COLD WAR INTERNATIONALISMS: THE USSR IN UNESCO, 1945-1967

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ABSTRACT

Louis H. Porter: Cold War Internationalisms: The USSR in UNESCO, 1945-1967
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This dissertation examines the participation of the USSR in the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) during the Cold War as a case study of the role of international organizations in Soviet engagement with the outside world. Utilizing archival material tapped in Russia and at UNESCO's headquarters in Paris, France, I provide the first analysis of how a noncommunist international organization integrated the USSR into the transnational flow of people, publications, and ideas in the postwar era before the onset of détente in the late 1960s. I contextualize Soviet internationalism in the Western internationalist movements surrounding UNESCO, reinterpreting the post-Stalinist leadership's policy of "peaceful coexistence" as an acknowledgement that noncommunist international organizations were *the* legitimate venue for multilateral diplomacy. Approaching UNESCO from the perspective of Soviet citizens, I historicize the UN system by highlighting how these citizens, coming to the organization as outsiders, assessed the "UN idea." Before the death of I. V. Stalin in 1953, the USSR boycotted UNESCO and other noncommunist international organizations outside the realm of security, using the internationalism of these organizations as a foil in the antiforeign and anti-cosmopolitan campaigns of late Stalinism. Because of the absence of the USSR from UNESCO, the West shaped the organization's culture, politics, and administrative practices in its first decade. After Stalin's death, the USSR under N. S. Khrushchev joined UNESCO in 1954. From 1954 to 1967, UNESCO extended to Soviet citizens new ways of

thinking internationally and appraising the USSR's place in the world, involving them in international public service, an international public sphere, and an international reading public. Members of the Soviet intelligentsia attended UNESCO events; Soviet professionals worked for years abroad in UNESCO's bureaucracy; and a range of citizens read UNESCO publications inside the USSR. Once it resolved to permanently stay in UNESCO after 1959, the USSR made progress toward rivaling the West in the organization. But as decolonization accelerated in the 1960s, the pluralizing world order attenuated the impact of this progress. Nevertheless, UNESCO's brand of internationalism offered Soviet citizens an alternative to Soviet internationalism once the latter grew hollow in the 1980s.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

In the course of researching and writing this dissertation, I have received the invaluable assistance and advice of numerous people and institutions in the United States and across the Atlantic in France and Russia. The kernel of an idea for this project first came to me when reading historian Ilya V. Gaiduk's diplomatic history of Soviet participation in the United Nations (UN). Gaiduk, who sadly passed away before expanding on his own preliminary inquiries into Soviet conduct in UN specialized agencies, drew my attention to the neglected state of research on Soviet relations with the world body. When I began to rummage around for a starting point on Soviet involvement in UNESCO in 2012, the academic librarians at the University of Illinois's Russian, East European, and Eurasian Center's Summer Research Lab assisted me in getting a feel for the literature on the subject. During my time at UNC, I benefitted from a University Merit Assistantship and a Dissertation Completion Fellowship from the UNC Graduate School at the beginning and end of my graduate career respectively. I also relied on funding from the UNC Department of History for summer research and a grant from UNC's chapter of the Department of Education's Foreign Language and Area Studies (FLAS) Program for the improvement of my Russian language skills.

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UNESCO, but also pointed me in the final stages of drafting to new avenues of inquiry pertaining to Soviet international civil servants. Susan D. Pennybacker encouraged me to make my history more global in scope and to complicate my treatment of the non-Soviet themes and players surrounding UNESCO. Louise McReynolds helped me to step out of my comfort zone of postwar Soviet history and refine my thinking about the context of my project in the *longue durée* of Russian history and the cultural milieu of the 1950s in the West. Most of all, words cannot convey my deep thanks to my adviser, Donald J. Raleigh, who taught me how to behave, write, and think like a historian. I am indebted to him for the thoughtful feedback he provided on drafts of this dissertation. His mentoring since I first stepped into his seminar at the start of my time at UNC has enabled me to grow both personally and professionally in countless ways.

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Most importantly, my family has given me the strength to persevere through all the ups and downs of graduate-student life. The love, care, and wisdom of my parents has given me the foundation upon which to build toward my dreams and a curiosity about the human condition that originally set me on the path toward history. I would have never made it to graduate school without them and the models they set for me growing up. The courage, empathy, and determination of my mother and father, along with the hours spent learning from them everything from tying my shoes to reading to algebra, prepared me for life. My wife, Liz, has been the best companion, ally, friend, and confidant I could have ever imagined. The love of my

life, she has been my rock in the worst of times and a joy to celebrate, joke, and share life with during the best of times. Without her strength, love, and understanding, this dissertation would not have been possible. Lastly, I would like to thank my golden retriever, Camus, who was a fantastic partner in exercise as well as relaxation outside of work. Through a hundred chewed-up tennis balls and a thousand walks in the woods, he reminded me that the best medicine for my writer's block was to get out of my head, go outside, and just have fun. I therefore dedicate this dissertation to Liz, Lou, Karen, and Camus.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACJ	Allied Council for Japan
AN SSSR	Academy of Sciences of the USSR
APN	Soviet “News” Printing Agency
ASOON	Soviet Association for the Promotion of the UN
BMS	UNESCO Bureau for Relations with Member States
BPM	UNESCO Bureau of Personnel and Management
BSE	Great Soviet Encyclopedia
BSSR	Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic
BTAO	UN Bureau of Technical Assistance Operations
CAME	Conference of Allied Ministers of Education
CBS	Columbia Broadcasting System
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
COMECON	Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
COMINFORM	Communist Information Bureau
COMINTERN	Communist International
CPSU	Communist Party of the Soviet Union
CSCE	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
DPRK	Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
ECOSOC	United Nations Economic and Social Council
EEC	European Economic Community
EPTA	UN Expanded Program of Technical Assistance
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization

FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FICSA	Federation of International Civil Servants' Associations
FRG	Federal Republic of Germany
FSA	Farm Security Administration
GDR	German Democratic Republic
GKES	State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations
GKKS	State Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries
GRTTL-ONTI	Division of Scientific-Technical Information
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
IBE	International Bureau of Education
ICIC	International Committee for Intellectual Cooperation
ICSAB	International Civil Service Advisory Board
IIIC	International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation
IIL	Soviet Foreign Literature Publishing House
IIMK	Institute for the History of Material Culture
IINiT	Institute for the History of Science and Technology
IIT, Bombay	Indian Institute of Technology, Bombay
IKP	Institute of Red Professors
ILO	International Labor Organization
IOELB	International Organizations Employees Loyalty Board
IPSA	International Political Sciences Association
MGIIIa	Moscow State Institute of Foreign Languages
MGIMO	Moscow State Institute of International Relations

MGPI	V. I. Lenin Moscow State Pedagogical Institute
MID	USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MINVUZ	Ministry of Higher and Secondary Special Education
MVT	USSR Ministry of Foreign Trade
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NKID	Soviet People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OEEC	Organization for European Economic Cooperation
OAS	Organization of American States
OAS	*Organisation de l'armée secrète*
OIC	Organization of Intellectual Cooperation
OMEO	USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs Division of International Economic Organizations
OMGUS	Office of Military Government of the United States
PRC	People's Republic of China
ROK	Republic of Korea
STA	UNESCO Staff Association
TAA	UN Technical Assistance Administration
TAB	UN Technical Assistance Board
Tekhnopromeksport	All-Union Technical and Industrial Export Organization
TsK KPSS	Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
TsK VKP(b)	Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party
TsSU SSSR	USSR Central Statistical Directorate
Ukrainian SSR	Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic

UN/UNO	United Nations Organization
UNC	United Nations Command, Korea
UNCSW	UN Commission on the Status of Women
UNECE	UN Economic Commission for Europe
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNKRA	United Nations Reconstruction Agency, Korea
UNRRA	United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USIA	United States Information Agency
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
VGBIL	All-Union State Library of Foreign Literature
VOA	Voice of America
VOKS	All-Union Society for Cultural Relations with the Abroad
VTsSPS	All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions
WHO	World Health Organization

INTRODUCTION

In 1957, Stephen Spender, a British writer who had penned an essay for the 1949 anticommunist manifesto *The God That Failed*, published *Engaged in Writing*, a biting satirical novel portraying the failure of Western intellectuals to come to terms with the violent "excesses" committed by Soviet leader I. V. Stalin and revealed in Soviet First Secretary N. S. Khrushchev's 1956 "Secret Speech." The novel follows Olim Asphalt, an official of "LITUNO" (the "literary and cultural suborgan–some said an operable appendix–of the United Nations"), during a trip to Venice, where he serves as a LITUNO observer at the "East-West Conference of European Intellectuals." Sponsored by LITUNO and convened by an associated organization called "EUROPLUME," the conference brings together two famous French existentialists; a pair of iconic writers of the Italian Resistance; a Hungarian poet; and three mandarins of the Soviet literary world.

Spender uses the setting of the conference not only to ridicule Western thinkers who justified Stalinist atrocities, but also to lampoon the philosophy of the real-life version of LITUNO, the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)—a United Nations (UN) specialized agency that championed putting the two opposing sides of the Cold War in the same room as the best means of realizing peace. LITUNO and its associated organization envision the week-long conference as an opportunity for the intellectual elites of the capitalist and communist blocs to experiment in "reconciliation" and "engagement" in the context of Khrushchev's de-Stalinizing reforms known as the "Thaw" and after a decade of estrangement due to the closing of the "Iron Curtain" in the late 1940s. For LITUNO, the mere

act of international communication would lead enemies to "mutual understanding." Spender, a former UNESCO official himself who had attended a conference in Vienna as an observer in the spring of 1956, parodies this naïve premise at the core of the mission of LITUNO and its associated organization in the opening remarks to the conference delivered by Bonvolio, the good-willed head of EUROPLUME:

> 'I wish to make clear very precisely and in the most concrete way,' he began, 'that our program here is to have no program. Certain of you may have objection to this program––or, you may say, this lack of program. But the aim of this meeting is, simply and exactly, to arrange another meeting. And for the purpose of that other meeting what we have to discuss is whether we can meet and, if so, precisely what discuss [sic]. In order to discover this, it seems best that we should examine ideas of a general order, to discover what grounds we may have of agreement, or, if I may so put it, of our agreement to disagree.'

The rest of the conference devolves into a self-indulgent, fatuously grandiloquent, and circular debate among the Western participants over the possibility of "engaging" their Soviet counterparts. Meanwhile, the Soviet representatives to the conference sit silently as objects of a solipsistic feud among the Western Left, looking on as spectators with a "remote staring air, like a range of mountains viewed from a distance." Cut off from the conversation by "barriers of language, ideology, and imperturbability," they occasionally utter formulaic regurgitations of official Soviet maxims or declarations echoing the conference's nebulous goals, but seem lost in the melee. Because their interpreter has fallen behind in translating, they cannot answer questions posed to them about the Thaw and seem oblivious to "the ghosts of the murdered and the suicides" of the Stalinist past filling the room. In the end, the conference attendees sign a vacuous but meticulously crafted communique boldly announcing their intent to have another meeting. On one night, the Russian-language interpreter lays bare to Asphalt the cynicism of

youth living in the eastern bloc before the two have sex in a gondola. Otherwise, little "mutual understanding" between the two sides comes from the whole affair.[1]

Notwithstanding his portrayal of the futility of the proceedings, the fact that Spender based the setting of his novel on a real conference sponsored by UNESCO testifies to the centrality of events convened by international organizations as major sites of interaction and negotiation between the capitalist and communist worlds during the Cold War. In the aftermath of the mass destruction of the Second World War, the number of international organizations grew exponentially due to a widely held assumption that the world needed to transcend the nationalist belligerence that had led to the worldwide conflicts of the first half of the twentieth century. The rise of this constellation of international organizations, which revolved around the newly created UN and its specialized agencies, heralded the advent of multilateral diplomacy as a major tool for solving global issues in every imaginable sphere of human activity.

UNESCO and these other new organizations represented an institutionalization of liberal, or Western, internationalism—the seldom studied but equally influential alternative to the socialist internationalism of the Soviet Union. Western and socialist internationalisms have an intertwined history dating back at least to the competing visions of international solidarity born out of the revolutions of 1848.[2] Unlike socialist internationalism, the founding ideology of the

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[1] Spender first published the novel in the journal *Encounter*, which he had founded together with the American political thinker Irving Kristol and which received funding from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The key target of Spender's ridicule in the novel is Jean Paul Sartre. For the novel, see Stephen Spender, "Engaged in Writing (A Short Novel, Part I)," *Encounter* 9, no. 7 (1957): 36–69; and Stephen Spender, "Engaged in Writing (A Short Novel, Part II)," *Encounter* 9, no. 8 (1957): 42–66. For an overview of Spender's life during this time, see John Sutherland, *Stephen Spender: The Authorized Biography* (New York: Viking Press, 2004), 349–408.

[2] I refer to liberal internationalism as "Western internationalism" throughout the dissertation. While this term simplifies the diverse range of political beliefs held by Westerners involved in UNESCO, it is useful when studying Soviet involvement in the organization because the USSR perceived this brand of internationalism as a single "bourgeois" competitor of socialist internationalism Although the vast majority of UNESCO supporters can be described as liberal internationalists, the term "Western internationalism" better encompasses the range of political views among the architects of UNESCO who nevertheless all supported the increased exchange of ideas and information across borders for the purpose of achieving peace. From social democrats to more traditional liberals,

Soviet Union that preached an upheaval of the present order by a horizontal alliance of "the workers of the world," Western internationalism advocated for reform of the established order through varying degrees of world governance and multilateral cooperation among peaceful nations—a vision concretized as international organizations in the twentieth century. Far from behaving as bystanders to the bipolar conflict that dominated world history from 1945 to 1991, these organizations, the historian Akira Iriye writes, "were actors in the Cold War drama."[3]

This dissertation is the first comprehensive history of the deeply rich social, cultural, and intellectual experiences of Soviet diplomats, scholars, professionals, and other citizens in this international organizational dimension of the "Cold War drama." Using UNESCO as a case study for Soviet relations with the larger network of postwar international organizations from the end of the Second World War to the eve of détente in the late 1960s, I go beyond the diplomatic theater of the UN Security Council and General Assembly to investigate how the broader Soviet population viewed and left its mark on UNESCO as an example of the general Soviet strategy for dealing with international organizations founded in the spirit of Western internationalism. Instead of approaching UNESCO as neutral grounds for different countries to conduct multilateral diplomacy, this dissertation takes the perspective of Soviet nationals who came into contact with the organization in order to unearth the hidden social dynamics, culture, and politics at work behind the veneer of neutrality at the core of the UN system. It therefore seeks to give

these internationalists all shared a conviction that the liberalization of the intellectual "tariffs" preventing the free trade of knowledge would lead to peace. They wanted to knock down anything that prevented this flow of information. For a genealogy of these two brands of internationalism, see Glenda Sluga, *Internationalism in the Age of Nationalism*, 1st ed. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013), 3–5.

[3] For an overview of the history of international organizations in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as well as this quote, see Akira Iriye, *Global Community: The Role of International Organizations in the Making of the Contemporary World* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 9–36; 65.

subjectivity to, and raise the voices of, the three lifeless Soviet onlookers whom Spender caricatures as little more than the objects of an ongoing Western debate.

I focus on UNESCO for my case study of Soviet participation in what I call the international organizational system—or the vast network of interconnected, specialized institutions that came into existence after the Second World War—because it represented the maximalist and most idealistic invention of the postwar movement to apply multilateral diplomacy beyond the realm of security-related negotiations over war and peace between states. While the continued rapid growth in the number of international organizations in the latter half of the twentieth century has since marginalized UNESCO as just one of many such institutions, the UN specialized agency stood at the vanguard of the new wave of international organizations that came of age from the 1940s through the 1960s. "In those days," Iriye notes, "no international organization better exemplified the renewed faith in worldwide cooperation than the United Nations, Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)."[4] Founded in 1946 on the belief that "since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defenses of peace must be constructed," UNESCO oversaw multilateral diplomacy in the expansive spheres of education, science, and culture. Involved in hosting conferences for scholars and other professionals, releasing publications on a variety of subjects, and providing educational technical assistance around the globe, it operated as both a force in its own right in these fields and as an intergovernmental mentor or benefactor to hundreds of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).[5]

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[4] Ibid., 44.

[5] Hundreds of major NGOs held "consultative status" with UNESCO. This meant that they worked in coordination with the intergovernmental body in their respective spheres of specialization. Those holding "consultative status" included international humanitarian foundations, international professional unions, and international scholarly associations. A random selection of such organizations in 1965 illustrates their diversity: The International Council for Philosophy and Humanistic Studies; The International Association of Plastic Arts; The International Council of

Before Stalin's death in 1953, the USSR initially refused to join UNESCO and all but a few noncommunist international organizations, casting them as symbols of foreign influence and "rootless cosmopolitanism" during the anti-Western campaign of xenophobia and isolationism inside the Soviet Union that coincided with the ratcheting up of Cold War tensions in the late 1940s. This boycott fit into a longstanding pattern of Soviet nonengagement with "bourgeois" international organizations. From 1919 to 1934, the communist country had sat out of the League of Nations (the predecessor to the UN). Although the Soviet Union acceded to the League in 1934 as part of its strategy of "collective security" against Nazi Germany, it soon left again when the world body expelled the communist country following the Soviet invasion of Finland in 1939.[6] While this expulsion had almost no long-term impact on the Soviet Union due to the outbreak that same year of the Second World War, Soviet abstention from UN specialized agencies proved a much more consequential mistake. As this dissertation will show, the absence of the Soviet Union from the formative years of the post-1945 international organizational system allowed the West to shape the fundamental architecture, institutional cultures, politics, and administrative practices of these organizations. Because they embodied Western internationalism, Stalin viewed UNESCO and other components of the international organizational system as a threat to the reconsolidation of the ideological hegemony of the Soviet

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Scientific Unions; The International Confederation of Free Trade Unions; The International Association of Universities; The International Council of Museums; The International Federation of Library Associations; The International Social Science Council; The World Federation of Trade Unions; The International Association of Legal Science; The International Federation of Free Teachers' Unions; The International Political Science Association, etc. "List of International Nongovernmental Organizations Admitted to Category A (Consultative and Associate Relations) and to Category B (Information and Consultative Relations)" (UNESCO, July 1965), 1–5, WS/0765.139/RIO, UNESDOC Online Database (referred to as "UNESDOC" in later citations), http://www.unesco.org/new/en/unesco/resources/online-materials/publications/unesdoc-database/.

[6] Susan Pedersen, *The Guardians: The League of Nations and the Crisis of Empire* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 5; 394; and Sarah Davies and James Harris, *Stalin's World: Dictating the Soviet Order* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014), 127.

state following the brief flourishing of cultural exchange between the capitalist and communist worlds during the Second World War.

Shortly after Stalin's death, however, the new Soviet leadership decided to join UNESCO and a slew of other international organizations in 1954.[7] Alarmed by Western domination of these institutions, the Soviet foreign-policy establishment recognized the increasing influence of these bodies in international affairs and their relevance to the Cold War battle to win over the hearts and minds of the world population to either the capitalist or communist ways of life. In contrast to Stalin's rejection of UNESCO and other international organizations, the post-Stalinist leadership resolved to confront Western internationalism in the latter's own institutions. As G. A. Mozhaev, a young Soviet diplomat working to facilitate his country's participation in UNESCO, wrote in a 1959 memorandum: "The intensive development of multilateral international cooperation began in the twentieth century and particularly in the last decade." This meant, he continued, that "there is now not a single area of knowledge and social practice not engulfed by diverse forms of international cooperation." The USSR, Mozhaev urged, had to "raise [its] work in international organizations to the highest level of state policy." A central node of the international organizational system, UNESCO offered the USSR its best entrée into this relatively new arena of diplomacy. "UNESCO," Mozhaev asserted, "is now the key to the whole system of international nongovernmental organizations of an ideological nature. Having an

[7] The communist country also joined the International Labor Organization (ILO) and rejoined the World Health Organization (WHO). The USSR had served as a founding member of the latter organization in 1946 but left it 1949 as the Cold War escalated. The USSR continued to refuse to join other UN specialized agencies, such as the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO). Christopher Osakwe, *The Participation of the Soviet Union in Universal International Organizations: A Political and Legal Analysis of Soviet Strategies and Aspirations Inside ILO, UNESCO and WHO* (Leiden: Sijthoff, 1972), 40–41; 110–11; 115.

ideological nature, UNESCO since its inception and up to the present represents an arena of ideological struggle between progressive and reactionary forces."[8]

Thus the Cold War "struggle" for international organizations was the culmination of the entangled histories of Western and socialist internationalisms begun in the nineteenth century. The juxtaposition of the symbols of UNESCO and the USSR illustrates the divergent content of the two internationalisms in their institutionalized forms. On the one hand, the hammer and sickle on the red backdrop of the Soviet flag evokes the militant, divisive struggle born out of the French revolutionary tradition and aimed at uniting workers and peasants to *upend the established order* under a star pointing to the five inhabited continents of the world.[9] On the other hand, the substitution of the "UNESCO" acronym for the columns of the Parthenon on the UNESCO logo emblematizes the organization's self-image as the *preserver of the established order* of Western civilization as well as the pediment of knowledge this civilization built atop its foundation. Harkening back to before the genesis of the revolutionary tradition extolled by the Soviet Union, the UNESCO logo manifests the organization's mission to act as the keeper of the tradition of the Enlightenment and as the reincarnation of the genteel "Republic of Letters" that preceded the upheaval unleashed by the French Revolution.

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[8] *Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv rossiiskoi federatsii*, or the State Archive of the Russian Federation, hereafter GARF, fond (f.) 9519, opis' (op.) 1, delo (d.) 2, listy (ll.) 198-203.

[9] According to the historian of the Russian Revolution, Orlando Figes, "in Bolshevik ideology, as it was told to the soldiers, the star's five points stood for the five continents, which their revolutionary struggle would one day liberate from exploiters." Orlando Figes, *Revolutionary Russia, 1891-1991: A History* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2014), 204.

Figure 1. The Soviet Flag and the UNESCO Logo. Sources: http://www.un.org/youthenvoy/2013/08/unesco-united-nations-educational-scientific-and-cultural-organization/; and https://www.csce.gov/sites/helsinkicommission.house.gov/files/tile-images/soviet-union_tile_745_670.jpg

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Despite the well-known proliferation of international organizations after 1945, research on Soviet participation in these entities has generally focused on high-level diplomacy at the UN Security Council and General Assembly, providing only cursory descriptions of Soviet actions in the body's specialized agencies. For example, Ilya Gaiduk's 2013 book, *Divided Together: The United States and the Soviet Union in the United Nations, 1945-1965*, which remains the sole diplomatic history of Soviet participation in the UN based on Soviet archival sources, spotlights only major developments and issues discussed in the security council and general assembly (the question of Chinese representation, the Korean War, the Congo Crisis, etc.) and refrains from addressing Soviet participation in the UN's initiatives in the spheres of economic development, science, culture, and education.[10] While no study exists that homes in exclusively on the mutual

[10] Ilya Gaiduk, *Divided Together: The United States and the Soviet Union in the United Nations, 1945-1965* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013). While working on his study of the broader development of Soviet participation in the UN during the Cold War, Gaiduk took an active part in UNESCO's History Project, which was dedicated to writing about the organization's past, and published an overview of the Soviet relationship with UNESCO in the Khrushchev era. Unfortunately, he passed away in 2011 before expanding his research into a larger study. I. V. Gaiduk, "Sovetskii soiuz i IuNESKO v gody 'kholodnoi voiny,' 1945-1967," *Novaia i noveishaia istoriia*, no. 1 (2007): 20–34. In the Russian language, Iu. V. Vanin's examination of the role of the UN in the

influence of the Soviet Union and UNESCO, a number of American political scientists and international legal scholars published during the Cold War short analyses that probe the sources of Soviet conduct in the various organizations under the UN's Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC).[11] Because Western political scientists could not freely access Soviet archives before the dissolution of the USSR in 1991, however, these works rely on conjecture and speculation derived from the public performances of Soviet diplomats in these agencies. Similarly, Elena Aronova, an historian of science, composed a dissertation on the emergence of science studies in the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Soviet Union that evaluates UNESCO's contribution to the popularization of science studies in the East and West during the Cold War. But this work does not consider the cultural and educational ventures of UNESCO nor delve deeply into the internal dynamics of the organization.[12]

Soviet-era research on UNESCO, which was produced by apparatchiks in the Soviet foreign-policy apparatus, manifests a heavy ideological influence and functions in my dissertation as an object of study as well as a layer of the existing literature on the topic.[13] Likewise, post-Soviet Russian scholarship lacks systematic and in-depth scrutiny of how the

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Korean War draws on archives but concentrates solely on the decision-making of various actors during the conflict. Iu. V. Vanin, *Koreiskaia voina (1950-1953) i OON* (Moskva: Institut vostokovedeniia, 2006).

[11] Alexander Dallin provides a journalistic profile of Soviet participation in the international governing body during the 1950s and early 1960s. Based on firsthand experience and published material, his work offers only a brief outline of Soviet involvement in organs such as UNESCO, UNIDO, and UNICEF. Alexander Dallin, *The Soviet Union at the United Nations: An Inquiry into Soviet Motives and Objectives* (New York: Praeger, 1962). Other examples of contemporaneous literature are: John A. Armstrong, "The Soviet Attitude Toward UNESCO," *International Organization* 8, no. 2 (1954): 217-33, and Christopher Osakwe, *The Participation of the Soviet Union in Universal International Organizations*.

[12] For a look at the role of Soviet representatives in UNESCO science activities, see Elena Aronova, "Studies of Science Before 'Science Studies': Cold War and the Politics of Science in the U.S., U.K., and U.S.S.R., 1950s-1970s" (Ph. D. dissertation, University of California, San Diego, 2012).

[13] Soviet publications include: S. K. Romanovskii, et al., *IuNESKO i sovremennost': k 20-letiiu IuNESKO* (Moskva: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1966), and V. K. Sobakin, *UNESCO: Problems and Perspectives* (Moscow: Novosti, 1972).

