves. The question this thesis seeks to answer is where, to what extent and why has Europeanization succeeded or failed on Bosnia’s path towards EU membership? To do this we will evaluate the influence Europeanization has had on the domestic decision
making process and the institutional structures within the four levels of governance mentioned above. All have had an impact on the current state of Bosnia; however they sometimes pull the country in opposite directions. While they all understand that membership in the European Union is the only viable future for Bosnia, their efforts are not coordinated and their objectives are not always aligned. Though some positive results have been achieved and Bosnia is clearly closer to EU membership today than in the past, the decisions taken by all parties on this journey have resulted in negative consequences as well. The following examination of the domestic actors in Bosnia through the lens of Europeanization is done in an attempt to highlight the success and failures of each individual group. In addition, we look to determine where the goals of each group overlaps and perhaps shed light on how Bosnia and Herzegovina can construct a new way forward. I argue that two of these main actors, the Office of High Representative and the nationalistic political parties, have stifled the process of Europeanization. However, progress has been made by the sub-national actors in initiating the process of Europeanization and that the conditions exist in which a positive discourse could have a substantial impact influencing the citizens of Bosnia.

The EU and other European actors have been intimately involved in running the country of Bosnia for over 12 years now. Yet, after over a decade of direct involvement in the democracy building process, more so than in any other European country, Bosnia is still considered to be near the bottom of the list of potential Member States. There are signs that Europeanization has taken hold in Bosnia, though one would expect a more substantial impact after so many years of EU influence. The evidence to follow will support several reasons for this. First, the Office of High Representative has failed to create a positive
discourse in the country regarding Europe and governance reform has not taken place because of the extensive use of the HR’s power. Instead the OHR has become viewed by Bosnians as a foe, rather than an ally on the path towards Europe and future prosperity. Secondly, the national parties, primarily those of the Serbs and Croats, resist institutional change. Instead they have invoked a discourse calling for what amounts to the dissolution of Bosnia. The national parties have emerged as the most obstructive forces to a Europeanized Bosnia. It is their actions and inactions that have forced the OHR to wield its authority in the manner that it has. Still, hope exists that the Europeanization process can succeed in Bosnia. There are signs that sub-national actors are susceptible to adopting a manner of governance very much in line with the EU’s views of democracy. These actors not only desire to see changes made in governance, institutional structures and the discourse of the country, they are willing to work for it as well. Lastly, we will see that the despite the impact that the war in Bosnia has had on creating a fractured society, the citizens of Bosnia do believe in an identity that goes beyond Bosniak, Serb or Croat. They understand that this brand of politics is futile and do in fact have the ability to move past this debilitating way of thinking.

The first section of this paper seeks to define Europeanization as well as provide some theoretical components of the term. This is done in order to better understand how the impact of Europeanization can be recognized. In addition, given that Bosnia in not a current member state, a comparison of the Europeanization process in member states versus candidate countries will be presented to distinguish between the relationships the EU has with each type of country. The second section will deal with the history of Bosnia since the fall of communism in 1989 followed by an account of the EU’s relationship with Bosnia. The final section will present the argument regarding the Europeanization process in Bosnia
by examining the Office of High Representative, the national political parties, the sub-national actors and citizens of Bosnia.
Europeanization

Defining Europeanization

Any country attempting to join the EU will undoubtedly face pressure to fundamentally change the manner in which they govern their country as well as the laws that govern many aspects of the economy and the polity. Europeanization has become the popular catch phrase to explain the transitions taking place within countries all over Europe. One must be careful though when using Europeanization as a research method. If used to loosely it can become difficult to determine what exactly Europeanization is. Radaelli terms this as conceptual stretching. It is therefore important to distinguish between what Europeanization is and is not. Though it is closely associated, Europeanization is not European integration, convergence, or harmonization (Radaelli, 2000). It is not exactly a model to be followed nor can it yet be called a theory; however it does build upon theoretical assumptions. Europeanization is more than just a simple term; it implies a process that initiates political and structural change in member states and non member states alike. What differentiates it from classical integration theories is that the focus of Europeanization is not its influence on the European political arena but rather its affect on the domestic level institutions and governance structures. Graziano gives us a broad, background definition of Europeanization. He defines Europeanization as “the domestic adaptation to European regional integration”. He also lays out several important factors to be taken into consideration when using Europeanization as a research method. He notes that
Europeanization is not just a top-down information transfer. The main focus is on domestic change, and domestic change can be influenced by many other factors other than the EU. The effect of EU directives and legislation, once transposed into the domestic system, can then create what Graziano describes as horizontal effects. These are indirect influences created by the interaction of domestic actors upon each other as they adapt to European regional integration pressures. Furthermore, he points out that the impact of Europeanization is not limited to just the policy realm, but can impact all aspects of domestic society including discourse and identities. Lastly, Europeanization is not just a process that affects EU member states; the scope of Europeanization studies includes the impact it has on countries outside the European Union (Graziano, 2006).

To take Graziano’s groundwork a step further, we can look at Radaelli’s definition of Europeanization as it more accurately captures the depth of the process. Radaelli’s defines Europeanization as

“the process of a) construction, b) diffusion and c) institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’ and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the EU policy process and then incorporated in the logic of domestic (national and subnational) discourse, political structures and public policies” (Radaelli, 2004).

Within this definition we can see that Europeanization is the process by which EU institutions and ideas are transferred to domestic actors at all levels of governance, at which point they decide for themselves what they are going to do with it. It is the domestic actors who make the final call, they determine how to react to the pressures and use the information
they are given. Thus, Europeanization will never look the same in any two given countries and there is no guarantee that the any country will adapt to EU measures in the manner that Brussels originally envisioned.

Where to look for Europeanization

We now have a working definition as to what Europeanization is, but before evaluating to what extent this process has taken hold in Bosnia, we must also determine where within the domestic setting we can observe changes due to Europeanization. In addition, because our country of interest is Bosnia, there needs to be clarification between the Europeanization of an EU member state and the Europeanization of a non-member state. The process may still be the same, but the results will vary depending on the countries relationship to the EU. Consequently, it is important to make these further distinctions when evaluating the Europeanization process on a country. One can not simply compare Poland to Germany or Bosnia to Romania in hopes that one country will mirror the other and then determine whether or not Europeanization was successful. It doesn’t work like that. There is no one EU member state that represents the whole of Europe. Every country is unique and every country institutes the directives from Brussels in their own manner. That is one of the beauties of the European Union. It is not attempting to create a union of cookie cutter countries. Each one reflects its distinct characteristics. However, each country must still show the capability to incorporate into the law the EU’s *acquis communautaire* by creating and reforming the institutions needed to do so. In addition, new member states must meet the Copenhagen Criteria demonstrating the stability of their institutions to ensure democracy, the
rule of law and meet their responsibilities to other member states in creating an environment in which political, economic and monetary union can exist (European Commission, 2008). So, while all countries, both member states and candidate countries, must institute the same requirements and abide by the same directives, the final outcome of the process is not going to look the same and will therefore not be the indicator of the level of Europeanization. Instead, to determine where and to what extent Europeanization is taking place, we will examine the change, or lack of change, taking place in three specific domains. These domains are that of governance, institutional structures, and discourse (Radaelli, 2004).

The first area that we can look for changes due to Europeanization is in the governance structures in EU member states and candidate countries. While the term government includes the public officials elected by the state and the state owned institutions, the term governance implies a much wider circle of participants. The governance of a country in today’s world can not be done solely by the government. The EU’s view of governance is that many other actors need to be included to reach the best outcome. These actors include markets, private businesses, NGO’s, public watchdogs, private citizens, community organizations as well as local and national governments. Together, all these actors need to coordinate their efforts, provide each other with information and work towards common goals with all their interests taken into consideration. While this type of cooperation may be the ideal way to govern, it is by no means an easy feat to accomplish. It is in this exact area where Europeanization comes into play. Well before the EU, all these institutions, levels of government and private actors existed, however, there was not always a driving force compelling them to work so closely together. Europeanization is the response
by these actors to adapt to EU policies in order to gain access to EU funds and economic opportunities (Paraskevopoulos, 2006).

