TURKISH-DUTCH MOSQUES AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF TRANSNATIONAL SPACES IN EUROPE

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ABSTRACT

MURAT ES: Turkish-Dutch Mosques and the Construction of Transnational Spaces in Europe
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This dissertation examines the production of transnational Turkish-Muslim identities and ethno-religious spaces in the Netherlands by focusing on the contested construction, meanings, and operations of mosques controlled by immigrants and citizens of Turkish background. The Turkish-Dutch form the largest ‘non-native’ minority group in the Netherlands. Organized under multiple and competing organizations, Turkish Islamic communities control nearly half of the 500 mosques in the country. As elsewhere in Europe, the long existent ‘invisible’ mosques – converted from idle schools, factories, and church buildings – are being complemented by recently established mosques that are purpose-built with identifiable architectural features. At the same time, parallel to the rise of increasingly popular discourses on ‘failed multiculturalism’ across Europe, mosques have become signs of ghettoization, urban decline, and failed integration for many in the Netherlands.

Departing from the focus on mosques in relation to radicalism and Muslim claims to public space that characterize most studies on European mosques, this dissertation approaches mosques as dynamic and contested sites that play an important part in the production of ethno-religious subject positions. Building on recent scholarship in cultural geography, I investigate the relationship between the contested construction of mosque spaces and Turkish-Dutch identities through transnational imaginaries and everyday material practices. In ten months of field research, I collected data through participant
observation, interviews with mosque administrators, imams, and civil society representatives, and focus group meetings with activists, youth, and women involved with mosques controlled by various organizations. My argument is that mosques play a seminal role in the production of ethno-religious belonging and highly gendered moral citizen-subject positions through not only public rituals but also mundane, quotidian spatial practices. My research findings indicate that the morally safe experiences of socialization provided by mosques are becoming increasingly central to the operations of mosques. Mosques also gain significance as spaces of carefully orchestrated as well as chance encounters and interactions between the Turkish-Dutch, other Muslim groups, and the native-Dutch through interfaith dialogues and Open Days. These events are crucial to the (re-)drawing of boundaries between Turkishness, Dutchness, Islam, Europe, Christianity, and secularity.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

The art installation *Entropa* was put on display in Brussels in January 2009. The work was commissioned by the Czech Republic to mark the inauguration of the Czech Presidency of the European Union (EU).\(^1\) The unveiling of the installation caused a minor scandal as the Czech artist David Cerny drew on national stereotypes while creating sculptures of member countries. The *Entropa* depicted a Netherlands swallowed by sea, leaving only the tip of minarets visible on the surface. *Entropa*’s Dutch section combined the two most significant ‘threats’ that this small, affluent country in North-Western Europe faces: the constant pressure of the sea—compounded by the rising sea levels due to global warming—threatening to swallow the land that was reclaimed by dykes and the threat of a ‘Muslim takeover’ through demographic and cultural means. The art piece, hence, attributed an apocalyptic quality to the Muslim presence in the Dutch context.

In recent decades, the controversies surrounding the construction and operations of mosques have moved to the forefront of public debates in many Western countries. The on-going ‘Ground Zero Mosque’ controversy in New York and the recent Swiss ban on the construction of minarets are two recent cases in point. There was a parallel rise in the number of studies on mosques. However, researchers across disciplines have generally focused on claims to public space and negotiations over the visibility of mosques in urban landscapes. This dissertation attempts to go beyond this almost

\(^1\) http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7827738.stm, retrieved on November 21, 2011.
exclusive focus in academic studies and popular discourses that approach mosques
primarily as representational sites of Islam in public space. Instead, this study brings
studies of everyday, ethnicity, and home in conversation with cultural geography and
geographies of religion to explore the relationship between mosque spaces and ethno-
religious subject formation. To this end, I explore mosque-centered practices of Turkish-
Dutch communities in the Netherlands.

This dissertation attends to the following questions: What are the ways in which
various actors with competing agendas imagine, produce, and experience mosques in the
Netherlands? Through what everyday practices do various native and Turkish-Dutch
communities claim, appropriate, and contest mosques? What is the role of mosques in the
production of various and competing modes of belonging as well as ethnic, national, and
religious subject positions in the Netherlands? How do mosques participate in the
constitution of different articulations of Turkishness, Dutchness, Muslimness, and their
hyphenated combinations in the transnational social field in/between Turkey and the
Netherlands?

The majority of the European Muslim population is comprised of settlers who
arrived through postcolonial and labor migration in the second half of the 20th century.
More recent settlers include refugees and asylum seekers. Allievi (2010, 20) notes that
there are close to 11,000 places of worship for a population of almost 17 million Muslims
in Europe. These include simple prayer rooms (musalla) or ‘invisible’ mosques –
converted from idle schools, factories, shops, and church buildings—as well as
increasingly common purpose-built mosques and Islamic centers with identifiable
architectural features. The purpose-built mosques have been instrumental in heightening
the visibility of Muslim presence in cultural landscape and they often mark the
boundaries of ‘ethnic’ neighborhoods. Struggles over the construction and operation of
mosques figure prominently in debates on the ‘integration’ of Muslims and accommodation of Islam in Europe.

Popular discourses on European Islam and Muslims are often predicated on the homogenization of actually diverse groups and communities differentiated along ethnic, linguistic, regional, sectarian, political, and class lines (Zubaida 2005; Ehrkamp 2007). As I have argued elsewhere,

Islamic communal spaces such as mosques are similarly approached as the spatial expression and location of a static Muslim identity. This reductionism regarding the relationship between Muslim identity and Islamic space calls for scrutiny. Mosques in Europe, as elsewhere, are neither monolithic, nor static. They are rather heterogeneous, dynamic, and contested places where a multiplicity of Muslim and non-Muslim actors negotiate the belonging of Muslims in Europe (Es 2011, 249).

This dissertation investigates the mutual production of ethno-religious identities and Islamic spaces in an attempt to develop a novel approach for studying European mosques. To this end, I conceptualize mosques as contested ethno-religious spaces that play a crucial role in the construction and reproduction of overlapping and not always congruous modes of national, ethnic, and religious belonging and citizenship.

**Figure 1.** Fatih Mosque, converted from a church, is located at the heart of Amsterdam.

Photo: Murat Es
Europe and its Muslims: in or of Europe?

Muslims established an empire in Iberia as early as the 8th century and have been living in various parts of Europe since then. Yet the European Muslim population significantly rose only in the wake of the Word War II as a result of the postcolonial and labor related migration. The need for labor during the post-war reconstruction of North Western European economies resulted in the temporary recruitment of workers from Mediterranean countries, including Muslim-majority ones. The first immigrants, or ‘guest workers’ were recruited through labor agreements in the late 1950s and early 1960s (Abadan-Unat 2011). This phase of Muslim migration came to an end with the ending of the worker recruitment programs by the early 1970s. However, due to a host of reasons including the failure to build up capital towards return and economic and political unrest in the countries of origin, the majority of the guest workers continuously extended their stay and they were eventually joined by their families. More recently, Muslims have been arriving as asylum seekers and refugees (Malik 2004; Akgündüz 2008). Immigrants eventually began to establish businesses, neighborhoods as well as cultural and religious infrastructure despite the persistence of a ‘myth of return’, both among the ‘guests’ and their ‘hosts’ (Alsayyad 2002). Yet the perpetual reproduction of the immigrant status to refer to Muslims has engendered a paradoxical situation in which many Muslims are formally no longer immigrants, yet they are considered ‘out of place’ in their adopted countries.

Beginning with the Rushdie Affair in 1989, and reaching its peak in the wake of the 9/11 attacks in 2001, a host of issues related to Islam and Muslims has been progressively signified as problems in need of urgent intervention in Western public

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2 I use the term to situate mosques both as the designated location of a reified Turkish Islamic alterity and as the site through which the Turkish-Dutch alterity as ethnicity is constructed and articulated. See (Es 2011) for a detailed discussion.
debates. At the same time, a culturalized Islam as the re-energized old foe of the Western civilization has gained widespread currency in a self-fulfilling prophecy of clashing civilizations (Lewis 1990; Huntington 1993). This reified and unitary rendition of Islam provided explanations for all sorts of ‘insensible’ Muslim attitudes and practices. As a total mechanism for explaining Muslim alterity, it threw a thick ideological cloak over social, political, and economic processes that produce and regulate various manifestations of Muslimness. Islam, in its reified form, has increasingly become a popular means of providing easy answers to questions ranging from the ‘oppression of women in Islam’ to ‘underdevelopment of the Islamic world’.

The growth of the European Muslim population has eventually led Muslims to make claims to European public spheres/spaces to pursue equal citizenship status, calling into question the boundaries of ‘Europe/an’. Boundaries are neither stable nor fixed but arise from social and political practices (Yuval-Davis et al. 2005; Kaplan and Hakli 2002). Historically shifting and symbolically contested boundaries of Europe are no exception (Lewis and Wigen 1997). As Agnew (2002) notes, formation of, and regional integration within the European Union has sparked further struggles over defining the boundaries of Europe and Europeanness. European integration stimulates some members of the ‘European’ public to “increasingly identify with each other across regional and national distances, while for others the emergence of stronger social and cultural ties and corresponding new structures of feeling have given rise to uncertainties and concerns about national sovereignty, cultural rights and autonomy” (Pickles 2005, 356). The uncertain political atmosphere carries the potential both for embracing and violently excluding Muslims as Europeans.

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3 I define culturalization as the process through which “reduction of political motivations and causes to essentialized culture (where culture refers to an amorphous polyglot of ethnically marked religious and nonreligious beliefs and practices) is mobilized to explain everything” (Brown 2006, 20).
Researchers have documented fallacies of the simplified representation of Islam and homogenous depiction of Muslims in the face of the empirical diversity of Muslim groups and Islamic practices (Vertovec and Peach 1997; Malik, 2004; Weedon 2004; Nökel and Tezcan 2005). Yet the debates over the viability of a distinctly European Muslim identity are informed by the discourses that position ‘Europe’ and ‘European’ in a relationship of mutual exclusion with ‘Islam’ and ‘Muslim’ (Asad 2002). In these debates Islam has a liminal status vis-a-vis a Europe’s ‘(Judeo) Christian roots’ while Muslims are imagined to be outside of the ‘modern’ Europe, both spatially and temporally (Sayyid 2003).

Anthropologists and geographers have been tirelessly pointing out the pitfalls of equating place with identity and particularity (Gupta and Ferguson 1997; Massey 1994). However, as Paasi (2005) argues, naturalized accounts of place-based identity claims still inform the negotiations of symbolic membership in national communities across Europe. Imaginary of a Europe as culturally sealed and homogenous civilization underlies what Gilroy (2005, 32) calls a “mythic version of cultural ecology” that locks Muslims into a position of perpetual outsiders, immigrants, or guests in Europe, even if they are born and raised there (Fortier 2006; Goldberg 2006). On the one hand, the countries from which Muslims settlers originate from are construed as the source of true, authentic, and authoritative Islamic knowledge and practice. There is an increasing pressure on young European Muslims to go beyond ‘reproducing’ the Islam of their parents and render their faith ‘compatible’ with European norms and values, on the other (Al-Azmeh and Fokas 2007).

Underlying such paradoxical modes of thinking is the construction of Islam as an alien transplant. The unidirectional influence of this alien religion on European social, cultural, and political landscape is deemed dangerous for the Judeo-Christian
underpinnings of Europe. This—implicitly secular—foundation provided by Judeo-Christianity is itself seldom questioned. The instabilities, heterogeneous origins and other, minor traditions informing multiple trajectories of Europe/an are silenced by the hegemonic position of this narrative. In their eagerness to confine anything related to Islam to the realm of radical alterity, many analyses of European Islam fall short of accounting for the mutual influences between, and the dialectical evolution of, ‘homeland’ and ‘diasporic’ forms of Islamic organization and activity. In this dissertation I argue that the transnational, multiscalar networks between multiple social, cultural, and geopolitical boundaries between Europe(s) and its Islamic Other(s) are mutually constitutive. To complicate the neat distinction and simplified relationship between a reified West and an equally reified world of Islam, I turn to the transnational Turkish Islamic field between the Netherlands and Turkey.

**The Netherlands: A Multicultural Haven?**

This dissertation focuses on the transnational religious field between Turkey and the Netherlands for the unique perspectives a case study of the connections between these two countries can provide. The Netherlands has one of the largest Muslim populations in Europe and its policies of accommodation, such as civic integration (*inburgering*) programs, have set trends for other European countries. The largest Muslim minority group in the Netherlands is the Turkish-Dutch community and among the European Muslim populations, those originating from Turkey merit special attention for several reasons. Turkey is the successor to the Ottoman Empire (1299-1923), which played a major part in the cultural, economic, and political developments in Europe between the 15th and the 20th centuries, both as a European power and as an ally of major European powers during periods of conflict. Complementing the historically specific cultural,
economic, and political relations has been the presence of a large Turkish diaspora in Western Europe constituted due to labor migration since the 1960s, constituting the largest immigrant populations in Germany and the Netherlands. Lastly, Turkey has been in negotiations to become a member of the European Union since 2004.

The Netherlands was until recently hailed as ‘a bastion of multiculturalism’ due to the recognition and public representation of ethnic, religious, and sexual minority groups. Due to the rising concerns over the state of social and national cohesion as well as the (perceived) crisis of the successful integration the Muslim population, the Netherlands has recently come to represent a major example of failed multiculturalism both in the Netherlands and in Europe generally. In reality, however, the country has had a robust integration policy since the early 1980s, when the Dutch authorities recognized that the Netherlands had become an immigration country (Scholten 2011). This integration policy was in constant change and different issues received priority over others over the years. The country has recently departed from social integration policies of the 1980s and 1990s that emphasized ‘integration with preservation of identity’ in favor of an ‘assimilationist’ model to achieve social cohesion (Vasta 2007). This new politics of integration is to a great extent based on a revived belief in the supremacy of Dutch norms and values in comparison to those of ethnicized minority cultures, especially the Muslims. As such, the Netherlands has recently tightened its immigration requirements for those who wish to emigrate from Muslim majority countries. Since 2006, immigrants from ‘non-Western countries’, i.e. Muslims, are required to take immigration tests in their home countries in order to attain an immigrant visa for entry to the Netherlands. Moreover, the Dutch state requires immigrants to demonstrate basic knowledge of Dutch history and laws as well as mastery of the Dutch language (van Houtum and Pijpers 2007).
Despite the fact that the Dutch colonized Indonesia, the most populous Muslim country between the 17\textsuperscript{th} and 20\textsuperscript{th} centuries and the colonial subjects from Suriname and Indonesia settled in the Netherlands as early as the 1930s, the most significant growth of the Muslim population took place during the labor migration of the 1960s and the 1970s (Rath et al. 2001; Shadid and Koningsveld 1991). The majority of these ‘guest workers’ came from Turkey and Morocco. Labor migration ended by the mid-1970s following the global oil crisis but immigrant population continued to grow as workers were joined by their wives and children through family reunification and formation. Another component of the Muslim population arrived as asylum seekers and refugees from Iran, Iraq, and Pakistan since the 1980s. ‘Muslims’ currently constitute slightly more than half of the 11 percent ‘foreign-born’ population in the Netherlands. By 2009, the country was home to approximately one million Muslims originating from Turkey, the former Yugoslavia, Morocco, Suriname, and Indonesia, making up about 5 percent of the entire population.\(^4\)

This dissertation is not another addition to the burgeoning literature on the public image and the architectural form mosques, roles mosques play in the formation of radical Islamic and pietist movements, or the politics of identity and/or belonging articulated by mosque administrators and imams. Instead this dissertation explores the role mosques play in the everyday lives of ordinary Muslims, both observant and non-observant. I argue that in the Dutch context mosques have evolved to function primarily as communal sites partaking in the production and reproduction of ethno-religious minority identities. Turkish-Dutch mosques I focus on are visited by diverse groups to perform religious services and attend meetings, seek financial and welfare support, socialize with peers, participate in various educational activities, and spend leisure time. Women frequent

mosques to take language classes or non-governmental organizations approach mosques to reach women. Children are sent to Koran classes and ‘native’ language courses. Men of various ages attend the teahouses at mosques to avoid morally ambivalent environment of coffeehouses for socializing purposes. In short, Turkish-Dutch mosques function as community centers where ethnic, cultural, and religious practices intersect. Mosques have been also at the center of educating the native Dutch about Islam and Muslims through interfaith dialogue initiative and Open Days. Some mosques organize cultural activities such as cooking classes that attract the native-Dutch, as well. Attracting the native Dutch to mosques has the additional aim of countering the stigmatization of mosques as breeding ground of radicalism.

There are about 388,000 immigrants and citizens of Turkish background living in the Netherlands. This makes them the largest minority group in the country. By 2005, ‘Turkish’ organizations controlled 213 out of 344 mosques in the Netherlands (Hollanda Diyanet Vakfı 2006, 8). The mosques established by Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands are in some ways strikingly different than their counterparts in Turkey. This is largely due to the Turkish model of secularism, which is predicated on state control over the production and dissemination of religious knowledge and the active involvement of the state in the provision of religious services. The state monopoly over the Turkish religious field is exercised through the Directorate of Religious Affairs, a bureaucratic state institution that appoints religious personnel and oversees places of worship. In the absence of active state involvement with religious education, expression, and practice,

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6 I am aware of the simplifying and unitary effect of suggesting the existence of a single “Turkish” community, as immigrants from Turkey include Kurds and Alevi groups that do not make much use of mosques. I use the term “Turkish immigrants” partly since the groups I worked with generally identified themselves primarily as Sunni Turks and partly because “Turkish” is the most generic category in circulation for referring to immigrants from Turkey in the Netherlands.
the Netherlands proved fertile ground for the development of a dynamic Turkish-Islamic field structured along competing sectarian, ethnic, and political interests.

**Transnational Religious Field In/Between Turkey and the Netherlands**

Contemporary forms and processes of immigration highlight the polarizing effects of new forms of mobility under globalization. The desires and attempts to create a world in which capital, commodities, and highly skilled labor can move freely have been accompanied by the advent of complex regimes of border regulation and control in order to keep certain populations immobile. This holds especially for the movement of unskilled labor from global south to global north. The very distinction between the forms of movement categorized as ‘migration’ and ‘travel’ point to the epistemic distinction between strictly controlled and highly securitized forms of human flows circumcised by national territories from cosmopolitan and/or business-related mobilities that easily move between and across national borders (Smith and Guarnizo 2003; Shamir 2005).

Early studies on migration focused on migrant sending and receiving countries rather than the multi-scalar networks and circular flows of human movement. Accordingly, until recently migration scholars studied mainly the arrival of migrants at their ‘host’ societies and the challenges they face in their gradual integration and/or assimilation into their places of settlement (Silverstein 2005). The transition from migrancy to citizenship was considered automatic if not natural (Gowricharn 2009). Recent shifts in global regimes of migration confound these assumptions, though. Currently, immigrants do not automatically gain full membership in their adopted countries and many states grant rights to their immigrant populations without providing access to citizenship (Nuhoğlu Soysal 1994).
The contemporary forms of migration are increasingly defined by frequent and continuous movement of migrants across national borders, to the extent that some argue that all forms of migration are becoming transnational (Castles 2000). Transnationalism refers to a life taking place not only between places of origin and destination but at multiple localities across various scales (Grillo 2007; Blunt 2007). That is, increasingly transnational character of contemporary human movement shows a circular pattern instead of a unidirectional form of mobility. As a result, approaching migration as a one way movement between bounded territories has given way to studies that focus on continuous and sustained movement between multiple localities spawning numerous diaspora communities and social movements transgressing national boundaries and logics (Kokot, Tölölyan and Alfonso 2004).

Vertovec argues that as an effect of globalization, transnationalism operates on multiple and intersected scales and spaces, as it is based on “sustained linkages and ongoing exchanges among non-state actors based across national borders” (2009, 3). He goes on to define transnationalism as

…a condition in which, despite great distances and notwithstanding the presence of international borders (and all the laws, regulations and national narratives they represent), certain kinds of relationships have been globally intensified and now take place paradoxically in a planet-spanning yet common – however virtual – arena of activity (ibid.).

The continuous engagement of immigrants with multiple localities and the bifocal character of their sense of belonging are nothing new, of course. However, what sets the current migration patterns apart from those of the past is their extensiveness, speed, multiplicity, and above all, intensity (Vertovec 2001; 2009; Levitt, de Vind and Vertovec 2003). The growing interest on transnational migration generated new perspectives in geographic research. Silvey and Lawson (1999) note that recent geographic research on migration has attempted to complicate the dualistic relationship between ‘the migrant’
and ‘place’. Drawing from anthropology and postcolonial studies, geographers highlight the material and ideological constructions of mobility and the processual character of migration, while problematizing gendered conceptions of place (ibid.). Mitchell argues that transnationality refers to “relations between things and on movements across things” and invites geographers to reassess “formerly emphasized state-centric narratives and territorially defined national borders” (2003, 74). Indeed, geographers working on transnational studies have sought to bring the materiality of mobility, borders, and national spaces back to the discussions of globalization and transnational movement (Silvey 2003; Cravey 2003; Nagel and Staeheli 2008; King 2012). Geographers have opposed both the celebratory accounts of a flat world comprised of smooth spaces of unrestricted movement and the geopolitical discourses of declining nation-states and disappearing national boundaries (Mitchell 1997). Instead, they highlight the diversity and the multisitedness of transmigration and explore locality and translocality by embedding migrants in place and examining their grounded mobilities (Featherstone, Phillips and Waters 2007).

The relationship between religion and transnational migration has been understudied until recently, as religion was generally assumed to be subsumed by ethnicity. However, Levitt (2003) remarks that world religions initiated and sustained some of the earliest forms of multilocal and multiscalar networks in human history. The growing literature on the transnational religious formations has shown that transnational religious actors draw from various forms of social capital to combine different and not always congruous repertoires of thinking and action regarding the matters of faith, while transforming religious beliefs, practices, and institutions both ‘here’ and ‘there’ (Levitt 2007).
Similarly, transnational dimensions of Islam and Muslim communities have until recently received scant attention in academic studies, excepting occasional references to global umma (community of believers) as an alternative to belonging in nation states, rendering Muslim membership in national space suspect. Grillo (2004) notes that there was relatively little academic interest in the Muslimness of immigrants in Europe until the late 1980s. Grillo recalls neither approaching nor diagnosing Islam as a significant variable in his research on immigrant communities with Muslim background in France during the 1970s. Since then the gap in research has been filled due to both global developments and growing political influence of Muslim communities in their countries of settlement. In other words, not only the institutionalization of Islam in individual countries but also regional and global developments rendered Muslim presence highly visible in public space and relevant in national politics in Europe.

Studies on the first generation of immigrants arriving from Muslim-majority countries focused mostly on labor related issues and economic deprivation, until the ‘guest workers’ have become ‘Muslims’. Parallel to this shift, concerns with the labor participation and class mobility of immigrants were gradually replaced by a preoccupation with the cultural (in) compatibility between Muslim minority and non-Muslim majority populations (Korteweg and Yurdakul 2009).

Grillo argues that Islam is transnational in three senses of the term: as “Islam within transnational circuits, Islam within a bi-national/plurinational framework,” and as “the umma” (2007, 865-866). The first sense depicts a temporary displacement from one’s country of origin while maintaining strong religious ties with the homeland, the second delineates a multinational framework where Muslims engage both the sending and receiving country contexts, while the third refers to a situation in which belonging to the imagined community of believers surpasses the national and/or diasporic attachments.
Privileging belonging in umma to participate in pan-Islamic and supra-ethnic networks engenders less localized or ‘deterritorialized’ approach to Islam in transnational settings by putting transnational Muslims in touch with other Muslim communities in their specific locality or elsewhere globally (Roy 2004). To put it another way, in some instances identification with a universally defined community of believers is more tenable than, or preferable to a diasporic configuration. This might be especially true in contexts where there is no single dominant Islamic community but a multiplicity of Islamic actors operating on a transnational field. Yet, it should not be forgotten that despite the multiple ways in which transnational Islam can be configured, it has been primarily “[t]he imagined existence of ‘global Islam’, a monolithic community united in its opposition to the west and threatening because of its transnational appeal, has been central to the diplomatic and military agendas of the USA and many European states” (Jones and Mas 2011, 4).

Bowen (2004, 880) observes that Islam’s transnational articulation “complicates current lines of transnational analysis by emphasizing its own universal norms and its practices of deliberating about religious issues across national boundaries.” From ‘transnational Islam’ Bowen understands a “public space of reference and debate,” (ibid., 882) especially for the Muslims in the West who constantly jump scales to reach out to their co-believers by means of a global imaginary of umma. To do so, they rely on the common denominator of Arabic in debating the prospects of a distinctly European interpretation Islam. Grillo (2004) argues that the appeal of this umma-centered transnational Islam has grown thanks to global catalyzing events such as the Rushdie Affair and 9/11.

According to Mandeville, transnational Islamic actors include “various governmental and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), scholarly and educational
associations, Sufi and pietistic networks, and a variety of diaspora and migrant communities” (2007, 275). In analyses of transnational Islam, one needs to distinguish between Islamic organizations and movements with political objectives and individual transmigrants who only identify as Muslim. For depending on which one of the two positions is being examined one’s findings will differ. That is, the researchers need to distinguish between the actors that take Islam as their central frame of reference and those who do not. Mandeville (ibid.) notes that 9/11 attacks and the ensuing ‘War on Terror’ resulted in the very notion of ‘transnational Islam’ to be associated mainly with radicalism and violence, even though transnational organizations such as Al-Qaeda comprise a very small part of the Muslim transnational field.

In this dissertation, I analyze the context within which Turkish-Dutch mosques are situated through a transnational religious field approach. Bourdieu (1977) uses ‘field’ to denote a specific set of social spaces that operate on the basis of their own rules and logics (see also Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992). Fields are competitively and hierarchically structured and their fluid boundaries shift as social agents attempt to gain various kinds of capital in them (Jenkins 2006). In the following chapters, I analyze the different set of rules, strategies, hierarchical power relations, and historical patterns of practice constituting both national and transnational religious fields, with their own logics, laws, and specific configurations of power.

Glick-Schiller and Levitt (2004, 1010) argue that social agents positioned in transnational social fields “are, through their everyday activities and relationships, influenced by multiple sets of laws and institutions. Studies on transnational migration by geographers look at the agency of migrants in relation to their mobility patterns to explore the “the ways in which migrants negotiate and inhabit multiple subject positions” in fields of “socially constructed power relations” (Silvey and Lawson 1999, 127). The
transnational religious field I explore involves individual and collective actors that simultaneously partake in urban, regional, national, transnational and global circuits of religious activism and knowledge production. Analyzing the transnational religious field in which Turkish-Dutch mosques operate allows me to attend to multiple scales as well as different national structures of feeling and mobilization that the Turkish-Dutch communities inhabit.

The collective actors of the transnational Turkish-Dutch Islamic field are as follows: *Diyanet* (the Netherlands Religious Affairs Foundation) is an extension of the Directorate of Religious Affairs of Turkey and controls the greatest number of mosques. Second largest organization, *Milli Görüş* (National Outlook) is a political Islamic movement affiliated with the Turkish Felicity Party and the European National Outlook Organization that has its headquarters in Cologne, Germany. *Süleymancı* are a Sufi community that follows the teachings of Süleyman Hilmi Tunahan (d. 1959). *Fethullahçı*, or *Gülenists* are the followers of Fethullah Gülen, one of the most influential clerics of Turkey. Süleymancısı and Milli Görüş contest the promotion of the state religion by the Turkish state through Diyanet, while simultaneously competing with one another in order to extend their base among the Turkish groups in Europe (Marechal 2003; Van Amersfoort and Doomernik 2002). Milli Görüş and Süleymancısı target the transformation of ‘homeland politics’ alongside with their goal of securing a foothold in the Dutch society. They contest Diyanet’s attempts to regulate and mobilize Islam along the interests of the Turkish state by generating a dynamic religious field with multiple and competing actors in the Netherlands.
Mosques in Islamic History

Before starting my discussion of the institutionalization process of mosques in the Turkey and the Netherlands, it is necessary to provide some historical background about the emergence and evolution of mosques in Islamic history. For the narratives about the role of early mosques in social and intellectual life constantly figure in the contemporary debates about how to construct and organize mosque spaces. Moreover, the references to the early days of Islam and the examples drawn from the sayings and the deeds of the prophet (Sunna) provide justification for both reproducing and challenging dominant gender norms in place at mosques.

In the Islamic tradition, it is emphasized strongly that anywhere a believer prostrates for prayer is a ‘mosque’. Yet the need for communal space inserted itself from the earliest days of Islam. The Arabic word masjid (mescid in Turkish) derives from verbal root of prostration and denotes any customary place where salat, or ritual prayer (namaz in Turkish) is performed. According to the Islamic tradition, the holiest site of Islam, Ka’ba was built in Mecca by Adam, both the first human and the prophet. Adam was the imam of this first place of worship for humanity. The first masjid Muslims established was the courtyard of the prophet’s house. This simple rectangular structure with no minarets or a dome, was not simply where believers gathered for congregational prayers. The first Muslims inhabited this masjid for military training, political meetings, and to learn about their new faith in the company of their prophet (Qureshi 1989). Later on a distinction was drawn between masjids and jamī’s (cami in Turkish). The former was dedicated to communal prayers whereas the latter additionally served the congregation for Friday prayers where a khutba (hutbe in Turkish), the weekly sermon was delivered. Following the example of the prophet, the uses of the early mosques included “meeting-place, council chamber, courtroom, treasury, and centre for military
operations” (Halood and Khan 1997, 59). In other words, mosques historically combined social, educational, and economic functions with the provision of religious services (Özdemir and Frank 2000).

Most of the early mosques were converted from churches, temples, and large houses in conquered lands during the first centuries of Islamic expansion. Following the rapid expansion of the Islamic Empire and the growing administrative and institutional specialization, Muslims eventually developed a distinct mosque architecture by incorporating Persian, Roman, and Buddhist construction methods and styles (Nath 1995). Minarets and domes, although considered indispensable components of mosques by many Muslims today, were later additions and have not been adopted universally. The first minaret was built in the late 7th century and construction of minarets at the prophet’s original mosque was even opposed by many as unnecessary (Halod and Khan 1997). Emergence of numerous regional styles was accompanied by differentiated uses of mosques as Islam spread among diverse societies in various countries (Frishman and Khan 1994; Metcalf 1996; Grover 2006).

Even though there are numerous hadiths and juridical opinions stating that prayers performed with congregation yield more good deeds and are important for building up strong communal bonds between the believers, only the adult Muslim men are required to attend communal Friday prayers at mosques (Qureshi 1989; Bosnalı 2009). Mosques have played a seminal role in the social, economic, and educational life of their communities beyond providing a space for public prayers, though. Because of their public character, mosques have been crucial sites of communal life in Muslim societies. Historically mosques played an important role in the legitimization and negotiation of the sovereignty of Muslim rulers over their subjects, while simultaneously serving as a platform from which political grievances and popular dissent were voiced (Fathi 1981).
More recently, due to the strict control of other public places for collective gatherings, in some Muslim-majority countries mosques became mobilizing grounds for oppositional movements, as in the case of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt (Munson 2001). In other instances, activists have turned to mosques for providing social and welfare services to their communities with states’ withdrawal from welfare provision as a result of neoliberalization (Arif 2008).

Even though they are often positioned against more ‘mystical’ Sufi sacred places such as shrines and lodges, mosques are far from merely being the bastions of Orthodox Islam. While it is essential to look into other sites of religious activity ‘beyond the officially sacred’ (Kong 2001; Gökarıksel 2009), I contend that it is also necessary to problematize the assumptions about the ‘officiality’ of the sacred status of mosques. Parkin and Headley (2000) have shown the limitations of approaching mosques as sacred sites proper, firmly grounded within the Orthodox Islam. For mosques mediate diverse and not always congruous communities as institutional sites of communal life. They play a central role in the construction of not only religious, but also ethnic and national collectivities out of heterogeneous populations by providing the imaginary of a place ‘for us’ (Ghannam 2002). In this sense they are habitual spaces (Fortier 2000) where Muslims might feel at home. In light of these insights, I find it imperative to look into the differences not only between but also within mosques. Studies on various meanings and uses of mosques should be complemented with analyses of the differences between politically, denominationally, and locationally distinct mosques. We must ask: what are the specific circumstances and qualities that distinguish one mosque from another? Which mosques are preferred by individuals and communities over others, for what reason, and to what ends?
What do we gain from a geographical perspective for studying of mosques?

Religion has lately come to the attention of a new generation of geographers (Brace, Bailey and Harvey 2006; Gale 2007). Geographical research on religion points out the historically specific constructions and contestations of religious, spiritual, sacred spaces, and places of worship (Holloway 2006; Ivakhiv 2006). New geographies of religion insist that sacred spaces can neither be studied in isolation from the social, economic, and political forces that shape them, nor can they be examined without attending to particular histories and experiences of the groups that construct, contest, and transform them (Kong 2001; Secor 2002; Gökarıksel 2009). Geographical research on Islamic communal places of minority Muslim communities have shown that attempts of Muslims to imprint their identities in urban spaces by building mosques are intricately linked other struggles, including claims to national belonging and citizenship (Isin and Siemiatycki 2002). Geographers time and again have shown that communal places such as mosques or churches play a central role in the construction of collective identities by constituting the locus of articulation for common interests (Nagar and Leitner 1998).

**Mosques Beyond the Visibility-Representation Nexus**

Challenging what I called elsewhere ‘the visibility-representation nexus’ in studies of mosques in Europe (Es 2011), this dissertation emphasizes lived and embodied materiality of mosque spaces and their importance in everyday life. I turn to cultural geography and geographies of religion to explore the relationship between mosque spaces and ethno-religious subject formation in the Netherlands.

Cherribi (2003, 196) observes that “over the past three decades Islam has become increasingly visible in the European public space. Mosques, halal foods, Muslim customs and ways of dress, are all increasingly common in European countries.” Indeed, mosques,
together with headscarves, have become important signifiers of Muslim presence, and are at the center of many public debates in Europe. Accordingly, there has been an increase in the academic studies exploring the ‘Islamization’ of European cityscapes (Eade 1993; Cesari 2005). Even though conducted by researchers from various disciplines, these studies are generally limited negotiations over access to public space among Muslim communities, local groups, and various bureaucratic bodies such as municipalities and courts (Naylor and Rain 2002; Maussen 2004; Jonker 2005; Gale 2005). For instance, the editor of special journal issue on European mosques remarks: “The mosque…expresses…the evolution of Islam from the private to the public sphere. Whereas in the past, Muslims in Europe were isolated within invisible and private prayer rooms, the mosque openly, publicly and visibly marks an Islamic presence” (Cesari 2005, 1018). Such exclusive focus on the issues of visibility regarding European Muslim communities, however, reduces the significance of mosque projects to being only the spatial expression of Muslim communities in public spaces. This approach finds Muslim agency first and foremost in the attempts to gain visibility. As a result, only the acts of gaining visibility in public space are coded and approached as manifestations of Muslim agency. By seeking Muslim social and political agency exclusively in the public sphere through the lens of politics of visibility, many scholars working on mosques are blind to the importance of everyday mosque practices in analyses of European Islam (Es 2011).

