Struggle Over Dimensionality: Party Competition in Europe

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Abstract

JAN ROVNY: Struggle Over Dimensionality: Party Competition in Europe. (Under the direction of Gary Marks)

This work studies political issues and political competition. Political issues -- contestable concerns within the public sphere -- are multiple and infinitesimal, as people understand them in different contexts and at different levels. To become comprehensible and debatable political demands, individual preferences must be simplified into issue bundles or 'issue dimensions'. The key actors in this process are political parties that use strategic calculus to join disparate political preferences into ideological platforms. This dissertation examines the considerations and constraints that figure in this partisan calculus. The dynamic that arises is one in which politics is not so much a contest over positioning on issues, as conceived by classical spatial theory, but rather a competition over the content and structure of these issues. Politics is a struggle over the dimensional composition of political issues.

To my Affectionate

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Introduction

In order to study the laws of history we must ... turn to the homogeneous, infinitesimal elements that move the masses to action.

Leo Tolstoy¹

This work studies political issues and political competition. Political issues -- contestable concerns within the public sphere -- are multiple and infinitesimal, as people understand them in different contexts and at different levels. To become comprehensible and debatable political demands, individual preferences must be simplified into issue bundles or `issue dimensions'. The translation of political elements into coherent value-packages, capable of moving masses into action, is at the heart of political competition. When and how this is done -- and cui bono -- is the topic of this dissertation.

The key actors in this process are political parties that use strategic calculus to join disparate political preferences into ideological platforms. This dissertation examines the considerations and constraints that figure in this partisan calculus. The three papers that constitute this dissertation examine the interaction between party strategy and the dimensional structure of political competition. They theorize the conditions under which political parties seek to alter the dimensionality of political competition through their manipulation of the salience of issues and their positioning on these issues. The dynamic that arises is one in which politics is not so much a contest over positioning on issues, as conceived by classical spatial theory, but rather a competition over the content and

¹ War and Peace, Volume III, Part III, Chapter 1, Penguin Classics 2005: 914

structure of these issues. Politics is a *struggle over the dimensional composition of political issues*.

The first paper, ``Who Emphasizes and Who Blurs?," notes that the partisan strategy of presenting ambiguous positions is considered costly by literature on party competition. This literature, however, does not consider party strategies in the context of multiple issue dimensions. Yet multidimensionality is likely to play an important role in partisan strategic calculus. While it may be rational for a party to emphasize a certain issue dimension and unequivocally advertise its position on it, it may be equally rational and rewarding to disguise its stance on another dimension by blurring its positioning. Who emphasizes issue positions and who blurs them may thus crucially depend on the dimensional context. This paper addresses party strategies in multiple issue dimensions. It argues that party strategies are determined by partisan attachment to different political issues, which implies that different political parties have varying interests in issue dimensions. Consequently parties employ the strategies of issue emphasis and position blurring in various dimensional context. Who emphasizes and who blurs thus depends on the actors' relative stakes in different issue dimensions. The paper makes its case by performing cross-sectional analyses of 132 political parties in 14 Western European party systems. It utilizes data from the Comparative Manifesto Project and the 2006 Chapel Hill Expert Survey.

The second paper, ``Where Do Radical Right Parties Stand?," applies the above argument to the radical right party family. It questions the utility of assessing radical right party placement on economic issues, which has been extensively analyzed in academic literature. Starting from the premise that political parties have varying strategic stakes in different political issues, the paper considers political competition in multiple issue dimensions. It suggests that political competition is not simply a matter of taking positions on political issues, but rather centers on the manipulation of the dimensional structure of politics. The core argument is that certain political parties, such as the radical right, seek to compete on neglected, secondary issues in the party system, while simultaneously blurring their positions on established issues in order to attract broader support. Deliberate position blurring -- considered costly by the literature -- may thus be an effective strategy in multidimensional competition, qualifying the study of party placements. The paper combines quantitative analyses of electoral manifestos, expert placement of political parties, and voter preferences, by studying seventeen radical right parties in nine Western European party systems.

The third paper, "Westernization of Political Competition in Eastern Europe," examines the empirical fact that political competition in Eastern Europe is, slowly and unevenly, converging on a western pattern. The paper first suggests that the underlying cause of this shift is the changing meaning of the non-economic, socio-cultural dimension in Eastern Europe. It is no longer dominated by issues of elementary civil liberties and democratic rights, which were paramount during democratic transition. Instead, the socio-cultural dimension is increasingly defined by more typically western concerns over cosmopolitanism versus nationalism, and secular modernism versus traditionalism. Second, under these new circumstances, political competition in Eastern Europe becomes determined by deeper historical experiences. The paper argues that the historical experiences of state and nation building are important factors framing political competition in contemporary Eastern Europe. It tests these claims by conducting quantitative and qualitative analyses of 14 Eastern European countries.

Who Emphasizes and Who Blurs?

Introduction

Literature on party competition extensively considers how various parties choose their political issues and their issue positions, and how adopting ambiguous issue positions is predominantly a costly strategy. It, however, rarely studies party strategies in reference to multiple issue dimensions. Yet multidimensionality is likely to play an important role in partisan strategic calculus. While it may be rational for a party to emphasize a certain issue dimension and unequivocally advertise its position on it, it may be equally rational and rewarding to disguise its stance on another dimension by blurring its positioning. Political strategy thus may not only differ across parties, it may also differ across issue dimensions. *Who emphasizes issue positions and who blurs them* may thus crucially depend on the dimensional context.

This paper addresses the internal logics of party strategies in multiple issue dimensions. It argues that party strategies are determined by partisan attachment to political issues, which implies that different political parties have varying interests in issue dimensions. Consequently parties employ the strategies of issue emphasis and position blurring in various dimensional context. Who emphasizes and who blurs thus depends on the actors' relative stakes in different issue dimensions.

The paper operationalizes dimensional attachment as a function of distance from the center of a given dimension. Outlying parties are expected to be more invested in the issues they stand out on. Consequently, the strategies of issue emphasis and position blurring are explained by the relative dimensional positions parties hold. By connecting partisan issue positioning, issue salience and positional ambiguity, this work stands at the theoretical cross-roads between spatial theory, issue salience theory and directional theory.

Additionally, this paper engages the 'obfuscation' literature, studied mainly in the context of U.S. politics. This literature argues that ambiguous issue positioning is a costly strategy. This paper, however, demonstrates that in multidimensional competition, position blurring may be beneficial. Furthermore, this paper comments on niche party literature by suggesting that who emphasizes and who blurs does not depend on party family, but rather on partisan interest in various issue dimensions.

The paper makes its case by performing cross-sectional analyses of 132 political parties in 14 Western European party systems on three major issue dimensions -- economic issues, non-economic/social issues, and the issue of European integration. It utilizes data from the Comparative Manifesto Project and the 2006 Chapel Hill Expert Survey. The paper first discusses the literature on party strategies in multidimensional context. Second, it addresses the theoretical expectations regarding issue emphasis and position blurring. Third, it discusses the data and the operationalization of key concepts. The fourth section presents the analyses and summarizes the results, while the final section serves as a conclusion.

Party Strategies in Multidimensional Context

The most broadly analyzed party strategy is *position-taking*, formalized by spatial theory (Hotelling 1929; Downs 1957). Parties respond to voters' ideal preference points, and position themselves on continuous issue scales, simplified into issue dimensions. Originally, spatial competition was conceptualized in a single dimension. Later models have relaxed the assumption of uni-dimensionality; their aim, however, was only to test whether and under what conditions equilibrium solutions hold in multiple dimensions (McKelvey 1976; Chappell and Keetch 1986; Enelow and Hinich 1989; Schofield 1993). For spatial theory, the dimensional structure and the salience of the various dimensions is an assumed context within which competition occurs. Consequently, the spatial tradition sees competition as a contest *over party positioning* with respect to voters, who minimize the aggregate distance between themselves and the party they vote for in n-dimensional space.

Some parties, however, may be more advantaged or competent on some political issues rather than others, and consequently seek to shift political focus toward their strengths. Issue ownership theory and saliency theory suggest that parties do not merely respond to voter preferences, but that they affect vote choice through their actions in political campaigns (Budge and Farlie 1983; Budge et al. 1987; Petrocik 1996). Another party strategy is thus to *increase the salience* of those political issues on which a party holds an

advantaged position, or on which it has better credentials. Inversely, parties ignore or try to mute those issues which do not benefit them.

This is consistent with spatial theory, although altering issue salience amounts to changing the structure of political competition. By emphasizing one issue over others, political parties increase the dominance of one scale over others, making the spatial distances on this scale more important determinants of vote choice.² This is very much in line with Riker's *heresthetics* where parties tactically shift dimensional salience to issue scales where they attract greater proportion of voters (1986).

The logical corollary to *position taking* is position avoiding, or *position blurring*. Rather than taking a clear position on an issue, parties may strive to either not be associated with any position on this issue, or to present a mixture of positions.

Position blurring has received considerable attention in the American politics literature under the label of `obfuscation' or `ambiguity'.³ It has, however, been studied exclusively in uni-dimensional contexts, common to formal theories simplifying the political world to one theoretical dimension.

In the uni-dimensional context of American politics, the strategy of position blurring or obfuscation has been seen as disadvantageous to political parties or candidates. The

 $^{^{2}}$ I am grateful to George Rabinowitz for this insight. Formally this amounts to multiplying the different scales by different weight coefficients.

³ I use the terms blurring, *obfuscation* and *ambiguity* of positioning interchangeably. I prefer the term *blurring* due to its more common usage.

literature generally agrees with Alvarez that ``the more uncertain a voter is about candidate positions, the less likely she is to support the candidate"(1998: 204). Consequently, the winning strategy is to clarify issue positions.

Earlier works conclude similarly on both formal and empirical grounds. Shepsle (1972) demonstrates that ambiguity decreases the appeal of a candidate. An equivocal candidate is positively disadvantaged, and this holds as long as only a majority of voters are risk-averse. Similarly, Enelow and Hinich (1981) develop a formal model showing that voters move away from the position where there is greater positional variance (i.e. where there is uncertainty). Bartels (1986) empirically applies the Enelow and Hinich model, illustrating that voter uncertainty is detrimental to candidates and that this detriment is comparably strong to voter-candidate issue distance. Gill (2005) reports similar findings using a different measure of uncertainty. This suggests that position blurring may deter voters as acutely as spatial distance.

Moreover, the 'obfuscation' literature frequently presents position blurring as primarily a structural factor. Alvarez stresses that uncertainty varies across candidates as a function of incumbency, previous experience and national prominence, and that uncertainty generally diminishes across the course of campaigns in response to issue and substantive information (1998: 204). This suggests that uncertainty is a characteristic, rather than a strategy. It is less a subject of candidate or party agency, but rather an exogenous context which can change only slowly and almost independently from the candidate or the party. An alternate view is that of Franklin (1991), who underlines how political institutions are

insufficient tools in providing clear messages to the electorate. He finds that candidates can affect the clarity of their perceived positions through their campaign strategies. Clarity, nonetheless, remains the strategic aim.

In the U.S. context, analysts logically consider candidate, rather than party strategies. Theoretically, however, position blurring can be carried out by either agent. Candidates, as well as parties, may choose to strategically blur their stances on certain issues. Moreover, deliberate position blurring may be even easier for individual candidates than for political parties, since many of the latter have extensive histories and established records -- often beyond an individuals' lifetime. On the other hand, political parties may consist of various internal factions which hold somewhat different positions on the same issues. Position blurring may thus result from internal party divisions. The extent to which position blurring is a deliberate party strategy or a result of unintended internal tensions is difficult to parse out without adequate data on party unity.

The party strategic literature has underemphasized the fact that political competition is not merely a struggle over where a party stands. Once issue salience is taken into account, political competition becomes a contest over which issues prevail in political discourse and voter decision-making. The work of Carmines and Stimson (1989) and Stimson (2004) highlights the importance of considering the dimensional structure of political competition when studying party strategies. The authors demonstrate that the structure of political competition is itself the subject of political strategizing. Parties do not merely respond to voter preference distributions. They shape the importance of these distributions by emphasizing or muting various political topics. They reshape political competition by raising new political issues which do not neatly fold into the standing dimensional structure, creating new dimensions of competition. Once party strategies are considered in this dimensional context -- in the context of party competition played out over a number of issue dimensions which may be independent -- the strategy of issue emphasis becomes crucial and the strategy of position blurring becomes viable.

Who Emphasizes and Who Blurs?

The core argument of this paper is that, given their histories, social followings, ideological outlooks and varying institutional entrenchment, political parties are invested in different issue dimensions. This investment importantly determines their strategies. On the one hand, parties *emphasize* the issue dimensions on which they hold intense -- i.e. outstanding -- positions. On the other hand, parties *blur* their positions on issue dimensions which are secondary to them, on which they do not take outstanding positions.

To attract attention to their preferred issue dimension, parties emphasize the given issues by increasing their salience and by taking distinctive, outlying positions on them. A party seeking to highlight the merits of a dimension and subsequently its credentials on it, is likely to take visible positions away from the dimension's center. Highlighting an issue dimension is unlikely to succeed by proposing a moderate stance, since a radical, outlying position is more distinguishable and captivating. On the contrary, parties may be disadvantaged on some issue dimensions, either because they have poor reputation on these issues; they hold unpopular positions; they are crowded by other proximate parties on these issues; or their core constituencies are divided over them. Under such conditions it is rational for parties to deemphasize these issues and strategically blur their positions on them. Position blurring may take the form of either avoiding to present any position on a given dimension, or of presenting a multiplicity of positions. Such strategy is rational because it allows a party to stand out on its preferred dimension, while being able to either not deter voters (no position is presented), or attract broader voter coalitions (multiple positions are presented) on other dimensions.

Consider a political party which has an intense, outlying position on issue dimension A. Assume further that this party has poor reputation on and a potentially divided constituency over issue dimension B. The party will logically emphasize issue dimension A. However, on dimension B, the party faces a dilemma. If it adopts and communicates a position on this dimension, it risks increasing the salience of issue dimension B, and faces potential defection from those members of the constituency who find themselves far away from the party's position. A rational strategy for this party would thus be to compete on issue dimension A with an unambiguous, and emphasized position, while muting issues connected with dimension B and blurring its positioning on them. This blurring may entail avoiding taking any position on dimension B, or -- if pressed -- the party leaders may present varying positions, depending on their audience. This is a rather different conclusion from that of the 'obfuscation' literature. Shepsle (1972: 567), searching for the conditions under which position ambiguity is advantageous, finds that deliberate position blurring may be a winning strategy only when majority of voters are risk-acceptant, and possess intense preferences over an issue, thus rendering it 'critical'. My argument, which considers multi-dimensional competition, is the opposite. The strategy of position blurring is adopted on those dimensions which are less salient to a given party. Blurring on secondary dimensions exploits the opportunity of attracting (or at least not deterring) broader voter groups.

By theorizing a connection between issue positioning and issue salience, my argument presents a middle ground between spatial and directional theory. In their seminal article introducing directional theory, Rabinowitz and MacDonald stress the idea that political actors emphasize a set of issues by taking `intense' positions on them:

"By taking clear, strong stands, candidates [or parties] can make an issue central to judgements about themselves. At the same time candidates [or parties] who can successfully evade an issue are able to make that issue far less relevant for judgements about themselves. Thus in a multiissue election candidates [or parties] are likely to be intense on issues that benefit them and silent on issues that are potentially damaging" (Rabinowitz and MacDonald 1989: 98-9).

This paper understands `intensity' both in the sense of salience, as well as outlying positioning. A `clear, strong stance' on the part of a political actor is understood to entail a strong emphasis on the issue, together with taking a distinctive position away from the center of the issue.

Consequently, parties adopting intense, extreme positions on one dimension are likely to prefer competing on this dimension. They are historically or ideologically invested in this dimension, and thus are likely to emphasize the political issues associated with this dimension. On the other hand, these parties are likely to find other dimensions less useful for their competitive aims. They are thus likely to deemphasize these dimensions and blur their positions on them. This leads to two hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1: The more extremely placed on one dimension, the more likely a party emphasizes its position on this dimension and deemphasizes its position on another dimension.

Hypothesis 2: The more extremely placed on one dimension, the more likely a party presents a clear position on this dimension and blurs its position on another dimension.

