NEWS CONSUMPTION & POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION
AMONG YOUNG, URBAN JORDANIANS

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ABSTRACT

JUSTIN D. MARTIN: News Consumption & Political Socialization Among Young, Urban Jordanians
(Under the direction of Anne Johnston, Ph.D.)

This study examined the associations between young urban Jordanians’ (N=321) news consumption patterns and their feelings toward the Jordanian and U.S. governments. Consumption of traditional news delivery formats (such as print newspapers, radio broadcasts, and interpersonal sources) was measured, as was reliance on new media formats such as blogs, text messaging, and podcasting. Young Jordanians’ assessments of the Jordanian and U.S. governments were operationalized as indices of political cynicism, political trust, and ratings of the U.S. government. News consumption variables were regressed on the political attitude scales, with media credibility included as a control variable. Young Jordanians in the sample rely mostly on TV news, newspapers, and interpersonal contacts for current events information. Just two of the news consumption variables, TV news use and reliance on interpersonal sources, were associated with political attitudes measured in the study; these variables negatively predicted feelings toward the U.S. government.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

In Jordan, it is not uncommon to see pictures of the country’s King, Abdullah II bin Hussein, everywhere. Abdullah’s mug adorns the interior of every government office, school, most restaurants, and many shops. Stickers emblazoned with the king’s face even grace the windows of many of Amman’s taxicabs. The Jordanian flag is nearly as ubiquitous as the King’s photograph. In store windows and on billboards, T-shirts and bumper stickers across the country, the red, black, green and white flag can be seen. The Jordanian government and those who wish to be in its favor are constantly trying to remind people on the street that Jordan is a nation of which one should be proud.

These efforts to endear Jordanians to representations of their king and their flag are components of a process called political socialization. Political socialization is a process by which people come to form their political identities. Broadly, political socialization is the construction of one’s political self (see Merelman, 1972, p.135), and the use of messages and symbols is a part of this construction. In the case of pictures of King Abdullah II, it seems that Jordan’s government is trying, in a proactive way, to politically socialize its citizens to believe that the King is to be revered. For their part, Jordanian citizens displaying the king’s picture demonstrate that they have been politically socialized to believe that the king is worthy of respect (or at least deem it a wise professional decision to show support for the king). Political socialization involves much more than the presentation of national symbols, however. First
conceptualized by Hyman in 1959, political socialization was defined as an individual’s “learning of social patterns corresponding to his societal positions as mediated through various agencies of society” (p.25). Formative school systems, peer groups, families, religious affiliations, and mass media systems are all “agents” of political socialization. Many of the assumptions in Hyman’s research go back to the writings in Plato’s *Republic*—such as the notion that societal forces can and should shape young generations of political participants—but Hyman provided a more official title and description of the process at a time when the world was gravely concerned with how young people are groomed to adhere to certain political values and behaviors. Hyman’s research put a strong emphasis on “learning” political norms and ideologies through society’s agents—reminiscent of, but predating, the social psychological focus of Albert Bandura’s (1963) social learning theory and the societal “lessons” described in the work of Gerbner (1970; 1977; 1998) in his articulations of cultivation analysis. This study focused on a specific societal agent—news media—and specifically on news consumption variables as they relate to political socialization measures. More precisely, this study examined news consumption and feelings toward the U.S. and Jordanian governments among 18 to 35 year-old Jordanians.

While political socialization research burgeoned in the decades following Hyman’s treatise, scholarship has predominantly focused on political socialization in the United States and Western Europe, according to Sapiro (2004). “A smattering of [political socialization] work covers other countries and international relations,” Sapiro wrote. “Clearly, we have learned too little about political socialization outside the United States” (p.5). He claims that agents of political socialization such as family, school systems, and mass media differ from country to country in their structure and influence on political socialization outcome variables. Western
scholars whose research focus lies outside the U.S., Sapiro argues, should be encouraged to explore political socialization processes in the interest of cross-national understanding.

Sapiro’s argument that relatively little is known about political socialization in developing countries applies especially to Arab countries, which American social scientists have traditionally avoided as a region of inquiry for proximity, security, linguistic, and other reasons. Little research has been published on political socialization in Arab countries (a noble exception being Farah and Kuroda, 1987), and virtually no research has been published on political socialization processes in Jordan.

One well-done study by Nisbet, Nisbet, Scheufele and Shanahan (2004) examined TV use and views toward the United States among a multinational sample of citizens in nine Muslim countries that included Jordan, but the results were reported in the aggregate, so data from Arab countries in the sample (Jordan, Egypt, Lebanon, Kuwait, Morocco, and Saudi Arabia) were lumped together in omnibus scores with data from Pakistan, Turkey, Iran and Indonesia. The study, although a welcome addition to the small corpus of literature on news consumption and political attitudes in Arab-Muslim countries, tells us little in terms of country-by-country political socialization processes. The authors did find compelling evidence, though, that Muslims’ television use (entertainment content was not distinguished from news) was negatively associated with views toward the United States, a finding that is important to remember for the current study.

If political socialization is important in the minds of American and Western European social scientists for the purposes of understanding formation of political identity and the political orientations that individuals quilt over the course of their lifetimes, then such processes should also be worth exploring in developing countries around the world. Jordan, for example, which is
considered a moderate Arab nation, should interest Western researchers and policymakers wishing to understand how Jordanian citizens come to hold political, social, and religious views that are more moderate than some other countries in the Arab-Muslim world. And if we were to agree that news consumption is potentially associated with political socialization variables, Jordanian news consumption, too, is worthy of examination. One underlying claim of this study is that political socialization processes in a county like Jordan matter and are worth studying. A second underlying claim is that news consumption in Jordan may be associated with political socialization variables and, therefore, also warrants scholarly attention.

In order to set the stage for this study, the following introductory information and review of the literature will attempt to do several things. Broadly, the review of literature will describe the Jordanian political system and where the press fits in this system. While few researchers have studied news consumption patterns or their political correlates among Jordanians, there exists a sizeable body of literature on the political system in Jordan, as well as a substantial amount of descriptive literature discussing what living in Jordan is like for news consumers and creators. This literature is reviewed.

Next, political socialization literature is examined, particularly when the framework is applied to mass communication research. A history of political socialization research is provided, including the role of mass communication scholars in this chronology, and strengths and weaknesses of this corpus of literature are outlined. Finally, political socialization is specifically discussed in the context of Jordan, and examples of governmental attempts to socialize citizens to the monarchy are provided. This literature will guide the formation of research questions and the operationalization of dependent variables.
Jordan and Its Media Environment

Jordan is a moderate Arab country with many facets that make it ripe for mass communication and political socialization research. First, and most importantly, Jordan is an Arab country that permits Western scholars to conduct original survey research, which is not the case in Saudi Arabia, Algeria, or Syria. In terms of its mass media system, Jordan is a country that monitors its domestic news producers to a certain extent but does not censor or block the importation of foreign news outlets, including stories from American news organizations. The country’s media landscape, therefore, is far more diverse than some of the more autocratic regimes in the Arab world.

What follows in the next few sections is a brief country description of Jordan in terms of politics and population, trailed by an in-depth analysis of the country’s modern news media environment. Gerbner (1977) wrote that to understand the associations between media use variables and important cultural indicators, one must first examine the possibilities and constraints of a given culture’s media system. A discussion of such abilities and limitations of Jordan’s politics and press system is where we begin.

The Kingdom of Jordan

Jordan is a small Arab country of just over six million people (CIA Factbook, 2007), situated between Syria, Israel, the West Bank, Iraq and Saudi Arabia. Its borders and name (Transjordan) were determined in 1921 by the British Mandate that followed World War I and existed until 1946, when Transjordan was granted full independence (Alon, 2006). Leaders forming the new government named their country simply “Jordan.” Considered the most moderate Arab country in some circles in the U.S. and Western Europe as well as a peaceful buffer between contiguous regional troublemakers, Jordan has carefully navigated its way
through many threatening events in its short history. The country has mostly managed to skirt the
Arab-Israeli wars of the 20th Century, competing Soviet and U.S. interests during the Cold War,
two U.S. campaigns in Iraq, and the often unpredictable actions of its Arab neighbors and Israel.

Jordan’s leadership is the main reason for these successes. Research suggests that, by
most regional comparisons, Jordan has enjoyed pragmatic leadership that has guided the nation
through no small number of Middle Eastern conflicts and has ushered in important economic
reforms (see Ryan, 2002). But liberalization and modernization of Jordan’s democratic
institutions—the press for the purposes of this paper—have been less quick in coming. The late
King Hussein, who ascended to the throne in 1953 after his grandfather was shot and his father
was deemed mentally incompetent to rule the country, ruled Jordan until his death in 1999
(Ryan, 2002). Somewhat of a moderate pragmatist, Hussein extended full diplomatic relations to
Israel in 1994 and was the first leader in the Arab world to sign a free trade agreement with the
United States. Hussein was regarded well by many people in the United States, partly because of
his marriage in the 1970s to an American woman named Lisa Halaby, who later took the name
Queen Noor (Noor, 2003). Very popular in Jordan but not without faults and enemies, Hussein
survived several attempts on his life during his half-century reign (Glain, 2003).

Weakened by cancer, Hussein declared on his deathbed in 1999 that his second eldest
son, Abdullah, would be the next king of Jordan, despite the fact that Abdullah’s older brother
had long been the heir in line to govern (Rogers & Smith, 2004). So far, Hussein’s choice in
Abdullah seems to have been a decent one. Like his father, Abdullah has had to walk a tightrope
above his region’s many perils. Since acceding the throne, Abdullah has governed through the
second Palestinian intifada, the ongoing war in Iraq, the Lebanese-Israeli war of 2006, internal
wars between the Palestinian political parties Hamas and Fatah, and the Israeli construction of a
security fence carving up Israel proper and the West Bank. As roughly 56 percent of the population in Jordan is Palestinian Arabs, issues of Palestinians living under Israeli control deeply affect stability and the political climate in Jordan.

In ruling Jordan as these neighboring conflicts threatened regional stability, Abdullah’s major domestic strategy has involved economic reforms and attempts to make Jordan a more visible element in the global economy (George, 2005). Abdullah has tried to strengthen Jordan’s technology sector (Ryan, 2006) and has crafted an aggressive campaign to privatize many of the country’s bureaucratic sectors. In addition, Abdullah has constructed an economy focused largely on export-oriented growth (Dew & Wallace, 2004), as Jordanian products are sold to the growing number of nations with which the king has heightened trade relationships. As a result of some of these reforms, the GDP in Jordan has been growing at or around six percent over each of the last few years, and the national debt has fallen substantially.

Despite his relative successes in riding out regional wars and implementing important economic reforms, however, Abdullah has presided over major economic challenges during his tenure. Unemployment in Jordan is currently 15 percent, according to conservative estimates provided by the Jordanian government, while the 2007 CIA Factbook suggests that 30 percent is a more accurate figure. Approximately 14 percent of the population lives below the international poverty line, and upward mobility in Jordan remains elusive to the impoverished. Inflation in Jordan is high—and has expanded as the country has absorbed over half a million refugees of the Iraq war (Black, 2007). A people with few natural resources prior to the war, Jordanians are suffering from weakening public services and resources as their country attempts to endure a rapid population increase of more than 15 percent.
With these pressing economic problems as their primary concerns, King Abdullah and his government have equivocated on many of the political and institutional reforms, that were promised after the king’s coronation in 1999. Such vacillating is evident in a discussion of the Jordanian press. King Abdullah has not liberalized the Jordanian press at the same pace he has attempted to liberalize the economy. Throughout his rule, the press has remained under the partial control of the Jordanian government, and few permanent steps toward greater press autonomy have been traversed. The same was true during the rule of his father, Hussein. Jordanian press restrictions during the 1980s and 1990s ebbed and flowed according to the political needs of the government (Najjaf, 1998). Periodically throughout these two decades, occasional causes for hope, such as across-the-board civil liberties reforms in 1989 were only to disappoint, as the government would fail to enact many of its promises.

With that said, however, the press in Jordan is not a dark institution that exists only to extol the virtues of the government. Jordanian reporters do from time to time uncover scandals, expose corruption, and challenge public policy directives. In these ways, the Jordanian press is a model for a number of other countries in the Arab world whose press systems are indeed dark institutions. Still, the professional limits of journalists, editors and publishers in Jordan are real ones that must be taken into account in any transparent discussion of news reporting in Jordan.

**The Jordanian Press**

In 2005 Jon Alterman wrote that “we know shockingly little about what the people of the Middle East watch, and how they interpret that information” (p.207). This is still true. While research on journalism across the globe has, according to Loffelholz & Weaver (2008), increased dramatically in the last few decades, their otherwise comprehensive book, *Global Journalism Research* contains not a single chapter discussing journalism research in an Arab or Muslim
country. In fact, the edited volume is tremendously Western-centric, with contributing authors mostly discussing contemporary journalism research in North American and Western European countries.

One of a very few studies ever authored on media consumption patterns of Jordanians was published by the Bureau of Applied Social Research at Columbia University a half century ago (Stycos, 1958). While Stycos reported some interesting findings, such as that Palestinians living in Jordan consumed much more news and demonstrated far greater needs for orientation than did indigenous Jordanians, his research is so outdated that it did not even assess television use. Examining patterns of contemporary news consumption in Jordan is one way to help address a void in the scholarly literature of journalism and mass communication research in the Arab world.

Jordan is a country ripe for mass media research, as it is one of the more progressive and educated countries in the region with the highest literacy rate—just over 91 percent—in the entire Arab world (UNESCO Institute for Statistics, 2005). Historically, the press in Jordan has been tightly monitored by the government, although press reforms in 1989 improved circumstances somewhat (Wolfsfeld, Khouri & Peri, 2002). This follows the trend identified by Weaver (1998), who claimed that, in the 1980s and 1990s, journalists in countries governed by authoritarian regimes began playing a more visible role in critiquing governmental decisions and promoting pro-social ideals.

Since Abdullah II succeeded his father in 1999, the government in Jordan has taken a few measures to expand press freedom. Supporters of the king and some outside observers point to a handful of press reforms approved by Abdullah in the last decade. In reversing some of the impediments to journalists imposed in the 1993 and 1997 press and publications laws (see Lucas,
2005, for details about these restrictive bills), for example, the Jordanian parliament has lowered the amount of financial capital required to launch a new publication in Jordan and has eliminated the requirement that all Jordanian journalists belong to the Journalists’ Union, according to Mellor (2005).

The 2007 press and publications law also made it more difficult for the Jordanian government to summarily shut down printing presses of vociferous publications (Freedom House, 2008). Measures such as these have led to the success of the new opposition paper al-Ghad (Arabic for “tomorrow”), which has recently become one of the most popular daily publications in the country. Other opposition papers have emerged, including the growing presence of a tabloid press that, despite its penchant for sensationalism, is a possible sign of journalistic liberalization in Jordan, according to Jones (2002).

However, despite journalistic optimism that may arise from a relativistic comparison of Jordan to its neighbors, Jordan still has a way to go, and Abdullah’s record on press reforms is ultimately mixed. Despite liberalizing the press in some areas, the kingdom has receded in others. For example, the king established in the last few years what are called “media free zones,” where foreign and regional outlets such as Reuters and pan-Arab outlets can operate censorship free and tax free (Mellor). However, the freedoms enjoyed by foreign news organizations in the media zones have not been extended to journalists working for domestic news outlets, a fact that creates strong resentment among Jordanian news practitioners.

The government may not despotically dominate its press system as do the regimes in Libya and Syria, but these countries may be among the poorest points of comparison. Some critics note that the press in Jordan is too closely watched by the government to be labeled “free.” Many reporters and editors face the threat of heavy fines for a number of different
offenses, such as defaming Islam or inciting sectarian strife (“Jordanian parliament endorses change to controversial press law,” 2007). Such fines may be as steep as $40,000 (Freedom House, 2008), nearly nine times Jordan’s Gross Domestic Product per capita (CIA Factbook, Jordan, 2008).

The Mukhabarat, Jordan’s version of the CIA, monitors press activities and is known for placing spies in positions at prominent media outlets. According to Freedom House (2007), some Jordanian editors and journalists complain repeatedly of governmental prior restraints, claiming intelligence forces have contacted them prior to a story’s publication, promising punishments unless the story is shelved. Such charges have been leveled by other human rights organizations, too, accusing Jordanian police of intimidating and beating reporters who refuse to budge when told to disperse from the periphery of controversial public events (IRIN, 2007).

The government also reneged on its promise to abolish prison sentences for vocal journalists. In 2007, the parliament promised to obviate prison sentences for Jordanian reporters who violate the sensibilities of government officials or other power brokers, and signed a law doing so (BBC, 2007), although it did not take the government long to break this promise. In March 2008, five Jordanian journalists were each sentenced to three months in prison for crimes of “defamation” and contempt of court (Reuters, 2008). Jordanian judges can easily dole out “contempt of court” sentences when Jordanian law protects journalists from incarceration. Also, the 2007 press and publication law still permits prison sentences of up to three years for journalists who directly criticize the king or royal family (Freedom House, 2008).

When considering any of the progress Jordan has made in terms of press liberalization, one should remember that the country is still designated a police state by many researchers who point out that journalists’ limitations in the kingdom are far short of acceptable. Despite some
domestic political and journalistic reforms passed by the government in the last ten years, Choucair-Vizoso (2006) argues that the fundamental power structure in Jordan’s government has remained unchanged. Power does not lie with the elected house of lower parliament, the citizenry or the press—nor has it ever, argues Choucair-Vizoso—but instead rests with the royal court and state intelligence forces.

George (2005, p.xi) cautions that although journalism in Jordan is often “lively and diverse,” and that “the media are free only within the constraints of a series of overlapping and vaguely-worded laws that ban all criticism of the king.” In George’s view, Jordan’s somewhat lively and diverse press with a number of differing viewpoints should not be mistaken as a free and autonomous news system. Journalists in Jordan do not have it easy; they must walk a precarious line, simultaneously avoiding obvious pro-government reportage that alienates them from Jordanian news consumers, and discordant news coverage that can be punishable when too critical of the king’s official policies (Wolfsfeld, Alimi & Kailani, 2007).

Despite the fact that Jordanian news media offer a somewhat diverse range of opinions when compared with other Arab states, international human rights group Freedom House classifies the press system in Jordan as “not free,” and argues that the Jordanian press needs much more autonomy from the government (Freedom House, 2006). Journalistic criticism of King Abdullah or any other members of the royal family is expressly and emphatically forbidden, as is impugning the armed forces or criticizing Jordan’s relationships with certain countries (Freedom House, 2007). While the organization ranks Jordan among the top three Arab countries in the Middle East and North Africa in terms of press liberties, the country performs poorly by global comparison; Jordan is ranked 128th in the world and is tied with Cambodia and Pakistan.
Ultimately, scholars of media in the Arab-Muslim world usually give Jordan a favorable ranking among its regional peers, but at the same time recognize the fact that progress is still needed. William Rugh (2004), for example, lauds the pluralistic nature of debate in many Jordanian newspapers, but he also describes Jordan as having a “transitional” press system, one at a crossroads facing either a path toward greater press liberalization or one in the direction of more government control.

While the Jordanian government places numerous restrictions on its country’s news creators, the country’s news consumers have an easier time. If Jordanians grow tired of their government-cleansed domestic news, they enjoy a number of journalistic alternatives. News consumption patterns and news access in Jordan are now discussed in order to shed light on the media elements found in many Jordanians’ media diets.

**News Access and Consumption in Jordan**

Among the goals of this project was to measure the degree to which Jordanians rely on foreign and domestic news outlets, and to examine the association such reliance has on opinions of the U.S. and Jordanian governments. With these goals in mind, this section will first discuss four specific genres of news media in Jordan, starting with print newspapers and televised news broadcasts, which represent the two main vehicles for Jordanians’ news information. Next, radio news programs and Internet news will be discussed. Finally, a section on foreign news outlets available in Jordan (such as the French newspaper *Le Monde* or BBC television broadcasts) is provided.

While general news consumption and newspaper consumption in particular have been steadily falling in recent years in the United States (see Meyer, 2004), the decline has been less precipitous in developing countries such as Jordan. In the absence of some of the emerging
electronic technologies enjoyed in the U.S. and Western Europe, Jordanians are still avid consumers of news in the traditional sense. One example of this is the success of one Jordanian daily newspaper, *al-Ghad*, which will be discussed below. The paper has 35,000 subscribers in a country of roughly 6 million. This would be the equivalent of an American newspaper boasting approximately 1.75 million at-home subscribers, something that none—including *The New York Times* and *USA Today*—do (note: the number of *al-Ghad* subscribers is 35,000; total average circulation figures for the newspaper are not known). By just picking up a daily newspaper in Jordan one can feel the vivacity of the print media industry; Jordanian newspapers are much heavier than American dailies, containing far more news and advertising than the increasingly gossamer print copies of the *Washington Post*, *Miami Herald*, and *Chicago Tribune*.

While Wolfsfeld, Khouri & Peri (2002) argued that the Jordanian press suffers from low levels of credibility, unclear journalistic standards and inadequate training, which is true, Jordanian news consumers still have a growing plurality of news outlets from which to choose, particularly in the digital age. Despite the Jordanian government’s common resistance to liberalizing the country’s press system, the media landscape in Jordan appears increasingly diverse.

Cafes in Amman are frequently packed with vocal men holding a newspaper with one hand and gesticulating with the other, while intermittently pointing to a news show broadcast on a mounted TV (Martin, personal observation, spring 2006). Minus the television, such scenes are not unlike those held in Western 18th Century coffeehouses fueled by the newspapers of the time. Papers such as *The Spectator* and the *Tatler*, writes Mackie (1998, p.16), spurred “debate that was highly oral and social rather than textual and academic, and coffeehouses were the chief sites of this debate.” The point here is not to liken Jordanian public discourse to Western habits
of centuries past, but to emphasize the fact that Jordanians are active news consumers who openly debate current issues. Andoni (1995, p.25), for example, wrote that “the journalistic culture [in Jordan] is part of the dominating culture in the country,” in arguing how important a role current events information plays in the lives of Jordanians.

It is not uncommon to see newsstands in Jordan sold out of the country’s most popular newspapers around lunchtime. Newspapers and TV and radio newscasts play important roles in the lives of many Jordanians (Martin, personal observation, spring 2006). The phrase “the Arab street” that some Western pundits use as a moniker for Arab public opinion does not exist without reason, and some scholars (see Lynch, 2003) conceptualize the “Arab street” as the public sphere in which Arabs discuss current events affecting the Arab world as well as other regions. Lynch attributes the ongoing discussion of pan-Arab and global politics in the Arab street to the rise of transnational Arab television and print media, such as al-Jazeera or the pan-Arab newspaper ah-Sharq al-Awsat. Current events in the Arab world are often dissected in public discussions among friends, family, or passersby in reaction to provocative news. Jordanians, avid news consumers and discussants, are no exception. For these reasons, the questionnaire for this study includes items asking respondents if they learn news information from interpersonal sources, such as friends and family members.

Print News in Jordan

Although the history of the print press in Jordan is quite short, Jordanians are enthusiastic news readers. The most prominent Arabic daily newspapers in Jordan are al-Ra’i and al-Ghad. Al-Ra’i, Arabic for “the opinion,” was founded in 1971 and is majority-owned by the Jordanian government. Al-Ra’i also publishes The Jordan Times, Jordan’s English-language daily newspaper (al-Shalabi & Mahafthah, 2005). Both of these outlets are known as at least partial
government mouthpieces that typically do not challenge the directives of the prime minister or parliament. *Al-Ghad*, on the other hand, is Jordan’s first independent and privately owned daily paper (Arab Press Network, 2006), and exhibits far less reverence toward the Jordanian parliament and other powerful institutions than do the country’s other daily papers (Martin, 2005). The paper is threatening to overtake *al-Ra’i* as the most popular daily news publication in Jordan, boasting more than 35,000 subscribers in a country of 6 million, according to the Arab Press Network. *Al-Ghad* (Arabic for “tomorrow”) is also more critical of some foreign countries than are government-owned news publications in Jordan. *Al-Ghad* is, for example, much more hostile to Israel than is *al-Ra’i*, as the former frequently expresses disapproval of the Jordanian government’s relationship with that country.

*Al-Ghad* is written with a young educated audience in mind, covering controversial issues of education, gender, the government’s democratic shortfalls, and some sensitive foreign policy matters, according to Fattah (2005). Fattah notes that *al-Ghad* frequently publishes verbatim letters from the Israeli ambassador to Jordan in order to highlight the two countries’ cozy relationship, something other Jordanian newspapers are very reluctant to do. While *al-Ghad* is privately owned, the editorial independence of the paper is sometimes questioned, due to the fact that the owner, Mohamed Allayan, is married to a relative of the king.

A third Arabic daily newspaper, *al-dustour* (meaning “constitution” or “charter”), is somewhere between *al-Ra’i* and *al-Ghad* in terms of autonomy and opposition to the government. While not as loyal to the Jordanian government as *al-Ra’i*, *al-dustour* is also not quite similar to *al-Ghad* in terms of its vocal individualism. Founded in 1967, *al-dustour* is the oldest operating daily newspaper in the country and, like *al-Ra’i*, the paper is partially owned by the government. *Al-dustour* tends to be more academic in tone and publishes more ponderous
political analyses than does *al-Rai*, according to al-Shalabi and Mahaftah (2005). In addition to their print product, all of the major daily newspapers in Jordan offer Web sites.

Daily newspapers, however, are not the only print news publications in Jordan. According to Adam Jones (2002), since the early 1990s, Jordan has seen the rise of a tabloid press, sensational in its reportage but very eager to chronicle the government’s shortcomings as well as discuss sensitive topics like sex and Islam. Jones cites the presence of a tabloid press in Jordan as evidence that the country is making strides in terms of press liberalization, although he notes that the government in Amman still strong-arms the press. An example of this oversight of tabloids was evident in 2006, when Jordanian officials removed two editors from the *Shihan* tabloid for republishing a series of Danish newspaper cartoons lampooning the prophet Muhammad (“Jordan editors face lawsuit,” 2006). Still, Jones recognizes that the existence of tabloid newspapers in Jordan is a positive indicator of the fact that the country’s press system is leaving behind some of its more staid and loyalist traditions.

While Jordanians are fairly avid newspaper consumers, based on some of the subscription figures available for papers such as *al-Ghad*, there is little evidence to suggest that print news magazines enjoy the same success. This is likely due to cost, as magazines in the country can often cost as much as those in the U.S. *Jordan Business* magazine, for example, an English publication catering to foreign businessmen and highly educated Jordanians, costs about as much as *Forbes* magazine at any American newsstand. Weekly news magazines such as *Newsweek* and *Time* are available in Arabic, but again, the cost of these publications is often too high for many Jordanians. To be sure, print magazines do sell in Jordan, evidenced by the fact that bookstores and newsstands offer them (“Emerging Jordan,” 2005). But print magazines do not seem to be nearly as large a component of Jordanians’ media diets as are print newspapers.
Broadcast news in Jordan

Domestic television in Jordan has a history of state ownership, marginal quality, (Ayish, 1989) and limited offerings. Gher and Amin reported in 1999 that Jordan had just seven TV stations, a number which has not changed much in the last decade. The most prominent of these television stations is the government-controlled Jordan Television, launched in 1968 (Gress 1973). The network offers general entertainment and news programs at various times of the day, much like a Jordanian NBC, but with no autonomy from government. Jordan TV is paired with the country’s government-owned radio network, and the tandem is known as JRTV (Jordanian Radio and Television).