Cultural geographers have consistently argued that space is neither a container of identities nor the backdrop of social processes, but is socially constructed and constitutive of social relations (Gregory 1994; Massey 1994, 2005). What remains understudied in analyses on the negotiation of location, size, and architectural form of mosque projects is the influence of the new meanings and uses of mosque spaces on the everyday lives of the communities that construct such places. Current scholarship defines mosques as symbols
and representative sites of Islam in Europe. Although it is useful to approach mosques as ‘spaces of representation’, there is more to mosques: as social spaces, mosques are also loci of social practices and imaginations (Lefebvre 1991). In this dissertation, I employ a ‘relational’ conceptualization of mosques in order to simultaneously examine the symbolic, material, and cognitive production of mosque spaces as social processes, rather than attending to representation as the main level of analysis (Harvey 2006). In other words, instead of privileging the conceived mosque space of architects, planners, and political scientists that dominate the work on mosques in the Netherlands (for example, see Erkoçu and Buğdaci 2009, Roose 2009; Maussen 2009), I propose to attend to the material, lived, everyday experiences and spatial practices of users and inhabitants of mosques (Lefebvre 1991; Merrifield 2000). Deploying a conception of space that is always already in the process of becoming (Pred 1985), and as heterogonous, indeterminate, and multiple (Natter and Jones III 1997; Massey 2005), this dissertation approaches mosques as ongoing projects that are open to constant intervention by social actors (Creswell 2004). In this study, then, mosques are reconceptualized as lived and embodied places that are claimed and contested by a host of social actors with varying motives and agendas. Mosques are pluriform and multipurpose centers of action and they constitute loci of various practices.

Space and subjectivity are implicated in one another. On the one hand, metaphors of space –insides and outsides, surfaces and positions, ‘Africa-ns’ and ‘Europe-ans’— are indispensable to the language of the subject/ivity. Subjects are always situated, i.e. emplaced and embodied, on the other (Kirby 1996; Longhurst 2003). The anthropologists have shown the importance of Islam for the cultivation of certain dispositions, attitudes, and values (Ewing 1997; Ghannam 2002; Mahmood 2005; Hirschkind 2006). Ghannam (2002, 131), for instance, highlights the corporeal and bodily aspects of mosques as
“site[s] for the construction of the meaning of bodies and the constitution of subjectivities.” Appropriating mosque spaces, as Mahmood has shown in her study of the Egyptian women’s mosque movement, is one way of challenging privatization of religion and has been conducive to “the cultivation of those bodily aptitudes, virtues, habits, and desires that serve to ground Islamic principles within the practices of everyday living” (2000, 45). However, spatial registers such as ‘topography’ or ‘soundscape’ appear in many of similar studies merely as ‘metaphor-concepts’ (Sparke 2005). Scholars often fail to pay enough attention to the ways in which ‘disciplinary spaces’ such as mosques can be articulated to certain social practices (Foucault 1995; Zieleniec 2007), and undermine material enactments of embodied selves through social spaces (Pile 1996; Moss and Dyck 2003; Gökarıksel 2009).

Methods

The recent literature on migration has pointed to the fallacy of ‘methodological nationalism,’ that is focusing on the processes and outcomes of migration exclusively within the space of the nation-state which serves as a container of social relations. Instead, scholars of migration have called for multi-sited research with a focus on the movement of ‘transmigrants’ between multiple places at various scales (Glick-Schiller 1995; Levitt 2003). In the particular case of the European Muslim communities, Muslims’ movement in-between and across multiple scales as transnational migrants is compounded by their connections to a global Islamic public sphere that extends beyond the confines of nation-states (Bowen 2004). In the early 1990s, the ethnographic imagination of the field as a bounded, temporo-spatially distant, and singular place was replaced by multi-sited, translocal, and mobility oriented approaches (Marcus 1995; Gupta and Ferguson 1997; Appadurai 1996). Marcus (1997, 97) notes that “empirical
changes in the world...[and] following the thread of cultural process itself impels the move toward multi-sited ethnography." The continuous flows and multiple networks of ideas, people, and resources between the sending and receiving countries of migration constitute the context within which transnational spaces such as the Dutch mosques emerge and evolve (Vertovec 2001; van der Veer 2002).

The importance of a transnational and multi-sited approach becomes clear when exploring the contemporary struggles revolving around national belonging and religious practices of the Turkish-Dutch immigrants in the Netherlands. Here, the influence of Turkey is significant in providing ideas, resources, and strategies for the creation and maintenance of mosques in the Netherlands, and vice versa. The sustained ties of the Turkish-Dutch communities to Turkey and the mutual interest and involvement between various groups, situated in and between the two countries, engender a dynamic research field that cannot be captured without focusing on the transnational networks comprised of financial, ideological, and political ties between the Netherlands and Turkey. The activities of the Turkish state beyond its borders to define, control, and produce religious knowledge, sensitivity, and practices has a strong impact on the configuration of the Turkish-Dutch mosques. The connections of the Turkish-Dutch communities to Turkey not only provide an important point of reference for what a ‘proper’ mosque should look like and how mosques should be used, but they also have a strong impact on the experience of being a ‘Turkish Muslim’ living ‘abroad’. The continuities and discontinuities of religious patterns and modes of mobilization between the two countries are crucial in understanding how transnational communities inspire, support, and challenge one another at multiple scales. Hence the significance of the policies, discourses, and strategies employed by the Turkish state in its involvement with the religious field in the Netherlands. Furthermore, Turkey’s status as a candidate for
membership in the European Union has accentuated the debates on the question of Islam’s compatibility with European norms and values (Savage 2004; Baban and Keyman 2008).

Transnational connections between the two countries required my research to be conducted through a combination of multi-sited ethnographic research and other methods, including archival work, discourse analysis, in-depth and semi-structured interviews, and focus groups. The research was divided into two phases: the first phase (December 2009-June 2010) involved 10 mosques in the Dutch cities Amsterdam, Haarlem, Zaandam, and The Hague. Phase two (June 2010- September 2010) took place in the Turkish cities Ankara, Emirdağ, and Istanbul, where I visited several universities, bureaucratic institutions, and mosques. This multi-sited focus with an emphasis on transnational links allowed me to explore the continuities and differences between the two countries in terms of the composition of mosque congregations and services.

I arrived at the Netherlands in December 2009 to start my field research activities. In preparation for the field research, I took extensive Dutch classes at the Free University Amsterdam during the first two months of my stay. My field research in the Netherlands focused on the three most influential Turkish-Islamic organizations in the Netherlands. I contacted and received research permission from the headquarters of the Netherlands Islamic Foundation –known as Diyanet- in The Hague. I also contacted the administrative offices of Milli Görüş Movement’s northern and southern federations in Amsterdam and Rotterdam respectively, and received permission to conduct research in the mosques affiliated with Milli Görüş. Lastly, I visited the Süleymançılı headquarters in Utrecht, yet I was not able to receive permission to conduct research at mosques Süleymançılıs operated.

There are considerable differences between Dutch cities in terms of how individual municipalities approach mosques in the Netherlands (Sunier 2005).
Comparisons between different urban contexts showed city specific patterns with regard to institutionalization and operations of Muslim Turkish organizations (Maussen 2009). I mainly focused on the cities of Amsterdam, Haarlem, and The Hague during my fieldwork in the Netherlands. My choice of these three cities is based on the density of the Turkish-Dutch groups in them and the existence of diverse mosque congregations and organizations. Almost half of the populations of Amsterdam and The Hague are composed on immigrant communities, with substantial number of Turkish-Dutch communities (Priemus 2007). Turks also constitute the largest immigrant group in Haarlem. I eventually concentrated my field research in the city of Haarlem for several reasons. First, there were already detailed academic studies on mosques and the Turkish Dutch communities in these two cities (Sunier 1995, 2005; Maussen 2004, 2009), whereas no such research was conducted in Haarlem. Second, relatively small size of the city allowed me to conduct comprehensive field research that could cover multiple political actors, various institutions and diverse populations. Lastly, the majority of the Turkish population in Haarlem originated from the same Anatolian town, Emirdağ, and maintained active relations with it, providing an ideal research case to follow transnational links.

During my field research, I conducted over 100 personal interviews and organized 10 focus group meetings. I used snowball sampling to locate my interviewees. In order to situate mosques within the local political structure, I approached municipality officials and members of political parties. I contacted and interviewed journalists, academics, and the representatives of NGOs, various religious organizations, neighborhood councils, and housing associations. Other than visiting several mosques in Amsterdam and The Hague, I conducted participant observation at three mosques in Haarlem and one mosque in Zaandam. In these mosques, two of which belonged to Diyanet and two operated under
Milli Görüş, I interviewed and spent time with administrators, imams, and congregation members. I also organized focus group meetings with youth and women branches of 3 mosque associations.

I participated in football tournaments, home lectures, and Open Days organized by these mosques, as well. Other than the Mili Görüş and Diyanet mosques, I interviewed the administrators of a mosque exclusively visited by Kurds and contacted and interviewed the administrators of now-defunct Polder Mosque, which was established to “transcend the ethnic mosque model in the Netherlands.” In addition, I participated in the meetings of an interreligious faith dialogue project and organized focus group meetings with participants from both the Turkish-Dutch and the native-Dutch parties in Haarlem. Conducting research in branches of the same organization in different cities enabled me to attend to the negotiations of the mosque projects and activities of immigrant organizations controlling mosques in multiple cities. This also helped me to understand the place-specific differences between the mosques operated by the same organization.

I traced the linkages of my research participants to Turkey with research in this country. During the first week of February 2010, I visited a language school in Istanbul. This school was established by Turkish-Dutch expats and offers preparation courses for integration tests given at the Royal Dutch Embassy. Since 2006 passing these tests have become obligatory for Turkish citizens applying for residence permit in the Netherlands. In order to trace the transnational links between the two countries I contacted and interviewed the Foreign Relations Chair of the Milli Görüş affiliated Saadet Partisi (Felicity Party). When I began the Turkey phase of my field work on June 1, I intensified my research efforts in the cities of Istanbul, Ankara, and Afyon. I made a research trip to Ankara to visit the headquarters of the Directorate of Religious Affairs and interviewed
the Directorate’s Vice President and various department managers. I contacted and
interviewed two imams who served in Diyanet mosques in the Netherlands during the
early 1980s as well as the founder and the first head of the Netherlands Islamic
Foundation. At the Divinity School of the Ankara University, I received information on
the recently established ‘International Theology Program’, where several Turkish-Dutch
students are currently enrolled. Other than interviewing several faculty members, I made
a focus group meeting with 3 Turkish-Dutch students of the program.

During my visit to the headquarters of the Directorate of Religious Affairs, the
manager of the Religious Guidance Services drew my attention to five ‘model’ mosques
listed on the Directorate’s website. These mosques are referred to as mosques with
“exemplary religious personnel.” I understand these mosques as prototypes of the
mosques to be developed under the guidance of the Directorate in the future, since the
Strategic Plan of the Directorate for the years of 2009-13 proposes the establishment of
200 ‘pilot’ mosques. These mosques are distinguished from ‘regular’ mosques by the
wide range of social services they offer. I found out that four of the five of these mosques
are located in Istanbul. Upon my return to Istanbul, I visited the Istanbul Mufti’s Office
to receive permission for conducting research at mosques. Upon receiving the permission
from the Mufti’s Office, I visited three of the ‘model’ mosques listed at the Directorate’s
website. Other than interviewing the imams and associational board members of all the
three, I conducted in-depth research at the Sümbül Efendi Mosque in Fatih. Here, I
organized a focus group meeting with a group of elderly women who spend most of their
days at the mosque’s women’s section, despite opposition from men. I also interviewed
several men who regularly visit the tea house of the mosque.

7 A mufti is the highest official of the Directorate of Religious Affairs at district or city level in Turkey.
Other than conducting research at the three ‘model’ mosques, I interviewed the imams of the ‘selatin’ Fatih and Eyüp Mosques and interviewed two vice-muftis from the Mufti’s Office in Istanbul. During the second half of July, I made a research trip to the Central Anatolian town Emirdağı in Afyon. The majority of the Turkish-Dutch community in Haarlem originates from this town and most of them visit their hometown during summer. I contacted several of my informants from the Netherlands spending their summer in Emirdağı and interviewed them. Even though I failed to receive permission from the governor’s office for interviewing the religious personnel at mosques, I had informal contact with one imam and interviewed a retired imam and the head of a mosque association. I conducted interviews and organized several focus group meetings with visiting elderly men and youth from the Netherlands and Belgium as well as organized one focus group meeting with youth permanently living in Emirdağı.

The recent work on research methods calls geographers to recognize their own embodied and situated relationship with their research environments and participants (Crang 2003). As a situated agent of knowledge production, I was acutely aware of my own multilocal, multi-ethnic, and multi-religious affiliations during my encounters throughout my field research. This helped me relate to the experiences of my research participants. I am the son of a ‘guest worker’ who actually returned to Turkey after living in Germany for about twenty years. I have uncles and aunts as well as countless cousins living in North-Western Europe. My eldest sister moved to Germany sixteen years ago and still lives there. Moreover, I could relate to the minority status of my informants as I come from a northeastern province of Turkey with the largest concentration of Kurdish Alevi population in the country. My father’s family has Turkish Sunni roots while my

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8 Selatin mosques were established under the patronage of the Ottoman sultans. They are monumental mosques with two or more minarets.
mother’s side is Kurdish Alevi. Even though my looks mark me as a Kurd in Turkey, my native tongue is Turkish and I am not particularly religious, neither drawing on Sunni Islam, or Alevism, despite having more cultural affinity to the latter. As a result, depending on my socio-spatial positioning, certain aspects of my multiple belongings and attachments were emphasized or undermined throughout my fieldwork. Sometimes I was an ‘Alevi’, sometimes a ‘Turk’, sometimes ‘Muslim’. At times I was called a ‘professor’ and at others ‘an American’.

Moreover, I am married to a native-Dutch woman and stayed with my in-laws in an upper-middle class neighborhood near Haarlem during my fieldwork. This added another level of complexity to my relationship with my informants. When I told them about my –back then Dutch fiancée—wife, I received questions ranging from “Is she real Dutch?” to “Is she Dutch Dutch?” from my informants. My in-laws gave me a bike as my welcome present and I happily used it as my primary means of transportation. This, together with my Dutch fiancé, often led to rather serious jokes about me ‘integrating’ to the Netherlands in one month more than what some of my informants did in 20 years. Another impact of my intimate living arrangements with a native-Dutch family was my ability to challenge certain stereotypes about the native-Dutch during my interviews and observe different domestic arrangements in comparison to Turkish families.

Ethnographic fieldwork constituted the primary method of data collection for my research. I relied on participant observation to find out the difference between ‘what people do and what they say they do’. Taking my cue from Schepers-Hughes’ (1993) active and committed approach to ethnography, I engaged my research participants as partners in dialogue and did not shy away from confrontation and conflict. I considered it my ethical duty to share my observations and criticism with my research participants.

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9 Alevi are non-Sunni ethno-religious minority groups that have been generally marginalized, persecuted,
during the research process in an effort to construct a relationship on the basis of mutual learning from, and benefiting of one another. I did not try to block the curiosity of my informants on my ethnic and religious affiliations and commitments during our interviews, because I found it just fair that they also had a right to question me considering the fact that I asked them to share their intimate memories, thoughts, and experiences with me.

Reflecting on my own ambiguous, shifting, and often ambivalent relationship to religiosity, I have come to realize extent to which researchers might erase ambiguities and inconsistencies they encounter during data collection in order to attribute intent and coherency to the narratives and the practices of their research participants. As Wolford (2006) points out, however, contradictions, fluidity, confusion, and less than perfect information are the norm rather than the exception during fieldwork. This aspect of research should not be overlooked in the quest for locating agency only in intentionality.

Geographers increasingly concede that in the future “social science methodologies and forms of knowing will be characterized as much by openness, reflexivity and recursivity as by categorization, conclusion and closure” (Davies and Dwyer 2007, 258). Accordingly, I tried to stay alert to the shifting and often contradictory character of perspectives as well as messiness of everyday discourses and practices, during my engagement with my research participants.

McDowell (2009) notes that with increased awareness of the position of the researcher vis-a-vis the interviewees, issues related to power and authority as well as language, gender, body language, and even clothing styles have appeared as important factors determining the success of interviewing process. I conducted semi-structured interviews where after a few standard questions, I would follow the particular trajectories and denied cultural and religious rights in Ottoman and Turkish history (see Es, forthcoming).
of a life history and primary issues of concern for my research participants. Other than interviews, I conducted focus group meetings to engage with my informants. As a cooperative and interactive research method with the advantage of representing the multiplicity of perspectives (Bosco and Herman 2009), focus groups have been successfully adopted by a growing number of geographers (Hopkins 2007; Gökarıkse and Secor 2012). I conducted focus groups for the first time during my dissertation fieldwork. My focus group participants shared personal histories as friends, colleagues, or membership in an organization. Accordingly, this method enabled me to mobilize relations of rapport among research participants with interlinked personal histories, where their intimacy, previous exchange of opinions, and common experiences would ensure the representation of different and often conflicting points of view. The disagreement among focus group participants were essential in revealing diversity of positions and ideas within seemingly homogenous groups, especially considering how outsiders, including researchers, often are presented with an image of unified communities as a protective gesture by minority groups. Focus groups enabled me to take note of diverse opinions, conflicting ideas, and disagreements that circulated between my research participants and could not be captured through individual interviews. In focus groups, I often initiated the meetings with structured questions and then did not interfere with the discussion except to refocus the group on the issue at hand or to allow relatively reserved participants to voice their opinions. I always told the participants that the meeting would be an exercise where we would “think together and learn from another.” Indeed, many times even long-time friends discovered surprising things about, or radically different opinions of their peers thanks to the creative tensions and the productive debates during the focus group meetings.
I have attained the necessary IRB approval for my research. I did my best to arrange interviews and focus groups at locations comfortable for my informants and sought their consent regarding the recording of the focus group meetings and interviews. The research participants were informed about their right to decline answering questions if they wished to do so and that they were told that could end the interview or leave a focus group meeting anytime.

Outline of Chapters

This dissertation consists of six chapters, including the conclusion.

Chapter 2, Shifting Politics of Migration in the Netherlands looks at the histories and politics of immigration in/to the Netherlands. I critically engage with the debates on pillarization—a corporatist regime of governance based on consensus between socially segregated communities—and the unfolding of the 'multicultural drama' in the wake of the arrival of the far right to the center stage of Dutch politics, a development often attributed to the failure of (Muslim) immigrants to integrate. This chapter illustrates the conceptual and perceptual shifts in terms of the categories through which Turkish-Muslim alterity has been constructed and deployed in the Netherlands.

Chapter 3, Actors of a Transnational Religious Field, looks at the emergence of first mosques and highlights the transnational dynamics of the institutionalization of Turkish Islam in the Netherlands. Of particular importance is the exploration of the decline of class-based politics in favor of ethno-religious identity politics—a very significant factor, I argue, underlying the diversification of mosque organizations and the proliferation of mosque services—since the 1970s. The chapter introduces the main organizations and movements active in the Turkish Islamic field with an emphasis on the institutional histories of and the competition between the two most important
transnational actors that control the majority of the Turkish-Dutch mosques: The Netherlands Islamic Foundation, or Diyanet (a semi-official organization de facto functioning as a branch of the Turkish State’s Directorate of Religious Affairs) and Milli Görüş Netherlands (originated in Turkey during 1970s, this previously radical Islamic movement has its European headquarters located in Germany).

**Chapter 4, Everyday Practices and the Formation of Moral Subjects**, attends to the homely experience of mosques. It points to the relationship between mosques and other sites of socialization such as coffeehouses. Second, this chapter highlights the seminal role mosques play in the production of ethno-religious belonging and highly gendered moral citizen-subject positions through mundane, repetitive, everyday mosque-centered practices, such as ‘hanging out’ at mosques and organization of sports events and festivals. Thirdly, this chapter investigates both chance and carefully orchestrated encounters between the Turkish-Dutch and the native-Dutch that take place in mosque spaces. The representational practices of, and the interactions between the two groups through interfaith dialogues and Open Days will be analyzed to explicate how the boundaries between Turkishness, Dutchness, Islam, Europe, Christianity, and secularity are re-drawn. All the three sections of this chapter are informed by the experiences of multiple groups differentiated along age, gender, class, sectarian, ethnic, and political affiliations that make contested claims and that enjoy varying degrees of access to mosque spaces.

**Chapter 5, ‘Mosques are for Everyone’: Turkish Secularism**, explores the impact of the Dutch secularism on the politics of religion in Turkey. After introducing the historical ruptures and continuities between Ottoman and republican histories of religious institutionalization, I analyze the Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs’ recent project of transforming the social status of imams into community leaders akin to Christian
priests. I show the ways in which the Directorate’s plans to establish ‘pilot mosques’ that provide ‘cultural’ services are inspired by the model provided by the European mosques. I also discuss the extension of mosque services to women, children, and youth, previously excluded groups from mosque spaces in Turkey.
CHAPTER TWO

SHIFTING POLITICS OF MIGRATION IN THE NETHERLANDS

The Netherlands has the reputation of being one of the most liberal democracies in the world. The country is well-known for the flourishing of diverse lifestyles, free use of soft drugs, and high living standards. Its vibrant political system is characterized by the parliamentary representation of various political affiliations and the absence of a strong center. Same-sex marriage has been legalized since 2001 and access to abortion or euthanasia is not subject to debate. Another significant aspect of the Dutch political system is the provision of extensive rights to ethnic and religious minorities, such as the right to establish religious schools with state support and minority access to broadcasting on public TV. Given the image of the Netherlands as a multicultural and egalitarian haven, the recent political developments in the Netherlands have surprised both domestic and international observers. The country was shocked by the political murders of the politician Pim Fortuyn in 2002 and polemicist Theo van Gogh in 2004. One year later, the Dutch rejected the EU constitution. In recent years the Dutch policy makers have devised some of the strictest immigration and integration policies in Europe, specifically targeting Muslims.

The common rhetoric posits that an entrenched multiculturalism dominating the political landscape throughout 1980s and 1990s met its sudden demise in the 2000s in the Netherlands (Statham et. al. 2005; Joppke 2004 and Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007). There is a growing consensus among the researchers, however, that there was hardly such
an extensive multiculturalist program or a consistent multiculturalist regime to begin with (Duyvendak et al. 2010; Scholten and Holzhacker 2009). Moreover, the tendency to attribute a host of problems ranging from the crises of national cohesion to the sustainability of welfare states to the failures of multiculturalism is not limited to the Netherlands. Attacking the ghost of a putatively failed multicultural experiment has become the mobilizing ground for many across both the left and the right end of the political spectrum in Europe (Lentin and Titley 2011).

**Toleration and Living in the Pillarized Society**

Mijnhardt (2010) remarks that the Dutch consider tolerance and permissiveness as quintessential national values. Yet notwithstanding their prominence in social and political life at certain historical junctures, practices of toleration have neither been seamlessly continuous nor principally articulated. Moreover, toleration did not extend to all social groups. The Dutch history of tolerance unfolded against the background of a pluralistic and multicentered power structure inside and outside the Netherlands: from the 16th century onwards, the ruling elite had to contend with a multi-confessional citizenry at home and strong monarchies in Southeast Asian colonies (Van Grossen 2007). Van Grossen points out that even though it emerged as a response to practical necessities, the idea of tolerance eventually “came to be regarded as a political virtue with clear social and, more importantly, economic benefits” (ibid., 7).

The Netherlands urbanized very rapidly and had one of the most literate societies in Europe by the 16th century. The diversity of the population was accentuated by the arrival of immigrants, many of whom were persecuted religious minorities, such as the Jews and the Huguenots. Coupled with the Protestant and Catholic divide, ensuing fragmentation of political field along multiple interest groups led to “a fluid governmental
practice dominated by compromise” (Mijnhardt 2010, 11). However, the long war of independence fought against the Catholic Spain had the implication of preventing the practices of tolerance from extending to Catholic subjects. Due to their association with Spain, the Catholics were treated as second class citizens well into the late 19th century. Accordingly, they were not allowed to build churches and could not practice their rites publicly (van Rooden 2010).

Lijphart (1968) has argued that by the early 20th century the Dutch population was divided into four blocks, or ‘pillars’ that were organized along religious and class lines: Catholics, Calvinists, Socialists and Liberals. Despite having its roots in the later 19th century (Wintle 2000) the pillarization (verzuiling) took root only after the ‘Pacification’ of 1917.10 The above-mentioned blocks formed the basis of the system of pillarization that helped foster and manage a pluralist society in the Netherlands. The pillars were separated from one another with more or less clear boundaries. Each group constituted a subculture along their respective ideological and religious preferences and individual pillars developed relatively exclusive religious, educational and leisure institutions for their members (Entzinger 2006). Accordingly, as Lijphart argues, the pillarization of the Dutch society culminated in a “politics of accommodation,” which was “based on a high degree of self-containment and mutual isolation of the four blocks with overarching contact among the blocks limited to the elite level” (1968, 112).

The intense industrialization and urbanization after the 1950s as well as the shifts in global political conjuncture brought about a “cultural revolution” characterized by ‘values such as authenticity, reflexivity, culminating in individual self-fulfillment” (Mijnhardt 2010, 118). These developments undermined the collective and conformist life experiences characterizing pillarized society and marked the beginning of
depillarization (*ontzulling*). During the 1960s, the pillars started to unravel and in the span of a few decades the Dutch society changed from one of the most ‘religious’ countries in Europe into a radically ‘secular’ one. This radical secularization process has undermined the influence of Christianity, which hitherto yielded considerable political power through churches (Sunier and van Kuijeren 2002). The Dutch Reformed Church played a significant socio-political role as the “link between the Calvinist and secular blocks” in (Lijphart 1968, 93). In the pillarized society, churches played a significant role in social life. Emancipation increasingly took the form of relinquishment of religious affiliation and leaving of church communities. Yet, the transformation of religious life through secularization did not simply mean the disappearance of religious activity but has meant that the decline of organized religion was being complemented by the emergence of a more diffused religious field and a societal tendency towards individualistic expressions of spirituality at the expense of collective forms of institutionalized religion (Kennedy 2005).

**Muslims in the Netherlands and Minorities Policy**

Unlike Britain and France, the majority of Muslims in the Netherlands are not former colonial subjects who emigrated to the imperial heartland in the wake of decolonization. This might appear surprising given the fact that the Netherlands colonized Indonesia, the most populous Muslim country of the world and was compelled to recognize its independence only due to a bloody war that ended in 1949. Yet movement from colonies with Muslim subjects was rather uncommon both during the colonial and postcolonial periods. The majority of the Muslim settlers arrived to meet the increasing labor demand during the reconstruction and industrialization efforts after the World War 10

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10 In 1917, a constitutional amendment introduced universal suffrage, proportional representation, and state
The Netherlands signed labor treaties with Turkey and Morocco in 1964 and the number of immigrant workers steadily rose until 1974, when the recruitment policy officially ended (Akgündüz 2008). The Dutch approached the initial settlers as temporary visitors, or “guest workers.” The workers also saw themselves as temporary sojourners at this time and planned to return their countries upon completing their contracts. However, unfavorable economic and political conditions in their countries of origin discouraged the guest workers from returning and eventually gave rise to a circle of postponed return. The immigrant population continued to grow through family formation and unification through the 1970s and 1980s. Since the later 1980s, asylum seekers and refugees arriving from other Muslim-majority countries including Pakistan, Iraq, and Iran further enlarged and diversified the Muslim population (Mügge 2010).

Even though the pillarization was more or less abandoned by the time of the arrival of Muslim immigrants, certain elements of the system remained intact, including the state funding for religious schools and public broadcasting opportunities for minorities (Sunier 2003; Vink 2007). The legacy of pillarization was influential in shaping the country’s initial minorities policy during the 1980s. In the 1983 Minority Memorandum ‘guest workers’ were for the first time defined as ‘ethnic minorities’ (Minderhedennota) (Uitermark, Rossi and van Houtum 2005). As such, migrant groups were recognized as minority groups with distinct cultures. Societal and political motto of the time was “to emancipate minorities as part of a multicultural society” (Lechner 2008, 14). Accordingly, the Dutch politics of accommodation at this time emphasized “integration with maintenance of cultural identity” (Vermeulen and Penninx 2000, 4).

However, Prins and Saharso (2010, 75) note that “by the end of the 1980s, the Dutch government already started to discard the perspective of collective rights and care, funding for both public/secular and private/religious schools.
put more emphasis on responsibilities and obligations.” In the 1990s, the government started requiring immigrants to learn the language and the customs of the Netherlands. For the first time in Europe, in 1998 the Netherlands introduced civic integration courses for the new immigrants in order to stimulate their participation and autonomy in Dutch society (Joppke 2007).

**The Advent of New Realism**

Different authors use different periodizations to describe the shifts in the integration policies that have progressively moved to the center stage of politics over the decades. For instance Scholten and Holzhacker (2009) locate a form of multiculturalism during the period between 1980s and 1990s whereas Prins and Saharso (2010) argue that multiculturalist policies were active in the politics of accommodation from early 1990s until mild 2000s. Regardless, sustained inequalities between the native and immigrant Dutch communities in terms of access to jobs, housing, and education, together with the failure of the expectation that immigrants would simply blend in and adapt to the native ‘Dutch way of life’, prompted a critique of the multicultural model in the mid-1990s (Vasta 2007). Intensified by the insecurities caused by the attacks on the welfare state under neoliberal reforms implemented in the early 1990s, anti-immigration and anti-Muslim sentiments found political expression in a neonationalist movement led by the flamboyant politician Pim Fortuyn in the late 1990s (Storm and Naastepad 2003; Cherribi 2010). Fortuyn was assassinated by an animal rights activist shortly before the elections that would most likely make him the first gay prime minister of the Netherlands. Ironically the murderer's motivations included his desire to protect Muslims (Buruma 2004). Fortuyn distinguished himself from his competitors by his claim to break the taboos around Muslims and immigration. Indeed, after his death, it has become common
to remark ‘Pim was killed for speaking up!’ Despite the fact that Fortuyn’s killer was not an immigrant or Muslim, this murder intensified the anti-immigration atmosphere.

Prins and Saharso (2010) argue that crucial to the success of Fortuyn was his popularization of an already existing public discourse, which they call ‘new realism’. As early as 1991, the leader of the Liberal Conservative People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD), Fritz Bolkenstein articulated his ideas on integration as a new realist: he argued that “‘guts and ‘creativity’ was needed to solve the problem of integration” (ibid., 74). Prins and Saharso contend that new realists are distinguished by their claim to have privileged access to hearts and minds, and speak for the real interests of native-Dutch people, who have been long silenced by historical taboos and political correctness, especially in regard to the state of the multicultural society in the Netherlands (for one of the early examples of new realism, see Vuijsje 2000). Neo-realists position themselves against the ‘political elites’ based in The Hague, who have presumably lost touch with the problems and concerns of the ordinary people. Moreover, this new populist discourse targets the left’s sensibilities about racism, tolerance, and fascism. Lastly, new realism is a gendered discourse: it focuses on minority women, who are represented as the victims of their culture. Prins notes that some of the most well-known political figures ranging from Paul Scheffer of the Labor Party to the right wing figures such as Geert Wilders are new realists.

Geschiere argues that success of Fortuyn pushed the mainstream parties to pass strict measures towards drastic curtailing of immigration, speedy extradition of ‘illegal’ immigrants, and a new policy toward remaining *allochtonen* aiming at their forceful integration, especially in a cultural sense. It was not their socioeconomic marginalization but rather their “refusal” to be culturally integrated that was now seen to be at the heart of immigrants’ problems” (2009, 135).
Indeed, those who deployed the new realist discourse by telling ‘hard truths’ about integration, immigration, and Muslims often saw their political fortunes rise. The murder of one such figure, the Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh by Mohammed Bouyeri, a Dutch-Muslim extremist in 2004, following his controversial depiction of Islam in his film ‘Submission Part I’, further ignited the debates on the ‘failures of multiculturalism’ (Spruyt 2007). The film includes a scene depicting the whipping of a woman whose head is covered but body is naked. On her naked back, verses from the Koran are written.

Submission’s scenario belonged to Ayaan Hirsi Ali, a Dutch Parliamentarian who arrived at the Netherlands as a refugee from Somalia. Hirsi Ali began her career as a self-defined Muslim reformer, especially regarding the treatment of women in Muslim communities, in the Netherlands (Hirsi Ali 2006). Interestingly, she did not lose her credibility as an ‘authentic Muslim voice for reform’ even after she has renounced Islam. Hirsi Ali was granted asylum on the grounds that she fled from war in Somalia in 1992. In 2006, a debate began about the fact that she lied about her name, birth date, and means of arrival in the Netherlands at asylum application, even though this was public knowledge since the publication of her book Son Factory in 2002. Hirsi Ali was threatened with the revoking of her citizenship by the Minister of Integration, Rita ‘the Iron’ Verdojnk from her own party. She managed to keep her citizenship in the end, but lost her position as a member of the parliament. Shortly after she left the Netherlands for the USA to take up fellowship position at the neoconservative American Enterprise Institute.

More recently, the far-right Party for Freedom (PVV) of Geert Wilders received 15.5 per cent of the votes by running almost entirely on an anti-Islam and anti-immigration platform during the Dutch national elections of June 2010. Wilders started his political career at the liberal People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD),
where he worked closely with Hirsi Ali. He left VVD to establish his ‘one-man’ PVV in 2004. Wilder is an inheritor of the populist streak of Fortuyn and articulates his politics through the new realist discourse, by warning ‘people about the Islamic danger’. Moreover, he combines his anti-Islamic rhetoric with an anti-EU stance. He has at different times proposed to ban Koran, which he deems a “fascist book,” offered to levy a tax on wearing headscarves and most recently proposed that no new mosques—which he calls “palaces of hate”—should be built in the Netherlands and if must, they should be outside of cities.

**Have we ever been Multiculturalists? Shift to Assimilationism**

The common story about the multiculturalism in the Netherlands presumes a liberal and accommodating approach to migrants that suddenly gave way to assimilationist impulses. According to this narrative, the calm, tolerant, and permissive attitude towards minorities encouraged by the traditional Dutch tolerance and excessive multiculturalism was replaced by an equally ambitious assimilationism during the last decade. Even those who admit that multiculturalism was built on a temporary solution to respond to the needs of a temporary migrant reality make a critique of multiculturalism as a well-intended yet naïve strategy of Western governments that only stood in the way of integrating new settlers in the larger society (Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007). Yet Scholten remarks that

Immigrant integration is an essentially contested concept in the Netherlands, with policymakers adopting a new frame of integration almost once every decade or so. This significantly challenges the view in national and international literature that the Dutch case represents a coherent, consistent multicultural model (2011, 277).