Perhaps the biggest incentive the EU has to offer is money. Structural Funds are made available to help countries and regions improve their infrastructure and help them cope with job losses due to the changing nature of the economy. However, in order to receive these funds, the EU desires that a system of multi-level governance is in place. The reasoning behind this requirement is that as countries develop an advanced system of multi-level governance the EU, national, sub national, and local actors will become more familiar with each other. In turn it improves the dissemination of information between all actors at all levels. It is believed that with the involvement of these multiple actors, encompassing the views of all aspects of society, the economic efficiency of the region will be improved. In addition, this networking of actors is supposed to improve the nation’s institutional capacity (Parson, 2007). So, one area to examine the impact of Europeanization on a country is by looking at the changes within their system of governance.

A second area in which we can see the forces of Europeanization influencing a country is by looking at the institutional changes taking place. One component which has been argued to increase the level of institutional Europeanization within a given country is ‘goodness of fit’. Goodness of fit refers to the institutional structure of the country prior to its attempts to change in order to meet EU requirements. The idea is that that some countries are in a better position to adapt to EU requirements than others. Thus, they are a better fit for EU policy. The EU regional policy focuses on regions within a country and in order to receive structural funds, they require that local and regional institutions are in place to
develop, manage and implement the proposed projects. However, in some countries, especially eastern European countries and former communist states, there are no regional governmental institutions. Therefore, these countries must create them. Another factor that may make it difficult for some countries to adapt is the amount of veto points in the system. A country with many possible veto points may have a more difficult time instituting the required changes. This is because certain actors with veto power who do not believe that the changes should be made, or perhaps will lose power because of the changes, will prevent the process from moving forward. So, in countries with many veto points and poor pre-existing institutional structure, Europeanization may be more difficult to achieve (Paraskevopoulos, 2006).

A third and final area that we can observe the influence of Europeanization is within the discourse prevalent in a country. The discourse is the manner in which different actors, at all levels of governance, discuss and view the EU and other European influences. The manner in which the EU carries out its policies and even its overarching vision of Europe can influence domestic actors, altering their vision of their countries place within the EU. A new institutional structure will have far more impact if those who design and implement it believe in the EU’s logic behind it. By looking at the discourse coming out of a country or even a segment of that country, one can obtain an understanding of their hearts and minds. Do they support the ideas embodied by EU membership or are they rejecting them? In this manner, we can evaluate the level of Europeanization by studying political meaning that groups are identifying with the EU project (Radaelli, 2000).
Europeanization Compared: Member States vs Candidate Countries

As noted above though, the influence of Europeanization plays out differently in member states and non-member states. Within all three areas we identified, governance, institutional changes and discourse, how far the power of the European Union reaches depends largely on its relationship to the individual country. The EU has several ‘steering mechanism’ to influence the process of Europeanization (Bauer, 2007). Where along this spectrum the country in question lies determines both the legal authority possessed by Brussels to impose changes as well as the likely desire of the country to engage in changing their laws or behaviors.

In the field of governance, the EU can use compliance pressures to force domestic bureaucracies to change their organizational structure, fundamentally altering the manner in which both public and private institutions conduct business and impose upon them new means of regulation. The tool of compliance refers to the legally binding rules set forth by the European Union which all member states must institute at a domestic level. These rules are not very flexible and are designed to ensure a fair playing field in the European common market. These regulations are often in connection with the protection of workers rights, in relation to consumer policies and in setting environmental standards. The EU can exert substantial amounts of pressure using the tool of compliance and can punish non conformity with sanctions and fines (Bauer, 2007). In member states, compliance is a powerful tool as it is legally binding. However, while member states have already agreed to allow the EU to regulate certain aspects of their countries, they sometimes drag their feet because changes can be costly or just possibly not popular. As they are already members of the EU, the
pressure to immediately conform is always balanced against the domestic political cost of making those changes, thus they try to get around things when possible. Member states can use tactics such as bargaining and facilitated coordination to influence the process and mitigate the negative consequences they foresee by complying with certain rules. The strength of their position as current member states allows them to maintain their structures of governance despite the Europeanization pressures (Radaelli, 2000, 2004). These options are not available to candidate countries.

In a candidate country such as Bosnia, compliance is much more forceful because non-compliance could result in the loss of the chance to become a full member. Candidate countries are under more pressure to comply and make the changes required by the EU even if they are unpopular measures. Since the 2004 enlargement, the EU has imposed stricter adherence to the letter of the law. This is part because of enlargement fatigue but also because new member states that were allowed to enter without complete compliance, stopped implementing reform or even reversed achievements once the EU lost the force of conditionality. Case in point, Poland and Slovakia, once admitted to the EU, began backsliding on their commitments to professionalize their civil services (Pridham, 2008). The EU has far more leverage and power in relation to a candidate country. However, once in the EU, they sometimes stop implementing the regulations at the same speed and with the same enthusiasm. Romania and Bulgaria both failed to combat corruption and enforce law reforms at the EU level of standard but were still both admitted; now the issues continue to linger (Bauer, 2007). As a result of EU’s overestimation of the progress of past candidate countries, the standard for new candidate countries like Bosnia has been raised.
With regards to institutional change, a second tool the EU can use is competition based regulations; obligatory rules related to the common market. The idea is that the incentive to remain competitive in the economic market will override national institutions resistance to change. The economic efficiency of a countries institutions and bureaucracies compared to those of other competing countries determines the cost of non compliance. Essentially, the EU asks that certain economic related policies be changed in order to create more competitiveness or remove barriers to the free functioning of the market. Though the directives are obligatory, the manner in which each country carries them out is left up to each country. Sometimes the EU provides a particular model, sometimes it does not. In member states, the rate at which they adopt the measures and how they carry them out largely depends on actors outside of the political sphere. The economic winners and losers of the changes apply political pressure and shape the nature of the institutional and administrative changes (Bauer, 2007). For some countries adopting a European model is easy, as their existing structures are very much already in line. This is an example of the ‘goodness of fit’ theory. However some countries have serious pains in changing their existing structures and perhaps resist it all together. The rate of change will depend on where between these to points the country lies (Radaelli, 2000).

In candidate countries, the motivation to be competitive in the common market is a large incentive to make institutional changes. Most candidate countries are in some manner participating in the common market prior to EU membership so they understand the importance of being competitive especially considering they are competing against larger more advanced European economies. In addition, economic prosperity is generally a primary reason that countries want to join the EU in the first place. Candidate countries also have
another large incentive to make structural changes in the area of competition. Because they know that once they are full member of the EU, they will be eligible for massive amounts of EU structural funds, candidate countries want to make sure that they have created the required NUTS II territorial statistical units required by the EU to receive funding (Bauer, 2007). However, it has also been argued that once candidate countries become member states, they will see that older member states have not made all the obligatory institutional changes themselves. They will then try to return to the status quo of the past. This argument does not have much support though, as the alterations to institutions required by the Copenhagen Criteria are strictly monitored by the EU during accession and can not easily be reversed. In addition, many new interest groups, NGO’s and sub-national actors acquire new economic and political powers due to the alterations and will not easily allow things to backslide (Pridham, 2008). Plus, many of the candidate countries from eastern European countries do not have existing institutions at all, so once they create them it is unlikely that they will dismantle them. All these factors combine to produce a strong competitive pressure to make any needed institutional adaptations to enjoy the economic opportunities that come with the European common market.