USSR interacted with the institution of UNESCO. For instance, Ol'ga Zolototrubova's Russian-language dissertation, "The Soviet Union and the Work of UNESCO in the Field of Training National Cadres for the Developing Countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, 1954-1987," narrowly concentrates on Soviet and UNESCO involvement in UN development projects and avoids a thorough assessment of Soviet-UNESCO relations.[14]

This dissertation not only fills these lacunae in the field of Soviet history, but also introduces to Soviet diplomatic history recent scholarship in the field of global history that historicizes the UN in its social, cultural, and ideological milieus.[15] I apply social, cultural, and intellectual historical methodologies to the history of international relations, going behind the scenes of the well-known drama of the security council or general assembly to tell the stories of Soviet citizens who contributed to the nuts-and-bolts operations of the UN system. I take my cue from scholars from other fields who have crafted works on the impact of UNESCO activity on issues dominating the latter half of the twentieth century, including decolonization, race, cultural exchange, the environment, and population growth. Owing to the difficulties of writing histories that involve regions outside of a historian's field of specialization, these historians ignore the influence of these entities on the Soviet Union, often referring to the communist bloc only in passing and as little more than an obstructionist presence within the organization.[16]

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[14] Ol'ga Zolototrubova, "Sovetskii soiuz i deiatel'nost' IuNESKO v oblasti podgotovki natsional'nykh kadrov dlia razvivaiushchikhsia stran Azii, Afriki i Latinskoi Ameriki, 1954-1987 gg." (cand. diss., Rossiiskii universitet druzhby narodov, 1996).

[15] For an example of the study of the influence of the UN on issues often confined to the framework of the nation, see Carol Elaine Anderson, *Eyes Off the Prize: The United Nations and the African American Struggle for Human Rights, 1944-1955* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). For an overview of recent studies of the UN and its role in global issues, see Sunil Amrith and Glenda Sluga, "New Histories of the United Nations," *Journal of World History* 19, no. 3 (2008): 251–74; and Glenda Sluga, "The Transnational History of International Institutions," *Journal of Global History* 6, no. 2 (July 2011): 219–22.

[16] Examples are: Anthony Hazard, *Postwar Anti-Racism: The United States, UNESCO, and "Race", 1945-1968* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012); Laura Elizabeth Wong, "Cultural Agency: UNESCO's Major Project on the Mutual Appreciation of Eastern and Western Cultural Values, 1957-1966" (Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard

Indeed, as historian Glenda Sluga has argued in her groundbreaking work on internationalism in the twentieth century, histories of international organizations tend to follow a standard narrative: Optimism about the role of international organizations reached its height in the brief period between the end of the Second World War in 1945 and the commencement of the Cold War around 1948. But after the fallout between the US and the USSR (so this narrative goes), these multilateral institutions gave way to the *realpolitik* of the bipolar conflict. Even Sluga, who reintroduces internationalism as a major force alongside nationalism in the making of the twentieth century, focuses on the "apogee of internationalism" in the immediate wake of the Second World War and the resurgence of this ethos in the "global seventies" without zeroing in on the importance of international organizations in the context of the Cold War of the 1950s and 1960s.[17]

While this chronology of the evolution of the internationalist spirit aptly characterizes Western European and North American societies, it does not apply to the experience of internationalism in the communist bloc. Because the USSR had, for most of its existence, stood as a pariah outside the international community and resorted to isolationism in the last eight years of Stalin's rule, its "apogee of internationalism" came just as this worldview went out of

University, 2006); Poul Duedahl, "Selling Mankind: UNESCO and The Invention of Global History, 1945-1976," *Journal of World History* 22, no. 1 (2011): 101–33; and Christopher Pearson, *Designing UNESCO: Art, Architecture and International Politics at Mid-Century* (Farnham, Surrey; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2010). Recently, a brief essay on Soviet participation in UNESCO appeared in a volume of collected essays exploring new directions in the study of the history of UNESCO and the organization's impact on various regions. While this essay provides a broad, sweeping overview of Soviet involvement in UNESCO similar to Gaiduk's article, it does not delve deeply into the subject. Poul Duedahl, ed., *A History of UNESCO: Global Actions and Impacts* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016); and Christian Ydesen and Aigul Kulnazarova, eds., *UNESCO Without Borders: Educational Campaigns for International Understanding* (New York: Routledge, 2017).

[17] For instance, Sluga writes the following on the "ebbs and flows" of internationalism and the interplay between nationalism and internationalism in the twentieth century: "Although the Cold War swung the balance toward nationalism–as the political objective supported by all sides–in the 1970s, the significance of internationalism in this oscillating relationship was restored, its meaning again radically renovated." Sluga, *Internationalism in the Age of Nationalism*, 6–7.

fashion in Western Europe and North America. Keenly aware of the economic strain of perpetual military buildup, Khrushchev declared a foreign policy of "peaceful coexistence" in the mid-1950s. This reversal of the Stalinist strategies of confrontation and isolation led not only to an increase in cultural and economic ties with the outside world, but also a campaign to peacefully prove Soviet superiority in industry, culture, education, and science.

I maintain that Soviet entry into the international organizational system in 1954 represents an overlooked but core facet of this new course in Soviet foreign policy. Intent on challenging Western hegemony over the international organizational system, Soviet officials mobilized their fellow citizens to go to conferences, work in the administrative apparatuses, and contribute to the publications of these organs. In essence, the USSR sought to contest Western control of the architecture, culture, politics, and administrative practices governing institutionalized international relations. It set out to perform the ideology of socialist internationalism within the walls of institutions inspired by the universalist ideology of Western internationalism. But because the USSR accepted these international organizations as the primary venues for interaction between the community of nations, it also implicitly recognized these bodies as the main channels through which countries should engage in multilateral diplomacy, thereby unintentionally agreeing to conform to the Western architecture, cultures, politics, and administrative practices governing these organizations in the hopes of undermining these ingrained elements of Western hegemonic control over the international organizational system. Viewed through the lens of Soviet enlistment in international organizations, "peaceful coexistence" thus amounted to more than just a relaxation of tensions in the Cold War or, as

historian Vladislav Zubok maintains, a realization of the West's disinclination to start a nuclear war.[18]

Rather, I argue that it signified the USSR's unstated recognition of the Western-designed international organizational system as *the* legitimate venue for multilateral diplomacy aimed at solving global problems. While both Stalin and Khrushchev envisioned *communist* international organizations (the COMINTERN, COMINFORM, COMECON, etc.) as, in the words of historian György Péteri, "the embryo of a future communist world order," Khrushchev's decision to enter Western international organizations stunted the growth of these communist organs in their embryonic state.[19] In essence, the post-Stalinist leadership lent credence to the self-representations of these Western international organizations as universalist bodies bridging the capitalist/communist divide and encompassing a diversity of nations, thereby de-universalizing these alternative communist institutions and making them little more than regional alliances within the Western international organizational system.

This concession led to the integration of the Soviet Union into a Western world order during the formative phase of the postwar period. By stressing peaceful coexistence as the main foreign-policy platform of the USSR, Khrushchev signaled a renewed commitment to what legal scholars Oona Hathaway and Scott Shapiro have described as the new "world order premised on the outlawry of war" that originated in the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact but came to full fruition

[18] Zubok asserts that "peaceful coexistence" only modified what he calls Stalin's "revolutionary-imperial paradigm," or the ingrained Soviet belief in the collapse of the West and the need to preserve its empire, Vladislav Zubok, *A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War From Stalin to Gorbachev* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 129.

[19] György Péteri, "Introduction," in *Nylon Curtain: Transnational and Transsystemic Tendencies in the Cultural Life of State-Socialist Russia and East-Central Europe*, ed. György Péteri, Trondheim Studies on East European Cultures and Societies 18, 2006, 4.

after the Second World War.[20] Viewed in this way, the policy of peaceful coexistence proclaimed a Soviet promise to work for peace, and peacefully display the superiority of the socialist way of life, through the established international organizational system. Once Soviet officials had become enmeshed within this system, they found it difficult to extricate themselves. Although they complained about the "Western biases" embedded in UNESCO's architecture, culture, politics, and administrative practices, Soviet UNESCO envoys knew that the withdrawal of their country from UNESCO or other international organizations would undermine the image of the USSR as a beacon of peace and international cooperation.

The real source of these ingrained, structural Western biases lay in the bureaucracies, or secretariats, of the UN and its specialized agencies. While most histories of the UN have focused on its representative bodies (the UN Security Council and General Assembly) as the formulators of policy, the authority to implement the vague program adopted by member states resided not in the governments of these countries but in the secretariats of the UN in New York and its specialized agencies in Western Europe. Just as the bureaucracy of a nation state determines the implementation of legislation drawn up by elected officials, the secretariats of the UN system had considerable latitude to flesh out the specifics of, and elaborate on, the resolutions passed by the community of nations. Put simply, the delegations of UN member states showed up for a few weeks annually or biennially to vote on proposals and then left. In the intervening period, the international civil servants employed by UN secretariats, or what I call the machinery of the international organizational system, stayed on to execute these proposals and to keep the

[20] Of course, wars have continued up to the present day. But Hathaway and Shapiro argue that the new world order was the first founded on this premise and has led to a lessening of conflict throughout the world since its inception. Oona A. Hathaway and Scott J. Shapiro, *The Internationalists: How a Radical Plan to Outlaw War Remade the World* (New York: Simon and Shuster, 2017), xvii.

organization running from day to day. Their personnel, who had their own ideas of the missions of their workplaces, acted as the carriers of the institutional memory and culture of the UN.

I show that the architecture, culture, politics and built-in practices of the UNESCO Secretariat reproduced Western domination, preventing the communist bloc from accruing significant power in the formative first thirteen years of Soviet participation in UNESCO from 1954 to 1967. In the eyes of Soviet diplomats, the UNESCO Secretariat functioned as a Western "deep state" not only responsible for putting into practice the "will" of member states, but also pursuing Western interests with a thoroughly bourgeois and anti-Soviet *esprit de corps*. Located at the international organization's headquarters in Paris, France, the UNESCO Secretariat perpetuated the West's advantage in the international organization even as the composition of UNESCO representative bodies (the UNESCO General Conference, or UNESCO's equivalent of the UN General Assembly, and the UNESCO Executive Board, its veto-less version of the UN Security Council) changed as a consequence of decolonization's accelerating pace in the early 1960s. The induction of new countries as UNESCO member states eroded Western hegemony over these representative bodies in the process. But contrary to the initial hopes of Soviet officials, the diminishment of Western power and the crystallization of a new bloc of nations from the "developing world" over the course of the 1960s did not lead to a strengthening of the influence of the communist bloc. Instead, the bipolar world gave way to a pluralist one in which the concerns of both superpowers took a back seat to the demands of the former colonies. In short, the USSR sought to ride the wave of decolonization only to get swept aside.

In the meantime, the normalization of Soviet relations with UNESCO enabled Soviet nationals to engage with the ideas, politics, and culture of the outside world in new ways, incorporating them into global discussions on everything from issues concerning their individual

professions to worldwide problems. By illustrating the implications of this normalization on the worldviews of Soviet citizens, this dissertation complements and expands on recent work on post-Stalinist Soviet cultural diplomacy that underscores the impact of transnational contact on the Soviet domestic order while contextualizing Soviet cultural diplomacy in an increasingly interconnected world.[21] I build on new explorations by historians Anne Gorsuch and Diane Koenker into the balance the communist bloc struck "between global integration and political differentiation" when negotiating "patterns of cultural cross-pollination" that arose as a result of novel "transnational flows of information, cultural models, and ideas . . . across the capitalist-socialist divide."[22] Yet I shift this examination of Soviet cultural diplomacy from bilateral episodic instances, such as the 1959 American National Exhibition, or more narrow and sporadic multilateral cooperation such as the Olympic Games, to the multilateral and institutionalized activities conducted by international organizations that reached broader swaths of the Soviet population over time.[23] Unlike other investigations into bilateral Soviet exchanges with specific

[21] Michael David-Fox has paved the way for a renewed emphasis on the impact of foreign culture and ways on Soviet domestic society. See Michael David-Fox, "The Implications of Transnationalism," *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 12, no. 4 (2011): 885–904; and Michael David-Fox, *Showcasing the Great Experiment: Cultural Diplomacy and Western Visitors to the Soviet Union, 1921-1941* (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2012).

[22] Gorsuch and Koenker's edited volume tries to understand "the global sixties" from the perspective of the communist world. See Anne Gorsuch and Diane Koenker, eds., *The Socialist Sixties: Crossing Borders in the Second World* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013).

[23] For various examples of studies that either focus exclusively on bilateral relations or one-time events, see Nigel Gould-Davies, "The Logic of Soviet Cultural Diplomacy," *Diplomatic History* 27, no. 2 (April 2003): 193–214; Susan E. Reid, "Who Will Beat Whom?: Soviet Popular Reception of the American National Exhibition in Moscow, 1959," *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 9, no. 4 (2008): 855–904; Pia Koivunen, "The 1957 Moscow Youth Festival: Propagating a New Peaceful Image of the Soviet Union," in *Soviet State and Society Under Khrushchev* (London: Routledge, 2009), 46-65; Vladislav Zubok, *Zhivago's Children: The Last Russian Intelligentsia* (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2009); and György Péteri, "Sites of Convergence: The USSR and Communist Eastern Europe at International Fairs Abroad and at Home," *Journal of Contemporary History* 47, no. 1 (January 1, 2012): 1-8. Jenifer Parks has written the first history of how the Soviet bureaucracy worked to ensure its country's participation in the global institution of the Olympic Games. I add to her study of how the Soviet bureaucracy responded to internationalist movements like the Olympics. At the same time, my dissertation covers an international organization that included a wider and more diverse portion of the Soviet population in its activities.

countries or regions, my research illustrates the gradual inclusion of the Soviet population into the emerging internationalization of education, science, and culture occurring during the postwar era. For the Soviet professionals, academicians, and other citizens who took part in UNESCO conferences, read and contributed to its publications, or went to work for the international organization, the UNESCO activities satirized by Spender as pointless attempts at reconciliation served as introductions into ongoing conversations about how to be "internationally minded" from which the isolationism of Stalinism had cut them off.[24]

UNESCO's goal of encouraging people to *think internationally* reflected the underlying Western internationalist ethos at the heart of the organization. As the first world government, the UN system replicated elements of national governments on an international scale, including departments or ministries of labor (the International Labor Organization, or ILO), agriculture (the Food and Agricultural Organization, or FAO), health (the World Health Organization, or WHO), and others.[25] UNESCO, which acted as the ministry of education, served as the ideological wing of this world government, aspiring not only to relieve the world of the ignorance supposedly at the root of all wars but also to foster a sense of internationalist identity through collaboration among the educated classes of different countries.

This objective mirrored the efforts of nationalists to forge a national identity through the assemblage of a shared cultural and scientific heritage as well as the standardization of educational systems purveying the myths of the nation. In her work, Sluga argues that Benedict

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Jenifer Parks, *Red Sport, Red Tape: The Olympic Games, the Soviet Sports Bureaucracy, and the Cold War* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2017).

[24] I adopt this term from: Sluga, *Internationalism in the Age of Nationalism*, 6.

[25] Historian Mark Mazower makes this argument about the internationalization of the agencies of national governments. However, my dissertation expands on this in the context of UNESCO. For more on Mazower's analysis of this development, see chapter 1. Mark Mazower, *Governing the World: The History of an Idea* (New York: The Penguin Press, 2012), 197.

Andersen's conception of the rise of national "imagined communities" pertains equally to visions of an international community in the twentieth century. With the increasing ease of travel and communication, Sluga posits that internationalist thinkers behind UNESCO and other international organizations viewed the same "simultaneity" enabling nationalist consciousness among far flung peoples as an equally useful tool for stimulating, on an international level, "sociability" among peoples of different nations. The "narratives of internationalists," she concludes, "share with the constructivist historiography of the nation the concept of simultaneity; the new internationalism was imagined as nationalism writ large."[26]

I add to her theory a case study of how UNESCO enabled Soviet citizens to become members of this internationalist project. UNESCO's operations to disseminate publications with internationalist messages and gather scholars to confer on international topics instilled Soviet participants with a sense of belonging to an international community that did not necessarily conflict with their Soviet identity. I further contend that such endeavors constituted three types of international publics inspired by the nation state: 1) international public service in the UNESCO Secretariat or in the developing world as UNESCO technical experts; 2) an international reading public of UNESCO publications; and 3) the international public sphere made up of UNESCO conferences, collaborative projects, and other events. Because the original theorist of the public sphere, Jürgen Habermas, defined it as an association among liberal subjects carrying out "rational-critical discourse" independently of the control of the state, the latter concept, at first

[26] As Sluga argues, just as the internationalist project remains incomplete, many nationalisms have failed to homogenize parochial affiliations or establish permanent nation states: "Historians of nations and nationalism are also able to maintain a double focus on the study of the success *and* failure of nations as states or social movements, on what is popularly forgotten as well as what is remembered," she points out. "But historians rarely extend the same grace to the study of international subjectivities or international imaginaries in nineteenth-or twentieth-century history, despite the existence of the League of Nations, the United Nations, and innumerable movements and stratagems for rethinking democracy, sovereignty, identity, and governmental internationalism." Sluga, *Internationalism in the Age of Nationalism*,153-56.

glance, seems inappropriate in an analysis of Soviet citizens who often received marching orders from bureaucrats in the Soviet government on how to comport themselves when dealing with foreigners. But given the exclusionary nature of Habermas's notion of the public as well as the socioeconomic influences on public spheres, a number of social theorists have doubted whether such a pure model has ever existed even in the West.[27]

In this dissertation, the concept serves as a useful analytical category to signify what the Western internationalist architects of UNESCO strived to create through its program. The public officials who worked for the international organization, as educational experts stationed throughout the world or in the UNESCO Secretariat, sought either to lay the foundation for enlightened international publics through educational assistance or to organize these publics in the form of conferences and readerships. To be sure, Soviet citizens who worked to construct, or participated in, these publics received directives from the Soviet state. But they also had to creatively elaborate on these general directives when unexpected arguments, ideas, and situations arose. Although Soviet ideology molded their opinions and behavior, these citizens nevertheless exhibited agency and autonomy as they refashioned Soviet ideology to negotiate contingencies and to navigate the foreign world beyond the reaches of the Soviet state. Moreover, they took the foreign ideas gleaned from these experiences and assimilated them to their Soviet worldview, adapting elements of Western internationalism into proposals to make the USSR a better interlocutor in the discourses cultivated by UNESCO. By doing so, they integrated their country into an ongoing process of globalization after the isolationism of late Stalinism.

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[27] Habermas made famous this pure theoretical prototype of the public sphere in his history of its rise in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Yet even he argued that the public sphere disappeared in the West with the rise of the "social question" in the nineteenth century. Jürgen Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society*, trans. Thomas Burger (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991). For a thorough summary of some of the more prominent early critiques of Habermas's theory, see Nancy Fraser, "Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy," *Social Text*, no. 25–26 (1990): 56–80.

This dissertation comprises three sections. In section one, I trace the history of the radical about-face in Soviet thinking about UNESCO and other Western international organizations from the USSR's boycott of these institutions before 1953 to the point in the late 1950s at which the USSR had become fully entangled in the UNESCO node of the international organizational system. In section two, I paint a picture of the everyday lives of Soviet professionals who went to work as international civil servants in the UNESCO Secretariat in the 1950s and the first half of the 1960s. The first archival-based reconstruction of the daily lives of Soviet citizens employed in the administration of a noncommunist organization during the Cold War, this section chronicles the struggles of these Soviet nationals to retain their loyalty to the Soviet state while serving the Western internationalist ideal of UNESCO and experimenting with an unprecedented ability to explore the West. Because the secretariat–as the mainframe of UNESCO's vast and ever-changing network of conferences, educational assistance, and publications–enjoyed an unrivaled ability to dictate the execution of UNESCO's program, this section also functions as the axis of my dissertation.

In the final section, I study the immersion of Soviet academicians, readers, and technical personnel in the international publics planned by the secretariat during the formative phase of Soviet participation in the international organizational system. In particular, this section investigates Soviet conduct in the international public sphere of UNESCO conferences and collaborative projects; the reading public of UNESCO publications, which constituted a pre-internet global network for disseminating information about education, science, and culture; and the drive to incorporate the developing world into these publics through technical-assistance initiatives. I end the dissertation with a brief look ahead to the evolution of Soviet-UNESCO

relations from the onset of détente and through the dissolution of the USSR as well as the role of the former communist world in the organization during the twenty-first century.

I base my picture of the USSR's experience in the colorful world of UNESCO on material that I examined over the course of nine months at the archives of the Soviet state and Communist Party in Moscow, Russian Federation, and on documents that I tapped during three months spent at the international organization's archives in Paris, France. To describe the day-to-day operations of the apparatus set up in the USSR to handle UNESCO affairs, I draw on, among others, the records of the Soviet National Commission for UNESCO Affairs (the Soviet UNESCO Commission). Housed in the State Archive of the Russian Federation (*Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv rossiskoi federatsii*, or GARF) and divided into nonclassified and formerly classified subsets, this voluminous collection of thousands of reports, correspondence, and records of conversation gives intricate insight into Soviet relations with the international organization and yet has remained almost completely unused by non-Russian researchers.[28] Importantly, this repository also holds the extensive paperwork of the Soviet Permanent Delegation to UNESCO (the Soviet UNESCO Delegation), which oversaw the USSR's contingent of Soviet UNESCO intermediaries in Paris. In addition, I integrate into my dissertation the records of the trade union of the Soviet embassy in Paris. Rich with information on the general state of the "Soviet colony" revolving around the embassy in the French capital, this collection, which is also located in GARF, helps me to contextualize the Soviet mission to UNESCO in the larger community of the Soviet diplomatic corps serving in France.

For the decisions of the higher-ups of the USSR concerning UNESCO, I interrogated resolutions and minutes of meetings housed in the archives of the Central Committee of the

[28] Gaiduk, who published in English and in Russian, uses a few of the documents in this collection in his brief overview of Soviet-UNESCO relations. Gaiduk, "*Sovetskii soiuz i IuNESKO v gody 'kholodnoi voiny,' 1945-1967*."

Communist Party of the Soviet Union (TsK KPSS) at the Russian State Archive of Contemporary History (*Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv noveishei istorii*, or RGANI) as well as records located in the Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History (*Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv sotsial'no-politicheskoi istorii*, or RGASPI). At the Archives of the Russian Academy of Sciences (*Arkhiv rossiiskoi akademii nauk*, or ARAN), I also conducted research on Soviet scholars who participated in UNESCO activities. On top of these Soviet archival holdings, I worked in the Russian State Library (*Rossiiskaia gosudarstvennaia biblioteka*), which contains UNESCO literature published in the Soviet Union but unavailable outside Russia.

At the UNESCO Archives, I collected documents revealing the internal deliberations of UNESCO officials about Soviet participation in the international organization as well as the personnel records of Soviet citizens who worked at its headquarters as international civil servants. I also make extensive use of the official records and publications of UNESCO stored in the international organization's digital archive, the UNESDOC Online Database. The divergent interpretations of Soviet and UNESCO functionaries of the same events manifest the starkly different cultures that intermingled within the walls of the international organization. Together with other primary and secondary sources, this evidence demonstrates that the Cold War represented a clash not only of nation states, blocs, and economic systems, but also of internationalisms.

SECTION 1

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS THROUGH THE COLD WAR: HOW THE SOVIET UNION LEARNED TO LIVE WITH UNESCO, 1945-1959

In the winter of 1947, Leonard S. Kenworthy, an employee of the UNESCO Secretariat in the Education Section, traveled to the Western occupied zones of Germany to give a lecture about the new international organization to students enrolled in an American literature class at the University of Frankfurt. Seated in a defunct bomb shelter, the audience of German youth "listened intently" to the UNESCO official's talk. "When the period of questioning came," Kenworthy reported back to UNESCO, "they pounced upon this opportunity." In preparation for the lecture, the professor who taught the class had asked the students, who had come of age under the tutelage of the Nazis, to read *UNESCO: Its Purpose and Its Philosophy*, a small treatise in which UNESCO's first director-general, Julian Huxley, cast the international organization as a vehicle for fostering international intellectual cooperation that would lay the basis for future global integration. Unsurprisingly, a handful of those enrolled in the course reacted with skepticism to this internationalist ideology conceived as the antithesis to the nationalist "New Order" of Nazism. "You can't develop world loyalty," one of the German listeners chirped, "with an eclectic philosophy like that!" Kenworthy characterized the response of this group, which likely represented "the 'cream of the crop' of German youth," as mixed. As he relayed back to his superiors, they "were alert, penetrating, and ready to be shown, but not ready to be kidded."[29]

The reluctance of some of these German students to embrace the message delivered by Kenworthy brings into sharp relief the worldview informing UNESCO's architects and the historical juncture out of which it emerged. Convinced that the inherent tribalism of nationalist allegiance and an ignorance of other peoples had fueled the revanchist regimes of the Second World War, UNESCO's founders envisioned this institution as a means of extending the reach of

[29] "Some Quick Impressions of Germany from a Four Day Visit in March, 1947," n.d., 2, Archive Group (AG) 8: X07 (43-15) A 80, Part I, UNESCO Archives.

the new United Nations Organization (UNO) by instilling in the world's population a sense of belonging to an international community. This belief in the necessity of transcending the nation state as the organizing principle of international relations reflected a larger campaign, hatched in Western intellectual circles and government agencies during and after the war, to enhance the power of international organizations and, in its more extreme iterations, to forge a single world government responsible for a cosmopolitan "world citizenship" that would either coincide with, or replace, nationality as the primary political identification across the globe. If the violent nationalism of the Axis powers inspired the mission of UNESCO and other attempts to secure peace through international organization, however, the new tensions of the postwar era challenged and therefore shaped the evolution of this internationalist crusade in its first decade. Within months of Kenworthy's 1947 lecture in Germany, the universalizing project of UNESCO and the broader push in the West for "one world" came up against the USSR, a new resistant obstacle to this internationalist dream.

This section of my study traces the tumultuous relationship between UNESCO and the communist bloc from the creation of the organization through the 1950s in order to highlight the Soviet experience of a highly influential but overlooked dimension of the Cold War— the world of international organizations. In historical scholarship, the fallout between the capitalist and communist worlds in the late 1940s has overshadowed the importance Western European and American public intellectuals and statesmen assigned to international organizations as a means of maintaining contact between East and West in spheres of activity outside of security (education, science, culture, health, economic assistance, etc.).[30] Far from devolving into an irrelevant

[30] In major histories of the origins and first years of the Cold War, international organizations outside the UN General Assembly and Security Council often have little presence other than brief discussions of the IMF or World Bank as part of the Bretton Woods system or mere references to the dates on which the USSR joined these organizations. See, for example, Zubok's brief summary of the Soviet relationship with the IMF: Zubok, *A Failed*

bystander to the Cold War, the internationalist movement embodied by UNESCO became a key foil in Soviet propaganda to the xenophobic fortification taking place within the USSR after the war. By bringing to the forefront the internationalist "moment" that spawned UNESCO, I contextualize the antiforeign or "anticosmopolitan" rhetoric of late Stalinism in its international context, demonstrating that the movers and shakers of Soviet cultural politics in the last years of Stalin's rule depicted this Western internationalism as a symbol of the threat capitalism posed to national sovereignty. Viewed from this perspective, the Soviet decision to reverse course and join UNESCO and other international organizations after Stalin's death in 1953 represents one of the most dramatic de-Stalinizing measures taken by the new leadership in foreign policy. Moreover, an examination of Soviet deliberations over UNESCO after the country joined the organization sheds light on how the international organizational system set up by the West after the war played a normative role in compelling the USSR to abide by its rules and cede the power to shape the framework for multilateral diplomacy to Western dominated institutions.