Indeed, some argue that the ‘failures’ associated with multiculturalism stem not from a rampant multiculturalism but its lack thereof (Lentin and Titley 2011). In critiques
of the ‘failed’ experience of Dutch multiculturalism, pillarization has been seen as a precursor to multiculturalism and attacked for privileging belonging to one’s own pillar above belonging to the Dutch nation and hence undermining Dutch nationalism (Vink 2007). The recent literature on the history of policy making and accommodation regarding immigrants has challenged this thesis. For instance, Duyvendak et al. argue that the accommodation of the new settlers in the Netherlands has been far too variable and inconsistent to be called multiculturalist:

The policy regarding cultural identities in the 1970s can easily be misunderstood as multiculturalist, the central tenet being that “guest workers” should maintain their identity. The reason for this policy, however, was not to accommodate pluralism in the Netherlands. It was to facilitate migrants’ eventual return “home” (2010, 234).

Buijs notes that immigration policies at the time actually “intended to avoid a further integration of ‘guest workers’ into Dutch society, to prevent a loss of ‘moral orientation’ and facilitate the re-integration’ of temporary workers and their families into their societies of origin upon their return” (2009, 426). That is to say, what is perceived as a comprehensive multiculturalist project in retrospect were actually ad hoc measures to facilitate immigrants’ return ‘home’.

The realization of the fallacy of the expectations of return eventually prompted a change in the direction of integration efforts from countries of origin towards the country of settlement. In the shifting politics of integration, immigrants were progressively required to practice a national culture that is assumed to be always already there, despite the serious ambivalence and doubt regarding the national cannon or identity of the Netherlands (Schinkel and van Houdt 2010). The pressure on Muslims to internalize Dutch norms and values led to conflicts as the question arose: what are those norms and values? For if there is a Dutch nationalism, it is a cosmopolitan one and the Dutch are highly cynical about the homogenous accounts of national identity. Then, it should not
come as a surprise that the overall tendency among the Dutch intellectuals and political elite has been to undermine efforts at implementing monolithic national values (Lechner 2008).

The debate about the national canon is a case in point. In the wake of the assassination of Theo van Gogh and as a response to growing calls to achieve national cohesion through incorporating Muslims into the nation, the Ministry of Education, Culture and Science commissioned a report of the Dutch Canon and appointed a committee (Commissie Ontwikkeling Nederlandse Canonas) to the task in 2005. The committee completed its report in 2006 and it was published a year after (A key to Dutch history 2007). In contradistinction to the political will behind the demand for the canon, the committee proposed that inclusivity and open-endedness should inform the new national cannon. They were careful not to use a patronizing tone or impose a strict framework. The committee described the canon they developed as one “that is open rather than closed… not a new school subject, not a complete curriculum, not a new textbook…not a lecture, but a discussion…choices, but no straitjacket” (ibid., 16-17).

The committee openly recognized and challenged the assimilationist agenda behind the canon:

People are often heard to say that newcomers’ naturalisation courses should include a, perhaps obligatory, large Dutch history and culture component. In such arguments, the canon serves as an integration resource with which to provide newcomers with a sorely-needed insight into (and a feeling for) the country in which they live, and as a means of establishing a link and of building bridges between them and native Dutch people. Collective terminology such as “newcomers” and “native Dutch” can, incidentally, be as unsavoury as they are inadequate. Such opinions are often accompanied by the insistence that the Netherlands must learn to reassess its identity and that, as regards the latter, it would not do any harm if Dutch people, who often tend to be contemptuous of their own culture, were to engage in more open displays of their love and pride for what this country has achieved over the centuries. In this context the canon becomes a guiding principle (ibid., 23)
Finally, the committee concluded that “the canon is conceptually vulnerable, ideologically questionable and, on the one hand, even suspect” (ibid., 27). An idea of a national canon having trouble drawing the ire of even those who are commissioned to devise it is emblematic of the problems plaguing the assimilationist discourse. This example clearly shows that there are not only different frames through which integration policies are assessed in the Dutch political and intellectual circles. It also points to the disjuncture between the researchers and politicians regarding the politics of accommodation in the Netherlands.

Despite the ambiguities regarding what constitutes the national culture, the Dutch government passed the act on Civic Integration Abroad (Wet Inburgering Buitenland) in 2006. Immigrants from the EU countries are exempt from the Civic Integration Test, which concerned mostly those willing to migrate from Muslim majority countries. In 2010, there was one private school in Istanbul, established by two Turkish-Dutch expats to offer assistance for the test. When I briefly interacted with its students, I observed that most of them needed to take the test to join their spouses. These applicants had to take the test in the Dutch Embassy and pay a fee equivalent of about USD 400, an amount higher than the minimum monthly wage. To prepare for the test applicants had to watch a study video that showed gay men kissing and a topless woman sunbathing, supposedly to prepare them what was ‘normal and expectable’ in the Netherlands, but in reality aiming at deterring Muslims from migrating. These images not only re-presented a Dutch national community that has presumably achieved full consensus about public expressions of gendered behavior and nudity, but also revealed the stereotypes those who prepared the video held about Muslim societies. In the process Muslim beliefs and practices were constituted as a threat to “specific cultural practices” of “organizing gender
and managing the body,” which were coded as essential for gaining membership in Dutch society (Ewing 2008, 199).

However, unlike the culture wars and the alliance between the security apparatuses and conservatism based on Christianity in the USA, the Dutch anti-Islamic discourse is based on the defense of enlightenment values. Moreover, iconic figures of the Dutch right such as Van Gogh, Fortuyn, and Wilders always presented themselves as the champions of free speech, often at the expense of religious groups other than Muslims as well, including Christians and Jews. Duyvendak et al. (2010) argues the Dutch politics of assimilation is peculiar in that, it is imposed by a liberal, rather homogenous majority constituted around progressive values. This progressive majority then forces minority groups to implement liberal cultural values. According to Butler, this leads to a paradoxical situation: limitations are put on the freedoms of one minority group in the name of protecting the freedoms of the majority, revealing a racist impulse borne from the imaginaries of national purity:

If the fortification of the state against established and new immigrant communities involves depriving them of freedom, questioning their own rights of assembly and expression, if it casts its own Muslim population as a threat to the value of freedom, then it protects one claim of freedom only through the intensification of unfreedom, through the augmentation of the state’s own coercive mechanisms (2009, 132).

The role of gender and sexuality in Islam has indeed become central to the recent integration debates (Roggeband and Verloo 2007; Korteweg and Yurdakul 2009; Prins and Saharso 2008). The position of Muslim women as ‘oppressed victims’ and the unequal treatment of homosexuals by Muslims figure prominently in the integration debates (Roggeb and Verloo 2007). John Bawer’s (2006) book on the failures of multiculturalism is worth mentioning in this context. Bawer’s work is part of a burgeoning literature of ‘wake up calls’ to a ‘failing/falling’ European civilization in the face of the presumed demographic and cultural warfare Muslims wage on Europe.
(Caldwell 2009; for the relationship between demography and geopolitics, see Smith 2009). An American journalist who relocated to the Netherlands after 9/11, Bawer offers an account of his life in the Netherlands as a gay man. The book is written as a warning to the ‘unsuspecting’ Dutch about the dangers of tolerating ‘Islamic fundamentalists’ in their midst. Even though Bawer’s style is similar to those of the new realists, he does not claim to have access to the inner thoughts and feelings of the Dutch people as an outsider. Instead, he speaks with the authority of an American who knows how to deal with the ‘enemies of freedom’. Bawer begins his book by recounting how he had lost hope in post 9/11 USA and decided to move to the Netherlands. He initially is infatuated by the Netherlands as a civilized and peaceful island in a world full of instability, danger, and insecurity. He eventually changes his mind, however, and re-embaces the American model due to his frustration with the ‘inability’ of the Dutch to take a preemptive and proactive stance vis-a-vis the failed integration of Muslim immigrants. Thus, the story becomes one of a new–born American.

According to Bawer, Muslims are guilty of not only failing to appreciate the gifts of Dutch freedoms and the welfare state, but they also spoil the tranquility of this liberal haven. This is felt strongly by Bawer. As a gay man he feels insecure around ‘Muslims’. He attributes his tense relationship with Muslims to their religion, while he remains ignorant of the historical, imperial, power, and class dynamics that inform the relationship between him, the native Dutch, and Muslims. Bawer’s initial infatuation with calm, humorous and “inherently peaceable” (ibid. 8) Dutch way of life does not last long, either. What he eventually decides is that this is a culture of “stifling conformity” and “passivity” (ibid. 13). This leads him to reaffirm the ‘American’ national values such as “ambition,” and he renews his faith in the ‘melting pot’ assimilation model as the answer to failures of Dutch social cohesion model (ibid.). Bawer’s account is emblematic of the
Paternalistic view that celebrates American racial model as the future Europe (for a critique, see Gilroy 2005). At the same time his account helps us comprehend the special relationship the European right-wing and anti-Islam politicians have with the United States. Ayaan Hirsi Ali, one of Bawer’s heroes, has been warmly embraced as a hero in the USA after losing face in the Netherlands, after all. Her success as a TV celebrity, bestselling author, and a fellow at the notorious neo-conservative think tank American Enterprise Institute is proof. As Bawer was reborn as an American in the Netherlands, Hirsi Ali was reborn as a freedom fighter in the USA.

Mosques and Governance

According to Sunier and van Kuijeren “three constitutive factors …have influenced the place of Islam in Dutch society” (2002, 145). The first is ‘the constitutional principle of religious equality” (ibid.). One of the turning points in this regard was the revision of the Dutch Constitution in 1983 that advanced the equality of all religions in their relationship with the state by severing the financial links between the Dutch state and the church (Rath et al. 2001). The second factor is pillarization. Despite the depillarization of the 1960s, Muslims were seen as a possible ‘fifth column’ and benefited from the continued state support for confessional schools and public broadcasting. Third, are the minority policies and the opportunities they created towards institutionalization since the early 1980s. These policies encouraged provision of education in the mother tongue at state schools and introduced subsidies for immigrant organizations, including mosque associations. At this time, Islamic organizations were officially recognized as legitimate representatives of minority interests. In the early 1980s “[m]igrant organizations, including Islamic ones, were seen as a possible bridge between the individual migrant and wider society, a potential vehicle for smoothing the process of
integration” (Sunier 2005, 86). Accordingly, the central state and municipalities were eager to work with mosque organizations and provide them subsidies (Sunier 2003).

During the 1970s, scant attention paid to Muslims and their religious needs, because of the firm belief in the temporary stay of immigrant workers (Rath et al. 2001). Even when purpose-built mosques began to become a common sight in Dutch cityscapes in the 1970s, the authorities saw their role in the process as ‘helping immigrants’. When the Turkish community constructed its first purpose built mosque in Almelo (1975) with the funds gathered through the contributions of workers, their employees, state-subsidies, and private donors, it was not seen as a gesture towards becoming permanent residents. Maussen notes that the Dutch personnel manager involved with the mosque project remarked that building the mosque was the same as what “we Dutch do when we settle somewhere in a foreign country: ‘building a church’” (2009, 128). By making this remark, the manager emphasized the ‘foreignness’ of the Netherlands for the Muslim settlers, even though he drew parallels between the Dutch and Turkish experiences while doing so.

Although the first purpose-built Dutch mosque was established in 1955 in The Hague, Muslim communities initially sought temporary accommodation for communal space by transforming idle school, factory, and church buildings into mosques (Rath et al. 2001; Roose 2006). Waardenburg (1988) notes that it was the Surinamese who took the lead in establishing mosques during the 1960s. He explains the relatively late takeoff among the Turkish and Moroccan communities regarding mosques by the fact that these communities believed that their stay was temporary.

Unlike the contemporary standard of ethnicity-based mosque distribution, some of the earliest attempts to build mosques aimed at appealing to the entirety of Muslim community in the Netherlands. Another distinguishing tendency at the time was the drive
towards establishing large, monumental mosques. Lastly, in the absence of the current policies towards nationalizing Islam, influence of foreign countries in the funding of mosques was not only acceptable, but desirable, as well. For instance, van Bommel notes that during the late 1960s

having initially made a plot of land available for the construction of a large mosque and shopping mall, the Utrecht municipality set as a precondition that the entire project should be financed from abroad. This was in accordance with the original Muslim initiative which fully relied on support from the rich oil states” (1992, 128).

However, these early attempts at building monumental, central mosques that would gather all Muslims regardless of their ethnic or sectarian background have failed and the ‘ethnic mosque’ model has eventually become the norm.

As mentioned before, earliest mosques were often converted from idle schools, churches, factories, shops, or houses. Only in the late 1980s did Muslim communities begin in earnest to construct mosques with an architecturally recognizable style, i.e. with domes and minarets (Rath et al. 2001; Pieterse 2004). During the 1980s and 1990s mosques thrived due to several factors: recognition of Muslim claims to the constitutional right of freedom of religion; the positive attitude of the Dutch state due to the integration policies of the time that supported the maintenance of minority cultural identities; and the availability of municipal subsidies for mosque organizations (Rath et al. 2001; Demant, Maussen and Rath 2007). The Dutch state initially approached mosques as institutions that would facilitate the integration of Muslim immigrants and it recognized mosque organizations as legitimate representatives of Muslim immigrants’ interests (Sunier 2003).

The sociopolitical changes summarized above resulted in a shift in the official policies and popular discourses on mosques in the Netherlands. In accordance with the recent departures from ‘the multicultural model’ and the new emphasis on
“assimilationist” policies, mosques started to be seen not as facilitators of, but hindrances to the ‘integration’ of Muslim immigrants to the Dutch society since the early 2000s (Maussen 2004). The state support for mosque organizations has dwindled parallel to the shift in both official and popular discourses of migration towards ‘Islam’s incompatibility with Dutch norms and values’ and ‘Muslim communities’ failure to integrate’ (Sunier 2005). Similarly, attempts to establish mosques have recently almost always generated conflict in their immediate locale. Mosques are associated with the decline and marginalization if not ghettoization of the neighborhoods in which they are located. The moral panic surrounding the establishment of mosques often results in the mobilization of the native Dutch dominated neighborhood organizations to oppose mosque projects as sources of ‘noise, social unrest, and traffic’ (Maussen 2004; Landman and Wessels 2005).

For the purposes of this study, however, it is important to note that the Netherlands has a centralized government yet city governments hold considerable autonomy and demonstrate different patterns of immigrant accommodation. As a result, policies stigmatized as ‘multicultural’ silently continue in many cities despite the deepening hostility towards multiculturalism, especially at the parliamentary level and in popular debates since early 2000s. Also, multiplicity of integration frames and fragmented structure of state apparatus have resulted in a multiplicity of positions, policies, and relationships between local and central government and mosque organizations in the Netherlands (Maussen 2009). For instance, after the murder of Theo van Gogh and during the crackdown of radical Muslim organizations and groups, mosques were approached by the government for cooperation (Buijs 2009). Similarly, in Haarlem, where I conducted fieldwork, all the mosque administrators were invited to meet with the mayor when Geert Wilders’ controversial anti-Islamic film *Fitna* was
released, to seek their cooperation in controlling their communities. Not only municipal but also civil society institutions and political parties approached mosques for their collaboration, most importantly to reach the Turkish community. As Arno Duivetsen, director of the Mondial Centrum Haarlem, which worked as coordinating institution for ‘ethnic’ organizations in the city put it; “People are concentrated at mosques, it is easy to reach people there.” He also told me that political parties have been organizing meetings at mosques to reach the electorate since 2002.11

Yükleyen (2009) argues that the establishment of the Contact Body between Muslims and Government (Contactorgaan Moslims en Overheid, CMO), an intermediary representative organization between the government and Muslim groups in 2004 was a sign of sustained multiculturalism in Netherlands. Cevdet Keskin, an administrator at the Netherlands Islamic Foundation (the Diyanet) recounted the establishment of the CMO. The establishment of CMO was prompted by the negative remarks of a Moroccan-Dutch imam about homosexuals in 2001:

When the imam made those remarks on TV, there was uproar. The Minister of Integration wanted to discuss the issue with all the Muslim organizations. When more than 100 representatives from all Muslim organizations flocked to the ministry, it quickly became clear that the meeting room could not accommodate more than 25 people. Then the minister said: “But I only invited the administrators of the organizations,” to which the representatives replied, “We are all administrators.” Then he asked them if there was not an umbrella organization and upon receiving a negative response, the minister told them to establish such an organization.12

Keskin went on to tell me that CMO has been instrumental in the area of Islamic broadcasting on public TV and is actively involved with the training of imams in the Netherlands. He also remarked that the Dutch authorities have recently stepped up their demands and treated the administrators of the CMO harshly, a sign of changing attitude towards Muslim organizations. For instance, Keskin recalled that in 2008 the Dutch

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authorities threatened to stop issuing visas to imams from abroad in response to the slow progress made in the planning of the training of imams in the Netherlands. Moreover, despite the attempts to represent all Muslim organizations through CMO, ‘heterodox’ groups such as Alevi and Amides refused to join CMO. Instead they founded Contact group Islam (Contactgroep Islam, CGI) in 2005.

**Figure 2.** An election poster on the entrance of the Selimiye Mosque, encouraging the community to vote against Wilder’s right-wing party PVV. It reads: “Claim your future. Vote!”

![Election poster](image)

Photo: Murat Es

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Conclusion

Joppke (2007) points to an increasing convergence of integration policies across Europe, while Ersanilli and Koopmans (2010) maintain that there remain significant differences between different countries in regard to the implementation of national integration policies. The debate on the integration of minorities has a strong influence in the reconfiguration of the Dutch national identity. For instance, when the expectations of immigrants’ smooth transitioning into citizens failed to materialize, this prompted anxieties over the weakness of the Dutch national identity. At stake, partly is “the political crisis of a country that is trying to balance the cultural heritage of the 1960s and 1970s on the one hand—the Netherlands being one of the most progressive and secular countries of the world—, and the huge economic and demographic transformations in subsequent and current years on the other hand” (Duyvendak, Hendriks and van Niekerk 2009, 10). The tensions arising from the integration of Muslims also has to do with international developments such as the EU integration progress and globalization, pressuring for a redefinition of the Dutch national identity (Lechner 2008). Accordingly, starting in the 1990s and increasingly after the 2000s it became commonplace to link the ‘refusal’ or ‘failure’ of immigrants to integrate to the lack of a strong national identity that the minority subcultures would be able and willing to integrate or assimilate into. This has led critics to campaign for the valorization and teaching of Dutch national values to young generation and new settlers (Scheffer 2003). The question remains, however: What are the national norms and values that immigrants should adopt? Duyvendak et al. argues that despite the fact that the native Dutch expect the Muslim minorities to become ‘Dutch’, “[t]hey treat Dutchness in a self-evident manner and scarcely relate it to individual experiences. They argue along general and vague lines, reflecting abstractions known from popular history rather than personal experience” (2010, 244).
The Dutch politics of integration—from the 1970s until the early 1990s—identified mosques as institutions that would facilitate the integration of Muslim immigrants by forming a bridge between the immigrants and the state authorities. The recent shift towards an ‘assimilationist’, or, ‘post-multiculturalist’ model of national cohesion in Netherlands, however, has changed the perceptions of mosques into symbols and sites of Muslim ‘refusal to integrate’. Riding the rising tide of backlash against multiculturalism, political actors both on the right and the left have been competing to reclaim the universality of Dutch ‘norms and values’ in opposition to a wide range of discourses, practices, and lifestyles identified as ‘Islamic’. Currently, governmental support for mosque organizations is rather cautious and limited. Around 500 mosques located mostly in ethnic Dutch neighborhoods for many politicians and the native-Dutch citizens have become simultaneously alienating and alienated spaces within national landscape. Yet, despite the attacks at multiculturalism as an institutionalized form out of touch with the realities and the needs of the contemporary Dutch society, mosques are still firmly placed within the ‘multiculturalist’ operations of many Dutch cities.

Kennedy (2005) argues that during the period of depillarization religion did not simply decline or disappear from public life but its manifestations went under transformation: new modes of religiosity that tended to be more individualistic, diffuse, and spiritual became prevalent, as the organized religion declined. The master narrative of secularization has been strongly incorporated into the ideal of modernity, however, despite the fact that religious life in the post WWII period has been much more complex and dynamic than the secularization thesis would contend. When we look at the treatment of Muslim in this light, it becomes clear why the belief in the ‘emancipation within the pillar’ before achieving full membership in the body of the nation informed the early policies of accommodation with regard to Muslim groups (Vink 2007). Approaching
Muslim through the framework of pillarization and depillarization also reveals certain assumptions of the native Dutch in regard to Muslims. First, there was never really anything like a proper “Muslim pillar’ because of the diversity of sectarian, ethnic, regional, class, and political affiliations within Muslim communities. Second, attributing pillar status to Muslims implied that Muslims were at a stage of social development that the Dutch had already left behind. That is, Muslims were in need to follow in the footsteps of their native Dutch betters and emancipate themselves the Dutch did. This has paved the way for a deep frustration with the ‘Muslim pillar’ as Muslims ‘failed’ to emancipate themselves and when many Muslims refused to leave their collective ties to the ‘Muslim pillar’ behind to become ‘secular individuals’ like their Catholic and Protestant counterparts. By implication, this has meant that Muslims chose their membership in their sub-national collective over that of the national community. In this sense, mosques appeared as signs of an anachronistically functional system of pillarization. Moreover, compared to the declining numbers of church membership and the valorization of churches increasingly more as museums and cultural relics rather than loci of communal life, establishment of new mosques lent itself to the image of Muslims as a group stubbornly remaining outside history and progress towards enlightened, secular individualism.
CHAPTER THREE

ACTORS OF A TRANSNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FIELD

When I was at the elementary school, I attended a Süleymançılı course for Qur’an lessons. They put a lot of emphasis on reciting the Qur’an fast and correctly. I also took tajwid [proper pronunciation during the recitation of Qur’an] lessons at Milli Görüş’s Ayasofya Mosque. Milli Görüş focuses more on religious doctrine. Because they identify [primarily as] “Muslims,” they pay more attention to religion. Diyanet is good for pilgrimage; let us say it is worldlier. The reason I come to [this Diyanet affiliated mosque] is the emphasis on national values. Here you say “I am a Turk.”

Fikret (25)

Fikret’s shifting affiliation with different and competing religious organizations over years challenges the assumptions about a religious field with clear boundaries between its actors. There are not only separate individuals affiliated with antagonistic or competing organizations in the Netherlands. Membership in and affiliation with organizations have often more to do with logistical needs—for instance proximity of a particular mosque to where one lives—and particular needs of communities than principles and world views.

This chapter begins with an overview of the recent perspectives on transnational migration in relation to religion. Then I move on to discuss the institutionalization of Turkish-Dutch Islam in relation to the Turkish and the Dutch contextual realities. To this end, I introduce the transnational actors who are active in the Turkish-Dutch religious field through a discussion of the various agendas they pursue and different scales at which

13 Personal interview, Amsterdam, January 29, 2010.
they operate. Lastly, I discuss the factors influencing the distribution of membership and relations between different organizations.

**Transnational Islam in the Netherlands**

The research on transnationalism has opened up avenues for the inquiries of the contested equation between fixed localities and singular belongings and ushered in a shift in scholarly focus towards fluid subjectivities, multiple attachments, and hybrid cultural formations (Glick-Schiller and Çağlar 2011). Mitchell notes that studies of transnationalism bring to view “in-betweenness or ambivalence, especially with reference to the nation” (2003, 74). Indeed, an important issue arising as a result of transnational migration has been the multiplicity of transmigrants’ identifications, or the duality of their belongings (Triandafyllidou 2001). In the case of the Netherlands, the simultaneous occupation of multiple places of belonging ‘here end there’ as well hyphen that accompanies differently defined primary identities posits a challenge to exclusive national identities: ‘Turkish-Dutch’ and ‘Dutch-Turkish’ carry different normative values and have strikingly different political implications. It goes without saying that the reference to transnational belonging does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that groups in question are always members of fully-fledged national communities. In fact groups that are marginalized on the basis of their gender, class, ethnic, political, and/or religious identities are generally overrepresented in migration flows and often develop a highly ambivalent relationship with the national categories that are applied to them. Stateless groups in the process of nation-making such as Kurds are a case in standing.

Transnational migration poses significant challenges to the social cohesion of nation-states, as transmigrants’ translocal belongings disturb the assumptions about the sovereignty of the nation-state over a homogeneous population within a bounded territory.
(Triandafyllidou 2001). Similarly, their positioning outside the national territory facilitates transmigrants’ breaking free from the policies that impose a coherent and monolithic national community of citizens back at ‘home’. The result is the emergence of new ethnicities and religious or class based movements relatively autonomous from but always evolving in tandem with the developments in the country of departure. In order to meet the challenges posed by the ambivalent status of immigrants, nation-states have developed flexible regimes of political membership, including dual citizenship (Ong 1999). Other state actors have opted to extend certain citizenship rights to migrant populations, such as the provision of welfare benefits to immigrants or granting the right to vote in local elections to resident non-citizens (Nuhoğlu Soysal 1994). Netherlands is one such country: it is not only possible for non-citizen residents to vote in the local elections, but double-citizenship is allowed, although it has recently come under attack.

However, because of the shifting attitudes towards immigration and Islam as outlined in Chapter 2, fears of transnational terrorism and foreign threats to Dutch social cohesion engendered suspicion and opposition with regard to the transnational links of Muslims in the Netherlands. In the specific case of the Turkish-Dutch communities, their relations with Turkey, the Turkish state’s involvement in the organization of Islam in the Netherlands, and the operations of transnational movements such as Milli Görüş across Europe have increasingly become suspect. My fieldwork experiences confirmed the sensitivity of transnational organizations regarding their connections with organizations and movements outside the Netherlands. As the transnational connections with Turkey came under scrutiny in the Netherlands, Turkish-Dutch organizations have downplayed or denied their ties to Turkey. Below is an excerpt from an interview with a Süleymançı representative:

Murat: How are your relations with Turkey?
Representative: There is no connection with Turkey. What is important for us is the Dutch society.
Murat: What can you tell me about your connection with Turkey?
Representative: We have none, this place belongs to itself.\textsuperscript{14}

There are four major Islamic organizations among the Turkish Sunni groups in the Netherlands: Süleymancıs, Milli Görüş, Gülenists and Diyanet. In the following sections, I will briefly introduce these organizations and then highlight their participation in the institutionalization of mosque-based activism and Islamic community building in the Netherlands. Yet, the communities that established the first mosques were not fragmented along ethnic, political and sectarian lines. The differentiation between mosque communities took place shortly after the establishment of the first mosques, though.

I met Yaşar (58) at the cafeteria of the Selimiye Mosque. He told me that he came to the Netherlands in 1974, at the age of 22. Yaşar had vivid memories of those years, when there were not any mosques or coffeehouses in Haarlem:

When Turks first came here, those who had brought their families over would visit each other. Those who did not stayed at boarding houses. Sometimes we went to the city center and played cards at cafes run by the Dutch. At other times we would drink tea and chat at the boarding house. There were no Turkish coffeehouses, neither a mosque here. We performed our prayers at the boarding house by ourselves. ...The first mosque was [established] somewhere in Rotterdam. It was not really a mosque; it was converted from a house. Afterwards folks here donated money and mosques were built everywhere. Thanks to that we made sure our children did not forget about Turkey.\textsuperscript{15}

The accommodation of the guest workers was initially arranged by their placement in workers’ camps and dormitories. These were generally located at the peripheries of cities. As a result, guest workers initially were insulated from and had little contact with the native Dutch. The absence of facilities to meet the social needs of guest workers at the time supports the argument that the presence of immigrants was seen as a temporary situation. They were seen as sojourners who would eventually return to their

\textsuperscript{14} Personal interview, The Hague, January 28, 2010.
\textsuperscript{15} Personal interview, Haarlem, May 12, 2010.
home countries. It should be noted that this was the impression both for the Turkish and the Dutch governments as well as the workers and the native-Dutch (Akgündüz 2008). The placement of workers in dorms, hostels, and makeshift housing arrangements of other sort resulted in spatial separation and a certain degree of segregation between the immigrants and the native population. This has eventually become a normalized condition. However the presence of largely single men in these places eventually resulted in, ironically more intimate relations of kind, as the frequent the stories about the affairs and marriages with native Dutch women I heard about initial years testify.

The migration from Turkey to Europe was initially characterized by the recruitment of single men who were employed at the manufacturing sector. Following a number of treaties with countries such as Turkey, Morocco, and Yugoslavia, Western European countries imported labor to aid the post-WWII reconstruction process which coincided with the ‘golden age of capitalism’, i.e. rise of industrial output and income levels across the global North. In the case of Turkey, this period was one of industrialization of agriculture and growth in factory-based production in urban centers. These changes in economic production pushed a large labor force from the countryside towards cities. As the urban centers were unable to absorb all of this labor, sending the labor surplus to Europe on a temporary basis appeared as a favorable option on the side of the Turkish government (Akgündüz 2008; Abadan-Unat 2011; Mügge 2010).

When Turkish workers first arrived in the Netherlands, they did not expect to stay after the completion of their two to four year contracts and hence had no objections to working long hours, taking multiple jobs, and staying at dorms or camps. These were located close to factories and offered cheap housing solutions that allowed workers to save money to invest back home. At this point migrants did not feel an urge to establish the infrastructure for cultural or religious reproduction. My informants told me that the
religious services at the time were generally provided by those workers who had some form of religious training deemed sufficient to lead congregation in prayers. Occasionally a professional imam who happened to be a fellow worker was also available to lead prayers.

In retrospect, representatives of the Islamic organizations as well as many of my informants regret the lack of attention paid to religious services individually and collectively in the initial years of settlement. They also accused the Turkish government for failing to send imams until the late 1970s. However, the workers were not very concerned with religious observance, actually. For one thing, this was a period in which long working hours allowed sparse opportunities for socialization or religious observance.

A ‘successfully integrated’ ‘immigrant’, an administrator at the Dock Foundation Haarlem, Mustafa Öcal16 recalled his childhood during the 1960s in very positive terms: “I was very popular in my school. Every day the first 15 minutes of class were spent on teaching me Dutch.” Ayhan Tonca, a conservative politician and activist had similar experiences:

We were seen as guests when we first arrived at the Netherlands in the 1970s. This was natural, of course, if you take into consideration that there were not many Turks living here back then. Family unification started only after 1974. When we went to school, we were [seen as] foreigners: “Look, a Muslim is here! Look, a Turk!” It is a white school full of Dutch, [and you are] the only blackhead there. It was almost like “An exotic species has appeared in our classroom, what are their customs and traditions?” Such was the curiosity among the Dutch.

Murat: But this was a positive kind of curiosity, right?
Ayhan Tonca: Yes, it was a very positive kind of curiosity. They were very interested in us and eager to be of help, to the extent that our neighbor’s daughters took us to school on the backseats of their bikes everyday, since we did not know how to ride a bike.17

Tonca’s story neatly demonstrates the act of subjectivation Althusser (1971) locates at the moment an individual is hailed. However, unlike Fanon’s (2008) experience

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16 I use both names and surnames of the informants who gave their signed consent for the appearance of their names in the dissertation. When I use only the first names, they are pseudonyms.
of subjection as an object of fear, the other is constituted as an object of desire, here. It was only when the exotic other started to speak and act like the self, yet remained different, the affective aspects of integration became more deeply felt. The first sites of socialization produced by the first Turkish settlers beyond their dwellings were coffeehouses. The establishment of coffeehouses meant that workers did not expect to return Turkey in near future anymore and decided to discontinue investing all their energies in saving money towards return. An important figure in Milli Görüş movement and the founder of the Ayasofya Mosque in Amsterdam, Üzeyir Kabaktepe explained the importance of coffeehouses in the lives of the generation of his parents in the following words:

People started to establish their own coffeehouses around 1975. When I first arrived here in 1973, Turks had already established coffeehouses, but only a few. It was just kicking off, because you had to attain a license, get the permit for selling alcohol, and get security clearance…People established the typical coffeehouses that you see in Turkey. Folks considered the job done if they bought up a few chairs and installed a TV. Back then, when a child needed to find his dad, he could be found at “such and such coffeehouse.” The number of coffeehouses went up considerably in the 1980s. The first generation found some peace when the second generation started school. Before that men could find peace of mind only at coffeehouses… Because men had not seen their families for years and lived abroad by themselves, there was previously no social space for Turks. Men worked from dusk till dawn and then took another shift somewhere else. For instance, if someone worked at the railways, he used his evenings to work at a cleaning job. If he had free time over the weekends, only then he went to coffeehouses to relax a little.\(^{18}\)

When the workers realized that they were not returning to Turkey anytime soon, they started to bring their families over by means of family unification. This has furthered the Turkish immigrants’ investment in spaces of socialization. It should be mentioned here that the reason for their constant deferring the time of return was also related to the political developments in Turkey. During the 1970s and 1980s, the radical left and the right were engaged in bloody conflict and educational institutions were at the center of

\(^{17}\) Personal interview, Apeldoorn, May 11, 2010.\(^{18}\)
the violent struggles for political control: Mustafa Öcal recalled that “during the 1970s, workers received letters from their wives in Turkey: “Your son has been arrested, either come back home or arrange for us to join you there’.”19

Arrival of workers’ wives meant that men now had more time to socialize outside work as they were relieved of domestic labor. As Üzeyir Kabaktepe remarked: “Women cooked, cleaned, and took care of the children at home. This gave men the opportunity to attend coffeehouses…Socializing started with the arrival of women, the first family visits began.” 20 Moreover, when children were either born in diaspora or arrived from Turkey, their parents’ connections with the Dutch institutions and lifestyles became more intensified. The children were the ‘most risky’ group when it came to maintain authority and order within families. Mustafa Öcal opined that “Turks’ turn to religion was motivated by the need for establishing authority over their children. For it was assumed that pious children would not challenge the authority of their parents.”21

Üzeyir Kabaktepe told me that an important push towards establishing Islamic organizations was borne out of the conservative families’ need for an intermediary in their negotiations with the Dutch authorities in regard to issues such as exempting their children from gender-mixed activities and arranging halal food at schools. Interestingly, Islamic gendered practices could gain recognition and a certain degree of accommodation in the Dutch school system whereas the secularist Turkish school system refused to implement them. Kabaktepe told me that Milli Görüş gained notoriety by challenging gender mixed gymnastics and swimming classes. It should be emphasized here that

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18 Personal interview, Amsterdam, April 5, 2010.
20 Personal interview, Amsterdam, April 5, 2010.
gender mixing was not only an issue concerning girls: “Boys also were embarrassed to go to swimming classes or play soccer and then go to shower rooms to see their friends showering completely naked. They did not want to do that.”\(^{22}\) As a result, mosques affiliated with Milli Görüş started to organize sports clubs for boys. No similar sports activities were organized for girls, though.