Put another way, the more extremely placed a party is on a given dimension, the more likely it emphasizes this dimension, and the less likely it blurs its position on it. These hypotheses consequently point to a curvilinear relationship between position and issue salience on the one hand, and position and position blurring on the other.

Historical or ideological investment in different issues, however, is not the only determinant of partisan tactics. Participation in government is an important conditioning factor on party strategy. First, parties which have been in government become somewhat constrained in their strategic employment of salience and blurring. While in office, their

representatives are likely to take positions on multiple issues, and these positions are more visible, due to their governmental profile. This establishes a clearer positional reputation of the party, and blurring becomes an improbable strategy. The strategy of deemphasizing and blurring economic issues is likely to be particularly limited by government participation. This is because economic issues tend to be the dominant concerns of mainstream party competition⁴, and every government faces and becomes responsible for concrete economic decisions. Second, parties which aspire to join government coalitions are likely to be circumscribed in their capacity to emphasize odd -usually non-economic -- issues, which risk driving a wedge between the coalition partners. In short, government participation likely limits position blurring, particularly on economic issues, and shifts issue salience toward economic, rather than non-economic issues.

Hypothesis 3: Government participation increases party emphasis on economic issues and decreases party emphasis on non-economic issues.

Various kinds of parties may employ the strategies of salience and blurring, according to their relative dimensional stakes. This theoretical account does not rely on any party typology. It simply sees party strategies as a function of their relative dimensional investment, where a clear indicator of preferring a dimension is holding an intense, visible position away from the center. Parties preferring competition on one dimension emphasize this dimension, while blurring their positions on other dimensions.

⁴ See Lipset and Rokkan (1967).

This argument complements the literature on issue entrepreneurship discussed by Hobolt and DeVries (2011). Issue entrepreneurs, who tend to emphasize and take outstanding positions on the issues they champion, are expected to blur their positions on mainstream issues.

On the other hand, this argument contrasts with niche party literature, which underlines the strategic particularity of small, marginal parties seeking to highlight new or resuscitated political issues (Meguid 2005, 2008; Rovny and Edwards forthcoming). While this literature provides a theoretical definition of niche parties, it invariably operationalizes them as radical right, green, radical left and occasionally ethnic and regional parties (ibid.; Adams et al. 2006; Ezrow 2008). This combines parties which are likely to differ significantly in their dimensional outlooks and consequently in their strategies. Radical left parties, for example, are likely to contest redistributive issues, while radical right parties concentrate on issues of immigration and national identity. Furthermore, niche party literature omits various other parties, such as liberal or Christian democratic parties, which may be equally likely to attempt shifting political salience to their preferred issue dimensions, while blurring their positions on other dimensions.

The niche party literature, concentrating on electorally marginal parties, effectively provides an alternative explanation, suggesting that issue salience and position blurring are a function of party size. The argument suggests that as small parties with limited prospects of electoral success in competition with the entrenched political establishment, niche parties seek to emphasize new or insignificant issues, while potentially blurring their positions elsewhere. Party size is thus a relevant control variable in this analysis.

Finally, electoral systems, which aid or hinder minor competitors in gaining representation are an important control variable. In addition, average levels of issue salience at the country level are used to control for system-specific characteristics.

Data and Measurement

This section addresses the data, conceptualization and tests the hypotheses developed in the previous sections. It proceeds in three steps. It first discusses the data and the operationalization of the key concepts. Second, it describes the political space of party competition and demonstrates which parties emphasize and which parties blur using descriptive statistics. Finally it tests the hypotheses concerning issue salience, position blurring and government participation using regression analyses.

This paper limits itself to cross-sectional study of West European party systems in the early 2000s. The ideal dataset for testing the above theory is the 2006 Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) which measures party positions on economic issues, non-economic or social issues and on European integration (Hooghe et al. 2010). The dataset covers 132 political parties in 14 Western European countries: Austria, Belgium, Britain, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and Sweden.

The paper follows the recommendations of Benoit and Laver (2011) and Rovny and Marks (2011) by conducting its analyses using three deductively derived issue dimensions. These dimensions are 1) the economic dimension, 2) the non-economic/social dimension⁵, and 3) European integration. Although these dimensions are in no way exhaustive of the complex concerns faced by advanced industrial societies, they are sufficient to capture the strategic dynamics of issue emphasis and position blurring. Furthermore, these dimensions capture core political conflicts in Western Europe (Kitschelt 1992; Laver and Hunt 1992; Kitschelt 1994; Hooghe et al. 2002; Kitschelt 2004; Marks et al. 2006; Kriesi et. al. 2008).

The measure of economic and non-economic issue salience is taken from the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) dataset, which codes quasi sentences of party manifestos as belonging to one of 56 issue categories (Budge et al. 2001). Salience of an issue dimension is thus measured as the sum of proportions of quasi sentences pertaining to issues belonging to the given dimension. For details on which issues are considered a part of which dimension, please see Appendix A. The measure of EU salience is taken from the CHES dataset, where it is measured with a direct question on a 4-point scale.

The most difficult concept to operationalize is position blurring. For lack of a direct measure, this concept is assess using the standard deviation of expert judgement on party placement. The measure takes advantage of the CHES dataset, which provides measures

⁵ The non-economic/social dimension is described by Kitschelt (1994: 9,12) as a communitarian dimension of politics, contrasting self-organized community values with paternalism. Marks et al. (2006) call this dimension *gal-tan*, juxtaposing `green, alternative, libertarian' values with `traditionalist, authoritarian and nationalist' outlooks.

on both expert positioning of political parties on different issues and issue dimensions, but also expert uncertainty over this positioning in the form of expert standard deviations.


This operationalization is far from ideal because clearly expert standard deviations capture more than position blurring. First, expert standard deviations tap expert (lack of) knowledge of certain parties. This lack of knowledge is likely to be related to party vote share, since experts know large party positions better (Marks et al. 2007). If this were the case, small parties should receive uniformly higher scores on blurring. Expert lack of knowledge is also likely to be related to the salience of the dimension evaluated, as experts tend to know party positions on highly salient dimensions better. To alleviate this concern, the statistical models control for the party system level salience of the evaluated issue dimension.

Second, expert standard deviations may also capture intra-party dissent. Where parties are divided, they may project multiple positions and experts may thus disagree on their placement. Ideally, it would be possible to control for party dissent on all of the three dimensions addressed in this paper. Unfortunately, the CHES dataset includes a measure on party dissent only for the European integration dimension and not for the other two.

Analysis and Results


The theoretical framework stresses that the employment of particular strategies depends primarily on party placement. Parties farther from the center of a dimension tend to emphasize this dimension, while blurring their position on the others.

Figure 1 Issue Salience



Outliers are most extremely placed 30% of parties on each dimension (15% on each end). Economic and Non-Economic salience measured as % of party manifesto (CMP data) EU salience measured by CHES 2006, transformed to range from 0-100.

Figure 2 Position Blurring



Outliers are most extremely placed 30% of parties on each dimension (15% on each end). CHES 2006

Figures 1 and 2 present descriptive statistics concerning issue emphasis and position blurring depending on the dimensional position of parties. For demonstrative purposes, these figures define parties as outliers when they belong to the most extremely placed 30% of parties (15% on each end) on each dimension, while mainstream parties are those that do not stand out on any dimension. Figure 1 shows the extent to which parties emphasize economic, non-economic and European issues. As expected, economic outliers concentrate on economic issues, non-economic outliers overemphasize noneconomic and EU issues, while EU outliers greatly stress EU issues. Similarly, figure 2 demonstrates position blurring, supporting my theoretical claims. Economic outliers tend to extensively blur their non-economic positions, while non-economic outliers blur their economic stances. Outliers on EU integration slightly blur the other two dimensions while presenting vary clear positions on the EU.

Turning from descriptive to inferential statistical analysis, table 1 presents six OLS regression models assessing party strategies of issue salience and position blurring. It uses combined party-level data from the CHES and CMP datasets. The first three models predict position blurring on the three dimensions, measured as standard deviations of expert placements in the CHES dataset. The last three models predict salience of the three issue dimensions. Issue salience of economic and non-economic issues is measured as the proportion of quasi-sentences in party manifestos from the CMP dataset, while issue salience of the EU is measured with a direct question in CHES 2006. All models use robust standard errors clustered by country, in order to eliminate country clustering effects.

The theory suggests that issue salience and position blurring are a curvilinear function of party positioning. Consequently, the key predictors in the models are position and position-squared on each dimension, as measured by CHES 2006. Furthermore, government participation is measured as the number of months a party spent in government since 1990. The rationale behind this measure is to capture not just temporary presence in government in 2006, but rather the partisan characteristic of being a major party or a governing coalition partner with routine aim and expectation of entering government. Vote percentage measures the vote share each party received in the most recent election prior to 2006. Average electoral district magnitude is an institutional variable capturing the proportionality of the electoral system. The measure is taken from Johnson and Wallack (2010). Finally, to control for the salience levels of given dimensions, average party system salience -- measured as the average salience of the given dimension in each party system -- is included in the models. In addition, the models predicting EU salience and blurring further control for intra-party dissent on the EU, as measured by a direct question in CHES 2006.

Table 1 Effects of Position on Blurring and Salience

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Economic Blurring	Non-Economic	EU	Economic	Non-Economic	EU
		Blurring	Blurring	Blurring	Salience	Salience
Economic Position	0.539***	-0.183	0.052	-5.918**	6.397***	0.071
	(0.101)	(0.143)	(0.078)	(2.027)	(2.116)	(0.082)
Economic Position ²	-0.052***	0.024*	-0.007	0.537**	-0.628**	-0.003
	(0.009)	(0.012)	(0.007)	(0.214)	(0.213)	(0.007)
Non-Econ Position	-0.184**	0.508***	-0.157**	5.919* [*]	-5.345***	-0.151*
	(0.077)	(0.119)	(0.069)	(2.057)	(1.140)	(0.075)
Non-Econ $Position^2$	0.019*	-0.052***	0.014*	-0.562**	0.498***	0.009
	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.007)	(0.204)	(0.112)	(0.007)
EU Position	-0.124	-0.290	0.878***	4.124	-1.874	-0.845**
	(0.116)	(0.201)	(0.066)	(2.814)	(1.514)	(0.182)
EU Position ²	0.002	0.023	-0.112***	-0.355	0.076	0.097**
	(0.016)	(0.022)	(0.010)	(0.332)	(0.150)	(0.023)
Vote %	-0.001	-0.009	-0.001	-0.006	-0.052	0.004
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.076)	(0.053)	(0.003)
Govt Participation	-0.000	0.001	0.001*	0.023	-0.056**	0.000
-	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.013)	(0.019)	(0.001)
District Magnitude	-0.002***	0.003***	0.000	-0.011	0.009	0.001**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.007)	(0.011)	(0.000)
Mean Econ Salience	-0.003			0.956***		. ,
	(0.004)			(0.067)		
Mean Non-Econ Salience		-0.020**			0.942^{***}	
		(0.009)			(0.138)	
Mean EU Salience			-0.209*			0.933^{***}
			(0.097)			(0.068)
EU Intra-party Dissent			-0.037*			0.001
			(0.020)			(0.026)
Constant	1.030^{***}	2.087^{***}	0.442	-9.856	12.241*	1.785**
	(0.243)	(0.506)	(0.382)	(7.474)	(6.779)	(0.446)
Observations	96	96	96	83	83	96
R^2	0.509	0.415	0.670	0.585	0.640	0.655

Robust Standard Errors Clustered by Country ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1, two-tailed




Figure 3 Effects of Position on Blurring and Salience

Based on results in table 1

Effect of issue position on position blurring and issue salience, while all other predictors held at their mean. EU position is 0-7 scale and EU salience is 0-4 scale

The results presented in table 1 support my theoretical expectations. To better illustrate the major findings, figure 3 summarizes some key results graphically. The top three panels of figure 3 depict the effect of issue positioning on position blurring, while other predictors are held at their mean.⁶

The first panel demonstrates that economic position blurring is increasingly performed by parties positioned at the extremes of the non-economic dimension, while parties at the extremes of the economic dimension present clear economic positions. The reverse is true for non-economic position blurring. Panel 2 of figure 3 shows that non-economic position blurring is enacted by parties standing towards the extremes of the economic dimension, while parties at the extremes of the non-economic dimension present clear position on it. Finally, as seen in panel 3 of figure 3, EU position blurring is carried out by non-economic outliers, while outliers on the EU present clear positions.

 $^{^{6}}$ As Stimson et al. (2011) observe in the French case, economic and non-economic party positions are correlated (r=0.576). Similarly, the square terms are correlated with the linear predictor. Consequently, to better test the statistical significance of positional effects in the models in table 1, I carry out a number of joint F-tests:

Model 1

 H_0 : economic position = economic position² = non-economic position = non-economic position² = 0, F(4,13)=10.40, p<0.001 Model 2 H_0 : economic position = economic position² = non-economic position = non-economic position² = 0, F(4,13)=12.28, p<0.000 Model 3 H_0 : non-economic position = non-economic position² = EU position = EU position² = 0, F(4,13)=49.18, p<0.000 Model 4 H_0 : economic position = economic position² = non-economic position = non-economic position² = 0, F(4,13)=6.65, p<0.004 Model 5 H_0 : economic position = economic position² = non-economic position = non-economic position² = 0, F(4,13)=6.54, p<0.004 Model 6 H_0 : EU position = EU position² = 0, F(2,13)=14.45, p<0.001

These results reject the speculation that experts simply do not know as much about small, fringe parties, and that the dependent variables of expert uncertainty thus merely tap their (lack of) knowledge, rather than party strategies. First, the models control for vote share. Second, experts demonstrate *greater* certainty about economic positions of economic fringe parties, and about non-economic positions of non-economic fringe parties. Simultaneously, they are significantly *less* certain about the economic positions of the non-economic outliers, as well as about the non-economic positions of economic outliers. This discrepancy cannot be simply attributed to expert lack of knowledge of small, fringe parties. Similarly, these results remain significant when controlling for mean national economic, non-economic and EU salience; as well as intra-party dissent on the EU. This further suggests that partisan strategizing -- position blurring -- is considerably reflected in expert placement standard deviations.

Issue salience is another strategy employed by political parties. The bottom three panels of figure 3 illustrate the effects of issue position on issue salience, while other predictors are held at their mean. As expected, parties on the fringes of the economic dimension emphasize economic issues, while outliers on non-economic issues tend to deemphasize them (panel 4). On the contrary, parties on the extremes of the non-economic dimension tend to emphasize non-economic issues, while parties on the extremes of the economic dimension deemphasize them (panel 5). Finally, parties which are on the extremes of the EU dimension emphasize EU issues (panel 6).

In addition to party strategies, government participation also affects issue salience. Model 5 in table 1 indicates that participation in government significantly *decreases* party emphasis on non-economic issues. Although the effect of government participation on economic salience is in the hypothesized direction, it just passes below the acceptable threshold of statistical significance (model 4). As suggested by the theoretical framework, governing parties are inhibited from politicizing alternative, non-economic issues. As members of the executive charged with economic management, they must rather take responsibility for explicit economic decisions.

Conclusion

This paper argues that the choice of party strategy is determined by varying partisan involvement in political issue dimensions. The well studied fact that political parties are endowed with varying core constituencies, ideological heritages and organizational structures has an important implication. Given these characteristics, specific parties are invested in different issue dimensions. Some parties are better placed to compete primarily over economic issues, some over non-economic issues, others over EU issues or a combination of the three. These relative stakes in different issue dimensions determine the choice of partisan strategies.

Consequently, parties employ the strategies of issue emphasis and position blurring in various dimensional contexts. The primary indicator of issue emphasis and position blurring is the intensity with which parties contest a given dimension. Political parties which stand farther from the center of a particular dimension tend to emphasize that dimension. It is, after all, a dimension on which they hold an outstanding position. On the contrary, on the dimensions where parties do not take eccentric positions, where they tend to be less advantaged, they tend to blur their stances. This dynamic holds across multiple party families, including those not considered marginal, niche parties.