In chapter 1, I draw on recent literature that historicizes the UN, UNESCO and other internationalist ventures of the postwar period to explain the initial Soviet refusal to become a member state of the organization under Stalin.[31] Rather than a "universal" international organization encompassing all nations and ideologies, UNESCO had "provincial" roots in the internationalist designs of a specific element within the Western elite who imprinted the international organization with their own ideas and cultural milieu, all of which stood in direct

Empire, 51. Likewise, histories of Western internationalism in the postwar period mention the Soviet response to this trend only in reference to the communist bloc's disdain for, or obstruction of, blueprints for world governance. Glenda Sluga, for instance, offers a short account of Soviet disparagement of UNESCO as a "cosmopolitan" organization, but does not explore the USSR's view of UNESCO in great detail. Sluga, *Internationalism in the Age of Nationalism*, 113–14.

[31] For a discussion of recent literature on the ideological roots of the UN, see citations in the introduction.

opposition to the drive for ideological purity of late Stalinism.[32] While many of UNESCO's supporters presented the organization as an apolitical arena for international collaboration, the Soviet Union interpreted the core values these Western internationalists desired to see fulfilled in UNESCO's program of activities (the "free exchange of ideas," the reeducation of the subjects of ex-enemy nations into democratic citizens, the revision of knowledge and culture so that it promoted "international understanding," etc.) as a smokescreen of virtuous jargon masking capitalist imperialism and aggression against the communist world. Owing to pressure placed on it to assist in the reconstruction of Western Europe, UNESCO became aligned with the West and entangled in a bipolar conflict between capitalism and communism that left little room for neutrality. As a result of the Soviet boycott before 1954, the organization, from its founding to the death of Stalin eight years later, more closely resembled an instrument for cooperation among like-minded North Americans and Western Europeans in education, science, and culture than a forum for the reconciliation of different parties for the purpose of attaining world peace.

In chapter 2, I provide an analysis of the major developments in the first five years of Soviet participation in UNESCO. Having entered the organization with a degree of optimism about the prospects of challenging the West, the Soviet Union set up two organs unique to the post-Stalinist era, the Soviet UNESCO Commission and Delegation. These facilitators of Soviet activity in UNESCO bore responsibility for mobilizing the country's intelligentsia to partake in UNESCO seminars, conferences, and publications. By 1958, however, the commission and delegation had grown disillusioned with the organization because of a feeling of alienation from those UNESCO member states with which they expected to find common ground, a suspicion

[32] I have in mind here the notion of "provincial" used in Dipesh Chakrabarty's study of Eurocentrism in academic discourse: Dipesh Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000).

that UNESCO discriminated against communist countries while preserving Western hegemony within its halls, and their own inability to muster participation from their domestic agencies. Yet those involved with UNESCO matters in the Soviet Union found it much more difficult to withdraw from the organization than they had anticipated. As a sign of the power of international organizations to bind countries to the increasing global integration that these institutions encouraged through the exchange of persons, publications, and ideas, lower-level officials in the Soviet UNESCO Commission and Delegation, recognizing the centrality of UNESCO and other international organizations in international affairs, successfully prevented the USSR from quitting this space of multilateral cooperation. In other words, once the USSR signed on to UNESCO, and thereby tacitly conceded the value of noncommunist international organizations as an influential force in international relations, it could not easily disengage from this dimension of diplomacy without incurring significant damage to its reputation and forfeiting the benefits gained from UNESCO membership. Whatever the failures of UNESCO and other international organizations to "solve" the Cold War through concrete policies, these bodies therefore contributed to the normalization of sustained Soviet interaction with the outside world in the long run, assisting in the country's permanent break with the isolationism of the Stalinist past.

CHAPTER 1

THE MISSING MEMBER STATE: SOCIALIST NATIONALISM, BOURGEOIS INTERNATIONALISM, AND THE RISE OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, 1945-1953

UNESCO originated in a series of wartime brainstorming sessions in London about how to reconstruct, in the coming postwar era, the educational and cultural institutions of a Europe ravaged and revolutionized by the Nazi imperial project. In October 1942, nine months after the United Nations Declaration and eight months after the US Department of State's "Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policy" began toying with the idea of a future world organization, the president of the British Board of Education, R. A. Butler, invited the ministers of education of European governments waiting out the war in Britain to come together in order to tackle "educational questions affecting the Allied countries of Europe and the United Kingdom both during the war and in the postwar period."[33] On November 16, 1942, ministers from seven governments-in-exile (Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Greece, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, and Yugoslavia) and the British government attended the first official meeting of the Conference of

[33] I. V. Gaiduk, *Divided Together*, 11–15; and "Conference of Allied Ministers of Education: Origin of the Conference," n.d., 1–3, AG 2: Conference of Allied Ministers of Education: London 1942; Vol. 2:1; General Document Series; AME/A/21a., UNESCO Archives. For more in-depth and general histories of CAME and the founding of UNESCO, see Jan Opocensky's unpublished manuscript on the history of UNESCO and James Sewell's masterful analysis of the politics animating the international organization during its formative years. Although I use my own research in the following paragraphs to outline the origins of UNESCO, I draw on their works to frame my discussion of CAME and the early years of UNESCO: Jan Opocensky, "*The Beginnings of UNESCO: 1942-1948*, Vol. 1," 1950, UNESDOC; and James Patrick Sewell, *UNESCO and World Politics: Engaging in International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975).

Allied Ministers of Education (CAME).[34] By the end of the war in 1945, CAME evolved into a multibranched agency with an Executive Bureau that oversaw seven commissions dedicated to amassing data on the resources of educational agencies in Europe.[35] Early on, the Conference also recognized the necessity of creating a permanent international organization to take over its mission of overseeing the multifaceted and expensive task of reconstruction.

Of course, the concept of an international organization devoted to the realm of thought preexisted CAME. In the interwar period, the League of Nations' Organization of Intellectual Cooperation (OIC) and associated entities—the International Committee for Intellectual Cooperation (ICIC) and the International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation (IIIC)—assembled leading intellectuals in Paris and Geneva to foster debate among great minds. As historian Jo-Anne Pemberton notes, "the OIC . . . supplied the nascent UNESCO with an organizational

[34] "Draft Report of a Conference held at the Board of Education on Monday, 16th November, 1942 at 3 p.m.," 1–4, AG 2: Conference of Allied Ministers of Education: London 1942-1945; Vol. 1; Records of Plenary Sessions, UNESCO Archives.

[35] The Books and Periodicals Commission, for instance, calculated the losses of libraries and universities under Axis control; coordinated with book repositories and "salvage drives" in nonoccupied Allied countries to raise a supply of books for occupied countries; and appointed a History Subcommittee to enlist scholars for the writing of "history textbooks of an objective character." The Science and Audio-Visual Aids Commission, launched in July 1943, wrote reports on the lack of laboratory equipment, educational films, projectors, and slides on the continent, while the Basic Scholastic Commission, formed in May 1944, reviewed "the essential material requirements for general teaching at the primary and secondary levels during the first six months of liberation." The Commission on Cultural Conventions and the Commission on the Protection and Restitution of Cultural Material, inaugurated in January 1943 and April 1944 respectively, studied agreements between different nations on the exchange of academic or cultural delegations and documented stolen or damaged works of art. As Allied forces advanced toward Berlin in the winter and spring of 1945, CAME moved beyond examinations of material deficits, taking on, albeit hesitantly, the perceived "special" or "psychological" effects wrought by Nazi tactics of ideological indoctrination and total war. In February 1945, the Conference initiated a Commission on "Special Educational Problems of Liberated Countries" to wrestle with questions of how to provide for displaced children and deal with the fate of the "children of quislings." The next month, CAME organized a committee to consider the proposal, laid out in a memorandum from the Belgian minister of education, to "take immediate action" to solve the "international" problem of "denazification" of youth through education. In this memorandum, the minister urged the formulation of "teaching methods" designed to ensure the "complete reform of the children's minds and characters" through the removal of the imprint left by "Nazi educational principles." For the memorandum, see "Memorandum Presented by the Belgian Government on Pedagogical Aids for Reeducation Problems in Liberated Countries," n.d., 1–3, AG 2: CAME Box 1, Commission of Enquiry on Special Educational Treatment AME/A/95, UNESCO Archives. For general outlines of the commissions and their work, see *Allied Plan for Education: The Story of the Conference of Allied Ministers of Education* (London: United Nations Information Organisation, 1945), 16–33.

model and ethos: a body comprising state representatives and intellectuals seeking to reduce the political temperature of world affairs and 'create the spiritual conditions of peace in the world.'" But because of a perception that these elite conclaves had failed to prevent the outbreak of another world war and given the scale of destruction this conflict had wrought in Europe, CAME believed that a replacement for the intellectual branches of the League required more resources for impacting a wider section of the world's population.[36] As Jan Opocensky, the Czechoslovak delegate to CAME who would sit on the UNESCO Executive Board during the organization's formative years in the late 1940s, observed in his unpublished 1949 history of UNESCO, the Conference from its inception resolved to "explore plans for the formation of a permanent organization for inter-allied and subsequently international cooperation in education matters in the postwar period."[37] On January 18, 1943, these preliminary discussions about setting up an intergovernmental organ took on a new intensity when the London International Assembly—a congress of statesmen and intellectual figures (Lord Cecil, Jan Masaryk, Edvard Beneš, René Cassin, etc.)—called for a "United Nations Bureau for Educational Reconstruction."[38] After CAME decided at its eighth meeting on February 4, 1944, to explore the creation of such an organ, the Conference ordered the examination of plans for an "international educational office," reviewing blueprints prepared by the American Liaison Committee for International Educational

[36] Jo-Anne Pemberton provides a concise but cogent outline of the evolving intellectual perspective on international intellectual cooperation from the League to UNESCO. For the quote used above, see Jo-Anne Pemberton, "The Changing Shape of Intellectual Cooperation: From the League of Nations to UNESCO," *Australian Journal of Politics & History* 58, (March 2012): 42.

[37] Opocensky, *The Beginnings of UNESCO*, 20.

[38] Sewell, *UNESCO and World Politics*, 37. Cassin attended and played a significant role in CAME as the representative of the French Committee of National Liberation. He also took on an active part in the creation of UNESCO and the organization's early years. For a list of the abovementioned contributors to the London International Assembly, see Kirsten Sellars, *"Crimes against Peace" and International Law* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 53.

Reconstruction in Harpers Ferry, Virginia, as well as a joint proposal from the London International Assembly and the Welsh Council for Education in World Citizenship.[39]

Despite these aspirational ruminations, serious deliberations over the form and mandate of an international organization in the sphere of education accelerated only after the Conference decided to extend its membership beyond European countries by bringing the rest of the United Nations coalition into the fold. Within the first four months of CAME's existence, the Conference sought to open channels of communication with the US and the USSR, but refrained from inviting them to officially take part in a project that they considered a European affair.[40] By the spring of 1943, however, Conference delegates realized the financial benefits of welcoming larger countries, especially a prosperous US relatively untouched by war, into the club.[41] In the fall of 1943, at the same time that CAME formally resolved to work toward a "United Nations Bureau of Reconstruction," the Conference requested that the USSR, US, China, and other friendly governments send emissaries to its gatherings.[42] On April 6, 1944, the US sent a delegation to the ninth meeting of the Conference. As historian Charles Dorn has argued, the American delegation, led by the famous pioneer of the educational component of American liberal internationalist "soft power" in the postwar era, Senator J. William Fulbright, not only

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[39] Opocensky, *The Beginnings of UNESCO*, 22-23.

[40] "Draft Report of the Third Meeting of the Conference of Ministers of Education of the Allied Governments and French National Committee under the Chairmanship of the President of the Board of Education, Held on Tuesday, 16th March, 1943, at 3.00 p.m.," n.d., 3–4, AG 2: Conference of Allied Ministers of Education, London 1942-45, Vol.1, Plenary Sessions, UNESCO Archives.

[41] As one CAME report put it, "the material needs of the occupied territories were so great as to call for the help of all those Allied countries which were in a position to give assistance; and, moreover, that the needs of the Allied countries extended beyond occupied Europe." "Conference of Allied Ministers of Education: Origin of the Conference," 1. See also Opocensky, *The Beginnings of UNESCO*, 20–21.

[42] "Draft Report of the 6th Meeting of the Conference of the Ministers of Education of the Allied Governments and French National Committee of Liberation, under the Chairmanship of the President of the Board of Education, held on Tuesday, 5th October, 1943 at 3 p.m.," n.d., 1–5, AG 2: Conference of Allied Ministers of Education, London 1942-45, Vol.1, Plenary Sessions, UNESCO Archives; and Opocensky, *The Beginnings of UNESCO*, 22-23.

ensured that CAME supported the incorporation of the envisioned organization into what would become the UN, but also helped shift the conversation of the Conference from plotting a reconstruction agency to designing an international organization that would promote "development" and "cooperation" on a long-term basis. The considerable influence of the US on the work of CAME broadened the scope of the Conference's mandate from a narrow focus on reconstruction to a conceptualization of how an international organization in education could work toward preserving peace. By 1945, CAME had initiated preparations for a constitutional assembly to establish UNESCO.[43]

Although the Soviet embassy in London dispatched its first secretary as an observer to CAME from March 1943 onward, it kept a cautious distance from the proceedings of the Conference. The Soviet Union declined to send representatives to work on multiple commissions set up by CAME from 1943 to 1945, replying tersely to some of these requests for its attendance with the explanation that it did "not have anybody here qualified for this purpose."[44] Once the

[43] The American team consisted of the Librarian of Congress, poet Archibald Macleish; the dean of Stanford's School of Education, Grayson Kefauver; State Department official and future contributor to UNESCO's *History of Mankind* (see chapter 7), Ralph Turner; President Roosevelt's Commissioner of Education, J. W. Studebaker; and Richard Johnson, the third secretary of the American embassy in London. "Draft Report of the 9th Meeting of the Conference of the Ministers of Education of the Allied Governments and French National Committee of Liberation, held on Thursday, 6th April 1944 at 2.30 p.m.," n.d., 1, AG 2: Conference of Allied Ministers of Education, London 1942-45, Vol.1, Plenary Sessions, UNESCO Archives. The American detachment successfully lobbied CAME—and, subsequently, the Preparatory Commission set up to design the future organization—to substantially curtail the ability of the new world educational body to actively intervene in the educational reconstruction of liberated countries, circumscribing its duties to surveying "war-torn countries' needs," functioning as "a clearinghouse for these reports," and disseminating "information on public and private relief sources." This push on the part of the Americans derived from their disinclination to cede the fiduciary power for reconstruction to a multilateral organization and a desire to preserve control of whatever territory fell under the jurisdiction of the American military in Europe. Consequently, initial drafts of the new organization's constitution, circulated to governments as the United Nations Conference on International Organization (UNCIO) took place in San Francisco in the spring of 1945, reflected an emphasis on long-term cultural and educational interaction rather than a unitary mission to rejuvenate societies devastated by war. For a discussion of the American role in turning the envisioned reconstruction organization into a permanent international organization, see: Charles Dorn, "'The World's Schoolmaster': Educational Reconstruction, Grayson Kefauver, and the Founding of UNESCO, 1942-46," *History of Education* 35, (May 2006): 297–320.

[44] The Soviet embassy, however, did obtain copies of "all relevant papers" from these commissions. For examples of UNESCO invitations and Soviet responses see: P. I. Hearoum, "Re: Conference of Allied Ministers of Education,"

Soviet first secretary started to show up at sessions of the Conference's Executive Bureau in 1943, he remained aloof and asked only brief clarifying questions a few times over two years.[45] In December 1943, three months after CAME agreed to appeal to nations outside of Europe for official delegations and three months before the US ordered the so-called "Fulbright Commission" to travel to London, the Soviet observer approached his American counterpart at the conference to learn whether the US intended to join CAME without demanding "organizational changes." In the course of their conversation, the Soviet ambassadorial functionary furnished several explanations for his government's wariness with respect to the nature and objectives of the gathering. According to the American foreign officer, his Soviet interlocutor expressed anxiety over the possibility that any international "cultural conference" would grant all states equal voting rights no matter their size or raw power from a *realpolitik* point of view. When the American speculated that "the principles followed in the UNRRA [United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration] and Food conferences might be applicable" (i.e., one country, one vote), the Soviet official worried that "such a basis would give undue and perhaps dangerous influence to small states." The Soviet emissary also revealed his government's doubts about the likelihood that the USSR would enroll in any future international educational organization, suggesting that the USSR "might not feel great hesitancy" about an "International Education Office" so long as "its activities were confined to the exchange of purely technical information." But if this organization "undertook to deal with the subject matter introduced in the curricula of national schools," he warned, "the USSR would be extremely

August 25, 1943, AG 2: CAME Box 1, UNESCO Archives; Nancy B. Parkinson, February 28, 1945, AG 2: CAME Box 1: CB/H8/281/6, UNESCO Archives; Mr. Van Dyck, June 9, 1944, AG 2: CAME Box 2, 90/48/2815, UNESCO Archives; and B. Karavaev, February 23, 1945, AG 2: CAME Box 1, CB/+8/281/6, UNESCO Archives.

[45] For an instance of the Soviet observer asking a clarifying question, see: "Draft Report of the 37th Meeting held on Wednesday, 12th September, 1945, at 2.30 p.m. at the Ministry of Education," n.d., 5, AG 2: Conference of Allied Ministers of Education, London 1942-45, Vol.1, Plenary Sessions, UNESCO Archives.

reluctant to participate." In general, the American observer characterized the attitude of the Soviet envoy toward CAME "as somewhat deprecatory" and surmised that the "USSR would prefer to conduct its cultural relations bilaterally."[46]

In the months leading up to the conference for the establishment of UNESCO, which commenced on November 1, 1945, at the Institute of Civil Engineers in London, the Soviet Ambassador to the United Kingdom, F. T. Gusev, justified the USSR's insistence on spurning the inchoate international organization by arguing that only the UN could authorize the constitution of multilateral, intergovernmental organizations. Although UNESCO would fall under the purview of ECOSOC after 1946, the two bodies had yet to iron out their exact relationship. The position of CAME as the architect of UNESCO therefore provided the Soviet Union with an opportunity to delegitimize the enterprise on the basis of its origins outside the UN. "In the opinion of the Soviet govt [sic]," Gusev wrote to the American embassy in London, "measures for the preparation and creation of an organization for matters of enlightenment and culture . . . should be taken by the Economic-Social Council of the organization of the United Nations after the formation of such council in the forthcoming first session of the General Assembly."[47]

Continuing its work without Soviet involvement, the founding conference, over which the British Laborite Minister of Education Ellen Wilkinson presided, aimed to produce an international organization oriented toward impacting "'the man on the street.'"[48] In his opening address to the conference, British Prime Minister Clement Attlee made the case for this far-

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[46] *Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1943, General*, vol. I. (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1943), Document 6797, http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/FRUS.FRUS1943v01.

[47] Ibid., 1515-16; and F. T. Gusev, September 30, 1945, AG 8: Box 1934, X07.211 (470), UNESCO Archives.

[48] Opocensky, *The Beginnings of* UNESCO, 60-65.

reaching "democratic" approach to international educational cooperation, enunciating words that would become part of the most famous line of the UNESCO Charter: "All of us hope to educate our people for the world we want to build. Our watchword is 'educate so that the minds of the people shall be attuned to peace.' . . . wars begin in the minds of men. And we are to live in a world of democracies, where the mind of the common man will be all important."[49] The conference ordered a "technical subcommittee" to review whether UNESCO should take part in reconstructing Europe and report to the first session of the UNESCO General Conference its findings. True to the desire of the US to limit UNESCO's undertakings in the area of reconstruction, the committee concluded that the organization would serve only as an information hub for UNRRA, which would deal with the costly enterprise of acquiring and distributing aid.[50] While these negotiations continued apace in London, the British and American embassies in Moscow unsuccessfully tried to convince the Soviet People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs (NKID) to do its part in the genesis of UNESCO, writing a letter to A. Ia. Vyshinskii and following up by sending their employees to urge NKID in person "to reconsider their previous decision and to send a delegation to the conference."[51]

A year later, the first session of the UNESCO General Conference opened in the fall of 1946 under the presidency of former French Prime Minister Léon Blum. The delegates elected Julian Huxley as UNESCO's first director-general and approved a series of programs designed, in line with the preamble of its charter, to construct "the defenses of peace" in the "minds of

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[49] "Conference for the Establishment of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation held at the Institute of Civil Engineers, London" (UNESCO, 1945), 21–22, ECO/CONF./29, UNESDOC.

[50] Opocensky, *The Beginnings of UNESCO*, 68-76.

[51] *Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), Diplomatic Papers: 1945, General: The United Nations*, vol. I. (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1945), Document 2280, http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/FRUS.FRUS1943v01.

men."[52] Despite the ratcheting up of tension internationally following the standoff in Iran over the continued Soviet presence in the north of the country and Winston Churchill's "Sinews of Peace" or "Iron Curtain" speech in Fulton, Missouri, earlier that year, UNESCO still harbored hope that the USSR would change its position in light of the suggestions of some Soviet emissaries that the country might become part of the international organization. At the founding conference of the WHO that summer in New York, the Ukrainian delegate proposed that all educational issues concerning public health fall under the purview of UNESCO. Over dinner with the UNESCO resident observer to the UN, Valere Darchambeau, Soviet delegates to the WHO conference "took great interest" in what the observer told them about UNESCO, telling him that the USSR would soon "step in" to the international organization. "We assume," Darchambeau reasoned, "that this indication could not be given to us without something being decided on this subject."[53] Two months after the closing of the conference, however, higher-ranking Soviet officials walked back these statements. In a meeting in February 1947, Director-General Huxley urged the Permanent Representative to the UN, A. A. Gromyko, to convince his government to reconsider its eschewal of the international organization. Gromyko repeated Gusev's assertion that all UN specialized agencies had to result from the deliberations of ECOSOC, reiterating the Soviet complaint that "UNESCO was established contrary to the stipulations of the [UN] Charter at the initiative of the British and American governments without taking into account the protest of the USSR." When Huxley corrected his assertion that all such organizations had to originate in ECOSOC, Gromyko replied that, "in general, the USSR

[52] "General Conference: First Session, held at UNESCO House, Paris from 20 November to 10 December 1946" (UNESCO, 1947), 18, UNESCO/C/30, UNESDOC.

[53] V. Darchambeau, "Entrée de la Russie à l'UNESCO," July 2, 1946, AG 8: Box 1934, X07.211 (470), UNESCO Archives.

does not participate in the work of specialized institutions that it had not helped to create." At the same time, the Soviet diplomat promised to "reflect" on Huxley's remarks and requested documents about the international organization.[54] As an overture to the communist state, UNESCO reserved one of the fifteen spots on its executive board for the USSR in the event that it had a change of heart. This seat would remain vacant until 1954.

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Thus the United States, the United Kingdom, and European governments exiled in London during the war provided the officials and intellectuals who laid the foundation for UNESCO with very little input from the USSR. Apart from Yugoslavia and three countries that would soon undergo communist takeovers (Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia), the majority of nations involved in CAME and the UNESCO General Conference would either align with the West in the escalation in tension between the capitalist and communist worlds in the coming years (Latin American, Asian, and Middle Eastern countries such as the Republic of China) or fell within the imperial domain of Western European states (e.g., India). Conceived of as a more expansive institutional successor to the League's ICIC by many of its European contributors and heavily influenced by American proponents of liberal internationalism, UNESCO represented, from 1945 to 1953, more of a transatlantic international organization than a worldwide venue comprising a politically diverse group of states.

Whatever the stated reasons Soviet emissaries offered to UNESCO advocates for this boycott, the fundamentally antithetical ideologies of the international organization and postwar Stalinism explain the deeper reasons the USSR snubbed the organization. These motivating

[54] "Entretien entre le Dr. Julian Huxley et Mr. Gromyko," February 8, 1947, AG 8: Box 1934, X07.211 (470), UNESCO Archives.

factors include Stalin's general view of international relations and the de-internationalization of Soviet ideology under Stalin initiated in the 1930s but accelerated in the postwar era.

As indicated by the Soviet observer to CAME, the USSR had deep reservations about the power UNESCO gave to "small states." In the summits from 1942 to 1945 that would culminate in the birth of the UN in San Francisco, Soviet dignitaries made clear their preference that any world organization narrow its portfolio to security-related matters and the preservation of peace between the victorious allies in the spirit of nineteenth-century congresses among the great powers of Europe. At the Dumbarton Oaks Conference in the fall of 1944, the USSR relented to pressure from the US and the UK on this issue, begrudgingly allowing for the formation of ECOSOC, which would oversee a constellation of new specialized agencies.[55] But whereas the Soviet Union had managed to safeguard its power to veto any resolution in the UN Security Council, all of the other constituent organs of the UN system, including UNESCO, operated on the basis of majority rule and granted equal suffrage to all states, thereby leaving the USSR with no means of quashing undesirable programs.[56]

While UNESCO never promulgated legally binding conventions designed to overrule the educational and cultural policies of nation states, the prospect of the majority of the international

[55] According to Gaiduk, a memorandum from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MID), "The Main Principles of the Statute of the International Organization on the Safeguarding of Security and Peace" laid out Soviet skepticisms about creating an international organization that would engage in questions outside the realm of security. The UK had also favored this more traditional form of international interaction but evolved before 1944. Gaiduk, *Divided Together*, 16-24.

