CONFLICT WITHIN SUDANESE AND SOUTH SUDANESE DIASPORAS:
OUTLINING THE NATURE AND IMPACTS OF CONFLICT AND ASSESSING EXISTING
EDUCATIONAL RESPONSES

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Abstract

JESSICA BUTCHER: Conflict within Sudanese and South Sudanese Diasporas:
Outlining the nature and impacts of conflict and assessing existing educational responses
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Conflict within the Greater Sudanese diaspora remains, and is exacerbated, in the resettlement process. Conflict derives from historical or current homeland issues such as identity or political cleavages. Conflict also emerges in the process of migration and acculturative stress. This has intergenerational and gender factors, and develops in reaction to the changing dynamics of a community ‘in exile’. Finally, conflict occurs as a result of interaction with the society of the resettlement country, including elevation of certain groups or individuals within the diaspora, be they ethnic, religious, gender or otherwise distinct. Formal education offers opportunities for conflict transformation in this resettlement context, through differing means and outcomes. Peace Education offers a deliberate, individualized approach to reframing conflict and peace. Vocational education offers structural inclusion through employment, a status demonstrated to decrease hostilities. Community Development Programming offers greater social inclusion, re-framing education for peace from an individual to a collective endeavor.
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Introduction

The Sudanese and South Sudanese diasporas\(^1\) are diverse, displaying a myriad of identities, narratives and migration experiences. Sudan has long been a significant contributor to refugee movement globally (Tempany, 2009), with increasingly high profile conflicts waged at times in combination with each other, and at others in isolation in geographically and ethnically diverse regions of the now newly divided land.

Sudan is one of the largest countries in Africa, housing hundreds of tribes and dialects, and multiple religions (Richmond & Gestrin, 1998 in Tempany, 2009). Identity, as ethnicity, is not static, but instead a messy and fluid construct (Hatoss, 2012), and members of these varying and constantly evolving groups now find themselves part of the diaspora – a group that at once attempts to create new community, whilst maintaining the old, forging and sustaining complex social relations within and between their countries of origin and residence (Lim, 2009). This transnational involvement of refugees has been studied in relation to economic, and to a lesser extent social, remittances, as has the sometimes uneasy relationship between refugees and their new host communities. Very little attention has, however, been directed toward the often significant ongoing conflict within diaspora communities: how this is perpetuated, and its implications for the diaspora, as well as communities in the countries of origin and residence.

This conflict is significant in diaspora life as an ensuing lack of communal trust frames ongoing relationships; can add to the already significant stress of resettlement; influences the way that children are taught about culture, history and other ethnicities or religions; alters the way that people in the residence country perceive the origin nation and conflicts; and can ultimately lead to a perpetuation of armed conflict. This paper will thus explore and discuss the level and nature of conflicts that exists within Sudanese and South Sudanese diasporas, as well as the implications of this conflict for the diaspora and to a lesser extent the countries of origin and residence. Finally, educational opportunities for assisting the diaspora to transform and decrease conflict ‘in exile’ will be

\(^1\) Both nations’ diasporas, and their separate and combined multiplicity of ethnic, cultural and linguistic groups are encompassed in this discussion, and will sometimes be referred to collectively as ‘Greater Sudanese’. This is due to the complexity of identities involved that are not always geographically or ethnically oriented, and methodological difficulties as most refugees discussed left Sudan before official division of Sudan and South Sudan. It is not in any way a political statement, or intended to undermine the diversity of statehoods, or desired statehoods, involved, but rather a way of categorizing a diverse region and diverse diaspora.
acknowledged and assessed, focusing on three broad models. Each model approaches diaspora conflict from a differing perspective, and endeavors to generate transformation through differing outcomes.

The first of these is the individual approach, with its intention to alter and broaden individual attitudes through the broad field of Peace Education. This differs from the second field, which aims to decrease conflict through diminishing systemic alienation of refugees through Vocational Education. The third area is the adult education model of Community Development Programs, which seek to address social alienation in order to generate more peaceful interactions. Discussion will focus particularly on identity conflict, alongside which other contributing factors will be presented and considered, drawing on research from resettlement contexts of Australia, North America and the European Union. Through these analyses, the most appropriate and effective role for education in this dispersed diaspora context will be sought and discussed.

**Methodology**

This research utilizes archival resources and a combination of data gathered through studies in Australia, the European Union and North America. Conflict dynamics and diaspora needs acknowledged in previous research, drawing from studies in social psychology, education, economics, conflict, and migration, will be assessed. Educational possibilities and conflict theory in the areas of individualized peace education, structural inclusion through employment, and social inclusion through community development programming will also be presented and analyzed. This thesis contributes to this field of academia through the application of diverse theoretical and practical frameworks, drawing together commonalities and differences in existing data, and analyzing educational opportunities for peace-building in the diaspora.

**Conflict in the Diaspora**

The Greater Sudanese diaspora is subject to conflict, and its exacerbators, above and beyond the experience of many other communities as it concurrently navigates three kinds of conflict. The first area of conflict is that which occurs due to historical or current issues in the homeland. This
is the conflict that has generated migration and might include cleavages that are identity, resource or political in nature. The second form is that which occurs within the diaspora, due to the process of migration and resettlement, and acculturative stress. Such conflict may have intergenerational factors, relate to gender norms, and develop in reaction to the changing dynamics of a community ‘in exile’. The third area is that conflict which occurs due to interaction with the society of the resettlement country, creating additional stresses, and potentially decreasing diaspora cohesion through discriminatory practices. This area of conflict is highly context-specific, and may include societal recognition of certain refugee narratives over others, or elevation of certain groups or individuals within the diaspora to leadership positions, inciting resentment from the remainder of the community and reinforcing divides. It might also relate to religious adherence, as resettlement countries in the West become increasingly rejecting of Islam, for example, increasing resettlement difficulties for one group within the diaspora over those experienced by others.

**Refugee Experience**

In 2008, at least 3.8 million people were believed to belong to the resettled global African diaspora, with the majority living in North America and Europe (Mohamoud & Osman, 2008). Greater Sudan is a large contributor to this, with large refugee-based diaspora populations throughout the world. The process of forced migration is one of inevitable distress, and difficulties in resettlement and the loss of social and cultural networks add significantly to the post-traumatic stress experienced by many (Khawaja & White et al 2008). As nationalism may prosper from the major dislocations and disruptions brought about by international migration (Conversi, 2012), diasporas can experience a heightened emotional connection with their homeland as their life becomes increasingly disjointed. This encourages some to lobby, or take a position in relation to development of their country of origin, and for others it increases financial involvement with remittances sent in many cases to sustain or enhance the livelihood of family, friends, or affiliated organizations, or, in other cases, to support armed groups in pursuing ongoing violent conflict (Vorrath, 2012). It can lead to reinforcement or development of nationalist or ethnocentric sentiment, as people differentiate between themselves and the ‘other’, framing the latter in an adversarial light.
Sumner (1906) coined the term of ‘ethnocentrism’, distinguishing between the ‘ingroup’ and ‘outgroup’ and associated intergroup dynamics that dictate group formation and competition (in Tajfel, 1982). This theory places one’s own group in the central role of superiority, and uses it as a reference point for all other groups that are, through such a lens, of course inferior. While the theory and notion of ethnocentrism is commonly accepted, a study of 186 preindustrial societies found that in many cases, indeed 75 per cent, the degree of internal warfare was positively correlated with hostility toward out-groups, meaning that conflict with external groups is often paired with conflict internally, somewhat contradicting Sumner’s theory of in-group and out-group dynamics (Pettigrew, 2007) and demonstrating the complexity of identity dynamics in conflict. Indeed, Sumner’s theory has been challenged in the acutely context-sensitive of conflict, as out-group stereotyping and social distance vary along with differences emphasized (Brewer, 1981 in Tajfel, 1982). Without explicit reference to ethnicity, a professional respondent in Westoby’s (2009) study of Greater Sudanese in Queensland, Australia, echoed the fluid and emergent nature of conflict dynamics in the diaspora, stating:

In my observation, to begin with people arrive here and are glad to be alive and they are also glad to find other survivors – there is an initial euphoria. But then there is depression – primarily due to survivor’s guilt, and the temptation is to either blame themselves or blame others. As others arrive, if these deeper issues are not resolved, people break into factions and everything then depends on how people work out those conflicts. (Professional interview 8, Westoby, 2009 p.63)

This statement demonstrates how this complex inter-group conflict dynamic within the diaspora may thus be further exacerbated and manipulated by the trauma suffered by refugees throughout the migration process, as past grievances can fuel the perpetuation of ongoing animosities in the resettlement context.

The refugee experience of adopting and adjusting to a new country of residence is invariably traumatic, and most quantitative studies have found high rates of PTSD and depression. Often this is assumed to relate primarily to those conflict experiences individuals have survived prior to resettlement, however, resettled Greater Sudanese refugees themselves often report more concern with current stressors such as family problems than with past trauma (Tempany, 2009). This indicates the powerful role of the communities of the host country in the migration experience, be they indigenous host communities or existing Sudanese diaspora. The new context provides important support possibilities, and also challenges in the form of altered cultural norms and often prejudice.
Migrant responses to stereotyping often reify ‘traditional’ practices symbolizing their homeland culture, particularly those related to gender roles and morality (Cohen 1969; Smith-Hefner 1999; Golomb 1978, in Fábos, 2012). This is not so for all migrants, however, as many attempt to concurrently navigate practices and frameworks of both communities, to differing degrees. This difference of acculturation can, and does, provoke further cultural conflict within the diaspora in a myriad of ways.

Identity conflict

Refugees are often defined by their insecurity, with little regard for their identity, context and life prior to conflict, nor the nature or potential of their participation in society post-conflict (Ekblad et al, 2004). Popular thinking in the west often equates common skin color with an assumed common African behavior, language, attitudes and capabilities (Ndhlovu, 2009). In the case of the Greater Sudanese diaspora, the geographically, linguistically and ethnically diverse community bases identity on a variety of things that are in constant flux, and represents more than simply a choice of the home or the host country, rather more closely linked with common ideologies and power dynamics (Blackledge, 2005; Gal, 2006, in Hatoss, 2012). The individual’s membership and role within the group is highly relevant to this identity in conflict, as Sherif and Sherif (1953, 1961) found that individual behavior in conflict is more dictated by the role of the group in intergroup competition than any pre-existing personal relationships that may have existed between groups prior to hostilities (in Tajfel, 1982). Collective identity is also highly relevant to this discussion, as groups have been found to demonstrate higher level of aggression or retaliation than individuals in some conditions (Tajfel, 1982), meaning that once conflicts become polarized along group lines, as opposed to individual, the intensity of conflict may be much more significant. Given the diversity of identity groups present in the Greater Sudanese diaspora, particularly those that are ethnically associated, this group element of conflict is of high relevance.