Most importantly, this paper demonstrates that the strategy of position blurring or `obfuscation' can be rewarding -- contrary to the claims of vast majority of the literature. When considering multidimensional political competition, political parties have an incentive to equivocate their positions on dimensions on which they are somehow disadvantaged: where they hold unpopular positions; where they are crowded by their competitors; where they have bad reputation; or where their core constituencies are divided. Projecting ambiguous positions or no positions at all on these dimensions can be advantageous because it can attract voters with varying stances, or at least not deter them. Position blurring thus is a rewarding strategy, *if applied on the appropriate issue dimension*.

This finding is consistent with the spatial paradigm. It highlights the utility of mapping positions of political actors in n-dimensional space. It is, however, inconsistent with spatial theory, which suggests that political actors compete through *position taking*. On the contrary, this paper theorizes and demonstrates the utility of political competition through position non-taking, or *position blurring*.

Finally, this paper outlines how strategic political actions are directed at the reframing of political competition. To be sure, party leaders are concerned with concrete political issues. In the aggregate, however, their actions lead to systemic change. Emphasizing particular policy issues aims at increasing their prominence in political competition, while blurring positions on specific issues seeks to disguise their relevance in political decision-making. Since, as argued in this paper, party strategies follow different stakes in different issue dimensions, it is the structure of political competition which is the central subject of political contest.

Where Do Radical Right Parties Stand?

Introduction

Today's radical right is said to be `right-wing' due to its nationalistic, authoritative, anticosmopolitan and especially anti-immigrant views. The economic placement of the radical right is, however, debated. While earlier works point to neo-liberal stances of radical right parties, studies of the social bases of these parties point to significant support from traditionally left-leaning constituencies. Recent scholarship argues that radical right parties abandoned their outlying economic positions and shifted closer toward the economic center.

This article, however, questions the utility of assessing radical right party placement on economic issues. It suggests that politics is a larger struggle over the issue content of political competition. Political parties are invested in different issue dimensions, and thus prefer competing on some issues over others. Consequently, parties emphasize their stance on some issue dimensions, while strategically evading positioning on others, in order to mask the spatial distances between themselves and their voters. This article argues that parties, such as the radical right, may successfully adopt a strategy of deliberate *position blurring*. In light of such competition, taking a position may be neither an appropriate party strategy, nor an adequate academic expectation.

This argument underlines the limits of spatial theory in capturing party competition. While spatial theory conceptualizes political competition as position *taking*, this article underlines the strategic utility of position avoiding or position *blurring*. This dimensional approach to political competition considers issue positioning, issue salience, and strategic positional avoidance in multidimensional context. This approach explains the apparent variance of radical right economic placement as an outcome of these parties' conscious dimensional strategizing -- of deliberate position blurring.

This article combines quantitative analyses of electoral manifestos, expert placement of political parties and voter preferences based on multiple public opinion surveys. It considers seventeen radical right parties in nine Western European party systems. The article first reviews the literature on radical right ideological placement. The second section introduces a dimensional approach to party competition, detailing general party strategies in multidimensional context, while generating specific hypotheses about the radical right. The third section discusses the data and operationalization. The fourth section presents the analyses and results, while the final section serves as a conclusion.

Where Do Radical Right Parties Stand?

Scholarship on radical right parties agrees on a large set of their ideological characteristics. It suggests that radical right parties rely on emotive appeals to national sentiments defined in ethnic terms; reject cosmopolitan conceptions of society; react to rising non-European immigration; oppose globalization and reject European integration which they see as undermining national sovereignty and identity; and brand themselves

as anti-parties, criticizing domestic political elites as corrupt and removed from the `common people.¹⁷ Rydgren (2005) argues that the rise and success of the radical right is associated with the development and diffusion of effective ideological `master frames.' The frame, pioneered by the French Front National in the 1970s and 80s, combines ethno-nationalism and populist anti-establishment rhetoric, without being overtly racist or anti-democratic. It infuses the previously marginalized radical right with a potent ideological model, allowing it to ``free itself from enough stigma to be able to attract [new] voters" (ibid.: 416).

This frame, however, says little about radical right economic positions. The rise of radical right parties in Western Europe is associated with a backlash against the 'excessive role of the state' in the economy, and the power of labour unions (Ignazi 2003). Earlier literature suggests that radical right parties present a '`classical liberal position on the individual and the economy"(Betz 1994: 4). Kitschelt and McGann suggest that the radical right must adopt a 'winning formula' consisting of authoritarian and nationalistic social appeal coupled with extreme neo-liberalism, ``calling for the dismantling of public bureaucracies and the welfare state," demanding a ``strong and authoritarian, but small" state (1995: 19-20, McGann & Kitschelt 2005).

Recent literature considering the social bases of radical right support, however, underscores the cross-class character of radical right voters. Evans (2005) finds that radical right parties attract both self-employed, as well as manual workers, and that

⁷ See Betz 1994; Taggart 1995; Kitschelt & McGann 1995; Mudde 1996; Hainsworth 2000; Hooghe et al. 2002; Hainsworth 2007; Kriesi et al. 2008.

continental radical right parties also increasingly attract routine non-manual workers, further diversifying the radical right class base (ibid.: 92). Ivarsflaten (2005) demonstrates that the self-employed and manual worker supporters of the radical right hold significantly different views on the economy, pointing to the radical right ''electorates' deep division over taxes, welfare provisions and the desirable size of the public sector" (2005: 490). Similarly, Kriesi et al. (2008) argue that radical right parties represent disparate 'losers' of globalization.⁸ Due to declining identification with workers' parties and organizations, manual workers are likely to consider more electoral choices, not necessarily on the basis of their economic views, but also on the basis of their authoritarian tendencies (Bjorklund and Andersen 1999).

How then do radical right parties respond to the diverse economic interests among their ranks? Mudde underlines the increasing orientation towards social market economy in radical right party literature, bringing these parties' positions close to Christian democratic parties, or even the social democratic 'third-way' (2007: 124). Derks (2006) suggests that in order to capture disenchanted industrial workers hurt by globalization, post-industrial society and the supply of cheaper immigrant labour, radical right parties use a mix of egalitarianism and anti-welfare chauvinism. Similarly, Kitschelt's recent work reflecting on the radical right constituency's division over economic policies, moderates his 'winning formula' (Kitschelt 2004: 10). He claims that radical right parties may not be on the extreme economic right, but rather on the ``market-liberal side of the political spectrum" -- a stance demonstrated by the few radical right parties which attained executive office (Kitschelt 2007: 1183). Testing Kitschelt's restated `winning

⁸This evidence revisits Lipset's (1981) decades-old concept of working class authoritarianism.

formula' on three cases, De Lange (2007) empirically supports the claim that radical right parties have shifted their position to the economic center.

This conceptual approach suggests that radical right parties hold discernible positions on major ideological dimensions. In fact the study of the radical right -- in line with the scholarship on political parties and actors in general -- uses spatial conceptions to account for party and voter placement. Kitschelt and McGann (1995, 2005), and Kitschelt (2007) analyze the ideal *stance* of radical right parties in the form of the `winning formula'. Van der Brug et al. (2005) explain radical right electoral success using party evaluations based on spatial proximity measures. Bjorklund and Andersen (1999) suggest that radical right voters in Scandinavia are positioned between the major left- and right-wing parties on economic issues. Ivarsflaten (2005) emphasizes the vulnerability of radical right parties, given the spatial differences among their voters on economic issues. Finally, Rydgren (2005) notes that radical right success starts with spatial electoral niches where there are ``gaps between the voters' location in the political space and the perceived position of the parties'' (2005: 418).⁹

Spatial theory provides a classical understanding of political competition by conceptualizing it as spanning continuous issue scales, simplified into issue dimensions (Hotelling 1929; Downs 1957)¹⁰. Parties *take positions* within this dimensional structure

⁹ A significant outlier to this approach is Mudde (2007), who considers the discourse of radical right parties, underlining their ``schizophrenic" positioning (2007: 135-7).

¹⁰ Originally, spatial competition was conceptualized in a single dimension. Later models have relaxed the assumption of uni-dimensionality; their aim, however, was only to test whether and under what conditions equilibrium solutions hold in multiple dimensions (Chappel and Keech 1986; Enelow and Hinich 1989; Schofield 1993).

in response to voter distributions. For spatial theory, the dimensional structure of political space is an assumed context within which competition occurs. Consequently, the spatial tradition sees competition as a contest *over party positioning* with respect to voters, who minimize the aggregate distance between themselves and the party they vote for in n-dimensional space.

The application of spatial theory to radical right party study has been importantly modified by Meguid (2005, 2008). While utilizing spatial representation of competition among mainstream parties and radical right parties, Meguid considers not only party positioning, but also issue salience and issue ownership. This leads her to formulate a strategic game in which radical right parties present new political issues into political discourse, and mainstream parties choose to engage or dismiss these issues, thus either boosting or lowering their salience (2008: 28). This broadens the spatial conception of political competition by demonstrating how issue salience allows strategic interaction between parties that are not spatial neighbours.

Meguid's work highlights how the inclusion of issue salience and ownership opens new strategic possibilities in party competition. Its implications are, however, even more profound. When political actors invest salience into new cross-cutting political issues, they are introducing new issue dimensions and redefining the political space where competition occurs. Under these conditions, parties are likely to be invested in some dimensions more than others. While they are likely to take clear positions on the dimensions of their primary interest, it may be logical for them to avoid taking clear stances on the dimensions in which they are not invested. Taking positions thus may be

an inappropriate strategy in the context of multidimensional competition -- and consequently, so may be its study. Thus, the question `where radical right parties stand' may not be the right question to ask. The next section turns to an analysis of the implications of multidimensional party competition in greater detail.

Dimensional Approach

The dimensional approach to competition introduced by this article is based on two core premises. First, the structure of political competition is not merely a fixed stage, but rather is itself the subject of competition. This approach understands political competition as a contest *over the presence and bundling* of political issues into various issue dimensions. Competition is then a contest over which issues or issue dimensions dominate political discourse and voter decision-making. Political parties thus do not only take positions on issue dimensions, they actively seek to alter the structure of competition to their advantage by manipulating these issues.

The second premise of the dimensional approach is that parties do not merely respond to voter preferences by taking positions, but that they also seek to affect voters' choices through emphasizing certain issues in political campaigns. This is borrowed from issue ownership and salience theory (Budge & Farlie 1983; Budge et al. 1987; Petrocik 1996), which argues that parties strategically increase the salience of those issues on which they hold advantaged positions, while trying to mute issues somehow harmful to them. The relationship between voter preferences and party strategies is thus more complex than spatial theory suggests. Parties may on the one hand fill popular niches by championing

publicly salient, but politically untapped issues. On the other hand, parties may affect the popular salience of issues by either emphasizing or ignoring them.¹¹

The dimensional approach points to two theoretically separate party strategies -- issue introduction and issue blurring. First, as originally formulated in William Riker's *heresthetics*, political parties tactically alter political competition by introducing novel issues into political discourse (Riker 1982, 1986)¹². Introducing a new issue may produce a new dimension of political conflict and create a competitive niche for its protagonist, particularly if the issue does not naturally fold into the standing structure of competition. A party may also wish to introduce a new issue on which it is likely to be viewed favourably. Finally, a party may choose to introduce a new political issue with the aim of creating tensions within competing parties, thus weakening them.

Second, political parties may strategically avoid stances on some dimensions of multidimensional political conflict, and engage in what this article terms *position blurring*. Since political parties may have different stakes in different issue dimensions, they may not simply mute the salience of issues secondary to them. Rather, parties may attempt to project vague, contradictory or ambiguous positions on these issues. The aim of the strategy is to mask a party's spatial distance from voters in order to either attract broader support, or at least not deter voters on these issues. Position blurring is unlikely

¹¹ These premises are consistent with spatial theory, as they effectively entail emphasizing (spatial) differences on a dimension which previously either lacked salience or where no differences between parties existed.

¹² See also Budge et al. (1987), Rabinowitz & Macdonald (1989), Rabinowitz et al. (1991), Carmines & Stimson (1989).

to be a successful strategy if applied on all issues. However, in the context of competing along one or few issue dimensions, blurring positions on other dimensions may be beneficial.

This is a contradictory expectation to the 'obfuscation' literature in American politics, which almost invariably concludes on both formal and empirical grounds that taking ambiguous positions is a *costly* strategy (Shepsle 1972, Enelow & Hinich 1981, Bartels 1986, Franklin 1991, Alvarez 1998). This literature, however, considers uni-dimensional competition. Blurring positions on a unique dimension of conflict is a profoundly different situation than blurring positions on some dimensions, while presenting clear stances on others. Position blurring on some dimensions may be a rational strategy in the context of multidimensional issue competition.

Position blurring may take on different forms. First, parties may avoid presenting a stance all together. More frequently, parties may present vague or contradictory positions on a given issue dimension. Mudde (2007: 127) reports, for example, that many radical right parties mix appeals for low taxation and privatization with economic protectionism, particularly in the agricultural sector. This ideological profile combines stances which are not usually connected, as most parties associate low taxation and privatization with economic liberalism. Misaligning stances on issues commonly attached to a unique dimension allows parties to blur their general dimensional positioning, while giving them the opportunity to present different voters with contradictory programs. Position blurring can thus appear as either a lack of a position, as concurrent multiplicity of positions, or as positional instability over time.

The strategies stemming from dimensional competition carry different costs. The parties facing higher costs to issue introduction and position blurring are likely to be established political parties with long-standing histories, organizational apparatuses, core constituencies and well-entrenched ideological images. They are likely to face organizational and ideological barriers to shifting political salience to new issues and blurring their positions on others. Established, mainstream parties are likely to find it harder to convince their membership and core constituents of the merits of adopting new issues and obscuring their positions on old ones. Their ideological heritage is likely connected with the historical development of social cleavages of their polity (see Lipset and Rokkan 1967). This means that their political stance is known, entrenched and their appeal stickier. Consequently, blurring positions on secondary issues may be futile and new issue introduction may spark crippling divisions.

On the contrary, radical right parties are less constrained in new issue introduction and position blurring. They have entered European party systems in recent decades as outsiders ostracized by political elites. Furthermore, they have centralized, hierarchical organizational structures which favour top-down decision-making patterns (Heinisch 2003). This gives them organizational facility in strategically contesting the dimensional structure of party competition.

Moreover, radical right parties face an electoral incentive for employing these dimensional strategies. As the literature on radical right social bases suggests, there is a dimensional discrepancy to radical right support. Radical right voters share an ideological affinity on non-economic, socio-cultural issues, such as immigration or law and order, while they are divided over the economy. This argument implies that radical right voters have different preference distributions across issue dimensions. This leads to the following hypotheses.

Hypothesis 1: Radical right voters hold significantly more dispersed economic positions than major party supporters, while being less dispersed on non-economic, socio-cultural issues.

Consequently, radical right parties face different stakes in different issue dimensions. They are induced to compete on non-economic, socio-cultural issues by overemphasizing them in their discourse.

Hypothesis 2: While major parties place comparable emphasis on both non-economic and economic issues, radical right parties overemphasize non-economic issues, while muting economic issues.

This article argues that while competing on the non-economic dimension, radical right parties do not merely deemphasize economic issues. In order not to deter supporters with divergent economic outlooks, radical right parties also present blurred stances on the economic dimension. The positional ambiguity of radical right parties on the economy can be analyzed across data sources, across party types and over time:

Hypothesis 3a: The assessment of radical right party positions on economic issues significantly diverges across different data sources, while the evaluation of their non-economic positions is largely consistent.

Hypothesis 3b: Voters and experts are significantly less certain about radical right party placement on economic issues then about the economic placement of other party types.

Hypothesis 3c: The assessment of radical right party positions on economic issues manifests significantly greater fluctuation over time than that of major parties.

The strategic increase in non-economic issue salience combined with position blurring on the economic dimension on the part of the radical right is likely to have positive electoral effects. By shifting emphasis towards their preferred issue dimension and distorting their economic stances, radical right parties attract their voters on the basis of non-economic, rather than economic issue considerations.

Hypothesis 4: While voters consider both economic and non-economic issues when voting for major parties, they consider only non-economic (and not economic) issues when supporting the radical right.