[56] In the words of a memorandum from the American embassy in London to the secretary of state at the height of CAME negotiations in late 1943, "considerable sentiment in favor" of the principle of "equal representation" pervaded CAME's discussions of a future international educational organization. Ralph Turner, a State Department educational specialist and later part of the Fulbright team sent to CAME, concurred with this opinion. "In the educational and cultural fields," the American embassy summarized Turner's point of view in a memorandum, "democratic cooperation and international goodwill require the free and equal association of peoples. At least these are fields in which power, prestige, and material interests should have least effect upon the relations of nations." *Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1943, General*, vol. I. (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1943), Document 6797, http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/FRUS.FRUS1943v01.

community exerting pressure on the Soviet Union to allow its intelligentsia to fraternize with foreigners ran counter to Stalin's postwar goal of expunging Western influence from his country and fostering a Soviet corpus of knowledge cut off from Western influences. As early as 1946, Stalin had started to rebuild the Soviet "fortress," cutting off cooperation between the Soviet intelligentsia and their foreign counterparts that had developed during the war.[57] That summer, A. A. Zhdanov, a member of Stalin's "inner circle," berated Soviet writers for their "servility" before the West.[58] Historian Ethan Pollock has detailed a series of academic debates on history, philosophy, science, and linguistics into which Stalin intervened directly as the "coryphaeus of science," conducting a "chorus" of scholars who served on the "philosophical front" of the Cold War. In December 1946, the same month in which UNESCO's first general conference adjourned, Stalin reinforced ideological discipline among Soviet academicians in the USSR when he criticized the third volume of G. A. Aleksandrov's *History of Western Philosophy*, kicking off a series of "open discussions" that would result in the unmooring of Soviet scholarship from the rest of the world. Stalin's endorsement of the spurious theories of Soviet geneticist T. D. Lysenko in the late 1940s would only worsen this fissure between Soviet and Western scholarship.[59] More fundamentally, anthropologist Alexei Yurchak has called Stalin the "master" of Soviet ideology, or the sole arbiter reserving the right to shape "ideological discourse from a position external to it, publicly commenting on the correctness or incorrectness

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[57] See Zubok, *A Failed Empire*, 51. Elena Zubkova has also described this reaction against foreign influence in Soviet society at large. For instance, the memories of European culture and society Red Army soldiers brought back with them after victory posed a danger to the reconsolidating Soviet state. Elena Zubkova, *Russia After the War: Hopes, Illusions, and Disappointments, 1945-1957* (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1998), 18.

[58] Yoram Gorlizki and Oleg Khlevniuk, *Cold Peace: Stalin and the Soviet Ruling Circle* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 32-35.

[59] Ethan Pollock, *Stalin and the Soviet Science Wars* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2006), 15–71.

of ideological statements and evaluating them for precision against an external canon to which he has exclusive access."[60]

Because UNESCO threatened to dilute the power Stalin aspired to wield over Soviet intellectuals, the organization posed a greater danger to Soviet sovereignty than other UN specialized agencies and multilateral institutions involved in matters usually dictated by governments (all of which–except the WHO–the Soviet Union would either join belatedly after Stalin's death in 1953 or object to until the disintegration of the USSR in 1991). Zubok offers several motives behind the Soviet determination to forgo participation in the multilateral organizations of the Bretton Woods system, including a disinclination to become indebted to foreign nations as well as "economic and financial penetration" due to what Molotov described decades later as the peril of being "drawn into" the "company" of the Americans but in a "subordinate role."[61] Similarly, in light of Western domination of UNESCO, Soviet leaders must have reacted negatively to the prospect of facing pressures to conform to the dictates of a potentially hostile group of member states intent on the "penetration" of Soviet cultural and educational institutions. The program adopted by the first session of the UNESCO General Conference in 1946—which incorporated measures emphasizing the "free exchange of ideas," the "dissemination of knowledge," and recommended the "study" of constructing a worldwide radio network under UNESCO auspices—likely affirmed these suspicions.[62]

The ideological milieu surrounding UNESCO came to represent the polar opposite or inversion of the Soviet shift toward an antiforeign isolationism that paralleled the deterioration in

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[60] Alexei Yurchak, *Everything Was Forever, Until It Was No More: The Last Soviet Generation* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), 40–41.

[61] Zubok, *A Failed Empire*, 51.

[62] Opocensky, *The Beginnings of UNESCO*, 86-88.

relations between East and West after 1946. A champion of intellectual cooperation, UNESCO was the product of a moment in which internationalism pervaded Western foreign-policy thinking. As mentioned, Sluga has designated this moment that lasted for much of the 1940s as the "apogee of internationalism," during which "'world government' was a rhetorical commonplace" in Western public discourse. Throughout the decade, she demonstrates,

> surveys of British and American public opinion confirmed that politicians, pamphleteers, scholars, and the public alike had come to identify being internationally minded as the most realistic alternative to the perils of nationalism and invested their hopes in the creation of the . . . [UN]. During the UN's early existence, cosmopolitanism came to favor in its literal translation 'world citizenship,' as did the prospect of a world federation on the American model.[63]

Similarly, political scientist Or Rosenboim illustrates how some of the leading "American, British, and émigré intellectuals" of the 1940s "had diagnosed the emergence of globalism as the defining condition of the postwar era," showing that "their proposals for ordering the postwar world envisaged competing schemes of global orders motivated by concerns for the future of democracy, the prospects of liberty and diversity, and the decline of the imperial system."[64] The formation of UNESCO, along with the specialized agencies in the spheres of labor, health, and food allocation, also amounted to an internationalization of the welfare state, or what Mazower characterizes as "a kind of global New Deal" hatched inside Roosevelt's State Department and supported by the left-leaning coalition governments that took power in Europe in the aftermath of the Second World War. Because of a perception that the Great Depression had precipitated war in 1939, many left-of-center intellectuals and statesmen came to the conclusion that "social and economic problems were not separate watertight

[63] Sluga, *Internationalism in the Age of Nationalism*, 6.

[64] Or Rosenboim, *The Emergence of Globalism: Visions of World Order in Britain and the United States, 1939-1950* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2017), 2–3.

compartments in the international any more than in the national sphere. The outlines of a version of postwar internationalism premised on a kind of New Deal for the world thus emerged."[65]

Since UNESCO functioned as the primary intergovernmental body engaged in instilling in the world's population "international understanding" and a transcendence of national identity, it brimmed with these Western internationalists, who viewed the organization as the crown jewel of the world order they sought to construct. Huxley, as the first director-general of UNESCO, conceived of the organization as a mechanism to cultivate a "world culture" that would pave the way for global consolidation under a single political entity. In *UNESCO: Its Purpose and Its Philosophy*, Huxley declared that the ideological foundation of the international organization should "be a Scientific World Humanism, global in extent and evolutionary in background." Depicting world history as on a trajectory toward the unification of knowledge through cultural and intellectual exchange, Huxley maintained that UNESCO should help aggregate the world's "cumulative tradition," particularly in the sphere of science, to show the universal bond of mankind and thereby undermine the competing national and philosophical historical narratives that served to justify war. In the opinion of the British biologist, "the more united man's tradition becomes, the more rapid will be the possibility of progress: several separate or competing or even mutually hostile pools of tradition cannot possibly be so efficient as a single pool common to all mankind." In Huxley's vision, then, UNESCO's mission was to reveal this "common pool of ideas" through global education and exchange. By doing so, UNESCO would lay the foundation for a future global community and "must envisage some form of world political unity or otherwise, as the only certain means for avoiding war."[66]

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[65] Mazower, *Governing The World*, 197.

[66] Julian Huxley, *UNESCO: Its Purpose and Its Philosophy* (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1947), 7–13.

In response to Huxley's inclusion of such rhetoric in his philosophy for UNESCO, the few communist delegates to the international organization intimated that the USSR's mistrust of UNESCO derived in part from an animosity toward its internationalist ambitions. At the first general conference, the Yugoslav delegate, M. V. Ribnikar, expounded on the misgivings of Soviet loyalists about these principles when justifying his country's hesitancy to ratify the Charter. "UNESCO," Ribnikar quipped, "has even elaborated its own philosophy, labeled 'World Scientific Humanism,' which according to the program, will be forcibly disseminated to and imposed upon the peoples of the world." Castigating Scientific Humanism as a "casting of the various national cultures in a standard mould," he described Huxley's plan for UNESCO as "a kind of philosophic Esperanto" that "would amount to subjecting science to metaphysics."[67]

While scholars of late Stalinism have analyzed the dynamics of the antiforeign cultural crusade known as the *zhdanovshchina* and the subsequent anticosmopolitan campaign, they have largely overlooked the context of these Soviet offensives in this internationalist spirit. In the postwar purges of foreign influence from Soviet academia and culture, the "world-government" movement in the West offered a foil for Soviet propagandists eager to consolidate the state's control over its intelligentsia. In his famous "two camps" speech in September 1947 on the mounting hostility between the capitalist and communist blocs, for example, Zhdanov portrayed disciples of world governance as the manufacturers of a humanistic disguise concealing American and British conspiracies for global domination and imperial exploitation. "One of the directions taken by the ideological 'campaign' which accompanies the plan for enslaving Europe," Zhdanov declared, "is an attack on the principle of national sovereignty, a call to reject the sovereign rights of peoples, counterposing to them the idea of 'world government.'" This

[67] "General Conference: First Session" (UNESCO, 1947), 39, UNESCO/C/30, UNESDOC.

aspiration, which "bourgeois intellectuals from among the dreamers and pacifists" had "seized on," was "used not only as a means of pressure for the ideological disarmament of peoples who are defending their independence from encroachments by American imperialism, but also as a slogan specially directed against the Soviet Union."[68] At the height of the anticosmopolitan campaign two years later, an article in *Pravda*, "Cosmopolitanism—the Ideological Weapon of American Reaction," again referred to this movement as the primary enemy of Soviet ideological and cultural purity. "The word 'cosmopolitan' translated from Greek means world citizen," the author of the article expounded. "Cosmopolitanism is the preaching of so-called 'world citizenship,' the rejection of affiliation with any nation, the elimination of national traditions and cultures of peoples under the pretext of creating a 'world,' 'universal,' culture." As an example of this "expanding" trend in "the bourgeois states of Europe," the writer derisively recounted a recent meeting in England of "'scholars and philosophers'" who dismissed "all patriotism" as "'idolatry.'"[69]

The campaigns kicked off by these public pronouncements accelerated a process of de-internationalization of Soviet ideology that paralleled the move toward internationalism among liberal statesmen and intellectuals in the West. In practice, the late Stalinist crusades against the intelligentsia targeted notions of a "world science" and a "world culture" at the core of UNESCO's philosophy. They did so by persecuting Soviet scholars who cited foreign

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[68] Giuliano Procacci et al., eds., *The Cominform: Minutes of Three Conferences: 1947/1948/1949* (Milano: Feltrinelli Editore, 1994), 237–39.

[69] Iu. Pavlov, "Kosmopolitizm—ideologicheskoe oruzhie amerikanskoi reaktsii," *Pravda*, April 7, 1949, 2. "Iu. Pavlov" was actually G. P. Frantsev, the rector of the Moscow Institute of International Relations and head of the press division of MID, publishing under a pseudonym. According to the editors of a volume of documents on the "anticosmopolitan" campaign, this article summed up, and to a certain extent put a halt to, the anti-Semitic campaign of the first months of 1949 "in the open press," although the purges continued throughout the country. At the same time, the article also "signified the transfer of the center of gravity of the campaign to a foreign-policy perspective." D. G. Nadzhafov and Z. S. Belousova, eds., *Stalin i kosmopolitizm: Dokumenty agitpropa TsK KPSS, 1945-1953* (Moskva: Mezhdunarodnyi fond, "demokratiia," 2005), 17, 376.

scholarship, rewriting history into a Russocentric narrative erroneously crediting Russians with foreign inventions, and erasing references to the intellectual achievements of Western countries. On a deeper level, historian Benjamin Tromly argues that the Soviet state couched recriminations of Soviet intellectuals who "kowtowed to the West" or acted as "rootless cosmopolitans" in an anti-intellectual populism intended to shore up Soviet patriotism at the onset of the Cold War. "For academic elites," Tromly writes, "a crucial aspect of Stalin's anti-Western ideological agenda was its perceived anti-intellectualism, understood in this context as a stigmatization of intellectual endeavors and their practitioners as distant from a mythologized Soviet people."[70] As chapter three illustrates, the anticommunist movement in the United States similarly singled out the internationalist ethos popular among Western intellectuals and institutionalized in the form of UNESCO as a threat to American sovereignty during the postwar Red Scare.

In short, the usage of the term "cosmopolitan" in denunciations of the Soviet intelligentsia did not emerge in a vacuum but had weight because of the intellectual fascination in the West with schemes to remake the world into a cosmopolitan society under a single government. As the principal intergovernmental organization preaching internationalism in the contested areas of education, science, and culture, UNESCO stood out as the ultimate achievement of this current of Western political thought popular in Western Europe and North America but anathema to the strict ideological line taken by the USSR after the breakdown of relations between East and West.

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Regardless of how the USSR viewed the ideologies undergirding UNESCO, the international organization did its best to ignore the seemingly inexorable march toward a new

[70] Benjamin Tromly, *Making the Soviet Intelligentsia: Universities and Intellectual Life Under Stalin and Khrushchev* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 79–82.

war between the capitalist and communist blocs, concentrating its resources on projects perceived as falling outside or "above" politics and in the supposedly "neutral" or "universal" realms of science, culture, and education. As a result of the first three sessions of the general conference, UNESCO founded the Hylean-Amazon Institute in Brazil, launched a campaign to improve education in Haiti's Marbial Valley, and hosted numerous scholarly symposia geared toward cultivating "international understanding."[71] Yet this posture of refusing to jump into the fray of international crises made some UNESCO functionaries and outside observers worry that the international organization might repeat the mistakes of the League's OIC and fade into irrelevancy as an ivory tower detached from the pressing problems dominating daily headlines. As the optimism about the possibility of a lasting peace degenerated after 1946 into alarm over the threat of a new world war, UNESCO resolved to dip its toes into the more contentious issues of the time—a decision that in turn dragged it into the epicenter of the Cold War. In particular, the international organization became a collaborator with Western governments in the reconstruction of the so-called "ex-enemy" nations.

In the case of Germany, UNESCO proceeded cautiously when entering the former Reich due to the raw feelings harbored by many UNESCO member states toward the former Axis powers. The first session of the general conference passed a resolution put forward by the Dutch delegate that authorized the international organization to tentatively explore measures aimed at exposing ex-enemy nations to the democratic traditions of other countries.[72] Over the ensuing months, UNESCO sent its officials to the Western zones of the defeated power with the mission of ascertaining the best ways to reintegrate Germany into the international community and

[71] "Report of the Director-General on the Activities of the Organisation in 1947" (Paris: UNESCO, 1947), 35–42, 2 C/4, UNESDOC.

[72] Opocensky, *The Beginnings of UNESCO*, 127.

refashion its political culture.[73] Encouraged by the favorable assessments transmitted from his colleagues on the ground, Director-General Huxley notified the American, British, and French governments in a letter on January 28, 1947, that he intended to broach the subject with the Allied Control Authority in Germany "by the end of April."[74] While the British and American governments welcomed this move to start negotiations, the French expressed apprehension that the USSR might respond to this overture negatively. "Their fear," an assistant to the director-general wrote in April, "is that agreement on their part to UNESCO's entry into the French zone of occupation, even though accompanied by similar activity in the British and American zones, might antagonize the Soviet authorities." The French government therefore preferred a "quadripartite" rather than a "tripartite" process.[75] Nevertheless, the Soviet, American, British, and French members of the Information Committee of the Political Directorate of the Allied Control Authority unanimously approved on April 21 a proposal to advise the directorate to ask

[73] Two days following the end of the first general conference on December 10, 1946, the UNESCO counselor for museums and the American adviser for arts and museums traveled to Berlin and throughout the American zone at the invitation of Monuments, Fine Arts and Archives Officers of the Office of Military Government of the United States (OMGUS). UNESCO found a sympathetic potential host in OMGUS. In the course of their stay, the UNESCO specialists explored where to store dislocated artifacts important to Germany's cultural heritage as well as the preservation and restoration of artwork, monuments, and historic buildings. OMGUS officials, the UNESCO detachment relayed back to Paris, hoped these measures would help to "eliminate the dangers of a recurrence of the same cycle of events that plunged the world" into the Second World War. "They believe the preservation and repair of at least a few of the greatest and most esteemed pre-mid-nineteenth century German artistic monuments would be a major contribution to this end, in establishing a more normal psychology for Germans." By bringing a "return to pre-Bismarck culture," OMGUS desired to "preserve those symbols of civilization on which the outside world and Germans can meet on a common ground of respect for early German achievement of spirit, mind, and hand" while also endowing German citizens with "something of self-respect, and of confidence of esteem of others." UNESCO, OMGUS envisioned, would assist this objective by fighting the "narcissism, almost total intellectual and artistic isolation," and "inferiority complex" that seemed to have been "deliberately exploited and encouraged" by the Nazis. The international organization, these UNESCO observers proposed, would wage this war for a peaceful Germany by presenting technical expertise; serving as a liaison between museums in Germany and those of other countries or international associations; raising funds for these endeavors; and "stimulating the flow of technical, artistic, cultural, educational and scientific information in the form of books, exhibitions, and similar vehicles that will break the barrier of silence and reestablish German contact with world thought." See "Arts and Monuments: Berlin and American Zone Germany," n.d., AG 8: Box 5, 1–12, X07 (45-13) A 80, Part I, UNESCO Archives.

[74] "Relations with Germany," n.d., 1–2, AG 8: Box 5, X07. 7 (43) A 60 Part I, UNESCO Archives.

[75] Mr. Berkeley, "Germany," April 2, 1947, AG 8: Box 5, X07 (45-13) A 80 Part I, UNESCO Archives.

UNESCO to "send representatives at an early date to discuss" with the Allied Control Authority its possible assistance to Germany.[76]

At the same time that the Allied Control Authority adopted this resolution on UNESCO, however, Secretary of State George Marshall had drafted an economic plan formulated to consolidate Western Europe into a prosperous region immune to the spread of communism. Soon after Marshall announced the European Recovery Program (ERP) on June 5, the Soviet Union recommended to its allies that they withdraw from economic talks in Paris, having come to the view that the "Marshall Plan" represented a plot to "encircle" them with a hostile bloc. In the remaining months of 1947, Stalin directed communist parties in Western Europe to abandon participation in the legal parliamentary processes of their countries. In September, Zhdanov gave his "two camps" speech, putting yet another nail in the coffin of the former Grand Alliance.[77] In the midst of this steady decomposition of relations between the communist and capitalist worlds, UNESCO dispatched in the fall of 1947 another intermediary to Germany for further investigation. That November, the second session of the UNESCO General Conference in Mexico City voted to endorse the continuation of negotiations between the international organization and the Allied Authority.[78] But in the first month of 1948, the leadership of UNESCO realized that it risked foisting the organization into the middle of the Cold War if it persevered in its bid to set up shop on the frontlines of the conflict. "The situation in Germany," Huxley wrote on January 6, "is now so delicate that we are anxious to consider every step

[76] "Allied Control Authority Political Directorate Information Committee: Minutes of the Eighteenth Session (DPOL/INF/M(47)5)," April 24, 1947, 1–2, AG 8: Box 5, X07 (45-13) A 80 Part I, UNESCO Archives.

[77] Zubok, *A Failed Empire*, 72–73; and Pollock, *Stalin and the Soviet Science Wars*, 41.

[78] Julian Huxley, "D.G./17570," December 2, 1947, AG 8: Box 5, X07 (43-15) A 80 Part II, UNESCO Archives.

carefully."[79] Eighteen days later, the Allied Control Authority notified UNESCO that it had "been unable to agree to enter into negotiations" with the international organization, thereby breaking off the nearly yearlong diplomatic consultations between the two organs.[80] According to the political and educational advisers to the British military governor, this negative reply to UNESCO from the Authority "was of course the consequence of Soviet obstructive tactics in the coordinating committee, where the Soviet representative took the line that UNESCO activity in Germany was 'premature.'" The Western occupying forces, they argued, should react to this behavior by advertising themselves as "promoting and encouraging UNESCO in its desire to function in Germany (and by contrast that it should be equally well known that it is the Russians who are trying to block this)."[81]

Undeterred by this rejection, Huxley penned separate letters to the British, French, American, and Soviet military governments without alerting the UNESCO Executive Board, effectively going around the Allied Control Authority.[82] Because the heads of the Western zones agreed in their responses to circumvent their Soviet counterpart and correspond with UNESCO independently, the executive board held an extraordinary session in April to consider its options. In a report prepared for the session, Walter Laves, the American UNESCO deputy director-general, described his experience meeting with the military chiefs in the three Western zones that March, assuring the board that these authorities wanted to team up with UNESCO. "The time has

[79] Julian Huxley, "D.G./15759," January 6, 1948, AG 8: Box 5, X07 (43-15) A 80 Part II, UNESCO Archives.

[80] R. G. Raw, "Cooperation Between UNESCO and the Allied Control Authority," January 24, 1948, AG 8: Box 5, X07 (43-15) A 60 Part II: X07.7(43)072.3, UNESCO Archives.

[81] Robert Birley and Michael Garran, "Paris Telegram No.28. Saving. UNESCO and Germany," March 3, 1948, AG 8: Box 5, X07 (43-15) A 60 Part II: X07.7(43)072.3, UNESCO Archives.

[82] "Relations with USSR Occupying Authorities Concerning the Extension of UNESCO's Activities to the Soviet Zone of Occupation," n.d., 1, AG 8: Box 5, X07 (43-15) A 60 Part II: X07.7(43)072.3, UNESCO Archives.

come for UNESCO to move as rapidly, judiciously and circumspectly as possible toward helping in reeducating the German people so that they may participate once more in international society," he asserted. "That time," he warned, "is running short. . . . The potential threat to peace continues in Germany unless the United Nations can be successful in this task. The threat is not only to the physical peace of the world, but to the institutions of education, science, and culture, as we know so well from the Nazi record."[83] In accordance with this call to action, the executive board articulated three overarching goals of UNESCO's Germany program:

> 1) to help to direct the minds of the German people towards democracy; 2) to facilitate contact and the movement of ideas between the best elements in Germany and those of member states which have expressed desire for such contact; and 3) to combat aggressive nationalism, religious or racial discrimination and any tendency opposed to the ideal of international cooperation through education, science, and culture, set forth in the Constitution of UNESCO.[84]

In the summer of 1948, UNESCO set up shop in an increasingly tense and volatile Germany rattled by the imposition of the Berlin blockade that June, opening an office in Stuttgart in the American zone and preparing to plant two more offices in the French and British jurisdictions.[85] The standoff in Germany also cast a pall over the third session of the UNESCO General Conference held in Beirut, Lebanon, that November. As the resident historian of UNESCO Opocensky wrote, a "climate" existed in which one had to "fight against the obsession of the thought that catastrophe is inevitable."[86] Making this atmosphere worse, American intelligence and press agencies reported that the Soviet Union and its communist allies in the

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[83] Walter H. C. Laves, "Report of Mr. Walter H. C. Laves, Deputy Director-General of UNESCO, to the Executive Board on Negotiations in Respect to Proposed UNESCO Programme in Germany" (Paris: UNESCO, April 5, 1948), 1–4, AG 8: Box 5, X07 (43-15) A 80 Part II, UNESCO Archives.

[84] "Report of the Subcommittee of the Programme Committee on Certain Matters Relating to UNESCO's Activities in Germany" (Paris: UNESCO, October 7, 1948), sec. Annex II, UNESDOC.

[85] Opocensky, *The Beginnings of UNESCO*, 171-72.

[86] Ibid., 187-88.

Middle East had engaged in "anti-UNESCO agitation" among the Lebanese population during the conference, which took place during the war between the new state of Israel and the Arab countries surrounding it. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) received information that "Soviet officials and communists in Damascus" had tried to foster "an anti-UNESCO propaganda movement in Syria and Lebanon" that would use "hired agitators" to "make an unfavorable impression on UNESCO delegates and discredit Lebanon."[87] An Associated Press (AP) dispatch on November 19 reported that "about 40 young Lebanese communists fired on police outside the building" housing the general conference. "The UNESCO meeting," the AP claimed, "continued despite the disturbance, and no one was hurt by the flying bullets."[88] Regardless of this tumult both on the ground and in the broader international situation, the international organization persisted, charging the director-general to form a "committee of experts" to deal exclusively with Germany.[89]

Over the next few years, the UNESCO offices in Germany labored to familiarize German citizens with the international organization and forge channels of communication between the defeated nation and the outside world. They handed out to libraries, universities, teachers' colleges, schools, and press agencies German translations of UNESCO documents (the UNESCO Charter, the pamphlet "UNESCO–What it is," a "Message to Youth," etc.); information on the activities of UNESCO and news updates on the fields of education, science, and culture (the monthly newsletter *UNESCO Courier*, a booklet on "Work Camps for Peace," the radio program *UNESCO World Review*); literature intended to educate Germans about the

[87] "Anti-UNESCO Propaganda" (Central Intelligence Agency), December 23, 1948, CIA Electronic Reading Room.

[88] "Communists Fire on UNESCO," *The Baltimore Sun* (*AP*), November 20, 1948, 9.

[89] Opocensky, *The Beginnings of UNESCO*, 177-78.

UN ("Suggestions on Teaching about the United Nations and its Specialized Agencies," "A Teacher's Guide to the Declaration of Human Rights"); and scholarly materials published by UNESCO. The organization also teamed up with a German organization to create a book center in Bad Godesberg that managed the exchange of academic writings between German institutions and willing UNESCO member states.[90]

Meanwhile, the Soviet Union devised its own version of internationalist cultural cooperation at the World Congress of Intellectuals for Peace, held in August 1948 in the city of Wroclaw, which had been ceded to Poland at the 1945 Potsdam Conference and stood at the epicenter of the tensions between the capitalist and communist blocs.[91] Just as Western states conceived of UNESCO's brand of internationalism as a means of building the architecture of a lasting peace, communist countries embarked on a large-scale initiative in the postwar era to rally their peoples to engage in an international "peace movement" led by the USSR as the guardian of a communist international order. Kicked off at the Wroclaw Congress, this socialist internationalist alternative to the Western internationalism undergirding UNESCO offered, as historian Timothy Johnson argues, "a vital platform from which a new, early Cold War vision of the world was communicated to the population of the USSR."[92] Attending the Wroclaw Congress in his "individual capacity," Director-General Huxley, who had professed his admiration for Soviet state planning in the 1930s and had connections with members of the

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[90] "Report on the Activities at Present Being Carried Out by UNESCO in Germany in Accordance with the Resolution Passed at the Third Session of the General Conference" (UNESCO, June 7, 1949), 107, UNESCO/XR/OT/Conf.1/2, UNESDOC; and "Four Zones of Germany to Profit from UNESCO-Created Book Center," *UNESCO Courier*, May 1949, 3, UNESDOC.