**The Gülen Community**

Gülen community, also known as Fethullahçıs (followers of Fethullah Gülen, b. 1941), primarily focuses on educational activities and interfaith dialogue. This has led them to adopt “a pluralistic approach to non-Muslims and non-Muslim traditions” (Yükleyen 2009, 304). I did not contact Gülenists during my fieldwork, as they did not ‘officially’ control any mosques. Their activities, however, were occasionally mentioned during my interviews with representatives of other organizations and movements. Administrators from both Diyanet and Milli Görüş accused Gülenists of being hypocritical and claimed that they hid their true agenda, a common critique Gülenists face due to the lack of transparency in their operations. For instance, a Milli Görüş administrator thought that Gülenists “act like kids from the back streets and do not openly declare themselves as an Islamic movement.”\(^{23}\) A Diyanet affiliated mosque administrator claimed that “Fethullahçıs pretend to be modern around the Dutch but they spread radicalism privately. Moreover, they do not work on a volunteer basis, their administrators are sent from Turkey.”\(^{24}\) That is, Gülenists were criticized by the more established movements for being ignorant of the institutional context of Turkish Islam in

\(^{22}\) Personal interview, Amsterdam, April 5, 2010.

\(^{23}\) Personal interview, Amsterdam, March 1, 2010.

\(^{24}\) Personal interview, Haarlem, March 6, 2010.
the Netherlands, because of their needless reliance on covert tactics that they deploy in Turkey.

**Süleymancı**

During my fieldwork I came across frequent references to the Süleymancı by my research participants regarding their rigorous Qur’an education. Yükleyen (2009, 304) notes that Süleymancıs were the first organized group “to provide imams and prayer halls for guest workers and founded mosques that contained Qur’an schools and student dorms” immediately after the arrival of Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands. However, Süleymancı lost the advantage they gained from their head start with the arrival of Diyanet and its takeover of some of their mosques (Vermeulen 2006). Amersfoort and Doomernik (2002) note that of all the Turkish Islamic groups active in the Netherlands Süleymancı showed the least interest in the Dutch society, even though this has been changing recently (Yükleyen 2011). Yet in control of 48 mosques by 2009, the Netherlands Islamic Center Foundation (Stichting Islamitisch Centrum Nederland) of the Süleymancı retains a strong presence in the Netherlands. Their loss of influence partly had to do with the relatively exclusive organization of the movement along Sufi lines, where one needs to be initiated as a member to be allowed in the Sufi activities of the movement. One notable aspect of the Süleymancı that distanced some of my informants from them is liturgical: Süleymancı skipped the evening prayers in North Europe because of the location; this has been seen as blasphemy by some.

Süleymancı are a Sufi movement affiliated with the Nakshibendi Religious Order. The name Süleymancı (literally means Süleymanist) derives from the founder of the movement, Süleyman Hilmi Tunahan (1888–1959). Tunahan was a conservative member of the Ottoman religious elite who devoted all his time to the teaching of Qur’an to the new generations after the foundation of the republic. During the single party era
(1923—1950) Tunahan and his followers established Qur’an seminaries to train preachers, which led to strained relationships with the state that did not sanction the training of imams by civil organizations. The advent of the multi-party era in the late 1940s brought about a period of rapprochement with the state. A large number of the preachers trained by Süleymancı were employed by the Directorate of Religious Affairs until 1965, when having an imam-preacher high school degree became compulsory for working as an imam (Yavuz 2003). The historical background of Süleymancı helps us understand why they were the first ones to organize religious services in the absence of interest by the Turkish state in diaspora, as the movement itself was borne as a response to the collapse of much of the Islamic higher learning during the single party era in Turkey. Yavuz (ibid., 146-147) notes that after the straining of relations with the state following the coup of 1971, Süleymancı concentrated their efforts to build a “distinct Turkish-Islamic community” among the Turkish workers in Germany…In the 1970s they started to organize among the Turkish workers in Europe, whose religious affairs were ignored by the DİB [DRA]. The 1980 coup further enhanced the Süleymançı networks, as the state regarded the Turkish-Islamic synthesis as a new national identity. As of 2003, they run the most powerful dormitory networks in Turkey and the second-largest mosque network in Germany.

The most distinguishing quality of Süleymancı vis-a-vis other actors in the Turkish-Islamic field is their preoccupation with the youth. Süleymancı have been very active in establishing dormitories for students where they learn how to recite Qur’an. The movement was less invested in establishing mosques that attend to the needs of the entire communities. Reflecting the structure of their religious brotherhood, Süleymançı affiliated organizations are also more exclusive especially when it comes to membership. These traits of the movement explain to some extent why Süleymancı are less well known and influential in civil society compared to Millî Görüş. That is to say,
Süleymancıs are more concerned with continuing their activities without hindrance than making claims to public space by establishing purpose-built mosques.

Given the relatively closed structure of this movement, it did surprise me when my attempts to approach the Süleymancıs for research purposes proved unsuccessful. Immediately after my arrival in the Netherlands, I visited a mosque belonging to the movement in The Hague. I was able to set up an appointment with an employee of the mosque but despite my numerous attempts I failed to make contact with the headquarters of the movement in Utrecht. When I finally did, I was kindly told that the leaders of the movement did not see any benefit in allowing me to conduct research in their mosques. Also considering the fact that the mosques Süleymancıs run generally take the form of dormitories incorporating a prayer hall, I decided to leave the movement outside the purview of my research and focus on Diyanet and Milli Görüş.

**Figure 3**: Newspaper clip depicting Necmettin Erbakan, founder of the Milli Görüş Movement.

![Photo: Murat Es](image-url)
**Milli Görüş**

Milli Görüş (National Outlook, in Turkish) has been an important actor in the organization of transnational Islam in Europe since the late 1970s. The movement has its roots in Turkey and still maintains strong ties with the leadership there, even though its focus has recently shifted more towards defending the interests of Muslim communities in Europe. Atasoy notes that during the 1970s “political Islam emerged to reorganize the existing social, political, and cultural arrangements in Turkey. Islamists began to give a particular political and ideological content to Islam” (2005, 123). The first political party Milli Görüş supporters established was *Milli Nizam Partisi* (National Order Party, founded in 1970) under the leadership of Necmettin Erbakan (1926—2011), who remained the leader of the movement until his death in 2011. Yavuz remarks that the seeming contradiction of naming an Islamic movement ‘national’ can be explained by the fact that the term ‘*milli*’ “does not simply mean ‘national’ but also connotes religious ethnos, and it continues to be articulated as an ethical signifier of justice, loyalty, and community” (2003, 208). National Outlook was the programme of the party, penned by Erbakan. It laid the groundwork for the establishment of what Erbakan called a “just order,” (*adil düzen*) which would be based on the reshaping of the Turkish political system through a revival of the Ottoman heritage for social and cultural life while advancing the country by adapting Western technology and through aggressive industrialization. After the military coup of 1971, Erbakan and his friends established another political party called *Milli Selamet Partisi* (National Salvation Party) in 1972. During the 1970s this party joined coalition governments with both the center left and right parties. The movement was especially successful in the countryside and enjoyed popularity among religious brotherhoods and Kurds, who were attracted to its “hybrid
populism and the representation of hitherto peripheral forces” and “invoking an Ottoman-Islamic ethos” (ibid., 212).

Milli Görüş began its mobilization efforts in Europe partly due to the rising number of migrant population there and in part because of the coup d’état of 1980. Pedersen (1999) notes that Milli Görüş was active in Germany as early as 1970 under the name of Türk Kültür ve Yardımlaşma Derneği (The Association for Turkish Culture and Solidarity), but it made itself public only by 1981. The current organization, Avrupa Milli Görüş Teşkilati (the European National Outlook Organization) was founded in Cologne, Germany, in 1985. Pederson goes on to argue that even though the organization began as an offshoot of Milli Görüş in Europe and was initially exclusively worked towards advancing the Islamist political cause in Turkey, by the 1990s it has become “a Turkish-European Islamic movement whose interests now lie to a great extent in the area of the organization of Islamic identity among Turkish immigrant minorities in Europe” (ibid., 105). By the early 2000s, the European National Outlook Organization had over 70,000 members and was “the most powerful Turkish expatriate organization with close ties to RP” and had established ‘transnational connections with other Muslim communities in Bosnia, Chechnya, and even Myanmar” (Yavuz 2003, 228). Yavuz notes that

The members of the AMGT are in constant move between Turkey and Germany and they carry financial means, skills, ideas, attitudes, and modes of action between the two countries. Thus Islamic networks in Europe are dense and very active in the flow of ideas and resources (ibid.)

In the Netherlands the movement is known as ‘Milli Görüş’ and is divided into two chapters in the North and South. The Southern chapter is called Nederlandse Islamitische Federatie (NIF) and the northern is known as Milli Görüş Nederland (MGN). Both chapters operate under Milli Görüş’s European headquarters in Cologne. However, Milli Görüş North has been more autonomous from the German headquarters than its Southern counterpart.
I was met with suspicion when I made my very first visits to the headquarters of the Southern Milli Görüş at the beginning of my fieldwork in order to secure the support of the administrators to facilitate my research at individual mosques. At the beginning of my interview with the head of the Southern Milli Görüş, Mehmet Yaramış, he asked me: “Were you encouraged by someone to study this topic in the USA?” He was trying to ascertain where my political loyalties lied, expressing the suspicion I encountered frequently at my mosque visits. Yaramış did not hesitate to use the metaphor of the ‘crusade’ when describing the political atmosphere vis-a-vis Islam in Europe: “Europe has negated Islam for centuries. The West and the United States think that Muslims need a mental (zihinsel) transformation. This is a sort of a crusade.” This echoing of George W. Bush’s ‘slip of tongue’ when he declared war on the enemies of the USA in the wake of 9/11 attacks reminded me of Erbakan’s opposition to Turkey’s EU membership in the early 1990s, when he declared the EU a “Christian club.” Yaramış told me that founded in 1981, his organization controlled 17 mosques and had 3750 fee-paying members aiding “our people in preserving their identity and character.” The organization also had 5500 families registered to its funeral services, he added.

Yaramış claimed that the difference between the North and South Milli Görüş was “only limited to practical matters.” However, Milli Görüş North has had a rather different, more dynamic, and volatile presence in the Netherlands compared to its Southern counterpart. This was partly because the Northern Branch has pursued a reformist agenda in the early 2000s and became one of the most influential Islamic organizations in the Netherlands as a result (Yükleyen 2009). High public profile of Hacı Karacaer was crucial to this process. Karacaer was the director of Milli Görüş North until his removal from the position in 2006. His close collaborator and the head of the Ayasofya Mosque in

Amsterdam, Üzeyir Kabaktepe was another seminal figure within the movement, who also lost his position over disagreements with the federation in Germany over a new monumental mosque project: Westerse Moskee (Western Mosque).

Even though the recent works on the Dutch Milli Görüş (Yükleyen 2009, 2010; Tol 2010) compare it favorably to the German Milli Görüş in terms of its relations with state authorities, i.e. its cooperative stance on achieving integration and combating radicalism, the relations between Milli Görüş and the Dutch governmental actors were rather sour by the time of my research, partly due to the controversy surrounding the Westerse Moskee project and in part because of the rising influence of anti-Islam politician Geert Wilders and his Partij voor Frijheyt (Freedom Party) in Dutch politics. Also important was the fact that despite the positive image of Milli Görüş in public sphere largely thanks to Karacaer and Kabaktepe, the majority of the members of the movement thought that they went too far in embracing liberal Dutch values. Karacaer explained me the situation in the following words: “I was a little too ahead of the community. There was an outrage, for instance, when I said on TV: I believe the upholding of the rule of law in the Netherlands as firmly as I believe in God.”

It was not the community, however, that removed from his position, but the pressure from the German headquarters of the Milli Görüş, that was just as agitated by his approach to Islam which in line with progressive Islamic groups on issues of gender, citizenship, and democracy. Karacaer severed all his links with the Milli Görüş after his sacking.

Another important development that led to the loss of Milli Görüş’s accountability in the Netherlands and in Europe at large was the Islamic holdings affair. During the late 1990s, groups of entrepreneurs with links to the conservative and Islamist Turkish communities in Europe started to arrive at various European countries. Many of them

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with no background in business, they promised halal, interest-free income to the guest workers by becoming shareholders in the companies they planned to establish in central Anatolian cities, invoking both Islamic solidarity towards establishing a just economy and patro-localist investment in the workers’ hometowns. A significant aspect of this story which is often ignored at the expense of the more flashy explanation of the zealous believers foregoing all the simple steps of safe business transaction for their devotion to an implicitly irrational drive towards establishing an Islamic economy is the fact that guest workers did not have any legal means to make use of their savings in the Netherlands, for they often saved money by working multiple jobs without reporting them, or continuing to work during sick leave, in order to avoid the high taxation rates exercised by the Dutch state.

There was a common trajectory in the stories I heard about the entrepreneurs who arrived from Turkey as money-collectors for Islamic holdings: they were pious, ‘god-fearing’ men and reached mosque congregations before, during, and after prayer times. Some of them acted as imams during their stay and even chose to sleep at mosques rather than staying with a family. In doing so, money collectors mobilized symbolic capital to gain the trust of mosque congregations towards establishing an informal business relationship. Their propensity towards storing huge sums of cash in simple plastic bags helped them to appear immune to the corrupting effects of money. They presented themselves as sincere believers in the advancement of both and Islamically oriented and patriotic project of national development. That is, they acted in a seemingly paradoxical way when they did everything within their power to signal their lack of interest in worldly temptations, while collecting big amounts of money towards a business initiative. They also mobilized their kinship and co-local ties to secure trust.

Money collectors accepted large sums of cash from guest workers, and gave them simple slips of receipt in return, which were later discovered to hold no legal value whatsoever. The investors were told that they were shareholders and hence “partners in the gains and losses of the company.” The distribution of up to 25% profit over the invested income for the first couple of years increased the attraction of this kind of investment for not only the conservative Turks but many others. I was told by one of the victims that “even leftists were taking on loans from banks to invest money in Islamic holdings.” Many took bank credits or put their houses on mortgage to invest further in the companies. Shortly afterwards, however, the Islamic holdings ceased to pay profits and explained the situation by the losses incurred by a volatile global economy and unfavorable business conditions in Turkey. During my fieldwork a good number of my informants, both in Diyanet and Milli Görüş mosques were trying to reclaim their lifetime savings from the holdings, with little success. At Milli Görüş mosques, in the relative absence of a secularist attitude towards ‘banning politics; from entering mosque space, money collectors from Turkey found a more welcoming atmosphere in their efforts to access congregations. Even though the administrators denied any involvement with the issue during our interviews, I was told by several informants how money collectors were allowed to address the congregations after Friday prayers in some Milli Görüş controlled mosques. By the time of my fieldwork, the administrators at Milli Görüş mosques grudgingly accepted the loss of congregations due to the huge financial losses suffered by their communities because of the ‘green capital scam’.
Diyanet

*Islamitische Stichting Nederland* (The Netherlands Islamic Foundation), which is known as ‘Diyanet’ is the biggest Islamic organization in the Netherlands in terms of the number of mosques it controls and the financial and political influence it commands. Diyanet was established by the representatives sent by the Turkish state in 1982, about two decades after the arrival of first immigrants. M ügge (2011, 32-33) notes that

When the 1980 military coup triggered a second wave of mass emigration, the Turkish state tried to control emigrants’ opposition activities. It set up formal organisations, for example around mosques, to control, monitor and manipulate migrants’ political activities. It actively provided political opportunities or imposed constraints.

In 1978 ten counselors for religious affairs were sent from Turkey to establish religious associations and foundations in Western Europe (Landman 1997). The structure
of the foundation makes clear its ties to the Turkish state. The majority of the members of the general council of the foundation are affiliated with the Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs, including past directors of the organization. During the early 1980s many of the previously established mosques willingly came under Diyanet’s control. By 2005, Diyanet was in control of 142 of 200 ‘Turkish’ mosques in the Netherlands. It offered a wide range of services ranging from funeral and pilgrimage services to provision of financial aid to students, while providing financial support for the mosque construction projects (Hollanda Diyanet Vakfi Faaliyet Rapport 2006).

Diyanet’s efforts to control religious mobilization abroad met strong resistance, especially during the 1980s. I met Mehmet Kervancı at the headquarters of the Turkish Diyanet Foundation in Ankara, where he served as an administrator. Kervancı is the founder of the Dutch Diyanet Foundation and has vivid memories of the antagonism he encountered during the initial years of the Turkish state’s entrance to the religious field in the Netherlands:

When I [first] went to the Netherlands, there were 80 mosques there. We were not able to [even] set foot in more than half of them…They would lie about us and refer to us in a demeaning way, [but] I never engaged them [directly]. We only drew attention to our services. We said, “Look, we offer such and such services.” We communicated the importance of the services we provided and were very careful not to engage in politics, needless to say. We also strived to explain the religion accurately and became successful because of that that. Religious services are [currently] controlled Diyanet both in the Netherlands and in Europe. I believe that the difficulties [we faced] are mostly overcome today.28

Kervancı distinguished his organization from its rivals through Diyanet’s efforts to combat “the abuse of religion” (dini istismar). Diyanet officials emphasized the formal training of Diyanet affiliated imams in order to set them apart from their counterparts at other organizations, many of whom were not professional imams. Moreover, the moderate Islam Diyanet’s imams preached would forestall fanaticism:

Mehmet Kervancı: I was working diligently towards establishing the domination (hakimiyet) of Diyanet when I became the attaché. Now, I visited a mosque once. They have heard about my visit…I arrived at the mosque. We prayed, conversed and so on. Some people challenged me, they tried to disturb and harass me in order to dissuade me from visiting [that mosque] again.

Murat: Was the attack verbal or physical?

Mehmet Kervancı: It was verbal, but carried the potential of developing into a physical attack. However, two youth among the congregation protected me. In another incident—I cannot remember specifically where in the Netherlands it was—we were trying to establish our domination over a place and Milli Görüş did not want to give up [their control over the mosque]. I contacted someone from the mosque administration and told him that I was coming over.

Murat: Then your position was akin to proselytizing. Were you inviting them to join Diyanet?

Mehmet Kervancı: Of course! Why? Because things that happened there were contrary to the essence of [our] religion.

Murat: What kind of things?

Mehmet Kervancı: Well, for instance people were being misinformed [about Islam] and pushed towards fanaticism. One of the rules of the religion is to oppose fanaticism...We arrived one hour or a little more before [the designated time of the appointment]. They had allowed a youth to take the pulpit and he started to deliver the sermon. There were hardly a few people inside. Then we went to the mosque association and talked. We said, “We have already informed you about our visit. Why did you allow this young man to take the pulpit? Would not it be embarrassing if we took him down [from the pulpit] now?” Anyway, we eventually convinced them and they took him off the pulpit. My colleague took the pulpit and delivered the sermon.

Murat. Was your colleague an imam?

Mehmet Kervancı: Yes.

Murat: It was the time for the Friday prayer, right?

Mehmet Kervancı: Yes. That group [the supporters of Milli Görüş] were [irritated by our arrival, but] there were also pro-state, pro-Diyanet members within the congregation. We talked calmly, without targeting anyone. Then a young men approached us and grabbed my tie—naturally, I was wearing a tie—and said, “Do not you ever come back to this mosque wearing a tie!” I responded “Why, my young friend?” He was a very young man, about 20, 21 years old. He said, “Have our prophet ever worn a tie?” I answered, “I can understand if you want to emulate our prophet’s dressing style, but I, too, have a question for you: Why are you wearing a jacket? Have our prophet ever worn a jacket?” When people around us heard this, there was laughter and the young man was silenced, of course.
Things of this sort would happen. Some people used to call my home to swear at me, for instance.

Murat: You were being harassed?

Mehmet Kervancı: Of course! I had to change my phone number several times.29

Kervancı’s account is significant in terms of bringing certain professional, institutional, and generational tensions to the fore. First, he did not acknowledge the man on the pulpit as an imam and continuously referred to him as “the young man.” Similarly, he refrained from openly mentioning Milli Görüş, referring to its supporters as “some people.” This way, Kervancı challenged the ability of the young man to function as a proper imam, while his refusal to name the organization that controlled the mosque aimed at denying Milli Görüş equal footing in running the affairs of the mosque. That is, Kervancı presented the parties interacting at the mosque as the state and the congregation. Yet, he was constantly challenged by the followers of the movement he refused to name, as an agent of the Turkish state.

The most important moment of his visit, however, came when the young man grabbed his tie and questioned his credentials as a good Muslim. Young man drew attention to Kervancı’s tie to mark him as an agent of the modern, secularist Turkish state, implying failure to reflect Islamic values in everyday life. Kervancı’s response drew on Sunna to show the inconsistency of the young man’s claims within the Islamic tradition. This helped him convince the congregation that his organization could offer a better response to the question of reconciling Islamic and modern lifestyles compared to Milli Görüş. Lastly, referring to his challengers as “young men” Kervancı emphasized their lack of knowledge and experience in running the affairs of the mosque, mobilizing the generational and patriarchal lines within the congregation to his benefit. In the second incident the struggle over taking the pulpit points to the symbolic importance of the
spatial control over the pulpit, where only those with the proper symbolic capital are
d deemed worthy of acting as imams and are allowed to claim the pulpit to address the
congregation.

Kervancı was an employee of the Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs (the
DRA) a governmental organization that regulates the production of religious knowledge,
provision of religious services and the management of places of worship in Turkey.
Landman (1998, 229) notes that “since the 1970s the Turkish government has pursued a
consistent policy of both instilling and nurturing a sense of Turkish national
consciousness among Turks living in Western Europe, and taking great care that this
develops along approved lines.” The Turkish state was universally criticized by my
informants for not immediately providing the religious guidance for the workers it sent
abroad. Turkish state for its part, got interested in providing those services when it
became apparent that the immigrants were not retuning Turkey anytime soon and as they
gained more and more importance for the Turkish state for economic (i.e., remittances
and investments) and political (i.e. growing support for transnational revolutionary
movements such as the PKK and Milli Görüş) reasons (Nell 2008). To this must be added
the growing political and economic integration of Turkey to the global world economy.
The mobilization of political movements in transnational space gained new significance,
as seen in the case of Kurdish and Alevi diasporas.

In a recent article in the special issue of the journal Muslim Minority Affairs on the
DRA, the minister of state in charge of the DRA at the time, Mehmet Aydin, relates the
‘global vision’ of the DRA to the imperial experience of the Ottoman Empire and its
legacy, not only in terms of the multi-confessional structure of the empire but also in
reference to the institutionalization of the religious establishment over centuries.

“Turkish Muslimness,” i.e., Islam as taught and experienced today in Turkey, has its roots in the “effective history” of the country, and is quite in keeping with democratic values and fundamental human rights. It accepts the secular meaning and significance of commonly shared values, norms and standards, but it sees no harm in bringing a religio-spiritual dimension to motivate and justify these values and norms (2008, 166).

In the same issue, the head of DRA’s Foreign Relation Department, Ali Dere puts the number of ‘Turks’ living abroad close to 4 million and the mission of the DRA as “to take the necessary steps and measures to meet the religious and spiritual needs of this population by providing well-trained and experienced religious staff members (Dere 2008, 291). Since the majority of the Turkish communities are based in Western Europe and Turkey is in negotiations with the EU over full membership, “Diyanet’s interest in the European question has three major dimensions. The first is directly related to the position of Islam in the West, and the second is the condition of Muslims living in the West. The third is Turkey’s relation with the EU as a negotiating country” (Aydın 2008, 167).

The DRA responded to the need for religious personnel abroad by training its own personnel in Turkey while recruiting others from abroad. According to Dere “[t]he aim was to guide and teach the religious beliefs and practices of Islam to generations born and brought up in different non-Turkish socio-cultural environments, and to establish religious shrines and other organizations (associations and foundations) for the purpose of creating religious congregations and related cultural activities” (Dere 2008, 292). The growing number and influence of the transnational Turkish networks necessitated changes in the organization of the DRA:

Diyanet is now functioning in this new environment. It is in a process of reorganizing itself in terms of infrastructure, personnel, education and general policies. New challenges require restructuring, a new vision and a newly defined mission. To meet these challenges and demands, the department in Diyanet dealing with external affairs has been enlarged and strengthened. Diyanet has undertaken an initiative and opened an office in Brussels to establish closer relations with the religious institutions in Europe and it meets regularly with the
representatives of the Commission of Bishops’ Conferences of the European Community (COMECE). Diyanet also plans to establish an agency and an affiliated research center to study relations between Turkey and the EU with a specific focus on religion and culture. We hope that these efforts will bear fruit in the near future (Aydın 2008, 169)

Diyanet has had an increasingly ambivalent relationship with the Dutch government over the last decades, though. On the one hand, its privatized, rationalized, and apolitical understanding of Islam is deemed in line with the secularized structure of the Dutch religious field and in the context of political polarization around the issues related to the accommodation of Muslim claims to difference. The spokespeople of Diyanet are well aware of this. For instance the state minister Mehmet Aydın, who was until recently responsible for the DRA has argued that

I can confidently say that not a single hate speech came out of the mosques owned by the Turkish communities, and we have not heard of any case in which the members of these communities were involved in any violent act. This calm attitude rightly receives the attention and appreciation of many authorities in Europe and elsewhere. Fortunately, the West is gradually realizing the vital role of Diyanet and its potential significance in the field of socio-political participation, which is necessary for humane coexistence (ibid., 169).

He further claims that

The help Diyanet provides to Turkish communities in Europe and elsewhere should not be seen as interference in the domestic affairs of those countries. Europe needs more efficient Islamic organizations that function in religious and cultural domains. Of course in Europe, as in other parts of the world, religious services have to be provided in harmony with the secular nature of these countries (ibid., 170).

For Dutch authorities, far from a simple commitment to multiculturalism, the provision of mother tongue education and the importing of religious knowledge from abroad were approached positively under the assumption that the immigrants would have less difficulty adjusting to life back in Turkey. Diyanet’s commitment to reproduce the Turkish Islam in Europe is confirmed in the below quote by the highest official of the Turkish State, the state minister in charge of the DRA in 2008.
Diyanet representatives presently employed in Europe have been recognized for their proficiency in providing religious services as well as for maintaining a healthy dialogue with locals, officials and the members of other religious communities. These representatives are in a position to explain what I call “Turkish Muslimness,” i.e., Islam as it is understood and practiced in Turkey by Turkish people (ibid., 169).

According to Aydın, “Diyanet’s relations with local Muslim organizations in Europe and elsewhere are guided by two basic principles: (a) that these organizations should never be involved in any act committed against the interests of the host country; and (b) likewise, they should never be involved in any act committed against the interests of Turkey and the Turkish people” (ibid., 170). He does not raise the question, however: what happens when a conflict arises between the interests of the Turkish state and the ‘host country’? Indeed, the very fact that he continues to approach the country of the settlement as the host country is an indication of the fact that he is caught in a binary mode of thinking that limits the Turkish-Dutch communities’ belonging to Turkey and assumes that they remain as temporary guests in the countries other than Turkey.

In line with the shift in the politics of integration in the Netherlands towards privileging belonging in a unitary Dutch national identity over ethnic/ized or multinational attachments, Diyanet’s emphasis on Turkishness have become problematic and its position was recoded as an agent of the Turkish state and as a threat to the development of an autonomous and localized Dutch Islam. Accordingly, Diyanet’s investment in reproducing identification with, and belonging to Turkey as well as its control over the administration of mosques and provision of religious services to disseminate the Turkish Islam has become undesirable. In other words, the mission of Diyanet was much more plausible for the Dutch authorities when they still believed the Turkish presence to be a temporary phenomenon. The growing concern over the position of Diyanet in the Netherlands has become more accentuated with the coming to power of
the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in Turkey, given its Islamist roots. As a result, the Dutch government commissioned

[The research project ‘Diyanet, the Turkish Directorate for Religious Affairs in a changing environment’, conducted between September 2009 and July 2010 in Turkey and the Netherlands. The aim of the research, which was commissioned by the Project Office IRP on behalf of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was to explore the policies, agendas and activities of the Directorate after the coming to power of the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP) in Turkey in 2003. It was expected that the AKP aimed to change the traditional role of the Directorate (Diyanet) from that of guardian to a republican version of Islam to a formal institute actively promoting the ‘Islamisation’ of Turkish society (Sunier et al. 2011).]

One of the complications in Diyanet’s claim to serve ‘Turkish citizens’ abroad has been the recent surge in double citizenship and also the increased pressure on diasporic communities to give up their Turkish citizenship in order to qualify for the citizenship of their adopted countries. For the former situation, the Netherlands is a good example while for the latter, German requirement to choose citizenship for the children born in Germany with parents born abroad at the age 18 comes to mind. Still, as the questioning of the loyalties of the secretary of Foreign Affairs, PM Nebahat Albayrak of the PVDA by the PVV of Geert Wilders has demonstrated, double citizenship is becoming increasingly contested in the Dutch context, as well.

Diyanet’s hierarchical structure raises doubts regarding the degree of autonomy mosque organizations affiliated with it can achieve. On the one hand, the mosque administrations belonging to Diyanet had a number of reasons find the relationship desirable. Especially the provision of financial support for mosque projects and the payment of the imam’s salaries are important markers of continuity with the model in Turkey, which still provides strong points of reference in mosque management in the Netherlands. However, the fact that all the top administrators of Diyanet are bureaucrats sent from Turkey as well as the priority given to those with living experience in Turkey in
its administrative functions lead to a certain degree of dissatisfaction with the 
organization.

In terms of its mobilization efforts, Diyanet is a late comer in terms of organizing 
women’s and youth branches. Sedat Oral, a municipal parliament member from the Labor 
Party and active with Diyanet’s Kuba Mosque in Ijmuiden saw a correlation between the 
growth of the community and the extensions of mosque services:

Now the community has grown here, so the needs have changed. Mosque is not 
only place where you go, pray, and then leave. It rather appears to be a mosque on 
the one hand, and a neighborhood center [buurthuis], on the other. It has become a 
place where Turkish Muslim community can meet, collectively celebrate holidays, 
and gather for mourning and supporting one another after funerals. This need has 
been present for some time already, as the individual houses are not large enough 
[to accommodate the entire community] anymore. There was the need for a place 
such as this one. As you see, there is a computer classroom in the next room. 
There is Qur’an and language classes for children and computers are available for 
general use. Women have had their needs, too. You see, there was nowhere to 
gather for women when 15 to 20 of them wanted to meet up. This was because old 
men claimed the entire teahouse for themselves before the extensions were made. 
There was no place for youth or women. Now women and youth can have as 
much space as they want in this [enlarged] building, without [having to] disturb 
anyone.30

By 2010 Diyanet had established 80 youth branches, the majority of them very recently.

When a centralized youth branch was established, Uğur Kaya was approached to become 
its head. Uğur, an Istanbulite who moved to the Netherlands through marriage after 
graduating from university in Turkey, did not think the fact that Diyanet chose him over 
another youth born and raised in the Netherlands was a coincidence:

Uğur: [The person who is in my position] should know the culture of Turkey, 
know the life in Turkey and have a connection with his/her [Turkish] roots. I have 
been recommended within this context.

Murat: Why is it so important for the person in your position to have strong ties to 
Turkey?

Uğur: Why? Because you need to know the culture of [running a] foundation. If 
you do not have sufficient knowledge of foundation culture, Islamic tradition, 
Islamic code, and Turkish customs and traditions, you cannot successfully

30 Personal interview, Ijmuiden, May 7, 2010.
transmit Islamic and Turkish traditions to those who live here. You yourself are the first one who needs to be in touch with those [customs and traditions] so that you can help the people, the youth who grew up here. The reasoning for this is as follows: a person who is at peace with herself, who is at peace with her faith and culture would never cause trouble for other societies in which she is also a member. For this reason, it was naturally the thesis [that informed my hiring] that people who have attained a certain level of education and who are familiar with the developments in Turkey, combined with the experience of having lived in Europe—i.e. capable of forming a synthesis of the two [European and Turkish cultures] while passing on our own customs and traditions—would succeed in this position. Thank God, we see that it really is the case. The feedback we receive is excellent.31

The motive behind choosing Uğur for this position despite his relative lack of living experience in the Netherlands was the assumption that only those from the ‘homeland’ could muster the necessary resources and skills towards successfully synthesizing European and Turkish values while staying committed to Turkish culture in Europe. According to Uğur’s logic, without the experience of living in Turkey, the threat of assimilation cannot be overcome. There is also the implication that the ‘homeland’ is seen as the authoritative and authentic source of tradition and customs deemed ‘Turkish’. Here the interpellation of the youth of Turkish origin as primarily Turkish is quite obvious.

What is meant by the ‘other society’ is the Dutch society. Uğur’s speaking style even gave the feeling of ‘stateliness’. His use of passive voice was most telling. The fact that he referred to himself as ‘us’ and made extensive use of the passive voice is common among notable state officials in Turkey. Uğur went on:

There is also this: we consciously use Turkish [as the primary language of communication]. Good command of Turkish is imperative because young generations struggle with Turkish. We especially use Turkish so that they do not lose their Turkish skills, that they do not get linguistically assimilated. This is just like how you speak English on top of Turkish, and how the Dutch speak a few more languages in addition to Dutch. It is perfectly fine for the Turkish youth to speak Dutch, English, or I do not know, for instance Latin, on top of their native tongue. New bridges have to be formed. That is how civilizations advance. In order for civilizations to advance you have got to know [about] your civilization. Then you need to know which direction the advanced civilizations are heading. It is crucial to have knowledge of your native tongue in order to learn about your

own civilization. You have to have strong enough a command of your language to be able to evaluate [your] civilization. You have to have the linguistic skills to not only to read but also seriously engage those [old] books. You need the language to nourish yourself from that [civilizational] culture, otherwise you cannot see what is behind you [what you have left behind/understand your past] and would run out of steam. As if you are nothing. I mean, you might feel like an extraterrestrial abandoned in the middle of the Netherlands. Research proves this point too: we know that those who have good command of their native tongue can easily pick up other languages, that this is not a problem. [New generations] should grow without being assimilated, be at peace with the [Dutch] society and the Dutch values. They should be able to contribute to the Netherlands while staying committed to their own traditions and values. This is [our] main objective.32

When Uğur was telling me about the importance of having a good command of one’s own civilizational language he was not only talking about the challenges the Turkish-Dutch faced in the Netherlands, but was also invoking the adaption of the Latin alphabet in place of the Arabic alphabet used by the Ottomans with the advent of republic as well as the republican efforts to rid Turkish of the ‘pollution’ caused by the strong presence of Persian and Arabic in the Ottoman language. Indeed, the fact that I studied history for my bachelor’s degree in Turkey was the only reason I could decipher the implicit background of Uğur’s extensive discussion on the relationship between language and civilizational belonging. In that sense, we were both more invested in Turkish culture wars than the Dutch politics of language. However, unlike Uğur, I thought that the problems of the Turkish -Dutch with formal Turkish existed at a much basic level than the reproduction of the historical memory of language.