The Greater Sudanese diaspora has experienced significant ethnically aligned cleavages, as outlined by Moro (2004) in case studies from Uganda and Egypt. Some instances of conflict have been based on historical tension, such as that between the Dinka and Nuer in diaspora. However,
conflict can also be related to current homeland affairs as was the case with street violence between refugees from these two ethnic groups in Cairo. This physical conflict was stimulated by reported atrocities committed in South Sudan by members of the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), which is often associated with Dinka ethnicity because of its leadership. As a result, abuses committed by these soldiers have often been attributed to Dinka people, building on existing resentment towards this ethnic group due to its dominant size and thus relative power in parts of southern Sudan (Moro, 2004). While in the homeland, ethnic dominance may be a source of privilege, once in exile this can have the converse impact of increasing the vulnerability to this ethnic group as they find themselves subject to historical and current resentments in the transient refugee context of insecurity.

Historical and current intergroup power differences in this way emerge into relevance in the diaspora. The Dinka experience exemplifies this well, as the largest ethnic group in South Sudan, and seemingly used to associated privilege, noted by refugee camp administrators in Uganda (Moro, 2004). This led to certain expectations on their part, due to their numeric and thus cultural significance, that were not met when they found themselves a relatively insignificant minority in some parts of the diaspora. Other ethnic groups, used to being the minority yet now finding themselves much more significant in numbers, harbored resentment that was exacerbated by current events such as those prompting violence in Cairo, as well as historical frustrations that were now able to be expressed in the altered power dynamic of the diaspora.

The Dinka have thus experienced many problems with other ethnic groups, and at times have been individually targeted in retaliation. Administrators of refugee camps also bring their own narratives and experiences to the dynamic, in some cases also displaying anti-Dinka sentiment (Moro, 2004). The result of this in Adjumani camp, Uganda, was that the Dinka were separated from the rest of the refugee population, and denied permanent resettlement with other refugees (Moro, 2004). The changing power dynamics associated with demographic shifts, in the context of current and historical tensions, are thus significant in the life of the diaspora. These dynamics, exemplified in these neighboring countries, form the initial experiences of the Greater Sudanese diaspora and likely
impact the development of their collective narrative in exile. A Sudanese interview participant in
Australia referred to the ongoing dynamic of tribalism and its importance in resettlement, stating:

In Africa, the educated people encouraged tribalism. This is the only way they can get into
power – when the tribe is behind you. So when you come here, and struggle, some still have
this in mind. (Participant interview 3, Westoby, 2009 p.63)

Such tribal or ethnic conflict is not unique to the Dinka. In Uganda, refugees from the Madi
and Kuku ethnic groups, both from Sudan, descended into conflict as resource allocation and
competition increased, despite these ethnic groups having experienced positive relations in Sudan
(Moro, 2004). Resources became central to this conflict – beyond the basics of existence, as power
resources became newly contested and sought after. The two groups combined accounted for almost
80% of refugees at the Adjumani camp. As the dominant ethnic groups in the camp, these groups
competed for NGO jobs, educational opportunities, basic resources and influence (Moro, 2004). In
Sudan, they weren’t in competition, and even supported each other against the perceived domination
by larger groups, especially Dinka. They had never directly competed for resources previously, but in
the camp environment they emerged as competitors. When violence erupted, other ethnic groups
were then also drawn into the conflict based on historical grievances and competition, for example the
Lotuho ethnic group which then sided with the Kuku based on former allegiance, against the Madi -
their historical resource rivals (Moro, 2004).

Again, unaddressed historical grievances emerge in current conflicts, increasing the
complexity of these group interaction dynamics. Importantly, the UNHCR response to this conflict, as
with the Dinka, was to separate the two dominant competing ethnic groups, creating camps, and thus
temporary territories, that were almost entirely Kuku or Madi (Moro, 2004). Given these examples of
the re-emergence of unaddressed ethnic conflict in the Greater Sudanese diaspora, questions could
be asked about the flow on impact of this segregation in subsequent resettlement as these groups
were not reconciled and rivalries were allowed to remain.

Relationships with the host country, and in temporary settlement, can also generate conflict,
as one ethnic or identity group might enjoy very differing conditions to another. In Egypt, a transit
country for many Sudanese and South Sudanese, many northern Sudanese have family and cultural
ties to the local population. Most southern Sudanese, by comparison, do not, sharing little heritage.
This has negatively impacted their ability to settle and gain inclusion in Cairo (Moro, 2004). Local communities and authorities further exacerbate this difference, with intimidation, violence and arrests of African Sudanese, as opposed to Arab Sudanese, including both undocumented and UNHCR-registered (Moro, 2004).

In Cairo, as elsewhere in the diaspora, Sudanese cultural events have proven powerful demonstrations of the cleavages between ethnic groups in diaspora. In some places football has been the litmus test, but in Cairo it was the Sudanese Cultural Festival of 1996. Some ethnic groups split, as some members opposed participation in an ‘Arab’ event, while others rejected the inclusion of ethnic groups that are present in, though not indigenous to, South Sudan such as the Nubi. (Moro, 2004)

Both the Egyptian and Ugandan diaspora examples share the commonality of geographic proximity to Sudan. The issues faced, however, are not unique to those exiled to surrounding countries. Westoby’s (2009) study found a similar situation in Australia, though with differing manifestation of ethnic cleavages. He quotes a South Sudanese community leader saying:

‘The politics of Southern Sudan has a significant impact here on the community. Smaller tribes tend not to co-operate with the larger tribes. They are afraid of being dominated. Significant parts of this are attitudes towards the Nilotics tribes. These are the tribes linked geographically to the Nile – Nuer, Dinka, Luo, Chiluk and Anyuak. They are major tribes that have also spread, but their origins are along the Nile. They are tall and dark.

Other tribes – the largest non-Nilotitic tribe is the Zanda, in Western Equatoria, of the Bantu race – they and other smaller tribes that join the Zanda, often do not cooperate. The Bari-speaking tribes have also historically annexed themselves to the Zanda.

In Brisbane, many of the leadership issues, struggles and conflicts are still built around these historical conflicts. It is hard to break down the barriers between Nilotic and Zanda/Bantu/Bari people.’ (Participant Interview 6, Westoby, 2009 pp.62-3)

Complexity is added to this discussion of identity conflict as persisting ethnic identities can be heightened not only in response to differences, but also pervasive similarities (Conversi, 2012). This is an important recognition, as conflict within the diaspora may not always be related to profoundly differing narratives, but may rather also include competition or differing views between those with very similar narratives, or in reaction to external societal perceptions of the universal commonality of ‘Sudaneseness’. Whether in response to difference or similarity, as a general rule, ‘exiled’ individuals
tend to feel strongly linked to a symbolically valuable territory (Vorrath, 2012), heightening the emotional plain at which diasporas interact with regard to their homeland.

This interaction with the homeland, whether emotional, financial, political or social, is a key opportunity to express and reinforce identities. Obligation can be a guiding force, as individuals feel a duty to positively impact the homeland situation given their newfound safety or security. Ethnic affinities and group identification as discussed above can also generate sympathy or feelings of guilt toward conflicting groups, or allow people to harbor grievance much longer than homeland residents (Bigombe et al. 2000, in Brinkerhoff, 2009), enabling the continuation of conflict in the homeland, or the diaspora, or likely both as presented here. Identity is thus key to any discussion of diaspora, and especially in the case of the Sudanese and South Sudanese diasporas an analysis of this dynamic is required to assess levels of conflict and ways to overcome this.

Diversity of experience

Diaspora groups comprise fundamentally diverse actors and sub-groups beyond and intersecting with ethnic lines, including governments-in-exile, political opposition figures, armed groups, advocacy groups — every actor in a conflict can be present in the diaspora. The Sudanese and South Sudanese diasporas are incredibly diverse in identity, as already explored. This identity is based on many aspects of life, and is impacted by each individual’s story and personality. Just as experience of violence might radicalize one, it may prompt another to promote peace (Vorrath, 2012). It is thus impossible to predetermine the impact of a particular event on a population, and the varying responses can lead to deeply held, and deeply divergent, beliefs. Beyond this, each armed conflict within Sudan and South Sudan, in each geographical and social context, is different in nature, leading to fundamentally different experiences (Vorrath, 2012).

Furthermore, the time at which individuals left their homeland, or arrived in their country of resettlement, and the path that they made all combine to impact their experience of migration, conflict and life. These experiences have the potential to create conflict in the diaspora, especially when one type of experience gains more ‘cultural value’ than another, skewing representation of the community as demonstrated by Sudanese community members in conversation with the United States Institute
of Peace, discussed below (USIP, 2010). This diversity of experience and recognition in the refugee context encourages a complex web of distrust between individuals. Westoby (2009) presents a South Sudanese community leader’s perspective on the issue of trust between such diverse groups in the diaspora, stating:

We seem to have come here with a culture of mistrust that sometimes makes it hard for us to build community – it is deeply distressing to see these patterns of mistrust constantly undermining some of our efforts. (Participant interview 7, Westoby, 2009 p.67)

Such distrust cannot be dismissed as unfounded paranoia, as former armed combatants and officers are known to be part of the South Sudanese diaspora context in Australia (Westoby, 2009).

Despite this, ‘Sudaneseness’, or ‘South Sudaneseness’ can be experienced in diverse ways that are both divergent and also fundamentally cohesive (Fábos, 2012). Adding to concerns about the consequences of its fracturing, Westoby (2009) found community to be fundamental to South Sudanese sense of wellbeing, both to ‘stick together’ through their resettlement hardship, and in following traditional community frameworks of living. Building on Sumner’s theory of ethnocentrism, the body of evidence to suggest that external conflict increases intra-group cohesion appears somewhat dependent on conditions. Stein (1976) found that if the external conflict invokes threat that affects all group members equally and indiscriminately, involves a possible solution, and the group has the capacity to care for and support its membership, increased cohesion is likely (in Tajfel, 1982). In the case of the Greater Sudanese diaspora in Australia, there is thus tension between the factors exacerbating conflict and the need for community for personal wellbeing. In this context, the lack of uniform in-group experience and a lack of capacity to support group members might account for the fracturing of this group that is so fundamental to coping strategies – even in the face of societal discrimination and injustice.

**Diaspora Representation**

Where internal conflict exists, communal assessment and engagement can be problematized by a proliferation of self-appointed leaders and ‘warlords’, exploiting tense ethnic, religious and emotional allegiances (Neumann & Emmer, 2012). To make use of Galtung’s (1971) conflict modeling in reference to the resettled diaspora, essentially the host society as a whole can be viewed as a
center point, within which there is a power center and a power periphery. This then relates to the Sudanese diaspora within it as the periphery, with this peripheral power again hosting its own center and periphery. The Sudanese diaspora can in this way be viewed as a center periphery structure, relating to the host and origin communities as such. This is helpful in understanding conflict in the diaspora especially as it relates to interaction with the host community, and flow-on intra-diaspora impacts.