[91] See the introduction and first chapter of Gregor Thum, *Uprooted: How Breslau Became Wroclaw During the Century of Expulsions* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011).

[92] Timothy Johnston, "Peace of Pacifism? The Soviet 'Struggle for Peace in All the World,' 1948-54," *Slavonic and East European Review* 86, (April 2008): 260.

British Communist Party, wanted to extend an olive branch to the cultural luminaries of the communist world.[93] But instead of convincing influential figures in the eastern bloc to appeal to their governments to join the international organization, Huxley spent his tenure as one of five presidents of the congress fending off attacks from the writer and international journalist I. G. Erenburg and other Soviet intellectuals on the "bourgeois barbarism" and "savagery" of the US.[94]

Erenberg's attacks signaled the final act in the schism between the internationalists of the West congregating in UNESCO and the internationally minded wing of the Soviet intelligentsia. A cosmopolitan icon who embodied the USSR's internationalist and antifascist worldview both at home and among the cultural elite of the West, Erenberg had agreed in the fall of 1946 to allow the US Assistant Secretary of State William Benton, who played an instrumental role in the founding of UNESCO and will feature prominently in the next chapter, to lead him and two other Soviet visitors on a tour of the United States.[95] Just two years later, Erenberg helped set into motion a peace movement that would compete with UNESCO, holding the floor at the Wroclaw Congress to passionately denounce American militarism. Joshua Rubinstein, a biographer of Erenberg, quotes Max Frisch, a playwright from Switzerland who attended the congress, to describe the Wroclaw gathering's dynamics:

> In the discussion each speaker is allowed ten minutes. Ehrenberg speaks for twenty minutes before Julian Huxley, the chairman of the day, ventures to remind him of the time limit. Frantic applause; Ehrenberg should be allowed to go on speaking. After thirty-

[93] "Dr. Huxley Issues a Personal Statement on the World Congress of Intellectuals," September 2, 1948, AG 8: Box 151, 327.4 A 06 (438) "48": 327.406.31, UNESCO Archives. In 1932, Huxley published a book praising state planning of the economy in the USSR and eventually helped set up a British organization dedicated to researching state planning: Julian Huxley, *A Scientist Among the Soviets* (London; New York: Harper and Brothers, 1932).

[94] See the following cutting of an article on the congress in the UNESCO archives: "Ehrenburg Attack on America," *Glasgow Herald*, August 27, 1948, AG 8: Box 151, 327.4 A 06 (438) "48," UNESCO Archives.

[95] Joshua Rubinstein, *Tangled Loyalties: The Life and Times of Ilya Ehrenburg* (New York: Basic Books, 1996), 232–38.

> five minutes an American gets up, wanting to know why Ehrenberg should be allowed to go on speaking. He finishes in the fortieth minute. A clever speaker, a Danton, lively and aggressive, ironic.[96]

After the congress, Director-General Huxley released a statement in which he disclosed his motivations for refusing to sign the final resolution of the congress, expressing regret over the sharp political tone of other speeches and the gathering's dismissal of UN institutions. "I had hoped," Huxley wrote, "that the World Congress of Intellectuals at Wroclaw would be devoting itself on the non-governmental level to the same tasks of international cooperation for peace in the fields of science and culture, to which UNESCO is devoting itself on the inter-governmental level." But "the congress from the outset took a political turn," he lamented. "There was no real discussion, and the great majority of the speeches were either strictly Marxist analyses of current trends, or else polemical attacks on American or Western policy and culture."[97] The Soviet newspaper *Literaturnaia gazeta* (*Literary Gazette*) struck back with an article slamming Huxley for the "political nature" of his cultural outlook; his support of eugenics; and his de facto "subordination," as the head of UNESCO, to British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin and his deputy, Hector McNeil, who were "instructing him how to behave."[98] Another denunciation of Westerners at the congress criticized Huxley and his allies for "talking about 'world' government, the cosmopolitan indifference to national cultures under the banner of a 'single

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[96] Ibid., 244.

[97] "Dr. Huxley Issues a Personal Statement on the World Congress of Intellectuals." Once Huxley resigned from his post as head of UNESCO, he became an outspoken critic of Soviet digressions from scientific consensuses in his professional field of biology. A staunch advocate of the universality of scientific truth or what the Western scholarly community called at the time "world science," the former director-general published in 1949 *Soviet Genetics and World Science: Lysenko and the Meaning of Heredity*, a thorough and caustic meditation on the significance of the ideological corruption of science in the Soviet Union symbolized by the 1948 "Lysenko affair," an intervention by the Soviet state into the debates of Soviet geneticists on behalf of the spurious theories of the agricultural experimentalist T. D. Lysenko. Julian Huxley, *Soviet Genetics and World Science: Lysenko and the Meaning of Heredity*. (London: Chatto and Windus, 1949).

[98] "Professor Khaksli nedovolen…," *Literaturnaia gazeta*, September 6 1948, 4.

language' and 'western culture.'"[99] Notwithstanding these diatribes against the international organization and its executive, the Soviet Union later conspired to use UNESCO as a platform for advertising its peace campaign. In a 1950 memorandum to Molotov, the Foreign Policy Commission of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (TsK VKP(b)) proposed that Eastern European delegates insert into the agenda of the UNESCO General Conference an endorsement of the recently issued Stockholm Declaration, one of the most prominent "petitions" of the "world peace congresses" against the use of nuclear arms.[100]

Over the course of 1949, UNESCO's reconstruction efforts faced a new wave of invective from the Eastern European UNESCO member states. In the wake of the establishment of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) on May 23 and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) five months later, UNESCO weathered heightened criticism from Hungarian, Polish, and Czechoslovakian delegations. At the fourth session of the general conference in the fall of 1949, *The UNESCO Courier* chronicled how the speakers from the communist bloc pushed for the "postponement" of UNESCO's Germany program, characterizing it as "'useless'" in light of West Germany's condition as a "'pseudo-state'" pervaded by fascist and nationalist fervor. "'To refuse to collaborate with Messrs. Heuss and Adenauer, whose names are associated with the memory of aggressions against Poland, Czechoslovakia and Austria," *The Courier* quoted the chief of the Polish delegation, "will indicate to the Germans that only the way of peace will lead them to become part of a world community. UNESCO will not be able to work usefully in Germany until there is a return to agreement between the four occupying powers.'" When the general conference overwhelmingly voted against a cessation of UNESCO operations in West

[99] D. Zaslavskii, "S kem oni, mastera kul'tury?," *Pravda*, September 6, 1948, 4.

[100] Johnston, "Peace of Pacifism?" 261–62; and RGASPI, f. 82, op. 2, d. 1399, l. 50.

Germany, the three Eastern European contingents walked out of the room. In a subsequent meeting, the head of the Polish delegation accused UNESCO of legitimizing the "'partition of Germany'" in contravention of the "'Yalta and Potsdam agreements.'"[101] An article published that summer in the RSFSR Ministry of Education's journal, *Narodnoe obrazovaniie* (*National Education*), linked the international organization to a longer history of American imperial ambitions cloaked in the language of cosmopolitanism. Framing UNESCO as the culmination of an American crusade for "pedagogical expansion" dating back to the First World War and the writings of the American liberal philosopher John Dewey, the author emphasized UNESCO's American provenance, connecting it to a wider story of "pedagogical missionaries" from the US and tracing its origins to the 1944 Harpers Ferry conference for an international educational organization rather than to CAME. It then proceeded to conflate UNESCO reconstruction activities to an American plot to export the "American way of life" to the "marshallized countries" of Western Europe. "Under the guise of providing material assistance for the reconstruction of educational institutions destroyed by war," the article asserted, "UNESCO essentially is trying to interfere in the internal educational affairs of other countries in the spirit of 'international understanding' in its Anglo-American interpretation."[102]

Despite this onslaught, the international organization, following the creation of "two Germanies," reaffirmed its commitment to Germany in correspondence with commanders of the Western zones and expanded its schemes to reach a larger portion of the German population.[103]

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[101] "UNESCO's Germany, Japan Programmes, Endorsed by General Conference," *The UNESCO Courier*, November 1, 1949, 18–19, UNESDOC; and Michael Clark, "UNESCO Approves German Program," *New York Times*, October 5, 1949, 5.

[102] M. Bernshtein, "Kosmopolitizm i pedagogicheskaia ekspansiia na sluzhbe amerikanskogo imperializma," *Narodnoe obrazovanie*, no. 6 (1949): 59–66.

[103] See, for example, the draft of a letter sent by the director-general to the Allied Authority and the latter's apparent response: Jaime Torres Bodet, n.d., AG 8: Box 5, X07 (43-15) A 80 Part II, UNESCO Archives; and L. Handley-

In 1950, the FRG recruited sixty German citizens specializing in subjects related to UNESCO to sit on a "Committee for UNESCO Activities," which acted as an informal version of the national commissions organizing UNESCO affairs in official member states. In 1951, the international organization orchestrated the creation of three institutes in West Germany—the Institute for Education in Hamburg; the Institute for Social Sciences in Cologne; and the Institute for Youth in Gauting. According to historians Aigul Kulnazarova and Poul Duedahl, the first institute labored to reform German education; the second to utilize the social sciences in order to find new approaches to issues "of vital importance to West Germany"; and the third applied the findings of the latter two institutes to the education of German youth.[104] More importantly, West Germany became a UNESCO member state in 1951—twenty-two years before the UN accepted both the FRG and the GDR into its membership in 1973.[105]

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From 1947 to 1950, UNESCO contacted Soviet authorities in the eastern zone of Germany on no less than eight occasions with pleas for cooperation, but ran up against a wall of silence. In December 1947, UNESCO mailed its first letter to Soviet authorities following the

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Derry, "AGSEC(49)190," November 22, 1949, AG 8: Box 5, X07 (43-15) A 80 Part II: X07.7(43)072.3, UNESCO Archives.

[104] Aigul Kulnazarova and Poul Duedahl, "UNESCO's Re-Education Activities in Postwar Japan and Germany: Changing Minds and Shifting Attitudes Towards Peace and International Understanding," in *UNESCO Without Borders: Educational Campaigns for International Understanding*, ed. Aigul Kulnazarova and Christian Ydesen (New York: Routledge, 2017), 66–68.

[105] UNESCO also welcomed other former members of the Axis alliance or nation states with controversial legitimacy into the organization years before they would sit at UN headquarters in New York. Italy enlisted in UNESCO in 1948 and the UN in 1955. The Republic of Korea (South Korea) did not join the UN until 1991 but signed up for UNESCO in 1950. Japan remained outside of the main UN bodies in New York before 1956 but enrolled in UNESCO the same year as the FRG. The GDR would not enter UNESCO until 1972, or the year before it could send an official representative to the UN. For a summary of the years in which Italy, South Korea, and Japan joined UNESCO, see Sewell, *UNESCO and World Politics*, 51. For a list of the years in which these countries joined the UN, see "United Nations Member States (Press Release ORG/1469)," un.org, July 3, 2006, https://www.un.org/press/en/2006/org1469.doc.htm.

vote of the second session of the general conference endorsing the extension of negotiations with the Allied Control Authority begun the previous spring. The next month, UNESCO transmitted a copy of the same letter it sent to other military governors to the Soviet powers in East Berlin after the Authority elected to cease discussions over the organization's possible assistance to Germany. In March 1948, Deputy Director-General Laves hand delivered to a staff member of the Soviet military government a request for an "interview" with the Soviet commander during his stay in Berlin before the extraordinary session of the executive board in April. That May, UNESCO gave documents detailing the actions supported at this session to the Soviet military governor. In 1949, it kept the Soviet Union up to date with developments in UNESCO's program in West Germany with three letters—two in the aftermath of the creation of the FRG in the spring and one in the fall. Finally, the international organization in 1950 asked the Soviet government if observers from the eastern zone of Germany could attend the fifth session of the general conference in Florence, Italy. Over the course of three years, the USSR did not respond to any of these missives from the international organization.[106]

The Soviet reaction to UNESCO operations in Japan reveals how Soviet officials interpreted UNESCO through the anti-internationalist lens of late Stalinism as well as their perception of the potential threat of the organization to their interests in the defeated enemy nations. As Kulnazarova and Duedahl argue, UNESCO's engagement with the Japanese people developed more organically on a grassroots level than among the West Germans. Prior to the organization's formal incursion into the country, academics and others at dozens of universities throughout Japan set up UNESCO "associations" and "clubs" oriented toward raising awareness of UNESCO's message of peace in a country exhausted by war. In October 1948, following

[106] "Relations with USSR Occupying Authorities Concerning the Extension of UNESCO's Activities to the Soviet Zone of Occupation."

negotiations with the American Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) General Douglas Macarthur, UNESCO launched an "action plan" and later created an "International Committee of Experts" for Japan similar to the organ overseeing the German program. In April 1949, UNESCO opened an office in Tokyo to manage activities comparable to those in Germany. In 1951, Japan became a UNESCO member state alongside the FRG.[107]

In a report on "UNESCO and other organizations in Japan" sent to Moscow in June 1950, a political adviser to the Soviet branch of the Allied Council for Japan (ACJ) excoriated the international organization as a weapon used by the West to indoctrinate the educated segments of Japanese society into the hegemonic ideology of American capitalism. The "lofty words" of the UNESCO Charter, he wrote, epitomized "the cosmopolitan and pretend apolitical views of bourgeois representatives from the sciences and culture, and of the idealist pacifists" who, having become obsessed with "preaching a nationless and classless so-called 'united world science' and 'world government,'" were "the direct servants of the modern contenders for world domination." Thus, he reasoned, it was "not by chance" that "rightwing socialists, famous as servants of imperialism," took on "an important role in the UNESCO movement." From the perspective of the Soviet political adviser, the American government had encouraged "the development of Japanese relations" with UNESCO and other UN specialized agencies in order to execute the policy of "peace without a peace treaty," which entailed "the dragging out of American occupation indefinitely" by avoiding the signing of an official agreement to end hostilities. Furthermore, the UNESCO clubs and associations that had sprung up all over Japan not only aimed to "serve the abovementioned goals of American imperialism," but also to carry out "anticommunist, anti-Soviet propaganda and the dissemination of the pernicious influence of

[107] Aigul Kulnazarova and Poul Duedahl, "UNESCO's Re-Education Activities in Postwar Japan and Germany: Changing Minds and Shifting Attitudes Towards Peace and International Understanding," 56–60.

American ideology." Noting that the heads of the education and cultural divisions working at Macarthur's headquarters had participated in the meetings of the UNESCO associations and clubs, he observed that the occupation authorities, in addition to inciting the "diffusion of the ideology of American imperialism," sought to use UNESCO for the "colonization of Japanese science, culture, and art." But because of a mixture of internecine fighting among the UNESCO movement's leadership, competition between the Japanese ministries of foreign affairs and education over control of these groups, as well as a possible illegal misuse of funds, the international organization's message had not "captured the working masses" and remained confined to "the narrow framework of bourgeois scientists and cultural circles" who intended to use it "as a means of political propaganda." At the same time, UNESCO's ability to seduce this elite strata of the Japanese population had compelled the "democratic organizations and trade unions" aligned with the Soviet cause to regularly attack UNESCO chapters in Japan as devoid of "any kind of clear goals or practical activity" and detached from "the life of the people and their needs in the spheres of culture and knowledge."[108]

Thus, by the time that the USSR's relationship with the UN reached a low point in 1950 due to the fallout over the struggle for China's seat at UN headquarters in New York, UNESCO had held the status of *organization non grata* in the Soviet Union because of its cosmopolitan, "world-government" ethos and direct role in the reconstruction of the Western zones of "ex-enemy" nations through which the fault lines of the capitalist and communist blocs ran. When the UN secretary-general, the Norwegian Trygve Lie, visited Moscow in May 1950 to persuade Stalin to recommit to the UN after the USSR walked out of the security council in protest over the absence of Maoist China, he pressed the Soviet leader on what amounted to an almost

[108] RGASPI, f. 17, op. 137, d. 416, ll. 16-43.

complete embargo of UN specialized agencies by the USSR. In his "memorandum on questions for consideration of the development of a twenty-year program for the achievement of peace through the UN," Lie offered a ten-point plan to the US, France, the UK, and the Soviet Union that included a proposal for the "more decisive use of the specialized agencies of the United Nations" and called for "more active support from all governments, including the membership of the Soviet Union in some or all agencies of which it is not currently a member." On the eve of his meeting with Stalin, the secretary-general held talks with Gromyko on this memorandum, unsuccessfully beseeching the Soviet diplomat to give in to entreaties for the USSR to abandon its opposition to UNESCO and other UN organizations.[109]

When the Korean War broke out on June 25, 1950, and the security council exploited the absence of the USSR over the China question to sanction military intervention, UNESCO all but confirmed its perceived alignment with the West in the Cold War by supporting UN operations in South Korea. In the month before communist forces breached the thirty-eighth parallel, UNESCO had selected the Republic of Korea as a UNESCO member state, implicitly endorsing the government that a month later would become an anticommunist protagonist in what historians would call the first hot war of the Cold War.[110] In response, the Soviet newspaper *Literaturnaia gazeta* castigated all "UNESCO hypocrites," and the organization's new director-general, the Mexican statesman Jaime Torres Bodet, in particular, for taking sides in the battles of the Cold War. "Following Truman, who declared his campaign of 'total propaganda' for the dissemination of 'truth,'" the publication mockingly explained, "Bodet announces that

[109] Gromyko dismissed UN specialized agencies as not conducting "any useful activity," playing on Lie's phrasing of his request for the USSR to return to these institutions. "It is incorrect," he replied, "to talk about the exit of the USSR from specialized agencies since the USSR had never been a member of such agencies." RGASPI, f. 82, op. 2, d. 1078, ll. 13-28. For more on this meeting, see Gaiduk, *Divided Together*, 159-64.

[110] For the resolution, see: "Records of the General Conference of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, Fifth Session, Florence, 1950: Resolutions" (UNESCO, 1950), 8, UNESDOC.

UNESCO's mission is a 'permanent crusade in the name of truth and tolerance'" that included "the Kuomintang ghouls" and "such zealots of 'truth and tolerance' as Titoist Yugoslavia and the puppet governments of South Korea, Malaya, and Transjordan, which have been quickly admitted to UNESCO membership."[111] With hostilities underway, the security council on July 31 urged UN specialized agencies, including UNESCO, to provide assistance in their respective spheres of activity to the United Nations Command (UNC) in Korea—an appeal ECOSOC reiterated on August 14.[112] UNESCO complied with this request on August 26, when its executive board chose to "relieve the needs of the civilian population in Korea within the fields of education, science, and culture by means of emergency relief and at the appropriate time by a reconstruction project."

To accomplish this grand design, UNESCO put aside $100,000 for a "special fund," promised to dole out "educational supplies" on an "emergency basis," arranged donations from other countries through UNESCO national commissions and NGOs, and assembled a UNESCO mission to visit the country and recommend long-term measures Korea should take to rebuild its educational infrastructure.[113] Reflecting the coalition fighting against Kim Il Sung's army, UNESCO's five-man mission to Korea consisted of specialists with pedagogical experience either in the West and its former colonial dominions or with the international organization. The chief of the mission, Dr. Donald P. Cottrell, served as the dean of the College of Education at the Ohio State University, but had worked for the US War Department as an "expert consultant" on education in Germany during the war and had spent time in China as a specialist on educational

[111] A. Varshavskii, "Litsemery iz IuNESKO," *Literaturnaia gazeta*, June 7, 1950, 1.

[112] "Annex 1: Contribution of UNESCO to the Action of the United Nations and Specialized Agencies following the Aggression against Korea (6C/BR/83)," July 6, 1951, 2, AG 8: 37 A 57 (519.13)187, UNESCO Archives.

[113] E. Ruiz, "UNESCO's Normal Programme Contribution to the United Nations and Specialized Agencies Regarding Korea," December 7, 1951, 1, AG 8: Box 269, 37 A 57 (519-13) 81 UNKRA, UNESCO Archives.

reconstruction a year before Mao came to power. Along with Cottrell, a Mexican educational specialist working for UNESCO, a British engineering professor at St. Catharine's College, Cambridge University, the former head of educational administration of the colonial French Concession in Shanghai, and a Filipino superintendent of schools joined the mission.[114] Touching down in Korea in September 1952, the team conducted "field investigations," consorted with officials in the Korean Ministry of Education, and gave speeches to Korean educators replete with positive characterizations of school systems in Western countries. At the end of their tour, the mission produced an extensive roadmap to the United Nations Reconstruction Agency (UNKRA) for their quest to modernize Korean education. They stressed the need for a "reorientation of the method and content of education" in Korea away from the "undemocratic" practices implemented under Japanese occupation, a familiarization of Koreans with "modern educational development elsewhere," and a transition from "authoritarian" Korean educational tradition to "a more decentralized system" built on "originality" and "grass roots" democracy. Advising UNKRA that it should set up an educational division, the report delineated a "Five-Year Program for United Nations Assistance" comprising a fifty-five-million-dollar budget for twenty projects dedicated to the construction of school facilities, the importation of experts from around the world to Korea, fellowships for Korean pedagogues to study abroad, the standardization of the Korean language, and the founding of training centers for Korean teachers.[115]

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[114] The mission also brought along a young American who had lived in Korea for secretarial, translation, and cultural work during their time in the country. "Curriculum Vitae, Donald P. Cottrell," July 6, 1952, 1–4, AG 8: 37 A 57(519.13) 136: 361.9(519)379.404.1, UNESCO Archives; and Jaime Torres Bodet, July 7, 1952, 1–2, AG 8: Box 269, 37 A 57 (519-13) 13, Part 1: 361.9(519)379.404 P.

[115] "Rebuilding Education in the Republic of Korea: The Final Report of the UNESCO/UNKRA Educational Planning Mission to Korea" (Paris: UNESCO, 1953), vii-9; 109-123, AG 8: 37 A 57(519.13) 187: 361.9(519)379.406.8, UNESCO Archives.

In the final year of Stalin's rule, relations between UNESCO and the communist bloc hit rock bottom. The three people's democracies had all withdrawn from the international organization in response to the Korea campaign and other UNESCO moves. The admission of General Francisco Franco's Spain into UNESCO in November 1952 also precipitated a wave of attacks in the Soviet press on the world body for its appeasement of reactionary forces. A December issue of *Pravda* featured an article on Poland's withdrawal from the organization alongside a cartoon of a large rodent, adorned with fascist regalia and sporting a holster emblazoned with the name "Franco," peering maliciously through the two O's of the Russian acronym for the UN. To illustrate how this pest had reached the world body, the drawing depicts a manhole stamped with the Russian transliteration of "UNESCO" under the rodent held open by the grotesquely slender hand of an unknown man with a dollar sign on his cuff (see figure 1 on the next page).[116] The following February, Czechoslovakia also quit UNESCO due to its acceptance of Spain. In the same month, *Izvestiia* published a lengthy review of a book, *The Secret Weapon of the Doomed*, which spelled out how UNESCO and other Western agencies served as arms of "American espionage."[117]

[116] "Nota pravitel'stva pol'skoi narodnoi respubliki o vykhode iz IuNESKO," *Pravda*, December 8, 1952, 4.

[117] V. Petrov, "Tainoe oruzhie obrechennykh," *Izvestiia*, February 8, 1953, 3.

Figure 2. *Pravda* Cartoon about UNESCO. Source: "Nota pravitel'stva pol'skoi narodnoi respubliki o vykhode iz IuNESKO," *Pravda*, December 8, 1952, 4.

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The absence of the communist superpower in UNESCO during the late 1940s and early 1950s cast a shadow over all of the international organization's actions and forced commentators in the West to rethink the place of international organizations in world affairs. For those concerned with international relations, and especially members of the American foreign-policy establishment, the Soviet Union came to symbolize the radical difference or particularities complicating the universalist internationalist project, becoming an object of their meditations on how to enlarge the international organizational system of the postwar period to encompass cultural and political diversity.

By the time of the rollout of the Marshall Plan in June 1947, many American statesmen and thinkers had concluded that UNESCO should give up on pleading with the Soviet Union to partake in its program and instead work to consolidate a new world order that excluded the hermetic USSR. In April 1947, Dr. George Stoddard, the president of the University of Illinois

and a member of the American delegation to the founding conference of UNESCO, told the American College of Physicians that "it would be better for Russia to stay out [of UNESCO] until it is willing to meet with other nations under conditions of free speech, majority rule and the exchange of persons." But he also urged the international organization to "fight with all its weapons" to ameliorate the strained international situation.[118]

That same month, Byron Dexter, an editor for *Foreign Affairs* (the influential American periodical of the Council on Foreign Relations that would two months later publish George Kennan's famous "X Article" on the "Sources of Soviet Conduct"), wrote for his magazine an article, "UNESCO Faces Two Worlds," in which he advised the international organization to abandon its sensitivity to the attacks lobbed at it by the Soviet Union and build a new international society around the communist fortress. According to Dexter, UNESCO grew out of the "widespread belief that only to the degree that there is a world community will world law be practicable and a world political organization be effective." Given the international organization's function as "an instrument devised to help build that community by working directly to mold men's ideas," it could not avoid "dealing with some of the most political issues now confronting statesmen and people." This grave responsibility inhered in UNESCO's dual nature as not only an "education clearing house" for professionals of different stripes but also the preeminent intergovernmental agency in charge of the field of mass communications rapidly bringing the global population closer together. "It is the one-world idea," Dexter proclaimed of the latter, "particularly vivid in the imaginations of Americans and heralded by the new technical devices which can be described soberly enough as introducing changes in communication comparable in importance to those effected five centuries ago by the invention of movable type."

[118] "UNESCO Pictured as a Peace Force," *New York Times*, May 1, 1947, 27.