JRTV’s Web site claims the conglomerate “caters to local and Pan Arab viewers, offering a transparent and diversified cultural Infotainment Television and Radio services [sic] in a civilized Islamic view” (JRTV, 2008). The extent to which Jordan TV is “diversified” and “transparent,” however, is subject to a wide variety of opinions and, for those that disagree, pan-Arab satellite networks can be more appealing. Straubhaar (2007) feels that television producers in government-run broadcast systems still have some levels of autonomy in what they create, because these individuals will always push the boundaries of their superiors to some extent. Regardless of whether Jordanian producers do, in fact, attempt to broadcast information beyond the borders set by the government, many Jordanian news consumers turned years ago to broadcast networks of neighboring states and beyond.

Like citizens in a number of other Arab countries, Jordanians get much of their televised news via satellite from networks stationed outside the country. More than half of the households in Jordan now have satellite dishes accessing dozens to hundreds of channels from other Arab countries and around the world (Sakr, 2007). Many Jordanians get their TV news from the pan-
Arab satellite networks founded in the 1990s, such as the Qatari channel al-Jazeera and the Saudi Arabian al-Arabiya. “These services,” writes Muhammad Ayish (2002, p.138), “have brought to Arab homes not only a wider range of program choices, but also new public affairs genres that seem to shape television journalism practices on Arab world television.” In many Arab countries, these more vocal networks with higher production quality trump the often stodgy, government-filtered news that pervades many state-run networks in Jordan and Egypt. Jordanians who watch al-Jazeera get a very different picture of their government’s policies than those tuning in to Jordan Television. The Jordanian government is often at odds with the Qatari network, recalling its ambassador from Doha in 2002 and shutting down al-Jazeera’s news bureau in Amman because of talk-show comments made about the Jordanian royal family (Martin, 2002).

Networks like al-Jazeera and al-Arabiya are not, however, entirely autonomous. These stations are owned by the Qatari and Saudi Arabian governments. They tend to be quite critical of, say, the Jordanian and Egyptian regimes, but much less critical of their own governments.

Despite the disparity in viewership and content between Jordanian television programming and that of pan-Arab networks, some recent developments indicate that Jordanian TV may soon diversify through private network ownership. As of late, not all television and radio programming in Jordan is broadcast by the government or other Arab countries. In 2002, the King dissolved Jordan’s overbearing Ministry of Information, replacing it with the Higher Media Council, an organization charged with the task of encouraging domestic and international investment in independent Jordanian media (Sakr, 2007). And although the Council has had a number of bureaucratic problems and has not realized its full potential in terms of encouraging media development, it is not simply a bulwark of the “old guard,” as the Information Ministry was.
In 2003, the year after the Higher Media Council was formed, the Jordanian government officially capitulated its decades-old monopoly on domestic TV and radio broadcasts (Freedom House, 2007), and in 2004 the newly created Audiovisual Licensing Authority began granting permits for private TV and radio stations. The startup costs for private TV stations in Jordan remain out of reach even for highly solvent entrepreneurs in Jordan, but the possibility for private TV news is no longer implausible.

The inception of new radio stations, though, is expanding. Sakr reports that, by 2006, the Higher Media Council had granted licenses for fourteen new private radio stations, a substantial number given the country’s erstwhile monopoly on broadcasting. Web radio has expanded as well. Daoud Kuttab, a journalism professor from al-Quds University, recently founded Radio AmmanNet, an independent community radio station based solely online (Pintak, 2007). By broadcasting only online, Kuttab circumvents government restrictions and is not forced to acquire a broadcast permit from the Higher Media Council.

So far, though, private radio in Jordan has fared better than private TV enterprises, which haven’t really fared at all. The founder of al-Ghad, the Jordanian daily newspaper discussed above, recently acquired a license and purchased the equipment necessary to launch an independent TV station. At a cost of 20 million Jordanian Dinars, or about U.S. $28 million, Mohamed Allayan founded ATV (al-Ghad TV) in June 2007, Jordan’s first independent television network (Maaluf, 2007). The network had secured the format rights for a number of Western entertainment programs, such as The Price is Right and Boss Swap, and was in the process of constructing a news agenda of interest to Jordanian viewers (Sakr, 2007). Freedom House reported in 2008, however, that the station’s launch had been blocked by the government.
Access to International and Online News in Jordan

Despite ongoing challenges that Jordanian journalists face, the average Jordanian news consumer fares much better, largely due to the fact that foreign—including American and European—news outlets have a visible presence throughout the country. Jordanians seem to be active consumers of news from other countries. Van Tubergen and Boyd (1986) found this to be the case when they conducted a media-use study among Jordanians in the 1980s, long before Internet communication technologies arrived in Jordan, and concluded that Jordanians in their sample garnered news information from many different sources, including American sources.

This is still the case today, as Jordanians can easily access international news from both online and print sources. Ali (2006) found that international news stories on Jordanian TV and radio stations were more common than any other news topics, including stories about sports and domestic politics. The weekly news magazines Time and Newsweek, for example, can be purchased at many newsstands in large cities like Amman and Irbid in both English and Arabic. Jordanians with access to satellite television—a percentage of the population that is quite high even among poorer citizens (Rugh, 2004)—are able to watch CNN and BBC news networks in Arabic and English, something many Jordanians do quite often (Mellor, 2005, p.6).

Unlike countries such as Saudi Arabia, Libya and Iran, the Jordanian government does not censor foreign publications and, according to Reporters without Borders (2006), Jordan is not known for censoring or blocking Web sites containing anti-government material. Each year, Reporters without Borders publishes a list of countries they feel are “enemies of the Internet” in terms of online censorship, and Jordan is not among them. So far, the Jordanian government has not attempted to block Internet content, including sexually and politically provocative material.
The government has arrested a number of Jordanian bloggers and other online communicators for publishing incendiary speech online, but for the most part foreign content is left alone.

Among Jordanians with Internet access, international news sources are often quite popular. CNN and BBC have highly popular online news sites in Arabic. CNN draws more than 300,000 unique visitors each month to its Arabic outfit, while BBC Arabic attracts more than 1.5 million (Carvajal, 2006), although these figures represent Web users throughout the Arab world, not only those in Jordan. Jordan is, however, the most literate country in the Arab world, so, presumably, Jordanians are among those Arabs reading Western news in Arabic online. Google News, Al-Hurra, Reuters, BBC, and CNN all provide versions of their Web site in Arabic. Google offers a pan-Arab version of its news page that culls news stories from Arabic publications around the world, while the other three outlets generate their own news content in Arabic. The first major western news organization to publish an Arabic Web site was BBC, as BBCarabic.com existed before September 11, 2001. In 2002, CNN followed with its Arabic Web site, Arabic.CNN.com (Quinn, 2001), trailed by Google in 2006 (Moussa, 2006).

All of these media outlets are available in Jordan, to some. Disparity in Internet connectivity is a major issue in Jordan and many other Arab countries. Yemen is the Arab country with the least Internet connectivity, and the UAE is the most connected Arab nation (Rahman, 2007), while Jordan is somewhere in between. Internet connectivity in Arab countries, however, is difficult to measure and poorly defined, evidenced by a number of vague reports. The 2008 CIA Factbook, for example, reported that about 13 percent of Jordanians are “Internet users,” but noted that an Internet user could be someone who “accesses the Internet at least several times a week,” or “those who access it only once within a period of several months.” The CIA’s measure does not distinguish, then, between Jordanians with high-speed, in-home
broadband connections and those who visit Internet cafes a few times a week. Other estimates of Internet access and users in Jordan vary, from 11 percent (Freedom House, 2007) to less explicit numbers of “Internet penetration” under 20 percent (Mofleh, Wanous & Strachan, 2007).

Such broad assessments of Web access are among the problems with measuring the so-called “digital divide” in developing countries, as it is often conceptualized in terms of those who have a computer and those who do not. Warschauer (2003) argues that the digital divide is more of a “digital continuum,” on which news consumers may have different levels of Internet connectivity. Wealthy Jordanians may, for example, have in-home broadband access, full Internet capabilities on their i-Phones, and a celeritous connection at their offices. Middle-class Jordanians, on the other hand, may have a decent Internet connection at work and dial-up services at home, but no Internet capabilities on their mobile phones.

By just about any measure, though, Jordan is one of the less connected countries in the world, and is one of the moderately connected countries of the Middle East. Many of the Arab Gulf states—Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the UAE—are ahead of Jordan in terms of Internet infrastructure. Internet connectivity is improving in Jordan, however; in 2007, the government began selling Jordanian college students highly subsidized laptops (Mofleh et al., 2007), with which they can hop online at Amman’s growing number of wireless hotspots. Varying levels of Internet access among Jordanians is something this study addresses, as young Jordanians were asked detailed questions about their online news consumption habits.

This study targeted young Jordanians for a number of reasons. First, young people represent a sizeable majority in the Arab world. Two thirds of the more than 300 million people in the Arab world are under the age of 30 (Baltaji, 2008). Arab countries such as Egypt and Jordan are struggling to cope with rapidly expanding populations while subsisting on finite
resources. Unemployment, political discontent and social disaffection run high among young people in the Arab world, who feel their leaders have not provided them with opportunities to improve their lives (Martin & Al-Bahlani, 2008). And while both Arab and non-Arab journalists have chronicled this disaffection in their news copy from time to time, social scientists have only begun to study its origins and consequences.

Additionally, this study focused on young Arabs because they are the demographic utilizing new communication technologies in Middle Eastern countries, particularly to receive political information and to support political causes. Just after the 2008 U.S. presidential election, a *Jerusalem Post* (Kuttab, 2008) article told the story of a young Palestinian in Gaza who would wait for the rolling electric blackouts in his neighborhood to end and would log on to Skype to call voters in Ohio and Pennsylvania and encourage them to vote for Barack Obama. Young Arabs are avid text message senders, and text messaging in the Arab world is common not only for social connections but also for political organizing. “Text messaging,” wrote Coll in *The Washington Post* (2005), “is the new tool of the political underground” in the Arab Gulf. *The Los Angeles Times* also reported this year the popularity of social networking site Facebook among disaffected Arab youth in Egypt, who have used the Web site to organize demonstrations against the government of President Hosni Mubarak (Mansour, 2008).

It is for these reasons that this study focused on the news consumption patterns of young people. Young people represent the Arab majority, and they are using and consuming both new and old media for political ends. This study, though, is not only descriptive in nature, for it attempted more than an assessment of young urban Jordanians’ patterns of news consumption. This study also concerned political attitudes associated with young Jordanians’ news reliance.
The next segment discusses political socialization processes in Jordan and Jordanian news media as potential socializing agents.
CHAPTER 2
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Perhaps the main reason mass communication scholars spend so much time and effort researching mass media messages is because they believe that exposure to such messages is associated with variance in human thought and behavior (McQuail, 1994, stressed this argument). Mass communication scholars often concern themselves with ways in which mass media messages are associated with certain worldviews. The current study involved such concerns, as political socialization was explored by examining the association between young Jordanians’ news consumption and feelings toward two governments.

Political Socialization

Political socialization, originally conceptualized in the 1950s, generated scores of related studies until the late 1970s, when research on the concept tapered off somewhat (see Niemi & Hepburn, 1995; McDevitt & Chaffee, 2002). However, political socialization research remains widely cited today in political science literature and continues to generate new research on the ways in which citizens form political worldviews. Indeed, despite a decrease in the 1980s in the number of social science studies published under the aegis of “political socialization,” the framework would undergo revitalization in the 1990s and 2000s, as some researchers reexamined political socialization processes in a post-Cold War world in which nations were beginning to form their new political beings. Conceptualizing political development as an
ongoing formative process in a given society, as we will see, still has appeal to many social scientists.

Political socialization involves the shaping of an individual’s role, over time, in a political system. The survival of political regimes depends on the loyalty of the governed to pay taxes, abide by laws, vote, and refrain from popular rebellion, and so governments—as well as other political and social systems—employ a number of strategies to socialize individuals to politics and consensual governance (Graber, 2006). Herbert H. Hyman, whose book *Political Socialization* (1959, p.25) gave name to this process, defined it as an individual’s “learning of social patterns corresponding to his societal positions as mediated through various agencies of society.”

Political socialization essentially embodies the ways in which individuals’ political worldview is shaped—a worldview that involves anything from patterns of political participation and voting, to views on government, democracy, and feelings toward specific regimes and administrations. (In some cases, there are labels for such a political worldview, such as an authoritarian worldview discussed in Adorno et al.’s *The Authoritarian Personality* [see below]. Otherwise, a political “worldview” is a rather amorphous term which can represent a number of different assessments—including designations from ideology [liberal, conservative, moderate] to party identification [libertarian, republican], political knowledge levels [informed, less informed] or, in the case of the current study, political attitudes [cynical, distrusting]).

As we will see, though, early studies on political socialization/political worldview formation largely ignored the role of mass media in socializing processes. This is curious, because an interest in politically socializing influences stemmed at least partly from the Nazis’ ability to socialize young people to a devastating social order in the 1930s and 1940s, via
carefully crafted mass communication messages and propaganda. Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson & Sanford’s landmark work *The Authoritarian Personality* (1950), for example, was concerned with the origins of anti-semitism and fascism in Hitler’s Germany. Adorno and Frenkel-Brunswik were themselves Germans who fled Hitler’s regime in the 1940s and wanted to know more about how fascist political personalities are formed. Hirsch (1988) recounts that Hitler’s methods of politically socializing young Germans was a comprehensive scheme involving public education, teacher training, and carefully tailored classroom materials (i.e., mass communication messages) designed to malign and dehumanize minorities. Still, early political socialization research focused on the influence of societal agents such as family and schools, but not the mass communication messages distributed by those agents to children.

Hyman similarly argued that the family, schools, and peer networks are the main forces that shape a person’s political outlook over time, largely ignoring media as a socializing institution. A person exposed to certain political influences over time is, Hyman maintains, “likely to exhibit certain persistent behavior apart from transient stimulation in his contemporary environment.” (p.25). The “persistent” component is an important aspect of Hyman’s definition: the notion that political socialization results in relatively stable attitudes which cannot typically be altered by exposure to ephemeral, countervailing information. Perhaps one of the more parsimonious and lucid definitions of political socialization comes from Sigel (1965, p.1), who wrote that the process “refers to the learning process by which the political norms and behaviors acceptable to an ongoing political system are transmitted from generation to generation.”

Like Gerbner’s (1970) conceptualization of long-term television exposure in cultivation analyses, political socialization patterns develop over time and are not particularly vulnerable to day-to-day stimuli. Political socialization is essentially the cultivation of an individual’s political
outlook by a number of societal agents over time. Other early researchers of political socialization similarly argued that the process is long-term and begins at a young age (see Patrick, 1968; Dawson & Prewitt, 1969). Political socialization is conceptualized as a continuous process throughout an individual’s lifetime. This longevity component of political socialization will become more important later as the methods by which mass communication scholars have measured political socialization are discussed.

Political socialization research is particularly useful to the current study, which examined young Jordanians’ news consumption patterns and their opinions of the U.S. government as well as their own. Hyman envisioned political socialization as a relatively stable phenomenon, invulnerable to transient, environmental stimulation. Opinions of one’s government are likely more lasting than, say, one’s current-events knowledge—an oft-used measure of political socialization. In fact, one could argue that an individual’s overall opinion of their government is a measure of political socialization in the classic sense. That American school children recite the pledge of allegiance and learn in classrooms containing pictures of Lincoln and Washington represents efforts to convince young people that the United States is a good country worth standing up for. A citizen’s views of his or her government are among the purest manifestations of political socialization.

Three Forms of Political Socialization Research

In discussing the first two decades of political socialization research, Atkin (1981) discusses three different ways in which the early literature defined and measured the concept: 1) cognitively; 2) affectively; and 3) behaviorally. Researchers examining cognitive elements of political socialization have measured factual political knowledge, current-events knowledge, and other forms of political awareness. Affective measurements of political socialization are
emotional assessments such as feelings toward political actors, parties, government institutions, and interest in public affairs. Behavioral measures of political socialization generally consist of interpersonal communication of politics and participation in politics or voting.

The first two categories, cognitive and affective, are relevant to the discussion of the shortcomings of mass communication research on political socialization. Cognitive measures represent the way many mass communication researchers have approached, somewhat errantly, studies of political socialization. These are the measures that do not, for the most part, satisfy Hyman’s criteria that political socialization is a stable concept. The second genre of political socialization research, affective measures, involves greater attention to Hyman’s stability criteria, as ratings of political institutions and parties are, presumably, less capricious than measures of political knowledge.

It is this affective domain—feelings toward political institutions—that the current study examined, as the association between young Jordanians’ news consumption patterns and feelings toward the Jordanian and U.S. governments is explored. Opinions of one’s government and of a foreign power are phenomena closely linked to many of the repeatedly cited definitions of political socialization. Unlike their levels of current-events knowledge, Jordanians’ levels of support for the Jordanian government have likely developed over time and may be firmly rooted and defiant to fleeting, contrary stimuli. This is where the current study differs from much of the literature on mass media and political socialization. Instead of measuring a protean variable of interest, such as political knowledge or activity in one political campaign, this study is concerned with feelings about governments, which ostensibly do not fluctuate as much due to transient environmental stimuli.
Most of the early writings on political socialization treated potential mass media influences on political development as an afterthought (Atkin, 1981; Graber, 2006). Early studies tended to focus on family, school systems, and peer networks as the main societal agents of political socialization. Citing Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet’s seminal book *The People’s Choice* (1948), in which a “two-step flow” of mass communication effects was proposed, whereby a relatively small number of opinion leaders communicate the contents of media messages to a larger majority, Hyman implied that mass media messages do not play a major, direct role in political socialization processes. Dawson and Prewitt (1969), too, cite the two-step flow of mass communication content from opinion leaders to the masses as evidence that familial institutions, as well as schools and peers, are more potent in the processes of political socialization. They also claim that any political socialization messages that mass media do communicate originated from other agencies such as the family or public education systems.

Langton and Jennings (1968) also relegated mass media variables to a passive role in the political socialization process, as media use was treated as a *dependent variable* and an actual measure of political socialization predicted by participation in high school civics curricula. This secondary role for mass media in the conceptualization of political socialization would continue until the early 1970s, when news media began to receive recognition as important forces in American political socialization. By this time, social scientists were beginning to doubt the roles of family and school as the main agents of political socialization, and researchers started including media use variables in explanations of variation in political socialization processes (Kraus & Davis, 1976).
Despite Hyman’s apparent resistance to the idea that mass media play a major role in political socialization, the politically socializing effects of media messages were eventually discussed by the light of his work in 1970. In a survey of adolescents in Wisconsin schools, Chaffee, Ward, and Tipton (1970) were among the first mass communication scholars to specifically discuss the politically socializing potential of mass media, and wrote that “analyses of the agencies of political socialization generally relegate the mass media to a secondary role at best” (p.647), behind the influences of parents, schools, and friends. Their study was correlative in nature, not experimental, but Chaffee et al. deserve some credit for arguing the case for media use variables as correlates, if not predictors of, models of political socialization processes.

In their study of media use and political socialization among junior and senior high school students, Chaffee et al. found that young people’s mass media use—particularly newspaper consumption—was positively associated with political knowledge and political activity (i.e. political campaigning). They argue that news media do have political socialization potential and, therefore, should be considered in serious discussions of politically socializing agents. Atkin (1981) also argued that mass media, particularly news media, wield significant power in political socialization processes and merit, therefore, scholarly attention.

Since the publication of Chaffee et al.’s study, a considerable number of mass communication and political science scholars have researched associations between news consumption and political socialization measures. Garramone and Atkin (1986) identified politically socializing effects of news after concluding that exposure to TV news broadcasts and print newspaper use were strong predictors of political knowledge among adolescents. They operationalized political socialization as current-events knowledge and “fundamental political knowledge,” or knowledge about the American political system. Ultimately, many social
scientists studying political socialization processes now take mass media variables into consideration when developing predictive models. “Research in the 1970s,” wrote Graber (2006, p.11), “finally established that the media play a crucial role in political socialization.”

*Shortcomings of Research on Mass Communication & Political Socialization*

Much of the research on the associations between news consumption and political socialization is somewhat problematic due to the ways political socialization variables have been operationalized. Atkin reported that a large number of studies of media and political socialization focus on “pre-adult stages of learning” (p.300) and on political or current events knowledge and political interest as the outcome variables. Indeed, some of Atkin’s own research falls into this category, as he and Garramone (1986) examined knowledge of political issues among adolescents (see also Atkin & Gantz, 1978). Tan (1980) similarly studied the association between mass media use and political knowledge, campaign participation, and interpersonal political discussions.

The tendency to equate political socialization with current-events knowledge or political knowledge is not just common among mass communication researchers; in general, political socialization researchers have focused their efforts on political knowledge, which is partly due to the fact that that many researchers have studied political socialization among children and adolescents (see Ehman, 1980; Kiousis, McDevitt & Wu, 2005), and political knowledge measures are easier to administer to young people than are more complex assessments. A great deal of American scholarship on political socialization processes in general—not just those concerned with mass media influences as predictor variables—has also examined outcome variables such as partisan affiliations and voting behavior, to the exclusion of more static and complex phenomena such as political identity (Sapiro, 2004).
Such studies, while presenting interesting findings on news consumption as a predictor of political knowledge and other important outcome variables, do not satisfy a key component of Hyman and others’ definitions of political socialization: the relative stability of the phenomenon. Hyman and other early political socialization researchers, such as Patrick (1968) and Dawson et al. (1969), argue that political socialization is a fairly steady phenomenon, resistant to occasional, dissonant stimulation. An individual’s current-events knowledge can differ from week to week—even day to day—depending on his or her recent levels of news attention.

Operationalizing political socialization through political knowledge variables is also problematic when considering another aspect of common definitions of political socialization: affinitive feelings toward a political system. Political socialization agents are often described as forces that socialize someone to or against a certain political system. Recall Sigel (1965, p.1), for example, who defined political socialization as a process by which the political norms and behaviors “acceptable to an ongoing political system” are transmitted from generation to generation” [italics mine]. Political knowledge variables do not capture a person’s feelings toward a political system. Conceivably, an individual may be highly knowledgeable about the American political system, but may not think very highly of it. An anarchist, for example, may know quite a bit about the workings of a certain political system. Conversely, someone may possess little factual knowledge of political or current events, but may be highly socialized to American laws and government.

Chaffee, Nass & Yang (1990) commit this indiscretion by operationalizing the political socialization of Korean-American immigrants as their knowledge of American politics. We have no way of knowing if political knowledge among these immigrants is at all predictive of their affinitive feelings toward the American political system. Korean-American immigrants with
high levels of knowledge of the political system may be not at all supportive of American
government. More on the mark in their exploration of political socialization among young people
are Conway, Wyckoff, Feldbaum, and Ahern (1981), who measured news consumption variables
as predictors of support for the electoral system, support for the two-party system, in addition to
political knowledge and political participation variables. Conway et al. did not find direct effects
of news consumption on political system support, but their subjects were also schoolchildren,
who may not yet have developed feelings toward the two-party political system.

Political knowledge, therefore, while an important element of political participation, may
not be the best operationalization of political socialization, as it is a phenomenon that has the
capacity to fluctuate substantially and may not measure affinitive socialization to a political
system. To be sure, factual political knowledge is, on some level, a component of political
socialization, but for researchers to broadly claim they are conducting a study on political
socialization when they are measuring only vacillating concepts is misleading. These same
researchers frequently define political socialization as a gradual, long-term process. Claiming
that a seventh-grader’s level of political knowledge represents a measurement of the extent to
which she is politically socialized is suspect. Chaffee et al. (1970) operationalized political
socialization in this way when they examined media use among junior high and high school
students. Their outcome variables of interest were political knowledge and political campaigning
activity.

The temptation to use political knowledge measures in studies of political socialization is
understandable. Political or current events knowledge measures are widespread, fairly easy to
administer and interpret, and they are usually highly associated with news consumption
variables. For similar reasons, interest in politics is often used as a measure of political
socialization. News consumption variables are also associated in strong ways with measures of political interest. An individuals’ interest in politics, however, may be ephemeral and susceptible to the transient stimulation Hyman claimed does not greatly affect political socialization.

An American voter may be highly interested in politics during a U.S. presidential campaign, not because she has been politically socialized over the years to be interested in politics in a general sense, but because she becomes more attentive to politics during a national election. Now, this person may have been politically socialized over the course of her life to believe that presidential elections are important and therefore worthy of attention, but this is a very specific form of political socialization, and if a researcher is interested in examining political socialization to presidential elections, he or she needs to say this.

**More Contemporary Research on Media & Political Socialization**

Despite leveling all of these criticisms at mass communication scholars who have studied political socialization in sometimes problematic ways, I must acknowledge that, when political socialization research resurged in the 1990s and 2000s, the operationalization of dependent variables improved somewhat. Researchers appear less likely to focus exclusively on political knowledge or candidate preference. Instead, as we will see, some scholars were more likely to examine outcomes such as political authoritarianism, tolerance for divergent viewpoints, and interest in expressing political opinions in conversations with other people.

Also laudably, political socialization researchers have begun to explore politically socializing agents in a greater variety of cultural and national contexts. Undoubtedly, some reasons for such internationalization are due to the greater ease in communicating across nations and cultures in the information age and the greater travel mobility that has characterized the post-
Cold War world. Still, the efforts of political socialization scholars to better internationalize their scholarly corpus is noteworthy and commendable (see Chaffee et al., 1997 for a good example of a political socialization researcher who, in previous years, focused mainly on political socialization processes in the United States but, during the recent resurgence, internationalized the scope of inquiry).

_The Recent Resurgence in Media & Political Socialization Research_

While the late 1970s and 1980s saw a decline in the number of social science researchers who used political socialization as a framework to guide their research, there was somewhat of a return to the framework in the 1990s and 2000s (Dudley & Gitelson, 2002). One reason for this was that some scholars were interested in studying political learning processes in developing nations with new political systems in the post-Cold War era (Niemi & Hepburn, 1995). Other scholars, such as Michael McDevitt (see McDevitt & Chaffee, 2002), seemed to recognize that examining the formation of citizens’ political selves became even more interesting and important, if complicated, in the information age. More modern research has been, in some cases, marked by a number of methodological and operational improvements. Namely, recent scholarship on mass media and political socialization has been characterized by discussions of new media forms such as news Web sites and blogs, more stable operationalizations of outcome variables, and a greater number of studies examining media and political socialization around the world.

Political scientists and mass communication scholars have begun studying political socialization processes anew in the digital age. In 2009, the journal _Political Communication_ published a special issue on “Communication and Political Socialization.” The issue addressed, among other topics, the role of media and political socialization outcomes in the digital media
age. Pasek, Kenski, Romer & Jamieson (2006) studied the impact of new media use on civic engagement, finding that overall Internet use is associated with greater levels of civic participation, a finding that counters many of the arguments Robert Putnam (2001) made regarding technological isolation in his widely cited book *Bowling Alone*. Similarly, Romer, Jamieson and Pasek (2009) found that informational Internet use (i.e. use of the Internet for non-entertainment purposes) was positively associated with civic engagement among a national sample of 1,800 adolescents and young adults. (See also Shah, McLeod & Lee, 2009, for an exploration of media use variables, including Internet news consumption, on political participation, political consumerism and civic participation).

Similarly, Lee (2006) studied the relationship between college students’ Internet use and feelings of political efficacy, finding that online news consumption was strongly associated with internal political efficacy, a kind of political self confidence. Dunsmore and Lagos (2008) studied the politically socializing effects on high school students of producing a news video segment, research that has important applications to emerging trends in citizen journalism. Increasingly, researchers interested in political socialization processes are applying their research framework to forms of electronic and new media.

Not only has recent scholarship begun to examine new media forms and political socialization outcomes, but it has also included more research sites outside the U.S. and Western Europe. Chaffee, Murdockowicz and Galperin (1997), for example, studied the relationship between local newspaper use and political tolerance and support for democracy among 5th and 6th grade Argentines. Newspaper use was tested experimentally in this study. Students baseline political attitudes were measured prior to the implementation of a newspaper in education program. Newspaper use was found to increase political tolerance and support for democratic
ideals. In another international study, Kim & Johnson (2006) surveyed Internet use and political socialization outcomes among Koreans prior to a major national election. They found that reliance on independent, Web-based newspapers was a better predictor of political interest and political involvement than was reliance on print newspapers. Liebes (1992) studied television viewing and political socialization variables in Israeli families.