In regards to evaluating the effects of Europeanization through discourse, the results here will also vary depending on whether a country is an existing member or a candidate country. To influence the Europeanization of discourse in member states, the tool of communication is used. This is done by bringing national regulatory agencies and institutions together at the EU level so that they can share ideas and information about how to solve common problems. The EU hopes that these actors from different nations will come up with new and inventive ways to tackle problematic issues. This EU method is completely
voluntary, no countries are required to participate but rather encouraged to learn from one country’s experience and adapt the ideas to fit in their own domestic setting. In member states, the effectiveness of the communication method depends on how legitimate the ideas are. If the consortium of actors comes up with a genuinely good idea, then member states will be more willing to make institutional changes. This tool of communication is most commonly recognized in the open method of coordination (OMC). Member states are expected to come up with action plans to solve related problems and engage in peer monitoring, constantly exchanging ideas and identifying best practices (Bauer, 2007). By analyzing the discourse, we can see if the member states interactions with the EU have Europeanized them. In Greece and Italy, Europe became the path to normalization and modernization, and thus helped both countries speed up the process to reform monetary and budget policy. In France however, the failure to create a discourse favorable to economic liberalization has led to problems in reforming the welfare system and resulted in protest and public discontent (Radaelli, 2000). Discourse, depending on the manner in which it is Europeanized in member states, can make new ways of doing things more acceptable or more confrontational. Discourse can alter the availability of resources and it can influence the opinions of all actors involved in the governance structure (Radaelli, 2004).

Candidate countries can also be highly influenced by the discourse originating from Brussels. During the accession process, candidate countries are closely tied into the EU network and influenced in many different ways through communication. When ideas are legitimized by a member state it is even more likely that a candidate country will adopt them. Another example of using communication to Europeanize candidate countries can be seen in the twinning project. During this process, member states send representatives to candidate
countries to help them introduce best practices and learn how to transition the structure of their institutions so that they are ready for EU membership (Papadimitriou, 2004). Though none of the suggestions resulting from these relations are mandatory, the pressure on candidate countries to adopt these ideas is substantial. They are still under a microscope to prove their worthiness for full membership. In central and eastern European countries, studies have suggested that the Europeanization of discourse does not extend past the elite of the countries. As a result of this failure to achieve a personal level of Europeanization translates into a weak process of transforming the system governance. It can also result in an outcome of what could be seen as the opposite of Europeanization, Euroskepticism (Hughes, 2008). Discourse thus seems to have mixed results in candidate countries as an effective means of Europeanization.
The Background on Bosnia

Bosnia since 1989

With this in mind, we will now take on the task of delving into the complex world that is Bosnia. The main forces driving domestic politics and thus responsible for the political outcomes are the international community, the national political parties, sub-national actors and the citizens of BiH. Reaching the goal of EU membership depends on how well they adapt to the pressures of Europeanization. Whenever discussing any aspect of Bosnia, the influence of the past must always be taken into consideration. It is unfortunate because Bosnia’s past is not a pleasant one. To some extent, the battle to achieve EU membership can be viewed as Bosnia’s tumultuous past vs. a Europeanized future. The two could not be further from each other. The way forward depends on the political decisions being made at all levels of governance. As we will see, making decisions in Bosnia is extremely complicate, and often times decisions that have been criticized for causing further complications could have been made no other way due to the nature of the ethnic divides in the country. In a way, taking a step forward to solve one issue in Bosnia can simultaneously be seen as taking two steps backwards in solving another. This is the nature of Bosnia.

The current situation in Bosnia stems from the civil war that emerged following the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the fall of communism in 1989. The war saw all three ethnic
groups, Serbians, Croats and Bosnian Muslims, fighting one another and attempting to create ethnically homogeneous enclaves. However, even before the war broke out, the political parties had already begun drawing the ethnic lines that would subsequently divide the nation. In the aftermath of the collapse of the Communist governments of Yugoslavia, the various republics of Yugoslavia began holding the first multi-party elections since the 1920’s. Bosnia followed suit and held elections in December of 1990. Initially, a law banned the formation of political parties around ethnic lines, an ideological holdover from Communism. The constitutional court overruled the law though and national parties were born in Bosnia (Bieber, 2006).

The three primary ethnic groups, Bosnian Muslims (henceforth referred to as Bosniaks), Serbs, and Croats each formed their own ethno-nationalist political parties. In 1991, at the time of the elections, Bosnia was about 45% Bosniak, 35% Serb, and 18% Croat (Bose, 2007). The Boaniaks created the Party of Democratic Action (SDA), the Serbs formed the Serb Democratic Party (SDS) and the Croats established the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ). The three parties garnered 75% of the votes to the surprise of almost all observers. The SDS had very close ties to Milosevic’s government in Serbia and the HDZ was actually a sister party to Tudjman’s HDZ government in Croatia. These close ties played a large influence in the disintegration of Bosnia. In June of 1991, Croatia declared independence from Yugoslavia. Croatia’s large ethnic Serb population revolted against the Tudjman government and civil war broke out in Croatia, much of it right along the Bosnia border. Serbian insurgents backed by Milosevic’s army, the JNA, eventually declared their territory as autonomous and formed the Republic of Serbian Krajina (Bose, 2007). This was
the environment in which Bosnia, geographically between Serbia and Croatia, went forward with declaring its independence as well.

Regarding the matter of Bosnian independence, the SDS was strongly opposed. The HDZ and SDA however, pushed forward. In reality, the HDZ only wanted to declare independence from Yugoslavia so that they could then separate and partition parts of Bosnia off to join Croatia. The issue of independence went to referendum on March 1st, 1992, with the SDS boycotting the vote. Without the Serbs participation, 99% of the voters supported independence (Bieber, 2006). Immediately following the vote, the SDS declared the formation of the Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the HDZ began creating their one ethnically controlled region in western Bosnia and paid little attention to the central government. When the international community recognized Bosnian independence in April, the war began. The SDS began its siege of Sarajevo, supported by men and arms from the JNA. The Serbian army began its campaign of mass murder and expulsion of Bosniaks and Croats from eastern and northwest Bosnia, at one point controlling almost two-thirds of Bosnia (Bieber, 2006).

For a while, the Croatian and Bosniak armies maintained a fragile alliance, but after expelling the Serbs from the Mostar region, the Croatian army, spurred on by their ties to Tudjman’s regime in Croatia, began their own attempt at cleansing the area of Bosniaks. In May of 1993, war broke out in Mostar turning the city, once a symbol of peace and multiculturalism, into a battle field. The fighting between Croats and Bosniaks continued for almost a year until the US finally intervened to negotiate a truce in Washington, DC in early 1994. This was also the beginning of international involvement in the war in Bosnia. The
Bosniak and Croat armies began to recapture much of the lands they had lost and in August of 1995, NATO warplanes began bombing Serb strongholds at the behest of America. After years of shelling and sniping in Sarajevo and following the massacre of over 7000 Bosniaks in Srebrenica by Serb forces, America would no longer stand on the sidelines and engaged to bring the war to an end (Bose, 2007). When the war finally came to a close, somewhere between 100,000 to 300,000 Bosnians were dead or missing. No firm numbers exists, but estimates are that around 50% (some 140,000) of the casualties were Bosniak, 35% (around 97,000) were Serbs, and 10% (about 28,000) were Croats. Over 1.2 million people where forced to flee the country and another 1.1 million were displaced within Bosnia (Bieber, 2006). The demographics of the country had also shifted, leaving the country divided into three ethnically homogeneous regions. The Serbs committed the most atrocious acts, systematically clearing their territory of non Serbs, mostly Bosniaks, through killings or expulsions. Additionally, the Serbs committed the massacre at Srebrenica and killed countless civilians during the siege of Sarajevo. All three groups however, were guilty of perpetrating vicious crimes. Bosniaks tortured and killed hundreds of Serb civilians in prison camps in Tarcin and Celebici and Croats imprisoned and tormented both Serbs and Bosniaks in detention camps in Dretelji near Mostar (Bose, 2007). The war may have been ended, but the scars and animosity between the three groups was no where near reconciled.