For Dexter, UNESCO reserved for itself "the task of promoting mass media in order to induce the greatest possible degree of understanding among the men and women of the world." Yet UNESCO faced a "great paradox" as the vanguard of this technological revolution. Referring to Ribnikar's criticism of Huxley's Scientific Humanism and the Yugoslav's disparagement of the "'the free flow of ideas'" as a "pro-fascist" pretext to "penetrate the masses by a new propaganda," Byron noted "the depth of the gulf that separates communist and 'Western' views of free speech," asking the reader if, in "attempting to bridge" the divide between these two perspectives, might "UNESCO cut the world more sharply into two communities?" Answering this question, Dexter dismissed the international organization's efforts to make artificial changes to its program, arguing that the organization would inevitably alienate the USSR and sharpen the divide between East and West because the expansionism of the Soviet Union left no room for the innate "world mission" of UNESCO. While encouraging the United States to take seriously the concerns of other noncommunist countries that UNESCO would become a one-way conduit for a deluge of American culture throughout the world and hence a tool of American domination, Dexter asserted that the "only guarantee that the gap" between the "Soviet and Western worlds" would "not widen is for all the world to become communist." Like UNESCO, he reasoned, "Russia does not doubt that a world community is desirable and necessary, but she has her own blueprint of the nature of that community." The international organization should therefore cease its self-denigration for the nonparticipation of the USSR in its program, since "the agency's larger aim of bringing peoples more closely in touch with peoples is repugnant to the Soviet Union" and an objective the USSR would fight "outside UNESCO or inside, as she thinks best." By sticking to its principles, Dexter declared,

"UNESCO will work amid danger" but also "in confidence that it is on the road that leads to the coming political shape of things."[119]

In contrast to Dexter's imploration that UNESCO abandon its futile attempts to include the Soviet Union in its work, Dr. Richard McKeon, dean of humanities at the University of Chicago and a UNESCO activist, drew on Ribnikar's rejection of Huxley's Scientific Humanism to formulate in 1948 a "philosophy for UNESCO" that would accommodate the ideological outlooks of all cultures. A primary contributor to the federalist Committee to Frame a World Constitution, McKeon brought a pluralist approach to tailoring the organization's universalist aspirations to the tapestry of difference covering the globe. From McKeon's point of view, UNESCO needed to forego the explicit articulation of a philosophical "doctrine" or set of "principles." Instead, it had to acknowledge and accept difference by exhibiting its philosophy through the identification of common problems and courses of action. In McKeon's opinion, UNESCO had displayed this approach in its first years, becoming "a concrete illustration of philosophy . . . in the sense of systematic endeavors to achieve agreement concerning projects directed to purposes common to many otherwise divergent philosophies." Moreover, while UNESCO should work to ensure that "cultural differences are not merely noted and tolerated, but recognized and appreciated as embodiments of values," it should stay true to its motivations for seeking "common action" by venturing to create in "some manner" a "world community" through the altering of "the present interrelations of nations and peoples in directions and ways calculated to promote understanding and peace."[120] In short, McKeon developed a complex, multilayered philosophy that conceived of action as the foundation upon which to gather the

[119] Byron Dexter, "UNESCO Faces Two Worlds," *Foreign Affairs* 25, (April 1947): 388–407.

[120] Richard McKeon, "A Philosophy for UNESCO," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 8, (June 1948): 573–86.

multifarious global population to solve problems and, through this practice, realize its internationalist ideal.

Other intellectual leaders ruminated over whether UNESCO should entangle itself in the immediate political crises of the time or set its sights on the supposedly apolitical issues in education, science, and culture that would cement peace in the long run. The poet and former Librarian of Congress Archibald MacLeish, in a speech to the fifth meeting of the US National Commission for UNESCO in September 1948, petitioned for the international organization to strive toward, in his words, "the preservation of the precarious peace on the foundations of which the lasting edifice—to say nothing of our present lives and living carcasses—must stand if they are to stand at all." Disagreeing with his colleagues who contended that UNESCO's meddling in international politics could "only end in disaster," MacLeish warned that the Cold War went beyond the expertise of "soldiers" and "diplomats." "It is a 'war' of which the battlefield is men's minds—and in which the weapons are the things by which men's minds are moved," he enunciated. "It is, in other words, precisely such a war as the Constitution of UNESCO, not the textbooks of the war colleges and the examples of the foreign-service schools, forsees [sic]." The "stupidities of the Soviet bureaucracy" in their attempts to control Soviet culture, he went on, proved that the USSR knew the location of the real "battlefield." Seeking to depict UNESCO as though it transcended and embraced all beliefs, MacLeish trumpeted the international organization as waging a battle for "human community" rather than the narrow "ideologies" dividing nations. UNESCO must use the "common international languages" of "the arts, of literature, of science" in order "to remind men of those things they hold in common, those things which befall each one as they befall others." By taking on the mantle of "a kind of trustee" for these shared values and deploying "all the intelligence and all the tools it possesses to declare

and to define the vast and tragic human experience which underlies all the dogmas and doctrines," he opined, UNESCO could "well break the paralysis of the 'Cold War.'"[121]

Opposing such advocacy for the politicization of UNESCO in the near term, the theologian and philosopher Reinhold Niebuhr described the organization in his 1950 article, "The Theory and Practice of UNESCO," as a mechanism through which the groundwork for a more peaceful world could be laid only in the *long durée*. Most known for his realist prescription for American foreign policy articulated in his 1952 book, *The Irony of American History*, the liberal anticommunist took a much more tempered view of UNESCO's capabilities than MacLeish. An active participant in the international organization, Niebuhr discerned as the "error of UNESCO" its assumption that "its various forms of cultural cooperation are of immediate political significance in resolving overt conflicts in the world community." This propensity was exemplified by UNESCO's aspiration to act as "a 'bridge' between Russia and the West." For Niebuhr, the faith that the end of the "moral isolation" of the Soviet Union would produce "a genuine exchange between the two worlds" overlooked the fact that "the most tragic conflicts" broke out "between disputants who know very well what the other intends, but are forced by either principle or interest to oppose it." As an alternative, Niebuhr proposed that UNESCO "find its justification in the contribution it makes to the integration of the emergent world community rather than in its supposed contributions to 'peace.'" Likening the organization to a university that "may greatly contribute to the total moral and intellectual resources of a community and thus be indirectly relevant to the settlement of a given dispute," he saw UNESCO as aiding in a trend toward peace but in the roundabout way of engendering the social fabric necessary for a world community. "Sometimes the immediate utility of an action is the more certainly achieved if it is

[121] Archibald MacLeish, "How Can UNESCO Contribute to Peace?," *Bulletin of the American Association of University Professors* 34, no. 3 (1948): 539–45.

not sought too directly," he wrote of the impatient expectation that UNESCO have an instant impact on Cold War tensions. "If for instance we could seek for the economic and moral health of the noncommunist world without too much preoccupation with the danger of Russian expansionism, we might well be more successful in averting that expansionism by achieving the health of our own world." Using themes that would surface in his other writings, Niebuhr worried that UNESCO might become "subject to the enervation of disillusionment" due to its grandiose pretensions. "The work in which UNESCO is engaged," he counseled, "requires a 'long pull' and not a short one."[122]

Niebuhr could not anticipate that within four years of the issuance of this article, the Soviet Union would allow UNESCO to put its grand design of forging a "world community" embracing the Soviet Union to the test. But at the time of the communist takeover in China, hostilities on the Korean peninsula, and a "Red Scare" permeating the US government, the chance that the USSR would join UNESCO likely seemed less plausible than the outbreak of war. As the Soviet Union under Stalin modulated its socialist internationalist rhetoric with an increasing Russocentric nationalism and xenophobia, many in the West viewed the internationalist vision exemplified by UNESCO as the best antidote for war and placed their hopes in international organizations in a way not seen before. Likewise, the Soviet boycott of UNESCO in the late 1940s proceeded logically from a perception that the international organization belonged to a constellation of institutions formed to implement a new world order fundamentally at odds with the control over Soviet culture and scholarship that Stalin understood as necessary for rebuilding after the wartime destabilization of the USSR and in the midst of the Cold War. The language of "anticosmopolitanism" in the Soviet Union can be understood only

[122] Reinhold Niebuhr, "The Theory and Practice of UNESCO," *International Organization* 4, (February 1950): 3–11.

in the context of this interplay between the internationalist “moment” in the postwar West and the reassertion of the authority of the state and party in the Soviet Union. While Stalin would have hesitated to sign his country up for any international organization centered around the convocation of the educated elite of communist and capitalist countries, the zealous invocations of “world government” and the “free flow of ideas” made by Western statesmen and intellectuals involved in UNESCO lent credence to the Soviet perception of the international organization as an instrument of homogenization under the aegis of American and West European powers.

As subsequent chapters will show, many of these concerns over the fundamental structure and culture of UNESCO did not disappear with the death of Stalin in 1953. Rather, the new Soviet leadership resolved to challenge Western internationalism at its core and illustrate to the world that the communist way could realize internationalism more effectively. However, the question remained as to whether the USSR could change the rules of the game of international organizations and defeat the West while playing on Western terms.

CHAPTER 2

THE "KEY TO THE WHOLE SYSTEM": THE USSR ENTERS UNESCO, 1954-1959

The death of Stalin in 1953 left Western observers and the Soviet population alike uncertain about the future direction of Soviet domestic and foreign policy. In the following months and years, the new Soviet collective leadership, which had existed in an embryonic form in the final years of Stalinist rule, quickly initiated reforms reversing the ideological line that had set the USSR on a trajectory away from the internationalist ethos of UNESCO in the preceding period.[123] Just thirteen months after the death of Stalin, the USSR joined UNESCO, thereby giving the organization's proponents in the West hope that the communist bloc would come out of its hermetic state and take up the fight to establish peace through cooperation in education, science, and culture. Likewise, Soviet diplomats and bureaucrats charged with handling UNESCO exhibited an eagerness to lessen the tensions of the previous decade. Over the next five years, however, Soviet officials responsible for engagement with the international organization began to have second thoughts over whether the USSR should have taken this risky leap into the world of international organizations in the first place.

Although the Soviet Union officially became a UNESCO member state in April 1954, Soviet archival sources reveal that this public manifestation of the Soviet Union's new look at UN specialized agencies resulted from a secret decision made by the Presidium of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (TsK KPSS Presidium, the new name of the Politburo) at

[123] For a discussion of the origins of this collective leadership in the "septet" around Stalin after 1950, see Gorlizki and Khlevniuk, *Cold Peace*, 97–120.

the behest of Molotov's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MID) on October 29, 1953—six months prior to the date commonly cited in scholarly and other literature.[124] In an indication of the importance Stalin's successors attached to gaining a foothold in the constellation of UN organizations, the new rulers—N. S. Khrushchev and G. M. Malenkov after the arrest of L. P. Beriia in June 1953—set in motion the process of joining UNESCO and the ILO before other more famous forays into the outside world (such as Khrushchev's 1955 tour of Asia, the Geneva Summit, as well as bilateral cultural exchanges). Moreover, the Presidium commenced this unprecedented reversal of Stalinist foreign policy in the midst of other pressing crises at home and abroad, including the mess left to them in the Soviet agricultural sector and broader economy; the German question and the fate of a GDR seething with uprisings that year; as well as the problem of reforming the penal system by ridding it of its Stalinist "excesses" and rectifying the mass persecution, torture, and falsification of evidence conducted before 1953.[125]

For UNESCO, these conciliatory moves came as a complete surprise. On November 12, 1953, the American UNESCO Director-General Luther Evans, a blunt, patriotic former librarian of congress from Texas, received from his counterpart at the ILO, the American David Morse, a copy of a letter from the legation of the USSR at the Soviet embassy in Bern, Switzerland, notifying the ILO chief that the USSR had resolved to "accept the obligations of the constitution of the said organization." Informing Morse that the letter "should be regarded as the official document" signaling the Soviet desire to join the international organization, the legation reiterated the USSR's previous complaints about the ILO with respect to its need to bolster "the representation of wage-earners and other categories of workers in its directing organs," stressing

[124] RGANI, f. 3, op. 8, d. 93, l. 112.

[125] For more on the context of these months after Stalin's death, see William Taubman, *Khrushchev: The Man and His Era* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2003), 240–65.

that the communist state would reject any provisions previously passed by the ILO that ran counter to Soviet interests. It also made the reservation that the USSR would not adhere to statutes in the international organization's charter referring disputes over ILO conventions or the organization's charter to the International Court of Justice absent the "consent of all parties."[126] On the same day that Evans obtained this news, the attaché to the Soviet embassy in Paris planted the first seeds of hope that the USSR would join UNESCO when he showed up unannounced at the office of the UNESCO Governments and National Commissions Division and asked an official for "documentation" on the international organization. While not "directly" broaching the prospect of the USSR becoming a member of UNESCO, the Soviet attaché made clear to the UNESCO official that the USSR expected "future cooperation" and gave the impression that the visit represented a testing of the waters. "It is significant that this is the first occasion in over five years that I have received a call from a representative of the USSR or any request for documentation," the official wrote to Evans. Hinting that the British government might have launched an effort to convince the Soviet Union to end its boycott of UNESCO, he noted the cryptic responses to his inquiries from contacts in the British UNESCO Commission, who declined to answer his question on the matter and stated only that their "lips are sealed" but that they would let him know "as soon as there is any definite information."[127]

Over the winter, Soviet envoys took small steps to reach out to UNESCO. Because no country could only partially ratify the charters of UN organizations, the reservations expressed over the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, which the Soviet Union eventually

[126] David A. Morse, November 7, 1953, AG 8: Box 1934, X07 211 (470), UNESCO Archives; and "Legation of the U.S.S.R. in Switzerland, No. 160," November 4, 1953, 1–2, AG 8: Box 1934, X07 211 (470), UNESCO Archives.

[127] Lorna McPhee, "Visit of Attaché of U.S.S.R. Embassy, November 12, 1953," November 12, 1953, AG 8: Box 1934, X07.211 (470) 01, UNESCO Archives.

communicated to UNESCO in addition to the ILO, raised eyebrows among the chiefs of both UN agencies.[128] Learning of this reaction of UNESCO and ILO officials from the Soviet ambassador to France, Molotov recommended to the Presidium that it relent on these proposed qualifications to its membership and join the two international organizations unconditionally. "In order not to complicate the entry of the USSR into UNESCO, MID SSSR thinks it desirable to send UNESCO a letter with notification of the entry of the USSR into this organization without raising our reservations," Molotov reasoned. "MID has in mind in this respect that, as a UNESCO member, the Soviet Union would have the opportunity to defend its position concerning our reservations." Thus, on March 22, 1954, the Presidium approved a resolution to finalize Soviet membership in the ILO and send official letters on behalf of the USSR, Ukrainian SSR, and Belorussian SSR (BSSR) informing the UNESCO director-general that these countries planned to sign the UNESCO Charter.[129]

Since these messages did not arrive at UNESCO until April 13, the organization was in the dark about the degree of Soviet interest in UNESCO until a week before the country accepted the terms of the charter. On April 9, a spokesman for the British Council, a body responsible for cultural diplomacy, set off a minor storm of confusion in the press when he stated that he had "no definite news" regarding Soviet intentions. Finally, the Soviet ambassador in London, Ia. A. Malik, signed the UNESCO Charter at noon on April 21 in the British Foreign Office, making

[128] The unclear legal status of the USSR in relation to international organizations presented challenges in general throughout these negotiations. At the ILO, officials were unsure as to whether the Soviet Union had "formally" left the organization in the 1930s or had simply let their membership lapse. Nevertheless, the expulsion of the Soviet Union in 1939 from the League of Nations resolved this issue in the eyes of legal advisers to the ILO. C. M. Berkeley, "ODG/Note 18106," November 16, 1953, AG 8: Box 1934, X07.211 (470), UNESCO Archives.

[129] RGANI, f. 3, op. 8, d. 93, ll. 110-12.

the USSR the seventieth UNESCO member state.[130] As an illustration of the extent of British investment in bringing the prodigal state into the international organization, Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden personally sent the telegram to UNESCO confirming Soviet enrollment.[131]

An hour before this ceremony, a Soviet delegation took its seat alongside emissaries and observers from more than fifty countries in The Hague to debate for three weeks the draft of the Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, which UNESCO envisioned as a landmark agreement among states to preserve material culture in warzones in light of the destruction of artifacts in the Second World War. As the first UNESCO-sponsored gathering attended by Soviet representatives, the convention represented an opportunity for the Soviet Union to commit symbolically to UNESCO's mission of promoting concerted international cooperation in the field of culture and show its ability to lead the way on this cause. In his report on the convention, V. S. Kemenov, the chief of the Soviet delegation and a fiery socialist realist art critic who had recently played a role in the attacks on "cosmopolitanism" under Stalin, portrayed his main objective at the meetings as the strengthening of the convention in the face of bids by Western nations to weaken it for their own militaristic purposes. "The central question of the discussion," according to Kemenov, revolved around the Soviet push to expunge language backed by the American delegation in articles four and seven of the convention that provided loopholes in regulations requiring protection of cultural artifacts in the event of "military necessity." In addition to this central bone of contention, the communist detachments, with an eye toward countering attempts by Western

[130] Arnaldo Schaffner, April 21, 1954, AG 8: Box 1934, X07.211 (470), UNESCO Archives; and "U.S.S.R. Becomes Member of UNESCO (Press Release No. 1059)," April 21, 1954, AG 8: Box 1934, X07.211 (470), UNESCO Archives.

[131] Anthony Eden, April 21, 1954, AG 8: Box 1934, X07.211 (470), UNESCO Archives.

empires to exclude conflicts in their colonial territories from the convention, pushed for an excision of statutes restricting its coverage to international wars. From the perspective of Soviet negotiators, the resistance of smaller capitalist nations to Soviet proposals derived from pressure exerted on them by the US and the UK behind the scenes. When the French delegate suddenly turned against a Soviet amendment, they attributed his about face to rumors of a "social 'call'" from Paris and a visit by the Frenchman to the American embassy the day before. They also regretted the "passive position" of Asian and Latin American delegates at the conference, but reported that the Asians "usually" expressed sympathy with their views in private conversations. In spite of a full defeat of their effort to purge the convention of exceptions for "military necessity" and only a partial victory on the dispute over internecine imperial warfare, Kemenov and his partners gave a favorable review of the results of the conference. Endorsing Soviet adoption of the convention, they characterized the sessions as evincing a "progressive character" and transpiring "peacefully and business-like."[132]

Unaware of these internal approbations, UNESCO executives had little inkling as to how the USSR viewed the international organization or what specific aspects of its program the Soviet Union would seek to change once its citizens appeared in its organs in the upcoming months. UNESCO had little insight into the opinions of the new Soviet rulers and what their reversal of Stalin's position portended. In the weeks after welcoming the Soviet Union into its ranks, UNESCO conducted a review of Soviet remarks during the meetings of ECOSOC before 1953 but found little useful except one occasion on which Soviet attendees directly criticized the budget and "propaganda" of the organization. In other instances, the Soviet ECOSOC delegate

[132] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 17, ll. 235-42.

either abstained from commenting at all or tersely uttered his approval of the fusillades of insults launched at the organization by his Eastern European comrades.[133]

American officials involved in UNESCO matters panicked at the arrival of the USSR in the international organization, which came at an inopportune time for them in the context of American domestic politics. While American UNESCO intermediaries had to appease a widespread campaign to ban UNESCO materials from American public life and purge the UNESCO administration of accused communists (see chapter 3), they also bore the responsibility of convincing these enemies of UNESCO that the organization's core mission and activities played a vital role in projecting American values abroad.

In a statement released in the weeks after the USSR joined UNESCO, Dr. George Shuster, who presided as chairman of the US National Commission for UNESCO, admitted that only time would tell what the shift in Soviet policy meant. However, he cited the attacks from the communist world on UNESCO, its refusal to join the organization, and its constant transgression of the concept of "the free exchange of ideas and knowledge" as sufficient grounds for other countries to cautiously "assess the implications of this communist move and to stand ready to resist any sudden moves to undermine UNESCO's effectiveness." Shuster placed the "burden" on the USSR to live up to the UNESCO Charter, the precepts of which he argued ran counter to previous Soviet actions. "I believe," he concluded, "that Soviet membership in UNESCO has created an unparalleled opportunity for a world audience to contrast Soviet promises and Soviet performance."[134] In a speech to the Miami Chamber of Commerce in May,

[133] P. C. Terenzio, "Soviet Criticisms during the Discussions of the Reports of UNESCO to the Economic and Social Council," August 5, 1954, AG 8: Box 1934, X07.211 (470), UNESCO Archives.

[134] "Statement by Dr. George N. Shuster, Chairman, U.S. National Commission for UNESCO," n.d., 1–2, AG 8: Box 1934, X07.211 (470), UNESCO Archives.

US Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs David Kay, while airing his concern that the Soviet acceptance of the terms of the charters of the ILO and UNESCO amounted to little more than an extension of the Stalinist "peace offensive," conjectured that the USSR had come to appreciate UN specialized agencies and feared missing the chance to use them as an entry point into the developing world. At the same time, he questioned whether it would "adapt itself to the free world atmosphere in which these United Nations activities function" or merely exploit these agencies for "disruption through infiltration."[135]

Believing that they had a fellow traveler in the office of the director-general, many of the most influential and important American figures upholding the US-UNESCO relationship sought to use their longstanding acquaintance with Evans as a direct line through which they could, in clear violation of the organization's autonomy from interference by a government, badger the international organization into fostering a suspicious and icy reception for the USSR. In the two weeks following the inauguration of the USSR as a UNESCO member state, former Assistant Secretary of State Benton, who had led Erenberg on his tour of the US in 1946, inquired of Evans in a raft of letters whether the enlistment of the USSR would "make UNESCO's road more difficult in the United States."[136] Disagreeing with a remark from a UNESCO Secretariat staff member that the Soviet entry might provide "the adrenaline needed by a sick and debilitated patient," Benton related to Evans his anxieties over the possibility that the USSR would instead "castrate and devitalize" UNESCO. To plan for any anticipated Soviet maneuvers undermining US objectives in the organization, Benton insisted that Evans journey from Paris to Washington

[135] "Address by the Honorable David McK. Key [Sic], Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs, Before the Miami Chamber of Commerce, Saxony Hotel, Miami Florida, at 6:30 P.M., E.S.T., Thursday, May 13 1954," May 12, 1954, 1–8, AG 8: Box 1934, X07.211 (470), UNESCO Archives.

[136] William Benton, April 30, 1954, AG 8: Box 1934, X07.211 (470), UNESCO Archives.

D. C. to hold urgent talks with President Dwight Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles.[137] In a reply later that May, Director-General Evans sought to resist this pressure, refusing to travel to the United States and stating that he "must assume" the Soviet Union aspired to "devote their efforts to the advancement of the purposes of the organization and that they will cooperate in the same way as other member states."[138] But Benton dismissed Evans's sunny outlook and wondered if the director-general had forgotten to whom he answered when declining to scurry to the White House. "Unhappily," he sardonically advised the director-general, "the UNESCO board and the general conference are not those who must be persuaded of UNESCO's performance."[139]

Over the next several months, Evans resisted petitions from Benton and other prominent American UNESCO supporters on the subject while ignoring several articles placed in the American press to bully him into submission by casting doubt on the desirability of having the USSR in UNESCO.[140] In correspondence with Walter Laves, the former American UNESCO deputy director-general who Benton selected to chair an American panel on the Soviet decision to join UNESCO, Evans revealed his frustration with the hawkish stance of Benton and others. "I am greatly worried," he wrote, "about the possible mishandling of relations with the USSR in regard to its participation in UNESCO." Rejecting attempts to transform UNESCO into a "forum" for the Cold War, Evans suggested that any preemptive hostile steps by the US would alienate other countries wishing for UNESCO to stay above the petty accusations of immorality the two superpowers hurled at each other as part of their propaganda war. Mutual labors on

[137] William Benton, May 7, 1954, 1–3, AG 8: Box 1934, X07.211 (470), UNESCO Archives.

[138] Luther H. Evans, May 19, 1954, AG 8: Box 1934, X07.211 (470), UNESCO Archives.

[139] William Benton, May 26, 1954, 1–2, AG 8: Box 1934, X07.211 (470), UNESCO Archives.

[140] Luther H. Evans, "ODG/478.012," August 24, 1954, AG 8: Box 1934, X07.211 (470), UNESCO Archives.

common problems, he predicted, would earn the appreciation of the world's population better than "proving . . . that all Russians are slave laborers or that all white men in the South have to kill a Negro to be eligible to vote."[141] At the eighth session of the UNESCO General Conference in Montevideo, Uruguay, at the end of 1954, the Soviet delegate likely corroborated, in the eyes of Benton and other American UNESCO promoters, their prediction that the polemics of the Cold War would corrupt the relative placidity of past general conferences. Despite some examples of cooperation between the US and the USSR, the chief Soviet delegate made his debut at the first plenary session and set the tone for the rest of the conference by rebuking UNESCO for allowing Taiwan to retain its status as a UNESCO member state.[142]

But apart from attending major conferences and some dabbling in UNESCO's initiatives, the USSR had almost no practical impact on the international organization in 1954 and 1955. During the summer and fall of 1954, diplomatic and other personnel from Soviet domestic agencies studied UNESCO's overall program but made no effort to engage in a way comparable to even the smallest of UNESCO member states. The UNESCO Division for Documents and Publications, along with other departments, delivered to the Soviet government hundreds of publications that included bibliographies published by the organization and copies of recent editions of UNESCO reports in English and French.[143] Inside the Soviet Union, academic institutions circulated memos detailing the multifaceted threads of UNESCO's activity, asking

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[141] Luther H. Evans, August 31, 1954, 1–3, AG 8: Box 1934, X07.211 (470), UNESCO Archives.

[142] "Records of the General Conference, Eight Session, Montevideo, 1954: Proceedings" (UNESCO, 1955), 40, UNESDOC; and "Records of the General Conference, Eighth Session, Montevideo, 1954: Resolutions" (UNESCO, 1955), 66, UNESDOC.

[143] "List of Publications and Documents from the Libraries Division of UNESCO compiled for the Information of the USSR," May 14, 1954, 1–3, AG 8: Box 1934, X07.211 (470), UNESCO Archives; and N. D. Bammate, "Envoi de Publications À l'U.R.S.S. (Memo ODG/GMC/16.310," July 6, 1954, AG 8: Box 1934, X07.211 (470), UNESCO Archives.

their employees to consider in which aspects of the organization the Soviet Union should partake.[144] In 1955, a handful of Soviet academicians showed up at UNESCO seminars (for example, the seventeenth and eighteenth conferences on public education, as well as meetings on solar and wind energy). That year, the Soviet Union also became a member of international associations closely affiliated with UNESCO (the International Bureau of Education, or IBE, and the International Political Science Association, or IPSA); permitted its scholars to compose articles for UNESCO publications (on the teaching of the social sciences in the USSR and the trip of Polish poet Adam Mickiewicz to Russia in the nineteenth century); and put together a team of Soviet historians who began to provide input into one of UNESCO's major enterprises, the Project for a History of the Scientific and Cultural Development of Mankind (see chapter 7).