Perhaps more important than either a focus on new media influence on political socialization measures or more examples of international research on media as politically socializing agents, communication scholars conducting recent political socialization research have begun measuring more stable outcome variables. Pfau, Moy & Szabo (2001), for example, measured the associations between television entertainment and news viewing on feelings toward the federal government and the executive branch. These are just the kind of affinitive outcome variables Sigel (1965) was referring to when he discussed political beliefs “acceptable to a political system.”

Eyal et al. (2006) studied the relationship between viewing of violent TV content and “aggressive” political opinions, such as feelings toward vigilantism and how society should deal with criminals. Pasek et al. (2006) were concerned with media use and civic engagement (membership in a civic group, volunteering). Chaffee et al. (1997) measured the association between adolescents’ participation in a civics program containing news-consumption activities and levels of political tolerance. Again, these are, mostly, stable political outcome variables to which Sigel referred and that go beyond mere assessments of political knowledge.

Despite methodological and operational improvements in some of the contemporary scholarship on mass media and political socialization, however, it is important to point out that not all the research in these areas has contributed to the gains. Eveland, McLeod & Horowitz
(1998; see also Niemi & Junn, 1998), for example, operationalized political knowledge as their lone political socialization outcome variable, perpetuating some of the main problems in media and political socialization research from the 1970s and 1980s. Political socialization outcomes should not be loosely defined as any plus or minus change in levels of any political variable, such as recall of political facts or interest in political information. Based on oft-cited scholarly research defining political socialization processes, prosocial or antisocial outcome variables seem to be more fitting and appropriate.

While no research in the new and somewhat improved wave of contemporary scholarship on media and political socialization looks into related processes in Jordan or other Arab countries, there are still a number of examples of how mass communication messages are disseminated in Jordan for the purpose of politically socializing the populace to certain ideals. While political socialization processes in Jordan have yet to be explored, a number of examples of mass media messages and political socialization programs in the country can be identified.

*Political Socialization & Mass Communication in Jordan*

In Jordan, as in most countries in which news media are at least partially controlled by the state, the press is supposed by the government to play a role in political socialization. Presumably, the main reasons governments exert power over media practitioners (other than lust for fiscal profits from media, which are often fleeting in developing countries) is to control the perceived effects of political messages on the governed and to maintain popular support for political leaders. Jordan is certainly no exception. PETRA, Jordan’s state news agency, for example, is a news copy generator on which most of the country’s daily newspapers consistently rely, and one that rarely strays from government positions.
The demographic makeup of the country may make political socialization processes essential for the survival of the monarchy. Approximately 56 percent of Jordanian residents are of Palestinian descent (Ryan, 2002), many of whom view their stints in Jordan as temporary until the formation of a Palestinian state. Another 14-16 percent of residents are Iraqi refugees from the second U.S.-led war in the Arabian Peninsula (Black, 2007). Without mechanisms in place to socialize residents in Jordan to the country’s political system and to the monarchy, the government’s legitimacy and authority would be in doubt.

While the press in Jordan does not exist solely as a loyalist pawn of the government—after all, journalists have some freedom to criticize government ministries or resolutions passed by parliament and to identify national problems—political socialization efforts in Jordanian media outlets are not hard to identify. The most obvious examples involve coverage of the Jordanian king and royal family. The king is always referred to in news stories as “His Majesty King Abdullah II” and usually greets morning newspaper readers above the fold and on page one, smiling in a favorable photograph. His wife, the beautiful Queen Rania al-Abdullah, is often pictured with him. The al-Ra’i newspaper has a permanent, stylish picture of Abdullah and Rania on its homepage, below which is a permanent link to the king’s official Web site (al-Ra’i, 2008). Negative news of the king is almost never published, and Jordanian editors who violate this code go to prison.

Use of mass media messages for other purposes of political socialization exists in Jordan, too, and one needs to look no further than the “Jordan First” campaign to identify attempts at mass political socialization. The “Jordan First” campaign was unveiled by the country’s Foreign Ministry in October 2002 in order to convince Jordanians to put the country above all other interests. According to King Abdullah, the campaign was an effort to encourage Jordanians to
put the interests of the country ahead of pan-Arab interests. “Jordan First,” the King said when
the campaign was introduced, was created to “mold Jordanian men and women in a unified
social fiber that promotes their sense of loyalty to their homeland, and pride in Jordanian, Arab
and Islamic identity” (Basu, 2002). The King’s statement harkens back to the early definitions
of political socialization of Hyman and others that describe politically socializing processes as
long-lasting influences that orient a people to a certain political system. The Jordan First
campaign was created to shore up support for the monarchy and other powerful elites and, as
political scientist Curtis Ryan (2004, p.58) argues, “Jordan First” may amount to little more than
a “regime security first campaign.”

Mass media messages were a central part of the Jordan First public relations campaign.
Emad Hajjaj, political cartoonist for the al-Ghad newspaper and one of the most popular
cartoonists in the Arab world, was conscripted to draw trendy logos for the operation. One such
logo pictures two interlocking fists and forearms in the geographical shape of the country and
decorated with the colors of the Jordanian flag. Please see Figure 1 for an illustration of this
image.

(Insert figure 1 about here)

This emblem became particularly widespread in Jordan after al-Qaida suicide bombers
killed 60 people at three Amman hotels in November 2005. The government also purchased
billboard advertisements throughout Amman emblazoned with some of Hajjaj’s emblems,
including one such billboard in the center of one of the capital’s busiest intersections.

Anecdotal evidence speculating about the politically socializing role Jordanian news
media play, however, does not represent a sufficient discussion of political socialization in that
country. Are news media in Jordan a politically socializing force? Are media campaigns such as
the Jordan First initiative associated with support for the Jordanian government? Is consumption of news from domestic sources versus international outlets associated with greater animosity toward outside (such as American) governments? No one is privileged to answer such questions, as political socialization processes in Arab states have gone grossly understudied since Hyman introduced the concept in the 1950s. Empirical research on political socialization processes in Jordan and other states is needed in order to begin to address such questions.

While one may assume that Jordanian mass media help socialize Jordanians to domestic politics, this is not a foregone conclusion, and certainly the strength of such an association is not either. Scholars should not presume that the Jordanian press functions as a political socialization mechanism in the same ways as it does in other developing countries or in Western countries. Of course, the current study does not explore the efficacy of the Jordan First campaign nor the monarchy’s specific efforts to swell its levels of public support, but instead broadly examines news consumption and popular opinions of government. This study is a step toward a greater understanding of mass communication and political socialization processes in an important Arab country.

Research on news consumption and political socialization in Arab countries is needed for the purposes of greater global, comparative understanding. Dawson & Prewitt (1969) wrote that, although political socialization may have some universal characteristics, political socialization undoubtedly differs from one country to another. A more complete understanding of processes of political socialization demands an investigation of such processes in more of the world’s corners, especially those outside the U.S. and Western Europe.

Some of the reasons our understanding of media and political socialization may benefit from surveying Jordanians relate to some of the core assumptions of media and political
socialization processes. First, one of assumptions, dare I say conclusions, of media and political socialization research since the 1970s and 1980s is that media influences are an important agent in political socialization processes, right alongside families, peers, and educational systems. Graber (2006) maintained that mass communication research in the 1970s and 1980s “established” media influences as important politically socializing agents. But the “establishment” that Graber discusses mostly refers to political socialization processes in the United States. The simple truth is that political communication scholars do not know whether media use plays as important a role in political socialization processes throughout the world as it does in the United States. Particularly in Eastern countries like Jordan in which family and peer networks are often more close-knit than in the United States (Nydell, 2006), reliance on interpersonal sources for information may trump the influence of mass media. The near-universal nature of Graber’s assumption—that media reliance can help explain the formation of political identity—demands that we conduct media and political socialization research in a more universal fashion.

McLeod and Blumler (1987) called this theoretical liberalism the problem of “false universality,” or at least dubious universality, in which theoretical propositions are pre-supposed to hold across time and across all cultural contexts. The universality of agenda setting or cultivation hypotheses in non-Western countries has been demonstrated to a much larger extent than has the hypothesis that media influences match familial or social influences in the formation of political dispositions. It is for this reason that some non-mass communication researchers studying political socialization processes outside the Western world still, to this day, ignore media use variables in their analyses (see Leung, 2006 for example, who explored “schooling” factors influencing political socialization of secondary students in Hong Kong, but excluded
mass media variables). Thus, the universality of Graber’s assumption is not necessarily ingrained in the minds of all political socialization researchers outside media and communication disciplines. In a small way, the results of the current study will either counter or support the theoretical universality assumed in Graber’s statement. That is, her statement will be supported if media use variables in the sample are associated with political attitudes at levels equal or greater than the interpersonal measures used in the study.

Additionally, since political socialization was, and still is, largely demonstrated through surveying young people in a political system, this study is a good starting point for political socialization research in an Arab country. While it is true that political socialization takes place across the life span, not just among the young, most of the theorizing about political socialization processes, including the roles mass media play, have capped examinations of the political attitudes of young people. So, while political socialization research should certainly not be limited to studies of young people, it might be out of place to begin an initial theoretical exploration of media and political socialization processes in Jordan by surveying, say, older news consumers. For this reason, the current study surveys news use and political attitudes among the age demographic from which political socialization assumptions have largely been drawn.

Overall, the above review of literature on the Jordanian press system and media and political socialization research attempted to outline the media environment in Jordan, including press laws, journalistic limitations, and news choices available to Jordanian news consumers, and also to discuss political socialization scholarship, laying the foundation for a related study in an Arab country. Visibly absent in the literature is contemporary survey research assessing news consumption among Jordanians. For this reason, the first two research questions deal strictly
with news consumption patterns. In terms of political socialization, the findings from the literature also seem to indicate that the most appropriate political socialization outcome variables would not be constructs such as political knowledge or political interest, but more seemingly stable variables such as political trust and political cynicism. Research questions three and four deal with these variables.

**Research Questions**

The main questions this study asked are found below. After each item is a brief paragraph describing the question and discussing its place in this study.

RQ1: On what news formats do young Jordanians primarily rely for news information? What are the patterns of reliance on newspapers, magazines, televised news, radio, online news outlets, blogs, podcasts, cell phone text messages and interpersonal sources for information?

This first question was the project’s starting point and was answered by gauging respondents’ reliance on a wide array of news media, including but not limited to newspapers, satellite television channels, radio, electronic newspapers, blogs, and cellular phone text messages. Respondents were asked which media they rely on for news information (newspapers vs. radio broadcasts) and were also be asked to specify which outlets they access (*al-Ghad* vs. *Voice of Amman* radio, e.g.)

In a developing country, it is presumed that many citizens rely on print newspapers for much of their media diets, but it is also possible that Middle Eastern citizens are increasingly accessing electronic news sources in both Arabic and English. This first question assesses the accuracy of these suspicions.

RQ2: How much foreign and domestic news do young Jordanians generally consume? For each of the media forms listed in Research Question 1 (newspapers, magazines, television,
radio, online communication), how much of the news content, by respondents’ estimation, involves domestic versus international events?

Evidence suggests news audiences in Arab countries are more likely than Americans to consume international news, whether from domestic or foreign news outlets (Mellor, 2005). In many cases, it is safer for journalists in autocratic regimes to cover and criticize the governments of foreign countries than their own. This question examined levels of foreign and domestic news young Jordanians attend to.

RQ3: How is news consumption among young Jordanians related to feelings toward the governments of Jordan and the United States? Specifically:

RQ3(a): Is reliance on newspapers, magazines, radio, television, interpersonal sources and the Internet for news independently associated with variance of measures of political cynicism?

RQ3(b): Is reliance on newspapers, magazines, radio, television, interpersonal sources and the Internet for news independently associated with variance of measures of political trust?

RQ3(c): Is reliance on newspapers, magazines, radio, television, interpersonal sources and the Internet for news independently associated with variance of feelings toward the U.S. government?

American policy makers have long tried to understand the provenance of sentiments toward the U.S. among Arabs. This question partly addressed this need, as it pertains to news consumption. A lot has been made of falling global opinions of the United States in the last several years, and of restoring perceptions of the United States among peoples of the world. As the United States tries to continue its role as a world leader, to gain or regain the trust of foreign nations, to contribute to global political cooperation, and to resolve assorted international
conflicts, it is important for the country to have a substantial cache of affinitive capital among the people of the world. These are the reasons research question three is being asked. The opinions people of the world harbor for the United States play a major role in the country’s ability to achieve many of its highest goals.

Wanta et al. (2004) found that news coverage of foreign nations had the capacity to dramatically affect news consumers’ feelings toward those nations and, for this reason, this research question asked, “of the media forms upon which Jordanians rely for international news information, which media are most associated with sentiments toward the United States?”

This research question also involves associations between Jordanian news consumption and attitudes toward Jordanian leadership. “Is television news consumption associated with young Jordanians’ opinions of the Jordanian government?” is the nature of the question addressed here.

RQ4: Which demographic variables, if any, are associated with both young Jordanians’ news consumption and feelings toward the U.S. & Jordanian governments? Specifically, are any of the demographic variables (age, gender, ethnicity, religion, nationality and education) significantly associated with political trust, political cynicism and feelings toward the U.S. government?

This question examined the association of education, age, ethnicity, religion and gender with the political socialization measures. These variables were employed as control variables in multiple regression models examining the partial associations between news consumption and political attitude variables.
RQ5: Do the correlations between news consumption and political cynicism, political trust and feelings toward the U.S. government change when media credibility is included as a control variable?

Respondents were asked to identify the extent to which they trust the accuracy of the information provided by Jordanian and foreign news sources. Scale items come from Meyer’s (2004) chapter on media credibility in his book, *The Vanishing Newspaper*, and were assessed on a seven-point scale. Mellor (2005) claims that trust of mass media in Arab countries is a serious issue and it should be considered in examinations of journalism in the Arab world. Jordanians may read *al-Ghad* daily but may not have the same faith a Manhattan reader of the *New York Times* places in that publication.

Presumably, levels of media credibility may moderate the association between news consumption patterns and political socialization outcomes. The concern here is that a young person may read a Jordanian print newspaper every day, but if she is skeptical of the newspaper’s credibility, the newspaper’s association with some outcome variables may be somewhat diminished. Druckman (2001), for example, found that framing effects of newspaper exposure were much more likely when experiment participants believed the newspaper content to which they were exposed came from a credible source. Holding media credibility constant, then, may make some of the relationships between news consumption and political attitudes more clear.
CHAPTER 3

METHOD

In order to answer the research questions posed in this study, a pen and paper survey measuring news consumption and political attitudes was administered to 321 18-35 year olds in Amman, Jordan. The survey was available in both Arabic and English. In cases when a respondent was illiterate, (s)he was asked to complete the survey orally. Intercept sampling in eight districts around Amman was employed to reach and recruit respondents. I traveled to public places (public thoroughfares, sidewalks, shopping centers, cafes, parks) and in each of the eight districts approached potential respondents. Please see Appendices D and E, respectively, for English and Arabic versions of the recruitment script used when potential respondents were approached.

Intercept sampling has been a common method of sampling harder-to-reach populations and urban groups since the late 1970s (Sudman, 1980; Bush & Hair, 1985). It is particularly popular in marketing and consumer research, as private research firms often make inquiries of customers in department stores and shopping malls (see Yoo, et al., 2007). Intercept sampling is often attractive in developing countries where, Seligson (2005) points out, face-to-face surveying is often the most favored method of data collection.

Intercept sampling was used for a number of reasons, some of which relate to security, others to financial and time constraints. While random-digit dialing in Jordan would be possible in order to reach some respondents on both land telephones and mobile phones, very few Jordanians are accustomed to being contacted by telephone for the purposes of public opinion...
research (D3 Systems analyst Karl Feld, personal communication, August 19, 2008). Their skepticism toward the researcher, especially when contacted by a Western-accented Arabic speaker by telephone, could have potentially been a fatal barrier to this project. Another problem of telephone surveys in developing countries involves the ubiquity of mobile phones as opposed to land telephones. Due to government taxes and weak telecommunication infrastructure, many citizens of developing nations use mobile phones that charge a fee per minute of domestic use. Many Jordanians are neither willing nor able to afford to complete a survey when contacted on their mobile phones.

An online survey, too, would present problems. Just 13-20 percent of the population in Jordan has consistent Internet access (Freedom House, 2007). Ghashghai & Lewis (2002) note that, although there are places in the Middle East where levels of Internet access are high, most of the region lags behind other regions in terms of Internet connectivity. Aside from the problems of the digital divide, attempting to conduct this project via e-mail could also be prohibitive for reasons of recipient skepticism as well as the fact that e-mail lists would be extremely difficult if not impossible to obtain.

While non-probability sampling is, for a number of reasons, not the most desirable way to collect data from a population, there is scholarly precedence for non-random data collection in Middle Eastern countries due to many of the challenges mentioned above. Clark (2006) surveyed 55 political scientists who have conducted research among human populations in Middle Eastern countries, 89 percent of whom relied at least partly on non-probability sampling methods such as snowball sampling or chain referral sampling. Similarly, Tessler and Nachtwey (1998) collected public opinion samples from Kuwait and Egypt, both of which were nonrandom in nature. When sampling in developing countries, scholars sometimes have to settle for non-probability data due
to financial or security constraints. Kousha & Mohseni (2000) collected a large non-probability sample of Iranians using snowball sampling methods, assessing their levels of happiness and general life satisfaction.

Reynolds, Simintiras and Diamontopoulos (2002) claim that the most common criticism of international survey research involves the non-random characteristics of data collection procedures. However, they also write that strict probability sampling in developing countries is often a luxury afforded a small number of researchers (such as heavily funded organizations like the IMF and World Bank), and non-probability methods are often the only course of data collection for scholars with slimmer research coffers. Data collection for this study yielded to some of the financial and practical limitations involved in collecting data in a country like Jordan.

Intercept sampling in a developing country introduced a number of issues that had to be addressed in this study. First was the issue of group responses. A potential bias in surveying in Arab countries involves group responses, in which survey respondents collaborate with friends or relatives to answer questionnaire items. Farah (1987) found that group responses to survey questions were common in Arab countries, which are more community-oriented than some Western cultures. She found, for example, that when survey researchers interviewed respondents in Arab countries, friends or family members of the respondent would blurt out responses, thereby contaminating some of the data she collected. In most cases, I tried to intercept single individuals or those in pairs. This greatly reduced, and virtually eliminated, the problem of group responses. In a few cases, respondents in pairs started to collaborate and compare answers on the survey. In this case, I kindly asked them to complete the survey without deliberating with their companion.
Another issue involved including refugees in the study. More than two million Iraqi refugees are living outside Iraq in the Middle East, primarily in Jordan and Syria. Jordan has absorbed more than 700,000 of these refugees, according to the Institute for the Study of International Migration at Georgetown University (Fagen, 2007), increasing the country’s total population by more than 17 percent. A few of the respondents in my survey (6 persons) were Iraqi immigrants or refugees. As they are for the most part at this time a permanent portion of the Jordanian population, I included them in the survey. Immigrants and refugees from other countries who are permanent residents in Jordan were included, too, including individuals from Egypt, Syria, Yemen, Kurdistan, and Armenia.

Lastly, two major geopolitical events transpired during data collection in Jordan. For the first two weeks of data collection, the Israeli-Hamas war was being fought in the Gaza Strip. The reality of current events in the Middle East, though, is that there are often environmental stimuli in the form of political or military conflicts in the region. Such stimuli are more of a political constant than an exception. Sadly, the Middle East is a region in which there has been armed conflict of one kind or another going on for much of the last 60-plus years, and this is one of the reasons some social scientists choose to study the region’s characteristics. While it is possible that the war could have affected Jordanians’ feelings toward the U.S.—with whom they associate Israel’s military might and actions—it seems less likely that the conflict would have altered or affected Jordanians ratings of their country’s government and politicians. Still, the war in Gaza was an elevation of violence even for the tragic Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and I must disclose the possibility that the war could have influenced ratings of the U.S. government.

The second major geopolitical event involved the inauguration of U.S. President Barack Obama, which came in the middle of data collection efforts. Twelve days of the overall data
collection were prior to Barack Obama’s inauguration, and 13 days of data collection fell after. In order to determine whether the change in presidential administrations had any immediate impact on Jordanians’ ratings of the U.S. government (the variables related to which made no mention of the words “president” or “administration”), independent samples t-tests were conducted for the three outcome variables of interest (political trust, political cynicism, and feelings toward the U.S. government) to compare pre and post inaugural scores. Respondents’ pre/post inaugural scores on the political trust \( t(313)= 1.36, p=.175 \) (two-tailed), political cynicism \( t(311)= - 1.79, p=.074 \) (two-tailed), and ratings of the U.S. government \( t(309)= - 1.27, p=.206 \) (two-tailed) scales did not differ significantly. Prior to data collection, the main concern regarding pre-post inaugural scores was in terms of ratings of the U.S. government. The independent-samples t-test reported here suggests that the inaugural of Barack Obama did not immediately influence respondents’ ratings of the United States.

**Instrument and Variables**

The questionnaire was a paper survey available in Arabic and English, although just three individuals opted to complete the survey in the latter language. The survey contained a total of 73 questions on nine sheets of paper, and took anywhere from 10-18 minutes to complete. Data were collected in January 2009. Please see appendices D and E, respectively, for English and Arabic versions of the survey.

Prior to the beginning of formal data collection, the English and Arabic versions of the survey tool were tested among Arabs in Chapel Hill, North Carolina and Amman. A handful of native Arabic speakers were asked to proof the survey in either Arabic or English and to provide feedback on the survey tool and identify any errors (translational, grammatical, or otherwise)
they noticed. Based on their recommendations, the survey tool was tweaked for a few minor issues related to clarity and grammar.

Independent variables in this study consisted of news consumption measures (or news attention measures) and, as such, yielded self-report data vulnerable to problems commonly associated with behavioral self-assessments, such as impression management and recall errors. However, news consumption/attention variables have been shown to be useful, valid variables when used to measure “general attention to broad, enduring categories of news,” (Chaffee & Schleuder, 1986, p.102).

The initial survey questions assessed respondents’ media reliance, and included broad items such as, “On average, how many days each week do you read a printed newspaper?” as well as much more specific questions like, “How often do you read news on the Web?” or “Do you ever receive current events news through text messages on a mobile phone?” News consumption items included questions involving traditional media, such as newspapers and television news broadcasts, but also assessed use of more contemporary media, such as blogs and podcasting.

The second main function of the survey tool was to gauge young respondents’ feelings toward Jordanian and U.S. governments, and items doing so were in the form of Likert-scales, as respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which they agree with statements like, “I feel confident in the government’s ability to run its national programs.” Regression models were used to determine the extent to which patterns of news consumption are associated with assessments of government. In addition to these variables, respondents were asked to report a number of demographic indicators, such as age, sex, education level, religion and ethnicity (Palestinian, Jordanian, or Armenian, for example).
News Consumption Variables

Variables in this study measuring news consumption might better be described as “news attention variables,” for one cannot be certain through self-reports that someone who is attending to a news outlet (i.e. sitting near a television broadcasting news content) is consuming that content. As Chaffee and Schleuder (1986) noted, news attention variables have been shown to be sound predictors of many different outcome variables when used broadly. Asking someone how many days each week he or she reads financial news in the newspaper is, for example, a better use of media attention variables than is, say, asking him or her how much attention he/she pays to news coverage of inflation.

Overall news consumption/attention variables in this study assessed reliance on a wide variety of media. News consumption was largely assessed using three main questions:

1) Initially, respondents were asked how many days each week they access a certain media format (read print newspapers, read print magazines, watch televised news, listen to news over the radio, read news online, access blogs, receive news text messages, and download podcasts);

2) Respondents were asked to report how much time they typically spend accessing a format each time they utilize it;

3) Respondents were asked to specifically list their top three news outlets (Al-Jazeera, CNN, BBC for TV, e.g.) for each format.

Additionally, respondents were asked to indicate whether specific outlets they access are English-language news sources or are in Arabic, and were asked to try to quantify the amount of news they access from each media format, on average, that deals with domestic events in Jordan and how much news involves events from outside the country. In order to add a bit of context to the discussion of quantitative data collected in this study, the questionnaire also contained open-ended questions involving news use. Two questions (“In your own words, please explain how
news plays--or does not play--a role in your everyday life,” and “Do you feel the need to learn about news and current events on a daily basis? Why or why not?”) were positioned toward the end of the survey, just prior to the demographic questions. Some of the responses to these questions are used to provide context during the discussion of findings for the news consumption measures.

**Print Outlets.** Respondents were first asked to indicate how many days in an average week they read a print newspaper(s) or magazine. Next, respondents were asked how much time they usually spend reading a print newspaper or magazine on a typical day. They were then asked which three newspapers and which three magazines, if any, they read the most, listed in order from most often to less often. They were asked if the paper is a daily or weekly publication (or, in the case of magazines, monthly or quarterly). Respondents were asked if the publication is in English or Arabic.

To assess international news attention, respondents were asked to indicate on a scale from one to ten how much of the content they read in print newspapers and, separately, in print magazines, is news about the country of Jordan. Respondents were told that a response of “seven” would indicate that approximately 70 percent of the news they read in print newspapers is predominantly about domestic events, while thirty percent is about events in other countries. This question was repeated for each media genre (broadcast, online) respondents reported attending to.

**Traditional Broadcast Outlets.** Respondents were asked to indicate how many days in the average week they watch televised news and listen to radio news. They were then asked how long they typically spend watching televised news broadcasts each time they access them. They were asked to specify which three TV networks and which three radio networks they watch/listen
to the most. They were also asked if they watch or listen to these broadcasts in English or Arabic. Respondents were also asked to indicate, on a one-to-ten scale, the amount of domestic televised and radio news they consume as opposed to news of other countries.

*Online & Wireless Outlets*. Respondents were asked if they ever access news online or via mobile devices, such as cell phones and iPods, and how frequently and how long they typically access news in each format. They were asked to list the top three Web sites, top three blogs, and top three news sites from which they receive text messages/podcasts (if any). They were asked if these sources are published or broadcast in English or Arabic. Again, respondents were asked to indicate on a scale of ten how much of the news they consume in these various digital formats involves events in Jordan as opposed to news from other countries.

*Interpersonal Variables*. Respondents were asked how frequently they learn news information from friends and family. The interpersonal items included on the questionnaire were the following four questions: 1) How often would you say you learn about news information from speaking with friends?; 2) How often would you say you learn about news information from speaking with family/relatives?; 3) How often would you say you learn about news information by communicating with friends online?; 4) How often would you say you learn about news information by communicating with family/relatives online? These interpersonal items were adapted from those used on political communication questionnaires by researchers of the Uvote project, a consortium of researchers from more than 30 colleges and universities who measure news consumption and political attitudes among young people in the U.S. each major election cycle (see Tedesco, McKinney & Kaid, 2007 for a description of Uvote data collection processes during the 2004 presidential campaign). Cronbach’s alpha for these four items was .70.
Governmental Assessment Variables

The second major set of variables assessed respondents’ feelings toward the Jordanian and U.S. governments. More specifically, measures of political cynicism, government trust, and ratings of the U.S. government evaluated young Jordanians’ feelings toward their own government and that of the United States. Political scientists, concerned with what a cynical, distrusting public means for participatory democracy, have been examining political cynicism and governmental trust since the 1960s (see Agger, Goldstein & Pearl, 1961, for a good example of one of these early studies). Cynicism “saps the public's confidence in politics and government, and encourages the assumption that what we see is not what it seems” (Cappella & Jamieson, 1996, p.72). In addition to the political cynicism and political trust measures, respondents were asked one open-ended question (“In your own words, please explain how you feel about politics,”) in order to help provide some context in the discussion of the quantitative data collected in this study. Some of the respondents’ answers to this question are included in the discussion of this study’s findings.