For those who preferred Diyanet affiliated mosques over those run by Islamic movements or Sufi brotherhoods, the ban on articulating political ideas in mosque space was the chief reason influencing their choice. However, they failed to recognize that the determination to exclude politics from mosques is a political decision itself. Gamze, a middle aged housewife, explained importance of a perceived form of political neutrality –

32 Personal interview, The Hague, , March 26, 2010
understood as a form of pluralism- for her choice to affiliate herself with a Diyanet
controlled mosque as follows:

Gamze: For instance, people have different opinions. They have different ways of
thinking. If we look at the religious brotherhoods, people generally follow and
accept a single way of thinking. But there is no such thing at Diyanet mosques.
People who subscribe to different ideas [all] come here. For instance, if I think in
a certain way, I can meet someone and learn his/her opinions, as well. Then, this
might eventually result in a change in my perspective on life. [Hence] we can
describe Diyanet mosque as a mosque where differences converge.33

During a focus group meeting three of my young research participants had a heated
debate about the legitimacy other mosques operating under the organizations other than
Diyanet:

Murat: For instance, do not you know about the differences between Diyanet,
Milli Görüş and Süleymançı community organizations?
Nihal: I have no idea.
Murat: Is it the case that a mosque is just a mosque for you?
Nihal: Indeed. Forgive me, I do not know anything.
Bedriye. I do not think that is the case….I think there is only one [mosque] and
that is Diyanet’s mosque. The others cannot be called mosques!
…
Murat: But you need to explain why they do not qualify to be mosques.
Bedriye: Because those people have just gathered and constructed a building and
now they call themselves a mosque [organization]. Mosque means Diyanet!
Hakan: Do not make that mistake. If there had been anyone from one of those
groups here, there would have been a quarrel. … Let us assume that I do not want
to drink tea, [then you should ask] “OK, what would you like to drink?” You need
to come up with an alternative. Why [are they not] mosques?
Bedriye: Because, I believe that they are discriminating.
Hakan: Then let us put it this way: they have a place of worship but their only
mistake is to allow politics in their centers.
Bedriye: If you are trying to do something good, then let us do it all together, why
are you separating [from the main body], why are you fragmenting?

33 Personal interview, Amsterdam, February 15, 2010
Muhsin: OK, [you mean that] there is discrimination, but they still all serve the same purpose.

Bedriye: Their only concern is “I will pray and fast, I will be a good [Muslim]. I do not care about anything else.” We need to be united.\(^{34}\)

The invocation of the ultimate political organization, the state as the guarantor of a politics-free environment is striking here. One informant, who was present during the handover of the Selimiye Mosque shortly after its establishment to Diyanet in the early 1980s told me this: “We convinced everyone to turn this mosque over to Diyanet. When the [mosque building] was first bought, the deed belonged to four men. Then we realized if they passed away, there would be the complication of dealing with their inheritors. That is why we turned the mosque over to Diyanet.” I asked: “Why not Milli Görüş?” He responded: “This [mosque] belongs to the state anyway. We [only] returned it.”\(^ {35}\) The seamless continuity between Diyanet and the Turkish state take for garneted by this informant was a source of resentment for the autonomous movement and organizations that often pursued revolutionary agendas at the time. Whereas for those who had been socialized in a social milieu where the relationship between the mosques and the state was a relationship of oneness, it was difficult if not impossible to imagine a mosque that was not state owned/controlled.

At this point, another man interjected: “The mosque now belongs to Diyanet, even though we paid for it. Even if they remove us from here, they cannot confiscate the mosque. There is the state.”\(^ {36}\) The backing provided by the Turkish state through Diyanet also meant stability and protection in a context where many could not speak confidently about the prospects of staying the Netherlands indefinitely. The Turkish state appeared as

\(^{34}\) Focus group meeting, Zaandam, May 5, 2010.

\(^{35}\) Interview, Haarlem, April 13, 2010.

\(^{36}\) Interview, Haarlem, April 13, 2010.
guarantor of their religious lives based on the perceived precariousness of these men’s presence in the Netherlands.

Sedat Oral, the municipal parliament member from the Labor Party and active with Diyanet’s Kuba Mosque explained the appeal of the ‘officiality’ of Diyanet controlled mosques in the eyes of the Dutch authorities through the increased securitization of Islam and mosques in the Netherlands. We met in one of the newly built rooms at the additional building he helped the secure the municipal permit for construction:

There is a process of lobbying. What is lobbying? I think mosques contribute to integration and not to radicalization. This is so, because if people do not come here to take lessons from an official imam and come together here in good and tough times, they will [have to] meet at small houses. Then they will probably get under the influence of an unofficial or unqualified imam. Radicalism begins only after that. Now here we have a normal imam send by Diyanet. He has been trained properly. He is really qualified to act as an imam. He can show you what is right and what is wrong. The administration here works in harmony with the municipality and their surrounding [community]. This prevents problems. Otherwise people would be dispersed here and there and that would lead to chaos. Things would not be under control. This is what makes mosque important. This is what I successfully explained to the municipality: both the youth and the women needed some extra space and this [accommodating the youth and the women by expanding the mosque facilities] would benefit the Dutch authorities and the society. Because the authorities always want to keep an eye on what is happening around here. For instance…the casinos are under the state control in the Netherlands. Why does the state do this? Not because it wants to encourage gambling by owning casinos, but to keep them under control. It also collects tax from the casinos while checking the extremities [of casinos]. When we explained this to the municipality, they were convinced and we received the license [to build additional facilities for the mosque] (italics are mine).37

Oral’s justification echoes the legitimacy the state officials and Diyanet leaders offer for the state control over religious services in Turkey, but interestingly, in this case the needs of the Turkish and the Dutch state seem to overlap when it comes to dealing with Islamic movements that recruit and mobilize their followers through mosques.

37 Personal interview, Ijmuiden, 7 May, 2010.
Comparing Milli Görüş and Diyanet

As early as three years after the Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power in Turkey, Ace (2005) argued that the adversarial relations between Milli Görüş and Diyanet would potentially be overcome because of the changing political climate in Turkey. Turkey has been ruled by AKP since 2002. This conservative-Islamic party has its roots in Milli Görüş movement and the fact that Diyanet is controlled by such a government helped remove the ‘statist’ stigma of Diyanet to a large extent. This also made it difficult for Milli Görüş supporters to criticize Diyanet officials as agents of the secularist Kemalist regime convincingly. This situation also led to frictions within Milli Görüş, as some members affiliated themselves with the AKP while others continued to support Erbakan’s Felicity Party. Secondly, the increased Islamophobia in Europe after 9/11 and assimilationist integration policies prompted different Islamic organization to underplay their differences and cooperate closely. Indeed, Yurdakul and Yükleyen observe that in the wake of 9/11 “the Muslim characteristics of their community gained popularity among Turkish expatriates as a form of immigrant political mobilization and representation, and many Turkish immigrant associations began to articulate their political demands along religious lines” (2009, 217). Lastly, the replacement of the first generation of immigrants with the second generation—that did not partake in the bitter struggles of the 1980s—at administrative positions facilitated the collaboration between organizations (Amersfoort and Doomernik 2002; Vermeulen 2006). For instance the youth branch chair of the Milli Görüş’s Furkan mosque told me that “It is not such a bad thing to admire Atatürk, after all. We have overcome many issues, than God.”

Statements such as this one were anathema to Milli Görüş activities in the political environment of 1980s and the 1990s.

38 Personal interview, Haarlem, April 9, 2010.
Contemporary differences between Milli Görüş and Diyanet are largely based on a distinction made between civil society and the state. Semi-official status of Diyanet is both seen as a source of strength and problematized by different actors. In comparison, Milli Görüş’s autonomy from Turkish state enables its representatives to pursue a more proactive program and adapt positions that are simply impossible for Diyanet. Let me illustrate this point with examples. During a personal interview, the secretary general of Milli Görüş South, Feat Durum remarked: “[Living in] the Netherlands is more comfortable than in Turkey. For instance, no one interferes with my daughter’s headscarf. When the [political] system is just, the God allows you to live in places [where Muslims are not dominant], whether it is a Muslim country or not does not make any difference, then….I have problems here, but I am not bound with Turkey.”39 The ex-director of Milli Görüş North, Hacı Karacaer further highlighted the limitations on the actions of the Diyanet as follows: “Diyanet is controlled from Ankara. Their top administrator [Bullet Sinai] speaks English, but he cannot appear on Dutch TV programs. For that reason they [implying Sinai’s superiors in Ankara] send him only to conferences. Folks at Diyanet do not consider themselves Dutch. As a result, the others [the native Dutch] see themselves as the hosts [and them as the guests].”40 The secretary general of Milli Görüş South, Feat Durum, also implied that the imams sent by Diyanet did not recognize the subtle differences that would aid them in adjusting their professional dispositions in the Netherlands:

There is laicism here. Laicism cannot function properly in Turkey. The Directorate of Religious Affairs is an institutions working under the Turkish state. We love our motherlands, but this [the Netherlands] is our second motherland. The religious personnel coming here do not have sufficient knowledge about

40 Personal interview, Amsterdam, January 5, 2010.
Dutch society. There should not be any statements antagonizing the Dutch society [by religious personnel].

For those sympathized with Diyanet, however, its ties to the Turkish state was not perceived as a sign of subservience or lack of initiative. Even though for both Milli Görüş and Diyanet supporters the most important distinction between the two organization is the relationship between politics and religion, for the former, the problem is the state controlled and depoliticized religion, and the politicization of Islamic discourse as a sign of religious corruption, for the latter. Diyanet supporters consider the state’s active involvement with religion as a way of guaranteeing neutrality and reliability of religious services. Diyanet also promises the predictability of a more standard and uniform organization structure due to its centralist and hierarchical organization. Also it provides a less challenging atmosphere for those who are not particularly invested in Islamic politics or piety. Milli Görüş, on the other hand has developed a more autonomous and dynamic structure in the absence of strong, bureaucratic, and official center controlling all affairs including the financial transactions. As a result, despite its limited financial resources and control over a smaller number of mosques, Milli Görüş is the most visible and well-known Turkish Islamic organization in the Netherlands (for a comparison of the two organizations in Germany, see Yurdakul and Yükleyen 2009).

The presence of the financial support from Turkey enabled Diyanet to undertake major mosque projects. Also the fact that the Turkish state pays the salaries of imams gives Diyanet an advantage over keeping its member mosques well-staffed. However, Milli Görüş imams have the opportunity to establish deeper relations with their congregations as there is no requirement for them to return to Turkey. Their unlimited stay also creates stronger motivation to learn more about the Netherlands and advance their linguistic skills. However, at the same time, Milli Görüş, just like other civil

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41 Personal interview, Amsterdam, January 5, 2010.
religious organizations, often turns to retired imams with diplomatic passports to work at its mosques without attaining work permits. Imams use their visa-free status to enter the Netherlands as tourists. Relying on these imams’ services has mixed success, though, because turnaround rate is sometimes even higher than that of Diyanet, especially when the Dutch border inspectors refuse to allow these imams frequent entries on tourist status.

Belying the popular perceptions, imams often do not take militant positions when they work outside Diyanet controlled mosques, as they often were trained in the same centers. More, the possibility of shifting institutions makes them cautious about criticizing different organizations or taking an antagonistic stance against them. This was made easier by the fact that by the time of my field research, the ideological differences between once fiercely competing Turkish Islamic organizations had been breached to a considerable degree. For instance, at Diyanet’s Selimiye Mosque, I ran into an old gentleman I had met the Fatih Mosque of Milli Görüş. I asked him if he was visiting both mosques. He told me that he was a firm Milli Görüş follower, but he would pray whichever mosque was nearby at prayer time. He said: “This is like the old days of Ottoman Empire. Then people moved from one caravanserai to another. These mosques are also like that, you can pray here when you are on the move.”

Even Hasan, an avid consumer of conspiracy theories who was convinced that the entire world was controlled by Jews and the founder of the Turkish Republic, Mustafa Kemal was a Masonic agent, did not hesitate when I asked him why he was still visiting Diyanet controlled mosque with a staunchly Kemalist administration. We were drinking tea and chatting at the garden of the Selimiye Mosque, when he said: “That is different. This [place] is a house of God.” Another day I was watching Osman and Cemil, two men in their late twenties, play poll at the Furkan Mosque of Milli Görüş. Cemil told me that neither one of them was “into namaz (ritual prayer).” He explained to me that the
Communal boundaries between mosques were more carefully guarded in the past: “For instance, the way things were in the old days, I should not be here, at this Milli Görüş mosque. Things are more relaxed now. Take TV. Back then you could only watch Channel 7 [a conservative channel popular among Milli Görüş supporters], but now we can tune in whatever TV channel we like.”

My own experiences with Diyanet headquarters confirmed the image of the Netherlands Islamic Foundation as a truly bureaucratic institution of the Turkish state. When I sent an email to the foundation for meeting with the cultural attaché who also serves as the chairman of the foundation to receive permission and support towards visiting mosques that were under their control, I was asked by his secretary to submit a letter from my supervisor. I was later told that this was because “Sometimes people with bad intentions approach us by faking their identities.” I felt—not so pleasantly—nostalgic about my adventures with the Kafkaesque operations of the Turkish bureaucracy, when I was asked to further submit an official student certificate from the University Registrar. Once I collected the documents and received the permission to work at Diyanet mosques the personnel at the headquarters and the imams and the administrators at mosques were very helpful. However, I was never able to reach the attaché for an interview outside a few casual and scholarly conversations and could not interview him in his capacity as the head of Diyanet.

Compared to my experiences at Diyanet, it was a much easier to approach the administrators of Milli Görüş and I was never asked to submit any documents whatsoever. However I found it much more difficult to access to the individual mosque administrators, imams and congregation members once I started conducting fieldwork at Milli Görüş affiliated mosques. The reason for this situation has to do with the particular paths of institutionalization Diyanet and Milli Görüş have gone through in the
Netherlands. Because of the hierarchical organization of Diyanet organizations, it was more difficult to reach the top administrators of this institution and they tried to avoid controversial topics during our meetings. However, in contrast to the higher-ups, the mosque administrators and the congregations at Diyanet mosques were very easy to approach. This was partly because of their conviction that the relationship between their mosque and the Turkish state gave a certain credibility and legitimacy to the operations of their mosques and in part because of the (perceived) inclusivity of their organization and the openness of their mosques to everyone. On the other side, Milli Görüş was an organization that was born in and thrived as part of the civil society. Accordingly, its representatives never shied away from engaging the Dutch governmental authorities, law, and public opinion regarding Islam-related issues. Their administrators were seasoned professionals who were more used to dealing with researchers, politicians, and journalists compared to their counterparts at Diyanet. However, the way I was received at mosques belonging to Milli Görüş was often less warm. The strained relations with the government and the declining image of the movement were to blame to a certain extent for this. Their mosque administrators and the congregations were more suspicious of the outsiders, partly because of the ‘damage’ done by journalists and partly because of the controversy surrounding their role in the ‘green capital’ scandal. The stronger sense of being not only a moral but also political community among the followers of Milli Görüş also made my position difficult when dealing with their members, sometimes.

Here is an example. When I wanted to conduct participant observation at Milli Görüş’s Mimar Sinan Mosque in The Hague, I had to try several times before arranging a meeting with the head of the mosque association. After giving me a brief tour of the mosque, he allowed me to take notes (he did not give his permission for voice recording, even though I assured him that I would not disclose his name) about how “great” his
mosque’s relations are with other mosques in the neighborhood, the municipality, and the police, actually too many times to make me doubt how great things were. After that he told me that it would be best if I did not show up at the mosque too often and dismissed me. Towards the end of my fieldwork, the new imam of the Furkan Mosque refused to give me an interview and did not explain his reasons no matter how many times I asked. However, it was obvious that he did not trust me as a researcher coming from the USA. Lastly, the internal struggles at many scales within Milli Görüş movement were making everyone cautious about speaking of the secrets of the community to outsiders.

Indeed, Diyanet controlled mosques were less autonomous in determining their relationship to several forms of activism compared to the Mill Görüş mosques. One sunny spring morning, I arrived at Milli Görüş’s Furkan Mosque on my bike right before the communal Friday prayer. I met the ex-head of the mosque association, Halil, with an Azeri man standing outside the mosque. The Azeri man told me that he was coming from an Azeri association and was collecting signatures in an attempt to oppose the building of a monument commemorating the Armenian Genocide in The Hague. Halil was greeting the men entering the mosque and urging them to sign the petition. The Azeri activist and one of his friends asked me to give a signature, as well. I told them that as a researcher I needed to maintain some distance from such acts as I did not see this compatible with research ethics. The activist told me that the Armenians killed many Azeris in Hodjali just 20 years ago and that Azeris had a video cassette as a proof of the massacre. Halil joined the conversation at this point and said “You can dictate whatever as just or unjust as long as you have weapons, wealth, and power.” He argued that the United States could get away with all the torture in Iraq because of its power: “If it was Turkey torturing people in Iraq, European countries would immediately put an embargo on Turkey. That is what I always say; eat only a plain piece of bread but work hard to become wealthy and strong in
this world.” The Azeri man told me that his friends were also at Selimiye collecting
signatures. When I moved on to Selimiye Mosque, the imam of the mosque told me that
he warned the Azeri activist to first approach the Turkish Consulate to get permission
before starting to collect signatures at the mosque.

Revisionist approaches to the fractured institutionalization of the Turkish Islam in
the Netherlands also became possible with the eroding of the differences between
multiple organizations. Veli, a journalist who recently arrived at the Netherlands through
family unification saw the underlying motive behind the mushrooming of Turkish
religious organizations in the approach of the Dutch governance of religion rather than
the combination of the available political framework and the cultural capital of the
organizers: “Here the [Dutch] central government divided the communities in line with its
‘divide and rule’ tactics. When subsidies became available for associations, even a
handful of people established associations to get money. This happened just at the
moment Milli Görüş and Diyanet wanted to come together and unite.” Cemal (38, male)
told me that he “saw the bearded ones [one way to refer to Milli Görüş activists] in the
1990s. This guy was telling me ‘Atatürk’s dad was a pimp and mum was a prostitute. I
asked him: ‘What is your level of education?’ He replied, ‘I finished elementary school.’ I
asked him what mosque he was affiliated with and he told me the name of a Milli Görüş
mosque. I have never visited that mosque again.”

Conclusion

Starting from 1980s Islam has come to replace class politics by Turkish migrant
populations as the main mechanism of making claims to difference and gaining
recognition in the Netherlands. This had to do with domestic developments in the

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42 Personal interview, Zaandam, April 23, 2010.
Netherlands as much as the political atmosphere in Turkey. In the process, two organizations achieved the most central status in reaching out to Turkish Dutch communities: Diyanet and Milli Görüş. The contrast Sunier (1995) draws between two Turkish Muslim activists affiliated with Diyanet and Milli Görüş during the 1980s and 1990s helps highlight the different attitudes towards Turkishness, Islam and life in the Netherlands cultivated by these different organizations during this period. Sunier’s analysis confirms the nationalist and exclusionary rhetoric of Diyanet and the more cosmopolitan and engaged attitude of Milli Görüş during the mid-1990s and towards the early 2000s. As a result, Milli Görüş mosques were more successful in attracting diverse groups to their activities during the 1980s and 1990s, but Diyanet gained the upper hand during the 2000s, largely due to the scandals plaguing Milli Görüş, Diyanet’s logistic superiority and the political developments in Turkey. However, the divergences between Diyanet owned mosques and Milli Görüş mosques were not as great as they were the 1980s during my fieldwork. The administrators on both sides were always careful not to make strong accusations towards their counterparts, while they were quick at pointing towards common goals and interests as Muslims in an increasingly hostile environment. I argue that the reason for the rapprochement between once bitter rivals has a lot to do with the shifting political conditions both in Turkey and the Netherlands, as well as the global developments, especially since the end of the Cold War.

Responding to differentiated needs, Turkish Islamic organizations offer differentiated services and specialize in different areas of expertise. Yükleyen notes that “Milli Görüş operates in the public and political sphere, Gülen movement provides education and interfaith dialogue, and the Süleymanlı teaches Qur’an recitation and mysticism” (2009, 306). My field research also shows that many of my research participants themselves attended or sent their children to Qur’an classes at Süleymanlı
institutions or at the mosques controlled by Milli Görüş because of the more thorough teaching of Qur’an at those institutions. Meanwhile, they preferred to attend prayers and socialize at Diyanet mosques because they were disturbed by the pressures to comply with rules or political statements of the above-mentioned groups. Negative statements about the Turkish State or Atatürk during sermons of imams or conversations with more militant members of those movements motivated them to seek Diyanet mosques instead.

This does not mean, however, that the boundaries between different congregations are static or strictly maintained. On the contrary, the congregations of the mosques belonging to different organizations overlap and shift constantly in practice. A good many number of my informants not only shifted their allegiance from one organization to another over time, but also visited multiple mosques simultaneously for different motives and needs. The specialization of different organizations towards niche services is not a secret to anyone and communities take advantage of the existence of multiple options to meet their different needs. Moreover, depending on the shifts within administrations and changes of location or of the particular facilities and offered services, it is quite common that members of a mosque congregation shift their allegiance to another mosque. They do so regardless of whether this new mosque is run by a different, rival organization. This was most obvious in the example of the Selimiye Mosque attracting many ex-members of the Furkan Mosque in Haarlem, both being located near one another. Some were attracted to the Selimiye Mosque, because it “looked like a mosque” and some found its services more appealing. Additionally, it was not uncommon for people to attend both mosques at the same time, saying “These are all God’s houses.”

The differences between organizations are far from completely bridged, however. Having closer contact with the Dutch bureaucracy and its egalitarian approach to state officials, the administrators at Diyanet’s own mosques could not help but mock the way
Diyanet officials handled their business. Mosque administrators often ridiculed the mannerisms and the state pomp Diyanet officials tended to show. Their point of reference was the Dutch politicians. The manifestation that was made out of the arrival of the attaché with his entourage in an overtly luxurious car was ridiculed by these administrators. They compared this “ritual” of arrival to the use of bicycles by the Dutch officials. One mosque administrator once mockingly remarked: “Sometimes, the chairman of Diyanet and its administrators show the Turkish [state] mentality. Even the least important attaché comes to visit us with an entourage of seven or eight people, in fancy cars. Diyanet should learn how to work on a volunteering basis. Turks love spectacle. Our [Turkish] superiors demand [receiving] respect. [When engaging] with the Dutch, however, you do not ask for respect, you earn it.”

This chapter analyzed the similarities, differences, and relationships between the transnational actors of Turkish-Islamic field in terms of their specific agendas, strategies, and priorities in the Netherlands. Following the initial phase of establishing the first mosques, the communities split along political, sectarian, and ethnic lines in the late 1970s. Following the fierce competition and the rivalry between competing movements and organizations in the 1980s and 1990s, developments in/between Turkey and the Netherlands as well global geopolitical shifts following the end of the Cold War initiated a period of rapprochement in the 2000s. From the very beginning, different organizations relied on their individual strength in specializing in different areas and services to attract members and followers. The boundaries between organizations have become increasingly porous over time as movements were compelled to set aside certain rivalries and disagreements and cooperate through the establishment of umbrella organizations in the context of rising xenophobia and Islamophobia.

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43 Personal interview, Zaandam, February 24, 2010.
CHAPTER FOUR
EVERYDAY PRACTICES AND THE FORMATION OF MORAL SUBJECTS

Burak: As far as I know, the Moroccans cause a lot of trouble, because they do not get much education/disciplining (eğitim) from their families. I mean, they are raised too footloose (serbest büyüdükleri için) and spend too much time on the street.

Murat: How are Turks brought up, then?

Burak: Turks are different. For instance, [when we were kids] we would go home when it became dark, because we were afraid that our parents would be angry with us otherwise. The Moroccans do not have that [sense]. I mean, you see [Moroccan] children on the street as late as 10 or 12 p.m. It seems their parents give them too much freedom (serbest bırakıyorlar) and do not care where their children are as long as they do not have to deal with them at home.44

Burak (24) was a university student who offered voluntary study aid to elementary school students in a Diyanet affiliated mosque. His opinion about the importance of family as a site of educating and disciplining children so that they clear of the streets and cause no ‘trouble’ for their families and—by extension for the society at large—throw into sharp relief some of the important conceptions that undergird the construction of moral ethno-religious subjectivities through mosque centered everyday practices. To attend to the relationship between the construction of mosques as moral spaces and their inhabitants as moral subjects, this chapter will first explore the multifold meanings of ‘serbest/lik’, a Turkish term that simultaneously means ‘free, lax’, and ‘comfortable’, in relation to the disciplining of bodies and formation of moral subjectivities through
mosque spaces. Different connotations and invocations of the Turkish term *serbest* are operationalized by a host of actors and play a crucial role in regulating the corporeal conduct and mobilities of gendered subjects through mosque and other social spaces.

Second, I will focus on the spatial distinctions mosque-goers make between ‘outside’/‘inside’ and ‘here’/‘there’. The deployment of such distinctions undergird the regulation of gendered, aged, and classed bodies and crucial to the formation of moral subjectivities in mosque spaces. A number of social spaces enter into relations of alignment and opposition in relation to mosque spaces in the process: on one hand, my research participants approach mosques as an extension of home, and thus as the primary site of intimacy, wholeness, belonging, and social control. On the other hand, they position mosques against the streets, coffeehouses, cafes, bars, discos, schools, and the homes of the native Dutch, which they perceived as assimilative or morally dangerous. These alternative spaces of social life are coded as sites of both insufficient and excessive freedom and as undesirable environments of cultural mixing. The polyvocality of *serbestlik* is crucial here for the relative positioning of subjects vis-à-vis different conceptions of freedom.

Lastly, this chapter attends to the spatial practices of diverse groups that claim, inhabit, and use mosque spaces. To this end, I will focus on spatiality of moral subjection by examining the articulations between Turkish Islamic subjectivity and homeliness of mosque spaces. The access to, and uses of the mosque space, as well as the drawing and transgression of political, class, ethnic, and gendered boundaries in and through mosque space will be the main points of departure for my analysis. I will look at the negotiations over the rules of proper conduct in mosque spaces to unpack the binary of mosque as either sacred/ritual space or profane/everyday space. For the distinction between the two

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is produced and reproduced through everyday practices and performances of the groups that occupy diverse and shifting subject positions.

Nagar and Leitner (1998) emphasize the central role places of worship play in the production and reproduction of communities. Creation of such places enables material reproduction of social life and sustains the sense of community and power hierarchy. Spaces both facilitate and hinder performances of the self (Probyn 2003). Kirby (1996, 11) notes that “[a]s subjects, we wary widely depending on the actual place we came from and the subsequent places we occupy.” She goes on to point out the interdependence of spatial and subjective positioning: our position within space defines our subjective status, while our subjectivity determines our mobility patterns and social positioning. To put it another way, there is mutually constitutive relationship between the subject positions and the material and imagined spaces we occupy. The competing discursive articulations of the categories such as Turk, Dutch, Muslim, European, and their various combinations highlight the negotiations over different modes and states of belonging across many social spaces. The strategies ethnic(ized) groups turn to and the cultural repertories they draw on in defining themselves point to the ways in which ethnic, national, migrant, and religious subject positions might be reworked and re(con)figured through the mosque spaces. We need to ask: who is included in and excluded from mosques?

In order to attend to these questions, this chapter turns to the relationship between home and belonging. While observing and participating in the collective act of ‘hanging out’ at the cafeterias and teahouses of mosques, I asked the people I encountered their motivations for spending their leisure time at mosques rather than somewhere else. The most consistent answer I received was “We [Turks and/or Muslims] have nowhere else to go.” This, of course was not literally the case. For women there were the alternative
option of visiting their friends and relatives, shopping, seeing a film, and attending the activities offered by various women’s organizations, while men could spend their free time at home with their families, visit coffeehouses, cafes, bars, discos, and so forth. There were a number of social clubs and sports facilities my research participants could visit in Haarlem. Yet, despite the availability of other possibilities towards leisure and socializing, my research participants chose to attend mosques in their free time.

Interestingly, I encountered many people who were not pious Muslims during my visits to mosques. For instance, a ‘secular’ Turkish-Dutch woman from Haarlem, Feride (40) did not think there was a need to establish new mosques in the Netherlands: “I think that is completely unnecessary. The Turkish community could organize its cultural activities and use a cultural center to come together, as well. Why should this be done especially at a mosque?” However, Feride sent teenager son to the Cultural Center of the Selimiye Mosque to take guitar lessons, because she believed “he can make friends there.” Of course ‘friends’ meant those who would share a certain cultural and moral orientation and form her son’s social networks for years to come.

By focusing on mundane and repetitive mosque-centered practices of the everyday, this chapter will explicate the seminal role mosques play in the production of ethno-religious belonging and gendered moral citizen-subject positions. The quotidian act of ‘hanging out’ at mosques for ensuring morally safe experiences of socialization will be a focal point of my discussion. I will also look at both chance and carefully orchestrated encounters between the Turkish-Dutch and the native Dutch taking place in mosque spaces. I will analyze the representational practices of, and the interactions between the two groups through interfaith dialogues and “Open Days” to explicate how the boundaries between Turkishness, Dutchness, Islam, Europe, Christianity, and secularity are re-drawn in the process.
My analysis will be informed by the experiences of multiple groups differentiated along age, gender, class, sectarian, ethnic, and political affiliations. Different groups make contested claims and achieve varying degrees of access to mosque spaces. This chapter advances the argument that mosque spaces are not strictly used for worship but they are also mobilized as social and cultural spaces where a moral Turkish-Muslim subject is constructed. Muslimness is articulated to Turkishness, in the process, and hegemonic configurations of gender relations are negotiated. Mosques thus are significant for the formation of the Turkish self as moral subject. Yet, the introduction of a range of social and cultural activities and the diversification of mosque communities also pose challenges to what it means to be a Muslim Turk in the Netherlands by creating a tension between the sacred and profane conceptions of mosque space.

**Everyday and Mosque: Extraordinary Ordinariness**

Notwithstanding its association with repetition, boredom, and superficiality, the realm of everyday is a crucial site of the production, maintenance, and transformation of social relations (Karner 2007). Despite the disagreement over whether the everyday is conducive to reproducing relations of domination—for instance, according to Lefebvre (2004) the everyday has been colonized by consumption practices and commodification of social relations under the assault of capitalism—or carries to potential subvert the asymmetrical relations of power and generates resistance against strategies of domination (de Certeau 1988), scholars agree that the minute, mundane, and seemingly superficial events and practices of everyday life are essential for sustaining and transforming social life (Highmore 2002). Indeed, complex ideologies such as nationalism are produced, reproduced, and resisted through everyday, mundane, banal acts of social actors and
gendered partition of social spaces are both naturalized and destabilized through everyday practices (Billig 1995; Sheringham 2006).

Brubaker (2004, 2) observes that ethnicity “is embodied and expressed not only in political projects and nationalist rhetoric but in everyday encounters, practical categories, commonsense knowledge, cultural idioms, cognitive schemas, interactional cues, discursive frames, organizational routines, social networks, and institutional forms.” I, too, recognize the necessity of taking account of the ordinary and quotidian practices of my informants to understand how their everyday lives are linked to their sense of selves and ethno-religious belonging. My findings show that seemingly insignificant everyday practices at mosques are indispensable to performances of a particular version of the Turkish Islamic culture, however conceived and enacted.

During my field research, I inquired into my informants’ motives to spend time at mosques outside prayer times. I met Serdar with his close friends Bekir and Ali at the teahouse of the Diyanet affiliated Sultan Ahmet Mosque, Zaandam. Serdar explained to me why he made a consistent effort to visit the mosque regularly:

Serdar: I come here after work every day, no matter how tired I am.

Murat: Why?

Serdar: Because life is extremely monotonous here [Zaandam]. You meet your friends at mosque in the evenings during the weekdays, because there is nowhere else to go. I mean, what I see at the city center is not acceptable for me (banters).45

For Serdar, mosque provides a safe space of socializing that shields him from what he implies to be the public performances of sexuality that he does not approve of. As he does not want to participate in the everyday life available to him on the streets, he seeks out a different kind of quotidian experience, another sort of ordinariness. He locates an unordinary ordinariness at the mosque.

45 Personal interview, Zaandam, February 2010.
According to one of the foundational figures of the studies of sacred space, Mircea Eliade (1959, 21), “the sacred manifests itself in...a break in the homogeneity of space.” Ivakhiv (2001, 44) notes that Eliade construes sacred spaces as “manifestations or ‘irruptions’ of inherent power and numinosity, exuding potent meanings and significances for the religious practitioner, who is able to shed everyday constraints of socially conditioned time and space by ‘entering into’ or ‘partaking of’ their sacred power.” Hence, according to Eliade’s reasoning, profane space is defined by its opposition to the perceived monotonity and ordinariness of the everyday. This distinction has a lot in common with the hegemonic variants of secularism in the West that locate religion and religiosity in ritualized performances of faith that mark a break with the everyday (Asad 1993; 2003).

This secular conception of sacred space influenced the configuration of the Turkish-Dutch mosque spaces in the Netherlands, as well. Due to the prevalence of this secularist framework, progressive integration of mosques into social life of the Turkish-Dutch communities resulted in a conflict between conception of mosque as sacred, ritual space and profane, everyday space. Informed by this binary conception of mosque space, different organizations and various members of mosque communities disagreed passionately about the use of mosque spaces. A productive tension and ambivalence in regard to mosque space arose, as a result: mosques were conceptualized by many of my research participants as home spaces, together with its connotations of safety, shelter, and familial socialization. But this prompted my informants to realize that a mosque was similar to yet different than a domestic home. Mosques are, as I was often told during my interactions with my informants, ‘the houses of God’ and in that capacity sacredness of mosque spaces coexist with their profane everyday existence. However, the recent literature in new geographies of religion suggest sacred spaces are constructed through a
host everyday spatial practices and it is not always easy to demarcate the boundaries between the sacred and the secular as the two is ever overlapping, intersecting, and interpenetrating with one another (Kong 2001; Ivakhiv 2006; Gökarıksel 2009).

The creative tension between the sacred and everyday conceptions of mosques is most potently articulated through the spatial distinctions my research participants made between ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ and ‘religious space’ and ‘cultural space’. The attribution of sacred status to mosques necessitated the rendering of the mosque a space where the worldly concerns and conflicts of everyday life is countered by the serene, peaceful inhabitation of a spiritual place. At the same time, the profane, everyday qualities of mosques refer to worldly yet moral means of socialization and protection from the allegedly corrupting influences of other sites of the everyday. The boundaries between the sacred and the profane within mosque spaces constantly shift as well as the proper modes of conduct are operationalized through this distinction. Negotiation of the boundaries between the two marks bodies differently and enables variegated practices. The production of mosques as both sacred and everyday spaces is what creates the abovementioned creative tension. This happens due to the constant negotiation and contestation of the profane and sacred marking of mosque spaces. The following excerpt is from a focus group meeting with young people who were members of a theater workshop at the Diyanet affiliated Sultan Ahmet Mosque, Zaandam. The opinions presented below reveal the tension between mosques as sacred and/or everyday spaces:

Hakan: We need to separate the culture section from the religion section [of a mosque]. Ottoman mosques also contained educational spaces. People in the Netherlands are starting realize that mosques should go beyond being merely mosques. The social and cultural activities are important. People do not see mosques as [places of worship] only. Folks are on a quest for the sake of their children.