As Galtung (1971) theorizes, the two ‘centers’ interact, to their mutual, though not always even, benefit. It is not desirable to either center that the two peripheries interact. These peripheries are the less engaged actors, with very limited mutual awareness. Through this construct, many aspects of conflict within the diaspora can be analyzed. Differing actors can be cast in the role of the ‘power center’, engaging with a potentially shifting ‘center’ of the periphery, dependent on the specific situation. For example, the homeland: in this case the Sudanese or South Sudanese government may be the power center interacting with the power center of the diaspora, which will be positioned as such due to political concerns and allegiances. The same example could be given for the host country government, seeking aligned individuals within the diaspora in their society’s midst. These political concerns can cause great issues within the diaspora as the external search for leadership of the diaspora seeks to satisfy the external desire for an internal ally – someone to speak for the diaspora as a whole. Such leadership is often not organically forthcoming due to social fracturing, and such center periphery power dynamics may influence the choice of who to support in their leadership, as lamented by members of the Darfuri diaspora in conversation with the United States Institute for Peace (USIP, 2010).

Galtung’s construct is also useful in assessing the often unanticipated negative outcomes of the well-meaning, perhaps NGO, community wanting to develop capacity of the diaspora through leadership training and giving voice to this disempowered community, without recognizing its deeply fractured nature. This can result in reinforcement of the power center, effectively increasing the division between diaspora center and periphery through knowledge and skills. What might be intended to empower the diaspora community may thus result in a perpetuation of conflict within the
diaspora, as evidenced by the selection of English-speaking males to lead UNHCR Peace Education programs in Kenya, as discussed later.

Research has found that competition between groups based on scarcity can be extended in intergroup dynamics to those goods that have no value outside the contest itself – such as status, power or prestige (Turner, 1975 in Tajfel, 1982). Thus in the case of the Greater Sudanese diaspora, these elements are able to occupy significant space in the quest for social and political recognition from a perspective of communal and individual disempowerment, as demonstrated in the Kuku-Madi conflict in Uganda.

Diaspora representation is a delicate area in this context of diverse identities, acculturation levels and experience. It is nonetheless an important issue, as western governments and NGOs collaborate with, or are lobbied by, diaspora leaders for both homeland and residence country affairs (Ostergaard-Nielsen, 2006). Establishing legitimate leadership in a context where gender, generational, identity, and other roles are contested is extremely difficult. In 2008 and 2010 the United States Institute of Peace convened selected members of the Darfurian diaspora to discuss issues related to the conflict situation in Darfur. Those present recommended that greater care be taken by the United States and United Nations in selecting truly representative and independent individuals and civil society organizations to participate as consultants to the peace process (USIP, 2010). Their discussion also demonstrated the lack of cohesion within even this smaller sub-group of the diaspora, as they disagreed on fundamentals of roles and representation whilst criticizing diaspora fragmentation and the maintained affiliation of some with particular armed movements (USIP, 2010).

The group also noted skewed external support in Darfur, as older Darfurian organizations led by traditional leaders were not gaining the same support from international NGOs as newer organizations led by a younger generation and women, displaying the potential negative impact of external agendas, even when intended to empower (USIP, 2010).

In a context that usually presumes some positive level of social remittances, especially around democracy, it is somewhat problematic that the diaspora advocate democracy in their countries of origin, when there are questions about how representative the diaspora leadership is of the wider group of migrants and refugees that they themselves claim to represent (Ostergaard-
Nielsen, 2006). This is an area of diaspora conflict significantly impacted by external actors, be they home or host country governments, societies, or international actors.

**Gender conflict**

An additional exacerbating factor in diaspora conflict emergence and perpetuation is gender. The disruption of forced migration usually means loss or restriction of family and community relations, physical displacement, cultural dislocation and restricted opportunities for self-determination (Ager, 1999; Deng et al., 2005; Marfleet, 2006, in Marlowe, 2012). This can significantly impact culturally based gender roles and associated self-perception of diaspora members. A common challenge for Greater Sudanese diaspora men is the changed family dynamic in their new country of residence, where social norms and economic realities often dictate that fathers are expected to care for their children, alongside mothers. Even when there is cultural resistance from the mother, father or both, without traditionally supportive communal constructs for child rearing, fathers’ involvement in this aspect of family life is simply a practical necessity (Marlowe, 2012). With the new cultural and contextual norms of diaspora life, the public role of Greater Sudanese women has also been significantly altered, as younger women challenge the old leadership, bridge secular and religious organizations, protest war and violence and establish themselves as theorists and activists (Lim, 2009).

Westoby (2009) conducted extensive research into the sociality of healing for South Sudanese refugees in Queensland, Australia. He quotes research participants’ responses regarding the social trauma of family disintegration and changing gender norms.

‘Women’s economic independence is very threatening. Even with peace coming to Sudan, many men are worried that if they want to go home and help in Sudan the wives will not come. This freedom for the women is a real problem in our African context. It is complex and linked to traditions – for example, if there is a divorce in Sudan the children go to the men and of course it is different here. Here a major source of conflict is that when a woman leaves a man it is always assumed that another man is involved. Then violence can erupt. Also, there are simple misunderstandings within Australia people: for example, when I Sudanese man says, "I am going to kill [referring to wife]", he does not mean it – it is only an expression. "I am going to beat [referring to a child]" is also only an expression. We are like the Italians – we express ourselves emotionally. But people here take it literally.’ (Participant Interview 6, Westoby, 2009 p.60)

Another interviewee is quoted saying:
“A big [issue] is women – back home they might be a doctor or a teacher, but they recognize their place. The role of the husband is clear and strong. Here the role of the man is reducing. Some women become radical in this situation and it causes much distress.” (Participant Interview 5, Westoby, 2009 p.60)

This gender challenge is a great source, and exacerbator, of conflict within the diaspora, both at a family and community level as new gender norms threaten established identities and attempt to push forth new manners of interaction. Many within the dominant host culture might also be unaware of the extreme cultural involvement in the formation of gender roles, leading to a lack of self-reflection and awareness when approaching this emotive subject in a multicultural context, and a tendency for condemnation of differing norms. Poppitt & Frey (2007) note the somewhat invisibility of diaspora gender conflict from the host society’s perspective, as Sudanese immigrants are aware of host culture disapproval of cultural practices with particular sensitivity to this divergent area of gender. Sudanese girls in Australia have also been found to have greater acculturative stress than boys, as they navigate dual cultural expectations that are further diverged than those of their brothers (Poppitt & Frey, 2007).

Gender conflict is immensely important individually and communally, and could easily warrant the entire focus of this discussion. However, in retaining the key focus of this discussion on identity conflict, gender will be considered only as a contributing factor and thus not explored in full.

**Generational aspects of conflict**

Sudanese children and adolescents in Australia usually live within a family structure, subject to the acculturative stresses of their parents as well as themselves. Parental control in this context is somewhat paradoxical, as it causes additional acculturation stress for adolescents, yet at the same time provides a sense of security and ethnic belonging (Dwairy, Achoui, Abouserie & Farah, 2006 in Poppitt and Frey, 2007).

Like all parents, Sudanese and South Sudanese in the diaspora educate their children, passing on values, experience, as well as their narrative of life, and in this case conflict, to the next generation. This differs in nature from parent to parent, as what some view as irresponsible long distance nationalism, others justify as necessary freedom fighting (Ostergaard-Nielsen, 2006). Many
adolescent refugees have little experience of Sudan or South Sudan, having grown up in refugee
camps or otherwise in exile, and their understanding of culture and connection with their homeland
comes through relayed information and experience from parents and others in the community (Poppitt
& Frey, 2007). Non-formal or Informal ethnic education for young migrants, where offered, seldom
draws on a widely accepted curriculum or set of values, and the decision, whether conscious or
unconscious, as to what attitudes and values will be conveyed to young people is largely at the
teacher's discretion (Cohen, 2004).

In the case of refugees, who have undergone traumatic experiences and severe conditions in
the home country, and often in transit and in the host country, significant grievances and fears are
often passed on to following generations (Vorrath, 2012; Conversi, 2012). This trauma impacts the
narrative of young refugees, and can perpetuate conflict within the broader diaspora. Conversely, it
can also cause family or local conflict as trans-generational narratives and norms are met with
resentment from young refugees, who are often more acculturated than their parents in the new
society through their access to formalized schooling (Poppitt & Frey, 2007).

Westoby (2009) quotes a professional working with the South Sudanese diaspora in
Australia:

“...A really major [factor] is the issue of family and children, children going along paths that they
don’t want them to go on. They want them, the children, to hold in some holy reverential way, the past – and they want, from the children, a sense that the past and present pain has been worthwhile, and a thanking of their parents. This is the acknowledgement they want from the children – to be valued in that – and instead they are finding that the children are not valuing that and valuing instead parties, drugs and alcohol, and the peer group.” (Professional interview 1, Westoby, 2009. p.61)

The relationship between parent and child in the diaspora is perhaps more complex than this
account, however, with Poppitt and Frey’s (2007) research, also conducted in Queensland, Australia,
finding Sudanese youth demonstrating protectiveness of their parents, through reluctance to answer
questions about any topics that might provoke social judgment of their parents, such as in areas of
discipline. Many adolescents also found that while they may not agree with the stricter family norms
advocated by their parents, they also disagreed with seeming Australian norms, finding them overly
disrespectful. Poppitt and Frey (2007) found the level of integration adolescents might achieve to be
partly dependent on the allowances of their parents, a demonstration of the interdependent nature of
family wellbeing. Intergenerational learning, norms and acculturative differences are thus significant and complex factors in diaspora life, and conflict.

Religion

Religious beliefs and practices provide a number of coping strategies commonly used by refugees from Africa (Khawaja & White et al 2008), and religion, usually Christianity, has proven a dominant avenue for women’s integration into Christian-majority societies and an important dimension of their understanding and experiencing of belonging (Benesova, 2004). This reveals an obvious potential cleavage between those of the dominant faith in the new host society, and those finding themselves in the minority – perhaps newly so. It begs the question as to the sense of belonging of non-Christians in Sudanese and South Sudanese diasporas, and how this impacts diaspora dynamics.

In the Egyptian context, for example, where we have already noted societal persecution of largely animist or Christian black African Sudanese groups, some Sudanese Muslims perceived church groups to be favoring Christians in their assistance (Moro, 2004). This perception may also extend to resettlement countries such as Australia, where Islam, and Muslim migration, has become the fear du jour, with anxiety about terrorism being associated with Muslims. Casimiro et al (2007) conducted research with Iraqi, Afghan and Sudanese Muslim women in Perth, Western Australia, finding that this group faced issues above and beyond those of other refugees based on their presence in ‘a host society that has become increasingly hostile to their form of religious expression and traditional lifestyle... an avowedly secularised society that has an intense mistrust of Islamic beliefs and practices’ (Casimiro et al, 2007 p.56). The Australian public has come to fear Muslim migration, in a politicized media context of terrorism discourse, ‘continuously replete with dominant stereotypes and negative attitudes towards refugees and Muslims, where Muslims are often labeled as ‘fanatics’ and ‘terrorists’ and refugees are ‘flooding our borders’ (Osuri and Banerjee, 2004; Yasmeen, 2001; Papastergiadis, 2004, in Casimiro et al, 2007 p.59).