Political Cynicism. The first set of government-assessment variables were used to measure respondents’ feelings toward the Jordanian government. Scale items were adapted from political cynicism variables used by the University of Michigan’s Survey Research Center in its National Election Studies. These variables have been used by political scientists and political communication scholars to assess political cynicism in a variety of settings (Banwart, 2007). Respondents were asked to agree/disagree with the following three statements on a seven-point scale: 1) Whether I vote or not has no influence on what politicians do; 2) People like me have a say about what the government does; 3) One never knows what governmental officials are thinking.
**Political Trust.** To measure respondents’ trust in the Jordanian government, four items from the National Election Studies and one from Lock, Shapiro and Jacobs (1999) were included on the survey tool and assessed on a seven-point scale: 1) Most of the time I feel the government is doing what is right; 2) One cannot always trust what governmental officials say; 3) One can be confident that politicians will always do the right thing; 4) I feel the government generally uses the money we pay in taxes for the right things. The fifth item comes from Lock et al. in their national survey of Americans’ trust in government: 5) In general, I feel confident in the government's ability to run its national programs.

**Feelings Toward the U.S. Government.** In order to assess respondents’ feelings toward the U.S. government, this study employed an ethnocentrism scale that was originally designed to assess Americans’ feelings toward the United States. The concept of ethnocentrism was developed more than a hundred years ago (by Sumner, 1906), and is usually defined as viewing other cultures, usually negatively, through the lens of one’s own. It is often described as one’s bias toward one’s own culture or country and a bias against (or rejection of) another country. Measures of ethnocentrism, then, are useful political socialization outcome variables. The Jordan First campaign, which aims to increase nationalism and politically socialize Jordanian residents and citizens to the country’s interests, was also, in effect, an effort to strengthen Jordanians’ levels of ethnocentrism. The campaign was implemented to increase Jordanians’ preference (or bias) for their country over others.

While the scale used in the current study was developed in order to assess Americans’ levels of ethnocentrism, it is also useful in assessing the views other people around the world hold toward the United States. The items measuring young Jordanians’ levels of ethnocentrism allow for implicit comparisons between the U.S. and Jordanian governments. Some of the items,
for example, directly compare support for the United States to other countries of the world. One such item asked respondents to agree/disagree with the following statement: “Countries really should use the United States as a role model.”

The items were adapted from a scale developed by Neuliep & McCroskey (1997), which includes the following five items assessed on seven-point scales: 1) Other countries should model themselves after the United States; 2) The United States is a poor example of how to run a country; 3) Countries really should use the United States as a role model; 4) The United States government would be better if it were more like other governments; 5) The United States government could learn a lot about how to function from other countries in the world.

Media Assessment Variables

Media Credibility. Research on media trust/credibility usually assesses the degrees to which news consumers believe a medium or outlet is, among other things, factually accurate, concerned about the community, and trusted to provide objective information (see, for example, Kiousis, 2001; Meyer, 1988). Respondents were asked to agree/disagree with four broad statements about media credibility: 1) I feel that information I receive from Jordanian news sources is factually accurate; 2) I would say that I trust Jordanian news outlets that I access; 3) I feel that information I receive from news sources outside Jordan is factually accurate; 4) I would say that I trust foreign news sources that I access.

Demographic Variables

Respondents were asked to report a number of demographic indicators, such as age, gender, ethnicity (Palestinian, Transjordanian, Armenian), nationality (holder of a Jordanian or Iraqi passport or identity card, Palestinian identity card holder, Egyptian immigrant worker, etc.),
religion (Christian, Muslim, other) and education levels (no high school diploma, high school diploma, college degree, master’s degree, terminal degree).

**Survey Procedures**

Data collection took place over the course of 25 days (three days in each district except Sweileh, where sampling lasted four days) in January 2009. Approximately 12-16 surveys were administered each day, and completion took respondents between 10-18 minutes. On the morning of each sampling day, I traveled to the main pedestrian hub of a given district. From this pedestrian hub, I spanned out to other areas and side streets in an attempt to cover as much ground in each district as possible. According to a pedometer I wore while sampling, I walked approximately 116 miles during the 25 days of sampling, an average of just over 4.5 miles/day. In all districts, I sampled both pedestrians as well as workers/employees at various businesses, in an attempt to include not just those Jordanians with time and resources to stroll and shop. This ensured that varying numbers of young service employees, businesspersons, delivery men, unemployed individuals, transients, shoppers and browsers were included in the sample.

Making my way through thoroughfares, alongside outdoor cafes, and down sidewalks and mall corridors, I approached young individuals, introduced myself and summarized the project in Arabic, and asked them to participate in the survey. When respondents agreed to participate, they were given an IRB “factsheet,” which included my contact information, as well as that of the UNC IRB office. This information was provided in both Arabic and English. Please see Appendix A for this bilingual factsheet. Respondents were asked to give consent to participate orally and signatures were not collected, in an attempt to include in the study Jordanians who might not have felt comfortable providing their names. No financial or other incentives were given to respondents.
When individuals refused to participate, a number of their characteristics and reasons for refusing were documented on a demographic half-sheet which included the district in which I approached them, gender, approximate age, nationality when they provided it, and the reason they would not or could not complete the survey. For example, when a young man with an approximate age of 20 declined to complete the survey, I documented his gender, approximate age, and the date and location of the refusal. Also, I documented ineligible participants. When I approached, for example, a few individuals who agreed to participate but were younger than 18, I terminated the survey and recorded their ineligibility. Refusal patterns will be discussed in more detail in the following chapter.

After each interaction—regardless of whether it resulted in a completed questionnaire or a refusal—I continued to walk down the street/thoroughfare/mall corridor until I came across another Jordanian appearing to fall in the requisite age range. In an attempt to avoid group responses that can be problematic for survey researchers in Arab countries, I attempted to approach individuals who were alone or with just one other person. This ultimately lengthened the time needed to collect 321 surveys, but it virtually eliminated the problem of group response.

**Districts**

I intercept sampled respondents from a number of districts in the Jordanian capital. Eight areas were selected for reasons of religious, economic, and ethnic diversity: Shmeisani (Amman’s banking and financial district), Jebel Webdeh (a highly Christian, urban area in central Amman); Abdoun (one of the city’s most upscale districts); Jebel Amman (a densely populated, middle class neighborhood in central Amman); Sweifiyah (a less-central neighborhood near the Amman airport; Sweileh (a neighborhood near the University of Jordan teeming with young people) Abdali/Wast al-Balid (downtown, a working/lower class
neighborhood containing mostly service industry jobs, which also features Amman’s major bus depot and transportation hub) and al-Rabieh. For geographical representations of these areas please see the attached map of Amman (Appendix B).

A Word on Sample Quotas and Weighting

While quotas were not used in the strict sense, that is, I did not demand that women represent exactly 49 percent of the sample, I did monitor the demographics of the sample each day I collected data in Jordan in order to be sure that the sample did not over-represent males, East Bank Jordanians, Muslims, or individuals at one end of the age spectrum. Table 4, discussed in the following chapter, reports the demographics of the survey and compares them to Jordanian census data. For the most part, acceptable demographic figures were reached in the natural course of the survey. The one exception to this was numbers of women, which were a bit low (about 40 percent female) during the first half of data collection. Because of this, I stepped up recruitment of women during the last 13 days of data collection, after which female representation increased to more than 47 percent.

Stycos (1958) used quotas in his examination of news consumption behavior in Jordan in the 1950s, as he sampled Palestinians and indigenous Jordanians using non-probability methods. Ultimately, the percentages of demographic groups in a sample can, and should, be compared to census data or other national survey data, and major departures from national figures (gender representation, for example) can be addressed through statistical weighting, when appropriate.

While some survey researchers point out that weighting intercept sample data in certain ways can improve data quality (see Sudman, 1980, for a lengthy discussion of weighting intercept samples) I decided not to weight the current sample. There are a number of reasons for this. First, a number of the characteristics in the current sample come quite close to population
statistics for Amman or for the country as a whole. More than 47 percent of the respondents in the sample are female, while Jordanian census data reports that 48.6 of the population of Amman is female. Eighty-six percent of the sample is Jordanian citizens, and Jordanian census data reports that 88.8 percent of Amman’s residents are Jordanian citizens. Also, the sample data come rather close to national figures in terms of religious breakdown. These figures will be discussed further in the following chapter.

That leaves one major demographic variable, ethnicity, that could possibly be weighted to slightly improve the quality of the dataset. Palestinians, representing 41 percent of the sample, are reported to represent around 50-60 percent of the population of the country (see Lust-Okar, 2006; Nydell, 2006, Ryan, 2002). While the percentage of Palestinians obtained in the sample is not too far off the national average, these data could be weighted slightly to enhance Palestinian representation. Above, though, I write that Palestinians are “reported to represent” about 50-plus percent of the population, because Jordanian census data for this demographic could not be found. Official figures for Palestinians and Transjordanians in Jordan are not available (Lust-Okar, 2006). Presumably, this is due to the fact that the Jordanian monarchy, Hashemite in its lineage, does not wish to publicly point out the fact that the progeny of its ancestors are outnumbered in Jordan by ethnic Palestinians. I decided to not weight the data for ethnicity since the anchor to which the weights would be affixed could not be strictly identified.

Assessing the Validity of the Political Socialization Scales

While it would be convenient to assume that the dependent variables of interest in this study—political trust, political cynicism, and U.S. government ratings—can be measured equally well in Jordan as they are in the United States, this is not necessarily the case. One of the greatest challenges to survey research involves lack of clarity on the survey tool (see Groves, 1987;
Iyengar, 1983), and this is particularly true in international survey research (Seligson, 2005). “Any study of political communication processes in an internationally comparative setting,” wrote Kaid & Holtz-Bacha (2006, p.5), “must consider the differences in political structures and processes in political culture” One cannot be sure, therefore, that the cynicism, trust and U.S. government rating scales discussed above, which have been demonstrated to be reliable and valid in Western settings, will measure phenomena with similar validity in an Arab country (one might expect, though, that Neuliep & McCroskey’s, 1997, ethnocentrism scale, created for the purposes of intercultural comparison, would present fewer problems in international survey research than political cynicism or political trust).

There are a number of ways to assess the utility of the indices used in the current study. First, I used post-hoc analyses to evaluate the validity and reliability of the measures. Cronbach’s alpha coefficients for the political trust, political cynicism, and U.S. government rating scales were .79, .52, and .69, respectively. When the item “The U.S. government would be better off if were more like other governments in the world” is removed, however, Cronbach’s coefficient increases to .703. The U.S. government rating index and political trust scale used appear to have acceptable levels of internal consistency, while the political cynicism index does not. Even when variables comprising the political cynicism scale are systematically removed one at a time and reliability is recalculated, Cronbach’s coefficient does not exceed .52. This scale appears to not be the most appropriate index for measuring political cynicism among young people in Jordan.

Another way to assess the reliability and validity of the political cynicism and political trust scales is to correlate them. Some existing research suggests that political cynicism and political trust are related to one another (see, for example, a discussion by Citrin & Luks, 2001), and are negatively associated. Pearson’s correlation coefficient for these two scales was
significant \( r(310)= - .24, \ p<.001 \) (two-tailed). Presumably, these two scales would have been more strongly correlated if the political cynicism scale had approached accepted levels of internal consistency (usually .70).
CHAPTER 4

RESULTS

Sample

This study was a survey of news consumption and political attitudes among 321 young people in Jordan. Respondents were approached in eight districts of the Jordanian capital and asked to complete a paper and pen questionnaire in either Arabic or English. Data were collected between January 8 and February 1, 2009.

Response Rate. A total of 402 individuals were asked to participate, and 321 of them completed the survey. This is an overall response rate of 79.9 percent. Table 1 reports recruitment statistics across the sampling districts. Lamentably, due to a labeling error, some recruitment characteristics for two districts, Abdoun and Abdali, can not be reported. Twelve questionnaires from Abdali were mislabeled as being from Abdoun, and the specific questionnaires that were mislabeled could not be determined. Sample sizes in each of the districts ranged from 38 to 44 respondents. Overall, response rates for women (83.1 percent) were somewhat higher than those for men (77.2 percent).

(Insert Table 1 about here)

Refusal patterns by district are detailed in Table 2. A total of 81 individuals, 50 men and 31 women, declined to take the survey. Numbers of refusals ranged from two to 25 across the districts. Sweileh, a university neighborhood in northwest Amman, had the highest number of refusals, while Jebel Amman, a middle class neighborhood in central Amman, had the fewest. While the age of individuals who declined to complete the survey was approximated, not
measured more accurately by self-reports, the approximate average age of refusing persons was around 23.

After declining to take the questionnaire, the 81 individuals who refused were asked to give a reason why. The most common reasons for refusal were “Not interested” (38 percent); “Too busy” (24 percent); “Did not live in Jordan” (14 percent); “Working” (8.5 percent); “Illiterate and did not wish to take survey orally” (6 percent); and respondent fatigue/attrition (5 percent).

(Insert Table 2 about here)

**Demographics.** The survey predominantly consisted of males (52.6 percent), East Bank Jordanians (49.5 percent) vs. Palestinians (41.7 percent), Muslims (89.4 percent) vs. Christians (10.6), Jordanian citizens (85.9 percent) as opposed to Palestinian identity card holders (7.5 percent) or Iraqi citizens (2 percent), and educated individuals (30 percent have high school diplomas, 57 percent claimed to have finished college\(^3\), and 5.3 percent have graduate training of some kind). Respondents had a median age of 23 years. Table 3 lists complete demographic figures.

(Insert Table 3 about here)

Table 4 compares some of these demographic figures to Jordanian census data. As Table 4 indicates, most respondent demographics quite closely mirror population statistics. Women comprise 48.6 percent of the population in Amman, and 47.4 of the sample in the current study. About 86 percent of respondents are Jordanian citizens, while 89 percent of the population in Amman has Jordanian citizenship. In terms of religion, 89.4 percent of respondents are Muslim, while around 92 percent of Jordanians nationwide are Muslim (figures for religion in Amman alone could not be found).
The only demographic that differs substantially from population figures is ethnicity. Palestinians in Jordan comprise around 50-60 percent of residents in the country are Palestinian (see Ryan, 2002; Lust-Okar, 2006; Nydell, 2006). However, official reports on ethnicity from the Jordanian government are not forthcoming, as the government does not wish to remind its constituents that ethnic Palestinians outnumber East Bank Jordanians (which includes the Hashemite monarchy that rules the country).

Percentages of Palestinians and East Bank Jordanians are not assessed in Jordanian census data and are not available in Jordan Department of Statistics’ reports. Conventional scholarship, however, typically reports that slightly over half of Jordan’s residents are ethnic Palestinians (this figure, however, as well as the percentage of East Bank Jordanians, would fall by several points were a census taken today, due to the more than 700,000 Iraqi refugees now living in Jordan). While ethnic Palestinians seem slightly underrepresented and East Bank Jordanians somewhat overrepresented, the decision was made not to weight the data in terms of ethnicity since more precise population figures could not be found.

(Insert Table 4 about here)

News Consumption Patterns

To answer the first two research questions involving young Jordanians’ news use, descriptive statistics and frequencies are mostly reported, enumerating news consumption trends across the sample. Research question one asked what news formats young Jordanians primarily rely on for news information, specifically the patterns of reliance on newspapers, magazines, televised news, radio, online news outlets, blogs, podcasts, cell phone text messages and interpersonal sources. The short answer to this question is that young Jordanians in the sample are likely to access TV news broadcasts and print newspapers more than other news formats.
News consumption patterns across the sample, however, are much more complex than this. The findings are discussed below, starting with newspaper use. Table 5 reports overall news consumption patterns across the various media formats.

Print Newspaper Use

Print newspapers may be endangered in the U.S., but they seem much more vivacious in Jordan. The vast majority of respondents in the sample read a daily newspaper at least once weekly. On average, young people in the sample reported reading a newspaper about three times each week for about 30 minutes each occasion. About seven in ten newspapers respondents listed are published daily, while 30 percent are weeklies. The vast majority of newspapers listed are published in Arabic, and fewer than half of the stories respondents read in newspapers focus on events inside Jordan.

(Insert Table 5 about here)

Table 6 enumerates the top news sources for each media format. *Al-Ra’i*, *al-dustour* and *al-Ghad*. Jordan’s most circulated dailies, were the most frequently listed papers. *Al-Ra’i*, the most widely circulated paper in the country, appears out in front among some young readers, while *al-Ghad* and *al-Dustour* are essentially tied for second place. Of the remaining six top ten newspapers, four of them (*al-Waseet*, *al-Medina al-Mumtaz* and *Shihan*) are weekly newspapers. *Al-Waseet* is a free weekly newspaper, often included as an insert in the *al-Ghad* newspaper, which is heavy on advertisements and little else. Nonetheless, roughly one quarter of newspaper readers in the sample listed *al-Waseet* as one of the three main newspapers they peruse. Other top newspapers named include *al-Arab al-Yawm*, Jordan’s lowest circulation Arabic daily; *The Jordan Times*, the country’s English daily; and *al-Quds*, a Palestinian daily newspaper published in Jerusalem and the largest circulation newspaper in the Palestinian territories.
Print Magazine Use

Around eight in ten respondents reported reading a print magazine(s) at least once a month. On average, respondents reported reading print magazines nearly four times each month for about an hour each occasion. Most magazines read by respondents are published in Arabic, and an estimated one-fifth of magazine stories focus on issues/events in Jordan.

Table 6 lists the main magazines most commonly named by respondents. Specific magazines listed tend to be fashion, music, or entertainment publications. The most frequently listed magazine, Layalina, for example, is a weekly Arabic magazine published in Kuwait which could be termed the “People magazine of the Arab world.” It focuses on fashion, society, and pictorials from high-end social gatherings. Rotana is a more news-oriented magazine targeting young Arabs, focusing on employment and academics, as well as pop culture.

Sayidaty magazine is an art, fashion and entertainment magazine mainly targeting women. Zahrat al-Khaleej, too, is a women’s magazine published by the Abu Dhabi Media Company. Its Web site touts it as the “number one [magazine] in women’s lifestyle across the region.” Haya is an entertainment magazine published by the Dubai-based MBC television conglomerate. Other magazines rounding out the top ten include Viva, a high end fashion magazine (Kate Moss graced a recent cover) published in Dubai; Laha, Arabic for “For Her,” focuses on some women’s interests, including family life, female employment trends, fashion, art, and women’s health; Jurs, details could not be found on this magazine; Living Well, whose Web site claims to be “Jordan’s best-selling lifestyle magazine,” focuses on social and cultural trends, including fashion and high society; and JO magazine, a pan-interest outlet published in Jordan, focusing mostly on Jordanian entertainment, politics, economics and culture.
Television news use was by far the most common form of news consumption among young people in the sample. Nearly 97 percent of respondents reported that they watch televised news at least once each week. On average, respondents reported watching the news 5.34 days every week, for about 45 minutes each time. Roughly nine in ten TV news networks listed are broadcast in Arabic, and respondents reported that around 24 percent of the news stories they see on TV focus on events in Jordan.

Table 6 lists the top television networks that respondents reported. Most respondents rely on al-Jazeera, the Qatari-run network, followed by two networks run out of the UAE: al-Arabiya and MBC. The latter offers entertainment as well as news. Jordan TV, the government’s main TV station, came in fourth, followed by the Lebanese militant group Hizballah’s network al-Manar and Hamas militants’ al-Aqsa TV. Finishing off the top ten are Rotana, an Arabic music network similar to MTV or VH1, and three Western news outlets: CNN, BBC, and BBC Arabic.

Radio news consumption was still substantial. Eighty-one percent of respondents indicated that they listen to radio news broadcasts at least once each week. Respondents listen to radio broadcasts about 3.15 times each week for around 24 minutes each occasion. Nearly all of the radio stations listed are broadcast in Arabic, and around 40 percent of radio stories focus on events in Jordan as opposed to other countries.

Most of the top radio stations listed by respondents are pop music stations that sandwich news briefs and DJ-directed talk between song broadcasts. Fan FM, Rotana, Amman FM, Amn FM, Mazaj, Radio Sawa—the U.S. government’s Arabic pop music and news station—and Sawt al-Ghad are all primarily music networks which also offer news segments and some talk radio.
Other networks rounding out the top ten include BBC Arabic radio and Hayat FM, an Islamic radio network offering religious music and news, Quranic recitations, and discussions of contemporary Islamic issues.

**Internet News Use**

While fewer respondents in the sample access news online than in print newspapers, television or radio, this figure is significantly higher than any of the numbers assessing Internet “penetration” or Internet “users” in Jordan. Recall that most estimates of Jordanian Internet “use” or “access” are between 14 and 20 percent (Mofleh et al.). Two-thirds of respondents reported accessing news online at least once each week. The average respondent consumes online news 2.75 times each week for around 60 minutes each occasion. Fewer online sources are published in Arabic (77 percent) than any other media format assessed in this study. In addition to traditional online news sites, 9 percent of respondents who access news online at least once weekly reported that blogs are among the sites they visit. Far fewer respondents who consume news online reported accessing news Web sites via a handheld device like a Blackberry or iPhone (less than three percent of Internet news consumers).

Among specific online news outlets listed by respondents, al-Jazeera reigns, just as it does in the TV arena. Beside this Arabic household name, though, a substantial number of Western news outlets top the list of most-visited sites among respondents, including Yahoo!, Facebook, BBC Arabic, CNN [in English], and MSN—Hotmail. Another news portal, Google News Arabic, is American in its ownership and management, but guides users to stories from mostly non-Western news sources. The remaining top online news sites listed include the sites of two print newspapers, *al-Rai* and *al-Ghad*, and one television network, al-Arabiya.
Text Messages & Podcasting

A substantial percentage of respondents (more than one in ten) reported receiving news information via SMS text messages. Most of the news texts were either in Arabic or a combination of Arabic and English, and around 38 percent of messages focus on events in Jordan. Anecdotally, a number of respondents mentioned while completing the survey that they receive Jordan weather updates from their cell phone providers in the form of text messages. Most respondents who reported receiving news via texts named their cell phone companies as the provenance of the texts; Zain, Orange and Umnia are all cell service providers. About a fifth of news text receivers reported that they receive news texts from al-Jazeera or other news organizations.

Fewer respondents reported news podcast use (6 percent) than news text consumption, and they estimated that around 86 percent of podcasts they download are in Arabic as opposed to English. According to respondents, just 9 percent of podcasts they access focus on events in Jordan. It is important to note here that a handful of respondents reporting podcasting use listed iTunes as the source of news, so it was not possible in every case to derive the specific news organization providing the podcast. The iTunes program allows users to download free of charge podcasts of BBC Arabic’s radio broadcasts, but iTunes itself is not the progenitor of this content.

Interpersonal Sources

Table 7 details respondents’ reliance on interpersonal sources for news information. Among respondents in the current sample, interpersonal sources seem to be a mainstay origin of news information. Nearly 70 percent of respondents report that they learn current events information from their friends either two or three times weekly or everyday, while 71.4 percent report learning news information from relatives with the same frequency. Respondents rely much
less on news information from friends (28.2 percent either two or three times weekly or daily) and family (32.2) received online, but online reception of news from friends and relatives is still robust enough to be considered in this study’s regression models exploring the associations between news consumption variables and political socialization outcomes. Cronbach’s alpha for these four items was .70.

(Insert Table 7 about here)

**Domestic vs. Foreign News Consumption**

Research question two concerned the amounts of foreign vs. domestic news young Jordanians generally consume. Table 5 reports percentages of respondents’ estimations of the domestic-centric vs. foreign-focused news they consume. Overall, Jordanians sampled tend to access more news information about events outside their country than news covering topics within Jordan. Via all media formats explored in this study, Jordanians consume more news focusing on foreign events/issues than goings on in their own country. The percentage of stories focusing on Jordan ranged from as low as 9 percent for podcasts and as high as 42 percent for print newspapers. In between were radio (40 percent), SMS text messages (37.9), Internet news stories (25), TV (24), and print magazines (22.2).

Jordan is a small country that generates less news than its regional neighbors, especially Egypt, Israel and Lebanon and, perhaps for this reason, much of the news to which respondents are exposed, and to which they expose themselves, predominantly focuses on events/issues in other countries.

**Political Attitudes**

Tables 8 and 9 present respondents’ reported levels of political trust, political cynicism, and feelings toward the U.S. government (in the form of the ethnocentrism scale). Table 8
reports omnibus figures for the political socialization indexes, as well as reports the index scores across gender and ethnicity. Also in Table 8 are found respondents’ assessments of foreign and domestic media credibility. Table 9 offers item-by-item summaries for each item in the three indexes. A number of the items in all three scales—the trust, cynicism, and U.S. government ratings indexes—were reverse coded in order to make descriptive statistics for the scales meaningful.

Initially, frequencies and descriptive statistics are provided for the political socialization variables, and t-tests and ANOVA procedures are provided at times examining the differences in these political attitudes across various demographic groups in the sample (men/women, Palestinians/Jordanians). Following the presentation of descriptive statistics is a discussion of the regression models which examined the associations between media use and political attitudes.

(Insert Table 8 about here)

**Political Cynicism**

The mean of the political cynicism score across the sample was 4.63 (SD=1.28). Figure 2 provides a histogram mapping the frequencies of scores on the political cynicism index. The appearance of the histogram, as well as skewness and kurtosis figures for the political cynicism index suggest that the variable is normally distributed.

(Insert Figure 2 about here)

There were three items included in the survey assessing levels of political cynicism. Results suggest low levels of confidence in participatory politics and in the motives of government officials. Table 9 reports that more than 52 percent of respondents in the sample agree ("agree somewhat," "agree," or "strongly agree") with the statement "Whether I vote or not has no influence on what politicians do." Just 39.6 percent of respondents agreed with the
assertion that “People like me have a say about what the government does.” Even more cynical were views toward the motivation of government officials; nearly 69 percent of respondents agreed that “one never knows what governmental officials are thinking.” Table 9 reports means and standard deviations of the political cynicism scale items.

(Insert Table 9 about here)

Due to the fact that gender and ethnicity (Palestinian vs. Jordanian) are two of the greatest demographic concerns regarding survey research in Jordan, the political socialization variables in this study were briefly examined for differences across gender and ethnicity categories. Table 8 reports these differences. In terms of gender, men appear to have significantly lower levels of political cynicism (M=4.42) than women (4.87) \(t(311) = -3.10, p = .002\). On ethnicity, we see that Palestinians in the sample reported slightly higher levels of cynicism (4.70) than either Jordanians (4.61) or other Arabs (4.38)—i.e. Jordanian residents of, say, Syrian, Egyptian, or Yemeni descent. One-way ANOVA analysis suggests, though, that the differences in political cynicism scores among Palestinians and Jordanians do not differ significantly \(F(2, 302) = .635, p = .53\).

As previously stated, the political cynicism scale used in this study was not internally consistent according to Cronbach’s alpha, suggesting that the scale, while highly valid in U.S. survey research, may not be the best index of political cynicism in Jordan. Thus, composite scores of the index should be considered with caution. In an attempt to assess each of the three items in the scale with the hope of identifying problematic items, each item was correlated with scores on the political trust index. We know from prior research that political trust is strongly and negatively correlated with political cynicism. If any of the items in the political cynicism
scale correlate negatively and highly with political trust, then, they may still be useful in assessing political cynicism in Jordan or other Arab countries in future research.

Among the three items in the political cynicism scale, just one (“People like me have a say about what the government does”) was significantly correlated with scores on the political trust index $p(315)=.32$, $p < .001$ (two-tailed). This item, then, may still be measuring a political cynicism construct similar to that assessed by the original scale in the U.S. In Jordan, and perhaps other Arab countries, this item, along with two to four other measures of political cynicism, might better assess a singular construct of political disaffection.