Despite its benefits, position blurring has its limits. Upon entering government, parties become responsible for implementing explicit policies, which circumscribes their ability to present vague or multiple positions, and forces them to take clear stances. Furthermore, parties who succeed in entering government with ambiguous views, may face public embarrassment. The fate of some radical right parties, particularly the Austrian FPO, which lost substantial public support after entering governments underlines this point (Luther 2003, Heinisch 2003, Fallend 2004). While an effective strategy in opposition, position blurring becomes a liability in government.

Hypothesis 5: Government participation limits position blurring of radical right parties.

Data and Operationalization

This article limits itself to contemporary (early to mid 2000s) Western Europe, where scholars argue the political space can be depicted in two dimensions.¹³ The first dimension relates to economics, ranging from state-directed redistribution to market allocation. The second dimension relates to non-economic, socio-cultural issues, concerning such factors as lifestyle choice, national identity, immigration and religious values, and it ranges from socially liberal, alternative politics to socially conservative and traditional politics (Kitschelt 1992; Laver and Hunt 1992; Hooghe, Marks and Wilson 2002; Kitschelt 2003; Marks et. al. 2006; Benoit and Laver 2006; Vachudova and Hooghe 2009. Since the second dimension tends to be more complex and loosely structured, this article refers to it simply as the non-economic dimension.

¹³ Although two dimensional political space is certainly a simplification, two dimensions are sufficient for capturing the key dynamics of issue emphasis and position blurring.

To locate parties on these dimensions this article uses the 1999, 2002 and 2006 Chapel Hill Expert Surveys (CHES), which place parties on an economic left-right scale and on green, alternative and liberal versus traditional, authoritarian and nationalist policies (Steenbergen & Marks 2007, Hooghe et al. 2010). The salience assigned by parties to the dimensions is assessed using the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) dataset (Budge et al. 1987). Table 9 in the appendix lists the CMP categories that were used to construct an additive measure of salience for the economic and the non-economic dimensions. Voter positions are determined using four sources: the World Values Surveys 1999-2000 (WVS), the 2004 European Election Study (EES), the European Social Survey 2006 (ESS) and the International Social Survey Program 2006 (ISSP). To construct economic and non-economic scales of voter preferences, I use factor scores from separate factor analyses on the economic, and non-economic items of each dataset. The specific items used for each dimension in a given dataset are listed in table 9 in the appendix.¹⁴

The article considers all Western European parties generally referred to as radical right, populist right, extreme right or neo-fascist by the party literature (cf. Golder 2003; Norris 2005; Kitschelt 2007). The case selection is, however, constrained by the data.¹⁵ Consequently, the article is limited to the study of 17 radical right parties in nine countries. These are: FPO and BZO in Austria; FN and VB in Belgium; FP and DF in

¹⁴ The 2004 European Election Study (EES) only includes a question about general left-right selfplacement. It does not contain any specific issue items which may be used for constructing an economic and non-economic dimension.

¹⁵ The CHES datasets, which are central to the dimensional analyses, do not cover Norway and Switzerland, while some radical right parties score below the dataset's 3% cutoff, and thus are not included. The CMP dataset tends to cover only electorally larger parties, hence a number of smaller radical right parties are not covered.

Denmark; True Finns in Finland; FN and MPF in France; REP, NPD and DVU in Germany; LAOS in Greece; AN and LN in Italy; and LPF and PVV in the Netherlands. Table 11 in the appendix contains the details.

Major parties are operationalized as the most significant political parties on either side of the left-right spectrum in each party system. These parties are either the primary governing parties or the main opposition parties. In cases where more parties can be considered as major right or major left parties, all such parties are included. See table 11 in the appendix for details.

Finally, it should be stressed that each analysis considering party placement variance measures voter or expert deviations from *party-specific* means. Consequently, the natural differences between party positions are removed from the analyses.

Analyses and Results

Radical Right Voters and Issue Dimensions

This section tests hypothesis 1, demonstrating that radical right voter preferences are highly dispersed on the economic dimension, compared to the preferences of major party supporters. Simultaneously, radical right voter positions are significantly more compact on the non-economic dimension, as compared to major party voters. Table 2 presents a summary of *party specific* standard deviations of radical right and major party supporters on the two dimensions. It considers each voter's deviation from *party specific* mean voters, thus removing the differences in individual party placements. This analysis

utilizes the ESS 2006 survey because it provides data on both the economic and noneconomic dimension and it is contemporaneous with the CHES 2006 data used later.

	Econ	omic Dimension	Non-economic Dimension				
	N	Standard	N	Standard			
		deviation		deviation			
Major Right	3612	0.967	3382	0.870			
Radical Right	522	1.093	466	0.871			
Variance Ratio Test	F(3611,	521)=0.783, p<0.000	F (3381,	465)=0.999, p<0.511			
Major Left	2942	0.880	2706	0.952			
Radical Right	522	1.093	466	0.871			
Variance Ratio Test	F(2941,	521)=0.655, p<0.000	F (2705,	465)=1.196, p<0.007			

Table 2 Variance Ratio Tests of Voter Positions

Variance ratio test of voter placement. Measures voter deviations from party specific mean voters over radical right and major parties. European Social Survey 2006. The statistics in table 2 suggest that radical right voters have a greater variance around their party's mean voter on economic issues. The variance ratio test shows that this variance is significantly greater than those of either the major right or major left parties. The radical right voter dispersion on the non-economic dimension is significantly smaller than that of major left parties, and almost identical to that of major right parties.


The causal order between radical right voter and party positioning is unclear. It is difficult to say whether some voters support radical right parties because of the parties' clear non-economic stances and vague economic stances, or whether radical right parties adjust their stances to fit these voter distributions. However, given these distributions of radical right supporters, there exists a political niche combining authoritarian positions on non-economic issues with a broad and dispersed economic placement, allowing the capture of wider economic constituencies. The next sections consider how radical right parties behave in light of this electoral niche.

Radical Right Parties and Issue Salience

Testing hypothesis 2, this section suggests that rather than contesting the entrenched issues of political competition, radical right parties highlight nationalism, ethnocentrism and general opposition to the political establishment. Their main issue domain thus lies not on the primary, economic, dimension, but on the secondary dimension.

Figure 4 compares the salience that radical right parties place on economic and noneconomic issues with major right and major left parties. Major parties devote about 30% of their manifestos to economic, as well as to non-economic, issues. They tend to slightly overemphasize economic issues, which is logical given the central role the economy plays in mainstream political discourse and public policy. Radical right parties, on the contrary, overemphasize non-economic issues by devoting over 40% of their manifestos to them on average. Economic issues are instead neglected, with only some 22% of manifesto space. The most striking is the relative difference: radical right parties devote almost twice as much of their manifestos to non-economic, rather than economic, issues.

Figure 4 Issue Salience by Party Type



Comparative Manifesto Data. Average salience by party type for years 2000 and up.

A similar picture emerges when considering the long-term trend of economic and noneconomic issue salience of these three party types (figure 5). Both major left and major right parties balance their attention between economic and non-economic issues over the post-war period. Radical right parties, on the other hand, place more or less constant emphasis on economic issues, while devoting increasingly more of their manifestos to non-economic issues over time.




Figure 5 Issue Salience in the Post-War Period

Comparative Manifesto Data

Economic Position Blurring

Radical right parties project themselves as parties contesting predominantly noneconomic issues. For strategic reasons, they muddy their economic outlooks and shy away from discussing economic policies explicitly and at length, which allows them to attract a broader coalition of voters. This economic position blurring is not only picked up by voters, who tend to evaluate the radical right on the basis of their non-economic issue preferences, but also by party experts.

This section tests hypotheses 3a, 3b and 3c. It first considers the assessment of radical right placements across multiple datasets. Second, it predicts the standard deviations of voter and expert party placements by party types, demonstrating the particularity of the radical right. Finally, it addresses the fluctuations of radical right party placements over time.

Figures 6 and 7 present ordinal expert placement of political parties and ordinal positioning of mean radical right voters on the economic and non-economic dimensions¹⁶. Each row corresponds to a different source of information on party placement within a given party system. Parties are arranged horizontally from left to right on the economic dimension and from social liberalism to authoritarianism on the non-

¹⁶ Expert judgments and voter preferences are coded on different scales. When experts place political parties and voters outline their positioning on political issues, there is no certainty that they conceive of political space in comparable ways. It is thus impossible to say that distance on the voters' scale is the same as the equivalent distance on the scale used by the party experts. As a result, it is erroneous to report the placement on a continuous scale. I rather opt to report the placement as ordinal level data, which compares voter positioning to other voters and expert placement relative to other expert placements.

economic dimension. They are lined up by major left and major right parties (lightly shaded) within each party system, while radical right parties are emphasized in bold.

The data show that *radical right economic placement seems rather erratic*. While some sources suggest that a radical right party stands on the extreme economic right, others place it *to the left* of the major left party in the given system (figure 6). This contrasts sharply with radical right positioning on the non-economic dimension of competition, where a vast majority of sources agree, and place the radical right on the authoritarian fringe (figure 7).

AUSTRIA		Econ															Econ Right	FPO	BZO
Voters	WVS 1999	KPO		20			Grur	ne	FPO			_	OVP	L	IF			0.67	
	ESS 2006	KPO		PO	G	rune	LIF		FPO		BZO		OVP				-	0.71	0.8
Experts	CHES 1999	Grune		PO									OVP	_	PO	LI	F	0.80	
	CHES 2006	Grune	SI	PO			FPO		BZO)			OVP	L	IF			0.50	0.6
BELGIUM		Eco	on Left													Ec	on Right	0.13 VI	0.1 B
Flanders	WVS 1999			SP		Agale	v	ID		CVF	5	VB		VLD					0.8
Voters	ESS 2006	Agal	ev/Groe	er SP.A	۱.	VB		CD&	V	N-V	'A			VLC					0.5
F	CHES 1999	Agal	ev	SP				VU-I	D21	CVF	þ			VLD		VB			1.0
Experts	CHES 2006	Agal	ev/Groe	er SPA		CD&V		NVA		VB				VLD					0.8
BELGIUN		E	con Le	ft												Eco	n Right	FÌ	
Francoprio	WVS 199	9 FN		C	COLO		S		PSC					PRL-FD	`				0.2
Voters	ESS 2006				COLO		S		ECC					MR	,				0.2
	CHES 19				COLO		S		PSC					PRL-FE		FN			1.0
Experts	CHES 19 CHES 20			E	COLO		S		ECC		CE	н		MR	,	FIN			1.0
	01123 20						5		200	0			1						0.4
DENMARK		Ecor Left															Econ Right	FP	DF
	WVS 1999	EL	SF			SD	FP	F	RF	CD	RV	,	KP	V		DF	giit	0.40	1.0
Voters	ESS 2006	EL	SF	F	P	SD	RV		(RF	DF	C			v	_	٢F		0.30	0.7
	ISSP 2006	EL	SF			SD	RV		DF	KRF		w Alli	ance	V		٢P			0.5
	CHES 1999	EL	SF			SD	CD	F	RV	KRF	DF		KF	V	F	=P		1.00	0.7
Experts	CHES 2006	EL	SF			SD				DF				V		٢F	RV		0.5
																		0.38	0.1
FINLAND			Econ Left														Econ Right	True I	Finns
	WVS 199	9	VAS		ę		True Finns	VI	IR	KD	KES	šΚ	RKP	KOK					0.3
Voters	ESS 2006	ESS 2006 VA				SDP					KESK		VIHR	RKP	т	rue Fin	KOK		0.8
	ISSP 200	-	VAS	VIH			RKP	KD		TrueF	inr KES		KOK						0.7
Experts	CHES 19		VAS				VIHR				KES		True Fi		K	OK			0.7
Expense	CHES 20	06	VAS		5	SDP	VIHR	Tri	ue Fin	KD	KES	κ	RKP	KOK					0.5
		_															_		0.2
FRANCE		Ecor Left															Econ Right	FN	MPF
	WVS 1999	PCF	VER	TS F	N	PS				UDF			RPR	DL				0.43	
Voters	ESS 2006	PCF				PS	VEF	TS 📘	/IPF	UDF	FN	1	UMP					0.86	0.5
	ISSP 2006	PCF				PS	VEF	TS		UDF			RPR	FN				1.00	
Evenente	CHES 1999	PCF				PS	VER	TS		UDF			RPR	RPF	0	DL	FN	1.00	
Experts	CHES 2006	PCF				PS	VEF	TS		UDF	FN	1	UMP	MP	•			0.71	1.0
																		0.24	0.3
GREEC		on Lef														Econ	Right	LAC	os
CHES 2006	KKE		D	IKKI		SY	riza		PA	ASOK		L	AOS		N	D			0.8
GERMANY		Econ	Left														Econ Right	REP	NPC
	WVS 1999	PDS			F	EP	SPE)			CDU-	CSU	Grune	n F	DP		.	0.33	
	ESS 2006	PDS	B	EP		IPD-DVL			Gru	nen	CDU-			- F				0.29	0.4
Voters	E33 2000	PDS					SPE		Gru		CDU-		NPD	F	EP	FD)P	0.86	0.7
Voters	ISSP 2006				G	arunen	SPE)			CDU-	CSU	DVU	F	EP	FC)P	0.86	0.7
		PDS					SPE)	Gru	nen	CDU-	CSU	FDP						
	ISSP 2006	PDS															Econ	0.32 LN	0.1 AN
Voters Experts ITALY	ISSP 2006 CHES 1999	PDS PDS																	
Experts	ISSP 2006 CHES 1999 CHES 2006	PDS PDS Ecor Left	:	2	CDU	Den		DI	د م	1	CCD				5		Right	0 00	0.0
Experts	ISSP 2006 CHES 1999 CHES 2006 WVS 1999	PDS PDS Ecor Left RC	PDS		CDU	PSD		PI	Fd		CCD			AN	FI		Right	0.80	
Experts ITALY Voters	ISSP 2006 CHES 1999 CHES 2006 WVS 1999 CHES 1999	PDS PDS Econ Left RC RC	PDS PDS	3	FdV	PPI	F	SDI	AN		CDU	CO	D	AN	FI		Right	0.60	1.0
Experts ITALY Voters	ISSP 2006 CHES 1999 CHES 2006 WVS 1999	PDS PDS Econ Left RC RC	PDS	3			F						D	AN			Right	0.60 1.00	1.0 0.8
Experts ITALY Voters Experts	ISSP 2006 CHES 1999 CHES 2006 WVS 1999 CHES 1999 CHES 2006	PDS PDS Econ Left RC RC	PDS PDS DS	3	FdV	PPI	F	SDI	AN		CDU	CO	D	AN	FI		Right LN LN Econ	0.60	1.0 0.8 0.1
Experts ITALY Voters Experts NETHERLA	ISSP 2006 CHES 1999 CHES 2006 WVS 1999 CHES 1999 CHES 1999 CHES 2006 NDS	PDS PDS Econ Left RC RC RC RC	PDS PDS DS Econ Left	3	FdV FdV	PPI SDI	F	PSDI DL	AN IdV	,	CDU UDC				FI		Right LN LN	0.60 1.00 0.20 LPF	1.0 0.8 0.1 PVV
Experts	ISSP 2006 CHES 1999 CHES 2006 WVS 1999 CHES 1999 CHES 2006	PDS PDS Econ Left RC RC RC RC	PDS PDS DS	3	FdV FdV	PPI	F	PSDI DL	AN	C	CDU UDC		CD N '(Wild D		FI	D	Right LN LN Econ	0.60 1.00 0.20	0.9 1.0 0.8 0.1 PVV 0.7 1.0

Figure 6 Economic Positioning of Radical Right Parties

Extreme right parties are in bold. Anchored by mainstream left- and right-wing parties. Please see appendix on details regarding the construction of dimensions.