The Isma project of the Australian Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission found a significant number of Arab and Muslim Australians to be feeling fearful, isolated and vulnerable, with
a majority of respondents reporting prejudice that they had experienced because of their race or religion. Such experiences included both verbal and physical abuse, occurring in a wide array of public spaces such as schools, shopping centers, airports, hospitals, and within Australian government and non-government entities (AHREOC, 2004). The Commission’s 2003-4 Annual Report found that:

Participants felt that those most at risk were readily identifiable as Arab or Muslim because of their dress, physical appearance or name, particularly Muslim women who wear the hijab. Arab and Muslim youth felt that they were particularly at risk of harassment which has led to feelings of frustration, alienation and a loss of confidence in themselves and their trust in authority. Many newly-arrived Arab or Muslim migrants and refugees reported that their experiences of prejudice have made it harder for them to negotiate the already difficult process of settling into a new country. (AHREOC, 2004 p.3)

Thus in a religiously diverse diaspora, such as that of the Greater Sudanese which is largely separated into a Christian/Animist South and a Muslim North, differing interactions with, and levels of acceptance by, the host community increase the difference of experience and privilege, real or perceived, of groups of differing faiths. In Australia, 83% of Greater Sudanese individuals adhere to some form of Christianity, while 12% are Muslim (ADIC, 2007). This significant numerical imbalance between religious communities creates another opportunity for marginalization in this context of already unequal societal responses.

Consequences of diaspora conflict

Conflict in the diaspora has implications for the country of origin, the host community, and the individuals and diaspora community itself as, by definition, the diaspora maintains complex emotional, geographical, social or political relationships with each of these groups. Such conflict can encourage long distance nationalism that perpetuates conflicts through economic and political support or intervention without personal risk. As seen in Ethiopia, Kashmir, Sri Lanka, Israel, Palestine and Kosovo, diaspora groups have been significant actors in augmenting and perpetuating conflicts (Collier and Hoeffler 2001; Lyons 2004; Vertovec 2005, in Vorrath, 2012). Ethno-national mobilization can be perceived as necessary for maintaining threatened ethnic boundaries, with the diaspora supporting more dangerous and less peaceful approaches, and often far more radical than ‘natives’ when they engage in ‘homeland politics’ (Connor 1986; Kaiser 2004 in Conversi, 2012). This has
been equated by some with reacting to guilt towards those left behind, or experiences of statelessness and marginalization in either home country, host country, or diaspora, facilitating the propagation of militant ideas among diasporas (Vorrath, 2012).

The host community can be impacted as perceptions of Sudanese, or refugees, or broader conflicts may be skewed or misunderstood. Violence within the diaspora, such as that documented in Cairo impacts society beyond the diaspora. It is also open to politicization, as people use this violence as justification for disallowing refugee resettlement in their society (Westoby, 2009). Political lobbying by diverse and divergent groups with differing aims can also impact the actions and perceptions of the host country. This complex web of challenges faced by Greater Sudanese refugees, and its impact on their conflict internally and externally, demonstrates the importance of promoting multilayered dialogue between the diaspora and host community and also within the diaspora itself (Ostergaard-Nielsen, 2006).

The diaspora itself is impacted by all of the above challenges, as essential relationships to the acculturative process are fractured, and additional trauma added to resettlement journeys. Through conflict in the areas of gender, identity, religious recognition and a multitude of other facts of life, the immensely traumatic refugee experience is compounded for the already diverse Sudanese and South Sudanese diasporas. The right to represent the diaspora, and routine perceived misrepresentation, is of paramount concern to diaspora members, and the potential consequence of perpetuating violence is evident. This all occurs largely in the absence of traditional conflict resolution structures, legitimate leadership or communal cohesion.

**Conflict Resolution**

As communities and individuals have moved from Sudan and South Sudan to the diaspora, their conflicts have changed. From initial land and agricultural conflict and blood feuds, ‘post conflict’ disputes have shifted focus to include also aspects of life such as traditional authority and family separation and reunification (Wassara, 2007). These social conflicts would traditionally be addressed by customary mediation, compensation or restitution in practices that differ greatly between Greater Sudanese cultural groups. Dinka and Nuer traditionally rely on mediation by elders, usually religious
persons, and require mutual consent in their processes. In Luo tradition, however, disputes would be handled by a king who would appoint a panel of judges to address the specific issue (Wassara, 2007). Traditional institutions and social behavior have undergone radical change as the result of the ongoing conflict and displacement of the diaspora to new lands (Wassara, 2007), however, and diaspora groups are forced to determine their own conflict resolution mechanisms in an altered multi-ethnic context, often in the absence of community cohesion, and usually in the absence of respected elders who are least able to make the long geographical journey of resettlement and may have been targeted in homeland conflict. The immediate capacity to resolve conflict that arises is thus significantly altered and diminished in this new diaspora context.

Reconciliation and education

Reconciliation of conflict in the pluralistic and multilayered fractures of the diaspora is both necessary and thus far largely elusive. In approaching this notion, we should view the diaspora as a divided entity in itself, yet one that also exists as a distinct group within the host community, and one that relates to the country of origin. Thus there are three of Galtung’s theoretical centers: that within the resettled diaspora grouping; that of the host country; and that of the homeland. Individual and group actors in the diaspora may occupy differing roles in each that should be acknowledged if they are to be reconciled.

Reconciliation requires active transformation, deliberately building a new common outlook on the past. Some scholars have gone beyond this, arguing that the process of reconciliation should ultimately lead to collective forgiveness and healing. Forgiveness requires a decision to learn new truths about ourselves, in order to open a new perspective of our adversaries, reimagining them as human beings with equal rights. It requires an active reformation of the collective memory in order to develop an inclusive vision of the future that allows new positive relations with the ‘other’ (Bar-Tal & Rosen, 2009). The idea of reconciliation through education is not new, as Boyden and Ryder (1996) assert, conflict is the result of learned attitudes and learned behavior, thus it is possible to alter both attitudes and behavior through educational interventions (in Sommers, 2001). This requires, however, a shift in emphasis of evaluation of education system ‘success’ from the current dominant paradigm
of increased performance on international testing and league tables, toward a focus on minimizing social exclusion, promoting social cohesion and equipping students with the opportunities and abilities to actively participate in society with tolerance and respect for diversity, as put forth in Article 29 on the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (Klasen, 2001).

With regard to reconciliation in the diaspora, its nature and removal from Greater Sudan positions it somewhat uniquely, balancing clear emotional, social and often political interaction with the homeland with geographic removal from it, and from each other. This means that standard mechanisms for retributive justice, for example, may not be as relevant or operationally possible given limits of jurisdiction and capacity – with the exception of course of those cases deemed significant enough to attract the attention of the International Criminal Court or governments. Likewise, a Truth and Reconciliation Commission may be unfeasible, as not all actors are present, and the communities that such models usually rely on have become fractured and dispersed. Such a commission may also promote a negative response from the host community, as individual admission of guilt in past conflicts may reinforce prejudice of violence amongst African communities, or be utilized politically as necessitating the end of humanitarian schemes. Thus neither of these commonplace post-conflict approaches is feasible for this nature of conflict in the diaspora, and alternative methods must be sought in order to promote peace and reconciliation in these communities. In accordance with Galtung’s (1971) conception of ‘structural violence’, this peace must be achieved not only through absence of physical conflict, but ‘cooperation and non-violent social change, aimed at creating more equitable and just structures in society’ (Hicks, 1988 in Sommers, 2001 p.6). Formal, non-formal and informal forms of education create an opportunity to transform such structures and open new possibilities in the realm of social justice.

**Diaspora Educational Context**

The educational context of the resettled Sudanese and South Sudanese diaspora is diverse, and educational opportunities and barriers for conflict transformation differ greatly between contexts. In Australia, as in the majority of other resettlement countries, refugee communities are dispersed, forming often numerically insignificant minorities in established mono- or multicultural communities.
Impossible to ignore in the diaspora context is, of course, the rest of the host society. The Greater Sudanese diaspora does not operate in a vacuum, and is subject to the systems and structures of their new society. The success of any educational peace-building initiative thus relies not only on the diaspora itself, but also involves the rest of society. It is difficult to imagine sustainable conflict reduction, should systemic and social discrimination remain.

I was standing in Coles. An Australian lady came close to me and called me ‘nigger – go back home’. I felt very bad. (Sudanese woman, 36 in Casimiro, 2007 p.66)

Education can be formal, non-formal or informal. These have varying definitions, and in this discussion we will adopt the distinction that Formal Education occurs through systematic, organized and deliberate presentation of content, for example, mandatory school-aged education undertaken in a classroom; Non-formal education occurs through those educational processes occurring outside formal structures, though still demonstrating deliberate educational content, for example some deliberate parent-child education, or self-guided homework; and Informal Education occurs throughout daily existence with no obligation on the student, or predetermined direct educational outcome, for example through the mass media, or the intergenerational learning between parent and child that is not deliberate in intention.

Much of what follows is an attempt to navigate formalized educational responses to largely informal social and systemic issues. Just as within the diaspora, intergenerational identity transmission and learning is also an important factor in the broader community, as perceptions about migrants, refugees, Africans, and Greater Sudanese individuals specifically are impacted and formed. The European Union’s 1988 Eurobarometer 30 Survey, found that older respondents, while not inherently more predisposed to prejudice, tended to display the key characteristics of lower education, more politically conservative views and national identity, that significantly increased their prejudice toward migrants (Pettigrew, 2007). In a country such as Australia with many holding living, and relatively recent, memory of the White Australia Immigration policy, such intergenerational learning may significantly promote prejudice.

Media portrayal of groups and selective news broadcasts is also key. The mass media is a particularly powerful educator. Whether we’re talking about race or gender or class [or religion], popular culture is where the pedagogy is, it’s where the learning is (bell hooks, 1997 p.2). Stuart Hall
(1997) has contributed much to this discussion of media representation, and specifically the relationship between cultural and economic power, and representation. Hall argues that meaning is given to situations by the deliberately constructed lens provided to us, building on dominant cultural conventions. This lens deliberately creates identification with or alienation from an image, creating the desired response. Repetition of images is very useful in creating automatic reactions to certain groups or situations. This is particularly important when considering stereotyping as it moves from conscious to unconscious reflexivity and can be very easily related to media images of refugees in the hyper-politicized Australian and European Union contexts. While other studies have found that exposure to one image is enough to create a lasting perception, repetition of biased depictions throughout film, television and advertising encourages an unthinking and unquestioning response. In this way representation of refugees and other groups in the media are not re-presenting what is in society, but rather moves beyond this, adopting dominant cultural frameworks to create the desired interpretation. Hall argues that the media creates the narrative, rather than reflecting it. The media thus dominates the determination and representation of societal acceptability, and conversely, of societal 'otherness'. This 'other' space is that stereotypical realm occupied by migrants, particularly refugees, and others with low cultural capital who become subject to oversimplified negative depictions in the name of creativity, saving dominant groups from more complex discourse (Hall, 1997).