### Political Trust

The mean of the political trust index across the sample was 4.14 (SD=1.14). Figure 3 presents a histogram diagramming frequencies of political trust scores. While the distribution may appear somewhat leptokurtic in shape, skewness and kurtosis figures suggest that the data are well within the realm of assumed normality.

As shown in Table 9, respondents tended to agree with statements such as “Most of the time I feel the government is doing what is right,” (55.5 percent agreed somewhat, agreed, or strongly agreed), “One cannot always trust what government officials say,” (51.9), “I’m confident in the government’s ability to run it’s national programs” (56.4), and tended to agree less with statements like, “I feel the government generally uses the money we pay in taxes for the right things,” (45.0) and “One can be confident that politicians will always do the right thing,” (32.6). Cronbach’s alpha for this scale was .79

Respondents tended to agree more with statements extolling the virtues of the government as a whole (such as “Most of the time I feel the government is doing what is right”)}
and disagree with statements praising individuals in the government (“One can be confident that politicians will always do the right thing,” and “One cannot always trust what governmental officials say”). There will be more discussion of this trend in the next chapter, but for now suffice it to say that respondents in the sample generally reported confidence in an amorphous government, but less so in personified “officials.”

Females reported significantly lower levels of political trust (M=3.98) than did men (4.3) \( t(313) = 2.43, p=.016 \). Palestinians reported much lower levels of political trust (3.77) than did East Bank Jordanians (4.45) or other Arabs in the sample (4.17). One-way ANOVA analysis suggests that scores on the political trust scale differ significantly across the ethnic groups \( F(2, 312) = 14.01, p <.001 \), and Tukey’s HSD post-hoc comparison test indicates that only Palestinians and Jordanians differ significantly in their reported levels of political trust.

**Feelings toward the U.S. Government**

 Respondents’ average score on the U.S. government ratings scale assessing views toward the U.S. government was 4.77 (SD=1.26). Figure 4 is a histogram mapping respondents’ scores on this index. The distribution is somewhat leptokurtic and bimodal. Bimodal distributions for variables assessing political attitudes often indicate that respondents’ feelings toward a political institution or actor are divided and polarized. This appears to be the case in terms of young Jordanians’ feelings toward the U.S. However, both modes are either at the median of the scale or above it, which helps account for the mean of 4.77—well above the scales median of 4.00—suggesting that respondents’ feelings toward the U.S. lean more negative than positive. Skewness and kurtosis figures, while confirming the fact that the U.S. government ratings distribution is not as normally distributed as the political cynicism and political trust indices, indicated that scores on the U.S. government rating scale are sufficiently normal.
As a score of seven on this scale represents highly negative feelings toward the U.S., respondents reported more negative scores on this scale than either political cynicism (4.63) or political trust (4.14) scale, the latter of which was right around the median of the scale. It should be recalled that, in order to improve the scale’s measure of internal consistency, one item (“The U.S. government would be better off if were more like other governments in the world”) was dropped from the scale. So the average of 4.77 reported above includes only the remaining four scale items. Cronbach’s alpha for these four remaining items was .703.

There was substantial agreement among respondents with statements such as “The U.S. government could learn a lot about how to function from other countries in the world,” (62.1 percent agreed somewhat, agreed, or strongly agreed), “The U.S. government would be better off if it were more like other governments around the world,” (58.4 percent) and tended to disagree with assertions like “Countries really should use the U.S. as a role model,” (just 23.0 agreed somewhat, agreed, or strongly agreed) and “Other countries should model themselves after the U.S.” (25.9 percent). There was less consensus on one item, “The U.S. is a poor example of how to run a country” (52.8 percent). It would appear that while respondents do not believe that other governments around the world should emulate the U.S. and that the U.S. would do better to take some cues from other countries, there is less agreement over whether the U.S. is a successfully run country. In fact, with this latter item, 47.1 percent either disagreed or expressed neutrality.

Concerning gender, there were no statistical differences on the U.S. government ratings scale between men (M=4.80) and women (4.74) [t(309)=.424, p=.67], nor were there any significant differences between Palestinians (4.92) Jordanians (4.66) or other Arabs in the sample.
Across much of the demographic board, feelings toward the U.S. government leaned negative.

**Media Credibility**

Recall that there were four items on the questionnaire measuring media credibility: two assessing credibility of domestic news sources and two the credibility of foreign outlets. Overall the one-to-seven disagree-agree scale, levels of media credibility came out largely in the affirmative: “I feel that information I receive from Jordanian news sources is factually accurate,” $M = 4.65$; “I would say that I trust Jordanian news outlets that I access,” $M = 4.81$; “I feel that information I receive from news sources outside Jordan is factually accurate,” $M = 5.31$; “I would say that I trust foreign news sources that I access,” $M = 4.57$. Young Jordanians in the sample are apparently much more confident in the factual accuracy of foreign news sources than those from within their country. A paired samples $t$-test indicated that means of respondents confidence in the factual accuracy of foreign and domestic news sources (5.31 and 4.65, respectively) differ dramatically $t(317)=5.75, p<.001$ (two-tailed).

However, despite the fact that respondents rate the factual accuracy of foreign news sources over their own domestic outlets, they reported that they trust Jordanian sources in the general sense (4.81) more than foreign media (4.57). The paired sample $t$-test comparing these two items approached significance [$t(317)=1.88, p=.062$ (two-tailed)] but did not reach the .05 significance threshold. Overall, though, respondents tended to agree with the items asserting the accuracy and trustworthiness of news sources, both foreign and domestic, that they access. Scores on each of the four items was greater than the median (4.00) of the seven-point scale.

According to one-way ANOVA tests, media credibility differed significantly across ethnic groups $F(2, 315) = 5.92, p = .003$, and Tukey post-hoc comparison tests indicate that only
Palestinians and Jordanians differ in credibility scores. Media credibility did not differ significantly according to gender.

Taken together, the four scale items assessing media credibility do not demonstrate acceptable levels of internal consistency according to Cronbach’s alpha (.443). For this reason, one of the items assessing ratings of foreign news sources (“I feel that information I receive from news sources outside Jordan is factually accurate”) was not included in the index used to answer research question five, which asked if the regression models exploring the relationship between news consumption and political attitudes would change in some way after media credibility is controlled. The two items assessing credibility of domestic sources were included in the models predicting political cynicism and political trust, and these items had a Cronbach’s alpha of .90.

However, in the regression model predicting ratings of the U.S. government, one of the scale items assessing credibility of foreign media (“I would say that I trust foreign media outlets that I access”) was included as the media credibility predictor. It seemed to make sense that, when examining predictors of feelings toward a foreign government, we might include an assessment of foreign media credibility as opposed to domestic media credibility. Just to be sure this was not a mistake, domestic media credibility was included in a trial run of the regression model predicting ratings of the U.S. government, and results suggested that it was not a significant predictor of scores on the scale and did not change the overall model much. The item measuring foreign media credibility included in the model, however, was, as we will see, significantly associated with U.S. government ratings.

**Associations Between News Consumption & Political Socialization Variables**

To answer research questions three and four, regression models were first run with the demographic variables (age, ethnicity, sex, education, nationality and religion) and the news
consumption variables (newspaper, magazine, TV, radio, and Internet use, and reliance on interpersonal sources) regressed on each of the three outcome variables of interest: political cynicism, political trust and ratings of the U.S. government. Next, to answer research question five, the same models were run again, only this time including media credibility. The two models were then compared.

So, in other words, all of the demographic variables and news consumption variables were entered into a single model predicting each political socialization variable. Then, media credibility was added in order to determine if trust in news outlets changed any of the relationships. In the model predicting political trust, for example, the six demographic variables and six news use variables were included in a single model, after which the same model was repeated with the addition of media credibility.

For the regression models reported below, media use variables were calculated by multiplying the number of days a respondent reported using a particular media format by the number of minutes they reported using that format each occasion. Thus, an individual who reported reading a print newspaper three times each week for an estimated 20 minutes each time would have been assigned a score of 60 for newspaper use. This same computation was conducted for all of the news consumption variables used in the regression analyses. Normal probability plots for all three political socialization variables (political cynicism, political trust, U.S. government ratings) suggested that the residuals of the variables are normally distributed.

As for the demographic variables, citizenship was coded as either Jordanian citizen or non-Jordanian citizen, ethnicity was coded as either Palestinian or Jordanian descent, and religion was coded as either Christian or Muslim. Education was entered into the model as a continuous variable, with respondents assigned a number of one through five based on the five
possible education categories reported on the questionnaire (no high school, high school graduate, college graduate, master’s degree, terminal degree).

*Standardized Betas*

Standardized betas are reported in the regression models, instead of the unstandardized b, or slope, because, due to the scale of the news consumption variables (minutes per week of news consumption in a certain format), many of the unstandardized slopes were infinitesimally small. For example, newspaper consumption, calculated by multiplying the number of days each week respondents read a paper by the number of minutes they reported reading the newspaper each occasion, ranged from 0 total minutes for some respondents to 1,260 for another.

Newspaper use, then, had an extremely small reported slope in the models predicting the outcome variables, as an increase in one minute of newspaper use resulted in infinitesimally small changes in the dependent variables. For this reason, the standardized betas are reported to more easily convey the slopes of the news consumption and demographic variables. Standardized betas represent the average increase in the dependent variable for each one standard deviation increase in the independent variable, when other variables in the model are held constant.

*Multicollinearity Among the News Consumption Variables*

In some cases, multicollinearity, or high statistical associations among predictor variables in a regression model, can confound interpretations of partial correlations and make it harder to see what is really going on. In order to test multicollinearity among the news consumption variables, Cronbach’s alpha was used to determine if the news consumption scales are measuring one, underlying construct of news consumption. They do not appear to be. Cronbach’s alpha
coefficient was .33, suggesting that news consumption variables in the current sample are measuring discrete behaviors.

Multicollinearity among the predictor variables used in the regression models does not appear to be an issue. We would expect news consumption variables to correlate with one another (people who frequently read news magazines may also read a daily newspaper, e.g.), and some of them do, but not so much as to suggest that one cannot parse out their individual associations with the political socialization variables. In a correlation matrix of the news consumption variables, none of the correlations among the variables exceeded .25.

**Political Cynicism**

Table 10 reports standardized betas and significance values for the regression models predicting political cynicism with demographic variables and news consumption scores. The two models reported are identical except that the second model includes media credibility as a predictor variable. Again, this goes back to the research of Druckman (2001), who argued that source credibility can play a role in the relationship between news exposure and certain outcome variables, and that credibility should be included in more studies on media influence. In an Arab country, one in which many media outlets are partly or wholly operated by the government, media credibility could moderate some of the associations between news consumption and political socialization outcomes.

(Insert Table 10 about here)

In the first model, we see that none of the news consumption variables are significantly associated with political cynicism. In terms of demographic predictors, gender appears to be the variable associated the most strongly with political cynicism. This reconfirms the results of the
independent samples \( t \)-test reported earlier, indicating that women reported significantly higher levels of political cynicism than men.

In the second regression model, which includes media credibility, there is very little change. Gender is still a significant predictor of political cynicism and, again, none of the news consumption variables are significantly associated with the outcome variable. The standardized betas for the news consumption variables record some minor changes, but none substantial enough to reverse the conclusion of their non-influence. The lone change in the model is the significant jump in \( R^2 \) resulting from media credibility’s contribution.

In this model, domestic media credibility is the variable most significantly associated with political cynicism, and the association is negative. This is intuitive; after all, we might expect that Jordanians who rate highly the credibility of domestic news sources—most of which are at least partly owned by the government—would also demonstrate lower levels of cynicism toward their government. In terms of the predictors of political cynicism considered here, media credibility appears to be the main variable driving the model’s total \( R^2 \). The total \( R^2 \) in the first model, .102, increases to .136 after media credibility is added to the model.

**Political Trust**

Table 11 reports standardized betas for the two models predicting political trust. Just as no news consumption variables predicted political cynicism, none of the news consumption variables are significantly associated with political trust, and this does not change when media credibility is added to the model. The only variables significantly associated with political trust are gender, ethnicity, and media credibility. Women and Palestinians report much lower levels of political trust than men or Jordanians, respectively.

(Insert Table 11 about here)
Media credibility is highly associated with levels of political trust, and the association is positive. Respondents reporting high levels of faith in domestic news sources also tend to report elevated levels of political trust. This association is intuitive; we might expect individuals reporting high levels of faith in domestic news sources to also report elevated levels of political trust, and this finding logically follows the negative association between media credibility and political cynicism reported earlier. The second model’s total $R^2$ jumps quite a bit following the inclusion of media credibility. The presence of media credibility in the model, though, does not alter much else.

*Feelings toward the U.S. government*

Table 12 reports the standardized betas for the two models predicting U.S. government ratings. In the first model, none of the demographic variables are significantly associated with ratings of U.S. government. As for the news consumption variables, just one item, television news use, is significantly associated with feelings toward the U.S. government. Respondents reporting high levels of television news consumption also tend to report more negative views of the U.S. government. This association does not change when media credibility is added to the model. The type one error rate (i.e. the obtained $p$-value) for the association between television use and feelings toward the U.S., though, more than doubles after media credibility is included in the model. This is likely because television news consumption correlates significantly, albeit weakly $[r(281)= -.133, p=.026]$, with media credibility, and the amount of unique variance in U.S. government ratings explained by television news consumption decreases when media credibility is included in the model.

(Insert Table 12 about here)
In the second model, reliance on interpersonal sources for news information is significantly associated with feelings toward the U.S. government. Respondents reporting greater reliance on relatives and friends for news information tend to report more negative views toward the U.S. government.

Just as in the models predicting political cynicism and political trust, media credibility is significantly associated with the independent variable in the model predicting U.S. government ratings. And again, the relationship here is intuitive. Respondents reporting high levels of trust in foreign media outlets also tended to report more favorable evaluations of the U.S. It is important to remember, though, that media credibility is included in these models only as a control and to increase statistical clarity. It is not inferred from these models that respondents’ faith in media sources they access is a potential cause of favorable ratings of the Jordanian or U.S. governments, only that the two are strongly related. Indeed, it would seem more intuitive to infer the reverse--that strong feelings toward foreign governments help predict ratings of the credibility of foreign news sources. Neither of these directional associations is being inferred here, however. It is only advised that media credibility be considered when researchers use news use variables to predict political attitudes.

The fact that the $p$ values for both television news consumption and interpersonal reliance change somewhat after media credibility is included in the model justifies credibility’s inclusion in models exploring the relationship between news consumption and political socialization outcomes. For the most part, media credibility does not alter the vast majority of associations reported in the regression outputs, so we may focus primarily on the second models predicting the political socialization variables—i.e. those models including all of the variables of interest.
Still, some evidence exists here that it may be wise not to exclude media credibility from models exploring the association between news use and political opinions.
CHAPTER 5
DISCUSSION

This dissertation set out to explore news consumption patterns and political socialization variables among young people in Jordan. Specifically, this study sought to quantify young Jordanians news reliance patterns and examine the association between news consumption and political cynicism, political trust, and feelings toward the U.S. government. Were I approached by someone on the street and asked to plainly summarize the findings of this study in one sentence, I would reply that “By virtually all measures, young Jordanians in the sample are avid news consumers, but are especially reliant on print newspapers, television and interpersonal sources, and the latter two variables are the only measures associated with respondents’ political attitudes measured in the study.”

The findings presented here, however, have many more implications in terms of our knowledge of Arabs’ news consumption and the relationship between news use and political socialization outcomes. While Alterman (2005) complained that we know “shockingly” little about news consumption in the Middle East, we may know a bit more now. And in response to Sapiro’s (2004) lamentation that political scientists have not added much to our understanding of political socialization processes in other countries, this study has a modest contribution to make on behalf of Jordan. Below is a discussion elaborating on the findings of this study in terms of news consumption patterns, political attitudes, and the relationship between these variables. In addition to a discussion of the numerical findings in this study, some respondents’ answers to open-ended questions on politics and news are provided to add a bit of context.
News Consumption

Andoni (1995) was right. Journalism and news consumption do seem to be parts of the “dominant culture” in Jordan, even among young people. In an age when news consumption among young people in developed countries is waning (see Jarvis, 2009), news use among young Jordanians in the sample seems comparatively strong. One 20 year-old respondent, answering the open-ended question involving the central role of news in her life, wrote that “[Arabs] are influenced by the news a lot, it saddens us, it makes us happy, makes us feel a presence that pushes us forward or discourages us.” Another respondent wrote that he follows the news “because I am a part of this world, and it's important for me to stay updated about every detail in this world.”

Jordanians in the sample reported strong consumption levels for traditional media (newspapers, magazines, TV, radio), as well as interpersonal sources and online news. Respondents’ news consumption patterns do not seem to follow David Mindich’s (2005, p.2) proclamation that “young people [under 40] have abandoned traditional news.” In fact, respondents tended to be most reliant on two traditional news sources (television, newspaper) and one ultra-traditional source of information: interpersonal contacts. And not only are news consumers sampled in the current study younger than forty, they are much younger; half of all respondents are younger than 23.

When considered, respondents’ reliance on TV, newspapers and interpersonal sources for information is not that surprising. Regarding televised news, scholars of Arab media have for some time recognized the primacy of Arab satellite TV news over other media formats. The “CNN effect” discussed in the 1990s, for example, involving the role that international television news plays in forming defense and diplomacy policies, has given birth to the “Al-Jazeera
Effect,” a term used to describe the powerful role that televised news plays in the Arab world (Nisbet, Nisbet, Scheufele & Shanahan, 2004). And the ubiquity of satellite dishes in the Arab world has made pan-Arab television news available to many individuals regardless of financial status (Rugh, 2004).

As for newspapers, Arabs find broadsheet dailies readily available and generally affordable, which no doubt contributed to the fact that nearly 27 percent of respondents reported that they read a print newspaper five days a week or more. The “vanishing” newspaper that Meyer (2004) correctly identifies in the U.S. does not seem to be evaporating at the same pace in Jordan. Jordan has the highest literacy rate in the Arab world, and many of its literate young people appear to be regularly accessing print newspapers. In Arab countries where the press is allowed to thrive, the newspaper industry can be quite vibrant. Mellor (2005) reported that print newspapers have burgeoned in Iraq following Saddam’s ouster. Jordan’s first privately owned and edgy daily newspaper, al-Ghad, for example, has the highest subscription rates of any newspaper in the country. This is not to say that as Internet connectivity in Jordan increases consumption of the country’s print publications will not fall, but only to point out that print newspapers in Jordan do not seem to be suffering greatly from the circulatory anemia plaguing newspaper industries in many other countries.

In addition to newspapers and television, respondents also reported very heavy reliance on interpersonal sources (family and friends) for current events information. “If there is not enough time for me to watch the TV or read the papers,” wrote one woman in the sample, “I ask my friends if they know of the events of the day.” Roughly 84 percent of respondents reported learning news information from friends at least once each week, and roughly the same percentage of respondents reported learning news each week from relatives.
This, too, is not necessarily a surprising finding. Eastern cultures are much more communally minded and family oriented than many Western societies (Nisbett, 2003). Nydell (2006, p. 71) wrote that “Arab society is built around the extended family system,” and that most Arabs feel strong connections with both immediate and secondary relatives. Many Arabs will live with extended relatives through adolescence and into adulthood, even after marrying. The finding that young Jordanians rely heavily on friends and family for news about the world, then, is not groundbreaking, but it should remind scholars conducting news consumption research in Arab countries to include measures of interpersonal news reliance in their questionnaires.

As for specific news outlets respondents use, overall, Jordanians report that they get their news from outlets outside Jordan, and these outlets come from a wide variety of locations. The short answer to the question, “What kinds of news sources are young Jordanians using?,” is that they are primarily accessing multi-national news organizations headquartered in other countries. Most of these foreign news organizations are from other Arab countries, but a number come from the U.K. and the U.S. With the exception of newspapers and radio stations, the majority of news outlets listed for each media format originate in countries other than Jordan. It was from these media formats, newspapers and radio, that respondents reported acquiring the greatest amount of domestic news coverage (around 42 percent of newspaper and 40 percent of radio stories focus on events in Jordan).

That Jordanians most-cited news organizations are foreign, along with the fact that respondents reported accessing more foreign than domestic news in each media format, supports Mellor’s (2005) assertion that many Arabs are more likely to receive news about pan-Arab issues and foreign affairs than they are news about events and problems in their own countries. Many respondents, when asked to describe the role that news played in their lives, focused solely on
foreign news. “News plays a very important role in our lives,” wrote one woman, “for it is the window from which we view other countries.”

The fact that Jordanians are heavy consumers of foreign affairs news is not necessarily surprising; Jordan is a small country that may not generate as much domestic news as some other Arab countries. In order to fill a broadsheet newspaper with coverage of newsworthy events, then, it appears that Jordanian editors are forced to publish large amounts of coverage of events in other countries.

The potential result, then, is that Jordanians may be more informed about international affairs than residents of larger countries. This may be a good thing, but there is also a downside; if consumption of print newspapers—the medium from which respondents claim to learn the most domestic/local news—falls precipitously in Jordan as it has done in many other countries, Jordanians may begin to know less and less about events in their own country and more about international affairs.

It may be incumbent on the Jordanian government, then, to do a better job of strengthening the domestic press system in order to help preserve—or, since Jordan is a relatively young country, to help build—a collective sense of national identity. The media free zones that the Jordanian government has developed in order to let foreign media outlets operate in the kingdom censorship and tax free strengthen the role of the foreign press in Jordan, but the government has neglected to slide the same springboard beneath the feat of domestic newspeople. Joseph Pulitzer once remarked that a nation “and its press will rise and fall together,” (Milton, 1936) and, if this is even partly true, then the Jordanian government must help nourish, or at least agree to let live, a domestic press that will promote knowledge of domestic affairs and foster a sense of national purpose. If the political socialization goals of the
“Jordan First” campaign are to be realized, domestic news interest and consumption may need to increase.

The heightened presence of foreign news in Jordan is the opposite of what is happening in the United States, where the space and time devoted to foreign news has been shrinking for many years (Hamilton & Jenner, 2004). Often, Americans must go online and actively seek out substantive coverage of international affairs not found in their newspaper or television broadcasts. Jordanians, on the other hand, may have to actively seek out news about their own country beyond their natural media diets. Again, with the exception of newspapers and radio (nine of the top ten newspapers and six of the top nine radio stations listed originate in Jordan), young Jordanians in the sample mostly report getting their news from organizations that do not provide a great deal of news about their home country. If newspaper consumption falls significantly in Jordan in the coming years, and if innovative televised news programming and online publishing does not emerge from within the country, the amount of domestic affairs coverage Jordanians access could be even less than that reported here.

This becomes especially poignant when one considers the online sites from which respondents in the sample report retrieving news. Just four of the top ten sites listed originate from within the Arab world, and only two from within Jordan. Other top sites listed, such as Yahoo!, Facebook, Google News Arabic, CNN, BBC Arabic and Hotmail-MSN are all run by information companies headquartered in the U.S. and Great Britain. While online news consumption among young people in the sample was considerably lower than use of other media formats (66 percent of respondents report accessing news online at least once weekly), this percentage is expected to rise as Internet connectivity in Jordan strengthens and as broadband connections become more affordable. Respondents’ preference for international news is not
necessarily problematic and there is nothing inherently subversive about the online news/information outlets listed here. It is supposed here, though, that more active participation in Jordanian public affairs, elections, and greater interest in domestic events depends at least partly on an energetic domestic press to which Jordanians pay attention. In the near future, however, greater access to online news could result in greater public alienation from domestic affairs.

**Political Socialization Measures**

The results of the survey suggest that young Jordanians in the sample demonstrate relatively high levels of political cynicism, modest levels of political trust, and negative feelings toward the U.S. government. And overall, respondents’ written comments about domestic and global politics were overwhelmingly negative. One 27 year-old respondent described her cynicism in this way: “Politics is important, but not a lot can be done by youth in my country.”

There were, however, a number of nuances and differences in the political socialization measures that need to be addressed. Political cynicism and trust findings are discussed first, followed by findings on the U.S. government rating index.

*Political Cynicism & Trust: High ratings of Government, Poor Ratings of Public Officials*

While individuals recording high levels of political cynicism typically demonstrate low levels of political trust, this was not necessarily the case in the current study. While the two measures were negatively correlated, on the whole respondents reported elevated levels of political cynicism and above-the-median scores on political trust. Respondents tended to be skeptical of the motives of political actors and officials but confident in the motives of the overall “government.” Consider for example the two following statements about politics written by respondents on one of the open-ended questions. One expresses cynicism about political actors, while the second statement alludes to entailment of governments with the security of
their citizens: “Politics is an ocean, you will stay swimming in it but you won't be to reach the end of it; no person can know what goes on in the world of politics if he is not a swimmer,” and “Politics is the leader’s protection of his country.”

There was a difference in how respondents rated the performance/characteristics of political individuals/officials in Jordan, and in how they rated the government as a whole. Consider the items on the political trust scale, for example. Respondents agreed with the statements “Most of the time I feel the government is doing what is right,” and “I’m confident in the government’s ability to run its national programs,” while also agreeing that “One cannot always trust what government officials say” and disagreeing that “One can be confident that politicians will always do the right thing.” Commenting on this split, one female respondent wrote on her questionnaire that “politics is good, when it serves the interest of countries, and it's bad when it serves just the interest of persons.” Addressing individual enrichment, another respondent wrote that “Politics is a good thing in terms of those who are in a good position in the government, but for the ordinary people, it is a waste of time.”

There may be an explanation for differences in respondents’ faith in government and their ratings of public officials. One of the interesting aspects of Jordanian politics involves the fact that, while many Jordanians do not think highly of many of the country’s ministers and politicians, the king and queen enjoy popular support in the country. King Abdullah is young, enthusiastic, and energetic (Csicsmann, 2007), and the international respect he has earned seems to be a source of pride for many Jordanians. The king is one of the most visible Arab leaders at major international political and economic conferences. In 2003, for example, Abdullah was the only Arab head of state to address the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland (Ryan, 2004). While his father Hussein, Jordan’s ruler for 46 years, put Jordan on the map, Abdullah is
determined to keep it there. This may contribute to some of his government’s popularity and the political trust scores recorded in this study. “Jordan is a safe country,” opined one respondent, “because Jordan keeps friendly relationships with all the Arab and the western countries, so it’s a safe country.”

And Abdullah’s wife Rania, the world’s youngest queen (Valencia-Martinez, 2007), is beautiful and magnetic. Type the word “queen” into Google, and you’ll find that “Queen Rania” is the fifth prompt the search engine suggests—at after “Queen Elizabeth,” “Queen Latifah,” “Queen Victoria” and “Queen Mary.” Many Jordanians beamed with pride when Rania traveled to Chicago in May 2006 and granted a lengthy interview to Oprah Winfrey on women’s issues in Jordan and the larger Arab world (Oprah Transcripts, 2006). Due to the popularity of Jordan’s king and queen, it is possible that when Jordanians are asked to provide feelings toward their “government,” they consider the highest reaches of the government, atop of which sit a popular monarch and his wife.

Unpopular policy positions and declarations, however, are often left to the delivery of the country’s prime ministers, who are sometimes reviled and frequently replaced; since 1950, Jordan has had more than 50 different prime ministers. The country’s premiers are appointed by the king and serve at his pleasure, until, usually, something goes wrong and another prime minister is installed. When the country’s economics or political landscape are not to the public’s, or the king’s, liking, it is the Prime Minister, not the country’s head of state, who takes the public fall, and this has always been the case. Nigel Ashton’s (2008) new biography of Jordan’s late King Hussein documents in dizzying detail the frequency with which prime ministers were appointed and replaced in the first few decades of the country’s history.
This bifurcated political arena seems to be part of the government’s crafted plan at socializing citizens to revere the king and his official policies, while government ministers and politicians may serve as lightning rods for discontent. Based on respondents’ political trust scores, this strategy may be working. Even if the differences in Abdullah’s and his prime minister’s public roles are not deliberate, however, we can at least say that the king’s public role and persona seem to be more comfortable and characterized by much more pomp than the public function assumed by Jordan’s premiers. While cynicism exists regarding the motives of government officials and politicians, Abdullah’s government and, perhaps, that of his father before him, have managed to socialize Jordanians to retain faith in the regime’s overall worth and competence.