Figure 7 Non-Economic Positioning of Radical Right Parties

AUSTRIA		Lil													Auth	FPO	BZO
/oters	WVS 1999	KPO	G	à	LIF		SPO		FPO	OV						0.83	
101013	ESS 2006				Grur	ne	SPO		LIF	OV		KPO	BZO		FPO	1.00	0.8
Experts	CHES 1999			.F	GA		SPO			OV		FPO				1.00	
	CHES 2006		Ģ	Grune	LIF		SPO			OV	'P	BZO	FPO			1.00	0.8
	•														A 4 h	0.08	0.0
BELGIUN Flanders			Lib												Auth	VB	\$
	WVS 1999	Agale	ev.	SP		ID		V	'LD	F	SC	VB		CV	p		0.8
Voters	ESS 2006	, iguit		÷.	ev/Gro	N-	VA		'LD		SP.A	CD	δV	VB			1.0
	CHES 1999	Agale	ev	VŬ-I		SF		V	'LD	C	CVP	VB					1.0
Experts	CHES 2006			Groe	en	SF	A	V	'LD	C	D&V	NVA	4	VB			1.0
																	0.0
BELGIU				Lib										A	uth	FN	1
Francoph	WVS 199	99	ECOL	0	Р	S		F	PRL-FD)	PS	SC		N			1.0
/oters	ESS 200		ECOL		C	DH		N	MR		PS	5		N			1.0
	CHES 19		ECOL	0	P	S		F	PRL-FD)	PS	C		N			1.0
Experts	CHES 20	006	ECOL	0	P	S		N	MR		C	ЭН					
																	0.0
DENMAR		Lib				KE.	0.0		00	V		_			Auth	FP	DF
Voters	WVS 1999	EL	RV RV	-	SF SF	KF CD	SD SD		CD	V V	D		stende	<rf< td=""><td>FP</td><td>0.90 1.00</td><td>8.0 9.0</td></rf<>	FP	0.90 1.00	8.0 9.0
	ESS 2006 CHES 1999		EL		SF SF	RV	SD		KRF	V	K			DF FP	DF	0.90	1.0
Experts	CHES 1999 CHES 2006		EL		N SV	SF	SD		NNF	V	K	-		-P	UF	0.90	1.0
	CHE3 2000	,			IV.	01	00			v	I.					. 0.06	0.1
FINLAND		Lib										1/501/			Auth	True F	
oters	WVS 1999	VIHR	VAS		KP	KO		DP	1/15			KESK	KD		True Finn		1.0
	ESS 2006	VIHR	VAS	к	KP	KO		DP	KD		KOK	KESK		Je Finn			1.0
Experts	CHES 1999	VIHR	VAS					DP		P/SFP	KOK	KESK		Je Finn			1.0
	CHES 2006	VIHR	VAS	R	KP/SFF	,	3	DP	KC	ĸ		KESK	Iri	ue Finn	KD		0.8 0.0
															I		0.0
FRANCE			-												A 4 h	FN	MPF
FRANCE	WVS 1999	VERT		PCF	PS		DL		UDF			RPR	FN		Auth	1.00	IVIPI
Voters	ESS 2006	VERT		01	PS		PCF		UDF	MF	DE	UMP	FN			1.00	0.7
	CHES 1999	VERT			PS		UDF		PCF	DL		RPR	RPF		FN	1.00	
Experts	CHES 2006				PS		PCF		UDF			UMP	MPF		FN	1.00	0.8
																0.00	0.1
GERMAN	v	Li	h												Auth	REP	NPD
GEIIIIAI	•		~												Auth		DVL
	WVS 1999		(Grunen	PDS	5	SPD		FDP			CDU-CS	U REP			1.00	
Voters	ESS 2006				Grur	nen	SPD		Linke	FD	Р	CDU-CS	U NPD	/DVU	REP	1.00	0.8
	CHES 1999	Grune	en F	DP	PDS	5	SPD					CDU-CS	U REP	·	DVU	0.86	1.0
Experts	CHES 2006	Grune	en L	inke	FDP	•	SPD					CDU-CS	U				
																0.08	0.1
GREECE			Lib												Auth	LAO	s
Experts	CHES 2006	SY	RIZA	1	PASOK		KKE			ND		DIKKI		LAOS			1.0
ITALY		Lib													Auth	LN	AN
Voters	WVS 1999	LIU	FdV	BC	PD	S	F	SDI	CDU	AN		FI	LN	PPI	CCD	0.80	0.6
	CHES 1999			FdV		-	-	PSDI	UD	LN	PPI		CCD	CDU		0.60	1.0
	Oneo 1999		RC							LIN	F PI						
Experts				SDI	DS		L	DL	ldV			FI	UDC	LN	AN	0.90	1.0
Experts	CHES 2006	FdV	no													-	
Experts	CHES 2006	i FdV	no													0.15	0.2
Experts NETHERL4		i FdV	Lib												Auth	0.15 PV	0.2 V

Extreme right parties are in bold. Anchored by mainstream left- and right-wing parties. Please see appendix on details regarding the construction of dimensions.

The right-hand column of figures 6 and 7 provides summary measures of radical right ordinal placement, while taking the number of parties in the party system into account.¹⁷ The standard deviation of these placements is reported below each party. The mean standard deviation -- that is the average discrepancy between the placement measures of each radical right party -- is 0.226 on the economic dimension, while it is mere 0.081 on the non-economic dimension.

This evidence, demonstrating that radical right party placement on the non-economic dimension is very consistent across data sources, but their placement on economic issues diverges extensively within each system, supports hypothesis 3a. This finding underscores the limited utility of spatial conceptions when studying radical right parties. Rather than holding positions on economic issues, radical right parties try to avoid clear economic stances.

Consequently, it is important to address whether radical right placement varies significantly more than that of other parties. Table 2 presents results of OLS regression analyses predicting voter and expert standard deviations on party placement on the economic and non-economic dimensions¹⁸. The standard deviations are explained by party family: major right, major left, radical right and radical left.¹⁹ In addition, the

 $^{^{17}}$ The summary measure takes the ordered position of an expert party placement or mean voter of radical right party on economic and non-economic issues, while adjusting for the number of parties in the given system. For example, if the radical right is 5th of 7 parties ordered along the economic left-right scale, it receives the score 5/7=0.714.

¹⁸ These are again party-level standard deviations, measuring either voter or expert deviations from party-specific means, thus removing the differences in individual party placements.

¹⁹ See table 11 in the appendix for the list of parties in each party family.

models control for general party characteristics: distance from the center of the left-right dimension; government participation and vote share. Government participation is interacted with the radical right dummy variable in order to assess hypothesis 5.

	Economic	Dimensio	n	Non-economic Dimension			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)		
	Voter Placement SD	Voter SD	Expert SD	Voter SD	Expert SD		
	(EES)	(ESS)	(CHES)	(ESS)	(CHES)		
Radical Right	0.757***	0.168***	0.669***	0.043	0.165		
	(0.196)	(0.060)	(0.185)	(0.071)	(0.292)		
Major Left	-0.052	-0.007	-0.048	0.097	-0.288		
	(0.204)	(0.061)	(0.193)	(0.072)	(0.305)		
Major Right	-0.030	0.069	-0.037	0.030	-0.019		
	(0.200)	(0.054)	(0.176)	(0.064)	(0.277)		
Radical Left	-0.414***	-0.110**	-0.337**	0.048	0.129		
	(0.152)	(0.050)	(0.153)	(0.059)	(0.241)		
Gov't Participation * Radical Right	-0.012***	0.002	0.003	0.001	-0.004		
Partial slope	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.005)		
Gov't Participation * Non-Radical Right	-0.000	0.000	-0.002*	-0.000	0.002		
Partial slope	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.001)		
Distance from Center	0.105**	0.015	-0.050	-0.010	0.064		
	(0.050)	(0.017)	(0.051)	(0.021)	(0.080)		
Vote %	0.002	-0.003	0.002	0.000	-0.002		
	(0.007)	(0.002)	(0.006)	(0.002)	(0.009)		
Constant	1.840***	0.914***	1.302***	0.887***	1.111***		
	(0.119)	(0.044)	(0.121)	(0.052)	(0.191)		
N	82	77	98	77	98		
\mathbb{R}^2	0.373	0.336	0.378	0.066	0.061		

Table 3 Predicting Voter and Expert Placement Standard Deviations

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

OLS Regression. The dependent variables are party level standard deviations -- they measure either voter or expert deviations from party-specific means. Voter placement of parties on the general left-right scale measured in the European Election Surveys 2004. Voter positions on economic and non-economic dimension measured in the European Social Survey 2006. Expert placement on economic left-right scale and social liberalism and authoritarianism measured in the 2006 Chapel Hill Expert Survey. Partial slopes calculated using Stata's `xi3' command written by Michael Mitchell and Phil Ender.

The results in table 3 support hypothesis 3b suggesting that radical right parties blur their economic positions. In the first three models concerning the economic dimension, the coefficient on the radical right is positive and statistically significant, meaning that voters and experts are significantly less certain (have higher standard deviations) about radical right parties. Major parties do not have a significant effect on voter and expert (un)certainty. Interestingly, both voters and experts are *more* certain about the economic placement of radical left parties, as the radical left has a negative effect on blurring (their standard deviations are significantly smaller). On the non-economic dimension (models 4 and 5), party families do not predict the certainty of voter or expert placement at all. This suggests that there is no significant difference in the (un)certainty of voters and experts about major and radical party placements on the non-economic dimension -- they are comparably certain about the placement of all of these parties.

These results reject the speculation that voters and experts simply do not know as much about the parties belonging to the radical right and left, which tend to be smaller and stand on the political extremes. The results further reject the notion that the dependent variable of expert and voter standard deviations thus merely taps the voters'/experts' (lack of) knowledge, rather than party strategies. First, the models control for vote share and distance from the center. Second, voters and experts are more certain about radical left placement, while exhibiting significant doubts about the radical right on the economic dimension. This discrepancy cannot be simply attributed to voter and expert lack of knowledge of smaller, outlying parties. It is very likely that deliberate partisan strategizing -- economic blurring of the radical right -- is the cause. The interaction effect in the models of table 3 provides a basis for evaluating hypothesis 5, which expects radical right parties to decrease their economic blurring when in government. The partial slope associated with the effect of government for radical right parties shows significant effect in the expected direction only in model 1. This supports hypothesis 5 by showing that voters are significantly more certain of radical right party placement on economic issues when these have been in government. However, since the finding is not reproduced in other models, the test of hypothesis 5 is inconclusive. A more refined time-series assessment of radical right strategies when in government, which is beyond the scope of this article, is likely to provide a clearer answer.

The final test of radical right economic blurring, evaluating hypothesis 3c, assesses radical right party ideological stability on this dimension over time. Given the hypothesized vagueness of radical right economic placements, we should expect significantly greater positional shifts on the economic dimension on the part of radical right parties than on the part of major parties. These shifts should not be interpreted as true movement of the radical right's positions, but rather as a reflection of the uncertainty of their positions.

Table 4 Party Position Change Over Time

	Eco	nomic Dimension	No	n-Economic Dimension
	Ν	Mean Position Δ	N	Mean Position Δ
Major Right	24	0.568	24	0.604
Radical Right	12	1.200	12	0.811
Means Difference Test	Γ	T=2.750, p<0.015		T=0.935, p<0.362
Major Left	22	0.516	22	0.514
Radical Right	12	1.200	12	0.811
Means Difference Test	Г	r = 2.953, p < 0.010		T=1.437, p<0.172

Mean absolute change of party positions between 1999, 2002, 2006. Means difference tests assume unequal variances. Chapel Hill Expert Survey. Table 4 summarizes the mean positional change of radical right and major parties over three time periods measured by the Chapel Hill Expert Surveys -- 1999, 2002 and 2006. The table provides statistical tests of differences in average position change of individual parties over this time period. Supporting hypothesis 3c, it demonstrates that radical right parties appear to change their positions on economic issues significantly more than major parties. On non-economic issues, radical right parties are viewed as not significantly different from major parties.

Thus, the evidence so far suggests that radical right parties employ deliberate dimensional strategies. They compete on non-economic issues, while blurring their stances on economic issues. These parties emphasize non-economic issues over economic ones in their manifestos. Both voters and experts are significantly uncertain about radical right economic placement, while they are more certain about the placements of other parties. Finally, radical right parties exhibit seeming instability in their economic placements. The next section considers the electoral consequences of this strategy.

Why Support the Radical Right?

Since radical right parties tend to mostly consider non-economic issues, voters should support radical right parties when they agree with them on non-economic issues, as per hypothesis 4. Economic issues should play a limited role in voters' calculus over casting a vote for the radical right. Figure 8 reports results of a Multinomial Logit Model predicting vote choice for radical right parties using the 2006 European Social Survey. The model predicts party vote choice by positioning on the economic and social dimensions, while controlling for voters' gender, age, education and income.²⁰ Although this analysis presents combined data across party systems, looking at individual parties produces substantively identical results. Substantively identical results can be also obtained using other datasets²¹. The figure presents the predicted probabilities of voting for radical right parties, given a voter's positioning on the economic dimension²², while other predictors are held at their mean.

The graphs support hypothesis 4 by showing that voters of radical right parties cast their votes on the basis of non-economic issue considerations. Radical right parties attract voters who stand at or near the authoritarian extreme of the non-economic dimension. Conversely, voters do not tend to place similar emphasis on economic concerns when voting for the radical right. Although statistically significant, positioning on the economic dimension does not substantively affect the probability of voting for the radical right. The

²⁰ The details of the model are presented in table 10 in the appendix. The core assumption of Multinomial Logit -- the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) -- holds when tested with the Small-Hsiao test. In any case, the alternative model -- Multinomial Probit -- is considered problematic, although not requiring the IIA assumption. It is computationally complex and with a larger number of choice categories becomes intractable. Furthermore, recent methodological literature suggests that the estimates of Multinomial Probit are almost always less accurate than those of Multinomial Logit (Kropko 2008).

²¹ For details, please contact the author.

 $^{^{22}}$ The economic axis is based on standardized scores of variable `gincdif' in ESS 2006, concerning voter propensity to redistribute income, which is the only question tapping explicitly economic preferences. The non-economic axis is based on standardized factor scores derived from principal factor analysis of the noneconomic items of ESS 2006, listed in table 5 of the appendix. Given the standardized scores, the axes run from roughly -2.5 to +2.5.

predicted probabilities stemming from the economic dimension are very low, and the economic left-right curve is almost flat. In comparison, mainstream parties attract voters on both dimensions.




Figure 8 Vote Choice for Different Party Types

Predicted probabilities for economic and non-economic positions while other variables held at their means. Based on MNL model presented in table 3. 2006 European Social Survey. Estimated using Stata 11.1 `prgen' command. The radical right's strategies of deliberately understating economic issues and blurring its stances on them shape its electoral fortunes. Since voters do not support the radical right on the basis of economic preferences, radical right parties are able to attract a broader electoral coalition, spanning from unemployed industrial workers to some white collar workers and the self-employed. Multidimensional party competition, with its strategies of issue emphasis and position blurring, permits the amalgamation of voters united by some preferences, but divided by others, with significant electoral consequences.

Conclusion

This article explores the puzzle of radical right party positioning. Using party manifesto data, expert data on party placement, and data on voter preferences, it argues that radical right parties contest the structure of political competition. Due to their investment in various issues, they employ diverse strategies in different dimensions. Consequently, radical right parties emphasize and take clear ideological stances on the authoritarian fringe of the non-economic dimension, while deliberately avoiding precise economic placement.

This article presents a dimensional approach to political competition, which sees politics as competition *over the issue composition* of political space. Parties compete for voters by seeking to shift the basis of political competition. To sidestep major parties, non-entrenched parties like the radical right are inclined to explore previously neglected issues, such as nationalism and anti-immigration -- a strategy facilitated by their hierarchical organizational structure.

This dimensional competition makes viable the partisan strategy of position blurring. While position blurring has been analyzed as *costly* in unidimensional competition, it is a potentially rewarding strategy in multidimensional contests. While competing on the noneconomic dimension, radical right parties keep a consciously opaque profile on economic issues. Through this position blurring they remove or misrepresent their spatial distances from voters, and attract a broader coalition of economic interests.

Radical right parties benefit directly from their strategy of economic position blurring. Voters respond to partisan signals and vote for radical right parties on the basis of their non-economic issue interests, rather than economic preferences. This benefits the radical right by securing electoral support of socially authoritarian voters, without deterring voters on the basis of economic issue preferences. Blurring ideological positions is thus a rational strategy on the part of the European radical right.

The dimensional approach to political competition presented in this article is consistent with the spatial paradigm in that it considers party and voter placement in n-dimensional space. It is, however, inconsistent with spatial theory, which sees party competition as *position-taking*, without considering the relative stakes that parties may have in different issue dimensions. It is the argument of this article that these stakes determine partisan strategic calculations, potentially leading them to avoid taking positional stances. The academic debate over radical right placement on economic issues should consequently

consider the limits of spatial theory, and acknowledge the possibility that parties may compete by deliberate position blurring.