The war in Bosnia concluded with the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords on December 14th, 1995. In some respects, the current problems existing in Bosnia stem from the framework of this agreement. In the name of peace and cessation of violence, the Dayton Accords created a divided Bosnia. The Inter-Entity Boundary Line (IEBL) divides Bosnia into two entities, the Republic Srpska (RS) and the Bosniak-Croat Federation (MCF).
RS compromises of 49% of the land and is populated almost entirely by Bosnian Serbs. The remaining 51% of the land is controlled by a Bosniak and Croat ethnic population (Bollens, 2008). While this arrangement ended the war, it has made progress toward EU membership a difficult task. National parties have formed around these same ethnic lines; they maintained separate police forces, had different languages, and for the most part, the two entities remained very independent of each other. The Dayton Accords also set up the framework for a national government consisting of a rotating, tri-partite presidency with one president coming from each of the three ethnic groups, one Bosniak, one Croat and one Serb. Each serves as the chairman for 8 months during the two year presidency (Political Overview, 2007). The Dayton Accords also established the Office of the High Representative (OHR). The OHR was created to enforce and implement the agreements embodied in the Dayton Accords and to oversee the process of transitioning Bosnia for EU membership (Majstorovic, 2007).

The EU and Bosnia

In the case of Bosnia, the EU has classified the country as a potential candidate country. Bosnia signed a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) with the European Union on June 16th, 2008. Implementation of the SAA is the next major step towards EU membership. If BiH successfully adopts the measures required in the SAA, then Bosnia can one day open pre-accession negotiations, which would make it an official candidate country. It should not be assumed though that because Bosnia signed the SAA that accession negotiations are just around the corner. Bosnia must still meet a number of benchmarks in
areas of economic, social, and environmental policies. However, the EU has been intricately involved in almost every political aspect of Bosnia since the signing of the General Framework Agreement for Peace, also known as the Dayton Peace Accords (DPA), in 1995. Via the Office of High Representation, some would even say that the EU essentially runs Bosnia. Furthermore, the EU has invested substantial amounts of money to the sum of 2.5 billion euro since 1991 (European Commission, 2008). The failure of Bosnia to reach the status of candidate country and subsequently enter the EU would be an enormous let down to the EU and by some standards would be an unacceptable outcome. There are few other countries, if any, that the European Union has as much riding on as Bosnia. If the nation building process that the international community has taken responsibility for in Bosnia were to fall apart, the EU would bear the brunt of the blame for such a catastrophe. Taking this into account, for the purpose of examining Europeanization in Bosnia and the use of the tools described above, one would expect the pressure to be equal to if not greater than that of a candidate country.

Since the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords in 1995, Bosnia has had a very close relationship with Europe. In December 1995, as part of the Dayton Accords, a NATO led military force of 60,000 troops, known as the Implementation Force (IFOR), entered Bosnia with a UN mandate to implement peace and ensure compliance with the Dayton agreement (Political Overview, 2007). In addition, the Dayton Accords also established the International Police Task Force (IPTF) as part of the UN mission. The IPTF was charged with monitoring the police reform process in Bosnia and ensuring that all police officers were thoroughly investigated before taking office. Additionally, they were responsible for recruiting minority police officers to create a more multi-ethnic force while at the same time
oversee the reduction of the total size of the BiH police forces (Bieber, 2006). In December of 1996, when the UN mandate for IFOR expired, the Stabilization Force (SFOR) carried on the UN mission under a new mandate to continue to ensure that violence did not resume and to maintain a climate in which peace could prosper (NATO, 2008).

In addition to the involvement of NATO forces, the Dayton Accords also established the Office of High Representative (OHR). According to article V, Annex 10 of the DPA, the OHR had “the final authority in theatre regarding interpretation of this agreement on the civilian implementation of the peace settlement”. The OHR is headed by the High Representative (HR) and supervised by the Peace Implementation Council (Bieber, 2006). The High Representative is also known as the EU Special Representative (EUSR). He in fact holds both positions, representing the International Community and the EU in Bosnia at the same time. At some point in time, the Office of High Representative will close but the EUSR will stay. In the last 5 years, the EU has taken on additional roles in Bosnia other than the HR. In January 2003, the EU Police Mission (EUPM) replaced IPTF. Their responsibilities are to continue to monitor, train and inspect the Bosnian police forces, helping BiH create and maintain a professional and multi-ethnic police force. Then in December 2004, the EU replaced NATO’s SFOR mission with their own EUFOR of 7,000 troops. This number has recently been reduced to 2,500. They are charged with continuing the SFOR mission of preserving an environment suitable for peaceful development and making sure compliance with the DPA is continued (Delegation of the European Commission, 2008). As we see, over time, the EU has increased it responsibility, visibility, and influence within Bosnia. It is the EU that now oversees all civil political matters, police force reform and peace stabilization in BiH.
It has not only been man power that the EU has provided to Bosnia but money as well. From 1991 – 2000, the EU spent over 2 billion Euros in assistance with reconstruction and the return of refugees. Then, from 2001 – 2006, the EU spent another 500 million Euros in areas such as infrastructure development, police reform and the reform of public administration. Now that Bosnia has signed the SAA, the EU has allocated another 226 million Euro over the time period of 2007 – 2009 under the Instrument for Pre-Accession funding umbrella. The EU has also extended favorable trade conditions with Bosnia. The EU has opened its borders to products from Bosnia without Bosnia having to fully open their market to the EU. Currently, Bosnia does over 50% of its trading with EU countries (European Commission, 2008).
The Europeanization of Bosnia

Despite the heavy involvement of the EU and other European actors in Bosnia, the Europeanization process has achieved mixed results. In this section, I argue that the actions taken by the Office of High Representative and nationalistic political parties of Bosnia have prevented a top down Europeanization process from effectively taking hold in BiH. Fortunately though, Bosnia’s close relationship to Europe since the end of the war has resulted in significant changes by sub-national actors. In addition, the failures at the national level have not gone unnoticed and there is awareness on the part of the Bosnia people that attitudes must change. Both the sub-national actors and the Bosnian citizens have shown the capacity to Europeanize, and in some cases, they are actively campaigning to change the way things work in Bosnia.

In the following, I will show that the OHR has done a poor job initiating a positive discourse regarding Europe in Bosnia. Though many of their actions are necessary in order for them to carry out their duty of instituting the Dayton Accords, their methods have come under much criticism. While they have used their leverage to force compliance, the transitions taking place within institutions and governance structures are not being embraced by the national politicians. The OHR has also failed to garner support from the Bosnia citizens. These failures have enabled nationalistic parties to maintain their influence and prevent BiH from moving forward in the true spirit of the
The Office of High Representative

The Office of the High Representative is the most powerful international body in Bosnia. In fact, it holds the power to do almost whatever it wants. The High Representative (HR) that runs the OHR has always been a European diplomat, not a Bosnian, and their powers include the ability to discharge politicians from their offices, institute laws and have amazing amounts of control considering Bosnia is supposed to be sovereign country. It also adds a very interesting aspect to studying Europeanization in Bosnia. While most countries feel the force of Europeanization coming from an external source, in Bosnia, the OHR, though representative of the international community, is very much an internal domestic force. In a way, the OHR is forcing Europeanization upon Bosnia and the means to reach the ends have been somewhat controversial. With so
much influence and control, it seriously alters the power balance between Bosnia and Europe. Though the OHR is a level of governance in Bosnia, it does not feel the affects of Europeanization; it is the de-facto source of the pressure. Unlike in other EU – candidate country relationships, the Bosnian national parties as well as the Bosnian people are not really given much room to decide how they will respond to the Europeanization pressures. The decisions made and dynamics of the process are not homegrown. Instead they are instituted by a foreign power and much criticism has been leveled at the OHR for the manner in which it has enacted change (Majstorovic, 2007).