It bears repeating, though, that the cynicism scale was not internally consistent, so the implications of the findings regarding this measure should be considered with caution. As for speculating why this scale was not internally valid in a country like Jordan, a number of conjectures are worth mentioning. First, the cynicism scale used here overlaps somewhat with measures of external political efficacy, or one’s sense that (s)he bears some influence on the political system (Craig, Niemi & Silver, 1990). Two of the items (“Whether I vote or not has no influence on what politicians do,” and “People like me have a say about what the government does”) may be measuring more a sense of political efficacy as opposed to political cynicism. Of these two assertions, one item, “People like me have a say about what the government does,” correlated significantly with scores on the political trust scale, which was a valid measure. In future studies, then, it may be better to administer a measure of political efficacy in an Arab country like Jordan as opposed to a measure of political trust.
Culturally, there may be an explanation for this. In an authoritarian country like Jordan, political disaffection could be more related more to a sense of helplessness and of being politically ineffectual than a feeling of cynicism about politicians’ motives. In my conversations with Jordanians about their political system, I get the sense from many individuals their feeling that all things political are outside their sphere of influence. There seems to be the belief that major chasm in efficacy exists between themselves and elites in the country. One Jordanian college student told me that, he “studies political science in school because the theories are interesting to consider, not because [he] can make any important changes.” Unlike U.S. citizens, most Jordanians are not told from a young age that political power belongs to people like them. While Americans are taught from primary school on that to vote is to exert power, many Jordanians are told that staying out of politics, and therefore out of trouble, is wise. In trying to measure political alienation in an environment like this, political efficacy may resonate more with respondents. Ultimately, though, a political efficacy scale might present some of the same validity problems in an Arab country that the political cynicism scale demonstrated. In that case, it is at least comforting that the political trust scale used in this study was shown to be acceptably internally valid and seems to be measuring a unified, underlying entity of Jordanians’ political disaffection/confidence.

**Gender, Ethnicity & Political Socialization Outcomes.** Political cynicism and trust scales differed across demographics of the sample. Young women in the sample reported higher levels of cynicism and less trust than did male respondents. One 20 year-old woman in the sample summed up her feelings about politics in this way: “politics is a game that is hard to understand and I am an intellectually young lady. In all honesty I do not pay attention to this field at all, for the presence of a number of things aren’t satisfactory in politics.”
Jordanian women, while not summarily excluded from their country’s political scene, have achieved nothing close to political parity. Just four of the country’s current 29 ministers, all royally appointed, are female (Web site of the Embassy of Jordan, Washington, D.C., 2009), and six of the 110 seats in the lower house of parliament are reserved for female candidates. Without this quota, Jordanian women have found it very difficult to get elected to parliament; before the quota was introduced, just two women had served in the lower house (Husseini, 2007a). And in the upper, more powerful, house of parliament, to which all 55 members are appointed by King Abdullah, seven women are currently serving (Husseini, 2007b). One Palestinian woman wrote that “politics is in a very difficult situation; it's filled with problems with no solutions. And it's getting worse slowly. Maybe the solution is that life should end on this earth.”

While women in Jordan were given the right to vote in 1974 (Brand, 2003), it may be difficult to politically socialize women to a governmental system in which their participation remains quite limited 35 years after suffrage expanded. Queen Rania may be the beacon of the modern Arab woman, but her country is still a male-dominated one, where women’s participation in government is near minimal and their trust in government is ambivalent (female’s scores on the political trust were right around the scale’s median). To socialize more of its citizens to the current government, in addition to the “Jordan First” campaign, the regime might consider enacting a “Women, Too” initiative. One 20 year-old woman, expressing her alienation from Jordanian politics, wrote that “I don't like interfering in [politics] because it does not take my opinion.”

Women weren’t the only demographic group that recorded lower levels of political trust, though. Palestinians, while not scoring far from the median of the trust scale, still scored more than half a standard deviation below ethnic Jordanians on the political trust index. One
Palestinian teenager wrote that “I do not approach [politics] and there is no place for me in them.” Sentiments like this may exist because Palestinians’ participation in the public sector is often limited by discriminatory policies. While Jordan is the only Arab country to grant Palestinians citizenship, and extend to them virtually all the political and economic rights enjoyed by East Bank Jordanians, in practice Palestinian participation in government is limited by a number of factors.

Parliamentary districts in Jordan, for example, are gerrymandered to award fewer numbers of seats to districts high in Palestinian representation (Lust-Okar, 2006). And Reiter (2002) argued that Jordan’s public universities conduct lopsided admission competitions, in which more Transjordanians are offered spots than Palestinians and not on merit alone. Nydell (2006) also points out that Jordanians, not Palestinians, hold most of the country’s administrative positions. One 22 year-old Palestinian man in the sample expressed his frustration with what is, in his view, a nepotistic political system thusly: “A weak man cannot bypass the government or have an opinion, but the person who has connections in the government or politics can have an opinion.”

For these reasons, it perhaps makes sense that Palestinians in Jordan would express lower levels of political trust than Jordanians. Jordan has opened up its borders to Palestinians, but not its public sector, something that may make it a challenge to politically socialize Palestinians to trust the ruling non-Palestinian elites. One Palestinian respondent summed up his feelings about Jordanian politics in this way: “Politics works lightly with the Jordanian mind because it is not clear and there is favoritism when working with current issues.”

It may be important to point out that, while gender and ethnicity demographics were associated with some of the political attitudes measured in this study, age was not. The age of
respondents ranged from 18 to 35, and age did not explain significant amounts of variance in the outcome variables. It should be noted that although age of respondents did not play a role in this study, important generational differences could still exist, and generations of older Jordanians may have very different political views than their younger counterparts. Prior research suggests that the views of younger individuals in a political system are more malleable and pliant (see Jennings & Niemi, 1978)—which is one of the main premises of Hyman’s original thesis, and that older voters’ views are more entrenched. Of course, this is one of the implicit assumptions of this study—that young people differ somewhat from their elders in political attitudes—and this is why young voters are studied in isolation.

It is important remind ourselves, though, that this study focuses on young Jordanians only, and that the political views of their parents and grandparents could be quite different. Pattie and Johnston (2001), for example, found that older British voters’ levels of political trust were higher than younger citizens. In an authoritarian Arab country Jordan, though, in which political participation has been limited and somewhat resistant to liberalization since the nation’s birth, we might see the reverse; that is, older Jordanians, who have lived through a number of wars, political coup attempts, and the almost yearly removal and installation of the country’s prime ministers, may demonstrate higher levels of political cynicism and lower levels of political trust than younger individuals. While age in the current study seems to be a non-factor in terms of political attitudes, I felt the need to point out that Jordanians older than 35 may still differ significantly from younger people in terms of political disaffection.

Feelings toward the U.S. Government

Unlike political cynicism and political trust scales, there were no demographic differences in terms of feelings toward the U.S. government; the index reported, by and large,
negative feelings toward the U.S. Respondents were in strong agreement that other countries
should not “use the U.S. as a role model,” and that “the U.S. could learn a lot about how to
function from other countries in the world,” and that the U.S. “would be better off if it were more
like other governments in the world.” While young people in the sample appear to have been
socialized to modestly trust their government, they demonstrated much less affinity for the U.S.
This finding is in line with a number of public opinion polls that have gauged Arabs and
Muslims’ negative feelings toward the United States (see Zogby, 2002; Pollack, 2007; Pew,
2008). One respondent viscerally wrote of how “other people suffer, of tragedies, hunger, death,
and destruction in Arab countries, by America and Israel,” and another commented that politics
“is America’s game.” (Of course, Arab and Muslim opinion of the U.S. may improve now that a
sea change in presidential administrations has occurred with the inauguration of Barack Obama.
This, however, remains to be seen, and current overall opinions of the U.S. among Arabs and
Muslims appear low).

There was one exception on the U.S. government rating index, however. On one of the
items (“The U.S. is a poor example of how to run a country”), the sample was more divided. You
can see in the histogram in Figure 4 that the distribution of the scale appears bimodal. Forty-
seven percent of respondents either disagreed with or were neutral toward this statement, and this
represents an interesting distinction that many Arabs make when assessing America. Arabs are
often likely to despise American foreign policies while simultaneously recognizing the U.S. as a
model country in other ways. Summing up this distinction, one male respondent commented that
“I like the [U.S.’] internal successes but I definitely do not agree with its foreign affairs and its
blind allegiances to Zionists and Israel.”
Hoffman (2002, p.83) wrote that even though Arabs and Muslims “disagree with U.S. foreign policy, particularly toward the Middle East, they yearn for freedom of speech and access to information,” and they often recognize that these freedoms exist to a greater extent in the U.S. Frequently, while administering the completing the survey and coming across the assertion “The U.S. is a poor example of how to run a country,” I was asked to clarify the question. Respondents wanted to know if I was talking about foreign policy or domestic policy. The reason, they told me, is that they felt the U.S. was a successfully internally run country, but its external policies, in their minds, are greatly flawed.

It is for this reason that many Arabs wish to move to the United States, despite the fact that they may strongly take issue with the president’s official foreign policies. Many feel that the U.S. is a place of economic opportunity and political liberty, especially in the minds of Arabs who are political or ethnic minorities. One Palestinian Christian woman who completed the survey, for example, told me that “even though I know the U.S. does much wrong, I still want to live there. Being Palestinian and Christian there matters less.” This is not to say that all Arabs feel American society is a success and wish to take part, but there is some evidence that a lack of political and religious freedoms in a number of Arab countries contributes to evaluations of the American model. In American public diplomacy efforts aiming to improve Arabs’ attitudes toward the U.S., then, it may bear fruit to highlight individual religious and political freedoms in the U.S. when communicating with the region’s oppressed. While many Arabs have apparently been socialized to detest American foreign policies, their assessments of America’s internal value are more mixed.
Media Credibility

Although not a political attitude, media credibility findings are discussed here, as they pose some implications for the political socialization variables measured in the study. Overall, media credibility ratings were quite high (M=4.72 for domestic media credibility and 4.94 for foreign media credibility). Respondents have much more faith in the accuracy of foreign news outlets than in Jordanian sources. Foreign, particularly Western, media outlets have a long history in the Arab world. Well before the era of pan-Arab satellite TV, for example, many Arabs did not trust the media mouthpieces their governments offered and turned instead to stations like Voice of America or Radio Monte Carlo for news (Ghareeb, 2000). Even today, many Arabs trust the factual accuracy of foreign outlets more than those in their own countries, and this seems to be the case among respondents in the current sample.

As for demographic differences in media credibility, Palestinians recorded much lower levels of domestic media credibility than did East Bank Jordanians. Given similar demographic differences in political trust scores, this disparity is perhaps not shocking. Also, most major Jordanian news outlets are run or owned at least partly by the government, and most important government posts are held by Jordanians, not Palestinians. Additionally, the Jordan First campaign has encouraged Jordanians to focus public discourse on national issues other than Israeli-Palestinian disputes (as Greenwood, 2003, points out), which may contribute to Palestinians’ feelings that Jordanian media are not meeting the needs of their community. One Palestinian respondent indicated that she did not trust the news and instead relied on personal contacts, writing that “news does not play a big role in my life because it is not the reality and I get the news, in Palestine for example, by calling my relatives there.”
As for this study’s regression models, inclusion of media credibility did not change things much. In the model predicting attitudes toward the U.S., though, media credibility’s presence in the model affected the conclusions made regarding the associations between interpersonal reliance and scores on the U.S. government rating index. For this reason, it is argued here that measures of media credibility should be included in studies assessing the relationship between news use and political attitudes in Arab countries. The suggestion to include media credibility measures in studies examining news influence on public opinion in general is not a novel idea (see Tsfati, 2003), but, in a region such as the Arab world, where public distrust of government-run news outlets may be intensified, including media credibility is particularly wise. In many cases, such as in the current study, media credibility may not lead to any major revelations, and the researcher can move on to his/her main concerns. But still, including media credibility in models examining media influence in a region where limited amounts have such scholarship have been undertaken is advised.

**Young Jordanians’ News Use & Political Socialization Measures**

Now that respondents’ scores on the political attitude measures have been thoroughly detailed, we can begin the awaited discussion on news consumption and political socialization among young Jordanians in the sample. To sum up again, none of the news consumption variables were significantly associated with political cynicism or political trust, and just two variables, television news use and reliance on interpersonal sources, were associated with feelings toward the United States.

Were he alive, Hyman (1959) might say, “I told you so,” as it appears that few of the news consumption variables were associated with Jordanians’ political attitudes. Recall that Hyman and other early political socialization researchers that followed him (see Dawson &
Pruitt, 1969; Langton & Jennings, 1968) discounted the influence of mass media in politically socializing young individuals to their government, and instead focused on institutions such as the church, family, and schools. Hyman, as well as Dawson and Pruitt, subscribed to the “two-step flow” theory of mass communication (Lazarsfeld, Berelson & Gaudet, 1948), whereby a limited number of “opinion leaders” access news information via mass media and communicate it to the masses through everyday conversations. They seemed to argue that media messages become influential only when communicated secondarily by friends or relatives.

Before we sign on to the limited-effects view of Joseph Klapper (1960), however, let us take a look at the news consumption variables and speculate as to why these items may or may not be associated with the political socialization measures used in this study. We have lists of specific news outlets respondents reported accessing, and these data may be able to tell us something about the observed relationships between news use and political sentiments. And ultimately, some of the news consumption/reliance variables assessed in this study were associated with views of the U.S. government, and these relationships have some things to tell us about media and political socialization processes in an Arab country.

*Foreign News & Political Socialization*

One reason many of the media use variables measured in this study were not significantly associated with political cynicism and political trust could be due to respondents’ high consumption of foreign, as opposed to domestic, news. When Chaffee, Ward, Tipton (1970) and others began making the case in the seventies that mass media were politically socializing agents, they were referring mainly to mass mediated information that addresses one’s own government or country. After all, political socialization processes were conceived from the beginning by Hyman as country-specific outcome variables (interest in national politics among,
say, young Koreans or Americans). And indeed, the news consumption variables in Chaffee et al.’s seminal study assessed TV and newspaper use patterns in Wisconsin that were, we might assume, heavier on information about domestic affairs more so than foreign events. For individuals whose news mostly comes from other countries, however, the politically socializing influence of mass media may be limited, and this may be partly why news use variables were not associated with political cynicism or political trust—both measures of domestic political contentment.

For each media format assessed in this study (with the exception of interpersonal reliance, which did not include a gauge of domestic-vs.-foreign information), respondents reported that more than half of the news stories focused on events outside Jordan. Respondents even reported that most of the events they read about in newspapers—of which the top nine listed are published in Jordan—do not focus on issues in their country.

Political socialization research theorizes political identity formation within a particular country. Reconsider Sigel’s (1965, p.1) definition of political socialization: “the learning process by which the political norms and behaviors acceptable to an ongoing political system are transmitted from generation to generation” (italics mine). It makes sense to speculate, then, that agents that socialize views toward an ongoing political system should come from within that system. Al-Jazeera reportage on violence in the Eastern Congo, for example, is not likely to be associated with changes in Jordanians’ political cynicism or trust levels. Jordanians in the sample access relatively little news about events/issues in their home country, and this may contribute to the non-influence of the news consumption variables in this study.

Given respondents’ heavy reliance on foreign news and foreign news sources, it perhaps follows that when news consumption variables in the study were associated with political
attitudes, they correlated with attitudes toward a foreign country. We now move to a discussion of the significant relationships between media use and ratings of the U.S. government.

_The Arab Street & the Satellite Dish: Respondents’ News Consumption & Ratings of the U.S._

Television news consumption and reliance on interpersonal sources were associated with feelings toward the U.S. government. As respondents’ levels of TV news use and reliance on interpersonal sources goes up, ratings of the U.S. government tended to be more negative. As alluded to previously, early political socialization researchers might take these findings as evidence that mass media influences play second fiddle in political socialization processes, since just one of five media use variables was significantly associated with political attitudes, while the only variable in this study examining influence of relatives and friends was significant. On the contrary, I interpret the findings differently.

First, in terms of interpersonal sources, the findings seem to point to evidence of the two-step flow theory of mass communication. Most respondents in the sample said that they learn news information from friends and family at least once every week. Although we cannot be certain, we suspect here that these friends and relatives, or at least many of them, learned the news information they eventually communicated from some mass media outlet. It is possible that, in a more communally oriented country like Jordan, the two-step flow process works stronger than in Western societies, given the strength of familial and social ties in that culture. (It is important to note, though, that this is just conjecture; we have no way of knowing whether the friends/relatives from whom respondents learn current events information acquire that information from news outlets, or whether they, too, learned the information from a family member or acquaintance. While we might assume that, at some time prior, relayed current events
information that respondents reported learning was communicated via mass media, the survey tool could not measure this, and so the discussion below is speculative in nature.

For this reason, it might be helpful to add a measure to future studies which asks respondents to speculate where their friends/relatives usually acquire the current events information they relay. For example, one item might ask, “When your relatives communicate news information to you, where do they usually acquire that information?” The responses could be a. From other relatives/; b. From friends; c. From news outlets; d. I’m not sure. This would give us more information as to where this interpersonally communicated information originates.

Interestingly, the two-step flow model of mass communication (Lazarsfeld et al., 1948) was originally interpreted as evidence of the limited effects of mass media (see Katz, 1957). It seems logical to argue, however, that the two-step model is actually evidence of powerful mass media effects. So compelling is a certain piece of news information to a media consumer, for example, that he or she shares the information with an acquaintance or relative. This piece of orally communicated news information, retaining its punch, then contributes to the opinion of the listener. In the current study, respondents receive large amounts of news information from relatives and friends, and this reception is significantly associated with negative views of the U.S. government.

However one interprets the two-step flow theory, i.e. as evidence of limited, indirect effects of media or of the extension of media effects beyond the original receiver, it seems reasonable to speculate that a two-step flow may be at work among young people in Jordan. Some political socialization of feelings toward the United States may be occurring, then, on the “Arab Street.” The Arab Street, although an often problematic metaphor, refers to an amorphous but lively place where Arabs gather to discuss current events or protest, and where collective
opinions are formed. The “Arab Street” refers to the Arab public sphere (Eickelman, 2002). References to the Arab Street usually explicitly communicate the two-step flow process. You might hear a TV pundit opine, for example, that “Obama’s interview with al-Arabiya TV is likely to have reverberations on the Arab Street,” or “Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s remarks in Cairo are not likely to generate positive feelings on the Arab Street.” The piece of news, Obama’s interview with al-Arabiya, is the first step which may have “reverberations” in interpersonal discussions on the Arab Street, step two in Lazarsfeld et al.’s model.

The problems with the Arab Street metaphor have been thoroughly listed (see Lynch, 2003), such as the fact that Arab public opinion is not unified and monolithic, and there is no single, Arab street; Arabs are independent minded and opinions differ on many public policy concerns. Still, the metaphor has staying power, if only for the more agreed-upon trends that Arabs are avid news consumers, they tend to be more collectively and communally oriented than Westerners, and they seem to get sizable portions of their news diets from interpersonal contacts. If we accept these provisos, then we may also accept the speculation that young Jordanians are being socialized to negative feelings toward the U.S. on one of the sidewalks of the Arab Street. Ultimately, of course, this study was correlative in nature and cannot establish temporal precedence necessary for concluding causality. Still, there is evidence here that how much news information young Jordanians learn from friends and relatives is related to how they rate the U.S. government.

Not all the variance in respondents’ ratings of the U.S. was associated with activity on the Arab Street, though. The satellite dish appears to play a role, too. Jordanians in the sample who consume large amounts of televised news tended to rate the U.S. government more negatively. This is in line with the research of Nisbet et al. (2004), who found that television use was
negatively associated with ratings of the U.S. among Arabs/Muslims in nine different countries. (TV use was their only media format variable, however, so there is no way of comparing respondents’ TV reliance to, say, radio), and also the work of Berman and Stokey (1980) who found that television news viewing was negatively associated with support for government. Nine of the top ten TV networks respondents listed were satellite news channels headquartered in other countries. Six of the nine networks are products of other Arab countries, and three outlets (CNN, BBC & BBC Arabic) are from the U.S. and U.K.

When we look at the TV networks respondents watch the most, it is perhaps not hard to speculate where negative views of the U.S. are coming from. Al-Jazeera was by far the most-cited network, and two other networks in the top ten, Hizballah’s al-Manar and Hamas’ al-Aqsa, are run by groups on the U.S. State Department’s list of terrorist organizations. Now, this is not to say that al-Jazeera’s news content is similar to that of al-Manar; in many ways it is not. But neither is al-Jazeera in open denial about the fact that much of its coverage is subjective. In a June 2008 press conference in Doha, Qatar, I asked the chief editor of the entire al-Jazeera network, Ahmad Sheikh, whether he felt it was necessary to cover the Israeli-Palestinian conflict with attempted objectivity. He avoided my question, only saying that the Palestinians are oppressed and need journalistic support—not exactly a reporting strategy taught in an introductory news writing class.

Few people doubt al-Jazeera’s global reach and influence, but the network’s objectivity and journalistic balance are indeed doubted, even by some Arab media scholars. Ayish (2002), for example, points out the sensational ways al-Jazeera treats Arab/Muslim issues as opposed to foreign affairs from South Africa or other non-Arab regions. Arab networks like al-Jazeera are also much more likely to broadcast gruesome war images than are Western news outlets (Fahmy
something which may contribute to respondents’ views toward the U.S. Respondents’ reliance on al-Jazeera and anti-American channels such as al-Manar and al-Aqsa may help account for respondents’ views toward the U.S.

Nisbet et al. (2008), however, found that TV use predicted negative views of the U.S. even among respondents who listed Western channels like CNN or BBC as their primary network choice, so content specific to Arabic news channels alone might not explain negative attitudes toward the U.S.; instead, TV news that mentions the U.S. at all might be associated with negative ratings of the U.S. In other words, the nature of global television news the U.S. generates, not necessarily the presentation of it, may be driving Arab opinion. Perhaps the “mean-world” phenomenon is at work; consumption of news about the U.S., regardless of presentation, is associated with increased skepticism of the U.S. government. This would be similar to what Romer, Jamieson and Aday (2003) observed when they found that local TV news viewing was positively associated with fear of crime. This would suggest, though, that the portrayal of the U.S. was more threatening than is actually the case, causing Arab news consumers to disproportionately fear the U.S. government. This assertion is, of course, somewhat subjective.

Regardless of the reasons for the relationship between TV use and evaluations of the U.S. among respondents in the sample, though, there seems to be evidence that satellite TV news may be a politically socializing agent in Arab countries. While some recent political socialization researchers point out the increasing dominance of Internet news over other traditional formats among young people in the U.S. (see McLeod & Shah, 2009), this study reminds us that televised news still matters in terms of political socialization, especially in a developing country like Jordan where Internet connectivity still has to grow for Internet news to assume the
dominant mantle. Not that many political socialization researchers doubt television news as a politically socializing force, but TV news is naturally becoming less of a focal point in some new studies on media and political socialization in developed countries in the 21st Century. This study suggests, though, that the lone media use variable associated with political socialization outcomes in a developing, Arab country is TV consumption—even in the Internet age and nearly a decade into the new millennium. The dominant role of television in socialization processes argued by Gerbner (1970) and colleagues nearly forty years ago still has much relevance, at least in Jordan.

Implications for U.S. Public Diplomacy. The United States has, for some time, been concerned with Arabs’ attitudes toward her, and the government has undertaken a number of initiatives to increase public diplomacy efforts in the Arab/Muslim world in recent years (Graber, 2009). This study, finding that young Jordanians’ interpersonal contacts are associated with negative feelings toward the U.S., suggests that direct diplomacy efforts may need to be increased further, replacing some of the negative interpersonal communications Jordanians share with their peers with more contact from Peace Corps representatives, Fulbright fellows, or other diplomatic missions. Of course, this is easily said and not-so easily done in a U.S. recession, but this is simply a recommendation on how the U.S. can improve its image, given the findings that interpersonal communication of news information in the Arab world may be hindering the U.S.’ image. Arab media scholar William Rugh agrees, and said the following in 2004 (p.3) before Congress: “The most effective public diplomacy for Arab audiences involves dialogue by Americans willing to listen and able to explain the United States and its policies…[W]e should increase the number of trained professional officers with Arabic language capabilities who can explain America and its policies.”
In terms of mediated, as opposed to interpersonal, communication strategy, this study suggests that the U.S. might focus more on satellite TV news broadcasting in the Arab world as opposed to other forms of mass communication. By most measures, al-Hurra, the U.S. government’s satellite television network in the Middle East, is not at all a success (Rugh, 2004), suggesting that a government-run, Voice-of-America style TV network might not be the way to go. Al-Hurra has an incapacitating stigma in the Arab world of being a PR rag for the U.S. military. Going a different route, the U.S. government might grant a private media company a limited two or three year contract to form an Arabic news arm—perhaps an organization like CNN, which does not yet have an Arabic TV network. CNN’s English network was, after all, one of the top ten TV networks respondents listed. Ultimately, the U.S. has three options in terms of TV broadcasting in the Arab world: It can give up and shut down al-Hurra, continue down the same road with al-Hurra, or go in a new direction. The latter option seems to be the only fruitful choice, as the U.S. is apparently being thoroughly outcommunicated on television in the Arab world.

Conclusion

So what of all this? What are the important theoretical concerns involving political socialization research that we should take away from this study? There appear to be three main points raised by this study that tell us about political socialization processes in a developing, Arab country.

First, the ability of mass media in a developing country to socialize young adults to the domestic regime may be limited if most of the news citizens consume deals with events in other countries. If Jordan’s media system grows, and if impediments to private media ownership in the country are reduced, this may change. But for now, mass media in Jordan may play a role
only in political socialization to foreign individuals, groups or governments, instead of domestic institutions.

Second, the study is a reminder of the importance of interpersonal communication of news information in models exploring political socialization. Especially in an Arab society, in which community and familial ties are paramount, researchers studying political socialization in Arab countries should include variables assessing the degree to which individuals acquire news information orally (or digitally, via the Internet) from friends and family.

Finally, this study acknowledges the significant association between satellite TV news consumption and political attitudes. Satellite news in the Arab world has been the focus of much commentary since the meteoric ascension of networks like al-Jazeera and al-Arabiya, and the far-reaching influence of these outlets has been suggested by many commentators (see Miles, 2006, for an example). Fewer researchers, however, have examined the correlates of satellite TV news consumption through survey research in Arab countries. This study, in part, did. The assumptions by Miles and others (see El-Nawawy, Iskandar and Farag, 2002), who have speculated about the influence of Arab satellite networks’ on Arab audiences, may have serious merit. I am not sure I agree wholeheartedly with E.B. White’s prediction that society “shall stand or fall by television,” (Wasko, 2005, p.11), but some political opinions in a small Arab country may.

Study Limitations & Future Research Outlook

While survey researchers can always take comfort in the fact that no study can avoid all methodological caveats, we are always trying to find, and put into practice, a better way to measure social phenomena. Naturally, then, I recognize that there are things I wish I could, or in hindsight wish I would, have done differently. Some of these issues can be addressed relatively
easily in future surveys in Jordan or other Arab countries, while others represent more immutable challenges of surveying in developing countries.

**Other Potential Explanations for the Variance in Political Attitudes.** Due to the fact that the media use variables in the study accounted for a relatively small portion of the variance in Jordanians’ political attitudes, it may be instructive to speculate for a moment regarding other cultural/societal factors in Jordan which were not explored in the study but might account for some of the variance.