The Westernization of Political Competition in Eastern Europe

Introduction

Eastern European party competition is argued to be distinctive from that of western Europe. Eastern European party systems are assumed to be ideologically looser, and -- if structure does appear -- it is expected to be contrary to the west. In Eastern Europe, the communist legacy is thought to bind left-wing economics with social conservatism, while the economic right remains the champion of social liberalism.

This paper presents empirical evidence that political competition in Eastern Europe is converging on the western pattern, which combines left-wing economic outlooks with social liberalism. This convergence is, nonetheless, uneven across Eastern Europe, begging an explanation of its variance.

This paper explains the structure in Eastern European party competition with two interrelated arguments. First, it demonstrates that the meaning of the non-economic, socio-cultural dimension is changing. It is no longer dominated by issues of elementary civil liberties and democratic rights, which were central to democratic transitions. Instead, the socio-cultural dimension is increasingly defined by more typically western concerns over cosmopolitanism versus nationalism and modern secularism versus traditionalism. Second, under these altered conditions, political competition in Eastern Europe becomes determined by deeper historical experiences. This paper argues that the historical experiences of state and nation building are the primary determinants of current political competition in Eastern Europe.

The paper analyzes 14 Eastern European countries that are covered by the Chapel Hill Expert Surveys (CHES)(Hooghe et al. 2010).²³ It first reviews the literature on Eastern European political competition. Second, it presents and discusses the empirical evidence of competition change in Eastern Europe, based on the 2002 and 2006 iterations of CHES. Third, the paper develops a theoretical explanation of the variance in this change. Fourth, it tests the general theoretical propositions using large-N, quantitative methods.²⁴ Before concluding, the paper considers four groups of cases in detail, highlighting the connections between historical experiences with state and nation building and current political competition.

Political Competition in Eastern Europe

Literature on political competition after communism has debated the role of social structure as basis for political contest and party ideology. Both sides of the debate, however, point to distinctions between post-communist party competition and competition in established democracies.

One side of the debate argues that Eastern European party competition and ideological structuring differs from Western Europe due to its lacking social bases, making it

²³ These countries are: Bosnia, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia and Slovenia.

²⁴ The paper combines data from the CHES surveys, the Benoit and Laver (2006) party expert dataset, the Comparative Manifesto Project (Budge et al. 1987), Fearon et al. (2007) data on ethnic fragmentation, Maddison's (N.d.) data on historical GDP levels, and Polity IV and Freedom House data on democratic development.

unstable, ideologically underspecified and personalistic. This view proceeds from the particular nature of Eastern European democratization which amounted to ``a triple transformation affecting all three levels of nationhood, constitution making, as well as the 'normal politics' of allocation" (Offe 2004: 507). Consequently, a number of scholars argue that Eastern Europeans not only lack experience with the political process, they also lack clear political preferences associated with their socio-economic outlooks which are only forming. Party building is thus dominated by elites, who create political parties only after the first free elections from within parliaments (Kopecky 1995, Agh 1996, Pridham and Lewis 1996, Zielinski 2002, Van Biezen 2003, Webb and White 2007), which leads to fluid, open party systems (Ost 1993, Mair 1997). The ideologically opaque character of Eastern European parties is further deepened by the necessity of economic liberalization, and later by the exigencies of European Union accession, which set the political agenda, circumscribing competition and ideological differentiation (Innes 2002, Grzymala-Busse and Innes 2003). These works see Eastern European political competition as rather unstructured and fickle.

A growing line of scholarship opposes what they call the *tabula rasa*²⁵ view of political competition in Eastern Europe. It argues that Eastern European political competition and ideological structuring is to a surprising degree rooted in social divides that inform voter preferences and translate into party ideologies.²⁶ This view, however, also stresses

²⁵ See Kitschelt (1995).

²⁶ Extensive research by Evans and Whitefield concludes that ``[t]here is considerable evidence that postcommunist societies contain structured social and ideological divisions, that social factors -- especially age, education, religion, ethnicity, and occupational class -- significantly shape ideological perspectives, and that voters choose parties that in large measure programmatically reflect their interests."(Whitefield 2002: 191, Evans and Whitefield 1993, 1998, 2000). Others stress the significance of different social cleavages,

Eastern European distinctiveness from the ideological structure of the west. It concentrates on studying how previous communist regime types and the transition process structure political competition in Eastern European countries (Kitschelt 1995, Markowski 1997, Kitschelt et. al. 1999, Vachudova 2005, 2008).

These works tend to divide Eastern Europe into groups. The democratic success stories -the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary and sometimes Slovenia -- were able to consolidate state institutions and carry out successful political transition with fast marketization, leading to party competition over socio-economic outlooks (Evans and Whitefield 1993, Kitschelt 1995, Tavits and Letki 2009). The intermediate category -- Estonia and Latvia -- managed to marketize, but ethnic heterogeneity retained the potential of trumping social class in the formation of political competition (Evans and Whitefield 1993). Finally, the democratic laggards -- Bulgaria, Romania, Serbia and to a lesser extent Slovakia -initially failed to transfer power to democratic elites and to fully marketize, which gave rise to ideologically circumscribed, personalistic political competition (Kitschelt 1995, Vachudova 2005, 2008).

This line of research thus concludes that Eastern European party competition is structured through voter demand and partisan supply. But -- although arguing for structure -- it also views political competition in Eastern Europe as different from that in the west. In the west, left-wing economics coincide with social liberalism. In the east, the left's

such as ethnicity (Bunce 2003) or center-periphery (Mudde 2005). Whitefield and Rohrschneider (2009) emphasize the stability of Eastern European political competition, concluding that there is no evidence of ideological de-alignment or realignment, and that Eastern European parties ``fulfill the conditions of representational consistency..."(ibid.: 686).

association with communist authoritarianism connects the economic left with social conservatism, which -- depending on the nature of the communist regime -- may lead to cooperation between left-wing and nationalist parties (Ishiyama 1998). The economic right, on the other hand, combines market liberalization with democratic opposition to communist rule, giving it socially liberal outlooks. Political competition in the East is almost a mirror image of the competition in the West (Kitschelt 1992, Marks et al. 2006, Vachudova and Hooghe 2009).

Party Competition Change in Eastern Europe

The view that Eastern European party competition is a mirror image of the west is, however, challenged by recent empirical evidence. The works of Marks et al. (2006) and Vachudova and Hooghe (2009) are based on data from the 2002 Chapel Hill Expert Survey. While this survey underlines the expected pattern of political competition in Eastern Europe, connecting left-wing economics with social conservatism, the 2006 iteration of the same survey shows change in a number of Eastern European countries (Rovny and Edwards forthcoming).

The change consists of two phenomena. First, economically left-wing parties are becoming more socially liberal. Second, economically right-wing parties are becoming more socially conservative. Table 5 documents this change. It presents the positioning of parties on economic and social issues in 2002 and 2006, as well as the change between these two years. The table demonstrates that economically right-wing parties have shifted towards social authoritarianism by about half a point on average, while the economic left has shifted towards social liberalism by almost one point.

Year	Party	Econ Placement	Social Placement	Economic Δ	Social Δ
	Family	Left-Right	Con-Lib	Left-Right	Con-Lib
2002	Right-wing	6.62	5.18		
2006	$\mathbf{Right} ext{-wing}$	6.81	4.66	0.19	-0.53
2002	Left-wing	3.25	3.26		
2006	Left-wing	3.19	4.16	-0.06	0.90

Table 5 Party Competition Change in Eastern Europe

Party placement change by party family. Left-wing defined as scoring <5 on economic placement. Rightwing defined as scoring >=5 on economic placement. Economic placement ranges from 0=left to 10=right. Social placement ranges from 0=conservative to 10=liberal. 10 Eastern European EU countries. Chapel Hill Expert Surveys 2002 and 2006.

Taken together, this amount to the rotation of political competition in a number of countries, where left-wing economics are no longer associated with social conservatism, as expected and observed by the literature. Instead, we see a pattern typical for West European countries, where economically left-wing parties are more socially liberal than the economic right (Kitschelt 1992, Marks et al. 2006). Figure 9 depicts Eastern European party systems which have not undergone a rotation of competition. In all these six countries the economic left remains more socially conservative than the economic right. Figure 10, on the other hand, shows the four party systems where political competition no longer follows the predicted pattern of socially conservative left-wing parties. In these four countries, the axis of competition -- symbolized by the best-fitting line on the graphs -- has a negative slope, suggesting that the left is more socially liberal than the right.²⁷

²⁷ The line of fit is weighted by party vote. Since political competition is mostly defined by larger parties in the system, it is logical to make the competition axis less sensitive to small parties. This strategy is followed by Marks et al. (2006) and Vachudova and Hooghe (2009).




Figure 9 Unrotated Political Space in Eastern Europe 2002-2006

Chapel Hill Expert Surveys




Figure 10 Rotated Political Space in Eastern Europe 2002-2006

Chapel Hill Expert Surveys

This finding is puzzling not only because it defies the expected pattern of competition, but also because the four countries which have rotated do not naturally coalesce in any of the groups outlined by the literature on party competition reviewed above. Estonia, Latvia, Slovakia and Slovenia have rather different social structures, as well as diverse communist and transition experiences. This puzzle deepens even further when we consider the structure of political competition in the four non-EU Balkan countries covered by the CHES dataset. Figure 11 depicts the political space in Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia and Serbia. Strikingly, only Serbia follows the expected Eastern European competition pattern. The economic left in Bosnia, Croatia and Macedonia is generally more socially liberal than the right. The following section considers an explanation to this puzzle.




Figure 11 Political Space in Four Balkan Countries

Chapel Hill Expert Surveys

Explaining Competition Structure in Eastern Europe

The shift in political competition appears to be precipitated by a decline of the communist experience as the defining characteristic of Eastern European polities. After two decades of democratic politics, communism starts to recede in the historical background. This process may be slow and uneven, but it also appears ineluctable. As the impact of the communist experience diminishes, other, deeper historical experiences come to define political conflict in Eastern Europe.

The Changing Meaning of the Socio-Cultural Dimension

A witness to the withering significance of the communist experience is the changing meaning of the socio-cultural dimension in Eastern Europe. A major impact of the communist heritage on Eastern European party competition is the bondage between leftwing economics and authoritarian social views, opposed by right-wing economic reformism and liberal democratic opposition to communist power (Kitschelt 1992, 1995). The left-right, conservative-liberal space is thus expected to be positively correlated.

The socio-cultural dimension is, however, defined in post-communist terms. It pertains to elementary civil liberties and democratic rights, such as freedom of speech, association and press, together with free and fair elections. In this domain the post-communist left is frequently tainted by its authoritarian past, while the right is made up of political forces opposing both communist social authoritarianism, together with its centrally planned economy.

However, as the communist experience becomes less salient, the meaning of the sociocultural dimension is redefined. In most Eastern European countries, elementary civil liberties and free and fair elections are a political reality taken for granted by parties and voters.²⁸ These issues are no longer contested, as even unreformed communists accept basic democratic rules (interview with Vojtech Filip, leader of KSCM). Elementary civil liberties and democratic rights thus compose an ever smaller portion of what the sociocultural dimension of political competition in Eastern Europe is about.

Figure 12 demonstrates the decreasing salience of freedom and democracy as reflected in Eastern European party manifestos. The figure depicts issues of freedom and democracy as a share of the socio-cultural dimension.²⁹ While in the early 1990s concerns over freedom and democracy make up close to half of social issues in party manifestos, by the early 2000s this drops to around 20%. There is a significant trend -- depicted by a dashed line in the figure.

²⁸ The situation is different in some of the western Balkan countries, such as Serbia, Bosnia and Macedonia, as well as in Eastern European countries beyond the scope of this paper, such as Russia, Belarus and Ukraine.

²⁹ The socio-cultural dimension is conceived as including all issues coded as `Freedom and Democracy', `Fabric of Society' (nationalism, multiculturalism, moral conduct) and per501 (environment) in the Comparative Party Manifesto Data.




Figure 12 Freedom and Democracy as Share of Social Issues

The current structure of the socio-cultural dimension in Eastern Europe is strikingly similar to that in the West. Table 6 shows that the socio-cultural dimension is dominated by three groups of issues in both regions of the continent. The first group, containing a number of salient issues, concerns cosmopolitanism versus nationalism. While the values associate with these issues correspond across the two regions, Eastern Europeans are more affected by domestic ethnic minorities, while Western Europeans are more influenced by immigration. The second group of issues pertains to secular modernism versus traditionalism. In both regions, it contains less salient issues concerning the role of religion in determining people's lifestyles. The final group of issues reflects international outlooks. It contains the single most salient issue in both regions -- European integration -

Comparative Manifesto Project Data

- while in the East it is also concerns the role the United States play in international politics.³⁰

³⁰ This analysis corresponds with the results presented by Rovny and Edwards (forthcoming). It is also consistent with most recent works on party competition in Western Europe (cf. Kriesi et al. 2008; Bornschier 2010).

	Eastern Europe			Western Europe				
	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Salience	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Salience
	(Cosmo.)	(Secular.)	(Internat.)	0-10	(Cosmo.)	(Secular.)	(Internat.)	0-10
Multiculturalism	0.89	0.26	0.00	4.49	0.91	0.33	-0.00	6.47
Minority Rights	0.89	0.12	0.04	5.88	0.89	0.28	-0.15	5.85
Immigration	0.84	0.33	-0.16	3.99	0.93	0.25	0.04	6.31
Cosmopolitanism	0.81	0.45	-0.05	5.95	0.76	0.39	-0.33	5.80
Civil Liberties	0.67	0.53	-0.32	5.48	0.84	0.41	0.11	6.36
Religion	0.27	0.80	0.19	4.33	0.50	0.77	0.17	4.71
Alternative Lifestyles	0.46	0.80	-0.18	5.01	0.61	0.72	-0.13	5.94
Urban	0.19	0.60	-0.23	5.03	0.39	0.59	-0.04	4.23
EU Integration	-0.47	-0.17	0.61	7.42	-0.21	-0.03	0.78	6.74
US Power	0.07	0.01	0.80	4.88	0.57	0.26	0.55	5.31
Decentralization	0.42	-0.03	-0.09	4.49	0.22	0.07	-0.01	5.13
Eigenvalue	4.12	2.34	1.27		4.95	2.10	1.11	
Variance Explained	0.51	0.29	0.16		0.57	0.24	0.12	

Table 6 The Structure of the Socio-Cultural Dimension in Eastern Europe

Principle factor analysis with varimax rotation. Salience of each issue assessed by experts on a 0-10 scale. Chapel Hill Expert Survey 2006.

Given the changing nature of the socio-cultural dimension in Eastern Europe, the outstanding question is: what structures party competition as the significance of the communist authoritarian heritage wanes, and other more typically western concerns, such as nationalism v. cosmopolitanism or modern secularism v. traditionalism, come to play primary role in non-economic political discourse, orientation and decision-making?

Historical Experiences and the Structure of Political Competition

The receding role of the communist heritage leaves room for deeper historical experiences to define the contemporary political competition in Eastern Europe. These experiences determine the general frame of party contest by shaping the predominant political divides, and by connecting political outlooks into more or less coherent ideologies. In the sense of Lipset and Rokkan's (1967) seminal work on party system formation in Western Europe, this paper suggests that a broad historical foundation of Eastern European politics underlies the strategic actions of political parties.³¹

³¹ cf. Sitter 2002, Batory and Sitter 2004, Bakke and Sitter 2005, Rovny and Edwards forthcoming.

The most profound historical experience of Eastern European countries has been that of state and nation building. These experiences are likely to be more powerful than the impact of the communist regime. However, the communist regime is not independent from these factors. It has both stemmed from the pre-communist state and nation building legacy of some of these countries (cf. Kitschelt et al. 1999), while the communist heritage has also intricately combined with these historical features in the post-communist aftermath (cf. Vachudova 2005). Nonetheless, the argument of this paper is that the experience of state and nation building is a central determinant of contemporary Eastern European party competition.