Though many of the controversial decisions made by the OHR are done out of necessity, the High Representative has done a poor job communicating this with the Bosnian public. The nationalistic political parties force the hand of the OHR, but the High Representative has does very little to try to connect with the ordinary Bosnian citizens, releasing their decisions via the press and often time offer no explanations. The OHR’s use of power is perceived by the Bosnian public in a very negative way. The methods of the OHR have been described as colonial and authoritarian and seem contradictory to its goal of establishing democracy in Bosnia (Majstorovic, 2007). Since their inception in 1996, the OHR has imposed over 100 laws and removed from office over 180 people. In June of 2004, the HR Paddy Ashdown removed 70 public officials in the RS including the president of the parliament over a period of just a few days (Beirber, 2006). When confronted with the fact that what they are doing is not very democratic, Carlos Westendorp, the second HR, said to the Wall Street Journal, “Yes, this disregards the principles of sovereignty, but so what? This is not the moment for post-colonial sensitivity…The problems of the region will only be solved when we have introduced a
general respect for democracy and rule of law” (Majstorovic, 2007). How are the people of BiH to learn to respect democracy when those there to teach them show none for it themselves? In fact, it has been argued that the heavy handed methods of the OHR are hurting the process of building a functioning system of governance in Bosnia.

One of the key tenants of an EU style of governance is that of developing a multi-level system with power sharing structures. The idea is that their will be negotiation and compromise to find the best solution for all involved. However, in Bosnia, because the OHR will eventually just force the required changes upon the nation without the consent of the political parties, the national leaders are effectively relieved of the responsibility to reach consensus. These nationalistic party representatives do not need to compromise and can maintain their hard line stances because they know that eventually the HR will just institute the laws he wants passed. They have no political responsibility and the result is that the weak institutions of Bosnia are not getting any stronger or independent. The need for reform in Bosnia is evident and the actions of the OHR can even be justified by the fact that without it little would get done, but at least the politicians would then have to be accountable to the Bosnian people for their failures to move the country forward.

A concrete example of the OHR failing to engage in this type of multi-level power sharing negotiations can be seen in the example of police reform. One of the conditions to signing the SAA was that Bosnia reform its policing structure. In 2004, the European Commission issued a report on the state of the policing system in BiH. It gave
3 recommendations to bringing the force within line with other European ‘best practices’ stating that any of the 3 would be acceptable. In conclusion the report stated that:

“All three models feature both advantages and disadvantages. The evaluation and final choice depend on the weight given to the different criteria like top down or bottom up, product orientation, integration in local/regional communities, rationality, distance to today’s realities, etc.” (ESI, Nov 2007).

The statement sounds very in line with the ideas of local ownership and participation of multiple levels of governance to create a system that best fits Bosnia. However, immediately following the report, HR Paddy Ashdown commissioned a group to draw up a centralized, single structured police force under the control of the Council of Ministers. There was no debate or involvement of the Bosnian representative. The leaders in the RS and MCF were not asked to give input on what they thought best. The decision was simply handed down and expected to be followed. The commission composed entirely of foreigners eventually came up with a proposal for a centralized police force and the HR gave the Bosnian parliament the deadline of Dec. 1st, 2007 to pass it into law. This whole process caused an uproar among Bosnian political leaders. HR Miroslav Lajcak threatened to remove politicians from office and enact the law himself if nothing was done. The Prime Minister of the Republik Srpska protested that the whole process was unconstitutional and that it if the Bosnian leaders had no say over what was going on, then Serbian officials would begin resign (ESI, Nov 2007). The next day, the Serbian Prime Minister of Bosnia resigned and told reporters:
“Bosnia-Herzegovina is absurd. If the international community always supports the high representative and not the institutions of Bosnia-Herzegovina, then it doesn’t matter if I am the head of that state, or Bart Simpson.” (Bancroft, 2007).

This whole situation highlights one of the major problems in the Europeanization process in Bosnia. If there is no domestic ownership, then there is no real Europeanization taking place. The OHR cannot always just impose law. It must relinquish some control to the Bosnians, even if that means the process will be slow and cumbersome.

The OHR eventually backed down and dropped their demands regarding the police force restructuring. The result was that the Council of Ministers adopted an action plan on police reform and the EU changed its position. They instead backed the idea that the Bosnian leadership develop their own solution that was more suitable to their situation so long as it still met the best practices laid down in the Commission report of 2004. The resolution of this problem also brought to end the heightened tensions and fears that a new conflict was about to erupt in Bosnia (Latal, 2007). This whole situation stirred fear in the public that the country would once again breakdown. This all resulted because the OHR would not engage in the very type of multi-level governance that the EU itself is a proponent of.

Despite the criticism, the OHR continues to institute its top-down form of Europeanization. The OHR has placed the idea of being part of Europe on a high pedestal, using language to elevate the idea of Europe and suggest that Bosnia is not part of it. In press releases, the OHR uses wording to describe Europe as prosperous, secure, the future, or a dream, and associates Bosnia with words such as corrupt, dirt, lost, or
suggesting that it will become part of Europe’s abandoned backyard (Majstorovic, 2007). This is not the type of discourse that furthers the Europeanization process. The OHR needs to approach the subject with far more tact and sensitivity. The citizens are BiH are in favor of a path toward joining the EU, but treating them with disrespect is not the way to win them over. Attempting to Europeanize Bosnia by suggesting that it must move towards this utopian vision is not working. The OHR also needs to stop publicly blaming the citizens of Bosnia for electing nationalist parties into power. 10,000 Bosnian Serbs marched in protest over the OHR using threats to make the Bosnian parliament pass the OHR’s police reform package. When the public is demonstrating that they do not like the way the OHR is running their country, then it is no surprise that the will vote for the people who are standing up to them. None of this is to say that the OHR is not needed or that they haven’t helped the country progress. However, it does show that perhaps the OHR should use more soft power and try harder to bring Bosnians into the political process to legitimize their decisions (Bancroft, 2007).

The OHR is in quite a difficult position and this can not be overlooked when evaluating the enormous task that they have been given. Initially, the OHR was intended to watch over the process of instituting the Dayton Accords. The High Representatives job was to facilitate cooperation, report back to Europe on progress being made, and to help the Bosnian political parties coordinate their efforts between each other and Europe. However, the Bosnian political leaders basically ignored the OHR altogether and did nothing on their own to institute the agreement they signed in the peace accords. The international community recognized that the limited power of the OHR was not enough to complete the task of implementing the Dayton Accords and at the end of 1997, the
OHR was given the far reaching powers that they have today (Bieber, 2006). This additional authority has become known as the Bonn powers.