Two possible contributors not considered in this study could be the influence of schools and religious communication (mosque sermons, study groups) on political attitudes. In future studies, it may be helpful to include some measure of religiosity, such as how frequently an individual attends religious services, as well as a measure asking respondents whether they attended a public or private school, as these institutions—just as Hyman pointed out—are important socializing forces. Just as I criticized early political socialization researchers for not considering mass media variables in their models exploring political attitudes, perhaps some criticism is due me for not including a measure of religious devotion or scholastic upbringing.

Religious sermons have the potential to be a powerful politically socializing force, and I witnessed this while collecting data in Jordan. Humphrey (1987) argued that the mosque is one of the most dominant, if not *the* most dominant political force among Muslim populations. On two occasions, Jordanians staged protests to decry the war that Israel had waged in the Gaza Strip at the time, and at one point there were clashes with Jordanian police that made international headlines. Both protests occurred on Friday afternoons, after some Muslims in Amman had attended Mosque and absorbed firebrand sermons about the plight of the Palestinians who were being attacked. In a country which is considered, and considers itself,
Muslim, it may be important to include a measure of religious practices when trying to account for variance in political attitudes. In order to further study the influence of religion on young Jordanians’ political attitudes, it could be instructive to go back and analyze more carefully the open-ended responses to the question on political outlook, in order to search for religious references. This could shed some light on the role religious influences play in the formation of young Jordanians’ political sentiments.

In addition to a measure of religiosity, it could be useful to assess educational background beyond just years of schooling. This study, for example, asked respondents to indicate how much formal education they received, but did not address the type of schooling they completed. In terms of explaining greater amounts of variance in political attitudes among young Arabs, it may be necessary to determine whether an individual attended a public or private school, whether that school was run under a foreign model such as Montessori, or whether they were educated abroad. And of course, it would be useful to determine if a respondent attended a Christian or Muslim-affiliated school. It is also possible that an individual attended a sexually segregated or only a unisexual school, which is another variable that could influence political worldview (see Haw, 1994, for example, who provides an important discussion of Muslim girls’ schools and political attitudes in Great Britain).

*Dispatching Arab Data Collectors.* If the resources were available, I would have dispatched Arab individuals to assist with the data collection. Arab respondents may be skeptical that an American surveying political attitudes in an Arab country is working secretly for the U.S. government and, therefore, could use restraint when responding to political attitude questions, particularly open-ended questions. It is always better for survey administrators to bear a more similar likeness to the demographic group of interest, and for respondents to think about the
likeness of the researcher or data collector as little as possible. Having said this, it should be pointed out that data were collected via paper questionnaires, not through oral interviews, which can trigger impression management behavior and social desirability biases. Still, using Arab individuals to administer the surveys (as Tessler, 2002, has) could have elicited more honest answers on the questionnaires. It is possible that the utilization of Arab survey assistants could have resulted in the reportage of more negative attitudes toward the United States.

In order to explore this a bit further, a future examination of the data collected in this study might compare the open-ended responses to the forced-choice questions in the survey. It is possible that respondents could have felt freer on the forced-choice questions to provide the most negative ratings of the United States, but, given the fact that they were completing the questionnaire before a U.S. citizen, may have felt less inclined to provide the most visceral responses to the open-ended questions. A content analysis of the open-ended questions comparing the qualitative responses to the categorical items in this study could shed more light on this speculation.

*Non-probability Data.* The data examined in this study are non-probability in nature, and are limited to the Jordanian capital, Amman. For this reason, the inferences suggested in this study should be taken with a grain of restraint. If I’d had my way financially, I would have collected probability data from each of Jordan’s twelve governates and obtained data more representative of the country. For future surveys I hope to obtain grant support to do this in Jordan and other Arab countries. Obtaining probability samples in developing countries, as demonstrated in this study, is difficult for a number of reasons. However, with proper grant support, it can, and should, be done. In the near future, I would like to replicate this survey in Egypt and Lebanon and collect data in a more representative way. Egypt and Lebanon are two
Arab countries with domestic media industries far more expansive than Jordan’s, and I would like to see if more media consumption patterns in these two countries correlate with feelings toward the governments in Cairo, Beirut, and the U.S.

When such replications are carried out, though, I would change a few things on the survey in terms of assessing Internet and new media use.

*Greater Assessments of New Media.* In hindsight, I wish I had included two more variables assessing Internet and new media use among young Jordanians: an item assessing Internet access and some measurement of social networking use. Naturally, the politically socializing influence of new media use in any country depends on levels of Internet connectivity in that country, and so, when this study is eventually replicated in Egypt and Lebanon, I will include a measure of Internet connectivity on a continuum ranging from “no Internet access whatsoever” to “broadband Internet access on a handheld device.”

Also, a replication of this study will include an assessment of social networking reliance. The Web site Facebook was the fourth most frequently listed Internet news site among respondents. Now, whether respondents receive news on Facebook via RSS feeds, news links from friends, or direct communication from relatives and acquaintances is not known, but respondents listed social networking sites as one of their main sources of online news information, and specific assessments of networking reliance should be considered in future studies.

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The current study is still not impervious to methodological criticism stemming from traditional definitions of political socialization. For example, the political attitudes examined in this study may not be the most intransient measures of political socialization, and they were
assessed at one point in time. And one of the political attitude scales administered in the survey was eventually shown to be an invalid, internally inconsistent measure of political socialization—which automatically disqualifies it as being the kind of stable affective variable political socialization researchers have favored.

Ideally, the best way to measure mass media influences on political socialization would be to track specific individuals’ media use over a number of years, while intermittently assessing relatively non-ephemeral measures of political socialization, such as support for various governments, administrations, or government institutions. The current study did not do this. Instead, this study assessed current patterns of news consumption among young Jordanians (a potentially ephemeral, short-term predictor variable) and feelings toward the U.S. and Jordanian governments.

Still, due to the fact that relatively little is known about news consumption among Middle Eastern populations, and even less about how news consumption is or is not associated with opinions of governments in this region, this study seemingly has something to contribute to our understanding of the potential politically socializing influences in an Arab country. This study attempted to add to literature on mass media and political socialization by assessing potential media influences on fairly stable measures of political socialization—feelings toward governments—in an Arab country.
Appendix A: Dissertation Factsheet

News Consumption and Political Socialization among Young, Urban Jordanians
University of North Carolina – Chapel Hill  Study Number: 08-2063

Researcher: Justin Martin, martinjd@email.unc.edu, Cell phone number in Jordan: To be determined.

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Advisor of Researcher: Anne Johnston, amjohnst@email.unc.edu, (919)962-4286, 362 Carroll Hall, Campus Box 3365, Chapel Hill, NC, 27599. Fax: (919)962-0620

UNC IRB Office: Campus Box# 7097, Medical School, Bldg 52
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
Chapel Hill, NC 27599-7097
aa-irb-chair@unc.edu
phone 919-966-3113; fax 919-966-7879

*University of North Carolina – Chapel Hill
Appendix B: Map of Amman

(Sampling Districts are Etched)
Appendix C: Respondent Recruitment Script

Title: News Consumption & Political Socialization among Young Jordanians

Information sheet for IRB study #: 08 -2063
Originating from: School of Journalism & Mass Communication
Principal Investigator: Justin Martin; Ph: (919) 923-1789; martinjd@email.unc.edu
Faculty Advisor: Dr. Anne Johnston; Ph: (919) 962-4286; amjohnst@email.unc.edu

Researcher to passersby: Hello. My name is Justin Martin and I am a Ph.D. student in the School of Journalism at the University of North Carolina in the United States.

I’m conducting a survey among young Jordanians’ news consumption and feelings about politics, and I’m wondering if you’d be willing to participate. Participation will take approximately 20 minutes.

You will not be personally identified in this research in any way. The researcher will be examining responses of groups, not individual people. There will be no link between you and the responses you provide.

Participation in this study is voluntary, and you may decide not to quit after you have begun to participate. You are free to leave at any time and are not required to provide the researcher with any reason. Also, you may choose to skip any question(s) for any reason, if you feel you don’t want to respond.

By completing the survey, you indicate that you agree to participate in this research. Would you like to participate in this project?

You will receive two (2) Jordanian Dinars for participating in this research. You must be above the age of 18 in order to participate in this study.

Translation of Recruitment Script for “News Consumption and Political Socialization among Young, Urban Jordanians”

IRB Number 08 -2063

PI: Justin D. Martin, martinjd@email.unc.edu, (919)923-1789

مرحبا. اسمى جاستن مارتن. و أنا طالب دكتوراة في كلية الصحافة في جامعة كارولاينا الشمالية في الولايات المتحدة. أنا أجري استطلاع بين الشباب تركيز على استخدام وسائل الإعلام والسياسة وهما أرغب في اشتراع وقت الاستطلاع تقريبا 20 دقيقة.

انت لن تكون المحددة في هذا البحث. الباحث سيدرس ردود المجموع وليس ردود من شخص معين. لن يكون أي رابط بينك وبين الزود اللي تقدم.

الإشارات هي طوعي تماما و ممكن انك توقف الاستطلاع في أي وقت و لأي أسباب. و اضافيهم يمكنكم تجنب أي سوال لأي أسباب.

من خلال المشاركة في البحث تقدم مكافأة للمشاركة في المشروع هل تريد المشاركة؟ الباحث سيدفعك دنانين للاشتراعك و لاكن من الإرام ان تنتهي كل الاستطلاع. و من الإرام ان عمرك أكثر من 18 و اقل من 36 أيضا.
Appendix D: English Version of the Survey

Thank you for participating in this survey. First, please answer the following questions about where you get your news information.

On average, how many days each week do read a print newspaper?

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Each time you read a print newspaper, approximately how much time do you spend doing so?

Which newspaper(s) do you read the most? (Please list them in order of use, and please list up to three).

Are any of these papers published weekly? If Yes, please list which papers are published weekly.

☐ No

☐ Yes; (Please list which papers are weekly papers)

Please indicate which of the newspapers you listed are in Arabic as opposed to English. (Choose all that apply)

☐ The first paper I listed is in Arabic

☐ The second paper I listed is in Arabic.

☐ The third paper I listed is in Arabic
One or more of the papers I listed is in a language other than Arabic or English (If so, please list paper and language).

Out of every 10 news articles you read in print newspapers, how many would you say focus on events/issues in Jordan, as opposed to other countries?

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

On average, how many days each month do you read a print magazine?

Each time you read a print magazine, approximately how much time do you spend doing so?

Which magazine(s) do you read the most? (Please list them in order of use, and list up to three).

Are all of the magazines you listed published monthly? If no, please list the magazine and the frequency of publication.

Yes, the magazine(s) I listed is/are published monthly.

No, one or more of the magazines I listed are published at a different frequency (please list magazine and how often it is published)

Please indicate which of the magazine(s) you listed are published in Arabic as opposed to English. (Choose all that apply)
☐ The first magazine I listed is in Arabic
☐ The second magazine I listed is in Arabic
☐ The third magazine I listed is in Arabic
☐ One or more of the magazines I listed is in a language other than Arabic or English (If so, please list the magazine and language).

Out of every 10 news articles you read in print magazines, how many would you say focus on events/issues in Jordan, as opposed to other countries?

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐

On average, how many days each week do you watch news broadcast on television?

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐

Each time you watch a news broadcast on television, approximately how much time do you spend doing so?

☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐

Which television networks/channels do you watch the most? (Please list them in order of use, and list up to three).

Please indicate which of the television network(s) you listed broadcast in Arabic as opposed to English. (Choose all that apply)
The first network I listed is in Arabic

The second network I listed is in Arabic

The third network listed is in Arabic

One or more of the networks I listed is in a language other than Arabic or English (If so, please list the network and language).

Out of every 10 news stories you see on television, how many would you say focus on events/issues in Jordan, as opposed to other countries?

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

On average, how many days each week do you listen to news on the radio?

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Each time you listen to news on the radio, approximately how much time do you spend doing so?

Which radio networks/channels do you listen to the most? (Please list them in order of use, and list up to three).

Please indicate which of the television network(s) you listed are broadcast in Arabic as opposed to English. (Choose all that apply).

The first network I listed is in Arabic
The second network I listed is in Arabic

The third network listed is in Arabic

One or more of the networks I listed is in a language other than Arabic or English (If so, please list network and language).

Out of every 10 news radio stories you listen to on the radio, how many would you say focus on events/issues in Jordan, as opposed to other countries?

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

On average, how many days each week do you access news on the Internet?

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Each time you access news on the Internet, approximately how much time do you spend doing so?

Which Internet news sites do you visit the most? (Please list them in order of use, and list up to three).

Please indicate which of the Internet sites you listed are Arabic sites, as opposed to English. (Choose all that apply).

The first site I listed is in Arabic

The second site I listed is in Arabic
The third site I listed is in Arabic

One or more of the sites I listed is in a language other than Arabic or English (If so, please list network and language).

Out of every 10 news stories you access online, how many would you say focus on events/issues in Jordan, as opposed to other countries?

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Do you ever visit news sites on your mobile phone or other wireless device? (If no, skip the next question)

Yes

No

On average, how many days each week do you access news sites on your mobile phone?

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Are blogs among any of the Web sites you access online for information? If yes, please list the blogs you access the most, up to three. If no, please skip the next two questions involving blogs).

No

Yes

Are these blogs published mainly in English or Arabic?

Arabic
Out of every 10 blog posts you read that comment on news/current events, how many would you say focus on events/issues in Jordan, as opposed to other countries?

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Yes (please list the organizations that send you text messages. List the news organizations in order of text frequency.)

Are these text messages mainly in Arabic or English?

Arabic

English

Both Arabic and English

Another language (if so, please report which language)
Out of every 10 news text messages you receive, how many would you say focus on events/issues in Jordan, as opposed to other countries?

☐ 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Do you ever download audio or video news clips (Podcasts) to an iPod or other MP3 device? (If yes, please list the news Web sites from which you download podcasts. If no, please skip the next 2 questions involving podcasts).

☐ No (please skip next two questions)

☐ Yes (please list the organizations from which you download podcasts)

Are these podcasts mainly in Arabic or English?

☐ Arabic

☐ English

☐ Both Arabic and English

☐ Another language (if so, please report which language) ______

Out of every 10 news podcasts you download, how many would you say focus on events/issues in Jordan, as opposed to other countries?

☐ 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

How often would you say you learn about news information from speaking with friends?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Daily</th>
<th>2-3 Times a Week</th>
<th>Once a Week</th>
<th>2-3 Times a Month</th>
<th>Once a Month</th>
<th>Less than Once a Month</th>
<th>Never</th>
</tr>
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<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

134
How often would you say you learn about news information from speaking with family/relatives?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Daily</th>
<th>2-3 Times a Week</th>
<th>Once a Week</th>
<th>2-3 Times a Month</th>
<th>Once a Month</th>
<th>Less than Once a Month</th>
<th>Never</th>
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<td>Choice</td>
<td>☐</td>
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How often would you say you learn about news information by communicating with friends online?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Daily</th>
<th>2-3 Times a Week</th>
<th>Once a Week</th>
<th>2-3 Times a Month</th>
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<th>Less than Once a Month</th>
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Now, please respond to the following statements about elections and politics. Please agree or disagree with the following statements:

Whether I vote or not has no influence on what politicians do.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agreement Level</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Somewhat Agree</th>
<th>Neither Agree nor Disagree</th>
<th>Somewhat Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Choice</td>
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<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

People like me have a say about what the government does.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agreement Level</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Somewhat</th>
<th>Neither Agree</th>
<th>Somewhat Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>Choice</td>
<td>☐</td>
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<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
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<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>Neither Agree nor Disagree</td>
<td>Somewhat Agree</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>Agree</td>
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</table>
I feel the government generally uses the money we pay in taxes for the right things.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Somewhat Agree</th>
<th>Neither Agree nor Disagree</th>
<th>Somewhat Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
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</tbody>
</table>

Now, please respond to the following statements about the United States. Please disagree/agree with the following statements:

The United States is a poor example of how to run a country.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Somewhat Agree</th>
<th>Neither Agree nor Disagree</th>
<th>Somewhat Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
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Other countries should model themselves after the United States.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Somewhat Agree</th>
<th>Neither Agree nor Disagree</th>
<th>Somewhat Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
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Countries really should use the United States as a role model.

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<tr>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Somewhat Agree</th>
<th>Neither Agree nor Disagree</th>
<th>Somewhat Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
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</table>

The United States government would be better if it were more like other governments around the world.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Somewhat Agree</th>
<th>Neither Agree nor Disagree</th>
<th>Somewhat Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
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</table>
The United States government could learn a lot about how to function from other countries in the world

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Somewhat Agree</th>
<th>Neither Agree</th>
<th>Somewhat Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
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</table>

Now, please respond to a few statements about how much you trust the information you receive from various news sources.

I feel that information I receive from Jordanian news sources is factually accurate.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Somewhat Agree</th>
<th>Neither Agree</th>
<th>Somewhat Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
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I would say that I trust Jordanian news outlets that I access.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Somewhat Agree</th>
<th>Neither Agree</th>
<th>Somewhat Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
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</table>

I feel that information I receive from news sources outside Jordan is factually accurate.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Somewhat Agree</th>
<th>Neither Agree</th>
<th>Somewhat Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
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</table>

I would say that I trust foreign news sources that I access.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Somewhat Agree</th>
<th>Neither Agree</th>
<th>Somewhat Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
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In your own words, please explain how you feel about politics.
In your own words, please explain how news plays (or does not play) a role in your everyday life.

Do you feel the need to learn about news and current events on a daily basis? Please explain why or why not.

Now, please answer a few questions about yourself.

How old are you?

Gender:

- Male
- Female

Ethnicity:

- Palestinian
- Jordanian
- Armenian
- Circassian
- Other (Please specify):

Please indicate your religion:

- Muslim
☐ Christian
☐ Other (please write) 

Nationality:

☐ Jordanian citizen
☐ Palestinian identity card holder
☐ Iraqi citizen
☐ Other (Please specify): 

Please indicate the last level of education you completed

☐ I did not finish high school
☐ I graduated from high school
☐ I graduated from college
☐ I finished a master's degree
☐ I finished a Ph.D. or other terminal degree
Appendix E: Arabic Version of the Survey

شكرا على مشاركتك في هذا الاستبيان. بداية، من فضلك أجب على الأسئلة التالية عن المصادر التي تشتكي منها معلوماتك

في المتوسط، كم يوميا من أيام الأسبوع تقرأ فيها صحيفة مطبوعة؟
7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0

في كل مرة تقرأ فيها جريدة مطبوعة، تقريبا كم من الوقت تمضيه في القراءة؟

أي صحيفة (أو صحيفتين) تقرأها في أغلب الأوقات؟ من فضلك اذكر أسماء الصحف (بحد أقصى ثلاث صحف) مرتبة حسب أولوية القراءة .

هل أي من هذه الصحف أسبوعية؟ إذا كانت الإجابة نعم، من فضلك اذكر أسماء الصحف الأسبوعية؟

لا
نعم (إذا تقرأ أي من التالية صحفا أسبوعية)

(من فضلك حدد أي من الصحف التي ذكرتها تصدر باللغة العربية وليس باللغة الإنجليزية (اختير من القائمة التالية كل ما ينطبق)

الجريدة الأولى التي ذكرتها تصدر بالعربية

الجريدة الثانية التي ذكرتها تصدر بالعربية
الجريدة الثالثة التي ذكرتها تصدر بالعربية
(جريدة أو أكثر مما ذكرت تصدر بلغة غير العربية أو الإنجليزية (لهذا الاختيار، من فضلك ذكر أذكر الجريدة ولغة الصدور.

من كل عشر مقالات تقرأها في الصحف المطبوعة، في رأيك كم منها يتناول الأحداث والقضايا في الأردن و ليس في بلد آخر؟
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

في المتوسط، كم يوميا من أيام الشهر تقرأ فيها مجلة مطبوعة؟

في كل مرة تقرأ فيها مجلة مطبوعة، تقريبا كم من الوقت تمضي فيه في القراءة؟

أي مجلة (أو مجلات) تقرأ في أغلب الأوقات؟ من فضلك اذكر أسماء المجلات (بعد أقصى ثلاث مجلات) مرتبة حسب أولوية القراءة.

هل كل المجلات التي ذكرتها تصدر شهريا؟ إذا كانت الإجابة لا، من فضلك اذكر اسم المجلة ودورية الصدور.

نعم، المجلة (المجلات) التي ذكرتها تصدر شهريا

لا، مجلة أو أكثر مما ذكرت غير شهرية. من فضلك اذكر المجلة ودورية الصدور.
من فضلك حدد أي من المجلات التي ذكرتها تصدر باللغة العربية وليس باللغة الإنجليزية (اختير من القائمة التالية كل ما ينطبق)
- المجلة الأولى التي ذكرتها تصدر باللغة العربية
- المجلة الثانية التي ذكرتها تصدر باللغة العربية
- المجلة الثالثة التي ذكرتها تصدر باللغة العربية
- (مجلة أو أكثر مما ذكرت تصدر بلغة غير العربية أو الإنجليزية (لذا الاختيار، من فضلك اذكر المجلة ولغة الصدور)

من كل عشر مقالات تقرأها في المجلات المطبوعة، في رأيك كم منها يتناول الأحداث والقضايا في الأردن و ليست في بلد آخر?
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

في المتوسط، كم يوميا من أيام الأسبوع تشاهد فيه نشرة أخبار التلفزيون؟
7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0

في كل مرة تشاهد فيها نشرة أخبار التلفزيون، كم من الوقت تمضيه في المشاهدة؟

أي شبكة أو قناة تلفزيونية تشاهد فما أغلب الأوقات؟ من فضلك اذكر أسماء القنوات (بعد أقصى ثلاث نوافات) مرتبة حسب أولويته المشاهدة

من فضلك حدد أي من القنوات التلفزيونية التي ذكرتها ناطقة باللغة العربية وليس باللغة الإنجليزية (اختير من القائمة التالية كل ما ينطبق)
- القناة الأولى التي ذكرتها ناطقة بالعربية
- القناة الثانية التي ذكرتها ناطقة بالعربية
القناة الثالثة التي ذكرتها ناطقة بالعربية

لقناة أو أكثر مما ذكرت ناطقة بلغة غير العربية أو الإنجليزية (لذا الاختيار، من فضلك ذكر القناة واللغة)

من كل عشر قصص اخبارية تشاهد على التلفزيون، في رأيك كم منها تتناول الأحداث والقضايا في الأردن وليس في بلد آخر؟

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

في المتوسط، كم يومياً من أيام الأسبوع تستمع فيه إلى نشرة اخبار الإذاعة؟

7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0

في كل مرة تستمع إلى نشرة اخبار الإذاعة، كم من الوقت تمضيه في الاستماع؟

أي محطة إذاعية تستمع إليها في أغلب الأوقات؟ من فضلك اذكر أسماء المحطات الإذاعية (بعد أقصى ثلاث محطات) مرتبة حسب أولوية الاستماع.

من فضلك حدد أي من المحطات الإذاعية التي ذكرتها ناطقة باللغة العربية وليس باللغة الإنجليزية (اختير من القائمة التالية كل ما ينطبق)

- المحطة الأولى التي ذكرتها ناطقة بالعربية
- المحطة الثانية التي ذكرتها ناطقة بالعربية
- المحطة الثالثة التي ذكرتها ناطقة بالعربية

144
للهذا الاختيار، من فضلك اذكر المحطة واللغة (الحدثة أو أكثر مما ذكرت ناطقة بلغة غير العربية أو الإنجليزية)...

من كل عشر قصص اخبارية تستمع إليها في الأذاعة، في رأيك كم منها يتناول الأحداث والقضايا في الأردن وليس في بلد آخر؟

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

في المتوسط، كم يوميا من أيام الأسبوع تتensch في الاختيار على شبكة الإنترنت؟

6 5 4 3 2 1 0

كل مرة تتصفح فيها الاخبار على شبكة الإنترنت، كم من الوقت تقضيه في التصفح؟

أي المواقع على شبكة الإنترنت تتصفح في أغلب الأوقات؟ من فضلك اذكر أسماء المواقع (بعد أقصى ثلاثة مواقع) مرتبة حسب أولوية التصفح.

من فضلك حدد أي من المواقع التي ذكرتها موقع تصدر باللغة العربية وليست باللغة الإنجليزية (اختير من القائمة التالية كل ما ينطبق

الموقع الأول الذي ذكرته موقع عربي
الموقع الثاني الذي ذكرته موقع عربي
الموقع الثالث الذي ذكرته موقع عربي

145
موقع أو أكثر مما ذكرت غير عربي أو انجليزي (لذا الاختيار، من فضلك اذكر اسم الموقع واللغة -

من كل عشر قصص اخبارية تقرأ على شبكة الإنترنت، في رأيك كم منها يتناول الأحداث والقضايا في الأردن و ليس في بلد آخر؟

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

هل تتصفح أي مواقع اخبارية من على تلفونك المحمول أو أي جهاز لاسلكي آخر؟

لا - احتفظ الامسائة ذات الصلة

نعم - اكمل الامسائاة ذات الصلة

في المتوسط، كم يوما من أيام الأسبوع تتصفح فيها مواقع اخبارية على الإنترنت من على تلفونك المحمول؟

7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0

هل المدونات من ضمن المواقع التي تتصفحها على شبكة الإنترنت من اجل الحصول على المعلومات؟ إذا كانت الإجابة نعم، من فضلك (الذكر اسماء هذه المدونات (بعد أقصى ثلاث مدونات). 

لا-احتفظ المسائل المتصلة بها

نعم - اذكر اسماء هذه المدونات (بعد أقصى ثلاث مدونات

هل اللغة الغالبة على هذه المدونات العربية أم الإنجليزية؟

العربية

الإنجليزية

كلا اللغتين على حد سواء -

(لغة أخرى (من فضلك اذكر اللغة الغالبة على المدونات التي تقرأها

146
هل تتلقى اخبار عبر خدمة الرسائل القصيرة على تليفونك المحمول؟ إذا كانت الإجابة نعم، من فضلك ذكر المؤسسات التي ترسل عليك هذه الرسائل القصيرة (بعد أقصى ثلاث مؤسسات).

لا - أخف المسئول المتصل بها 
نعم (أذكر المؤسسات التي ترسل عليك الرسائل مرتبة وفقا لتكرار تلقى الرسائل).

هل اللغة الغالبة على هذه الرسائل العربية أم الإنجليزية؟

العربية
الإنجليزية
كلا اللغتين على حد سواء
لغة أخرى (من فضلك ذكر اللغة الغالبة على الرسائل).

من كل عشر رسائل قصيرة تلقاها، في رأيك كم منها يتناول الأحداث والقضايا في الأردن وليس في بلد آخر؟

لا يوجد اجابة صحيحة.
هل قمت ابداً بتحميل ملفات صوتية أو مرئية على جهاز أي بود أو أم بثري؟ إذا كانت الإجابة بنعم، ذكر المواعيد التي قمت بتحميل البودكاست منها.

لا، احذف الأسئلة ذات الصلة.

نعم - ذكر المواعيد التي تقوم بتحميل البودكاست منها.

هل اللغة الغالبة على هذه البودكاست العربية أم الإنجليزية؟

العربية.

الإنجليزية.

كلا اللغتين على حد سواء.