The building of Eastern European states and the defining of Eastern European nations occurred over a span of 150 years, and thus under vastly different circumstances.³² The entire region was divided into four empires -- Austrian, Ottoman, Prussian/German and Russian -- for most of the 19th century, with none of the current Eastern European countries in existence. The process of Eastern European independence started in the 1860s, but continued rather gradually over the next one and half century. Only with the independence of Montenegro and Kosovo in 2006 and 2008 respectively, does there appear to be no significant secessionist movement in the region. The circumstances and

³² While in most cases national awakening movements preceded state formation (cf. Agnew 1993, Bradley 1984, Brock 1973, Chlebowczyk 1980, Gellner 1983, Molenda 1991, Niederhauser 1982), I am interested in the connection between state formation and nation-building.

logics under which state institutions were erected and national myths were (re)enforced are likely to significantly inform contemporary political outlooks.³³

Three components are likely to determine the nature of state and nation building in Eastern Europe, and thus frame political competition. These are 1) the level of economic development at the time of independence; 2) lost great power status; and 3) independence after communism.

1) Level of Economic Development at Independence

The level of economic development at the time of independence determines the social forces behind the construction of state institutions and the formation of national self-conceptions. This is mostly salient for countries gaining independence prior to the rise of communism. A number of scholars suggests a connection between economic development, social structure and the nature of national movements (cf. Gellner 1983, Hroch 1985). Higher level of economic development at the time of independence is likely associated with the level of industrialization. More developed countries are then likely to have a middle class, connecting national independence with its economic aspirations. Also, more developed countries are likely to have some, at least somewhat organized, industrial working class. Under such circumstances state and national formation is influenced by classical liberal thought associated with the middle class, while the working class is influenced by marxist conceptions of proletarian internationalism. Consequently, such countries are likely to be more inclusive.

³³ On parallels between past and present nationalism in the region see Hroch (1996).

On the contrary, countries achieving independence at low levels of economic development tend to lack the middle class, as well as an industrial working class at the time of state and nation building. Their statehood develops in the context of paternalistic -- either aristocratic or ecclesiastical -- elites, who associate national interest with their political aims (Hroch 2001). State building in such context is rooted in traditional paternalism. There are few classical liberal influences, and thus limited drive towards market capitalism. Instead, these countries develop a tradition of populist *etatism* where protectionist, authoritative rule is connected with a traditional and nationalist ruling elite.

2) Lost Great Power Status

Although all countries of the region do not exist prior to the mid 19th century, Poland, Hungary, Serbia and Lithuania enjoyed rule over extensive territories in medieval and early modern times. This heritage fuels nationalist sentiments of historical grandeur and mission, associated with the aristocratic elites. However, the invariable loss of this great power status is perceived as national tragedy.³⁴ In extreme cases, this loss is perceived as national martyrdom, leading to perpetuation of messianic national myths, declaring, for example, that ``... on the third day the soul shall return to the body, and the Nation shall arise and free all the peoples of Europe from slavery"(Mieckiewicz 1832 cited in Brock 1973: 319).³⁵ Lost great power status thus tends to reinforces the effect of traditionalistic

³⁴ The Czech Kingdom also enjoyed some medieval grandeur, but its heyday was relatively short -spanning only the late Premyslid and the Luxembourg dynasties. Furthermore, most of the native Czech aristocracy was executed in the aftermath of the Bohemian campaign of the Thirty Years' War in 1621, leaving few natural heirs of the imperial past.

³⁵ Similar myths exist in other countries. Kossuth, the leader of Hungary's independence movement in 1848-9, saw ``a besieged Hungarian nation which would disappear if it did not take the offensive to defend

and ethnic conceptions of statehood, strengthening a conservative nationalist pole of political competition.

3) Independence After Communism

A number of Eastern European countries do not achieve independent statehood until after the collapse of communism. The rise of these new countries results from more or less rapid disintegration of three communist federations: Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. In the case of the Baltic republics, post-communist independence is preceded by interwar independence between 1918/1921 and 1940. In all cases, however, independence after communism is likely to affect the conception of statehood and nationhood, and consequently the character of political competition, in particular ways.

In these countries, communism is largely perceived as a form of foreign domination from the federal center.³⁶ Under such circumstances, the political left in the new state has an incentive to distance itself from communism, which embodies not only authoritarianism, but also national submission.

Furthermore, the democratic opposition to the communist regime, `the right', is also the strongest advocate of independence, making it naturally more nationalist, if not explicitly separatist. In countries that had experienced higher levels of economic development in

itself," while oppressing other national minorities (Longworth 1997: 132). The Serbian myth of Kosovo Polje portrays the Serbs as defenders of European Christendom (Clemens 2010).

³⁶ This is particularly acute in the Baltic states which were effectively occupied by the Red Army in 1940. However, even in Yugoslavia, the communist federation was dominated by the Serbs, who made up the conservative vanguard of the regime. This eventually led the Slovenes to walk out of a Communist party congress in 1990, precipitating the federal breakdown (Bebler 1993).

the past, this is connected with economic liberalism, thus making the nationalist, anticommunist right also economically right-wing.

Table 7 summarizes the historical experiences of Eastern European countries with respect to the three components discussed above. The column 'economic development at independence' offers a qualitative assessment, ranking the countries on an ordinal scale from 1 (low development) to 4 (high development). GDP per capita at independence provides Maddison's (N.d.) measure of historical GDP at the time of independence or at the closest available date, reported in parentheses. 'Lost great power status' and 'independence after communism' are dummy variables. The index variable at the right side of table 7 is a sum of the ordinal 'economic development at independence' variable, and the 'lost great power status' and `independence after communism' dummies. The index thus ranges from 1 (low development, lost great power status, independence during communism) to 6 (high development, no lost great power status, independence after communism).

Country	Year of Independence	Economic Development	GDP/capita* at independence	Lost Great Power	Independence after	Index
		at Independence	(or closest year)	Status	Communism	
Bulgaria	1878	1 Low - Agrarian	839.91 (1870)	1 No	0 No	2
Bosnia	1992	2 Low-medium	2475.32 (1992)	1 No	1 Yes	4
Croatia	1991	3 Medium - Communist industrialization, Free enterprise experience	7350.59 (1990)	1 No	1 Yes	5
Czech	1918	4 High - Industrialization,	1933.19 (1920)	1 No	0 No	5
Republic		Middle Class, Communist movement,				
Estonia	1920	3 Medium - Hanseatic heritage, Limited middle class	8657.28 (1973)	1 No	1 Yes	5
Hungary	1867**	2 Low-medium Limited industrialization, Small middle class, Strong landed aristocracy	1091.60 (1870)	0 Yes	0 No	2
Latvia	1921	3 Medium - Hanseatic heritage, Limited middle class	7846.02 (1973)	1 No	1 Yes	5
Lithuania	1918	2 Low-medium	7592.86 (1973)	0 Yes	1 Yes	3
Macedonia	1991	1 Low-medium	3972.36 (1990)	1 No	1 Yes	3
Poland	1918	2 Low-medium Limited industrialization, Small middle class, Heritage of strong landed aristocracy	1739.01 (1913)	0 Yes	0 No	2
Serbia	1878	1 Low - Agrarian	599.01 (1870)	0 Yes	0 No	1
Slovakia	1993	3 Medium - Communist industrialization	6250.93 (1993)	1 No	1 Yes	5
Slovenia	1991	4 High - Industrialization, Middle class, Free enterprise experience	10859.73 (1990)	1 No	1 Yes	6
Romania	1861	1 Low - agrarian	931.04 (1870)	1 No	0 No	2

Table 7 Historical Experiences in Eastern Europe

*1990 International Geary-Khamis dollars (Maddison, n.d.). **Hungary considered independent since the `dualization' of Austria in 1867.

Countries scoring low on this index have developed their state structures and national self-conceptions in the context of traditional paternalistic elites. Their lost great power status fuels ethnic nationalist myths of grandeur, and the fact that they did not create a new state after communism removes an opportunity to break with the communist past. In these countries nationalism, economic populism and paternalism tend to coincide. They are thus likely to adhere to the original post-communist structure of political competition -- linking economic left with social conservatism -- longer. They are likely to be the laggards in the rotation of the competition axis to the western pattern. Countries scoring high on the index, on the other hand, are countries which formed their state institutions and national awareness in the context of some liberal influence of the middle classes. They have not experienced great power status in the past and thus are less likely to succumb to appeals of old national glory. The fact that some separated from communist federations gives them a specific opportunity to break with the communist past. In these countries the anti-communist right is influenced by its national separatism, as well as market capitalism, while the left is less burdened by the communist heritage. These countries are likely to spearhead the shift of competition structure from the postcommunist eastern pattern to that of the west. They are the first to connect left-wing economics with social liberalism. The following section tests these hypotheses.

Analyzing Competition Change in Eastern Europe

This section develops statistical models predicting the structure of political competition in Eastern Europe. The dependent variable is the slope of the competition axis -- the best-fitting line depicted in the graphs in figures 9, 10 and 11. A positively sloping axis is typical for the original post-communist party competition where economic left correlates with social conservatism. As the slope approaches zero, the social positions of the economic left and economic right coincide. When the slope is negative, the economic left is more socially liberal than the economic right, which is typical for western European countries. Thus clockwise rotation of the competition axis reflects social liberalization of the economic left combined with movement towards social conservatism on the right.

The primary predictor of the competition slope argued for in this paper is the historical experience of state and nation building. This is summarized by the index developed in the previous section. However, since this index is based on qualitative assessment, three more objective predictors: 1) GDP per capita at independence (or closest year); 2) lost great power status; and 3) independence after communism, are used as additional proxies of historical state and nation building experiences. These predictors cannot be used in the same model due to their high collinearity.

Given the very small number of observations (T*N=24), offering very limited number of degrees of freedom, the models need to be exceedingly simple. They, nonetheless, control for four key variables considered crucial for explaining post-communist party competition by the literature. First, the models control for ethnic fragmentation, measured by the ethnic fragmentation index (Fearon et al. 2007). Second, the models control for pre-World War II democratic experience, measured using the Polity IV database. I multiply each positive Polity IV score by the number of years the country received it. This captures not only the depth, but also the length of the democratic experience. Third,

the models control for the type of communist regime the country experienced. I follow Kitschelt (1995) and Kitschelt et al. (1999) and divide the countries as experiencing either bureaucratic-authoritarian, national or patrimonial communist regimes. Finally, the models control for post-communist transition legacy, which is proxied by the year in which a country obtained the highest Freedom House democratic score of `free.'³⁷ Countries which transitioned quickly and successfully achieved the status of `free' shortly after the collapse of communism, while those who struggled with their transition took a longer time.

The data is a panel cross-section consisting of 14 units and two time periods.³⁸ Most variables are time invariant. Since I am interested in variance between countries, rather than over-time, I employ a method advocated by Huber et al. (2009).³⁹ I combine OLS estimation with robust cluster standard errors. This estimator remains valid in light of any pattern of correlation among errors within units. Since it is sensitive to error correlation between clusters -- possibly caused by omitted factors affecting the dependent variable across all units at the same time -- I ran all the models with a time period dummy variable. In all models this time-period dummy remained insignificant, suggesting no unmeasured time effects.

³⁷ Where a country relapsed to `partly free,' and then back to `free', the latest shift to `free' is considered.

³⁸ Only one time period is available for the non-EU countries.

³⁹ An alternative would be the Bartels-Mundlak model (Bartels 2008). This model distinguishes within and between variances, allowing the observation of both within and between effects. The down side of this model is that it effectively doubles the number of predictors in the model, using twice the degrees of freedom. Given my small sample size, this method is unfeasible.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Index	-0.490***			
	(0.144)			
GDP/cap at Independence		-0.000175**		
		(6.48e-05)		
Lost Great Power Status			1.350^{***}	
			(0.422)	
Post-comm. Independence				-1.300*
-				(0.661)
Ethnic Fragmentation	0.0421	-0.948	-0.221	-0.257
-	(1.085)	(1.264)	(1.163)	(1.436)
Pre-WWII Democracy	-0.00267	0.000348	-0.00182	-0.00129
	(0.00521)	(0.00650)	(0.00500)	(0.00634)
National Communism	-0.795	0.444	-0.890	0.236
	(0.546)	(0.817)	(0.567)	(0.742)
Patrimonial Communism	-1.253	0.0136	0.185	-0.285
	(0.923)	(0.998)	(0.698)	(1.125)
Transition Legacy	-0.0542*	-0.0417	-0.0837***	-0.00601
	(0.0299)	(0.0396)	(0.0267)	(0.0452)
Constant	111.1*	84.31	167.4***	13.13
	(59.74)	(79.11)	(53.48)	(90.05)
Ν	24	24	24	24
R^2	0.548	0.480	0.548	0.447

Table 8 Predicting Competition Slope in Eastern Europe

Robust cluster standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

OLS regressions with robust cluster standard errors. Dependent variable is the competition axis slope (bestfitting line) weighted by party vote. Transition Legacy is proxied by the year when rated `Free' by Freedom House after communism. Bureaucratic communist regime is the baseline. Table 8 summarizes the results, which support my hypotheses. The index of historical experience is highly statistically significant (despite the very small number of observations). Its negative coefficient suggests that the higher the index score, the more negative the competition axis -- as suggested by the theoretical propositions. One unit change on the index translates to 0.49 unit change of the competition axis slope, which translates to about 26° clockwise rotation.⁴⁰ The other proxies of historical experience exhibit a similar effect. A \$1000 change in GDP per capita at independence changes the competition slope by 0.17 units clockwise. Even more strikingly, having lost great power status reverses the shift of the competition axis slope in the western direction by 1.35 units, which amounts to over a 50° ⁴¹ counterclockwise rotation. Similarly, gaining independence after communism shifts the competition axis slope by 1.3 units, that is over 50° ⁴² clockwise rotation.⁴³ Finally, all three models exhibit large R² measures. The first and third model, based on the index of historical experience and lost great power status capture almost 55% of the dependent variable variance.

Discussion

Countries which have experienced higher levels of development at the time of state and nation building, countries which have not had any great power status to lose, as well as countries which have separated from communist federations after 1989, are more likely to converge on a western pattern of political competition, connecting the economic left

 $^{^{40}}$ tan⁻¹(0.49)=26.1

 $^{^{41}}$ tan⁻¹(1.35)=53.5°

 $^{^{42}}$ tan⁻¹(1.3)=52.4°

⁴³ The fact that this effect is only significant at the 0.1 level is acceptable, given the very small number of degrees of freedom.

with social liberalism. This section considers four sets of cases assessing the particular connection between historical development and party competition change.

1) The Czech Republic

The first set of countries would be made up of two cases -- the Czech Republic and the German Democratic Republic -- had the latter not exited Eastern Europe through its unification with West Germany. Both countries experience relatively early industrialization, connected with the development of a significant middle class. In the Czech case, the national revival movement of the 19th century is explicitly bourgeois, centered around secular middle-class intellectuals and their salon culture (Hroch 1999, Longworth 1997: 136), which stands in stark contrast to the aristocratic or clerical national movements elsewhere. The Czech lands, just like Germany, develop a strong domestic workers' movement, whose organization dates back to the 19th century. The repressive bureaucratic-authoritarian communist regime eventually depends on Moscow's backing, and when this is removed by Gorbatchov, the regime implodes. The liberal middle-class heritage gives way to a competitive political system centered on an economic redistributive cleavage, with a liberal market-oriented right opposing the communist authoritarian left (Markowski 1997, Hanely 2004).