Many Muslim refugees, for example, believe that increased prejudice against them is due to a lack of information, or misinformation, of the broader public. This extends to biased media portrayals and a lack of legal enforcement of protection from discrimination and vilification based on faith adherence (AHREOC, 2004). This both acknowledges the prejudice experienced by this, one of the fastest growing faith groups within the refugee community, and its systemic nature (Casimiro et al, 2007). It is difficult to ignore the media’s importance in any educational proposition to reduce conflict in the diaspora. While we are focusing on the education of the diaspora, we must therefore also consider the education of the wider community and how this impacts peace and reconciliation for this group within their midst.
Analysis: Three forms of Formal Education for Peace

For this analysis, three forms of education have been selected for discussion and comparison, with each offering potential for diaspora conflict mitigation through differing foci. The first form of education, Peace Education, focuses on individualized learning, and peace building through challenging and shifting of prejudice and associated behaviors through exposure to alternative narratives and cultural norms. The second form, Vocational Education, aims to reduce tensions by better equipping members of the Greater Sudanese diaspora to fully and meaningfully engage with the Australian workforce, through acquisition of appropriate skills and training. The third form of education, Community Development Programming, seeks to overcome diaspora conflict by generating and strengthening social structures and engagement between members of the diaspora, and between the diaspora and mainstream society. These three forms of education demonstrate very different approaches to diaspora conflict, recognizing the variety of contributing factors involved in such conflict, and differing schools of thought as to its transformation.

Individual Alienation: Peace Education

Introduction

It is widely acknowledged in the field of post-conflict education that a smooth transition from social conflict to peace cannot reasonably be expected, and that some education, be it formal or role modeled, may be required. In refugee camps, such an approach has been adopted by international actors such as the UNHCR, UNESCO, Red Cross, and specialized education and peace-building NGOs. In the resettled diaspora, however, the common assumption is that refugees leave their conflict behind and that in traversing national boundaries and oceans, individuals and communities will somehow find peaceful living. As stated by a participant in Westoby’s (2009) study:

It is very hard to be suddenly talking about none or no violence with a community that has lived in a context where violence is the only way of surviving. In war, violence is non-negotiable, you survive through acts of violence, and then you arrive here and you have to change, in act non-violence is non-negotiable. And you have to make that change really quickly or suddenly the systems will have split your family up. Colonisation is a violent process, and it is felt in the body, the family, the community. How do we deal with that overnight? (Participant Interview 7, Westoby, 2009 p.57)
Acknowledging this, Peace Education programs have been adopted by a variety of organizations in the humanitarian field (Sommers, 2001), though these remain inadequate in capacity and coverage for the vast number of refugees generated by conflict, and are often limited to refugee camps. Once refugees are resettled it is usually assumed that their geographical removal from the conflicted homeland will suffice to overcome tensions, and further Peace Education is not provided.

**What is Peace Education?**

Peace Education is a diverse, loosely structured term used in very different ways by different authors. Some use it interchangeably with Conflict Resolution Education. Others frame it as a subset of Multicultural Education, or vice versa. Peace itself is a vague and subjective concept, with connotations ranging from the inner spiritual, to the absence of fighting, to equality of opportunity. This has led to some confusion about the nature and goals of Peace Education as a field, with some feeling that it is too soft, vague, preachy, and perhaps even a waste of time (Sommers, 2001). The International Congress on Peace in the Minds of Men in 1989 created the concept of ‘a culture of peace’, based on universal values of respect for life, liberty, justice, solidarity, tolerance, human rights and gender equality (Korostelina, 2012). Although both focus on the realization of human rights, Peace Education can be seen as differing from Peace Building in that the former is just one of many tools to promote the latter. A commonality of Peace Education discourse, however, is an understanding that the goal is to change individuals’ behavior from conflict-oriented to peace-oriented (Baxter & Ikobwa, 2005). As articulated by Bar-Tal and Rosen (2009), Peace Education aims to actively and deliberately transform society members’ worldview, including their values, beliefs, attitudes, emotions, motivations, skills, and patterns of behavior in order to facilitate conflict resolution, peace-building, and prepare individuals to live in an era of peace and reconciliation.

Peace Education initiatives vary considerably, and can be formal, informal or non-formal, as programs can be run in schools and community organizations; through the powerful tool of the mass media; or can focus on communal interventions that empower using local cultural understandings and practices.
The formal, school-based, approach to Peace Education as discussed here focuses efforts within the formal school system, viewing the school system as a major agent in socialization (Dreeben, 1968; Himmelweit & Swift, 1969 in Bar-Tal & Rosen, 2009), with an individualized framework for learning. In recognition of the massive task of persuading the whole society of the importance of peacemaking, it focuses on this one agent, due to its power and influence. The education system is an obvious choice for such societal narrative changing, as it has the unique value of being compulsory in most societies, with a geographical and social reach across all segments of society. Schools possess the authority, legitimacy, resources, methods and conditions for Peace Education to occur, and predominantly educate children and youth who tend to be more open to new ideas and information than older generations, and at a time in their development that they are least affected by the dominating ethos. (Bar-Tal & Rosen, 2009)

Peace Education, by some best practice models, moves beyond the advocacy sphere to teach not only what constructive behavior is, but also how to achieve it. Democratic learning styles and the ability to model, practice and take ownership of new behaviors are key. There have been some very successful Peace Education programs, for example those provided in partnership with the UNHCR. Sommers (2001) provided the following assessment the UNHCR program in the Kakuma and Dadaab refugee camps in Kenya:

The strengths of the UNHCR Peace Education Programme are many. It promotes refugee empowerment and self-sufficiency. It appears to have been reasonably successful in bridging cultural gaps in Kakuma and Dadaab... Its practical orientation and objectives naturally and appropriately connect to the objectives and values inherent in refugee protection and education. The problem-solving skills it teaches have the potential to support both peaceful refugee repatriation and stable resettlement. It is also popular with refugees: a measure of its success lies in the fact that refugees in the programme not only continued but sometimes even expanded the programme during periods when UNHCR peace education personnel were not present. Finally, it is cost-effective. (p.37)

While values of tolerance, peace, acceptance, non-violence, and human rights are not objectionable to most societies, some of the requirements of formal Peace Education programs can create resistance to such programs outside of refugee camp contexts. Peace Education in schools requires major investment, as new educational objectives, new curricula and textbooks, teacher training, and the creation of a school climate that is conducive to peace education are all necessitated (Bar-Tal & Rosen, 2009).
Requirements for effective Peace Education in schools

Many, if not most, resettlement countries for Greater Sudanese diaspora would have the infrastructure and authority to meet educational conditions required for school-based Peace Education, however the societal conditions necessary for successful Peace Education in schools may not be so forthcoming – especially in a country that is not involved in the conflict itself. Bar-Tal & Rosen (2009) note that in conflict or post-conflict contexts, these should include evident broader progress towards peace; support for the peace process from the majority; readiness for reconciliation; and political support. However, in resettlement countries for the Greater Sudanese diaspora, these may not be relevant, sidelined instead by an ignorance that conflict is present at all.

A major consideration for formalized Peace Education, however, is leadership. As discussed previously, leadership in the diaspora is an immensely charged, and challenging, area, with significant implications for education. Determining who might make decisions about education, and how it might happen are far from simple. Capacity development of such leadership is thus essential, though with respect for the issues and limitations previously stated. Finding teachers within the diaspora community for Peace Education is the obvious preference, but then there is the potentially significant problem of the identity of such teachers, who despite good intentions, may 'carry with them the legacy and habits of their lifetime membership in oppositional ethnic groups’ (Bekerman, 2009 p.80).

If such programs are to succeed, the teacher must have the capacity and orientation to not only teach, but also personally uphold and demonstrate the knowledge, skills and attitudes associated with Peace Education (Baxter & Ikobwa, 2005). The formal curriculum structure of Peace Education in schools, as per the UNHCR model, uses rights-based learning as the key principle in designing the democratic and involved learning methodologies. To have sustained impact, these programs shouldn’t be ‘one off’, and should be structured, with activity-based, practical learning (Baxter & Ikobwa, 2005).

Selection of teachers also requires high levels of awareness and sensitivity, as discussed previously in relation to diaspora representation, as teacher training is in itself a form of empowerment. Sourcing from existing power structures, such as the educated males of the refugee
elite, rather than the most vulnerable and alienated, may further skew existing power dynamics, increasing marginalization and conflict between the diaspora’s power center and periphery (Sommers, 2001).

**The Issue of Exclusion**

Alongside the above requirements, a significant criticism of Peace Education is its risk of becoming counter-productive if focused only on children and not their parents or families, given the demonstrated importance of intergenerational learning in families – particularly from parent to child (Sommers, 2001).

Formal education must always negotiate the issue of exclusion. The more formalized an interaction, thus the more reliant on structured physical participation, the more susceptible to program ‘drop-outs’. This lack of involvement of ‘drop outs’, those disillusioned youth most at risk of marginalization, was noted in Kakuma, Kenya, though formalized education systems in Australia face a similar issue as disenfranchised students are pushed out of a system unable, or in some cases unwilling, to cater to them. This relates to a key criticism of the peace education field, which is noted for a tendency to aim programs at those already seeking peace (Sommers, 2001). This can serve to facilitate and magnify exclusion of the more marginalized individuals and groups, whose frustration may link with social, systemic and psychological isolation. The following three quotes from Kakuma youth interviewed by Sommers (2001) demonstrate these areas, the first eluding to social isolation or ostracization:

They do nothing, they don’t have jobs, they are idle without anything. They are frustrated. Drop-outs can be robbers, in breweries. They are never allowed into [our] traditional dances. Peace education is for the most peaceful youth, not the Drop-outs, who are in the majority. (Sommers, 2001 p.28)

The second to the economic isolation of poverty:

Young men become Drop-outs, another youth commented, “due to frustration. Without food at home, with hunger, they can’t understand what they’ve learned [in school]”. (Sommers, 2001 p.28)

And the third referencing the isolating impact of psychological trauma:

“Some people do not understand [Drop-outs], they are not well because they saw killing, looting, and so on during war, so they’re still disturbed.” (Sommers, 2001 p.28)
These are all significant issues faced by refugees, and are extremely important to acknowledge and address if Peace Education is to positively impact communities. No one must be excluded from the dialogue of reconciliation, for it to be meaningful and sustainable. Thus in the resettled refugee context, Peace Education is made more difficult due to the number of excluded community members who are beyond the formal K-12 education system, and unable to meaningfully participate. Social exclusion among children is, after all, primarily associated with social exclusion and economic opportunities of the family in which they grow up (Klasen, 2001). Parents continue to demonstrate conflictive models while peace educators target such behavior in the child, thereby positioning Peace Education between children and adults and creating a situation where it is "virtually impossible for education to inculcate peaceful values in children when adult role models are built on conflict" (Boyden and Ryder, 1996, in Sommers, 2001). This may in turn create ‘a disjunction between values promoted at home and in school may cause anxiety and distress in children rather than optimism and peacebuilding’ (Sommers, 2001).