Without these powers, there is little doubt that Bosnia would have fallen apart long ago. The OHR was charged to rebuild a war torn country, bring democracy to a place where it had never previously existed, and bridge ethnic divides that had been festering for decades. Without these powers, corrupt politicians would have destroyed the political process in Bosnia, ethnic politics would have prevented anything from ever moving forward and Bosnia would be nowhere near the place it is today. The overall effect of the OHR has certainly been more positive than negative (Bose, 2007). The mandate for the OHR has been extended several times and while Europe has hoped to close the office, it has not yet done so. The situation is Bosnia has not reached a place where the EU feels comfortable leaving the Bosnian parties to their own devices. Some argue though, that while perhaps the OHR should stay, the Bonn powers should not. While they may have been necessary at one time, the Bonn powers have become a burden to the democratic process. Bosnian politicians do not feel the need to make tough decisions or work hard to build political coalitions needed to overcome obstacles because the HR will eventually make the decision for them. It is also felt that the HR is too quick to use the power, thinking that by instituting one more law, or removing one last politician will finally set Bosnia on the correct path. In the name of doing good, the overuse the Bonn powers has also created a dependency upon them (ESI, 2003). Perhaps the time has come for the OHR to simply do the job it was originally intended to do, facilitate, coordinate and report.
Bosnia is without a doubt, a complex and difficult environment for the OHR to carry out its nation building task. Still, perhaps they have gotten to comfortable using their powers to institute change. The national leaders of Bosnia may be hard to work with, but they are still the elected representatives of the people of Bosnian. If they are the people chosen to determine the future of the country, then the OHR needs to accept that as a political reality and allow the Bosnians to feel the affects of their decisions or inability to reach decisions. Every country has its own culture and image, their own set of values and norms. Europeanization is not about transforming one country into a mirror image of another. It is a process by which a country transforms its system of governance in the manner it chooses to include more actors at all levels of society, from national to local (Paraskevopoulos, 2006). This is not what the OHR is doing. To solve the problems of Bosnia, the OHR needs to be facilitating cooperation and dialogue, and if the upper level elites are not receptive to the idea, then the OHR needs to focus efforts on lower levels of governance. It must be kept in mind that Europeanization takes hold in every country in a different way. Which way will work the best depends on the particular characteristics of each country. In some countries, a top-down approach my work, but in others, the focus may need to be more of a bottom-up approach. In order to determine which way is best for Bosnia we must take a closer look at other processes taking place within BiH at lower levels of society other than the all power international Office of the High Representative.
The National Parties of Bosnia

Though Europeanization is defined as a process, that process can not move forward without the support and actions of several groups, most notably the national parties and the elite within those countries. In effect, in order for the process of Europeanization and the transformation of governance to take place, the actors themselves must in a way be Europeanized. Their thoughts and concerns must be moved in the direction of a European frame of mind. While they certainly must maintain the desire to improve conditions in their own country, they must also understand why working with the EU to achieve its goals are in line with achieving the goals within their respective nations. A failure by the EU to achieve this personal level of Europeanization will in turn translate into a weak process of transforming the system of governance as well as a possible outcome of Euroskepticism.

When looking at the Europeanization of national parties in Bosnia, we once again find that there has been little penetration in altering the nature of the parties, their structures or their political agendas. The national level of politics is dominated by parties that are nationalistic in nature. The main parties in Bosnia that continue to win a majority of the elections are the SDS, the HDZ, and the SDA. The SDS is the nationalist party in the Republic Srbska. From the beginning of the creation of Bosnia as an independent state, the SDS has advocated more autonomy for the RS, at times calling for it to leave BiH altogether and form its own nation. The discourse coming out of the RS has in no way facilitated the Europeanization of Bosnia. Though they have toned down that rhetoric in recent years, they still sometimes use threats to leverage power. The party
has fought against any law that threatens their autonomy and they have done very little to help displaced Bosnian Croats and Muslims return to their pre-war homes in the RS (Beiber, 2007). It would be very hard to say that the SDS or other parties in the RS have been Europeanized in any way.

In the Federation, the main parties are the HDZ, the nationalist Bosnian Croat party and the SDA, the nationalist Bosniak party. The HDZ has had a similar agenda to that of the SDS in the Republic Srbska. They argue for more autonomy and they too have initiated discourse calling for their own independent region much like the RS. The SDA is a little bit more moderate and of the three parties, they are about the only one that has views more closely aligned to those of the EU. They have called for the dissolution of the RS and support more state control. They would like to see the state institutions strengthened. However, in Bosnia, due to the nature of the countries political design, consensus between the three ethnic parties must be reached for most anything to be done. Because the HDZ and SDS have been resistant to the forces of Europeanization, little progress has been made.

This stark political divide in the agenda of the three parties sometimes makes it difficult for seemingly easy decisions to be made. In several cases, the deadlock could only be broken by the High Representative who finally stepped in and made the decisions for them. The HR Carlos Westendorp intervened and made decisions regarding the design of the national flag, what Bosnian passports and currency would look like, as well as the design of the license plates. He has also had to remove politicians from office. In 1999, Westendorp removed the Republic Srpska President Nikola Poplasen from office.
because he wouldn’t appoint a Prime Minister that could form a parliamentary majority government. With such an ethnically divided parliament, no party ever gets enough seats to form the government and must form a coalition to rule. Poplasen refused to appoint a moderate who could garner such a coalition and after months of failure, Westendorp removed him from office (Political Overview, 2007).

While all the parties state that they believe the EU is the future of Bosnia, their actions do not reflect their words. Each party struggles to set aside the past and creates barriers to true unification. Despite the international pressure and the presence of the OHR, at the national level, the parties have continued to move in a more hard line direction. The election of 2002 resulted in the nationalist parties winning more seats in parliament than ever before. However, voter turnout in this election was only 55% (Political Overview, 2007). This voter dissatisfaction is reflected in opinion polls that show Bosnian voters have little trust in the political parties. In fact 78 percent of Bosnians believe that politicians obstruct the improvement of ethnic relations and 30 percent of Bosnians reject the established political parties all together (Touquet, 2008).

The biggest reform to come out of the national government and could be viewed as a step towards the Europeanization of the institutions of Bosnia would be the 2002 entity constitutional reform. In 1998, Bosnian president Alija Izetbegovic brought before the Constitutional Court a list of complaints against both the constitutions of the Federation and the Republic Srbska. He stated that it was unconstitutional for the entities to not recognize all three ethnic groups as constituent people in both entities guaranteeing them equal treatment, protection and representation. The Constitutional Court agreed
and the entity constitutions were required to be changed. Neither the RS nor the Federation parliaments amended their constitutions though, and in 2001, the High Representative commissioned two groups in each entity to write new constitutions. The commissions were made up of four members of parliament from each ethnic group in both entities. Giving credit to the HR, Wolfgang Petritsch did as much as he could to produce local ownership of the process. In February of 2002, for the first time since the war had ended, all the main parties, representing all the ethnic groups met to work out a compromise on the amendments without international supervision. Unfortunately, both parliaments failed to pass the amendments and HR Petritsch was forced to impose the new constitutions into law in both the RS and the Federation. However, he did give credit to the Bosnian politicians for coming to agreements on writing the new constitutions stating “This time, the largest part of the job was done by the domestic authorities and I congratulate them for that” (Beiber, 2006). Furthermore, most every political party in Bosnia welcomed the changes except for the SDS in the Republic Srbska and the HDZ in the Federation. Because of these constitutional amendments all three ethnic groups are now represented as equally as possible in all governmental institutions at all levels of government thought the whole of BiH.