Yet the Soviet leadership, disregarding or perhaps unaware of the decentralized and intensive work done in other countries to corral universities, civic organizations, and public agencies to participate in UNESCO, erroneously assumed at first that it could handle the exacting tempo of UNESCO and the organization's demands through a highly centralized process of mediation concentrated in the highest ranks of MID, the Soviet Ministry of Culture, and the Central Committee of the Communist Party. Consequently, supplications for Soviet involvement in UNESCO-linked organizations and events went unanswered for months. In a review of the situation conducted later on, the USSR Ministry of Culture found that Soviet organs often did not receive UNESCO requests until after the deadline to fulfill them had already

[144] For example, the USSR Academy of Sciences (AN SSSR) distributed among its subordinate organs in September information on the "scope and nature" of the international organization. Emphasizing the role of UNESCO as the nexus for international collaboration in the spheres of education, science, and culture, the director of the AN SSSR Social Sciences Library wrote to the Secretary of the Division of Historical Sciences that the organization had "a relationship with a countless number of national and international organizations as well as scientific, political, trade-union, cooperative, technical, medicinal, cultural, educational, athletic, youth, religious, and pacifist [organizations]." But he also cautioned that "there are progressive as well as reactionary international organizations" among these entities. ARAN, f. 457, op. 1, d. 434, l. 105.

passed. On average, it took three months for UNESCO letters to reach their intended destination in the Soviet Union.[145]

In the context of this sputtering start to Soviet engagement and motivated by hopes for a deescalation in the Cold War in the wake of the July 1955 Geneva summit between the heads of state of the "four powers," UNESCO sought to assert itself as the primary channel through which the intellectuals of the capitalist and communist blocs could lay the foundation for mutual understanding between the two sides. In October 1955, the international organization managed to include a ten-page memorandum written by René Maheu (the assistant director-general and future director-general of UNESCO) as part of the agenda of the meeting of the foreign ministers of the four powers taking place in Geneva as a follow up to the summit earlier that year. The document, "Concerning the Role UNESCO Could Play in the Development of Relations Between East and West," not only advertised to the foreign ministers how they could employ UNESCO's program to facilitate dialogue between their countries, but also outlined a plan to bring their populations closer together. In particular, Maheu proposed that the upcoming general conference in 1956 adopt a UNESCO "major project" on "the development of educational, scientific, and cultural relations between the countries of East and West." Paid for by a "special

[145] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 2, l. 3. Furthermore, MID, the Soviet Ministry of Culture, and the Central Committee displayed an ideological rigidity when it came to much of what UNESCO had to offer. In August 1955, the director of the State Hermitage in Leningrad wrote the Ministry of Culture to ask permission for its numismatics division to respond to a ten-month old invitation to become a member of the International Numismatics Commission, which belonged to the constellation of dozens of international bodies closely related to UNESCO. Consulting with the Central Committee, the ministry overruled this entreaty and left other appeals from UNESCO unanswered. GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 1, l. 24-27; 29. To further probe the hermetic communist state's willingness to let UNESCO infiltrate Soviet territory, Director-General Evans proposed that the USSR accept four "traveling exhibitions" that would visit schools and other "cultural-educational" organizations "in provincial centers as well as more important institutions and museums in the capitals" of the Soviet Union. Consisting of two collections of reproductions of world art before and after 1860 as well as copies of Japanese engravings and the drawings of Leonardo da Vinci, the exhibitions belonged to part of a UNESCO arsenal aimed at instilling in the publics of different countries an appreciation of a common aesthetic inheritance. The Central Committee accepted the Japanese and Da Vinci collections for limited showing at the Hermitage and in Moscow, but turned down the troves of paintings from before and after 1860 because, as the Ministry of Culture wrote, UNESCO had "arbitrarily" selected art representative of the "formalistic" tradition of "bourgeois art" reviled by official Soviet tastes. RGANI, f. 5, op. 17, d. 544, ll. 70-74.

fund" that would receive half of its money from UNESCO and half from the coffers of the four countries, this project would take measures to increase the teaching of the French and English languages in the Soviet Union while expanding the study of Russian and "other languages" of the USSR in France, England, and the United States. It would also convene experts to assure the "accuracy" of depictions of the other three countries in the textbooks of each nations' public school systems; provide resources for the publication of academic and other types of literature in each country from the other three powers; support the translation of English, French, and Russian scholarship into all three languages; and disburse funds for the reproduction of art from the four countries for circulation. The UNESCO note also urged the four powers to take steps to encourage the "free exchange of information" and "eliminate obstacles" to the flow of all documents between the nations with the exception of secrets pertaining to national security.[146]

While Molotov, in a letter to the Presidium on December 1, reacted with suspicion to the motivations behind the memorandum, he expressed interest in some of the ideas for collaboration it contained. On the one hand, the call for the "free exchange of information" caused the Soviet leaders to recoil from the document as a possible plot by Western states. The "main proposals" of the memorandum, in the words of Molotov, "reflect, albeit in a softer form, those proposals of the Western powers which we rejected at the Geneva meeting . . . as aimed at interfering in the internal affairs of states." Thus, he maintained, the "Western powers," having "not achieved their goals at the Geneva conference," conspired to "use UNESCO for discussion of only those issues that interest them." On the other hand, the Soviet foreign minister identified some elements of the UNESCO plan that did not "raise objections" from the Soviet perspective, such as the teaching of languages and the dissemination of replicas of national art. After discussing the

[146] Quoted from the Russian translation of the document in the archives of the Communist Party. RGANI, f. 3, op. 8, d. 342, ll. 110-19.

matter at several meetings, the Presidium decided to send a reply to Director-General Evans on December 30 that detailed which schemes it found of interest while criticizing the "freedom of information" segments and the absence of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in UNESCO.[147]

On February 20, 1956, or just five days before Khrushchev gave his "Secret Speech" on Stalinist repression to a shocked audience at the Twentieth Party Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Molotov revealed to the Soviet people this correspondence with the international organization in a statement over the airwaves of *Radio Moskva*. According to a report from the Norwegian Telegraph Agency obtained by UNESCO, the Soviet foreign minister, phrasing this revelation as if the USSR had concocted the initiatives laid out in the memorandum, expressed his support for an "International Fund under UNESCO for the purpose of cultural cooperation between countries" that would "assist member states of UNESCO with the exchange of cultural delegations, professors, students, exhibitions and scientific material, and to arrange international congresses and youth meetings."[148] The next day, *Pravda* and *Izvestiia*, amid extended coverage of the Twentieth Party Congress, ran an article by an anonymous author summarizing communications between Evans and Molotov. The featured story integrated the formerly taboo international organization into the new narrative of Soviet internationalism in the post-Stalinist era. "The Soviet minister of foreign affairs," the article recounts, "stressed [to the director-general] that the Soviet government is for broad international cooperation in the sphere of cultural exchange and the strengthening of cultural relations," viewing this "cooperation as one of the most important means of strengthening peace and creating an atmosphere of trust

[147] Ibid., ll.102-105.

[148] The Norwegian Telegraph Agency characterized this proposal as having been made "in a letter to the Director-General Luther Evans, in response to a request from UNESCO to the Foreign Ministers of the Four Great Powers to state their view on the role which this particular United Nations Organisation ought to play concerning the development of relations between East and West." "Publication via Moscow of Letter from U.S.S.R. Foreign Minister to UNESCO Director-General," February 21, 1956, AG 8: Box 1934, X07.211 (470), UNESCO Archives.

between peoples." Moreover, the article casts this onetime symbol of the cosmopolitan decay of national culture and imperial subordination of peoples as a main instrument for realizing Khrushchev's foreign-policy platform of peaceful coexistence. "In the expansion of cultural exchange between peoples," the article continues, "UNESCO—an organization specially created to help achieve the goals of international peace, general wellbeing and mutual understanding between peoples through the development of education, science and cultural—is called upon to play an important role."[149]

The memorandum UNESCO sent to the Soviet foreign minister at the Geneva conference therefore opened a line of communication between the higher-ups in the communist world and UNESCO that resulted in the introduction of a favorable interpretation of the international organization into Soviet public consciousness for the first time. By addressing the Soviet public, Molotov signaled a revolution in Soviet foreign policy, alerting Soviet citizens to a radically new approach to multilateral organizations. Coinciding with the denunciation of the "cult of personality" that same week, the announcement confirmed the transformation of the Soviet Union into a willing participant in an international organizational system inspired by Western internationalism but designated as antithetical to the nationalist isolationism propagated under Stalin just three years before.

The October memorandum also brought the attention of Soviet leaders back to UNESCO and the question of how to invigorate Soviet activity in the organization after little progress in cultivating relations since 1954. In late November 1955, V. A. Zorin, the deputy of MID who served two stints as the USSR ambassador to the UN over the course of his career, appealed to

[149] "K voprosu o roli IuNESKO v razvitii nauchnykh i kul'turnykh sviazei mezhdu narodami," *Izvestiia*, February 21, 1956, 6; and "K voprosu o roli IuNESKO v razvitii nauchnykh i kul'turnykh sviazei mezhdu narodami," *Pravda*, February 21, 1956, 10.

the Presidium to send a delegation to a meeting of representatives from governmental agencies responsible for cultural diplomacy mentioned by Maheu in his communiqué. Assuring the Presidium that the decisions of the conference would not place any binding "obligations" on represented states, Zorin convinced the Soviet governing council to approve a delegation to the conference consisting of the head of the All-Union Society for Cultural Relations with the Abroad (VOKS), as well as the deputy ministers of the USSR Ministry of Culture, the Ministry of Higher Education, and MID (i.e., Zorin himself).[150] What these emissaries learned at this conference only reinforced in their minds the need to organize more effectively their country's dealings with UNESCO. While attending the conference, A. I. Denisov, the chairman of VOKS, had a lengthy conversation with the UNESCO Secretariat employee charged with funneling printed materials to the USSR. Speaking "frankly" as a fellow communist, the French UNESCO worker complained about the "extreme slowness" from the Soviet agencies in getting back to UNESCO, citing his experience of not receiving a reply to a letter he had given to the Soviet embassy more than a year previously. Now that the international organization had "ceased to be an American branch for cultural affairs," Denisov's interlocutor concluded, the USSR should send materials "ranging from bibliographies on various spheres of knowledge to articles and essays on different themes of Soviet life (for example, about fishermen in some region, sanatorium works, and so on)."[151]

But most importantly in terms of the long-term trajectory of Soviet involvement in UNESCO, the 1955 memorandum from the international organization accelerated the creation of

[150] RGANI, f. 3, op. 8, d. 36, ll. 126-29. For a short biography of Zorin, who would become a central figure in MID's management of Soviet involvement in UNESCO, see: I. S. Ivanov et al., eds., *Ocherki istorii ministerstva inostrannykh del rossii v trex tomax,* vol. 2 (Moskva: OLMA-Press, 2002), 347.

[151] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 2, ll. 146-47.

an infrastructure inside the Soviet Union that would function as a permanent conduit for sustained cooperation between Soviet domestic agencies, UNESCO, and its many constituent international organizations until the collapse of the USSR in 1991.

On December 1, or the same day Molotov wrote the Central Committee about Maheu's letter, the Presidium passed a resolution to establish the Soviet UNESCO Commission, which would act as the sole manager of the flow of information and people among Soviet educational, scientific, and cultural agencies and the international organization. This resolution came at the request of Zorin and the deputy minister of culture, S. V. Kaftanov, who had grown frustrated over the inability of the USSR to take advantage of UNESCO. "The absence in the Soviet Union of an organ that can unite the diverse activity necessary for participating in UNESCO, and which could carry out the necessary coordination of activities, greatly complicates the implementation of work related to our involvement in the organization," the two ministers explained. Given the real dangers of fraternizing with Western persons and institutions under Stalinism, Soviet domestic agencies had hesitated to reciprocate when UNESCO contacted them. "Without a decision that obligates our agencies to participate in UNESCO," the two functionaries emphasized, "Soviet organizations directly concerned do not take a sufficiently active part, and sometimes, noting that they are not instructed to do so, completely refuse to participate in UNESCO work." Attaching to their proposition a description of other national commissions, the Soviet apparatchiks recommended that the USSR model its commission on those in other large countries (the US, France, the UK, etc.) and predicted that "the beginning of the USSR's participation in UNESCO and organizations related to it would allow us to receive valuable scholarly information and also use UNESCO channels to expand our international cultural and scholarly relations."

The Presidium agreed to direct the ministry of culture to form the Soviet UNESCO Commission and relegate responsibility to it for all UNESCO matters. After selecting as chairman of the commission the Minister of Culture N. A. Mikhailov and allotting five people from this ministry to serve as secretarial staff, the Presidium made the commission an interagency affair by drafting eight high-level officials from Soviet organs relevant to UNESCO as permanent members, including Gromyko, as a MID deputy foreign minister; V. N. Stoletov, the deputy minister of higher education; P. V. Zimin, the deputy minister of the RSFSR Ministry of Education; academician A. V. Topchiev, the chief scholar-secretary of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR (AN SSSR) Presidium; L. N. Solov'ev, the deputy chair of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions (VTsSPS); Denisov, the VOKS chairman; as well as R. V. Babeichuk and G. Ia. Kiselev, the deputy minister and minister of the Ukrainian SSR and BSSR respectively.[152] In the following months, the Ukrainian SSR and BSSR set up their own national commissions with Babeichuk and Kiselev as chairs.[153] The Presidium of the Communist Party also formally ordered all "union, union-republic, and republic ministries and agencies" to comply with UNESCO requests passed along by the commission.[154]

[152] RGANI f. 3, op. 8, d. 337, ll. 195-202; and GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 11, ll. 106-13. Gromyko left the commission just over a year after its creation when he became the foreign minister, replacing D. T. Shepilov in early 1957. Afterward, one of Gromyko's deputies served on the commission for the next decade. GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 9, l. 106.

[153] Babeichuk personally pushed, against some initial resistance from the Soviet UNESCO Commission, for the creation of a separate Ukrainian UNESCO Commission, proposing in March 1956 that it would help "the coordination of the activities of different Ukrainian organizations" in their effort to "increase international scholarly and cultural relations in accordance with the UNESCO Charter." The BSSR founded its own commission in October 1956. For the petition from Babeichuk and a description of the Belorussian UNESCO Commission, see GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 1, ll. 198-99; and GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 11, ll. 106-13.

[154] RGANI f. 3, op. 8, d. 337, l. 195.

In December 1955, the Presidium set up the commission's counterpart and primary ally in Paris—the Soviet UNESCO Delegation.[155] A replication in miniature of the USSR ambassadorial detachment at UN headquarters in New York, the Soviet UNESCO Delegation had an organizational structure resembling that of other Soviet diplomatic outposts. A chief permanent delegate acted as the "ambassador," sitting on the executive board and governing the delegation. This position had four occupants over the first fifteen years of its existence: from 1956 to 1958, Kemenov, the former delegate to the 1954 Hague convention; from 1959 to 1961, A. G. Kulazhenkov, a former ambassador to Mexico; from 1961 to 1965, A. P. Pavlov, a former ambassador to France in the last years of Stalin's rule; and from 1965 to 1971, V. K. Sobakin, a Soviet international legal scholar. The delegation also employed an attaché; first, second, and third secretaries, each of which nominally dealt with one of UNESCO's specialties (social sciences, natural sciences, mass communications etc.); support staff (accountant, typist, chauffer, cook); and advisers, including the official BSSR and Ukrainian SSR permanent delegates to UNESCO.[156] Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the Ukrainian and BSSR permanent delegates chafed at their awkward position of belonging to the Soviet UNESCO Delegation while simultaneously purporting to speak for republics recognized as independent by the UN. "Because of this duality," Kiselev wrote to the Soviet UNESCO Commission in 1963, the BSSR permanent delegate "must contact foreigners in UNESCO . . . on issues relating only to the Soviet UNESCO Delegation. UNESCO Secretariat employees always meet these approaches with perplexity or an ironic smile, and in a number of instances refused to talk to the BSSR delegate at all." When a Soviet secretariat worker let slip to a Belgian UNESCO envoy that the

[155] RGANI, f. 3, op. 8, op. 342, l. 102. The representative to the forty-second session of the UNESCO Executive Board recommended forming this delegation on November 28, 1955. GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 5, l. 128.

[156] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 1, ll. 145-46; and GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 2, ll. 9-10.

BSSR permanent delegate aided the Soviet UNESCO Delegation, the Belgian, at a meeting of the executive board, moved to shut down a speech by the BSSR representative "on the basis that he, supposedly, was the second orator from the same power—the USSR."[157]

Staffed and financed by MID on the basis of advice from the Soviet UNESCO Commission, the delegation was subject to the rules and privileges of other diplomatic personnel, carrying out its duties in "close contact" with the Soviet embassy in Paris but under the "general guidance" of the commission and the "observation" of MID. As the eyes and ears of the Soviet Union at UNESCO, the delegation had to monitor events at the international organization while cultivating relationships with UNESCO employees and delegations from other UNESCO member states, especially those from the communist bloc. In terms of its daily tasks, the delegation had to vigorously defend Soviet interests in meetings with UNESCO officials; tout the achievements of the USSR in education, science, and culture; keep the commission privy to the latest UNESCO news; report to MID and the commission the successes of other countries in UNESCO-related areas of knowledge; counter the influence of capitalist countries in the international organization; supervise the lives of Soviet international civil servants in the UNESCO Secretariat; and host Soviet groups or individuals temporarily visiting UNESCO for seminars and conferences.[158]

The founding of the Soviet UNESCO Commission reflected not just a desire on the part of the USSR to use UNESCO as a platform for propaganda, but also a sincere acceptance of the international organization's philosophy and mission of achieving peace through international intellectual communion. The 1956 constitutional regulations delineating the purposes of the

[157] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 24, ll. 265-66.

[158] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 1, ll. 144-46. For more on the role of the delegation in keeping watch over Soviet secretariat workers, see chapters 5 and 6.

Soviet UNESCO Commission stipulated that it should enhance "the use of UNESCO for the comprehensive development of cooperation" between the USSR, the international organization, "its related organizations," and its member states; advertise "USSR policies aimed at strengthening peace" and "lessening international tension"; and also focus on "increasing international cooperation and mutual understanding between all governments through the preparation and dispatching of relevant information to UNESCO, its related organizations, and national commissions." The commission would accomplish these objectives by showcasing the "achievements of the USSR in science, culture, and education"; providing commentary on, and proposals for, drafts of the biennial plans passed by the UNESCO General Conference; formulating specific directives for delegations to sessions of the general conference, executive board, as well as regional conferences; determining whether or not the Soviet Union should join organizations, councils and associations holding consultative status with UNESCO; nominating candidates for positions in the UNESCO Secretariat and as technical experts in "weakly-developed countries"; and fostering "working contacts" with all foreign persons and institutions falling within UNESCO's orbit.[159]

As a coordinating body, the commission took on the enormous job of operating as an intermediary between UNESCO and hundreds of Soviet universities, academic institutes, public organizations, and press agencies, delivering to these organs thousands of invitations, calls for applications, information requests, and publications from the international organization annually. The regulations outlined how, in theory, the commission would function as a middleman between UNESCO and Soviet society. When the commission received solicitations, it "studied" them in order to settle on which Soviet agency or agencies could most effectively respond with

[159] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 2, ll. 139-41.

appropriate personnel or documentation. Once the assigned agencies had drafted a reply under the loose guidance of the commission, they had to mail it back to the commission and the USSR Council of Ministers (as well as, for sensitive matters, to the Central Committee) for final approval. Oddly, the regulations also contained a provision that contradicted this procedure by permitting individual Soviet organizations, if UNESCO directly addressed appeals to them, to unilaterally confer with the international organization provided that they pass along copies of the correspondence to the commission.[160] As subsequent chapters will show, this qualification caused constant headaches for members of the commission left out of the loop as they struggled to keep track of developments.[161]

More problematically, the responsibility for fulfilling UNESCO petitions fell on domestic agencies lacking the incentives with which national commissions in other countries lured their compatriots to write for UNESCO publications, work in its administration, or attend its conferences. Instead of commanding the commission to organize and pay for all Soviet activity in UNESCO, the regulations devolved to Soviet domestic agencies the chores of devising proposals, assembling delegations, selecting candidates for secretariat posts, and funding the expenses accrued by delegations or individual specialists in preparation for and while serving abroad (these costs included "reports and materials, stands, exhibitions, [and] photos" made before and after returning from the trip as well as salaries, transport, and per diem stipends during travel).[162] While, in the West, UNESCO had established through advertising campaigns a

[160] Ibid., l. 133.

[161] In January 1957, the commission chairman sent UNESCO a letter complaining that UNESCO sometimes did not send the commission copies of letters sent to Soviet domestic agencies. A. Zhukov, January 9, 1957, 1–2, AG 8: Box 1934, X07.211 (470), UNESCO Archives.

[162] The commission, however, would take the lead in organizing a delegation if it required representatives from multiple agencies. In this case, each agency still had to cover the expenses. GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 2, ll. 134-35.

reputation among professionals in the fields under its purview, represented an internationalist ideology popular among a significant number of academics, and offered prestige to those keen on advancing their careers or the reputations of their institutions, the international organization had little resonance or allure among Soviet citizens or their employers who, if they had heard of UNESCO at all, gleaned their knowledge of the organization from the multiple denunciations of it as a cosmopolitan tool for Western imperialists in the Soviet press before 1953. As we will see, the recalcitrance of Soviet organizations, almost all of which had little interest in diverting their resources outside their own walls let alone beyond Soviet borders, continued to surface as one of the core weaknesses in the Soviet crusade to exert influence on UNESCO.

The composition and structure of the Soviet UNESCO Commission grew larger and more complex as it underwent several reforms over the next decade. In the summer of 1957, the commission moved from the ministry of culture to the USSR Council of Ministers' State Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries (GKKS)—a new organ succeeding the defunct VOKS and charged with handling the upswing in cultural and academic exchanges between the USSR and the rest of the world. This transfer arose out of a realization that the expansive mandate of GKKS aligned more closely with the multidimensional UNESCO program than any specific ministry. As Minister of Culture Mikhailov observed when arguing for the reassignment, his ministry was "only one of the agencies interested in UNESCO work."[163] While most of the members and secretarial staff stayed on at the commission after its relocation, Mikhailov relinquished his position as chairman of the commission to GKKS Chairman G. A. Zhukov, a seasoned journalist who had worked as the *Pravda* correspondent in Paris from 1947 to 1952 until assuming the job of editor-in-chief of the *Pravda* international section for five

[163] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 9, ll. 112-13.

years.[164] In February 1958, Zhukov orchestrated a reorganization of the commission, dividing its labor among Soviet domestic agencies in order to increase productivity because of the disparity between the large amount of money the USSR invested in the organization ($1.7 million annually, or 15 percent of the total UNESCO budget and the second largest contribution of any country behind the US) and the inability of the commission to furnish specialists to write for UNESCO or show up at its events.[165] While the American UNESCO Commission had more than one hundred members and twenty-eight people in its secretarial division at the State Department, the Soviet UNESCO Commission consisted of only nine members and five administrative workers. To open up what one person on the commission called this inordinately "exclusive group," the Soviet UNESCO body recruited in 1958 the head of the Soviet Information Bureau (Sovinformburo), the deputy editor-in-chief of *Pravda*, and the deputy chairman of the State Committee for Radio and Television Broadcasting. By the end of the decade, the commission included over twenty prominent figures from a diverse array of Soviet agencies. By 1967, thirty-six persons sat on the commission.[166]

Most importantly, Zhukov divided up the obligations of the commission among seven committees. Easing the burden of each individual member of the commission who hitherto had answered personally for entire UNESCO fields, the committees produced proposals,

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[164] Zhukov played a significant role in Soviet cultural and diplomatic relations with other countries during the Khrushchev era. In addition to acting as chair of the Soviet UNESCO Commission and GKKS, he served as president of the "USSR-France" Society and vice-president of the Institute of Soviet-American Relations. He was part of a group of writers who won the 1960 Lenin prize for their book on Khrushchev's travel to the US (*Face to Face with America: The Story of N. S. Khrushchev's Visit to the USA, September 15-27, 1959*). He also wrote a book on Khrushchev's tours of southeast Asia. GARF, f. 9518, op. 4, d. 93, ll. 2-7; 23.

[165] At a meeting of the commission that month, Zhukov quoted with pleasure the comments of an adviser to Secretary of State Dulles, who remarked that the USSR had "quickly adjusted" to UNESCO and had started to "insistently and skillfully use UNESCO for its own interests." At the same time, the Soviet chairman expressed a desire to not only increase the number of Soviet citizens sent to UNESCO, but also plan several UNESCO conferences and seminars inside the Soviet Union. See footnote below for citation.

[166] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 11, ll. 176-86; and GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 13, l. 219.

publications, and delegates for corresponding UNESCO divisions and major projects. Thus, the director of the AN SSSR Institute of Oriental Studies, B. G. Gafurov, led a committee on the UNESCO major project "on the Mutual Appreciation of Eastern and Western Cultural Values" (the "East-West" project), which sought to develop cultural understanding between Asian and Western countries; the deputy chief scholar-secretary of the AN SSSR Presidium, N. M. Sisakian, took the reins of the committee for natural sciences; the deputy academic-secretary of the AN SSSR Division of Economics, Philosophy and Law, V. P. D'iachenko, spearheaded the committee on social sciences; the vice president of the RSFSR Institute of Pedagogical Sciences, N. K. Goncharov, ran the committee on education; the deputy editor-in-chief of the *Bol'shaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia* (*The Great Soviet Encyclopedia*), A. A. Zvorykin, directed the committee on culture; the editor-in-chief of the newspaper *Sovetskaia kul'tura* (*Soviet Culture*), V. I. Orlov, commanded the committee on information; and the director of the All-Union State Library of Foreign Literature (VGBIL), M. I. Rudomino, ran the committee on library sciences and bibliography.[167] As UNESCO outposts stationed at some of the major professional centers of the Soviet Union, these committees further integrated the communist world into the global network of the international organization. For example, the committee on library sciences and bibliography, one of the most successful of these units, employed forty-six librarians at VGBIL in Moscow and by 1960 had established branches in the cities of five constituent republics (Alma-Ata, Frunze, Leningrad, Riga, Vilnius). The committee presented Soviet bibliographic materials to UNESCO; familiarized "the Soviet library community with achievements in library sciences abroad"; hosted librarians from foreign countries (in 1960, it welcomed representatives from Sweden, the UK, and Czechoslovakia); published the Russian translation of the journal

[167] RGANI, f. 5, op. 30, d. 280, ll. 28-30.