Reinforcement of Divisions

Bekerman (2009), a critic of many multicultural and peace education initiatives, questions the validity of such education also because it can reinforce barriers between ethnicities, as in seeking to acknowledge differing groups, it disallows ambiguity and movement between them. Such categorization may serve to reinforce ethnic cleavages, as the focus falls on difference. This is both a valid criticism, and an understandable aspect of such programs, particularly in the area of children and youth multicultural education, where parents may hold significant fears about the nature of multiculturalism, and its implications for the identity of their child. A strong school of thought exists, particularly in the field of interfaith dialogue, that one cannot truly engage in dialogue in its complexity and multiplicity without first having a strong sense, and understanding, of ones own identity.

Individualism

A key criticism of formalized Peace Education is its tendency toward individualism rather than acknowledging the important role of the group. This has been accused of perpetuating Western
cultural imperialism, and its biased conception of individual human rights (Sommers, 2001). Regardless of its origins, individualism as it is commonly framed in Western societies is a foreign concept to many others and it ignores or excludes the importance of communality and communal rights so fundamental to many cultures (Sommers, 2001). Because of this failure to recognize the role of the individual within the community – a relationship that has been demonstrated to be of key importance in both wellbeing and conflict, it may also make Peace Education less effective in many contexts, including that of the resettled Greater Sudanese Diaspora.

**Structural Alienation: Vocational Education**

**Introduction**

According to the World Health Organization, *the most effective way to promote sustainable long-term peace is a commitment to social justice* (Ekblad et al, 2004 p.328). This social justice sentiment relates to systemic justice and, at a basic level, the ability to participate meaningfully and appropriately in employment and economic life. It is increasingly recognized globally that overcoming basic threats to wellbeing, including poverty, literacy and insecurity, can diminish the likelihood of violent outbreaks in society (Ekblad et al, 2004), demonstrating the significance of practical empowerment of the Greater Sudanese diaspora in order to promote sustained peace. One of the key barriers to economic empowerment is education, whether vocational, ‘bridging’, or linguistic, and this will thus be explored as the second educational model for peace-building in the diaspora.

**What is Vocational Education?**

Vocational education as discussed here, is that education which aims to impart skills and knowledge specific to a trade or career in order to prepare an individual to undertake skilled employment in a variety of areas. In many resettlement contexts, these are catered to through Vocational Education Training programs in schools, and/or equivalent programs post-compulsory schooling. ‘Bridging education’ in this context refers to the education necessary in order to be able, or allowed, to utilize skills learned overseas. An example of this would be a medical doctor who trained
elsewhere and requires additional coursework or examinations in order to be licensed to practice in the resettlement country. Many within the Sudanese diaspora arrive on humanitarian programs and may have experienced disrupted schooling, but this is not universal as some individuals already have significant professional and educational experience and their barrier is more administrative. This group has been known to experience greater distress with unemployment, as the greater disparity between the socio-economic levels pre- and post-resettlement is correlated with increased negative psychological outcomes (Aycan & Berry, 1996). Language ability has significant implications for individuals to access the above education, and thus adequate, accessible and appropriate language education is also an important element of this discussion.

Although also individually focused, this area of education and its various elements differs from Peace Education as it focuses on addressing conflict generated or exacerbated through systemic isolation as a result of unemployment or underemployment, and subsequent economic, social and mental health impacts. The focus is not on altering mindsets or teaching peaceful interaction, but rather seeks to address the inequality of opportunity within the diaspora and between the diaspora and broader society as one key facet of the ‘structural violence’ acknowledged by Galtung (1971). Hall & Kostic (2009) found that greater structural integration encourages a higher level of reconciliatory sentiment between groups within the former Yugoslav diaspora, lending practical weight to this area of education as a tool for peace building.

**Structural Inclusion**

Structural, or systemic, inclusion in society is important for the wellbeing of individuals, and the community. Income is typically an important means for achieving this, as poverty is a strong exclusionary factor, though the importance of income is purely instrumental, while the importance of employment for social inclusion, societal participation and respect are intrinsically valuable (Klasen, 2001). Individual economic security has been found to promote personal wellbeing, happiness and, importantly, tolerance, whilst at the same time benefiting economic growth (ILO, 2004). Employment also assists in protecting against mental health issues in refugee populations, as well as aiding in empowerment of individuals and communities through status and self-sufficiency, creating hope for
the future, positively strengthening individual identities, and human rights and dignity for the benefit of society (Ekblad et al, 2004).

Conversely, economic insecurity fosters what the International Labor Organization has termed "a world full of anxiety and anger" (ILO, 2004). The most important element in such economic insecurity is not the level of income, or even increase in income, but rather the level of income security, evidenced by income protection levels and inequality (ILO, 2004). This is key for members of the Greater Sudanese diaspora, as they navigate life in a new host society, often with interrupted formal schooling, and occupy unskilled labor positions with less job security. Their disempowered status positions them in the above-mentioned world of anxiety and anger, likely inflaming tensions.

In general, immigrants and minorities lag behind natives and the majority populations in economic, educational, social and political areas. They tend to have higher unemployment rates, lower occupational attainment and wages, a looser labor market attachment, and are least able to find and hold good jobs. Worse, mobility remains slow or nonexistent across generations. (Constant et al, 2009 p.6)

In Australia’s segmented labor market, African migrants are allocated low status jobs, regardless of their prior skills and training (Colic-Peisker and Tilbury 2006, 2007; Fozdar and Torezani 2008 in Marlowe, 2010). The 2006 Australian Census showed the average weekly income for the Sudanese diaspora was $231, less than half that of the $488 earned by Australian born individuals (Marlowe, 2010). Appropriate employment is thus of great importance to this community.

**Structural Inclusion for peace**

Hall and Kostic’s (2009) research findings argue that empowerment of diasporas through structural integration provides the psychological coherence required to reconcile the past and envision a common future with other groups. They base their assessment on citizenship, language training, education and employment. Given the educational context of this discussion, focus will be restricted to the latter three. Hall and Kostic’s (2009) study focused on reconciliatory attitudes of Bosnians, Croats, Serbs and Yugoslavs in Sweden, testing the effects of social and structural integration on attitudes towards, among other things, forgiveness and prospects for peaceful coexistence. Their theory is drawn from the fields of health psychology and sociology. In such fields,
unemployment, in particular, has been associated with a range of negative consequences of individual wellbeing.

Findings showed that greater structural integration encourages a higher level of reconciliatory sentiment between groups within the diaspora (Hall and Kostic, 2009). Higher structural integration led to a decrease in ethnocentrism and a higher level of positivity towards cultures and traditions of other ethnic groups within the same diaspora. Importantly, these structurally integrated diaspora members were more likely to acknowledge the past suffering of others in their conflict, be more forgiving of past persecution committed against their group, less likely to justify the concept of ethnic cleansing, and overall more optimistic towards future prospects for coexistence of differing groups within the diaspora of the former Yugoslavia (Hall and Kostic, 2009).

These findings lend significant weight to the argument for diaspora peace-building through systemic integration, offering educational opportunities in the areas of skills and training – whether vocational, bridging, or linguistic. Reasoning for this draws on the theory that ‘structural integration, through the mechanism of a higher sense of coherence (SOC) empowers diasporas to process and contextualize war-related experiences and make sense of daily life, and to deal with the new challenges they face in the hostland environment’ (Hall and Kostic, 2009 p.8).

As mentioned above, employment has importance for the individual beyond providing income, including contribution to a sense of purpose in life, defining status and identity, and enabling relationships with others in the society (Jahoda, 1982, in Aycan and Berry, 1996), all of these of particular importance to refugees as a vulnerable and systemically ostracized group.

**Barriers to Structural Inclusion**

Aycan and Berry (1996) researched barriers to migrant integration into the Canadian workforce, and found that language competence, a lack of recognition of credentials and a lack of local work experience proved the most significant barriers. Constant et al (2009) echo this, adding also the differing social, cultural, and religious norms originating from within the respective ethnic minority. Whilst this research was not specific to refugees, it demonstrates also that employment-related adversity such as status loss, and unemployment or underemployment, impacts negatively on
the psychological wellbeing of migrants, increasing acculturative stress, negative self-concept and societal alienation as well as negatively impacting the capacity of migrants to adapt to their new host society (Aycan and Berry, 1996). Acculturative stress is associated with depression, due to loss, and anxiety, due to uncertainty. Employment issues, including unemployment and underemployment, and associated low socio-economic status increase depressive symptoms and stress of migrants (Aycan and Berry, 1996).

Alienation is likely to occur when there is a discrepancy between the desired state that the society values as the norm (e.g., having a decent job), and the achieved state (e.g., unemployment or underemployment) that is characterized by a failure to meet the societal norms and expectations (Kanungo, 1979 in Aycan and Berry, 1996 p.242).

Gang et al. (2002) reported that those in the center of society: young people, the more highly educated and skilled demonstrated more favorable sentiment toward ethnic minorities and immigrants, while those on the periphery, such as the permanently sick or disabled, disillusioned workers, unemployed individuals and retirees held more hostile attitudes (in Constant et al, 2009). Hostility in reaction to competition between refugees and those most vulnerable and in society is unsurprising as these groups compete most directly for economic and social inclusion from the most unstable positions, and thus perhaps are the least empathetic with each others’ plight.

Language Ability

In the Australian context, English language proficiency has a direct impact on the ability of migrants to adapt socially and economically to their new context, and the duration of such adaptation (Stewart and Nam Do, 2003; Rida and Milton, 2001, in Casimiro et al, 2007). Despite government efforts, current offerings do not adequately meet the needs of refugees. Those who already speak English before arrival are able to settle more easily, noting the 'tremendous effect' that being able to speak English had in allowing them to find employment, access services and attend educational training' (Casimiro et al, 2007 p.60).

Conversely, a lack of English leads to isolation and difficulties in the acculturation process. Unfortunately, the vast majority of Sudanese arrive in Australia with limited or no English, as demonstrated by Casimiro et al’s (2007) survey of refugee women. Parts of Sudan have experienced conflict and significant upheaval for decades. Most refugees from Sudan and South Sudan have thus
experienced immense disruption to their education as they transit through refugee camps and other temporary settlements – often for many years at a time. One impact of this is that many recent arrivals may never have experienced formal education and may struggle with literacy in their first language (Casimiro et al). Beyond this, members of this diaspora arriving in Australia are unlikely to have extensive, if any, knowledge of English. Sudanese women surveyed viewed this insufficient knowledge of English as a major barrier to employment, with one stating:

If you don’t speak English, It’s like being in a cage – you are like a bird with no wings... I felt like a child not able to speak and communicate with people. Employers don’t even consider you – even if the job doesn’t require knowledge of reading and writing in English, such as a commercial cleaner. (Casimiro et al, 2007 p.61).