A positive indicator of change is that in the most recent elections gains have been made by more moderate parties (see tables 1 &2). None of the former nationalistic parties won a seat in the tri-part presidency, but hopes of an effective ruling class have still been unfulfilled. The last several years have also been mired by scandals. In 2003, the Serb member of the presidency, Mirko Sarovic, resigned from office after being implicated in an illegal arms trade deal with Iraq. Then, in 2005 the OHR led by Paddy
Ashdown had to remove the Croat president Dragan Covic because of corruption charges. The Office of High Representative was actually suppose to close in 2007, but due to the continued inability to the political elites in Bosnia to effectively manage their country, the term of the OHR has been extended. In fact, the World Bank’s governance indicator of political stability for Bosnia has gotten progressively worse since 2000 (Political Overview, 2007). Clearly things on the national stage have not reached a level that is on par with what is expected of a member state of the EU. Until these factions realize that the only way they are going to move forward is together, then the prospects of self governance is unlikely. Intense nationalistic aspirations within national level politics are preventing anyone from making gains and denying the Bosnia people a prosperous future they desire and deserve. After almost 13 years since the war in Bosnia ended, one could still argue that it is still being waged by the political parties.
Table 1: Results of the Oct. 2006 Presidential Election, top two candidates for each ethnicity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Percentage of Vote</th>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Haris Silajdzic</td>
<td>SBiH</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>Bosniak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sulejman Tihic</td>
<td>SDA</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>Bosniak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nebojsa Radmanovic</td>
<td>SNSD</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>Serbian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mladen Bosic</td>
<td>SDS</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>Serbian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zeljko Komsic</td>
<td>SDP</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>Croat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivo Miro Jovic</td>
<td>HDZ</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>Croat</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: [www.izbori.ba](http://www.izbori.ba), BiH Central Election Commission Official Website

Table 2: Result of the Oct. 2006 Parliamentary Election to the House of Representatives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Seats</th>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SDA</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Bosniak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SBiH</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Bosniak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNSD</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Serbian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDP</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Croat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDS</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Serbian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDZ</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Croat</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: [CountryWatch.com](http://CountryWatch.com), Bosnia-Herzegovina Country Review 2007
Sub-National Actors

Though there has not been much progress to praise on the international and national levels, there have been some modest accomplishments coming out of the city of Sarajevo. European influences working at the city and sub national level have made some inroads towards bridging ethnic divides. They have rallied the people of Bosnia around the common belief that they need to improve their economic conditions and put aside the animosity to focus on goals that achieve mutual benefits. A key aspect of EU regional policy is to incorporate sub-national level actors into the governance process, promising local and regional authorities the opportunities to influence the development within their regions. With such dismal failure on the national level, it only makes sense that the EU looks elsewhere to achieve cohesion and integration in Bosnia. In addition, as a multicultural and multiethnic enclave, successes within the city of Sarajevo can be seen as a model to be used elsewhere. Sarajevo was once an extremely multiethnic city, however, after the war, Sarajevo ended up in the Muslim-Croat Federation, just west of the Inter-Entity Boundary Line (IEBL). The city of Sarajevo is now a majority Muslim.

In 2003, the EU assisted in the creation of the Sarajevo Economic Region Development Agency (SERDA). To help integrate the people of Bosnia, the SERDA encompasses areas on both sides of the Inter-Entity Boundary Line, bringing together for the first time parts of the Federation and the Republic Srbska. It includes 18 municipalities in the Federation and 13 in the Republic bringing together a population of 700,000 people and creating the largest economic market in Bosnia. One very interesting
aspects of this union is that while national politicians in the RS have been resistant to ideas brought forth from the EU, the local politicians in the eastern Sarajevo urban area that is in the RS embraced the SERDA as a mechanism for them to deal with local economic and social problems. With the center of the Bosnian Serbs political base in Banja Luka, the SERDA offered local politicians and businessmen opportunities that they had never had at their disposal. Local mayors and entrepreneurs are working together and transcending the IEBL (Bollens, 2008). Hopefully this will begin to erase the line and bring a breath of fresh air to the stagnant decision making taking place at the national level. The SERDA has also brought Muslims, Croats and Serbs together in the city of Sarajevo. Furthermore, if the greater Sarajevo economic area can become a conduit to the EU, perhaps the Bosnians of all ethnicities that are benefiting from this regional development will better grasp the EU project. In turn, it will provide them a common good and a shared experience that will help them foster a new identity and a positive discourse as well as be an example to other Bosnians as to what can be achieved if they work together instead of pushing each other apart.

The issue of identity in Bosnia has time and again been seen as an important factor in developing a functioning state. Part of the Europeanization process includes the development of healthy working relationships between all actors both socially as well as politically. In Bosnia’s case, the citizens must first begin developing a Bosnian identity that transcends ethnicity before they can begin forming an EU related identity. As we move closer to the ground level, away from the national stage, it becomes more evident that the traditional national ethnic identities are not all that exist. The citizens of BiH are quite capable of creating alternative identities that cross ethnic lines and understand that
there are causes that matter to all Bosnians. In order to further explore this idea, we can look toward non state actors, outside the conventional institutions. Student led youth movements, NGO’s and citizen action groups all exist in Bosnia and fight to changed the perception of Bosnia as an country crippled by ethnic tension. Their voices are a force for change, not only attempting to alter the image that outsiders have of Bosnians but also encouraging Bosnians to start looking at themselves differently and not get swept up by the negative imagines portrayed by their national leaders.

The first example of one such group is *Dosta* which means enough. The goal of this citizen action organization is to wake up Bosnian citizens into recognizing that ethnic politics is a disastrous policy. They use non traditional and visible tactics to draw awareness to the issues. Their agenda is less political and more social. Their battle call is for people to wake up, take responsibility for their lives and stop listening to the lies. *Dosta* hopes to inspire people to organize themselves and force the politicians to begin listening to the people. Another group, the *Omladinska Informativna Agencija* (Youth Information Agency) is committed to making sure that the issues of the youth are taken into account in politics. In 2006, they sent to political representatives, 40,000 letters from citizens stating that they would not vote for a political party unless it adopted a list of 30 institutional changes relating to youth policy. They were also the organizers of the “Shake up the State” campaign to encourage young people to vote (Touquet, 2008).

Perhaps one of the most influential organizations in Bosnia is *Grozd*. It is an assembly of around 400 local NGO’s that actively campaign on issues from education to agriculture. They recently put together a series of over 130 public debates all over BiH
to find out what common issue where of importance to all citizens. They then selected 12 demands and created a petition that 500,000 BiH citizens signed. This petition was sent to the every single Bosnian political party and 36 of them signed statements promising to work on them. Since then, 27 local chapters of Grozd have sprung up across Bosnia and now monitor local politicians and hold them accountable for what they are doing. Even more impressive, Grozd has begun exchanging information with similar organizations in other Balkan states, furthering the goal of bringing down ethnic barriers, reforming institutions and developing an identity based on public good (Touquet, 2008).

All these organizations prove that ethnic divides can be overcome as people from all three groups, Croats, Serbs and Muslims have participated and signed petitions for reform. These groups show that the seeds of change have been planted and that it is not only viable but imperative that more is done to foster a national Bosnian identity. In fact, the results of an Oxford Research International study of 3,580 Bosnians shows that the citizens of BiH are capable of having multiple identities, just like in other European countries. Only 14% of the respondents said that they only see themselves in the context of their ethnic identity, while 80% responded that they see themselves as Bosnians as well, accepting a national identity (Touquet, 2008). The key is to help this trend grow and enable it to become more publicly visible and accepted. Eventually, it is movements like these that will free Bosnia from its current chains. Moreover, the development of these groups and organizations as well as their interaction between each other and the national level of government are all examples of the Europeanization of the governance structure. The process of vertical and horizontal networking, the building of relations and
the incorporation of their ideas and values are all essential to reaching an outcome of an efficient system of governance.

_The Hearts and Minds of the Bosnian People_

With organizations like these achieving respectable levels of success, it can not be denied that the healing of the wounds from the tremulous past is possible. Though the agreements that come out of the Dayton Accords created the framework to end the violence, the time has come to begin dissolving the line that divided Bosnia and reinforced their ethnic differences. Many agree that the creation of the two entities based solely on ethnic composition is one of the biggest obstacles that Bosnia now faces in building a united country ready for EU membership. The creation of the Muslim-Croat Federation and the Republic Srpska has made it more difficult for both sides to come to terms with the past. Some have even called for the dissolution of the Federation, transforming Bosnia into a three level federal state divided into 12 regions (ESI, 2004). The idea is that by erasing the divisive lines, the three parties can overcome their feelings of anger and denial. A series of studies done by the University of Sussex have shed some light into this very idea by investigating on what is going on in the minds of Muslim and Serbian youths.