The shift in the meaning of the socio-cultural dimension is precipitated by the increased salience of European integration. The European issue redefines the socio-cultural dimension in the Czech Republic as consisting primarily of the cosmopolitan versus nationalist divide. In this new context, the Czech hitherto liberal right starts employing national, Eurosceptic rhetoric, starting its slow turn towards social conservatism. Given

its historical development, the Czech system is, however, not endowed with paternalistic national sentiments, and so the nationalist rhetoric is rather reminiscent of the British Tories. On the left, the CSSD adopts pro-European more socially liberal positions typical for social democrats, while the unreformed communist KSCM remains skeptical. Although unrepentant, KSCM cannot be described as a socially conservative party in the new political context. Its historical commitment to internationalist working-class ideology leads it towards a modern radical left platform based on egalitarianism and antiglobalism. Of ten interviewed party leaders and staff members from all Czech parliamentary parties, nine consider KSCM as socially liberal (Cizinsky 2009; Drabek 2009; Filip 2009; Kupka 2009; Luzar 2009; Mach 2009; Prusa 2009; Rybar 2009; Schon 2009; Zaoralek 2009). The chairman of KSCM and his deputy independently place KSCM as the most socially liberal party in the Czech system. KSCM thus seems to follow the path of the German PDS (*Die Linke*) which shifted from ossified communism to a western style, radical left protest party (Segert 2002).⁴⁴

2) Poland and Hungary

Poland and Hungary did not enjoy the same level of industrialization in the 19th century as the Czech lands. Though largely agrarian, a number of industrial centers, such as Budapest and Lodz, developed. The national elite is, however, of aristocratic lineage, reminiscent of the historical grandeur of the Polish Commonwealth or the Kingdom of Hungary. This sense of national traditionalism is coupled with Catholicism to create a strong religious-nationalist ideological pole. The communist regime imposed by Soviet

⁴⁴ Preliminary results from the 2010 CHES survey strongly support the claims that the Czech party system is also rotating.

troops is allowed to adopt national specifics, leading to controlled political and economic liberalization after 1970s (Kitschelt 1995). The domestic communist elites, detached from Moscow and its propaganda, are rather ``ideological pagans [than] communists" (Bozoki 2002: 96). Seeing themselves as pragmatic problem-solvers, they negotiate liberalization and democratization with the communist opposition during the late 1980s.

Given the traditional national-religious heritage in Poland and Hungary, the majority of the communist opposition turns towards Christian nationalism. The peculiarity of these two cases is that there is no economic right at all. Economic liberalization is taken up by the reforming pragmatic ex-communists (SLD and MSzP), but these parties are decisively leftist -- Mitterrandian or pre-Blairite -- drawing on socially liberal, moderately educated, secular, urban voters (Bozoki 2002, Markowski 2002). The `right' adopts Christian national populism, which places it *to the left* of the ex-communists, but on the conservative side of the social divide. This situation is altered in Poland in 2001, when the economic right-wing, social conservative Platforma Obywatelska succeeds in parliamentary elections. In Hungary, the `right'-wing Fidesz remains a populist nationalist alternative to MSzP.

3) Croatia, Estonia, Latvia and Slovenia

Though geographically separate, Croatia, Estonia, Latvia and Slovenia exhibit a number of common characteristics. They experience medium to moderately high levels of development. Clemens (2010) emphasizes the role of early self-organization associated with a merchant middle class in Estonia, Latvia and Slovenia, coupled with a history of tolerance in the two Baltic countries, rooted in their Hanseatic heritage, the legacy of liberal Swedish rule, and early abolition of serfdom under tsarist Russia. Croatia and Slovenia enjoy a politically and economically open Yugoslav communist regime, which gives them a taste of small-scale market capitalism, while massive emigration (particularly from Croatia) creates a connection with the west (Pickering and Baskin 2008). Although Soviet communism is far more stringent, the Baltic countries profit from the liberal atmosphere of *perestroika*, developing national independence movements seeking to negotiate with the communist elite prior to 1989 (Kitschelt 1995).

All four countries have broken out of a communist federation after 1989. The Croats and Slovenes walked out of the Yugoslav communist congress in 1990, which precipitated the demise of the federation (Pickering and Baskin 2008). In the Baltic states, the Singing Revolution eventually led to declaration of independence by the Supreme Soviets of the two republics in 1991. The separation process, connected with the heritage of moderate historical development, produces two consequences. First, the left-wing parties are able to (at least partially) detach themselves from the communist legacy, associated with the federal center, and adopt socially liberal stances in the face of nationalism. In the Balkan countries, entangled in ethnic war, the left retains a multi-ethnic character. In 1990, only 52% of the Croatian SDP members are ethnic Croats, and during the war, the SDP provides a social democratic option for an electorate which does not prioritize ethnicity or religion (Pickering and Baskin 2008). In Slovenia, the left begins to cooperate with the Socialist International and swiftly emulates the ideological positions of the Party of European Socialists (Krasovec and Lajh 2009). In both Balkan countries, the left is

supported by the young, educated and urban populations (Jou 2010). In the Baltic countries, the left champions Slavic minority rights, which turns it towards social liberalism on the cosmopolitan-nationalist divide. Second, the right in these countries combines anti-communism with separatist nationalism. With the exception of Croatia, where the process is delayed, these positions are coupled with right-wing economics thanks to the history of moderate economic development and the earlier existence of a middle class (cf. Bunce 2003: 173).

4) Bulgaria, Romania and Serbia

The historical experience of Bulgaria, Romania and Serbia combines economic underdevelopment with early independence and state-building. The three countries are the first states in the region to gain full independence, emerging from the rubble of the declining Ottoman Empire in the mid to late 19th century. Longworth (1997: 137-41) notes the contrast between the intransigence of the aristocratic Boiar class and the vast and impoverished peasantry. State construction, he adds, is thus carried out under limited development, where ``dread of commercial enterprise" leads the privileged classes to proliferate officialdom, and flock to the civil service or the military whose opulence becomes an unsupportable financial burden on the new states (ibid: 140).⁴⁵ There are too few workers to be mobilized, left-wing intellectualism is nonexistent (Mungiu-Pippidi 2002), and thus paternalistic nationalism pervades.

The communist regimes in these states take on a patrimonial, rather than working-class, character. Communist industrialization is coupled with highly personalized political style of the communist elites, reaching its apex in Causescu's Romania (Mingiu-Pippidi 2002).

⁴⁵ Bulgaria and Serbia in fact go bankrupt prior to the First World War.

With weak and fragmented communist opposition, partial democratization is carried out by the communists from above, without the severing of old-time patronage networks (Ziblatt and Biziouras 2002). To legitimize their continued rule, left-wing ex-communists rekindle paternalistic, ethnic nationalism (Ishiyama 1998, Ishiyama and Bozoki 2002, Brankovic 2002, Vachudova 2005, Pop-Eleches 2008). The left thus remains weighed down by authoritarian nationalist outlooks, while the right opposes these positions.

Slovakia is a unique case. Its historical development is determined by its agrarian and largely Catholic character, dominated by domestic clerical elites. Its industrialization comes relatively late and its working class is minimal. This points to a heritage of paternalistic, populist nationalism, which is indeed revived by Tiso's clero-fascist dictatorship between 1939 and 1945. Slovakia shares its communist regime and early transition with the Czech Republic, but in 1993 it separates from Czechoslovakia. Slovak independence is spearheaded by the populist-nationalist HZDS, combining left-wing economics with social conservatism. Slovakia's position in the Czechoslovak federation allows the Slovak ex-communist SDL to break with communism, and adopt social democratic leanings -- following the Slovenian pattern. By 1994, SDL opposes HZDS nationalism and populism, and cooperates with the liberal right to oust HZDS from office (Fisher 2002). The association with the right, however, causes SDL to lose the 1994 elections, which establishes HZDS as the primary left-wing conservative force in the country, galvanizing the liberal right-wing opposition 46 -- a pattern more typical for the eastern Balkan cases. Only with the decline of HZDS and the rise of only mildly nationalist left-wing SMER after 2000, does Slovakia come to resemble the Czech case.

⁴⁶ See Vachudova (2005) for the role of the EU in this process.

This is again broken by SMER's social conservatism and the rise of the small, liberal right SaS in 2010. Slovakia is thus continuously pulled by its heritage of populist nationalism.

Figure 13 summarizes the four patterns of political competition in Eastern Europe. The Czech case, as well as those of Croatia, Estonia, Latvia and Slovenia, shows convergence on the western structure of party competition. The Hungarian and Polish pattern converges only if a major right-wing force adopts right-wing economic positions. This seems to be the case only in Poland, but not in Hungary. The Bulgarian, Romanian and Serbian pattern is likely to follow the traditional eastern competition structure for the foreseeable future.




Figure 13 Four Patterns of Eastern European Party Competition

Conclusion

Eastern European politics have been considered as significantly different from those of western European countries. Eastern European party systems are expected to be either fluid and unstructured, or -- should structure arise -- to combine ideological views in opposite ways than the party systems in the West. The empirical evidence presented in this paper suggests that Eastern European party competition is both structured and converging on western ideological patterns. Although most Eastern European party systems combined left-wing economics with social conservatism in the past, this is no longer the case.

This paper presents two explanations. First, it demonstrates that the meaning of the noneconomic, socio-cultural dimension in Eastern Europe has changed. No longer dominated by concerns over democratic rights and elementary civil liberties, more typically western issues of cosmopolitanism versus nationalism and secular modernism versus traditionalism prevail to define the socio-cultural dimension in Eastern Europe. Second, under these changing political conditions, deeper historical characteristics of Eastern European societies come forward to frame political competition. This paper emphasizes the role of historical experiences connected with state and nation building as the predictors of contemporary structure of political competition. Where early development aids the rise of a middle class and worker organizations, limiting the impact of aristocratic or ecclesiastical elites; populist, paternalistic nationalism is more likely curtailed. Right-wing politics tend to be infused with a market-oriented heritage, while the left-wing has an internationalist legacy to draw on. Furthermore, countries that gain independence from communist federations after 1989 are likely to combine communist opposition with right-wing nationalism, while their left-wing parties have an opportunity to distance themselves from the communist past and adopt western social democratic views.

Eastern Europe remains particular. Its parties are not deeply entrenched; their partisan apparatuses less developed; the political elites less socialized and experienced; corruption and patronage more widespread. However, as the communist experience settles into the crevices of history, the communist ideological bondage between left-wing economics and social conservatism gives way to deeper historical divides, which frame a number of eastern party systems in western patterns of party competition.

Appendix

Table 9 Dimensional Structure of Used Datasets

Economic Dimension	Social Dimension
World Value 5	
Private ownership of business increased/decreased	Religious leaders should not influence vote
People/government should take more responsibility	Employers give priority to locals v. immigrants
Competition is good/harmful	Strictness of immigration policy
State gives freedom to firms/State controls firms	Justifiability of homosexuality
-	Justifiability of abortion
European Socia	d Survey
Government should reduce differences in income levels	Gays and lesbians free to live as they wish
	Ban parties that wish to overthrow democracy
	European unification go further/gone too far
	Allow immigrants of same race
	Allow immigrants of different race
	Allow immigrants from poorer countries
	Immigration bad/good for countrys economy
	Culture undermined/enriched by immigrants
	Immigrants make country worse/better to live
	How often do you attend religious services
International Social S	
Cuts in govt spending	NA
Finance projects to create new jobs	NA
Less govt regulation of business	NA
Support industry to develop technologies	NA
Support declining industries to protect jobs	NA
Reduce working week to create jobs	NA
Govt should spend money on environment	NA
Govt should spend money on healthcare	NA
Govt should spend money on education	NA
Govt should spend money on retirement	NA
Govt should spend money on unemployment	NA
Govt responsibility to provide job for everyone	NA
Govt responsibility to control prices	NA
Govt responsibility to for healthcare	NA
Govt responsibility for standard of living for old	NA
Govt responsibility to help industry grow	NA
Govt responsibility for living standard for unemployed	NA
Govt responsibility to reduce income differences	NA
Govt responsibility for financial help for students	NA
Govt responsibility to provide decent housing	NA
Govt responsibility to protect the environment	NA
Comparative Man	ifesto Data
Free enterprise (positive)	Military (negative)
Incentives (positive)	Freedom and human rights (positive)
Economic orthodoxy (positive)	Democracy (positive)
Welfare state limitation (positive)	Environmental protection (positive)
Education limitation (positive)	Social justice (positive)
Labour groups (negative)	National way of life (negative)
Market regulation (positive)	Traditional morality (negative)
Economic planning (positive)	Multiculturalism (positive)
Corporatism (positive)	Underprivileged groups (positive)
Keynesian demand management (positive)	Military (positive)
Controlled economy (positive)	Political authority (positive)
Nationalisation (positive)	National way of life (positive)
Welfare state expansion (positive)	Traditional morality (positive)
Education expansion (positive)	Law and order (positive)
(here a)	Multiculturalism (negative)

Table 10 Multinomial Logit Analysis of Vote Choice

	Major Right	Radical Right		
Left-Right Position	1.660***	1.482***		
	(0.0792)	(0.152)		
Social Position	0.153^{**}	0.852^{***}		
	(0.0600)	(0.110)		
Gender	0.0296	-0.343**		
	(0.0907)	(0.172)		
Age	0.00299	-0.0259***		
	(0.00299)	(0.00510)		
Education	0.0870**	-0.367***		
	(0.0348)	(0.0785)		
Income	0.0735***	0.0880**		
	(0.0246)	(0.0436)		
Constant	-0.964***	-0.223		
	(0.281)	(0.519)		
Pseudo R^2	0.2504			
Log-pseudolikelihood	-3521.3477			
Baseline	Major Left			
Observations	5309			
Robust standard errors in parentheses				
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1				

Table 6: Multinomial Logit Predicting Vote Choice

Results for MNL model predicting vote choice for Major Right, Major Left and Radical Right. Estimated using Stata 11.1. Small-Hsiao test supports the presence of IIA. Data: 2006 European Social Survey.

Table 11 List of Party Types

Major Right

	Major Right	
Austria	Osterreichische Volkspartei	OVP
Belgium	Christen-Democratisch & Vlaams	CD&V
Belgium	Centre Democrate Humaniste	CDH
Belgium	Vlaamse Liberalen en Democraten	VLD
Britain	Conservative Party	Cons
Denmark	Venstre, Danmarks Liberale Parti	V
Finland	Suomen Keskusta	KESK
Finland	Kansallinen Kokoomus	KOK
France	Union pour un Mouvement Populaire	UMP
Germany	Christlich-Demokratische Union	CDU
Greece	Nea Dimokratia	ND
Ireland	Fianna Fail	FF
Ireland	Fine Gael	FG
Italy	Forza Italia	FI
Netherlands		CDA
	Christen-Democratisch Appel	
Portugal	Partido Popular Democratico/Partido Social Democrata	PPD/PSD
Spain	Partido Popular	РР
Sweden	Moderaterna	М
	Major Left	
Austria	Sozialdemokratische Partei Osterreichs	SPO
Belgium	Parti Socialiste	PS
Belgium	Socialistische Partij Anders - Spirit	SPA
Britain	Labour Party	Lab
Denmark	Socialdemokraterne	SD
Finland	Suomen Sosialidemokraattinen	SDP
France	Parti Socialiste	PS
Germany	Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands	SPD
Greece	Panellinio Sosialistiko Kinima	PASOK
Ireland	Labour	Lab
Italy	Democratici di Sinistra	DS
Netherlands	Partij van de Arbeid	PvdA
Portugal	Partido Socialista	PS
Spain	Partido Socialista Obrero Espanol	PSOE
Sweden	Arbetarpartiet - Socialdemokraterna	SAP
	Radical Right	
Austria	Bundnis Zukunft Osterreich	BZO
Austria	Freiheitliche Partei Osterreichs	FPO
Belgium	Vlaams Belang	VB
Denmark	Dansk Folkeparti	DF
Finland	Persussuomalaiset	True Finns
France	Front National	FN
France	Mouvement Pour la France	MPF
Greece	Laikos Orthodoxos Synagermos	LAOS
Italy	Alleanza Nazionale	AN
Italy	Lega Nord	LN
itury	205u 1101u	

Netherlands	List Pim Fortuyn	LPF
Netherlands	Partij voor de Vrijheid	PVV

Radical Left

Denmark	Enhedslisten	EL
Denmark	Socialistisk Folkeparti	SF
Finland	Vasemmistoliito	VAS
France	Parti Communiste Francais	PCF
Germany	Die Linkspartei - Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus	Linke/ PDS
Greece	Dimokratiko Kinoniko Kinima	DIKKI
Greece	Kommunistiko Komma Elladas	KKE
Greece	Synaspismos tis Rizospastikis Aristeras	SYRIZA
Italy	Partito dei Comunisti Italiani	PdCI
Italy	Rifondazione Comunista	RC
Netherlands	Socialistische Partij	SP
Portugal	Bloco de Esquerda	BE
Portugal	Coligacao Democratica Unitaria	CDU
Spain	Izquierda Unida	IU
Sweden	Vaensterpartiet	V

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