Muhsin: When I tell people that I play pool at the mosque, they are surprised.
Hakan: Only, that the place where you play pool is not the mosque. It is the cultural center. You should say, “I play pool at the cultural center [of the mosque].”

Muhsin: It does not make sense to me that these kinds of things can take place at a place of worship. The place where you worship should be separate. Why? Because people curse when they are watching soccer games downstairs [at the teahouse]. This is supposed to be the God’s house, a mosque! Otherwise the mosque loses its [sacred] quality, you know.

Nihal: I had a quarrel with someone. S/he said that if you are going to stage a play at the mosque you need ‘aanpassen’ (make adjustments) accordingly. S/he said that you cannot express your ideas [freely] there.

…

Muhsin: I do not find it right that other sorts of activities can take place somewhere where you perform your prayers.

Hakan: Islam is a social religion. [According to your logic,] we are cancelling out that social part, we throw it away.46

This exchange points to the tension between different modes of conduct coexisting at a mosque. Hakan limits his conception of a mosque exclusively to the prayer hall and proposes to refer to the rest of the building as a cultural space. Thereby he excludes cultural and social activities from the sacred space of the mosque. Muhsin, on the other hand, attributes sacredness to the entire building as a whole and hence finds contradictions with holding a variety of ‘non-religious activities’ in the mosque. Cursing during a game is commonplace at a coffeehouse, but when done at the teahouse of a mosque, it alienates certain members of the congregation and puts the sacredness of the mosque into question. Nihal’s friend raises a different point about whether the content of a social or cultural activity need to be adjusted according to the norms of the specific setting it is taking place, and thus suggesting where something happens will transform the content and nature of that social/cultural activity. At the same time, mosque administrators and many congregation members are aware of the need to attract the youth.

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46 Focus group meeting, Zaandam, May 5, 2010
and women to mosques and diversifying mosque services appear to be the best strategy available to them.

When I asked Üzeyir Kabaktepe, who is one of the pioneers of introduction of pool or table soccer at Milli Görüş affiliated mosques, he responded: “You cannot draw the youth to mosques only by [relying on] religion.” That is, there is a broad agreement over the need to attract more and especially the young people to mosques across organizations. The question is rather how should the organizations decide what kind of activities are permissible and where and what kind of activities should be offered within the walls of a mosque building without putting its status as a place of worship into question. Even a cursory look at the popular religious literature on mosque manners reveals desire for a quiet and solemn place of worship:

Sleeping or eating at a mosque unless one is obliged to do so, is not encouraged. Even though there is a degree of disagreement about the issue, children’s presence in a mosque is also generally discouraged as they might dirty the mosque or use it as playing ground. This is considered to be against the solemnity of a place where people pray. Even talking is subject to regulation: speeches in mosques “-if unavoidable- should be in accord with the divine atmosphere” (Ünal 2007, 226).

For instance, the administration of the Diyanet affiliated Sultan Ahmet Mosque Zaandam has recently started to offer *saz* (Turkish lute) and *ebru* (water painting) courses to gender mixed groups, aerobic classes for women, a theater workshop for youth. The aim was to attract the least represented groups, the youth and women, to mosques. Similarly, Diyanet’s Selimiye Mosque in Haarlem began to offer guitar lessons for mixed groups and cooking lessons for women. When I asked a Milli Görüş administrator from another mosque in Haarlem what he thought about the guitar lessons at the Selimiye Mosque, he replied: “I personally do not approve it. There should be a separate place, a few kilometers away. The lessons should be offered there. They [Selimiye Administration] are offering religious education outside the mosque. It should be the
This administrator was referring to the renting of a separate building by the Selimiye Mosque’s Cultural Center to offer religious and language courses. When I asked the administrators at the Selimiye Mosque why they did so, their reasoning was: “We do that in order not to alienate those people interested in our courses, but hesitant to send their children or come themselves to a mosque.” That is, the administration was ready to go as far as relocating its cultural activities outside the mosque to reach secularist and non-pious groups. Another reason for this, I was told, was the problem of securing funding from the city of Haarlem for such activities, given the Dutch policy of not funding the activities of religious organizations. The administrators used the separate headquarters of the cultural center to convince the local authorities that their services were ‘only cultural’.

Figure 5. Children playing at the prayer hall, Selimiye Mosque, Haarlem.

Photo: Murat Es

Home and Homeland at Mosque Space

There is an intrinsic connection between mosques and domesticity in the Netherlands. This is because many of the early mosques were constructed through reclaiming of houses, which were previously used for dwelling purposes. Moreover, in the Islamic tradition, mosques are called the ‘houses of God’. However, this chapter primarily highlights the relationship between mosques and their homeliness as a “realm of familiar ontological security” (Morley 2000, 9). Even though the modern idea of home has been increasingly linked to houses, home has connotations beyond one’s immediate site of dwelling. Home is not just a singular location either. As a metaphor, home ties multiple and hierarchically organized sites of belonging across multiple scales, ranging from one’s immediate dwelling to a neighborhood, from the city one lives to the homeland (Blunt 2005, Blunt and Dowling 2006; Schissel 2006). That is, from bodies to diasporas and nations to regions, home jumps and connects multiple scales. Moreover, geographies of home points to the ways in which “intimate and personal spaces of home – and their loss – are closely bound up with, rather than separate from, wider power relations” (Brickell 2012, 229).

Blunt notes that “[t]he home is a material and an affective space, shaped by everyday practices, lived experiences, social relations, memories and emotions” (2005, 506). Any study of the everyday, then, is inextricably bound with experiences, sites and affective qualities of home, as it is a site where repetitious, ordinary, and predictable rhythms of life reign supreme (Coolen and Meesters 2012). Home carries the promise of retreating from public sphere into the privacy of individual and familial life for some, connoting familiarity, safety, and memory (Bachelard 1994). Home is simultaneously a

space of oppression, violence, and exploitation, especially for women, as the feminist scholarship has shown (Blunt and Varley 2004).

In this chapter, I discuss the relationship between home and mosques from three angles. First, mosques are called ‘the houses of God’ and from this statement a certain modality of inclusion and exclusion with regard to ‘pure’ and ‘impure’ people and practices emerge. Second, mosques gain significance for my research participants as an extension of home in the sense of providing a safe and moral space of socialization, in the sense of being both their individual and collective home. Third, mosques invoke homeland, in their capacity to articulate belonging to the space of the Turkish nation.

In the imaginaries of many of my informants, home and Turkey are intimately linked. For instance, Eren, a Turkish-Dutch journalist told me that

The atmosphere at my house was like a little Turkey and the warmth at our house just like a mom’s womb. I associated Turkey with that happy family life at our house. Once you leave your house and go out, you become a foreigner, though. I have always wanted to be just like everybody else but the question ‘Where are you from?’ constantly reminds you that you are different. 49

For Eren, the constant questioning of his belonging beyond the domestic sphere of his home only strengthened his feelings of safety and warmth at home. For this reason, he likened exiting home to the banishment from the warmth and safety of mother’s womb. Once ‘outside’ ambivalences regarding Eren’s place in the Netherlands would turn him into a stranger within the Dutch national body by reinscribing his ‘foreignness’ on his body.

My research findings show that the connection established between mosques and their increased importance in the social life of certain groups has to do with their home-like qualities. Mosques gain homely associations through the expansion of imaginaries of home to include mosque space and its inhabitants. An excerpt from the below interview

with the ex-director of a Milli Görüş affiliated mosque in Haarlem illustrates my point clearly:

Halil: All people have their distinct nature (karakter). Everyone should go to the place where s/he feels most comfortable. This [mosque] is my home.

Murat: Why?

Halil: Because I have known the people [here] for a long time, I consider them my kin. Of course this does not mean that I have a problem with those who are outside [the mosque]. What I mean is, what we have here is a big family.  

According to Halil, the mosque is a place where he feels comfortable because he can perform his original or authentic ‘nature’ there. For him, the congregational family is securely placed inside the mosque and protected from those influences that threaten the integrity of the mosque inhabitants, his imagined kin. When I was interviewing Halil, a visiting imam from another Milli Görüş mosque interjected: “Mosques are places where [our] people take refuge (sığınmak). They go to teahouses [of the mosques] to relax and they forget about their domestic troubles while performing their prayers at the prayer hall. The hacı (old pious men) come to the mosque two hours before the afternoon prayer and go home as late as at 1.00 a.m. after midnight.”

Morley (2000) notes that feeling at home is closely linked to the degree of mutual understanding at a setting without explicit communication of the meaning of acts or social gestures. In this sense, home spaces are laden with thick notions of intimate sociality exclusive to their inhabitants, distinguishing insiders from outsiders, kin from strangers. For instance Ahmet (33) told me that “When you come here [mosque] we speak the same tongue with most of the people (aynı dili konuşmak)” It is important to note that the Turkish expression Ahmet used here means a lot more than shared mastery of Turkish. It

50 Personal interview, Haarlem, February 2010.

51 Hacı literally means pilgrim. It is a prestigious socio-religious in Islamic circles achieved by performing pilgrimage to Ka’ba. The term is also commonly used to refer to any pious old man, as is the case here.
connotes understanding each other at a deep level beyond common linguistic capability. The expression ‘speaking the same tongue’ alludes to partaking in a common frame of mind and being in possession of shared cultural capital, which enable the respective parties to understand each other without having to explain themselves. Ahmet went on tell me that “Here you see your acquaintances, your friends. People do not smoke. At coffeehouses, people smoke and that bothers me. You feel [that people here] are more intimate, you feel more *serbest.*” The Turkish word ‘*serbest*’ has the double meaning of ‘comfortable’ and ‘free’. When I asked Ahmet what he meant by ‘*serbest*’ he explained: “It [the mosque] is just like home, it is a place you know really well, [a place] where you know people.” I find Ahmet’s perception of mosque space striking. His remarks point to the gendered experiences of home spaces: home invokes positive feelings of safety and comfort, especially for men and the dominant groups in a given society. Home can be both a site of empowerment and creativity for oppressed or minority groups (hooks 1990) and a space of domestic arrangements based on confinement, exploitation, and oppression of women (Blunt 2005).

Moreover, consumption of certain foods as well as exposure to specific smells and sights constitute affective bonds that are conducive to the development of a sense of feeling at home, based on feelings of familiarity at mosques. That is sensory experiences derived from the reproduction of Turkish material culture underlies attachment to mosque spaces. Here is an excerpt from my fieldwork notes: “I am sitting at the cafeteria of the mosque. A few old men sit at the corner, dressed in style no different than their counterparts in Turkey, watching a Turkish TV channel. A father brought his son for a haircut in the barber shop right across from where I sit. I smell *lahmacun,* a popular snack in Turkey, known as ‘Turkish pizza’ in the Netherlands, being prepared at the cafeteria.

52 Personal interview, Haarlem, January 2010.
Mosques gain homeliness thanks to the familiarity of shapes, sounds and smells you encounter there. The faces one sees, the taste of the Turkish tea served in ‘ince beli bardak’ (specially shaped ‘Turkish’ tea glasses), familiarity of ceramic works on the walls with Ottoman motifs, and the particular shape and the smell of ‘a la Turca’ restroom all render the mosque a ‘Turkish’ place.” I was struck by how this mosque in Haarlem reminded me of my homeland, of mosques in Turkey. Moreover, most of the recent purpose built mosques funded by Turkish-Dutch communities reproduce neo-Ottoman mosque architecture with its central dome and pencil shaped minarets, their prayer rooms are covered with tiles made in Kütahya, Turkey. This invites the criticism of ‘nostalgia mosques’ or the accusation that these non-Dutch ‘foreign styles’ do not align well with the (cultural) built landscape of their surroundings (Erkoçu and Buğdacı 2009), but it is undeniable that this kind of continuity with the cultural landscape of Turkey produces a familiar sight in the Dutch landscape for the Turkish-Dutch, making their new ‘homeland’ strangely homely.

It is not only the sensory and mnemonic qualities of mosque spaces that are important for mosque centered communities. Despite the attention paid to religious education and the performance of communal prayers, I contend that the everyday performances of a particular invocation of ‘the Turkish culture’ are actually equally important reasons to attend mosques for my informants. In Turkey, religion, morals, and Turkishness have been strongly articulated to one another in the political imaginary of the successive conservative political movements, especially since the 1980s. Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan of Justice and Development Party has recently instigated a polemic with Kemal Alemdaroğlu, the leader of the secularist Republican People’s Party when he declared “We want to raise pious generations.” When criticized for making such a

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53 These are characterized by the absence of urinals and use of a hole on the ground rather than commode.
statement as the head of a secular state, Erdoğan argued that a generation raised without religion would “have no morals and end up as homeless drug addicts” (Radikal 2012). Indeed, when an atheist family recently sued the government for relief of their son from compulsory religious classes, the court decision rejecting their application stated that there are no religion classes in Turkey but “a class on ethics” (Radikal 2012). That is, a conception of morality without religion is impossible to imagine for many in Turkey, especially the conservative segments of the society. Similar conceptions inform the foundation of Turkish subjectivity for certain groups in the Netherlands as much as in Turkey.

At the same time, the fear of the Turkish parents to be alienated from their children due to their socialization through Dutch educational system is another motivation for families to frequent mosques. This is especially the case for sons, as their spatial mobility is generally less restricted compared to daughters. During a focus group meeting, Neriman, a Turkish woman in her early forties told me: “My son wants live serbest like the [native] Dutch. But I do not find it right. He behaves like the Dutch. He acts in this manner [similar the native Dutch] if he spends too much time outside [home]. He pressures me to behave similar to what he observes with his [Dutch] friends’ families.”

Interestingly, in this example free behavior (serbestlik) outside an approved space of socialization is coded as danger by Neriman. At stake here is a double process in which the son attempts to reform his mother according to the norms of the group that dominates the public sphere, whereas the mother wants to control her son’s acculturation according to ‘Turkish’ traditions. In her attempt to selectively pass on to him the ‘Turkish’ values that are dominant ‘inside’, at home and by derivation at the mosque, she faces competition from ‘outside’. When I asked Neriman how the mosque would help her fight

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54 Focus group meeting, Haarlem, May 20, 2010.
the ‘assimilation’ of her son, she replied: “Then [at mosque] he would at least be somewhere safe. This is the God’s house, all our abis (elder brothers) are here, and everyone here can tell me about his whereabouts. He would not be exposed to bad habits if he spends his time at the mosque.” This determination to enclose the young boys at places where the communal social control would protect them from immoral acts was a persistent attitude among my research participants and complemented the mosque’s importance in reforming the elder men’s behavior after all the years spent at other sites of masculinity such as coffeehouses.

These examples show the ways in which mosques are constructed as homes, as moral places that put their congregations on a proper path in line with communal values and religious ethics of the ‘Turkish’ culture in its infusion with Islam. As a result, even the seemingly simple act of spending time in a mosque’s cafeteria instead of visiting a coffeehouse marks the beginning of an extraordinary journey towards becoming a disciplined, moral male subject that controls his urges to engage in morally dubious activities such as alcohol consumption or gambling that he would be exposed at coffeehouses. It becomes possible because mosque provides a site of socialization that is free from the corrupting influence other social spaces. The fictive kin relations invoked by Neriman’s reference to ‘elder brothers’ emphasize the homely state of the mosque, again, but this time as a site of passing on ‘Turkish’ cultural values under the patriarchal authority of the elderly, who gain power as the gatekeepers of the ethno-religious culture. The result is the reproduction of the community and its masculinist structure of hierarchy through younger men’s deference to elder men on the one hand, and elder men’s control over the spatial behavior of the younger men, on the other.
‘We Have Nowhere Else to Go’: Performing Masculinity

History of coffeehouses (kahvehane) in Turkish culture goes as far back as the 16th century (Ulusoy 2011). Coffeehouses are salient public sites where hegemonic forms of masculinity and a patriarchal social order are produced and reproduced in Turkey (Arık 2009). As recounted in the Chapter 3, Turkish immigrants established coffeehouses before mosques as spaces of everyday socialization and leisurely activity. However, mosques have been attracting a growing portion of the clients of coffeehouses lately. For instance, Musa, a man in his late forties with thick eyebrows and thinning hair, told me that he started to frequent the Sultan Ahmet mosque after he got laid off from his work: “When I became unemployed, I felt empty. I wanted to fill that void [by becoming active at the mosque].”55 The shifting of employment opportunities from manufacturing to service industries during the restructuring of the Dutch economy after the economic stagnation of the 1980s meant that many unskilled men who arrived at the Netherlands to be employed at factories lost their jobs and had difficulty finding reemployment. I met time and again men in their fifties and sixties like Musa, volunteering to work at mosques in order to use their ample free time for a good cause. The fact that they were unemployed also meant that they had a more limited budget to attend coffeehouses regularly. Instead, some of them started to frequent teahouses at mosques as a cheaper alternative. Musa went on to tell me that “every place has its own congregation (cemaat), [we can talk about] a cinema congregation or a cafe congregation. Just like in a coffeehouse there are those who gamble and those who do not, here we have people who perform their ritual prayers and those who do not.” When I asked why he regularly came to the mosque even though he did not pray regularly, he reiterated the reasoning “We have nowhere else to go. We prefer our own society. This is the place where we are most comfortable. Also it

is because of our faith.” Interestingly enough, in his explanation, the religious affiliation came as the last one. In response to my question why did not he visit coffeehouse instead, Musa narrated a transition in his life trajectory, but he also lamented changing nature of coffeehouses:

We do not have the money for it, anyway. If you play five or six games [for loser pays for the drinks] you end up paying for at least two rounds. It is not a coffeehouse, but a casino! Moreover, there is a lot of cursing in those places and there is always fighting. You cannot find peace in such places. Here, nobody hurts another’s feelings. Even if they do so, someone else reminds them: “We are at a mosque, what do you think you are doing?” We all find both material and spiritual peace here. At coffeehouses, you start with small [games], but end up attending bars and casinos as the next step. The coffeehouses are not what they used to be anyway, there is no more any sohbet there. When the life of the coffeehouse (kahve hayattı) is over, you start attending the mosque.\textsuperscript{56}

When I talked to coffeehouse owners in Haarlem, they told me that their customers included a good number of mosque regulars, though. For instance Mehmet, coffeehouse owner in Haarlem told me that “I have regularly praying, devoted Muslims among my clients. It is true that we serve alcohol but we do not force anyone to consume it. Does our religion forbid attending mosques, no it does not. It [Islam] says ‘do not consume alcohol, do not gamble’. It is alright to attend coffeehouses as long as you do not do such things.”\textsuperscript{57} He did not think that the difference between the teahouses at mosques and coffeehouses was clear when it came to issues such as ‘dirty’ language or physically inappropriate behavior like violent debates: “that depends on one’s character. If you curse all the time, you cannot stop that even in Mecca. Of course people are extra careful at mosques, but we have really descent people here, as well.”

One of the most important functions of mosques is to provide a space for youth and children’s socialization where Islam and ‘Turkish culture’ is part and parcel of everyday life, an environment where it is norm/al to perform Turkish Islamic cultural

\textsuperscript{56} Personal interview, Zaandam May 6, 2010.

\textsuperscript{57} Personal interview, Amsterdam, 5 January 2010.
codes. I met several teenagers at the teahouse of the Milli Görüş affiliated Fatih Mosque on one of the rare sunny days of the winter. When I asked them if their families encouraged them to spend their leisure time at the mosque. Their response implied an opposition to coffeehouses by their families: “Those who wrong others (yanlış yapan) cannot come here. Families send [their children here] because it is a mosque. They do so because there is no gambling or alcohol here.” One of them, Cemil quickly added: “I come here especially in order to hang out (takılmak) with my childhood friend.” He went on to say that “If a youth feels suffocated whenever he goes out, the mosque is the place where he escapes falling into depression. It also is a place where he can have fun.” He explained that not only he met his childhood friend at the mosque, but also “practice my Turkish with those friends who finished up the high school in Turkey.” Since it is easier to find those who have recently arrived from Turkey at mosques, those Turkish-Dutch who were born and raised in the Netherlands visit mosques to practice their Turkish. This means that mosques also provide opportunities for the Turkish-Dutch youth towards attaining cultural capital such as Turkish linguistic skills.

At another time, my interview with Zübeyir Güngör, the head of Milli Görüş’s Furkan Mosque in Haarlem, was interrupted by the call to night prayer. We stopped the interview so that he could perform his prayer. Zübeyir stopped at the teahouse on his way to prayer hall. There was a soccer game on TV. He announced a few times, loudly “The night prayer has been announced!” Half of the teahouse emptied and the other half remained on their seats. When we resumed our interview after prayers, Zübeyir looked a little embarrassed as he recalled: “In the old days we would either switch off the TV or lock down the teahouse. Nowadays we say, religion means to counsel. Namaz (salat) signifies presenting yourself to God five times a day to show that you have not severed

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58 Personal interview, 6 January 2010, Amsterdam.
your ties with the God. This cannot be forced on [people] anyway. Namaz should be performed because you feel the urge yourself.” Hence, in this new understanding of religious practice, the community sheds its responsibility of enforcing the religious code to the individual who surveilles himself while being surveilled by an omnipresent God. Zübeyir added that “mosques have a social structure and this social structure renders mosques a little more attractive. [Unlike coffeehouses] People spend their [social] time within the bounds of what is permissible according to our religion.”

It might be argued that the organization of the Turkish-Dutch mosque spaces often does not challenge the dominant gender and generational hierarchies, but rather discourages those aspects of masculinity that are located outside the conservative Islamic moral universe, such as gambling, alcohol consumption, use of slang. As mosque attendance has declined and the concerns over ‘losing’ members to other sites of socialization deepened, even pietist organizations such as Milli Görüş had to relax their rules regarding Islamic practice at their mosques and resignify mosque spaces as everyday spaces.

**Figure 6.** Women’s section, Selimiye Mosque, Haarlem.
Feminizing Mosque Space? Locating Women

As Ahmed notes, “movement becomes a form of subject constitution: where ‘one’ goes or does not go determines what one is ‘is’, or where one is seen to be, determines what one is seen to be” (2000, 33). Regulating the proximity of women to men in mosque spaces are significant for gendered subject constitution. In the process no-go areas for men and women are devised and their boundaries are policed. During a focus group meeting, my friend Bedriye (33) recounted her experiences of moving about in Diyanet’s Sultan Ahmet Mosque: “Last week I went to the teahouse to ask something. I was so shocked! The place was full of men. It was actually a coffeehouse!” It was not just her observation about the erosion of the boundary between a mosque teahouse and a coffeehouse that bothered Bedriye. She further objected to the treatment she received while moving in mosque spaces:

Bedriye: For instance, sometimes I take kids to the Qur’an recitation lessons. You try to enter from a door. [A man] says, “No, the women’s entrance is from the next door.” He does not even look at you, does not see you.

Murat: Did you experience this yourself?

Bedriye: Yes. I get really angry at some people when this happens.

It is worth noting here, though, that Bedriye was frustrated because she thought that men refuse to acknowledge her, but perhaps the men thought that they were being modest by not turning their gaze at her. The relationship between women and domesticity gets further complicated by the association between mosques and home, as mosques have been historically constructed and experienced as spaces dominated by men (Mernissi 1991). In mosque spaces, the positioning of bodies and their interaction, the

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60 Focus group meeting, Zaandam, May 13, 2010.

61 Focus group meeting, Zaandam, May 13, 2010.
choreographies of movement, and bodily conduct are central to the creation of moral subjectivities. The placement of bodies in relative locations, their distance and visibility vis-a-vis one another, partitioning and access to compartmentalized spaces of mosques are based on gender divisions. Actually, the very gender divisions are constructed through these very spatial practices.

The director of the Diyanet affiliated Selimiye Mosque, Erol Sayar, recounted his attempts to promote gender mixing outside the prayer hall. He recounted that “in 2005, the women’s branch refused to hold a meeting with me because I was not a woman. I told myself that this cannot be the society [envisioned by] the Republic.” This led to a situation where “they [our adversaries, probably meaning Milli Görüş] spread rumors that say ‘Selimiye Mosque has been taken over by the leftists’.” Sayar’s experiences show the tension arising from running a ‘cultural’ institution under the roof of a mosque. His expectation that gender mixing should be acceptable outside the prayer room points to the scales of gender segregation that are operationalized through mosque spaces. For women who refused to meet him, the rule of gender segregation was applicable the entire building, which they saw as a continuation of the prayer space. Hence, the gender segregation was valid for the entirety of social space. In another episode, during the construction of the mosque, Sayar wanted to have no screening while designing the second floor balcony at the rear of the prayer hall, the designated spot for women to pray. Again, women objected, but Sayar was able to lower the screen from initially planned eye level to the waist level so that women could see the imam during service if they stood up (see Figure 7). These examples show that it is not always women themselves seeking improvements of gender equality at mosques, but sometimes those in leadership.

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62 Personal Interview, Haarlem April 26, 2010.
positions. The outcome is always negotiated and subject to debate, no matter which party initiates the change, though.

I met Didem, a women’s branch administrator active at a Milli Görüş affiliated mosque at the Selimiye Mosque. Our meeting took place there, because the women’s branches active at the Milli Görüş mosques in Haarlem did not accept to meet me. I arranged a meeting with Didem, though one of my contacts at the Selimiye Mosque and our meeting also took place there. A confident, outspoken and inquisitive woman, Didem believed that “the mosque [primarily] belongs to men, but women have also been offered a place. There is no competition between men and women according to our religion. Man as a man has his own place and woman as a woman has her place. To put it differently, they [have different roles] as husband and wife.” She defended the need for women to go to mosques to seek education that would empower them, yet argued that “there is no time to perform the daily prayers at mosque [for women]. I do not go to mosques for my prayers. A woman has many responsibilities at home anyway. God does not require women to pray at mosques because he is aware of this situation.” Didem did not believe in the virtue of spending time at mosques amounted a moral subjectivity, either: “You cannot accumulate good deeds (sevap) by drinking tea at the mosque. You need to be at home with your family.” Didem’s remarks show that according to her, a mosque not only is a masculine space, but it also exists in an antagonistic relation to home. According to Didem home is the primary site of women’s everyday life where women realize their responsibilities as mothers and wives and form themselves as moral subjects. Yet, mosques should be open to women as sites of religious learning and activity. In the process, she reproduces the prayer space as male space but reappropriates mosque through religious learning.
In a similar vein, head of the women’s branch at Diyanet’s Sultan Ahmet Mosque claimed that women did not attend the mosque to socialize: ‘They socialize with their neighbors.’ Yet she admitted that some women insisted on having no men in their Dutch language lesson. The reason for this was not explained to be religious, though: “they created a gün (informal gatherings among housewives) atmosphere there. That is why they do not want any men.”63 These women did not want men in the environment but not because of following Islamic gender segregation norms. It was rather because they wanted to have an intimate gathering among friends. I observed that women’s participation in mosque activities largely consisted of cleaning up classrooms and cooking authentic food to raise funds reproduced mosque as a home in the domestic sense of the metaphor, due to the nature of women’s labor inside mosque spaces. Activities offered to women also generally concentrated on cooking, aerobic and ebru classes. Despite the fact that women took great price on financially contributing to the needs of the mosque through their cooking, they seldom took up administrative positions or ventured out of women’s section. That is, despite the attempts of certain individuals at leadership positions and transgressive actions of some women, gender segregation rules were largely left intact, even in mosques with more secularist orientation, such as those Diyanet affiliated ones. Women seldom sought administrative positions and even if they attempted to move through masculine spaces of mosques such as teahouses or cafeterias, they did not challenge their place within prayer halls.

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63 Personal interview, Zaandam, February 16, 2010.
Figure 7. and 8. Native-Dutch visitors at Open Day of the Sultan Ahmet Mosque, Zaandam.

Photos: Murat Es

Open Days, Interfaith Dialogue, Festivals

Open Days are generally organized annually. For a full day, mosques are open for visitation—even though there is no rule forbidding anyone from visiting mosque at any other time of the year— and mosque administrations showcase ‘cultural’ goods, ‘ethnic’ food is put on display and Dutch-speaking guides give tours of mosques to the visitors. Open Days were instituted as response to the rising levels of controversy and violent attacks targeting mosques and political crises arising from national controversies. Herman Lock, the contact person for the Immigrants Association at Haarlem Municipality, told me that after the release of Geert Wilders’ film *Fitna*, “mosque leaders met with the mayor and following this meeting, began scheduling ‘open days’.”64 All of the mosques at which I conducted my research have been for several years organizing events such as school visits, interfaith dialogue activities, and Open Days. The most important target

64 Personal interview, Haarlem, February 22, 2010.
group of Open Days, school visits and arranged tours for small groups is the ‘native’ Dutch, who would ideally get a chance to learn more about their neighbors and would be rid of their possible prejudices against Islam and Muslims. The Turkish-Dutch, for their part, use this opportunity to show to the native Dutch how tolerant they are by gestures such as allowing them to roam not only in the yard but also in the prayer space in their shorts and by not requiring women to cover their heads in prayer halls.

The very notion of an Open Day is problematic, though. The implicit act of ‘opening’ mosques to ‘outsiders’ presumes a previous state of ‘closedness’, suggesting a state of opaqueness to begin with, implying that without the opportunity and experience of a special occasion such as an Open Day, one cannot properly know the Turks/Muslims. For this reason, in the remainder of the paper I will discuss the ways in which Open Days might conceal more about mosque congregations than they reveal their ‘mystery’. More, despite the much lauded aim of educating the native-Dutch about Muslims through Open Days, there is an inherent push here towards transparency, arising from the context of the securitization of Muslim difference in the Netherlands: “act openly and transparently so that we know that you are not doing anything suspicious.” In other words, Open Days and other forms of visits to mosques are presented as means of overcoming the stereotypes about Muslims through first-hand knowledge received from Muslims themselves and through close encounters between mosque congregations and the native-Dutch. Yet these are often carefully orchestrated encounters: the politics of representation requires the silencing of differences and internal heterogeneity of positions among Muslims in order to present a coherent, homogenous image of the Turkish-Dutch to ‘outsiders’.

To explain this paradox, I will briefly discuss Gerd Baumann’s (1996) work on the self-reification of cultural differences by minorities. In Contesting Culture, Baumann discusses how the ‘South Asian’ inhabitants of the suburban district of Southall in
London strategically deployed reified understandings of their own ‘culture’ in everyday settings. Baumann distinguishes between what he calls the demotic discourse from the dominant discourse on culture. Demotic discourse refers to “the daily process of ‘making culture’, rather than ‘having culture’” (ibid., 6). Residents of the Southall switch between the demotic discourse with its attention to multiplicity, ambivalence, and processual character of cultural identities and the dominant discourse with its inherently biologist, racist reification of cultural difference. They deploy self-reification in order to strategically engage other cultural groups and government authorities as well as to achieve successful political mobilization. This means that in different settings and while engaging different audiences Southall residents deploy different cultural discourses and draw from different repertoires of action to articulate their cultural difference or similitude with respect to multiple Others.

Drawing from Baumann, I argue that intentional mis/recognitions, cultural reifications, and reliance on stereotypes and cultural mis/understandings are essential for sustaining a coherent representation of cultural self and predictable group behavior in the encounters with cultural others, in everyday setting as well as during occasions such as Open Days. This is the case although people know just too well from their experiences and observations that ‘things are more complicated than that’. To illustrate my points with an example, the tendency to reify Islam as a culture was clearly the case in one interfaith dialogue event I observed in Haarlem. The dialogue meetings I attended were structured as follows: the native-Dutch were eager to present their varied individual stances on Islam and Christianity related matters and did not shy away from disagreeing one another. The Turkish-Dutch participants, on the other hand, were more concerned about representing Islam ‘properly’ than raising their individual opinions. They were more invested in presenting a coherent picture of Islamic faith and the Turkish community than
highlighting its internal differences. This led to the prevailing of an image of the Turkish community as more homogenous and coherent in the eyes of the native-Dutch group, I learned at a focus group meeting. The native-Dutch informants thought that their dialogue partners were living their religion fully and that Islam dominated every aspect of their everyday lives.65

Returning to the Open Days, now I would like to question the assumptions about achieving social cohesion and harmony between cultural different groups through having them share the same social space. Valentine (2008) argues that the expectation that occupying the same space would lead to feelings of understanding and empathy between different groups is based on Gordon Allport’s (1954) contact hypothesis. Gordon suggested that “the best way to reduce prejudice and promote social integration was to bring different groups together” (ibid., 2008, 323). Valentine is not convinced by Allport’s proposition: Is every encounter with an Other transformative? Would it teach us to respect, and thus move beyond just tolerating, those who are different than us? How about encounters that harden prejudices and reaffirm stereotypes? Valentine reminds us that everyday acts of recognition and civility produce public spaces through “normative codes of behaviour. Encounters in public space therefore always carry with them a set of contextual expectations about appropriate ways of behaving which regulate our coexistence. These serve as an implicit regulatory framework for our performances and practices” and “this urban etiquette does not [necessarily] equate with an ethics of care and mutual respect for difference” (ibid., 328-329). She concludes by proposing to account for history, material conditions, and unequal power relations that influence the outcome of such encounters.

65 Focus group meeting, Haarlem, March 17, 2010.
Open Days are such instances of staged encounters between the native Dutch and their Other, Turks/Muslims. The purpose of Open Days is to create a positive relation between the two groups, but as any public encounter (even though they are staged) Open Days may also have just the opposite effect. Following Valentine, I will now analyze an Open Day I attended in the city of Zaandam during summer 2010. The first thing I noticed was that how this Open Day was organized like a street festival. The yard of the Sultan Ahmet Mosque was crowded with stalls selling goods ranging from clothing to electronic gadgets and toys. An entire stall was dedicated to Turkish flag paraphernalia, especially clothing and hats. Conspicuous presence of the Turkish flag in this context helped marked the site as a ‘Turkish’ one. Moreover, the Turkish culture presented here rested heavily on stereotypes. Take the food. Women prepared intricate dishes such as stuffed grape leaves and baklavas. These ‘Turkish’ dishes that are laborious, time-intensive specialty dishes were sold by the women’s branch of the mosque to raise money to support the mosque. However, in the process, the gendered division of labor resulted in women performing domestic tasks and confirming the stereotype of the Turkish women as housewives, as domestic labor first and foremost. Moreover, the food is one of the most attractive parts of Open Days, but ‘eating the Other” is often the easiest, ‘safest’, and the most superficial way to relate to Others without risking substantial social or cultural engagement (Fortier 2008; Mitchell 2004).