The studies focused on the ability of Bosniaks to forgive the Bosnian Serbs for their misdeeds and how guilt and shame in Bosnian Serbs lead to feelings of empathy towards Bosniaks. The participants in the studies were high school age children. The
results of the studies are quite relevant in dealing with the current problems of ethnic animosity. The conductors of the studies agree that the division of Bosnia into the Federation and the Republic has made unity difficult but suggest that steps can be taken to overcome this. In the study of Bosniaks, the research concluded that as they had more meaningful contact with Serbs, they were much less likely to perceive the entire group in a negative light. It was not the amount of contact that matter but the quality. As Bosniaks and Serbs interacted on a closer level, the Bosniaks were able to differentiate between the Serbs that committed the crimes and those that had nothing to do with it. The results were that they were able to generate feelings of forgiveness for the entire group and become more open to social interaction with Bosnian Serbs (Cehajic, 2008).

On the other side of the study, the Bosnian Serbs that felt guilty and ashamed about what their group did at Srebrenica experienced feelings of empathy for Bosniaks and had a desire to partake in some form of reparations. It should be noted that this study took place shortly after the 10 year anniversary and publicly televised memorial and burial ceremony that took place at Srebrenica. There was also a video released of the massacre at Srebrenica. Both these events helped put to rest some of rhetoric on the Serbian side that denied the murders ever happened and brought to the public debate the responsibility of the Serbs for this atrocity. The study concluded that through education and interaction, both the Bosniak and Serbian children are much more likely to cope with the past and begin forging a new path towards a better relationship (Brown, 2008). Forgiveness regarding what occurred and a willingness to seek out that forgiveness are essential for Bosnia’s future.
Another important aspect making the process of Europeanization more achievable is that of social capital. Social capital is best described as the amount of trust built up between actors within levels of governance and between levels of governance. As stated earlier, Europeanization is a process in which a transition in governance occurs. What the EU wants to see is more sub-national and regional actors, such as private business or local watchdogs, who have typically been left out to the debate, brought into the fold in regards to decision making about what needs to be done in the region. In order to do this though, some actors may have to give up or share power with these new players in order to achieve a higher level of collective action in a given policy area. Europeanization aims to create strong, interdependent ties between both public and private actors at all levels. This requires trust. In order for the process to work, actors must trust one another to share information and resources and feel like they are all working towards a goal that will be in all their interests. If a particular region or country lacks any trust between actors, it will be more difficult for Europeanization to take place. However, in an area or country with high levels of social capital and trust, developing these networks will come about more easily, in return, allowing the process of Europeanization a better chance of succeeding (Paraskevopoulos, 2006).

Social Capital is a key component in the development of a functional system of governance. Effective governance is of course a major objective of Europeanization. Thus, one can say that social capital is also a major factor in the success of Europeanization in the Bosnia. In an article by Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, she looks at social capital in the Balkans and relates it to the ideas of particularism and universalism. Mungiu describes particularism as a mentality prevalent in the Balkan states in which the
way a person is treated depends upon the group they belong to. She contrasts this way of thinking to that of universalism, the western model and the design upon which the European Union has followed. Universalism simply means that all individuals are treated as equals under the law and by society at large.

Particularism refers to a system that is based on informal institutions. These informal institutions are tied more into traditional rules, while formal institutions are associated with legal legitimacy. Some believe that informal institutions prevent formal institutions from taking root, while others believe that informal institutions work because the formal once are weak and ineffective and thus become a parallel system to get things done in society. While this idea somehow suggests that the informal institutions do not hamper the growth of a formal system, long term and widespread particularistic behavior detracts from the rule of law and prevents modernization and bureaucratization. In short, rule of law and particularism can not coexist; they are on opposite ends of the spectrum. In particularistic societies, people are treated unequally because of their position in society and the groups they belong to. Access to goods and services depends on how close you are to individuals in power, not rule of law. This system in the Balkans is a result of Communist era ‘politocracies’ that created special groups to distribute social and political power. The result of this particularistic way of doing things is that there is no trust between groups, no shared set of moral values or norms of behavior and thus no social capital (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2005). Social capital is the trust between groups and people that allows for civic and business relationships to thrive, develop and form close associations between and amongst all levels of society. Without this social trust their can be no modernization and the development of the institutions in Bosnia needed to
effectively run the country. Social trust is based on shared positive experiences; it
ddictates behavior and is strengthened by these positive interactions. There have not been
enough of these shared positive experiences in Bosnia.

In Bosnia, there appears to be a serious lack of trust. Trust has been found to be a
key component in economic, political and social development. Trust creates an
atmosphere where growth can flourish and in general contributes the health of society. In
Bosnia, surveys, data and findings seem suggest that trust has declined over the past 10
years and that ethnicity may be a contributing factor but not the only factor. In general,
people in Bosnia do not trust anyone outside of their family. They do not even trust
people of the same ethnic group. However, those who show high levels of trust do trust
people of their own groups as well as people from other nationalities. So when people do
trust, ethnic homogeneity is not an issue. The data does shows that groups in ethnically
heterogeneous areas have less trust than groups in homogeneous areas. So ethnicity does
appear to play a role in trust, but how much so it not completely clear (Hakansson, 2007).
What is clear though is that in order to Europeanization to take hold in Bosnia in any
form at any level something must change. In order to influence lasting change within the
institutions and governance of Bosnia as well as in the hearts of the people, trust is going
to play a big part of it.
Conclusion

In order for Bosnia and Herzegovina to make the lasting reforms needed to meet the stringent criteria of the *Acquis Communautaire*, the way forward must be travel as a united force. The international community, the national level leaders, the sub-national actors and the citizens of BiH must find a way to create new relationships built on their shared desire to improve the lives of all the peoples of Bosnia. It is my belief that until the voices at ever level of governance are brought into the fold, the situation will remain stuck in the rut of the past. By looking at the case of Bosnia from multiple angles, from the top down as well as the bottom up, we can see that there is clearly a gap between what is going on at the grass root level and what is taking place on the national stage. European leaders have in many ways neglected to capitalize on these positive developments. Many view the structure of the Dayton Accords as a significant barrier and underlying cause of today’s stalemate between the political parties. In the quest for a Europeanized Bosnia, it is important to focus on each and every level of society in the search for the answer. In order for prosperous and lasting change to take place, the influences and the ideas of participants ranging from the High Representative to the aspiring youth need to be taken into consideration. All actors at each level of governance have important roles to play in the future of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The more ties between them and the deeper those relationships become, the better the likelihood that the decisions reached will adequately reflect the desires of the people.
There is certainly much work to be done and a long way to go before Bosnia will be joining the European Union. Europeanization can take hold in Bosnia though. There are clearly trust issues, a major factor in the development of the type of governance structures the EU would like to see, but the elements to change the countries direction do exist. The people of Bosnia may be disheartened but they have not given up. Europe is the only viable future for Bosnia, and while that statement is recognized by all, the fact that so little has been accomplished in the last decade is a sign that something is not working. The major roadblock toward progress is clearly the nationalist parties the run the country. However, the only real way to replace them is to better inform the public of the problems they are causing and to help foster new parties to replace them. The Office of High Representative must do a better job a facilitating a positive European discourse, even if they must continue to use their power to move things forward. If needed, they should appeal more directly to the citizens of Bosnia for help in accomplishing the task of transforming the country. If the national elite can not reach a consensus, then the international community needs to put more resources into developing regional associations such as the Sarajevo Economic Region Development Agency and help support grass root organization and NGO’s that create the type of identity groups that transcend ethnicity. They have shown the capacity to achieve the type of relationships that the political elite have so far failed to demonstrate. The Europeanization of Bosnia is not going to come just from the top but rather from the efforts and desires of a new generation who have yet to exert the full extent of their influence into the process. The path to Brussels may be a long one but with patients and perseverance it will be reached.
Bibliography