Another Sudanese woman stated:

When I came here I experienced loneliness and depression. Language was the biggest problem for me to blend into the Australian society. My children have absorbed the language very quickly because they are young and at school. But for me, I am at home and need more help and effort in order for me to learn the language, as well as get work. They [the Government] should provide work for people who can’t speak the language because we really need to work to blend into the Australian society and support our families not only here but family overseas. (Casimiro et al, 2007 p.61).

The Australian government provides access to 510 hours of English language classes for refugees, usually through the Adult Migrant English Program. Like others internationally, this program has been criticized due to long waiting periods, a lack of knowledge of class options, insufficient hours of formal learning, the mixed academic level of classes, childcare concerns and the mixing of genders and ethnicities within classes (Casimiro et al, 2007). Language courses provided to migrants also often lack coverage of technical language for the workplace, further limiting their capacity to enter elements of the workforce (Thomas, 1992, in Aycan and Berry, 1996). The ability to access adequate education to enable interaction in the resettlement country language is thus an immensely powerful factor for this diaspora, with outcomes clearly delineating between those with and without this developed language ability with deeply divergent social, psychological and economic outcomes.

**Discrimination in the workforce**

Individual skills attainment alone may not suffice in decreasing structural violence within and against the Greater Sudanese diaspora, due to the broader issue of discrimination in the workforces of many resettlement societies. In 2007, the IZA Expert Opinion Survey (Zimmermann et al, 2007)
was conducted among expert stakeholders in the EU and reported the majority of respondents perceived ethnic minorities to be exposed to either “high” or “very high” risk of labor market exclusion in that context, with 81 percent of all respondents and 91 percent of minority respondents believing this risk of exclusion to be either constant or increasing (in Constant et al, 2009). Experts consulted suggested, among other strategies, a number of educational means such as targeted pre-school education and information campaigns, self-confidence development programs, active lobbying, cultural diversity education, recognition of foreign educational documents and media management to promote the benefits of immigrants and challenge racism in the media (Constant et al, 2009).

Twenty out of the thirty-four Sudanese women surveyed by Casimiro et al (2007) in Australia echoed this, reporting experiencing racism wither whilst attempting to attain work or at work once employed. A Sudanese woman noted:

I am working as a nurse assistant. I feel fortunate to be working because many of my Sudanese friends have no jobs. Employers always ask us if we have Australian experience...At work, the white Australian nurses give me the heaviest and messiest duties to do. Some talk down to me and others just don’t take notice of me and ignore me. It makes me mad, it is demeaning, yet I cannot say anything. (Casimiro et al, 2007 p.63)

Beyond individual concerns, this has significant implications at a communal level, as those suffering from structural exclusion, whether through educational, linguistic, or discriminatory means, have less stake in the existing order. As such, they are less likely to seek to uphold that order, instead engaging in anti-social behavior. Without wishing to delve too deeply into this highly stigmatized area, data does support the connection between the dynamics of unemployment, systemic violence through poverty, social effects, and some forms of criminal behavior (Klasen, 2001).

Given the risk posed by potential conflict repetition through erosion of social supports and intergenerational transmission, addressing intra- and inter-community reconciliation through a systemic approach to peace building through employment is highly plausible at an individual level, but alongside this, broader steps to address racism and discrimination are clearly required.
Social Alienation: Community Development Programs

Introduction

Social identity has many functions, both cognitive and emotional, and directly influences self-esteem and many other aspects of self-identity. Individual self-esteem is elevated or lowered in part due to broader social perception and regard for the performance and status of not only ourselves, but our membership groups (Pettigrew, 2007). In the event of societal breakdown, people often revert to exclusionary ethnic or confessional identities even in previously cohesive environments (Zartman, 2007 in Neumann & Emmer, 2012). In situations such as that of the Greater Sudanese diaspora, where conflict occurs between groups, neighbors, individuals, within families and communities, the population becomes divided by affiliations, as everybody becomes implicated in the conflict, often simultaneously as both victim and offender, leading to segregation that complicates the possibility of reconciliation (Neumann & Emmer, 2012 p). This physical and social removal and alienation from other parts of the diaspora community negatively impacts individual coping strategies as well as the possibility for reconciliation as a society.

The strong social emphasis of Silove’s (1999) five adaptive systems allows some insight into the current and desired context of post-conflict refugees: 1. Interpersonal bonds; 2. Security and safety; 3. Social framework that promotes new identities and roles; 4. Respect for human rights and social justice; 5. Respect for the individual need to belong to religious, spiritual, political or social groups (in Ekblad et al, 2004). Amartya Sen’s (1992, 1999) Capability Approach complements this, calling for equality of access to basic capabilities including basic physical necessities alongside the basic social necessities of community integration, participation in community and public life, and the enjoyment of social bases of self respect (in Klasen, 2001). Such a rights-based approach to this issue ‘emphasizes that the inability to participate in, and be respected by, mainstream society is a violation of a basic right that should be open to all citizens (or residents)’ (Klasen, 2001 p.415), while encouraging society to take responsibility for integration of members, leaving less temptation to blame the excluded for their position. ‘It highlights the central role political, economic and social structures play in exclusion and the role of communal solidarity in overcoming it’ (Townsend, 1997 in Klasen, 2001 p.415). Social connection is thus key to inclusion in society as individuals come
together in mutual support. In the case of the Greater Sudanese diaspora with its fractured social context, such communal solidarity cannot simply be assumed.

**What are Community Development Programs?**

Community Development Programs seek to decrease social distance between and within groups, providing a common network of dialogue and support. Communal trust is essential for democracy and non-violence (Newton, 2007 in Neumann & Emmer, 2012). Interpersonal forms of communication between antagonized groups is thus an essential precondition to such trust and understanding, as interaction encourages, and at some point requires, reinterpretation of social narratives, transforming prejudice and re-humanizing enemies (Neumann & Emmer, 2012). Like structural exclusion, social exclusion generates threats to society through crime and violence, as well as creating and exacerbating societal divisions, racism, xenophobia and systemically undermining behavior from excluded elements (Klasen, 2001). In the case of the resettled Greater Sudanese community, this may mean increased racism and violence within the diaspora, or between the diaspora and disenfranchised members of the host society as locals target their perceived competitor.

**Social Inclusion and Exclusion**

Social inclusion is an important factor in stability and peace-building in the diaspora. Bar-Tal and Rosen (2009) explain the existence and maintenance of communal conflict as derived from an evolved culture of conflict that is dominated by societal beliefs, collective memory and an ethos of conflict. This ethos of conflict provides meaning for conflicting groups, directing current actions and future goals. Such narratives are selective, biased, and distorted as they seek to justify rather than provide an objective account of the reality (Bar-Tal and Rosen, 2009). Social fragmentation as in the Greater Sudanese diaspora maintains such distortions, offering little opportunity for mutual understanding. To focus initially on the role of group-aligned social cleavages, Tajfel (1982) states that:

> Two types of theory are required to explain the state of ethnic group relations in a society. One must be a theory of intergroup behavior, sociological in orientation and using for its evidence materials that are primarily historical. The other theory is social psychological. Its
concern is primarily cognitive factors and the relations of these factors with the interpersonal behavior of individuals (p.2)

Social exclusion is an immense issue facing societies globally, increasingly recognized as discourse broadens from traditional notions of exclusion through income poverty, which fails to adequately acknowledge the multilayers and immense disadvantages faced by some groups (Klasen, 2001). These layers of disadvantage concern the Greater Sudanese diaspora as individuals and communities struggle to navigate not only the reasons for social exclusion, such as language and economic means, but are also subject to the negative flow-on effects of such exclusion communally, psychologically and inter-generationally. However, in the same way communication is used to escalate conflict it can be used to de-escalate and transform conflict even under challenging circumstances (Neumann & Emmer, 2012)

**Intergroup Dialogue**

Intergroup dialogue through structured Community Development Programs is a key, and popular, avenue for pursuing the transformation of social exclusion, and build social cohesion, as research has recognized that positive, face-to-face intergroup contact helps moderate out-group prejudice (Pettigrew, 2007). Dessel et al (2006) provide a definition of intergroup dialogue as ‘a public process designed to involve individuals and groups in an exploration of societal issues such as politics, racism, religion, and culture that are often flashpoints for polarization and social conflict’ (p.303). Such dialogue can be immensely powerful in achieving personal and communal conflict transformation, providing a communal safe space to express remorse, anger and frustration about injustice, and power, and where cultural issues and other divisive issues can be addressed constructively (Agbaria & Cohen, 2002 in Dessel et al, 2006).

Jürgen Habermas’ theoretical line dictates that community level cooperation between identity groups is essential to stabilizing peace and communal wellbeing. This requires the establishment of formal communication structures to enable interaction and discussion even in areas of disagreement. Acceptance of such structures requires them to be rooted in the community, and thus developed by the stakeholders themselves (in Neumann & Emmer, 2012). The UNESCO Medium Term Strategy for 1996-2001 encouraged that a ‘culture of peace should be built on dialogue, mediation, and
recognition of equality and dignity for every state, group, and person. It suggests the development of a global identity that rests both on local identities and a global solidarity against common threats to the planet' (Korostelina, 2012 p.1).

The intergroup dialogue process is designed to be inclusive, collectively exploring contentious social issues that contribute to conflict in the diaspora. Through witnessing, and engaging in such discussions new communication and listening skills are learned and modeled, and shared meanings sought toward an inspired and optimistic future (Chasin et al, 1996 in Dessel et al, 2006). ‘Participants are asked to suspend assumptions, confirm their unfamiliarity with each other, be spontaneous, and prepare for unanticipated consequences. They are encouraged to collaborate willingly, be vulnerable, and believe in the authenticity of all participants’ (Cissna and Anderson, 2002 in Dessel at al, 2006.) It is not what is communicated in some precise narrative truth that is healing, but the invitation to share because pain itself is not something purely private (Humphrey, 2002 in Westoby, 2009).

Outcomes of Community Development Programs

The individual and societal benefits of such interpersonal education and transformation are immense. An inclusive group perspective can minimize prejudice and the desire for violence, as demonstrated in the European Union. The GMF02 study in 2002 surveyed respondents in Germany and found that those displaying the highest level of nationalist connection in their identity were more prejudiced against foreigners, more anti-Semitic and more favorable toward violence. By contrast, those who identified more universally as a member of the European Union were less prejudiced against foreigners, Jews and less condoning of violence (Pettigrew, 2007). Community Development Programming, involving intergroup dialogue, endeavors to promote such collective identity, and such associated steps in prejudice reduction.