I briefly interviewed, Rose, a middle aged woman and one of the few ‘native’ Dutch who showed up for the day, about her impression of the event. She told me that she was surprised to see a place like a mosque in her hometown and heard another ‘native’ Dutch visitor saying “I feel [like] a tourist” when she was walking out of her car. As we continued to talk, it has become clear that for Rose this visit became a reaffirmation of perceived Dutch freedom and tolerance, while the ‘homelands’ of the ‘immigrants’ lacked
those: “I was raised a Christian but I am not a believer anymore. But can I get [to establish] my church in Turkey, or Morocco? I do not know if that is possible… but we are in Holland and there are so many [mosques]. I can [should be able to] also build a church with my own people [in those countries]. I do not know, but I think it is difficult.”

For Rose, the Christianity she claimed to have left behind resurfaced as her ‘cultural’ identity when she identified with the hypothetical position of a Christian settler in a Muslim country. While admitting not to know about the accommodation of non-Muslim groups in Turkey or Morocco, she also made it clear that she believed that the same level of ‘tolerance’ Muslims received in the Netherlands would not be extended to Christians in Turkey or Morocco, a deep prejudice against Muslim countries made popular by Islamophobic groups in the Europe. At another level, Rose’s approach to mosques demonstrates a mechanical conception of alterity that correlates distance to difference where here reasoning dictates that what is near should be similar (Massey 2005).

Similarly, my mother-in-law told me about one of her native-Dutch students in her English classes. This woman loved travelling abroad and always boasted of her successful interactions with ‘natives’ there but openly talked about her dislike of ‘the immigrants’ here.

In sum, the Open Day was conceived and organized just as much as a ‘Turkish culture day’ as an Open Day for presenting Islam. In the process the event naturalized the relationship between the mosques and Turkishness. This created the effect of removing the category ‘Turkish mosque’ from oxymoronic status even though ideally mosques are the houses of God and belonging in the Islamic community of believers surpasses ethnic or national attachments. As a result mosques became the houses of God for Turks. For the ‘native’ Dutch, meanwhile, the Open Day visit to the mosque became a touristic activity, hence reaffirming the strange/r status of mosque and its congregation. This experience
also provided an opportunity to reassert faith in the liberal and tolerant image of ‘their’ country and themselves.

**Conclusion**

In this chapter, I emphasized the relationship between mosques, home, and belonging in the construction of gendered moral subjectivities through mosque spaces. The remainder of the chapter focused on the encounters with difference through mosques and the unintended outcomes of those. Mosques are often contrasted to coffeehouses by my informants, which are spaces of relaxation, sharing of information, idle chat and entertainment for men. In that capacity, they are similar to mosque cafeterias. That is, my findings show that mosques and coffeehouses are actually not incompatible but overlapping social spaces for the performance of masculine subjectivity. The differentiation between the two sites is constructed, however, through certain practices such as alcohol consumption and gambling that are deemed to be out of place at mosques. To put it another way, coffeehouses are marked as unhomely and dangerous sites of socialization in comparison to mosques, because of ‘immoral’ practices they allow to take place.

The everyday practices at mosques to attract diverse groups create certain tensions about the sacredness of mosque spaces. As a result, the range of ‘non-religious activities’ is constantly negotiated in an attempt to decide what activities should have a place or be out of place under mosques. More pietist and conservative groups approach mosques as more solemn, serious, and exclusive places devoted to religious practices and training where believers should attend for the very purpose of distancing themselves from the temptations of the everyday, which would serve as distractions that would make believers forget their duties towards the God and the rest of the community of believers. For such
groups, allowing music classes, games, or watching talk shows on TV is anathema to the idea of an ideal mosque. This tension is overcome, by those who deploy such tactics to attract congregation members and especially the youth to mosques, by stating that having new members inside the mosques is the first step towards their reformation, as they are cut off from the bad influences they are exposed to at other spaces of socialization. They are brought physically within the vicinities of the religious practice and placed among moral subjects who would influence the behavior of the young generations by exposing them to the proper performances of moral conduct. In that sense, space of the mosque gains its own agency in enabling the performance of moral subjectivity.

Turam (2011) notes that studies on Islamism have privileged a dichotomous framework of secular vs. Islamist in public sphere when studying piety based practices in Muslim societies. Furthermore, Turam posits that researchers focused on “collective action, research on Islamism has largely focused on deliberate action, mobilization, strategy, and resources at the cost of neglecting the mundane aspects of faith-based lives and Muslim politics” (ibid. 144). From mundane Turam understands “daily lives, practices, and sites of ordinary Muslims (as opposed to political leaders, the elite, or activists)” (ibid., also see Staeheli and Peake 2004; Gökariksel 2009 Secor 2008; Navaro-Yashin 2002). This is especially the case when it comes to Muslims in Europe, whose very presence have increasingly been framed and handled as a ‘problem’ destabilizing the premises of secular public sphere in liberal democracy. This is so even though the majority of Muslims, often labeled ‘moderates,’ does not participate in Islamist movements, pursue pietist politics, or support radical organizations. We know relatively little about the everyday lives of such ‘moderate’ Muslims. This chapter attended to this gap in scholarship and approached mosques through their everyday meaning and significance in the lives of their congregations. Despite the critique of everyday as boring,
superficial, and conducive to alienation and oppressions of various sorts, this chapter
draws attention to some of the ‘positive’ qualities of everyday as it endows a sense of
security, familiarity, and normalcy to inhabitants of mosques.
CHAPTER FIVE

‘MOSQUES ARE FOR EVERYONE’: TURKISH SECULARISM

The headline of an article in the major daily newspaper Radikal read as “We give you ‘a new generation of imams’” (Radikal 2012)! The subject of this article was Selman Okumuş, ‘the young imam’ (35) of the monumental Kılıç Ali Paşa Mosque, who delivered the weekly Friday Sermon in English to a congregation that included the Prime Minister Erdoğan. The article pointed out that Okumuş spoke four languages and used an iPad during his sermons. Okumuş is not unaccustomed to media attention. He regularly gives interviews to Turkish newspapers and has his own website. In one of such interviews that appeared on another daily newspaper, Okumuş presented himself as fashion-savvy: “I live in the heart of fashion. The congregation would warn me if they see me unshaved even for half a day. My black suits are from Beymen [one of the most fashionable and expensive men’s clothing brands in Turkey] and my sports equipment from Cacharel. I shop at Polo and Ramsey for my sports apparel” (Hürriyet 2011).

Okumuş’s case is emblematic of the changing patterns of religious service and signals the advent of a new clerical image parallel to the new experiences and expressions of piety in Turkey. Many of his colleagues could not have afforded the luxurious, consumption driven lifestyle of Okumuş. But even more importantly, many of them would condemn his eagerness to promote the image of his vocation through conspicuous consumption.

Yet, ‘the new imam’ is at home with the latest fashion trends, incorporates technology into his religious services, and deliberately promotes a ‘modern’ public image.

This chapter begins with pointing to the continuities and ruptures between the Ottoman and the republican periods in ‘Turkish’ history with a focus on the socio-political role played by the religious establishment and mosques. This will help me explain some of the recent transformations in the image and responsibilities of imams as well as the roles of mosques in socio-political life. Subsequently, I will attend to the emergence of a new type of imam both as a response to and to help shape formation of a new type of moral community. The formation of this new imam and certain transformations in the organization of religious services were intricately linked to the transnational religious field that is comprised of, among other elements, the influences of the Euro-Turkish Islam on Turkey. In this chapter, I will highlight the qualities that distinguish the new type of imam from his colleagues: a new rhetoric of efficiency, image-conscious public service, and eagerness to be entrepreneurial and innovative. I will conclude the chapter with a discussion of the recent project of the Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs (hereafter referred to as the DRA) to diversify mosque communities with parallel efforts to extend religious services beyond mosques.

Even though there is an unspoken assumption in most of the studies that investigate the transnational links between Turkey and Europe that religious influence originates from the homeland towards the diaspora, in this chapter I argue that mosque projects and operations of diasporic organizations in Europe has had an impact on the Turkish religious establishment, as well. The multipurpose mosque model in Europe to a certain extent inspired the DRA to change the way it religious services are organized in Turkey. The DRA has recently begun to transform mosques into communal centers to challenge the public image of mosques as places that can be used only to perform prayers.
At the same time, the experiences and observations of the DRA personnel during their decades long engagement with the Islamic and Christian communities based in Europe have inspired the Directorate to expand the duties of imams beyond mosques and diversify mosque services in an attempt to attract children, youth, and women to mosques.

**The Ottoman Legacy**

I find it imperative to begin this chapter with a discussion of the historical relevance of mosques in the social lives of the Ottoman subjects and the republican citizens in order to shed light on the contemporary conflicts surrounding mosque design and use in Turkey. The historical detour is necessary, as the legacy of the Ottoman configuration of religious affairs informs the contemporary binary of the sacred and the secular that is crucial to the regulation and use of, and access to mosque spaces in Turkey. Moreover, idealized histories of Ottoman Empire fuel the contemporary attempts to reinsert imams into social life of neighborhoods beyond the immediate mosque setting.

Establishment of mosques was at the forefront of the colonization efforts following the Turkic incursion into Anatolia from the 10th century onwards (Cahen 1979). Ocak argues that during the first centuries of Turkish settlement and Islamization of Anatolia, a mosque was ‘the most determining unit of the physical structure of cities’ (1996, 85). He goes on to argue that, as such, in the cities founded by Muslim Turks, new neighborhoods were generally established around a *mescid*, a mosque complex (*külliye*) or a dervish lodge (*tekke*). Ottomans adapted these complexes that had mosques at their center (ibid.). This was done through the establishment of *imarets*, an old near eastern institution which the Ottomans adopted in the building of Bursa, Edirne and other cities. It was a complex of institutions –mosque, medrese, hospital, traveler’s hostel, water installations, roads and bridges—founded with pious or charitable motives, and the institutions which provided revenue for their upkeep, such as an inn, market, caravanserai, bath house, mill, dyehouse, slaughterhouse or soup kitchen. The religious and charitable institutions were
usually grouped around a mosque, while the commercial establishments stood nearby in some suitably active place (İnalcık 1997, 142).

Under the Ottoman Empire (1299-1922) mosques became a crucial means of creating Muslim neighborhoods and were the markers of boundaries between confessional groups together with synagogues and churches in cities. Following the conquest of Istanbul, “[r]esidential quarters (mahalles) soon emerged in the vicinities of these complexes, whose upkeep, and the salaries of staff, were supported by endowments (evkaf) given by members of the imperial household (both male and female) and Ottoman statesmen, as well as by revenue from markets and other commercial services” (Goffman 2004, 70).

Initially importing their learned classes from other Islamic Empires, Ottomans began to train their own ulema by establishing the Fatih Külliye in the mid-15th century. Barkey argues that the foundation of the Fatih Külliye marked the beginning of the creation of a state-controlled religious establishment, the organizational structure of which, as I will show, has provided the blueprints of what is in place in Turkey today:

after the conquest of Constantinople, Mehmed II had converted eight churches into religious schools (medreses) for famous scholars, while later the construction of the Fatih complex – a mosque and eight medreses– signaled not only the religious inclination of the conqueror, but also his new integration of religious institutions into the grip of the state. Religious scholars were tied in as salaried officials of the state who worked in the highly sophisticated medrese network of the city, among them the sultan’s mosque complex, which gathered the best religious minds of the realm (2008, 102-103).

What made Ottoman mosques different from their predecessors, however, was the fact that the Ottoman mosque and the palace complexes were designed to “fashion” both a Muslim state personnel and Muslim state subjects” (Meeker 2001, 118). That is to say, beginning with the reign of Mehmed II, Ottomans laid the groundwork for the submission of the religious scholars and institutions to the interests of the state. Mosques, accordingly, played a major role in legitimizing the rule of the sultans:
In symbolic terms, the compact was also renewed every Friday at the mosques throughout the empire, with rulers who were not named and prayed for during the Friday sermon considered not legitimate. The sultan provided justice, and his approval rating was assessed in the mosques of the empire. That justice was centered on the sultan again underscores the importance of the house of rule to the legitimacy of empire. Even though there were significant changes in the ideological discourse and in propaganda as well as in the behavior of sultans, strong and universal legitimacy based on justice endured throughout the centuries (Barkey 2008, 101).

Building monumental mosques in large cities eventually became a major means of marking and communicating the sovereignty of the Ottoman ruling elite. Moreover, “[e]very Friday, at the noon prayer, the name of the ruling sultan was read aloud in mosques across the empire – whether in Belgrade, Sofia, Basra, or Cairo. Thus, subjects everywhere acknowledged him as their sovereign in their prayers” (Quataert 2005, 94).

Selim II’s (1512-1520) conquest of Egypt resulted in Ottoman sultans to adapt the office of the Caliphate. Selim’s son Suleiman the Great’s reign (1520-1566) saw mosques becoming integral to the statecraft of the Ottoman Empire. This development was prompted by the political competition with the Shia Safavids as much as the need to reconcile the secular law with sharia in one of the largest empires on earth. Dressler notes that

In 1537–38 Ebu’s-su‘ud issued a sultanic decree obliging Muslim villagers to build mosques (where they did not previously exist) and regularly attend communal prayers. Since prayer was conceived as a duty prescribed by shari’a, “failure to observe it would be a defiance not only of God, but also of the sultan’s command, and hence it must have acted as a test of loyalty to the sultan as much as to orthodox Islam (2005, 162)

Late Ottoman sultans relied on the mosques located at the distant regions of the empire to visualize, expand, and intensify the sovereignty of the sultan and the state power, as well (Özbek 2002). For instance, Quataert notes that every Friday Abdulhamit II (1876-1909) “marched in a public procession from his Yıldız palace to the nearby Friday mosque for prayers, as his official collected petitions from subjects along the way” (2005, 94). Deringil (1999) argues that during the reign of the Abdulhamit II, together
with schools, mosques appeared as a significant channel through which the centralizing sovereign power of the empire extended to territories previously less accessible to the Sublime Porte. Abdulhamit’s strategy resulted in the Ottoman state’s “recognition for repairing mosques, schools, and the like, a job performed in the past by the privately endowed vakifs” (Karpat 2002, 230). Facilitated by the loss of territories with Christian populations following the Ottoman-Russian War in the late 19th century and as part of the sacramentalization of the monarchical authority in an attempt to promote the unity of the empire, Abdulhamit II mobilized state resources to construct mosques. His aim was to convert non-Muslim and unorthodox Muslim populations in order to combat the dissolution of empire by deploying an Islamic rhetoric of solidarity.

**Republic and Its Islam**

The Ottoman Empire was officially dissolved in 1923 and in its place the Republic of Turkey was established. The Turkish Republic inherited the two most important traits of the Ottomans state’s relationship with religion. The first is the notion that the survival of Islam as a religion depends on the presence of a strong state. Secondly, it is a state strategy to exercise moral authority over the population by controlling the creation and dissemination of religious knowledge and the regulation of the provision of religious services (Yavuz 2003). Hence, it could be argued that the case of Turkey neatly demonstrates the subordination of religious sentiments to national causes despite the conflict between the nationalist and religious forms of universalism (Balibar 1991).

Identifying Islam as the main cause of underdevelopment and subjugation to western powers, the founding fathers of the republic sought to curb the influence of religion in public life (Mardin 1989; Yavuz 2003). To this end, the new regime led by
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, abolished the Office of the Caliphate in 1924 and closed down religious schools and shrines in 1925. But the Kemalist regime never abandoned the Ottoman legacy of state domination over the religious establishment (Gözaydin 2009). Rather, the republican regime intensified the control and compartmentalization of Islam through strict state control over religious education and places of worship, notwithstanding frequent and recurring challenges to the Kemalist hegemony over the experiences and manifestations of religion in public life (Aktay 1999, Tapper 1991).

The DRA was established in 1924. Ahmad (2003, 84) notes that Kemalists “intended to use Islam to further their programme of reform and revolution by having it legitimized, when necessary, by the Directorate of Religion [DRA].” The DRA, then, has been founded by the ruling elite as a “state-friendly disseminator of moderate and enlightened interpretations of Islam” (Bein 2011, 160). To put it differently, despite the secularist conceptions of nationalism that posit and inevitable antagonism between the nationalist and religious discourses, the two cooperated as much as they competed with one another. It is important to remember, however, that religious elite suffered a heavy loss of influence and prestige during the reconfiguration of the religious field in the republican era. Together with the Caliphate, the Office of Sheikh-ul Islam was also abolished in 1924. Compared to the Office of the Sheikh-ul Islam, the DRA controls limited resources and can claim less autonomy vis-a-vis the government in determining its policies. For instance, even though they could only attend to the organization of religious services as officials of the republic, duties of Ottoman muftis “included formal control over waqfs (pious foundations) and supervision of schools and mosques” (Özdalga 2005, 9). But the establishment of the DRA meant the reconfiguration of religious life through a “centralized and hierarchical bureaucracy to an extent that had
never been achieved by Abdulhamit II” (Zürcher 2010, 280), where muftis could only deal with the provision of religious services.

Unlike in the Netherlands, where the role mosques play in everyday lives of Turkish-Dutch communities has increased over time, Kemalist reforms in the religious field meant declined use and severance from everyday sociality for mosques in Turkey. As the discourses and practices of Islam were purged from public spaces, mosques appeared as the only officially recognized center of religious activity in the wake of the closure of shrines and madrasas. Mosques under the intensified control of the state lost much of their educational and social importance and their use was increasingly limited to the performance of ritual prayers. Currently the number of mosques is estimated to be over 80,000 in Turkey and almost all of those are controlled by the DRA (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı İstatistikleri 2010). The Turkish state holds the legal authority over the establishment and operation of mosques. Individuals or associations cannot legally own or operate mosques. Mosque associations are required turn over the ownership of their mosques to the DRA within three months after the completion of the project (Özdemir and Frank 2000; Onay 2008). The state trains and appoints religious personnel and provides compulsory religious education in primary and secondary schools. Religious sermons and activities at mosques are officially under the DRA’s supervision.

The exclusion of certain Islamic actors and practices from public life had a strong influence on the social status and role of mosques. Mosques were restructured to assist the production of the secular nationalist hegemony despite some challenges from Islamic circles (Kara 2008). The elimination of other public spaces of religious practice forced mosques to become simultaneously more inclusive and uniform. During the single party rule, mosques were central to the project of fashioning a Turkified Islam. The Kemalist regime changed the call to prayer from Arabic to Turkish in 1932 and this continued until
the transition to multi-party politics in 1950. Another important moment in the operationalization of mosques in nation building efforts was the period that followed the 1980 Coup. In order to curb the influence of the leftist groups and Islamists alike, the junta made religion and ethics courses compulsory in secondary education, opened up numerous imam-hatip schools, and invested heavily in new mosque projects, especially in Alevi villages (Eligür 2010; Atasoy 2005). School curricula were transformed to cultivate “a new Turkish civic morality infused with Islam” (Türkmen 2009, 391). These efforts were based on the adoption of the Turkish Islamic Synthesis as the official state ideology. Proponents of the Turkish Islamic Synthesis posited a unique affinity between Islam and the pre-Islamic Turkish culture, and resignified Islam as the kernel of the Turkish national identity (Kaplan 2006). However, this was a sectarian projection with its Sunni leanings and despite the emphasis on Islam, failed to convince Kurds to identify as Turks. That is to say, the Turkish Islamic Synthesis advanced its own exclusions and largely failed at its attempts to assimilate the two most important minority groups, Kurds and Alevis, into the national body.

Turkish mosques have never been completely dominated by the secularist state apparatus, though. There have been frequent and recurring Islamist movements that have challenged and continue to contest the state Islam (Yavuz 2003; Tapper 1991). One of the outcomes of the particular configuration of the religious field described above has been the fact that the construction of mosques currently enters public debates mainly through the struggles over the (hegemonic) definition of public space (Şimşek et al. 2006). The competition between the secularists and Islamists/conservatives over defining symbolic meaning of urban public space takes place through attempts to build mosques in the

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67 Alevis are non-Sunni communities constituting 15 to 20% of Turkey’s population. An Alevist social movement has been actively calling for the dissolution of the DRA and the official recognition of Alevi centers of culture and religion, cemevis (cem houses, ‘houses of gathering’ literally) as places of worship next to mosques (see Es, forthcoming).
‘secular’ core of major cities, especially Istanbul (Çınar 2005; Meeker 1997). Moreover, during the 1990s Islamists turned to mosques in their attempts to reorganize public space along Islamic principles. For instance, in Sultanbeyli, a famed Islamist district of Istanbul, construction of a mosque at the very center of the district aimed to provide a model for restructuring both public and domestic spaces Islamically by aiding the attempts to institute the separation of sexes in accord with the project of creating an ideal Islamic society (Tuğal 2009). Furthermore, the state control over mosques are continuously undermined by the state’s inability to keep up with appointing imams in the face of explosive expansion of mosque projects over the last decades. Another factor delimiting the state control over mosques is the presence of radical Islamic movements and Islamic brotherhoods in control of certain mosques (Silverstein 2011). For instance, Eligür (2010, 124-125) argues that “[f]ormally, there is no relationship between mosques, which are under the control of the DRA, and the Islamist movement in Turkey. Yet, interviews with Turkish scholars of Islam conducted by the author in 2004 suggested that there are mosques beyond the control of the DRA, the exact number of which is impossible to determine.”

**Figure 9.** Imam’s office, Sümbül Efendi Mosque, Istanbul.

![Image of Imam’s office, Sümbül Efendi Mosque, Istanbul.](photo)
The DRA and Mosques: Bringing the Experience Back Home

Most studies on transnationalism, including those with a focus on Islamic links between Turkey and Europe, assume that religious influence originates from the homeland and moves towards the diaspora. Rarely the literature on transnationalism considers the circular impact of the diasporic experience on the countries of origin. My research, however, shows that transnational connections are not unidirectional. The accumulated experiences deriving from establishing and operating mosques in the European context have been brought back ‘home’ to have a considerable impact on the religious establishment in Turkey. My findings indicate that the historically specific development trajectories and the accumulated institutional experience of Islamic organizations in the European diasporic contexts have provided inspiration for new possibilities for the mobilization and regulation of religion in Turkey.

My research findings show that European mosques influence their counterparts in two ways. First, imams who serve abroad draw on their observations and experiences regarding the role of clergy and places of worship in social life, when they resume working in Turkey. Secondly, the visits bureaucratic cadres of the Turkish religious establishment pay to mosques and churches in European countries and their interactions with Christian clergy through interfaith dialogue initiatives there inspire, to a certain extent, new models for restructuring the scope of religious services in Turkey. Before a detailed discussion of these transnational interactions, a brief discussion the official, secularized Islam is in order, as the attempts to implement European inspired models of religious life elicit specific responses and give rise to certain controversies due to the contested formation of secularism in Turkey.

The DRA preaches an interpretation of Islam as a distinctly tolerant and rational alternative to other interpretations and traditions of Islam that its experts label
‘superstitious’ or ‘uninformed’. The promotion of the DRA’s interpretation of Islam has a self-legitimizing function, for it presents the DRA as the guarantor of a moderate, secular, enlightened Islam at home and abroad. However, the DRA’s vision of Islam and its positioning within the state bureaucracy have not gone unchallenged. To the contrary, the political status and the operations of the Directorate have been constantly debated throughout the republican history (Gözaydin 2009). The DRA has been criticized for its symbiotic relationship with the state apparatus by secularists and Islamists alike. Secularists and non-Sunni groups such as Alevi and Christians criticize the DRA for imposing Hanefi Sunnism as the state religion, while many Islamists and conservatives argue that the DRA is co-opted by its proximity to the state and hence is too ready to give in to modernist, rationalizing tendencies (Çakır and Bozan 2005). The lack of women’s representation within the Directorate’s cadres and its services has been pointed out by its critics frequently, as well.

The officials of the DRA are aware of these critiques. Lately, the leading cadres of the Directorate have been claiming autonomy from the state and emphasizing ‘the civil nature’ of the DRA with growing frequency (Bardakoğlu 2006). The DRA’s involvement with the transnational religious field has provided not only inspiration but also legitimization for its aim to simultaneously distance itself from the stigma of a state-controlled religious organization and to contest the strict limitations put on its activities by the secularist state apparatus. It was against this background the Directorate initiated the project it promoted as ‘Religious Services Improvement Project’ or the ‘Religious Services with Social Opening’ in early 2010. The DRA president Ali Bardakoğlu introduced the project as follows:

Mosques should be at the center of social and cultural activities that would bring together all segments of the society including the youth, children, and women. We hear the call to prayer five times a day and this has become something we have come to take for granted. However, things are different abroad. Our brothers and
sisters abroad miss even the sound of the adhan. These people transformed their mosques into centers for both worshipping and socio-cultural activities. We have started a project of ‘Religious Services beyond Mosques’. With this project we are trying to make it clear that religious services are not simply limited to performing ritual prayers or fasting, but encompass the social life in its entirety. Our religious personnel are not merely state officials leading prayers at mosques. They should be opinion leaders that engage the entire social life in our society (Milliyet 2010).

The reference to the mosques outside Turkey is significant here. Even though there is the historical memory of a vibrant civic life centered on multi-purpose mosque complexes (külliye) in the Ottoman era, the republic’s ambivalent relationship with the Ottoman Empire which preceded it renders any reference to the Ottoman past highly loaded and controversial at the contemporary moment. Moreover, referencing Europe as a model has time and again proved a successful tactic of legitimating political initiatives since the ‘European way’ of doing things is highly contested yet—at least rhetorically—embraced and accepted as a model by the majority of the Turkish society.

In March 2010, the DRA initiated its “Religious Services Improvement Project” in 5 pilot cities: Ankara, Tekirdağ, Karabük, Amasya, and Elazığ. The project requires imams to make regular home visits in their neighborhoods in an attempt to attract citizens to mosques and to provide religious counseling for familial problems. Imams are also expected to be present during social events such as wedding and circumcision ceremonies and aid state authorities in the fight against drug addiction or gambling through coffeehouse visits.

Soon after the project was initiated, it was dubbed as “the family imam project.” During a newspaper interview, the mufti of Tekirdağ, one of the pilot cities chosen for the project, remarked:

The goal of this project is to take religious services beyond the mosque. This of course does not mean that mosque-centered religious services will discontinue. It

rather means that religious services will not be confined to mosques. We have seen this method in Europe. Priests do this. Priests are not only responsible for their congregation at the church, but also for the households in their [service] areas (Posta 2010).

The fact that the reference to Christian priests was promptly rejected by the Independent Religious Personnel Union notwithstanding, many imams actually welcomed the project as a return to the rightful position of imams as ‘true leaders’ of their congregations beyond mosque settings, while others expressed reservations about its practical challenges due to the increased responsibilities and workload it would entail.\(^69\) The President of the DRA, Bardakoğlu also hinted at the importance of the observations made during visits to European Turkish mosques:

> There is something I admire about Kazan Muslims of Tatarstan and the mosques built by our citizens in Europe: mosques are full of life (*civil civil*). Around, next to, under, and above mosque buildings there are socio-cultural places where men, women, and youth can gather and spend time together…We have left our mosques quite abandoned and lonely [in Turkey]. We have mosques that are in use only for Friday prayers. During the daily prayers, you can only see a few people around…Our mosques should be places where all segments of the society can express themselves and meet one another.\(^70\)

Bardakoğlu went on to argue that the somber and insulated state of mosques in Turkey had to do with the dissolution of ‘traditional’ order of neighborhoods under the socio-spatial transformations engendered by modernization and urbanization:

> This also has to do with the notion of the neighborhood (*mahalle*), which has disappeared from our cities. Would not we wish our neighborhoods have their [proper] avenues, schools, mosques as well as orderly [citizens] and elders who would say “[acting in such and such manner is] disgraceful and sinful?” In the modern world, neighborhoods and the relations between neighbors have been replaced by uniform, huge apartment blocks in which no one knows one another. As a result, our [religious] personnel could not find a community to address….Instead of saying “the imam of the neighborhood” or “the hodja of the neighborhood,” we started to talk about “the mosque personnel.” Imam’s vocation has been transformed to become a state official whose only duties are to lead prayers and voice the call to prayer…We observe that industrialization,


\(^70\) http://www.dinvehayatdergisi.com/eski/soylesidin1.html, retrieved on May 1, 2012
urbanization, and modernization are destroying our original culture, customs, and traditions, that people are left in void by the leveling of the social control mechanisms, that people who act more responsibly among their kin and follow their traditions are losing their [sense of] responsibility as a result of the phenomenon of haphazard urbanization.\footnote{Ibid.}

The reference of neighborhood connotes close-knit communities built on networks of solidarity at the local scale. More important for the purposes of Bardakoğlu, neighborhood invokes mechanisms of social surveillance and a moral order enforced by one’s neighbors. Bardakoğlu articulates a specific imaginary of social life under modernity that is characterized by moral deficit and alienating lives of atomic individuals. Religion, for Bardakoğlu, provides a moral anchor and a counterweight with respect to the excesses of modernization in its capacity to connect the disoriented modern individual with his/her true self and help him/her to assume responsibility as a moral member of his/her community.

The other component of the DRA’s socially comprehensive religious services concept has been to render mosques more attractive to groups that generally show little interest in, or have limited access to, mosques. The increasingly common and successful multipurpose mosque model existing in Europe inspired the Directorate to some degree to expand and diversify mosque services to turn mosques into ‘centers of attraction’ (cazibe merkezi). To this end, the Strategic Plan Document of the DRA for the years of 2009-2013 includes the plan to establish 200 pilot mosques that will, akin to the Turkish-Dutch mosques, offer a broad range of services such as computer courses and sports activities. These pilot mosque projects will be designed with an eye towards rendering mosques attractive and accessible to especially women, children, and youth. To this end, the DRA established its own sports club in 2007.\footnote{The DRA has taken decisive steps toward increasing the number of female preachers and personnel it employs. It has also stepped
up its efforts to provide ablution and prayer space for women at mosques and is encouraging female participation in Friday prayers.\textsuperscript{73}

However, the idea of redefining the status of imams as ‘opinion leaders’ and expanding their presence beyond mosques did not meet universal acclamation and alarmed several groups. Alevi Bektashi Federation opposed the project as yet another attempt by the Turkish state to exert “religious pressure and assimilation” towards Alevi.\textsuperscript{74} Ever suspicious of the ruling Justice and Development Party’s Islamist roots, prominent columnists in secularist newspapers questioned the capacity and the right of imams to act as opinion leaders (Birand 2010) and some accused the DRA of partaking in ‘the secret agenda’ of the ruling party to turn Turkey into an Islamic republic (İnce 2010). Lastly, social service experts questioned the ability of imams to successfully arbitrate in family affairs on professional grounds, and interpreted the project as an attempt to “move religion into an ideological position.”\textsuperscript{75}

The policies of the founding elite of the republic eliminated or drove underground religious brotherhoods and dissident elites, but also undermined the role imams played in social life. True, mosques became the only recognized sites of Islamic practice with the advent of the republic, but imams saw their influence and prestige diminish by the confining of their activities almost exclusively to mosques and by the removal of not only secular but also religious education from the hands of imams to teachers at public schools, notwithstanding Koran courses. During the Ottoman era, mosques often had their own income through waqfs whose “revenue source might be cultivable lands or, perhaps,
shops and stores” (Quataert 2005, 34). With the channeling of the waqf resources to the state, mosque complexes did not only lose their welfare and educational functions, but were stripped of their financial independence, as well. Meanwhile imams and Islamic scholars further lost their autonomy from the state by becoming salaried state employees. The republican system of central appointment of imams rather than perpetuating the Ottomans practice of allowing communities to choose the imams who would serve in their neighborhoods further undermined the relationship between imams and their congregations. Seeking a career as an imam is not generally seen a very desirable option today, considering relatively low pay and the lack of social status accompanying the vocation, as many imams complained to me about during my field research.

Given the undesirable conditions surrounding the social status of imams, the DRA took certain steps to restore some of the lost dignity and influence imams enjoyed before the advent of the republic. The DRA’s efforts, according to the institution’s 2012-2016 Strategic Plan, include the proposition to recruit more theology faculty graduates to imam positions and raise the performance of existing imams through service training. Also, other measures have already been implemented to improve the image of imams, such as the abandonment of the traditional black robes for lighter colors to improve the gloomy image of imams and association of imams with funerals and hence, death. Both the DRA administration (Bardakoğlu 2006) and ‘model’ imams I interviewed were very concerned about the negative representation of imams in media as dirty, unsophisticated, fanatical people.76 The DRA also took steps to encourage imams to incorporate new technologies to their working practices. For instance an administrator at the Religious Education Office

76 Personal interview with Ahmet Yüter, imam at the Çinili Mosque, Istanbul, July 14, 2010.
at the headquarters of the DRA told me that “we ask imams to download the weekly khutbas from the internet so that they learn how to use computers.”

In summer 2010, I visited several mosques in Istanbul that were among those showcased by the DRA as “mosques with exemplary personnel”. These mosques were differentiated from ‘regular’ mosques by the unorthodox, innovative practices of their imams and the wide range of social activities they provided to their congregations. Imams I met at these mosques were all university graduates excepting one. They were all very vocal about expanding the influence and uplift the public image of their vocation. Another trait they all shared was their work and/or travel experiences in Europe, which inspired them to cultivate specific skills and adapt certain attitudes and modes of conduct they observed in European mosques. Ahmet Yüter, the imam of the Çinili Mosque in Topkapı is renowned for initiating the popular practice of inviting intellectual and academics to Friday sermons starting from the 1990s. He also claimed to be one of the first imams to incorporate PowerPoint presentations into his sermons. Yücel Atalar, the imam of the Atalar Mosque in Kartal convinced the mosque administration to open a fitness center at the basement of the mosque and organized blood drives. During our interviews, both these imams emphasized how important it was to them to make their mosques “attractive and accessible” to different age, gender, and income groups. İbrahim Yıldırım, the popular young imam of the Sümbül Efendi Mosque in Fatih told me how he was inspired to put a table tennis set in the cafeteria of the Sümbül Efendi Mosque after he observed a pool table attracting youth to a mosque he visited in Dusseldorf,

Germany. Mehmet Uçuk, the imam of the Ramazan Efendi Mosque, also in Fatih, narrated the impact of serving in Germany in the late 1990s in his change of attitude to become “more open to communicating with other faiths” and the organization of soccer tournaments between the newly established mosque soccer clubs to attract youth, “just like in Europe.” All the imams I met were very proud “to attract well-educated people to their mosques,” who sometimes came from long distances just to attend their lectures or Friday sermons.

From my interactions with these ‘exemplary’ imams, the sketch of the kind of imam desired by the DRA and appreciated by certain urban congregations can be drawn. This new type of imam is proactive. He does not shy away from taking initiative to contact local institutions, mobilize resources, and start projects. What set this new imam apart from his colleagues is the proficiency with which he deals with multiple groups differentiated not only along the axes of gender, age, and class, but also along varied degrees of faith. What I observed during my interactions with these imams is the prototype of a new imam type who can move across different social boundaries and negotiate his position at various social settings. To reach his congregation effectively, this imam actively learns and deploys interpersonal communication and pedagogical techniques. He does not take his congregation for granted and works towards expanding it. That is, this new imam is deeply engaged in a certain form of pastoral care as he is constantly concerned with, and attends to the well-being of his flock (Foucault [in Carrette] 1999).