(لغة أخرى) (من فضلك ذكر اللغة الغالبة على البودكاست التي تقوم بتحميلها)

من كل عشر بودكاست تقوم بتحميلها، في رأيك كم منها يتناول الأحداث والقضايا في الأردن و ليس في بلد آخر؟

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

في رأيك، كم عدد المرات التي يمكن أن تقول انك علمت أو تعرفت على معلومات إخبارية من حدوثك مع أصدقائك؟

يومياً إلى 3 مرات

مرة كل أسبوع إلى 3 مرات

مرة كل أسبوع

مرة كل شهر

مرة كل شهر

مرة كل شهر

لا أتعلم أو أعرف شيئاً منهم مطلقاً
في رأيك، كم عدد المرات التي يمكن أن تقول أنك علمت أو تعرفت على معلومات اخبارية من حديثك مع العائلة؟

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>يومياً</th>
<th>الى 3 مرات</th>
<th>مرة كل اسبوع</th>
<th>الى 3 مرات</th>
<th>مرة كل شهر</th>
<th>لا تعلم أو اعرف شيئاً منهم مطلقًا</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

في رأيك، كم عدد المرات التي يمكن أن تقول أنك علمت أو تعرفت على معلومات اخبارية من حديثك مع اصدقائك على شبكة الإنترنت؟

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>يومياً</th>
<th>الى 3 مرات</th>
<th>مرة كل اسبوع</th>
<th>الى 3 مرات</th>
<th>مرة كل شهر</th>
<th>لا تعلم أو اعرف شيئاً منهم مطلقًا</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

في رأيك، كم عدد المرات التي يمكن أن تقول أنك علمت أو تعرفت على معلومات اخبارية من حديثك مع الأقرباء على شبكة الإنترنت؟

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>يومياً</th>
<th>الى 3 مرات</th>
<th>مرة كل اسبوع</th>
<th>الى 3 مرات</th>
<th>مرة كل شهر</th>
<th>لا تعلم أو اعرف شيئاً منهم مطلقًا</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

والآن، من فضلك اذكر رأيك في الجمل التالية حول الانتخابات والسياسة. من فضلك حدد درجة موافقتك أو رفضك لكل جملة.

الإدلاء بصوتك من عدمه ليس له أي تأثير على ما يفعله السياسيون.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>[</th>
<th>]</th>
<th>موافق بشدة</th>
<th>معارض بشدة</th>
<th>موافق إلى حد ما</th>
<th>معارض إلى حد ما</th>
<th>موافق بشكل محدود</th>
<th>معارض بشكل محدود</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

الناس أثاثى لهم كلمة فيما تفعله الحكومة.
لا يعرف الفرد أيضاً ما يفكر فيه المسؤولون الحكوميون

لا يمكن للفرد أن يثق فيما يقوله المسؤولون الحكوميون

لا يمكن للفرد أن يثق فيما يقوله المسؤولون الحكوميون

لا يمكن للفرد أن يثق فيما يقوله المسؤولون الحكوميون

لا يمكن للفرد أن يثق فيما يقوله المسؤولون الحكوميون

لا يمكن للفرد أن يثق فيما يقوله المسؤولون الحكوميون

لا يمكن للفرد أن يثق فيما يقوله المسؤولون الحكوميون

لا يمكن للفرد أن يثق فيما يقوله المسؤولون الحكوميون

لا يمكن للفرد أن يثق فيما يقوله المسؤولون الحكوميون

لا يمكن للفرد أن يثق فيما يقوله المسؤولون الحكوميون

لا يمكن للفرد أن يثق فيما يقوله المسؤولون الحكوميون
أشرع أن الحكومة بصفة عامة تسخر أموال الضرائب لمشاريع الصناعية من فضلك تعني في المجمل والآن، من فضلك اذكر رأيك في الجمل التالية حول الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية:

الولايات المتحدة مثل سيء لكيفية إدارة دولة

يجب أن تحتوى الدول الأخرى بالولايات المتحدة

يجب أن تنظر الدول إلى الولايات المتحدة كمثال على
لأنه، عبر عن رأيك في الجمل التالية حول مدى تفتيك في المعلومات التي تحصل عليها عن مصادر الأخبار المختلفة.

أشعر أن المعلومات التي اتبعتها من مصادر الأخبار الأردنية دقيقة من حيث الحقائق المذكورة.

يمكن أن أقول إنني أثق في الأخبار الأردنية التي تحصل عليها.

أشعر أن المعلومات التي تحصل عليها عن مصادر اخبارية خارجية دقيقة من حيث الحقائق المذكورة.
يمكن ان اقول انتى اثق بمصادر الاخبار الأجنبية التي اجتабاها
معارض بشدة، موافق موافق إلى حد ما، موافق موافق منحيد موافق موافق

صف لي كيف تشعر حيال السياسة

هل تشعر بالحاجة لمعرفة الأخبار والأحداث الجارية بشكل يومي؟ من فضلك اشرح لماذا ابا كانت الإجابة نعم ام لا

الآن، اجب عن هذه الاستفهام عن نفسك

كم عمرك؟
الجنس

ذكر

أنثى

العرق

فلسطيني

أردني

أرمني

جركسي

آخر (من فضلك اذكر العرق)

من فضلك حدد ديانتك

مسلم

مسيحي

آخر (من فضلك اذكر الديانة)

الجنسية
اأردنى الجنسية

فلسطيني حامل بطاقة هوية

عراقي الجنسية

اخرى (من فضلك اذكر الجنسية)

من فضلك حدد اعلى درجة علمية حصلت عليها

لم انه المرحلة الثانوية

انهيتي المرحلة الثانوية

احمل شهادة جامعية

احمل شهادة الماجستير -

احمل شهادة الدكتوراه او درجة م.
References


Feld, K. (personal communication, August 2008).


Martin, J.D. (personal observation, spring 2006).


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>No. of Respondents</th>
<th>μ Age</th>
<th>Sex-M/F</th>
<th>Palest./Jordanian*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sweileh</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22/23</td>
<td>17/22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shmeisani</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>27/12</td>
<td>18/20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jebel al-Webdeh</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>25.1</td>
<td>21/19</td>
<td>17/21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jebel Amman</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>15/25</td>
<td>13/22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swefiyeh</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>18/23</td>
<td>14/23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdoun**</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdali/Wast al-Balid**</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rabieh</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>23/15</td>
<td>19/16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>**Totals</td>
<td>321</td>
<td>23.91</td>
<td>169/152</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>134/159*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Summed, these two numbers do not equal 321, as they do not include Armenians, Circassians, Iraqis, etc. in the survey. Numbers of Palestinians and Jordanians, however, represent the main two ethnic groups and are, for this reason, provided here.

**Individual district statistics could not be compiled for Abdoun and Abdali, as 13 surveys which should have been categorized as Abdali were mistakenly marked as being from Abdoun.
### Table 2

**Refusal Statistics by City District**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>No. of refusals</th>
<th>μ Age</th>
<th>Sex</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sweileh</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>11/14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shmeisani</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>6/4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jebel al-Webdeh</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>8/1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jebel Amman</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>1/1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swefiyeh</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>5/6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdoun</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>2/5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdali/Wast al-Balid</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>7/6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rabieh</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td>10/4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>81</strong></td>
<td><strong>23.28</strong></td>
<td><strong>50/31</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3

Demographic Characteristics of the Sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>52.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>47.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jordanian</td>
<td>49.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinian</td>
<td>41.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab other than Jord./Palest.</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Circassian</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenian</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurdish</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin American descent</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European descent</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religion</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>89.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>10.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jordanian Citizen</td>
<td>85.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Jordanian Citizen</td>
<td>14.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinian Identity Card Holder</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraqi Citizen</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syrian Citizen</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egyptian Citizen</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemeni Citizen</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabian Citizen</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordanian/American Citizenship</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Citizen</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Median</td>
<td>23.00 Years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>23.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inter-quartile Range</td>
<td>21-26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Did Not Finish High School</td>
<td>7.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obtained High School Diploma</td>
<td>29.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finished College (including 2-year college)</td>
<td>57.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obtained Post-Graduate Degree</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctorate/Other Terminal Degree</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N =321

1 All individuals in the sample are either Jordanian citizens living in Jordan, or permanent residents of Jordan. Some respondents, though, may have one parent of Latin American or European descent, however, and reported this as their lineage.
Table 4
Population-Respondent Figures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gender</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>52.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>47.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Citizenship</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordanian Citizen</td>
<td>85.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Nationality</td>
<td>14.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ethnicity</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Bank Jordanian</td>
<td>49.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinian Ethnicity</td>
<td>41.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Religion</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>89.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>10.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N=321


<sup>*</sup> These figures represent estimates based on Ryan (2002), Nydell (2006) and Lust-Okar (2006), but are not official census figures. Such figures could not be obtained from the Jordan Department of Statistics.

<sup>n</sup> These figures come from Nydell (2006), the CIA World Factbook, as well as the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office: [http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/about-the-fco/country-profiles/middle-east-north-africa/jordan/](http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/about-the-fco/country-profiles/middle-east-north-africa/jordan/). The latter two references are only as recent as 2001, however. This figure reports percentages of Muslims/Christians for the entire country, not just the capital.
### Table 5

**Overall News Consumption Patterns**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Medium</th>
<th>% Read Medium</th>
<th>Days per Week Use</th>
<th>Median Time</th>
<th>% Medium in Arabic</th>
<th>% Stories Focusing on Jordan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Print Newspapers</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Read Print Newspaper</td>
<td>90.8%</td>
<td>3.17</td>
<td>30 min.</td>
<td>97.8%</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Days Per Week</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newspaper Use</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median Time</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Read Newspaper</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Newspapers in Arabic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Individuals Listing Weekly Newspapers</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>~% Stories Focusing on Jordan</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Print Magazines</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Read Print Magazine</td>
<td>81.6%</td>
<td>3.86</td>
<td>60 min.</td>
<td>82.3%</td>
<td>22.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Days Per Month Magazine Use</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median Time</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Read Magazine</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Magazines in Arabic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Stories focusing on Jordan</td>
<td>22.2%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Television</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Watch Televised News</td>
<td>96.8%</td>
<td>5.34</td>
<td>45 min.</td>
<td>88.9%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Days Per Week Television Use</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median Time</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Watch Televised News</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Networks in Arabic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Stories focusing on Jordan</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Radio</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Listen to Radio News Broadcasts</td>
<td>80.9%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Days Per Week Radio Use</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median Time</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Listen to Radio News</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Radio Stations in Arabic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Stories focusing on Jordan</td>
<td>95.2%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Internet News</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Access News Online</td>
<td>66.1%</td>
<td>2.75</td>
<td>60 min.</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Days Per Week Internet Use</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median Time</td>
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<tr>
<td>Access News</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Web sites in Arabic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Stories Focusing on Jordan</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Accessing Blogs (% of total N / % of subjects who seek news online)</td>
<td>2.2%/9.2%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SMS Texts</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Receiving SMS Texts</td>
<td>10.6%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>88.2%</td>
<td>37.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>from News Organizations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%News Texts in Arabic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Text Messages Focusing on Jordan</td>
<td>37.9%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Podcasts</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%Accessing News via</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>85.7%</td>
<td>9.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Podcasting/MP3 Downloads</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%Podcasts in Arabic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%Podcasts Focusing on Jordan</td>
<td>9.0%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 6
Top News Sources Listed By Respondents

Source (% of total users listing that source)\(^2\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspapers</th>
<th>Source (% of total users listing that source)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Al Rai (82.9%)</td>
<td>5. Al-Arab Al-Yawm (10.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Ah-Dustour (53.7)</td>
<td>6. The Jordan Times (4.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Al-Ghad (52.3)</td>
<td>7. Al-Medina (4.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Al-Waseet (24)</td>
<td>8. Al-Mumtaz (3.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Al-Arab Al-Yawm (10.8)</td>
<td>6. The Jordan Times (4.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Al-Arab Al-Yawm (10.8)</td>
<td>7. Al-Medina (4.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Al-Arab Al-Yawm (10.8)</td>
<td>8. Al-Mumtaz (3.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Al-Arab Al-Yawm (10.8)</td>
<td>9. Al-Quds (1.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Al-Quds (1.7)</td>
<td>10. Shihan (0.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Shihan (0.4)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Magazines</th>
<th>Source (% of total users listing that source)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Layalina (30.6%)</td>
<td>5. Haya (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Sayidaty (27)</td>
<td>6. Viva (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Rotana (19)</td>
<td>7. Laha (3.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Zahrat Al-Khaleej (15.9)</td>
<td>8. Jurs (2.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Layalina (30.6%)</td>
<td>6. Viva (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Sayidaty (27)</td>
<td>7. Laha (3.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Rotana (19)</td>
<td>8. Jurs (2.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Zahrat Al-Khaleej (15.9)</td>
<td>9. Living Well (2.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Layalina (30.6%)</td>
<td>10. JO (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Layalina (30.6%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TV Networks</th>
<th>Source (% of total users listing that source)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Al-Jazeera (83.9%)</td>
<td>5. Al-Manar (13.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Al-Arabiya (39.9)</td>
<td>6. Al-Aqsa TV (10.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. MBC (27.9)</td>
<td>7. CNN (2.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Jordan TV (18.5)</td>
<td>8. Rotana (2.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Al-Jazeera (83.9%)</td>
<td>6. Al-Aqsa TV (10.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Al-Arabiya (39.9)</td>
<td>7. CNN (2.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. MBC (27.9)</td>
<td>8. Rotana (2.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Jordan TV (18.5)</td>
<td>9. BBC English (1.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Al-Jazeera (83.9%)</td>
<td>10. BBC Arabic (1.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Al-Jazeera (83.9%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Radio Stations</th>
<th>Source (% of total users listing that source)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Fan FM (33.9%)</td>
<td>5. BBC Arabic (13.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Rotana (24)</td>
<td>6. Mazaj (13.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Amman Radio (17.7)</td>
<td>7. Sawat (8.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Amman Radio (17.7)</td>
<td>8. Hayat (8.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Fan FM (33.9%)</td>
<td>6. Mazaj (13.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Rotana (24)</td>
<td>7. Sawat (8.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Amman Radio (17.7)</td>
<td>8. Hayat (8.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Fan FM (33.9%)</td>
<td>9. Sawt Al-Ghad (6.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Amman Radio (17.7)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Online Sources</th>
<th>Source (% of total users listing that source)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Al-Jazeera.net (38.8%)</td>
<td>5. Google News Arabic (6.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Yahoo! (17.7)</td>
<td>6. Al-Ghad (6.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Al-Rai (11)</td>
<td>7. BBC Arabic (5.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Facebook (6.7)</td>
<td>8. Al-Arabiya (4.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Al-Jazeera.net (38.8%)</td>
<td>6. Al-Ghad (6.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Yahoo! (17.7)</td>
<td>7. BBC Arabic (5.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Al-Rai (11)</td>
<td>8. Al-Arabiya (4.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Al-Jazeera.net (38.8%)</td>
<td>9. CNN English (4.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Yahoo! (17.7)</td>
<td>10. Hotmail—MSN (3.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Al-Jazeera.net (38.8%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SMS Text Sources(^4)</th>
<th>Source (% of total users listing that source)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Zain (29.4%)</td>
<td>5. All other news sources, i.e. non-cell phone providers (14.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Orange (14.4)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Umnia (14.4)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Al-Jazeera Mobile (5.9)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. All other news sources, i.e. non-cell phone providers (14.7)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^2\) These percentages were calculated in the following way: 287 respondents reported they read a print newspaper at least once each week. Of those reporting at least some newspaper use, 238 reported reading Al-Rai. Of the 287 individuals reporting at least some newspaper use, 82.9 % listed Al-Rai as one of the three papers they read.

\(^3\) About 6 percent of respondents listed “FM” as one of the radio stations from which they acquire news. While “FM” is listed here, it is not clear if this reference refers to “Amman FM” or some other station. Enough people listed simply “FM,” however, for it to be included here, despite the fact that the specific station could not be identified.

\(^4\) The reason only five SMS sources are listed here is because too few respondents reported receiving news text messages to make more than four rankings meaningful.
Table 7
Respondents Receiving News Information from Interpersonal Sources

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>News Information from Friends</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Daily</td>
<td>36.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2-3 Times/Week</td>
<td>33.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Once a Week</td>
<td>14.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2-3 Times/Month</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Once a Month</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Less than Once/Month</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Never</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>News Information from Relatives</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Daily</td>
<td>46.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2-3 Times/Week</td>
<td>25.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Once a Week</td>
<td>12.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2-3 Times/Month</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Once a Month</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Less than Once/Month</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Never</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>News Information Online from Friends</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Daily</td>
<td>12.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2-3 Times/Week</td>
<td>15.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Once a Week</td>
<td>15.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2-3 Times/Month</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Once a Month</td>
<td>9.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Less than Once/Month</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Never</td>
<td>26.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>News Information Online from Relatives</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Daily</td>
<td>16.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2-3 Times/Week</td>
<td>15.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Once a Week</td>
<td>10.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2-3 Times/Month</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Once a Month</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Less than Once/Month</td>
<td>10.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Never</td>
<td>30.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 8

Composite Scales of Political Trust, Political Cynicism & Media Credibility

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Index</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>By Sex (M/F)</th>
<th>By Ethnicity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Palest./Jord./Other Arab)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political Cynicism</strong></td>
<td>313</td>
<td>4.63</td>
<td>1.28</td>
<td>4.42/4.87**</td>
<td>4.70/4.61/4.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political Trust</strong></td>
<td>315</td>
<td>4.14</td>
<td>1.14</td>
<td>4.30/3.98*</td>
<td>3.77/4.45/4.17***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>U.S. Gov. Ratings</strong></td>
<td>311</td>
<td>4.77</td>
<td>1.26</td>
<td>4.80/4.74</td>
<td>4.92/4.66/4.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Media Credibility</td>
<td>318</td>
<td>4.72</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>4.76/4.67</td>
<td>4.42/5.00/4.45n</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belief in Accuracy of Domestic News</td>
<td>319</td>
<td>4.65</td>
<td>1.56</td>
<td>4.76/4.53</td>
<td>4.38/4.95/4.15n</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in Domestic News Outlets</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>4.81</td>
<td>1.59</td>
<td>4.80/4.82</td>
<td>4.47/5.09/4.75n</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Media Credibility</td>
<td>319</td>
<td>4.94</td>
<td>1.05</td>
<td>4.93/4.94</td>
<td>4.97/4.93/4.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belief in Accuracy of Foreign News</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>5.31</td>
<td>1.27</td>
<td>5.26/5.36</td>
<td>5.41/5.22/5.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in Foreign News Outlets</td>
<td>319</td>
<td>4.57</td>
<td>1.46</td>
<td>4.60/4.54</td>
<td>4.52/4.65/4.40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Difference is significant at alpha level of p<.05, according to an independent samples t-tests
** Difference is significant at alpha level of p<.01, according to independent samples t-tests
***Difference is significant at alpha level of p<.001, according to One Way ANOVA
n Difference is significant at alpha level of p<.01, according to One Way ANOVA.

Please recall that 1 item in the original 5-item scale was removed (“U.S. govt. would be better off if were more like other govts. in the world,”) to increase internal consistency, leaving a total of four items in the scale.
Table 9
Respondents’ Reported Levels of Political Cynicism, Political Trust & U.S. Government Ratings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>%Agree</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political Cynicism</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Whether I vote or not has no influence on what politicians do.”</td>
<td>52.1</td>
<td>4.70</td>
<td>1.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“People like me have a say about what the government does.”</td>
<td>39.6</td>
<td>3.97</td>
<td>1.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“One never knows what governmental officials are thinking.”</td>
<td>68.6</td>
<td>5.13</td>
<td>1.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Trust</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Most of the time I feel the government is doing what is right.”</td>
<td>55.5</td>
<td>4.55</td>
<td>1.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“One cannot always trust what governmental officials say.”</td>
<td>51.9</td>
<td>4.52</td>
<td>1.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“One can be confident that politicians will always do the right thing.”</td>
<td>32.6</td>
<td>3.73</td>
<td>1.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“I feel the government generally uses the money we pay in taxes for the right things.”</td>
<td>45.0</td>
<td>4.19</td>
<td>1.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“In general, I’m confident in the government's ability to run its national programs.”</td>
<td>56.4</td>
<td>4.73</td>
<td>1.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Government Ratings</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“The U.S. is a poor example of how to run a country.”</td>
<td>52.8</td>
<td>4.53</td>
<td>1.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Other countries should model themselves after the U.S.”</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>3.30</td>
<td>1.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Countries really should use the U.S. as a role model.”</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>2.90</td>
<td>1.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“The U.S. government would be better off if it were more like other governments in the world.”</td>
<td>58.4</td>
<td>4.60</td>
<td>1.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“The U.S. government could learn a lot about how to function from other countries in the world.”</td>
<td>62.1</td>
<td>4.74</td>
<td>1.40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6 % of respondents that agree somewhat, agree, or strongly agree with the listed assertions.
7 Political Cynicism, Political Trust and U.S. govt. ratings were assessed on a 1-to-7 strongly disagree-strongly agree scale. Strongly disagree was coded as a ‘1’ and strongly agree a ‘7.’ The n for each item ranged from 313-320.
Table 10
Regression Model Using Demographic & News Consumption Variables to Predict Political Cynicism

---

Model 1: Demographic & News Consumption Variables Predicting Political Cynicism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Demographics</th>
<th>Standardized Betas</th>
<th>Significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>-.172</td>
<td>.025*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnicity</td>
<td>.105</td>
<td>.192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion</td>
<td>-.120</td>
<td>.117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationality</td>
<td>.117</td>
<td>.131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.071</td>
<td>.370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-.004</td>
<td>.959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>News Consumption Variables</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newspapers</td>
<td>-.031</td>
<td>.690</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magazines</td>
<td>-.131</td>
<td>.090</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio News</td>
<td>.010</td>
<td>.897</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Televised News</td>
<td>.065</td>
<td>.414</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internet News</td>
<td>-.013</td>
<td>.927</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interpersonal Sources</td>
<td>.043</td>
<td>.565</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Model’s R² =.102

Model 2: Demographics, News Consumption & Media Credibility Predicting Political Cynicism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Demographics</th>
<th>Standardized Betas</th>
<th>Significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>-.171</td>
<td>.023*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnicity</td>
<td>.093</td>
<td>.240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion</td>
<td>-.130</td>
<td>.087</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationality</td>
<td>.135</td>
<td>.079</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.044</td>
<td>.580</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-.007</td>
<td>.932</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>News Consumption Variables</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newspapers</td>
<td>-.017</td>
<td>.827</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magazines</td>
<td>-.098</td>
<td>.201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio News</td>
<td>.013</td>
<td>.866</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Televised News</td>
<td>.068</td>
<td>.384</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internet News</td>
<td>-.010</td>
<td>.892</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interpersonal Sources</td>
<td>.018</td>
<td>.814</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media Credibility</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Media Credibility</td>
<td>-.188</td>
<td>.011*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Model’s R² =.136

* = significant at the p<.05 level
Table 11
Regression Model Using Demographic & News Consumption Variables to Predict Political Trust

Model 1: Demographic & News Consumption Variables Predicting Political Trust

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Demographics</th>
<th>Standardized Betas</th>
<th>Significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>.148</td>
<td>.050*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnicity</td>
<td>-.295</td>
<td>&lt;.001**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion</td>
<td>.058</td>
<td>.439</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationality</td>
<td>.044</td>
<td>.565</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-.125</td>
<td>.109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-.008</td>
<td>.915</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>News Consumption Variables</th>
<th>Standardized Betas</th>
<th>Significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Newspapers</td>
<td>-.039</td>
<td>.608</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magazines</td>
<td>.060</td>
<td>.426</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio News</td>
<td>.029</td>
<td>.715</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Televised News</td>
<td>-.021</td>
<td>.786</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internet News</td>
<td>-.007</td>
<td>.925</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interpersonal Sources</td>
<td>.027</td>
<td>.711</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Model’s R² = .127

Model 2: Demographics, News Consumption & Media Credibility Predicting Political Trust

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Demographics</th>
<th>Standardized Betas</th>
<th>Significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>.141</td>
<td>.027*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnicity</td>
<td>-.235</td>
<td>.001**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion</td>
<td>.077</td>
<td>.229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationality</td>
<td>-.006</td>
<td>.930</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-.070</td>
<td>.295</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-.009</td>
<td>.888</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>News Consumption Variables</th>
<th>Standardized Betas</th>
<th>Significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Newspapers</td>
<td>-.053</td>
<td>.409</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magazines</td>
<td>-.023</td>
<td>.718</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio News</td>
<td>.025</td>
<td>.708</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Televised News</td>
<td>-.027</td>
<td>.681</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internet News</td>
<td>.010</td>
<td>.870</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interpersonal Sources</td>
<td>.076</td>
<td>.227</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Media Credibility</th>
<th>Standardized Betas</th>
<th>Significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Media Credibility</td>
<td>.527</td>
<td>&lt;.001***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Model’s R² = .387

* = significant at the p<.05 level
** = significant at the p<.01
*** = significant at the p<.001 level
Table 12
Regression Model with Demographic & News Consumption Variables Predicting Feelings toward the U.S.

Model 1: Demographic & News Consumption Variables Predicting Feelings toward U.S.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Demographics</th>
<th>Standardized Betas</th>
<th>Significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>.014</td>
<td>.854</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnicity</td>
<td>.068</td>
<td>.393</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion</td>
<td>.053</td>
<td>.488</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationality</td>
<td>-.108</td>
<td>.163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.067</td>
<td>.397</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-.071</td>
<td>.360</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>News Consumption Variables</th>
<th>Standardized Betas</th>
<th>Significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Newspapers</td>
<td>.059</td>
<td>.442</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magazines</td>
<td>.142</td>
<td>.066</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio News</td>
<td>-.084</td>
<td>.288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Televised News</td>
<td>.205</td>
<td>.010*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internet News</td>
<td>-.129</td>
<td>.088</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interpersonal Sources</td>
<td>.132</td>
<td>.078</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Model’s $R^2 = .128$

Model 2: Demographics, News Consumption & Media Credibility Predicting feelings toward U.S.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Demographics</th>
<th>Standardized Betas</th>
<th>Significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>.024</td>
<td>.746</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnicity</td>
<td>.053</td>
<td>.497</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion</td>
<td>.044</td>
<td>.562</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationality</td>
<td>-.098</td>
<td>.198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.084</td>
<td>.285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-.069</td>
<td>.369</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>News Consumption Variables</th>
<th>Standardized Betas</th>
<th>Significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Newspapers</td>
<td>.053</td>
<td>.482</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magazines</td>
<td>.136</td>
<td>.073</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio News</td>
<td>-.084</td>
<td>.284</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Televised News</td>
<td>.181</td>
<td>.022*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internet News</td>
<td>-.113</td>
<td>.129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interpersonal Sources</td>
<td>.147</td>
<td>.047*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Media Credibility</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Media Credibility</td>
<td>-.177</td>
<td>.015*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Model’s $R^2 = .397$

* = significant at the $p < .05$ level
Figure 1: “Jordan First” Emblem
Figure 2: Histogram of Political Cynicism Scores

Mean = 4.63
Std. Dev. = 1.278
N = 313
Figure 3: Histogram of Political Trust Scores

Pol.Trust.Index

Mean = 4.14
Std. Dev. = 1.135
N = 315
Figure 4: Histogram of U.S. Government Rating Index

Ethnocentrism Scale

Mean = 4.77
Std. Dev. = 1.259
N = 311
1 In 2007, however, Freedom House reported that the Jordanian government had not, in fact, abolished the requirement that all Jordanian journalists belong to the Journalists Union. Either way, the Union does still exist online, and the English site can be found at http://jpa.easycgi.com/english/.

2 Al-Hurra is not included in this analysis, because its Web site serves as a guide to its televised programming, not as a separate online news source as does the BBC.

3 In hindsight, it probably would have been best to ask respondents not only if they had finished college, but also if their degree was from a two-year community college or vocational school. Also, I got the sense that some respondents who were still in college were reporting that they had in fact graduated. In fact, I had to correct a few individuals on this. In friendly conversations, some respondents told me they were university students, and then reported on the survey that they had finished college. When this happened, I clarified the question and asked them to reconsider it. Due to some of the issues reported here, the numbers of college graduates reported may be inflated.