Intergroup dialogue environments seek to foster willingness and respect for sharing, and potentially threatening acknowledgement of the contribution of history as well as the present in conflict, thus factors such as the nature of facilitation, and choice of location for meeting are highly relevant to the outcome (Dessel et al, 2006). Such a structure must: Create an environment where
ideal speech situations are encouraged; Provide a shared framework for interaction, that mediates between perceived competing narratives and build individual trust; Lead to the establishment of grassroots institutional structures at a local level to enable maintenance of communication throughout situations of conflict (Neumann & Emmer, 2012). Enabling such spaces can be highly complex in a group such as the greater Sudanese diaspora, wherein ethnic and identity groups endeavor to adapt to their new context, including a new relative power context. Assumptions of symmetry between the communication partners are challenged in identity conflicts, where groups can experience significantly differing power levels both numerically and socially (Neumann & Emmer, 2012).

Westoby (2009) proposes a social model for healing within this diaspora, following his identification that the trauma experienced is primarily social in nature. He finds that this significant wounding has included disruption to culture and collective agency, the rupturing of interpersonal and communal relationships, exacerbated by injuries of structural suffering. In response to this, he puts forth the social resources for healing as culture, community and power through social processes that build connections, and reduce conflict within and between the Sudanese diaspora community and others.

[This] provides ample evidence that any resources of culture, community and power have been impacted upon by the social process of violence, forced migration and resettlement. Hence, any intervention needs to be based on eliciting, again through dialogue, refugee collective agency to make sense of their agonistic new location in a resettlement context such as Australia. (Westoby, 2009 p.87)

Through strengthening such communal ties, local capacity is strengthened to resist manipulation and to respond positively on behalf of the entire community, regardless of its divisions (ACORD, 2009).

**ACORD: Community Social Peace and Recovery Model**

The Community Social Peace and Recovery Model used by ACORD uses community-driven dialogue to analyze underlying causes of conflict, begin healing, and encourage collective leadership in working towards a peaceful future with negotiated commitments for cohabitation and community-based recovery (ACORD, 2009). The model involves five interwoven elements of reconciliation: developing a shared vision of an interdependent and fair society; acknowledging and dealing with the
past; building positive relationships; significant cultural and attitudinal change: and substantial social, economic and political change (ACORD, 2009). Changes in the ways people relate to and perceive each other are key, as developed cultures of suspicion, fear, mistrust and violence are broken down, opening space in which people can both listen and feel that they are heard, nurturing respect for human rights and human difference, providing for a context where individuals are more active participants in society, with a greater sense of invested belonging (ACORD, 2009).

Following the logic argument that if social fracturing is the issue, it can also be the solution, this program framework also includes the communal creation and formation of Community Watchdogs within the community itself, which oversee grassroots implementation of community social peace contracts and encourage individuals to maintain their commitment to peaceful cohabitation, as has been successfully used throughout Africa, including in Sudan (ACORD, 2009).

**Community Development and Individual Wellbeing**

Another aspect of Community Development, beyond conflict mitigation and resolution, is individual wellbeing. Goodman (2004) found that Sudanese youth primarily used collectivity and communal self as a way of coping (Khawaja et al, 2008). A study of the trauma coping mechanisms employed by Sudanese refugees in Brisbane, Australia echoed this in part, finding two of the dominant mechanisms to be faith and social networks (Khawaja et al, 2008). Both of these are socially relevant, as religious communities contribute to refugee social connection, and sense of wellbeing. Refugees also reported praying to get through difficult situations, and relying on their trust in God to find the strength to continue. Professed faith adherence has been found to be positively correlated with the crucial coping strategies of hope, endurance, resourcefulness, and in the structural realm of educational attainment, language ability and lower PTSD. This is consistent with a study in US south that found the church community to be central to refugee healing and sense of belonging. This causes some concern in the case of minority faiths, as they may not have adequate access to holy sites or meet with societal hostility, as previously discussed. Religious adherence, as a
specific subset of social engagement, is a key coping strategy common throughout much of Africa (Khawaja et al, 2008).

Social support has been found to act as a protective factor against the impact of violence and persecution, as families and communities provide emotional support to the individual (McMichael and Manderson, 2004, in Khawaja et al, 2008). The social focus of Community Dialogue programs implies that ‘the sociality of healing includes processes of re-building a social fabric within a refugee social body, and at the same time weaving a new social fabric between the refugee social body and the host society’s social body’ (Westoby, 2009 p.90).

**Discussion and Conclusion**

The resettled Greater Sudanese diaspora experiences complex conflicts in a myriad of ways. These range from gender to identity to intergenerational and religious. Some are dependent on interactions with the host country, others the homeland, and others occur solely within the diaspora itself.

Building on a Capacity Development approach, which seeks to enable and facilitate application of existing capacity, it is clear that any framework for assistance should be created collaboratively at all levels, promoting learning exchange and capacity development of diaspora communities in a ‘bottom-up-top-down’ approach’ wherein individuals are considered ‘responsible co-creators’ involved in joint problem solving and creative, collaborative development rather than recipients of an intervention (Ekblad et al, 2004).

Peace Education is an obvious inclusion in this discussion of differing educational models as opportunities for transforming conflict within the Greater Sudanese diaspora, with its direct focus on reframing mindsets and altering prejudice toward a peaceful coexistence. One significant consideration for this method in a resettlement context, however, is whether Peace Education is itself an inclusive or exclusive program within broader society. An exclusive approach would include only members of the diaspora, whilst an inclusive approach would involve broader society alongside the diaspora, seeking to include all children in the formal K-12 schooling system. Excluding society, and
including only the Sudanese diaspora in this education may decrease hostility within that group, simultaneously building a common external ‘other’ that is the broader society. This is also unhelpful. But if all of society’s children are included in the Peace Education program, it should be considered whether the program could maintain its relevance for those within the nuanced and complex social conflict dynamics of the Sudanese diaspora, or if this might be lost in the broadening process of inclusion.

Structural integration through vocational, bridging and language education is another way to address conflict, without focusing on, or delineating, identity or history. The focus instead is on allowing individuals the opportunity to develop greater autonomy through economic integration, in this instance assisting Greater Sudanese diaspora members to enter and progress in the workforce, along with associated positive psychological impacts and coping mechanisms. This reliance on economic integration, with its flow-on effects to broader social connection and self-esteem raises highly disputed questions in the field of migration studies, of integration versus multiculturalism – emphasizing either the host society, or the migrant community, as the most significant potential source of support. This model perhaps warrants similar criticism to Peace Education, in its individualized focus. Beyond attempting to ensure equal access to employment opportunity throughout the diaspora, it otherwise ignores this microcosm of community within which Sudanese migrants operate. Structural integration through employment has no aim to specifically build the capacity of this group, focusing instead only on the individual. This may be less appropriate for Greater Sudanese cultural groups that have been demonstrated to strongly uphold community and communal identity.

Community Development Programs take a communal approach to conflict resolution, relying on improved social interaction and mechanisms to improve issues of social dislocation. This appears highly congruent with the cultures present in the Sudanese diaspora. This model does, however, also face risks that activists and community workers focus only on the diaspora, potentially alienating the rest of the community. A sole focus on building the diaspora capacity whilst ignoring a surrounding societal environment that has been demonstrated to be hostile to such groups and individuals is surely limited in its potential positive impact, if not counter-productive.
In acknowledging the importance of externalities, it is prudent to note the exacerbating impact these externalities have on diaspora conflict, and yet also acknowledge that this is not the sole factor – that diaspora conflict also occurs in separation from broader society. Historical animosities and asymmetrical acculturation conflict may be generated by migration conditions, though they do not result solely from interaction with host society itself. Thus, whilst it is an important factor, if we eliminated the external racism, there is no evidence that this would solve the problem of conflict in the diaspora. It must thus be decided which is more important for Community Development Programs - diaspora community building, or integration with the local community. Given this evidence, an obvious answer would be ‘both’. Issues exclusive to the diaspora that promote or provoke conflict must be adequately addressed, and broader societal issues of racism and stigmatization should also be acknowledged and addressed if the diaspora is to be afforded equal access to structural and social inclusion.

Each of these three models has been demonstrated to provide an opportunity for peace-building within the Sudanese diaspora context: One through deliberate and structured broadening of perspectives; one through increased economic participation in society; and one through increased social engagement. Each of these is also impacted by perceptions and prejudices held by wider society, and all would benefit from awareness raising and counter-racism campaigns at a broader societal level. In assessing the validity and potential of the three educational foci: Individualized Peace Education; Systemic Integration; and Social Integration, the question should be asked: if this were the only educational opportunity, would it in itself transform hostilities?

The individualized nature of vocational education means that whilst mindsets might well be changed, the outcome is highly dependent on circumstances to be successful, as ongoing economic participation is required for such positive attitudinal responses to be upheld. Likewise, the nature of classroom Peace Education makes it dependent on willingness and capacity to deliver such education, based on the teacher-student model, without which it lacks use as it is not well-adapted to self-learning, and has not demonstrated its sustainability beyond target communities and formal
programs. It is structurally reliant. For both of these models this is a significant disadvantage, as the threat to fracture is increased through this external reliance as diaspora members find themselves subject to broader actors of the economy and schooling systems.

Comparatively, Community Development Programs through dialogue offer potentially robust alternatives, reinforced by communal investment to withstand the ebbs and flows of existence, empowering the diaspora community itself to navigate conflict, both current and future, should it emerge. The other two forms of education are in themselves very useful, and should not be discounted for their importance and potential impact on the diaspora, however it is through grassroots dialogue and community building that people will be able to communicate their needs, discuss issues of concern such as gender norms, offer healing to each other for past and present trauma, and collectively build resilient capacity to address the challenges of the future.

Education is a powerful force in conflict. This happens formally, through systematic, organized and deliberate presentation of content; non-formally, through those educational processes occurring outside formal structures, though still demonstrating deliberate educational content; and informally, as education occurs throughout daily existence with no obligation on the student, or predetermined direct educational outcome. None of the educational approaches presented here offers certainty in conflict resolution, nor do they have the capacity to independently achieve holistic conflict transformation. Yet each of these three educational areas: Peace Education, Vocational Education, and Community Development Programming have been demonstrated to hold significant value in decreasing the potential for diaspora conflict. The potential impact of education in all these forms on the process of reconciliation is immense, as its immense capacity to modify mindsets, promote inclusion and enable social justice are clearly evident. In the case of the Greater Sudanese diaspora, such educational initiatives offer significant peace-building opportunities to traumatized individuals and fractured and disempowered communities.

Mother Teresa famously said, ‘If we have no peace, it is because we have forgotten that we belong to each other.’ Education offers us the re-discovery of this interconnectedness, structurally, socially and in our humanity. It provides the conditions to allow members of the Greater Sudanese
diaspora to recognize anew their common belonging as people, and as migrants, and it allows resettlement societies to take steps toward meaningfully including, and celebrating, this group within their midst.
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