The ways in which ‘the model imams’ relate to their congregations demonstrate their use of new pedagogies with varying degree of success. Imam İbrahim Yıldırım of

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the Sümbül Efendi Mosque told me that “In the Eastern provinces the congregation might be more content with a [rough] imam who always shouts at them, but in Istanbul there is a demand for better informed and calmer imams.” Yıldırım’s remarks interestingly echoes the east-west divide I observed between the Netherlands and Turkey: ‘the west’ connoting a more textual and enlightened version of religion/Islam. Yet the more ‘academic’ and sophisticated style of Yıldırım was not received warmly by everyone. One of the regular members of the mosque congregation Cemil, a 56 year-old retired worker who spent most of his time at the Sümbül Efendi Mosque complained about the pedagogical style used by Yıldırım: ‘İbrahim Hodja’s level is too high for the congregation. People start yawning when he is preaching.’ Cemil went to another mosque for religion lessons and guidance even though he performed his daily prayers at the Sümbül Efendi Mosque. He explained the reason he preferred the imam of Hadım Ali Paşa Mosque as follows: ‘Ahmet Hodja’s thankfulness and respect for God (takva) and guidance are good. He is also experienced, you understand him even when he is talking about complicated topics. He talks in a way that [common] people can understand.”

Another member of the congregation, a 70 year old man named Ismail complained that “İbrahim hodja stays in his office [all the time]; previous imams would sit and spend time with us.” Cemil’s and İsmail’s opinions regarding the imam of their mosque point to the changing class and demographic composition of the congregation and differentiated pedagogies of religious education.

Moreover, the eagerness to open up mosques for everyone regardless of their relationship to Islam does not rhyme well with all congregations. Towards the end of my fieldwork, I visited the İsmail Ağa Mosque in Çarşamba quarter of Istanbul. The mosque

belongs to İsmail Ağa community, known for their hardliner position. I stood out in the courtyard with my clothing as almost everyone around me was dressed in turbans, robes, and loose trousers. Almost everyone fashioned long beards. The man sitting at the reception booth was not too eager to help me. He told me to wait for Murat Vanlıoğlu, whom I wanted to visit to see if there would be a chance to organize a focus group meeting with members of the mosque congregation. When I inquired about the whereabouts of the imam, I was told he would arrive at the mosque only by the time of the evening prayer which was one hour later. I spent that hour in the library adjacent to the mosque. I visited rooms filled with books written mostly in Arabic. Meanwhile I saw people taking ritual ablutions. I heard an old man teasing another “I know that when you were performing your ablutions, you did not think about the God, you were too preoccupied with the price of fruits and vegetables at the market,” implying that his friend did not devote all his thoughts to the ritual he was conducting. He was warning him about keeping his thoughts with God instead of worldly affairs as he prepared for the prayer.

I also had the chance to converse with some community members waiting for the prayer time to arrive. I told two young men about my research, that I was comparing the Dutch mosques with the Turkish ones. When I told them about the pool tables at Turkish-Dutch mosques Ali was quite annoyed: They pretend to attract people, but their real message is ‘finish up your prayers and forget about everything else’!” His friend Celal added: “In the mosque, you are not supposed to talk about worldly things. People you are talking about are modern people. They think rationally, instead of following Qur’an! ‘Let me relax a little’. As if namaz is a burden!” Ali was incredulous: “A pool table at the mosque?! [They should] build a graveyard instead so that people do not forget that they are mortal.” When I told Ali that mosques had pool tables because they played an

important role in the sociability of their congregations, he replied: “Why do you go to mosque? In order to be alone with the God. A sociable person seeking fun would not go to mosque in the first place.”

When the prayer time approached I inquired about the whereabouts of Mr. Vanlıoğlu and the imam again. One community member told me that the imam was in the mosque. I walked into the mosque and started climbing upstairs. An old man stopped me and started questioning me about the reason for my presence inside the mosque, rather aggressively. When I told him that I was looking for the imam and that I had all the necessary permission from the authorities, he replied “Have you made your ablutions?” When I replied “no,” he said: “You cannot enter a mosque without your ablutions. Go out, make your ablutions, come back and perform your prayers with us. Then you can see the imam.” I was afraid of telling someone that I did not pray for the first time since the beginning of my fieldwork. In this particular situation, the spatial relationship between me and my research site was articulated through my interpellation as a Muslim, who was in turn required to act accordingly in the eyes of the old man. I left the mosque and asked the man in the reception booth again about meeting the imam. He gave me the same advice: “Make ritual ablution, pray, and see the imam after the prayer as you will only find him inside the mosque.

This incident points to the co-existence of an alternative understanding of mosques in the social life of Muslims in Turkey, radically different than what the DRA is trying to spread. The İsmail Ağa community articulates a vision of Islam that is constructed in clear opposition to the profane realm of the everyday. For the people I interacted there, mosque was a sanctuary, where the believer distances himself/herself from everything that comes between the believer and the God, who is contacted through prayers after ritual purification. One first needs to begin with cleansing of the mind, of
worldly thoughts and temptations, which are obstacles to achieve a pious subjectivity. However, interestingly enough, this extremely pious group actually fit in with the sacred and secular space divide more neatly than groups that openly defended secularism.

**Figure 10.** Women’s section, Sümbül Efendi Mosque, Istanbul.

![Image](image_url)

Photo: Murat Es

**Family Guidance Offices and Women-Friendly Mosques**

In the Islamic institutions across the globe, women have made significant inroads into taking up leadership positions over the last three decades despite continuing domination of positions authority and leadership by men (Predelli 2008; Kalmbach 2012). Hammer (2010; 2012) argues that especially in North America, women have challenged male leadership of congregations and services and demanded equal access to prayer spaces in the name of overcoming the ‘gender apartheid’. Historically, indeed, it has been
more commonly the case that women were active in shrines rather than mosques. In her study of gender segregation and moral purity in Izmir during the late 1980s, Marcus observed that women’s lives revolved around households and they had limited access to mosques: instead “[t]he series of household visits, prayers, readings and mevlüts which commemorate the dead are quite different from the mosque prayers, and are very important to women (1987, 123). The visits to mosques and shrines are not necessarily exclusive of one another, though. In her study of women’s shrined visits in Turkey, Olson observed that

..if there was a room set aside for women in the mosque complex associated with the shrine, during the formal prayer times they would also form lines and perform the namaz in that room to the sound of the imam’s voice over the loudspeaker. Alternatively, once the men had quit the mosque after the namaz, the women would return to the mosque and perform the namaz individually or as part of a small group of friends (1994, 207).

Similarly Delaney (1991) notes that mosques are predominantly male spaces except during Ramadan and the performance of mevlüts, in Turkey. Moreover, in big cities such as Istanbul, even though most of the selatin mosques contain a section for the prayer of women at the back of the prayer hall, often covered with a screen, many recently constructed mosques lack such amenities.

Starting from the early 2000s, however, the DRA started to pay attention to women’s issues: the institution raised the number of female personnel, attempted to reach out women outside mosques, and lastly, made efforts to render mosques more welcoming for women through additions to mosque buildings: prayer areas, toilets, and ablution places for women’s use (Hassan 2011; 2012). An important step in this direction was the establishment of Family Guidance Offices (Aile İrşat ve Rehberlik Büroları) in 2003 and as of 2010 there were such offices in 33 cities in Turkey.85 Governmental guidelines for

the opening of the offices were released in 2010. The guidelines state that, functioning under the mufti’s offices, the Family Guidance Offices aim at “correctly informing our society with regard to family [matters] from a religious perspective” and “contributing to the protection of family structure.” It is unclear whether the “family structure” in need of protection refers to the institutions of family in general or the Islamically inspired family arrangements.

Other than providing counseling services to families, the responsibilities of the offices also include “archiving of the counseling interviews as well as conducting research on and creating archive about the family structure and familial problems in the area the offices are located.” The governmentalist intervention of the state through the DRA officials to produce and archive knowledge about families seeking religious guidance, however, met with resistance. The 8th article about the archiving of the interviews conducted by the offices to be presented to the DRA headquarters was taken to the court by the Ankara Bar Association. By the end of 2011, the State Council blocked the article on the grounds that it contradicted with the Article 20 of the Turkish Constitution that guarantees the right to privacy for individual and families. A more recent internet search yielded the result that one of the primary goals of the Offices are to “continue and plan our efforts towards the preservation and consolidation of a family structure that is dedicated to [our] national and spiritual values,” clarifying what family structure is meant to be protected through this initiative.

87 ibid.
The establishment of offices is one of the key means through which the DRA extends its scope outside mosques. The offices creates the possibility of employing more female employees, who in turn facilitate the Directorate’s attempts to reach women and children, who are more difficult to reach through mosques. This situation is reflected by the greater interest women show in the offices. For instance, in 2008, the Female Fatwa Chamber (Bayan Fetva Odası) received about 2/3rd of its applications from women. Nevin Meriç, who works as a Religious Services Expert at the Istanbul Mufti’s Office notes that offices “opened up new spaces of operation for our institution” and provides religious guidance to both men and women about issues ranging from domestic violence to sex-life, from cheating to divorce.

Conclusion

The idea that organic, holistic religious life of Turkish immigrants going under a rupture with settlement in Europe is misleading, at least in the case of Turkish immigrants. For despite certain continuities, the organization of religions authority and services went under some radical ruptures after the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and the foundation of the Turkish Republic in 1923. The single party rule that lasted between 1923 and 1950 saw a decline of the number of religious scholars and personnel as well as the influence of religion in public life. However, multiparty governments progressively deepened the role played by religion in sacralizing the nation and moralizing citizenship. Accordingly, mosques gained significance as important sites of schooling different constituencies: children into national and ethical subject-citizens, women into good mothers, men into good fathers and patriotic soldiers.

91 ibid.
Roy (2002) argues that imams in the West look more and more like catholic priests because their congregations are westernized. As the discussion above shows, however, services regularly demanded from, and performed by imams in the Netherlands, once introduced in Turkey, have met with resistance from different groups, despite presence of a social memory that is conducive to such action. Moreover, the proposed changes have been successfully implemented only by a small group of imams who not only had sufficient educational capital but also exposure to European context, qualities far beyond the grasp of the majority of the imams employed by the DRA, most of whom only have high school degrees and lack experience in technological know-how and interpersonal skills to reach beyond their congregations (Buyrukçu 2008). Limitation on the social influence of imams and the functions of mosques and the religious establishment in general have had lasting effects in Turkey. Authoritarian secularist establishment has anchored imams in mosques and their venture outside the mosques has been impeded by not only their status as the agents of the state but due to secularist and sectarian concerns about their influence in social life. The modeling of mosques after European mosques and churches and imams after Christian priests and/or Euro-imams, even if the model is derived from another secularized context, is at odds with the historically specific formation of public religion and meets strong resistance from various parties in Turkey. The move by the DRA to implement a religious service model akin to the one deployed by its extensions in the Netherlands, has, and accordingly met with serious resistance in Turkey.

Moreover, unlike many priests in Europe, Turkish imams do not depend on their congregation for their livelihood and are state employees, a status that also imposes certain limitations on their activities and relations with their congregations. Financial and administrative limitations of ‘the model’ imams are often circumscribed through the
presence of mosque foundations and associations that raise money for the projects of imams and organize the ‘political’ activities that might compromise imam’s position as a state employee. Importantly, almost all the ‘exemplary’ imams were able realize their projects thanks to the presence of a mosque association in control of mosque property ready in rent. In other instances, it was the backing of pious businessmen from the congregation that enabled imams to undertake new projects. This is indeed a factor that potentially delimits the prospects of this model of mosque operations becoming common in the future, as many mosque communities lack financial resources of their own.

One might ask to what extent the recent projects of the DRA have been prompted by the transnational interdependencies and to what degree by factors such as the ruling AKP’s Islamist roots and conservative agenda, the absorption of Islamist opposition into formalistic capitalist relations, and the accompanying rise of an Islamic bourgeoisie, as well as the growing demand for an urban Islam by secularist and pious Muslims alike (Atasoy 2005; Tuğal 2009). I do not deny the role of such ‘local developments’ in instigating certain shifts in the politics of religion in Turkey. What I am trying to do is to highlight the specific contribution of the transnational developments in the process.
CHAPTER SIX
CONCLUSION

Some find the peace they seek at a bar, some at the whorehouse. We find peace here [at the mosque]. Everyone has a right to his/her own peace of mind.\textsuperscript{92}

Musa (50)

In this dissertation, I examine the transnational production of mosque spaces and ethno-religious identities in the transnational field in/between Turkey and the Netherlands by exploring the transnational imaginaries, organizations, and connections informing the construction and operation of mosques. Mosque centered everyday material practices are central to my analysis. Mosque spaces have many uses and gain meaning in relation to a variety of other spaces. The fifty-year-old Musa, for example, compares mosques to other social spaces and emphasizes that he finds peace of mind at the mosque. This dissertation develops a relational approach to mosques that simultaneously attends to the relationship between the symbolic, material, and cognitive construction of mosque spaces across multiple scales, with a special focus on the rather understudied embodied experiences of mosque goers. The findings of my research challenge the politics of Euro-nativism predicated on unbridgeable Muslim difference by reconceptualizing mosques as transnational ethno-religious spaces: not in the sense of implicitly dangerous and self-isolating sites of absolutized alterity, but as sites in which ethno-religious difference is conjuncturally produced, adapted, and/or undone.

\textsuperscript{92} Personal interview, Zaandam May 6, 2010.
Morley and Robins (2002, 86) argue that by the end of the Cold War the cultural boundaries of Europe have been redrawn through “a reworking of a rather ancient definition of Europe—as what used to be referred to as ‘Christendom’—to which Islam, rather than Communism, is now seen to supply the ‘Eastern’ boundary.” More recently, the European region where Islam is currently the second largest religion, was deeply influenced by the global securitization of Islam and Muslims in the wake of 9/11 and the ‘Global War on Terror’ (Savage 2004). The situation is further compounded by the historically ambivalent relationship of Islam and Muslims to Europe/an: whether Muslims are in, or, of Europe, has been articulated into the struggles through which ‘Europe’ as a region and ‘European’ as a cultural identity are constructed (Asad 2002; AlSayyad and Castells 2002). Debates over the ‘Euro/pean Islam’ figure significantly in the discussions of whether Islam already is—or in the process of becoming—localized by adapting to the European context, or is, and will ‘remain an alien transplant’ (Yükleyen 2009). Calls for adopting Islam to European civic cultures (Tibi 2005) are countered by the argument that following the universal tenets and practices of Islam is not at odds with European politics and lifestyles in the first place (Ramadan 2004).

The politics of civilizational exclusivism advocated by figures such as Huntington (1993) and Lewis (2002) posits unbridgeable differences between ‘Western’ values and Islamic principles and practices. Current European politics of accommodation similarly runs the risk of positioning Muslims as eternal outsiders to European societies. Conspicuous use of mosque images in the media signifies an unwanted Muslim presence and/or piety, often with strong subtexts of fanaticism and fundamentalism. Similar to the externalization of Islam and Muslim communities as outsiders in Europe, mosques are constructed to be out of place in European public spaces.
The contested position of Islam in the Netherlands offers a compelling case for studying the future of Islam and Muslims in Europe. In a country long associated with tolerance, multiculturalism, and cosmopolitan values, the integration debates about the Muslim immigrants have taken the center stage of politics and intensified the discussions on what constitutes the Dutch national identity (Entzinger 2006). Having already been curtailed by the fears of Islamist terror in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the politics of tolerance was further undermined by discourses on the ‘failure of multiculturalism’. The situation got worse with the murder of the Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh by a Dutch-Muslim extremist in 2004, following his controversial depiction of Islam in the film Submission, Part I (van der Veer 2006). Riding the rising tide of backlash against a putatively rampant multiculturalism, political actors both on the right and the left have been increasingly in agreement to reinsert the universality of Dutch ‘norms and values’ in opposition to a wide range of discourses, practices, and lifestyles identified as ‘Islamic’ (Scheffer 2003; Vasta 2007).

The Netherlands does not have an official church or religion. All religious communities have the right to organize freely and open up their own schools. This relatively open and accommodating religious field resulted in the formation of various Turkish-Islamic organizations differentiated along sectarian, ethnic, and political lines. The different interpretations of Islam and their varied implementation in social and political life have resulted in the proliferation of numerous, competing Turkish Islamic organizations with their separate mosques. In this dissertation, I focus on Diyanet (the Netherlands Religious Affairs Foundation), a semi-official extension of the Turkish state and Milli Görüş, an influential political Islamic movement, both transnational actors. I argue that despite the initially antagonistic relationship between the two organizations, there has been a recent process of rapprochement due to the transformation of ‘homeland’.
politics in Turkey and as a response to the rising tide of anti-immigrant and anti-Islamic politics in the Netherlands and globally.

Mosques do not serve strictly ‘religious’ purposes in the Dutch context. Their evolution as communal spaces has resulted in claims to mosque spaces by groups other than only the pious Muslims. Accordingly, the Turkish-Dutch mosques have come to operate as dynamic communal places that are loci of a wide range of educational, commercial, and political activities. Both observant and non-observant people attend mosques for a variety of reasons, ‘religious’ and ‘secular’. It is not uncommon to find mosques offering theater and music classes, sports activities, or computer courses. In other words, Turkish-Dutch mosques are important sites in which boundaries between ethnicity and nation, culture and religion, Turkishness and Dutchness, as well as Turkey and the Netherlands constantly shift and intersect in multiple ways.

This dissertation points to the imaginary and material construction of mosque spaces through the productive tension between mosques as both sacred and everyday spaces. It is not only the sensory and mnemonic qualities of mosques that are important for mosque-centered practices. Despite the scholarly attention paid to teaching of Qur’an recitation and religious education offered at mosques, I argue that rather understudied everyday performances of a particular invocation of ‘the Turkish culture’ are actually equally if not more significant for the majority of mosque goers. This dissertation explores the relationship between sacredness and everyday in relation to home and domesticity, especially through gendered conceptions and practices of everyday mosque access and use. I attend to claims to mosque spaces simultaneously by pietist and secularist groups and by those who attend mosques for the mundane and not strictly ‘religious’ practices. This becomes possible largely due to the concerns over decreasing mosque attendance and attempts to attract women, children, and youth to mosques, in
response to that. Hence the organization of activities that are not typically associated with mosques as ‘places of worship’, such as theater and music classes, sports activities, or film screenings. Reproduction and naturalization of gender hierarchies through gendered division of labor is common, but there are also challenges to gendered partition of mosque spaces through increased female involvement in mosque activities.

Since the late 1990s the practices of belonging located at mosques have been increasingly coded as a threat to national cohesion in public debates in the Netherlands. Mosques have been perceived as more than mere ‘religious sites’. They have increasingly been perceived as as self-segregating sites of an uncanny alterity, through which ethnicized religious identities that are deemed incompatible with ‘Dutch norms and values’ are re/produced. However, there is a lack of consensus in the Dutch public debates as to what constitutes these national ‘norms and values' and in what ways they are at odds with Islamic principles and minority cultural values. The decades long institutionalization of Islam in the Netherlands and the resultant adoptions and adjustments made by both the Dutch authorities/native-Dutch residents and the Turkish communities are overlooked.

For the Turkish-Dutch communities, mosques carry significance for anchoring young generations in a safe space of socialization where they would have the opportunity to cultivate dispositions towards becoming moral members of their communities. The Turkish-Dutch parents are gravely concerned about ‘losing their children’ to assimilation. Their understanding of assimilation is linked to those social spaces such as cafes, bars, and streets. The youth are expected to learn where their place in the neighborhood and what their position in the Dutch society are, i.e. ‘unassimilated Turks’. Moreover, places such as mosques are linked to home spaces by the Turkish-Dutch communities, since mosques are one of the few public spaces of communal gathering where the sensory and
affective experiences of feeling at home and belonging are present. It is against this
background that the majority of my research participants explain their motives for visiting
mosques: “We have nowhere else to go.” However, this does not necessarily mean that
mosque experiences of the youth are inevitably tied to the construction of exclusive
ethnic identities. The parents are rather concerned with protecting new generations from
crime, dropping out of school, and the consumption of soft drugs. Mosques offer not only
sports classes but aid with school work, for this reason. Seen in this light, mosques can be
argued to aid ‘integration’ by supporting the upward mobility of the minority children. To
put it another way, an anti-assimilatory discourse aligns mosques with integration,
understood as achieving social mobility. Through this integrationist discourse mosque
centered practices of belonging aid in integration by retaining identity, as conceived in the
1990s.

Indeed, mosques are seen by many as crucial sites to enact a certain moral
performance of Turkish Muslimness. The reality on the ground is more complicated,
however. On the one hand, there are the attempts to articulate mosques to the
reproduction of Turkish Islam and this is expected to take place through a selective
performative enactment of cultural codes and the practicing of gendered cultural identities
through mosque spaces. On the other hand, due to the eagerness to attract diverse groups
to mosques, mosques increasingly function as everyday social and cultural spaces with
diminishing emphasis on religious training and services. The everyday practices of
children, youth, and women not only affirm but also challenge the masculinist and
‘sacred’ coding of mosque spaces. For social spaces enable encounters and the surprise
element of spatial encounters can never be completely contained, despite efforts to
contrary. Moreover, practices of belonging and performances of moral subjectivity
taking place through mosques are not uniform. There are different understandings of
integration, belonging, morality, and citizenship by and between different individuals, groups, and organizations active at and operating through mosques. That is, instead of passively reproducing a static Turkish alterity, mosques are dynamically formed and reformed in response to the conjunctural shifts in the transnational religious field and belonging in/between Turkey, the Netherlands, and/or global Islam, which are also constantly redefined and negotiated in the process.

This dissertation contributes to the studies of transnationalism. Despite the assumption that transnational links between Turkey and Europe are unidirectional and that religious influence originates from the homeland towards the diaspora, this dissertation argues that mosque projects and operations in Europe have had a strong impact on the configuration of the religious establishment in Turkey. The multipurpose mosque model existing in Europe to a certain extent inspired the Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs to expand mosque services and transform mosques into communal centers beyond exclusively providing religious services. The Strategic Plan of the Diyanet for the years of 2009-13 includes the project of establishing 200 pilot mosques that will, similar to their counterparts in the Netherlands, offer services that are not ‘cultural’ and not strictly ‘religious’ in nature. Just like their Dutch counterparts, these mosques are designed to appeal to women, children, and youth. However, unlike in the Netherlands, rendering mosques more open to children and women meets resistance from not only the male congregations but many within the religious establishment, as well. This is mostly due to the exclusively ‘religious’ construction of mosques as social places in the Turkish model of secularism.

This dissertation challenges certain assumptions that underline the treatment of Muslims and the perception of Islam in Europe. By focusing on the concerns over the social use of mosques in Turkey and the Netherlands, it problematizes the neat distinction
and the radical difference assumed to exist between the Turkish and European
engagements with religion in social life. For at stake in both contexts is the
problematization of the spaces of religion and secularity, albeit for different reasons. In
Turkey, the issue is the expansion of mosque-centered religious activities to private and
secularized public spaces. The movement of the religious experts and practices beyond
mosques is coupled with the movement of non-religious practices into mosques, blurring
the discursive boundaries and material spaces of religion and secularity. In the
Netherlands, the anchoring of Muslims in mosques is coded as a threat to national order,
since mosques are perceived as more than mere ‘religious sites’, but rather as places of
belonging through which an ethno-religious identity—that is deemed incompatible with
‘Dutch norms and values’—is produced. Yet in both countries, the common concern is
the containment of the ‘religious’ in mosque space, to keep religion from spilling over to
the secular-ized public space and vice versa.

This dissertation points to the historically and locationally varied configurations as
well as the mutually constitutive relationship between the secular and religious realms
through a discussion of the creative tension between the sacred/ritual and
profane/everyday space. In other words, religious and secular sites coexist and have
intersecting boundaries that are in constant flux. The increasingly multi-purpose mosque
model incorporating commercial, educational, political, and welfare services in the
European and the Turkish contexts compounds easy assumptions about mosques as
sacred sites proper. This dissertation instead points to the situated and specific
relationship between the secular and the religious in the transnational religious field
between Turkey and the Netherlands. It shows that mosques are simultaneously religious
and secular sites that partake in the production of moral citizen-subject positions across
multiple scales and in relation to ethnic, national, and religious discourses and practices of belonging.
APPENDIX: LIST OF INTERVIEWEES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Affiliation</th>
<th>City</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4-Jan</td>
<td>Anonymous</td>
<td>Social services expert</td>
<td>Haarlem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-Jan</td>
<td>Hacı Karacaer</td>
<td>Former director of Milli Görüş North</td>
<td>Amsterdam</td>
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<tr>
<td>5-Jan</td>
<td>Fatih Üçler Dağ</td>
<td>Head of the Ayasofya Mosque</td>
<td>Amsterdam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12-Jan</td>
<td>Özgür Canel</td>
<td>Journalist</td>
<td>Amsterdam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22-Jan</td>
<td>Ergün Erkoçu</td>
<td>Architect</td>
<td>Den Haag</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22-Jan</td>
<td>Cihan Buğdacı</td>
<td>Architect</td>
<td>Den Haag</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-Jan</td>
<td>Mehmet Yarımüş</td>
<td>Head of the NIF (Milli Görüş South)</td>
<td>Rotterdam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-Jan</td>
<td>Fuat Nurlu</td>
<td>NIF (Milli Görüş South) Secretary</td>
<td>Rotterdam</td>
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<tr>
<td>4-Jan</td>
<td>Anonymous</td>
<td>The first female chairperson for a mosque association in the Netherlands</td>
<td>Utrecht</td>
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<tr>
<td>28-Jan</td>
<td>Bülent Şenay</td>
<td>Head of the ISN (Diyanet)</td>
<td>Den Haag</td>
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<tr>
<td>28-Jan</td>
<td>Anonymous</td>
<td>Mosque administrator</td>
<td>Den Haag</td>
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<tr>
<td>29-Jan</td>
<td>Anonymous</td>
<td>Immigration officer</td>
<td>Amsterdam</td>
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<tr>
<td>4-Feb</td>
<td>Mustafa Kaya</td>
<td>Felicity Party Foreign Relations Representative</td>
<td>Istanbul</td>
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<tr>
<td>11-Feb</td>
<td>Anonymous</td>
<td>Furkan Mosque administrator</td>
<td>Haarlem</td>
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<tr>
<td>14-Feb</td>
<td>Arno Duivetsen</td>
<td>Director of the NGO Mondial Centrum</td>
<td>Haarlem</td>
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<tr>
<td>14-Feb</td>
<td>Zübeyir Güngör</td>
<td>Head of the Furkan Mosque</td>
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<tr>
<td>16-Feb</td>
<td>Herman Lock</td>
<td>Advisor to the Haarlem Municipality</td>
<td>Haarlem</td>
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<tr>
<td>24-Feb</td>
<td>Ali Acar</td>
<td>Head of the Sultan Ahmet Mosque</td>
<td>Zaandam</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Songül Ayaz</td>
<td>Head of Women's Branch, the Sultan Ahmet Mosque</td>
<td>Zaandam</td>
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<tr>
<td>25-Feb</td>
<td>Mustafa Özel</td>
<td>Administrator, Stichting Dock Foundation</td>
<td>Haarlem</td>
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<tr>
<td>3/1/201</td>
<td>Yusuf Altuntaş</td>
<td>Milli Görüş North Secretary</td>
<td>Amersfoort</td>
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<tr>
<td>1-Mar</td>
<td>Rick Leeuw</td>
<td>Native Dutch Muslim</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Uğur Kaya</td>
<td>Coordinator for Youth Activities, ISN (the Diyanet)</td>
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<td>26-Mar</td>
<td>Faisal Mirza</td>
<td>Founder of the 'Wij blijven Hier! (We stay here!)' Website</td>
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<tr>
<td>31-Mar</td>
<td>Anonymous</td>
<td>Journalist</td>
<td>Den Haag</td>
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<td>7-Apr</td>
<td>Yassmine Esaihi</td>
<td>Head of the Polder Mosque</td>
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<td>5-Apr</td>
<td>Üzeyir Kabaktepe</td>
<td>Ex-administrator at Milli Görüş North and the Ayasofya Mosque</td>
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<tr>
<td>6-Apr</td>
<td>Mohammed Cheppih</td>
<td>Founder of the Polder Mosque</td>
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<tr>
<td>9-Apr</td>
<td>Halil Pala</td>
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<td>Tevfik Turna</td>
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<td>Anonymous</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Anonymous</td>
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<td>Hülya Kat</td>
<td>Ijmuiden Municipal Council Member, affiliated with the Kuba Mosque</td>
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<td>3-May</td>
<td>Anonymous</td>
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<td>Ijmuiden</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Imam</td>
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<td>Fatih Arslan</td>
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<td>Hikmet Aydın</td>
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<td>Ingrid Hamer</td>
<td>Regional Administrator working for the Haarlem Municipality</td>
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<td>Ayhan Tonca</td>
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<td>Apeldoorn</td>
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<td>Recep Ayaz</td>
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<td>Anonymous</td>
<td>Coffeehouse owner in Haarlem</td>
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<td>Anonymous</td>
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<td>Fadime Örgü</td>
<td>Former PM</td>
<td>Vlaardingen</td>
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<td>Goos Blok</td>
<td>Native Dutch participant in interfaith dialogue meetings</td>
<td>Haarlem</td>
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<td>Aysel Demiral</td>
<td>Representative of the NGO Effect in Haarlem</td>
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<td>Fatma Ergüneş</td>
<td>Preacher working for ISN (Diyanet)</td>
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<td>Anonymous</td>
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<td>Rajid Bal</td>
<td>Administrator at the Inholland Imam Training Program</td>
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<td>Hasan Yar</td>
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<td>Administrator at the Netherlands Islamic Foundation</td>
<td>Den Haag</td>
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<td>7-Jun</td>
<td>Şaban Ali Düzgün</td>
<td>Faculty Member at the Ankara University Divinity School</td>
<td>Ankara</td>
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<tr>
<td>7-Jun</td>
<td>Anonymous</td>
<td>Faculty Member at the Ankara University Divinity School</td>
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<tr>
<td>8-Jun</td>
<td>İzzet Dere</td>
<td>Vice-President of the Directorate of Religious Affairs</td>
<td>Ankara</td>
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<tr>
<td>8-Jun</td>
<td>İzzet Tosun</td>
<td>Manager at the Foreign Relations Department at the Directorate of Religious Affairs</td>
<td>Ankara</td>
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<tr>
<td>8-Jun</td>
<td>Anonymous</td>
<td>Imam with work experience in the Netherlands</td>
<td>Ankara</td>
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<tr>
<td>9-Jun</td>
<td>Mehmet Kervancı</td>
<td>Founder and the First Head of ISN (Diyanet)</td>
<td>Ankara</td>
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<tr>
<td>9-Jun</td>
<td>Anonymous</td>
<td>Imam with work experience in the Netherlands</td>
<td>Ankara</td>
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<tr>
<td>10-Jun</td>
<td>Ahmet Çekin</td>
<td>Branch Manager for Guidance Services at the Directorate of Religious Affairs</td>
<td>Ankara</td>
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<tr>
<td>10-Jun</td>
<td>Anonymous</td>
<td>Administrator at the Education Branch of the Directorate of Religious Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>11-Jun</td>
<td>Nusret Çam</td>
<td>Faculty Member at the Ankara University Divinity School</td>
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<tr>
<td>21-Jun</td>
<td>Anonymous</td>
<td>Female Volunteer at the Selimiye Mosque</td>
<td>Haarlem</td>
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<tr>
<td>21-Jun</td>
<td>Erol Sayar</td>
<td>Head of the Selimiye Mosque</td>
<td>Haarlem</td>
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<tr>
<td>22-Jun</td>
<td>Emin Ateş</td>
<td>Former head of IOT (Advisory Institution for Turks in the Netherlands)</td>
<td>Amstelveen</td>
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<tr>
<td>23-Jun</td>
<td>Anonymous</td>
<td>Police officer</td>
<td>Ijmuiden</td>
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<td>23-Jun</td>
<td>Anonymous</td>
<td>Male Volunteer at the Kuba Mosque</td>
<td>Ijmuiden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>24-Jun</td>
<td>Şükriye Urfalı</td>
<td>Participant in interfaith dialogue meetings</td>
<td>Haarlem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28-Jun</td>
<td>Mustafa Ayranç</td>
<td>Head of the HTIB</td>
<td>Amsterdam</td>
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<tr>
<td>28-Jun</td>
<td>Martijn de Rijk</td>
<td>Journalist</td>
<td>Haarlem</td>
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<td>28-Jun</td>
<td>Süleyman Akın</td>
<td>Head of the Emirdagi Foundation Haarlem</td>
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<td>28-Jun</td>
<td>İbrahim Erden</td>
<td>Anthropologist</td>
<td>Haarlem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Occupation and Details</td>
<td>Location</td>
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<tr>
<td>29-Jun</td>
<td>Anonymous</td>
<td>Coffeehouse owner in Haarlem</td>
<td>Haarlem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29-Jun</td>
<td>Eliza B.</td>
<td>Native Dutch Muslim</td>
<td>Amsterdam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-Jun</td>
<td>Ahmet Azdural</td>
<td>The director of IOT (Advisory Institution for Turks in the Netherlands)</td>
<td>Utrecht</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Harm van Zuthen</td>
<td>Administrator at IOT (Advisory Institution for Turks in the Netherlands)</td>
<td>Utrecht</td>
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<tr>
<td>1-Jul</td>
<td>Anonymous</td>
<td>Housewife</td>
<td>Istanbul</td>
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<tr>
<td>6-Jul</td>
<td>İbrahim Yıldırım</td>
<td>Imam at the Sümüş Efendi Mosque</td>
<td>Istanbul</td>
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<tr>
<td>7-Jul</td>
<td>İbrahim Bilen</td>
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<tr>
<td>8-Jul</td>
<td>Anonymous</td>
<td>Teenager</td>
<td>Istanbul</td>
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<tr>
<td>9-Jul</td>
<td>İrfan Üstünadağ</td>
<td>Vice Mufti of Istanbul</td>
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<td>13-Jul</td>
<td>Yücel Kara</td>
<td>Imam at the Atafar Mosque</td>
<td>Istanbul</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Mehmet Uçuk</td>
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<tr>
<td>3-Aug</td>
<td>Anonymous</td>
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<td>13-Aug</td>
<td>Osman Şahin</td>
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<td>Istanbul</td>
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<tr>
<td>15-Aug</td>
<td>Kadriye Avci Erdemli</td>
<td>Vice Mufti of Istanbul</td>
<td>Istanbul</td>
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