UNESCO Bulletin for Libraries; and sent Soviet librarians to UNESCO conferences as well as the annual convention of the International Federation of Library Associations and Institutions (IFLA), which had consultative status with UNESCO and was the preeminent worldwide professional organization for librarians.[168]

While these measures gradually improved Soviet responsiveness to UNESCO and made its domestic apparatus commensurate to those of small UNESCO member states, this burgeoning system for mobilization in the USSR paled to the extensive and decentralized complex in the communist country's main adversary, the United States. Simply put, the American head start on the USSR in the institutionalization of a consciousness of international organizations meant that the Soviet Union had as much of a chance of rivaling it in the battle for hegemony in UNESCO in the 1950s and 1960s as it did of surpassing the US in meat and dairy production or other areas of economic competition in which Khrushchev had promised his compatriots inevitable superiority.[169]

Indeed, the US National Commission for UNESCO spanned the entire country and boasted major figures from a broad selection of professions. An "advisory body" controlled by the State Department, the US National Commission relied on the aid of the assistant secretaries of state for public and UN affairs as well as the Office of Education of the Federal Security Agency (a predecessor to the US Department of Education). It also enjoyed the backing of hundreds of organizations spanning the national, state, and local levels. In 1950, for example, the following individuals served on the commission: ten officials from the federal government (the librarian of congress, the commissioner of education, the directors of the Smithsonian Institute

[168] GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 22, ll. 257-61.

[169] For a brief description of Khrushchev's proclamation with respect to meat and dairy, see Taubman, *Khrushchev*, 305–6.

and the National Gallery of Art, Maine Senator Margaret Chase Smith, and others); one governor (Chet Bowles of Connecticut); three college presidents or provosts (from Hunter College, Kansas State, and UCLA); four superintendents from school districts or boards of education (those of New York City, Los Angeles, Maryland, and Washington state); and almost sixty representatives from civic organizations (the National Education Association, Social Science Research Council, National Academy of Sciences, National Grange, B'nai B'rith, Negro Newspaper Publishers Association, among dozens of others). This commission–which celebrated in 1949 the fact that over 9,000 people flocked to Cleveland, Ohio, to see former First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt address the annual US-UNESCO "national conference"–oversaw "panels" sponsoring UNESCO-themed events (a "dramatic arts" panel, for instance, partnered with around 400 "theater groups" to encourage the performance of plays espousing "international understanding"). The National Research Council and the American Council on Education teamed up with the commission to draft scholars for UNESCO seminars and insert UNESCO topics into the curricula of American schools. Fifty "state" and "local" councils also convened discussions on UNESCO issues. Even a department store in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, reportedly sponsored a "UNESCO meeting" that attracted "more than a thousand men and women." In Elmira, New York, a "local UNESCO conference" brought over a thousand people together to found a "permanent UNESCO Council for Elmira."[170] At institutions of higher education in the state of Kansas alone, UNESCO councils sprung up at Baker University, Bethany College, Kansas State, Friends University, the Municipal University of Wichita, Washburn Municipal University of Topeka, and the University

[170] *The UNESCO Story: A Resource and Action Booklet for Organizations and Communities* (Washington, D. C.: US National Commission for UNESCO, 1950), 18–23.

of Kansas.[171] Although the anticommunist, isolationist attacks on UNESCO from the American Right (explored in the next chapter), along with a disillusionment with the lack of progress of the international organization, tempered this enthusiasm somewhat by the late 1950s, UNESCO continued to boast a sizeable American following. In 1955, a "Citizen Consultation Program" comprised fifty-five UNESCO statewide and local gatherings as well as a series of symposia about UNESCO on college campuses. At the national conference that November, 1,000 delegates from all over the United States congregated in Cincinnati, Ohio, to examine UNESCO's program.[172]

While the Kremlin and those at the helm of the Soviet UNESCO Commission drastically underestimated the scale of domestic voluntarism UNESCO required of large countries, some of the rank-and-file of the Soviet foreign-policy community comprehended the gap between the USSR and the US with respect to their recruiting practices for international organizations. In April 1956, Mozhaev, the GKKS official and consultant to the Soviet UNESCO Commission whom we met in the introduction, penned a letter to Khrushchev in which he underscored the importance of UNESCO for the new Soviet doctrine of "peaceful coexistence," rattling off the reforms needed in Soviet thinking to fight the West on its turf. A graduate student who at the time helped plan research on "the legal regulation of cultural relations" at the International Law Department of Moscow State University, Mozhaev took stock of the dramatic transformations in his field over recent years, declaring the permanent break with the Stalinist boycott of international organizations as a fait accompli. "Previously," he noted, "the principle tenet in

[171] The commission even released a book on the diverse activities of UNESCO devotees in Kansas. See *The Kansas Story on UNESCO* (Washington, D.C.: US National Commission for UNESCO, 1949), 36.

[172] D. F. Fleming, "The Fifth National Conference of the US National Commission for UNESCO," AAUP Bulletin 42, no. 2 (Summer 1956): 386–89; and *UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization: An American View* (Washington, D.C.: US National Commission for UNESCO, 1956), 36.

relation to our possible participation in such organizations was as follows: because the activity of certain international organizations was aimed at the dissemination and strengthening of bourgeois ideology, we do not participate in them. But this was earlier." Since the "international situation" had "changed radically" as a result of "the international isolation of the USSR" becoming a thing "permanently of the past," the Soviet Union, he argued, "can and should change [its] attitude to the myriad of international organizations." Citing the writings of Lenin to legitimize his case, the international-relations expert pushed for the USSR to "skillfully use all our opportunities for the bolstering of the struggle against hostile ideology, including within international organizations of the bourgeoisie." Making his chagrin known over the "weak" stance of the USSR, he exhorted Khrushchev to direct the Soviet state to conduct a systematic review of, and make a "long-term plan" for, Soviet entry into the most effective of these bodies.

But Mozhaev went beyond merely enumerating reasons for an increase in Soviet efforts to elevate their influence in these organizations, lobbying for a massive public offensive inside the Soviet Union in the mold of the grassroots initiative in the US. Admitting that the birth of the Soviet UNESCO Commission marked a "new step forward in the activation" of Soviet endeavors in UNESCO, he nevertheless regretted that the Soviet "share in the implementation of the UNESCO program" remained "negligibly small" due to the tendency of Soviet domestic organs to "underestimate the opportunities that membership in UNESCO presents for the strengthening of peace and friendship between peoples." By allowing Soviet agencies to erect a "wall of excessive caution," and thereby doom requests from the international organization to "drown in the archives of these institutions," the young foreign-policy wonk warned that the USSR was "closing" itself off from "one of the international channels for the distribution of truthful information on the development of science and culture in the USSR." In order to educate

Soviet society about the value of UNESCO, Mozhaev judged, "there needs to be the constant and moreover tremendous help of the public [*obshchestvennost'*]." Highlighting the big tent of persons belonging to the American commission, he pointed to the "positive organizational experience of some bourgeois countries and, in particular, the USA" as an example to follow, describing how the American national UNESCO conferences drew "representatives of universities, colleges, theaters, museums, the film industry, libraries, athletic organizations, tourist organizations, etc." To match the Americans, Mozhaev therefore beseeched Khrushchev to permit "the broad and continuous involvement of the Soviet public in the work of the commission."[173]

Because the power of a nation in UNESCO depended in part on the quantity and quality of the citizens it furnished to participate in the organization's program, the US and other Western countries had the upper hand because of their larger pool of possible candidates for selection as contributors to UNESCO publications, workers in its administration, or participants in seminars and conferences. In the short term, the Soviet UNESCO Commission had no realistic expectation of challenging the US in this respect without encouraging Soviet citizens to independently come forward through a public relations campaign about UNESCO on the same scale as the US publicity drive. This would require an intensive allocation of resources for the waging of a far-reaching mobilization in the spirit of the contemporaneous "Virgin Lands" campaign. As this study will demonstrate, however, the long-term dilution of US influence in UNESCO, as a result of the entry of new countries into the international organization, provided an opportunity for the USSR to increase its situational power through the forging of alliances with UNESCO member

[173] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 3, ll. 151-61.

states leery of the West and open to alternative benefactors in the game of multilateral cooperation.

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At its first meeting on January 5, 1956, the Soviet UNESCO Commission spent fifteen hours huddled in the ministry of culture brainstorming about ways to educate its members on the unknown international organization and drawing up a strategy for how to proceed over the next year. The commission secretarial staff pulled together for reference a collection of documents on the history and protocols of UNESCO, a card index of "leading UNESCO activists," samples of UNESCO publications, and a catalogue of all UNESCO books. The chairman then imposed deadlines for the completion of projects (such as the selection of articles from *Sovetskaia kul'tura* to submit to UNESCO periodicals, the devising of a plan for challenging the international organization on the China question, the coercion of Soviet domestic institutions into becoming involved with NGOs tied to UNESCO, and the organization of delegations for upcoming conferences).[174]

In the spring and summer of 1956, the existence of the commission improved the country's utilization of UNESCO as a means of furthering the general foreign-policy agenda of the new Soviet leadership. By September, the Soviet Union had agreed to accept foreign scientists to study in the USSR for six months on UNESCO grants; nominated specialists to sit on UNESCO consultative committees; and sent delegations to two UNESCO regional conferences for Asia and Europe in Tokyo and Aix-en-Provence.[175] Prompted by the USSR, UNESCO put on a conference in Geneva that July on the political, legal, economic, and

[174] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 2, ll. 35-37; 58.

[175] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 1, ll. 151-52; GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 3, ll. 179-80.

historical dimensions of peaceful coexistence at which scholars from the communist and capitalist blocs debated recommendations from the International Economics Association (IEA) and other UNESCO-affiliated scholarly organizations on Khrushchev's new vision for easing tensions.[176] The Soviet UNESCO Delegation also quickly discovered that UNESCO represented a valuable venue for developing bonds with the intellectual classes of countries lacking official diplomatic relations with the USSR. In February, the Soviet UNESCO Delegation to a session of the UNESCO Executive Board in Madrid held informal conversations and exchanged gifts with the mayor of the Spanish capital and the country's minister of education. This first contact, which took place more than a decade before an official diplomatic mission from the USSR opened in Spain, led to the UNESCO Secretariat arranging a back channel between AN SSSR and Spanish academic institutes despite the public hostility between Franco's regime and the communist world. Building on this relationship, the Spanish and Soviet delegates to the executive board later examined the feasibility of a détente between the two countries. Like other countries that would exploit the UN as a covert means for communicating with adversaries, the Soviet Union utilized UNESCO repeatedly over the next decade to foster ties with several other countries in which the USSR had no diplomatic mission, including Australia, Ecuador, and Bolivia.[177]

In spite of these incremental steps, a sudden darkening of the "international situation" overshadowed the progress of the commission and delegation by the end of the year. On October 23, widespread demonstrations broke out across Hungary against the Stalinist government controlled by Mátyás Rákosi and in favor of the ascension to the post of prime minister of the

[176] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 5, ll. 88-89.

[177] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 1, ll. 139-41; GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 6, l. 168; and GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 7, ll. 9-10.

reform-minded Imre Nagy. On November 5, following two weeks of tortured deliberation in the Kremlin, Soviet troops fanned out across Hungary to suppress the uprising, leaving the streets covered with dead civilians and provoking the loudest outcry from the West over communist aggression since the Korean War. On the same day of the brutal crackdown in Hungary, British and French forces touched down in Egypt and brought the dispute between European powers and the government of Gamal Abdel Nasser over the fate of the Suez Canal to a head.[178] And in the morning on that fateful day during which these two crises converged, the seminal event on the UNESCO calendar for that year, the ninth session of the general conference, kicked off in New Delhi, India.

The incessant cascade of news from the Middle East and Eastern Europe wreaked havoc on the best laid plans of the Soviet UNESCO Commission and Delegation for what amounted to the Soviet Union's first major appearance in the world of international organizations beyond UN headquarters in New York. Having diligently prepared for the conference for almost a year by tailoring the composition of the Soviet delegation and its speeches to courting India and other Asian countries at the heart of the new "nonaligned" movement, Soviet authorities had to abruptly send Soviet representatives, who had already arrived in Delhi, "additional directives in light of the changing international situation." These messages instructed the Soviet party to politick among other delegations for resolutions condemning France, the UK, and Israel for their "aggression" in Egypt while relying on procedural rules to block any mention of the unrest in Hungary.[179] But as the Soviet crackdown continued, these instructions proved of little use for the

[178] Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, *Khrushchev's Cold War: The Inside Story of an American Adversary* (New York; London: W. W. Norton, 2006), 132.

[179] For documents relating to the lengthy work of the commission on the conference, see: GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 3, ll. 133-140; 168-69; 176; 200. The commission selected academics and bureaucrats from Central Asia to attend the conference and ordered the delegation, as one of its "major directives," to "develop contacts" with Asian countries:

rebuttal of the unforeseen attacks of other countries on the Soviet invasion of Hungary. When the Soviet delegation begged Moscow to "urgently pass along" direct updates on the official position of the Soviet state on the Hungarian insurrection, their bosses back home told them that all such information would go through its normal route and end up at the Delhi branch of TASS, the Soviet news agency. Yet because meetings of the general conference began at nine o'clock in the morning, or before the arrival of the latest TASS report, the head of the delegation, Kemenov, complained that this arrangement made the team's job "practically impossible" by forcing them to "organize, on our own, around-the-clock duty at the radio-receiver, translating the morning editions of Indian magazines and briefs to the press." Only after the Hungarian debacle had wound down did Soviet attendees of the conference receive direct communications from the Soviet Union. "In the future," Kemenov wrote, "it is necessary that Soviet delegations at conferences are provided with timely information, especially if their work is taking place in a period of exacerbation of the international situation."[180]

At the general conference, Kemenov and his cohort navigated a tense atmosphere from the start. Just four days before it opened, UNESCO received from the Library of the Hungarian National Academy of Sciences in Budapest a telegram protesting "the bloody and bellicose aggression of Soviet troops in Hungary" and imploring the international organization, as the putative protector of cultural and intellectual heritage threatened by wartime destruction, to "provide moral support for the total and immediate withdrawal of the Red Army from our country."[181] In the first hours of the conference, Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru dealt

GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 5, ll. 5-8; 169-70. For the "additional directives" on Hungary and Egypt, see: GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 4, l. 36.

[180] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 8, l. 141.

[181] Hollinshead, November 5, 1956, AG 8: 37:362.58 (439.1), Part 1, UNESCO Archives.

the Soviet contingent a strong blow by referencing the Soviet incursion into Hungary. As the Soviet delegation rued in its final report, the leader of the nonaligned world, in his welcome address, "put the aggression in Egypt and the events in Hungary on the same plane, speaking with the same condemnation of them as supposedly equally significant occurrences." The "wavering" of Nehru throughout the conference on this point "created an extremely fragile position for the Indian delegation . . . and made it difficult for the Soviet delegation to reach a firm agreement with the Indians." Over the course of the conference, the Soviet contingent "rebuffed the slanderous fabrications" of the "Atlantic bloc" regarding the "counterrevolutionary rebellion in Hungary." It also strongly opposed a resolution that did not explicitly mention Israel, the UK, and France as the belligerent countries in Egypt and instead denounced all "aggression" worldwide, thereby implicitly censuring the Soviet role in the Hungarian conflict rather than restricting the reprobation to the Suez Crisis. After unsuccessfully attempting to woo Egypt and other Middle Eastern countries to introduce, in conjunction with the USSR, a resolution specifying the attackers, the socialist countries put forward their own resolution, which the conference ultimately rejected with twenty-two member states in favor (socialist and Middle Eastern countries) and thirty-two against (Western nations and their Latin American allies).[182]

Later in the proceedings, the Soviet delegation struggled to deflect accusations of a lack of empathy for the plight of those affected by the violence in Hungary. To thwart a Belgian proposal to redirect $200,000 from the UNESCO budget for assistance to Hungary and Egypt, Soviet representatives demanded that the Hungarian government approve the resolution before it entered into the minutes of the meeting. But to the dismay of their Soviet partners, the Hungarian delegation called for an "acceleration of this assistance" and commended the Belgian motion as

[182] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 8, ll. 11-14.

honoring "the ideals of UNESCO." At the forty-seventh session of the UNESCO Executive Board in March 1957, UNESCO formalized this decision and empowered the director-general to select a permanent "expert" to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Austria for the purpose of supervising the education of Hungarian children who had left Hungary and fled to the neighboring country during the uprising. Because the socialist camp viewed these refugees as enemies of the current Hungarian government and disapproved of the "mostly American" educational organizations under the auspices of the UNHCR expert, the Soviet board member criticized the appointment of this envoy and abstained from voting on the resolution. "Not speaking directly against aid to Hungarian children abroad," he reported back to Moscow, "the Soviet delegate insisted all funds be equally distributed to assist Hungary and Egypt." Donations to Hungarians *outside* their country, the board member argued, would make this distribution uneven.[183] Once this resolution passed, UNESCO quickly hired an expert for the UNHCR position in Austria and by the summer of 1957 had expended thousands of dollars to ship chairs, desks, typewriters, books, projectors, and other equipment emblazoned with "UNESCO badges" to Hungary.[184] To the annoyance of Soviet officials, UNESCO employees continued to bring up the Hungarian crisis for years to come. In 1959, for example, the UNESCO

[183] This Soviet position corresponded to the orders Budapest gave to its citizens in UNESCO "not to object in principle to giving aid to Hungarian refugees and only note the need to ensure this category of persons not be allocated significant funds while saying that the Hungarian government on its own is spending significant funds on such aid." GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 6, ll. 21-25.

[184] UNESCO intended these badges as an advertisement of the international organization behind the Iron Curtain. But as one UNESCO official lamented, the students and educators receiving these donations "would probably think that UNESCO is the name of a manufacturer of school furniture." "Equipment Ordered for Hungary," n.d., AG 8: 37:362.58 (439.1), Part II, UNESCO Archives; and W. H. Loper, "Delivery of Equipment to Hungary (Memo KDSO/4/57/57)," August 30, 1957, AG 8: 37:362.58 (439.1), Part II, UNESCO Archives.

deputy director-general tried to negotiate the release of intellectuals imprisoned during the 1956 demonstrations.[185]

In spite of the failure of the communist bloc to present itself as the guarantor of peace during the conference, several socialist representatives espied some auspicious developments in retrospect. Thanks to Soviet pressure, the "East-West" project abandoned its orientalist focus on ancient culture as the only valuable contribution of Asian life to the world and shifted part of its activities to taking stock of the decolonization in Asia occurring at the time.[186] The socialist member states also celebrated their missionary work, as representatives of the Soviet Union, among the broader population of India. In Delhi, professionals belonging to the Soviet delegation gave lectures at universities and schools; appeared on radio programs; and met with Prime Minister Nehru. Outside Delhi, they visited Bombay, Hyderabad, Allahabad and other cities to present on Soviet education and open an exhibit on the topic.[187] When attendees from all socialist countries gathered the day after the conference to evaluate their overall performance, Eastern European delegates pointed to these moments in order to justify closer collaboration within the eastern bloc on UNESCO affairs. Warning of the poor "ideological cooperation" between socialist countries and the threat of Western attempts to exploit this weakness to "flirt" with individual people's democracies, the Polish emissary called on the communist world to foster their own "inner UNESCO," or "an organization that would coordinate cooperation between the

[185] GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 1, ll. 196-98.

[186] As the Soviet report on the conference described, the project "should not be limited to issues of the historical past alone, but should be closely related to the contemporary life of the peoples of the East and West and, in particular, take into account the fundamental changes that have unfolded and are currently taking place in Eastern countries." GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 8, l. 24.

[187] In an act symbolizing the international cultural exchange expounded by UNESCO as well as the cordial relations between the two countries, the Belorussian members of the Soviet delegation gave Nehru their "national costume" as well as one of their famous inlaid boxes. Ibid., ll. 139-42; and GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 10, ll. 39-41.

Soviet Union and people's democracies in science, education, culture, etc." This pitch set off a drive over the next decade to better harmonize the tactics of socialist states that would lead to regular, intrasocialist consultations before and after major UNESCO happenings. Expressing remorse over the rejection of the international organization under Stalin, those who spoke at the meeting acknowledged that they "had not properly valued UNESCO," labelling as a "mistake" the Eastern European walkout in the early 1950s. "In leaving UNESCO," the Pole remarked, "we left the battlefield." After conversing with the heads of Western national commissions, another member of the Polish delegation marveled at the size and sway of these rival commissions, comparing them unfavorably to Eastern European commissions. "We were ashamed," he bluntly admitted of the socialist commissions, which he claimed existed "in name only." This embarrassment before the West compelled those at the meeting to back a rapid expansion of their commissions—a proposition that some socialist countries executed better than others.[188]

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Eager to turn the page on the Hungarian debacle, the Soviet UNESCO Commission and Delegation brought in the new year of 1957 with a determination to prove through UNESCO that the USSR not only led the way in education, science, and culture, but also stood at the vanguard of the internationalist mission at the core of the organization. This resolve reflected a broader confident idealism sweeping the Soviet Union at the time as well as the reinvigoration of Soviet internationalism intertwined with the new foreign policy of peaceful coexistence. The "optimism" of the "early years of the Thaw," historian Melanie Ilic points out, "was fueled by real and tangible achievements in economic growth and in scientific and technical developments in the 1950s and was reflected in the somewhat utopian promise of the building of communism

[188] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 9, l. 41; and GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 10, ll. 44-49.

in the near future that was set out in the 1961 Party Program."[189] Determined to "catch up and overtake" the United States on the world stage, the Kremlin infused Soviet foreign policy with what Zubok describes as an "ideological romanticism," or a belief in the "global victory of communism" through a "solidarity of workers and peasants around the world." A harkening back to the Leninist roots of the USSR, this resurrection of "internationalist themes of 'unity of working people' and 'fraternal solidarity'" replaced the "Russocentric chauvinism" of late Stalinism with a socialist internationalist platform sharing the values of peace and international cooperation professed by UNESCO.[190] The World Youth Festival in the summer of 1957 and the launch of the first satellite "Sputnik" in the fall of that year seemed to confirm the conviction that communism could shine as a beacon of international communion among nations and outdo the US as an innovator in everything from ballet to the space race. Sitting at the intersection of these two major pursuits as both a symbol of peace and a venue for parading national successes to a worldwide audience, UNESCO seemed to correspond perfectly to Soviet strengths and Khrushchev's desire to show off Soviet ingenuity.

The de-Stalinizing policies adopted after 1956 also rejuvenated education, science, and culture inside the Soviet Union, reestablishing these spheres of human activity as central venues of Cold War competition and making them more conducive to international exchange. In 1958, Khrushchev announced a set of educational reforms designed to "strengthen the ties between school and life." Enhancing the role of polytechnic education in the Soviet Union, these reforms provided Soviet UNESCO intermediaries with a practical educational model to advertise to weakly-developed countries faced with a choice between Western and Soviet technical

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[189] Melanie Ilic, "Introduction," in *Soviet State and Society Under Nikita Khrushchev*, eds. Melanie Ilic and Jeremy Smith (New York: Routledge, 2009), 2.

[190] Zubok, *A Failed Empire*, 103-05.

assistance through UNESCO (see chapter 9).[191] The prioritization of polytechnic education proceeded from the Soviet leadership's glorification of applied science as the key to Khrushchev's promise to "catch up and overtake America." Beginning in 1956, the Soviet state trumpeted the onset of a "Scientific-Technological Revolution" in every aspect of Soviet life from research in nuclear physics to the modelling of kitchens. In accordance with the fundamental Marxist-Leninist premise that rational planning would quell the chaos of capitalism, this revolution entailed an enhanced utilization of science and technology to improve society as a means of demonstrating the superiority of the socialist order in the context of the Cold War. "In the postwar world," the historian Susan Reid explains, "advanced science and technology were fundamental to the arms and space race as well as for international prestige. But only the socialist system, founded on scientific principles, it was argued, was capable of fully applying the technological revolution to human life."[192] To realize this revolution, Soviet scientists dramatically expanded the scope of their research and began to engage with the latest Western trends such as cybernetics. Notwithstanding the continued sway in Soviet agricultural studies of the famously spurious theories of heredity and genetics of Lysenko, Soviet scholars also challenged and eventually got rid of the most egregious pseudoscientific theories permeating Soviet academia under Stalin.[193] At a deeper level, the Soviet conception of science underwent a transformation over the course of the 1950s from *partiinost'* (party-mindedness) to *nauchnost'* (science-mindedness), or a recognition that "science was important beyond its compatibility with

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[191] For an overview of the public responses to these reforms in the Soviet Union, see Laurent Coumel, "The Scientist, the Pedagogue, and the Party Official: Interests Groups, Public Opinion, and Decision-Making in the 1958 Education Reform," in *Soviet State and Society Under Nikita Khrushchev*, 66–82.

[192] Susan Reid, "The Khrushchev Kitchen: Domesticating the Scientific-Technological Revolution," *Journal of Contemporary History* 40, no. 2 (2005): 290.

[193] Alexander Vucinich, *Empire of Knowledge: The Academy of Sciences of the USSR, 1917-1970* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 257–58.

party decrees" as an independent "force of production" determining the development of technology in the Marxist-Leninist schema of social evolution.[194] Opening up more space for autonomous scientific research, the latter transition enabled Soviet academicians to more proficiently speak the universal language of science when participating in UNESCO activities.

In contrast to the anti-intellectual rhetoric of late Stalinism, the Thaw unleashed by the new leadership in the Kremlin similarly led to a convergence of how the Soviet intelligentsia viewed the role of culture in Soviet society and UNESCO's conception of culture as a means of enlightening the common man and making better citizens. As Tromly maintains, scholars of the Khrushchev era have depicted the intelligentsia as using culture to carve out a space for a kind of "'proto-politics,' in which intellectuals and their supporters sought to 'create a new language of civic culture,' a framework of social and moral responsibility, truth and sincerity.'" Tromly situates this renewed emphasis on culture in a "longstanding *mission civilisatrice*" central to the self-image of the intelligentsia as a distinct social class within the USSR. Culture as a force in society became "all the more urgent in the disorienting post-Stalin era as only it could overcome Stalinism, which was a moral failing predicated on a lack of enlightenment."[195] Thus, these new framings of education, science, and culture, while still heavily influenced by Marxist-Leninist ideology, made Soviet work in these fields more responsive to UNESCO's vision of intellectual endeavors as serving a universal, moral good.

UNESCO also offered an alternative to other types of international bodies considered by the USSR as more detrimental to its geopolitical interests. In August 1957, Yves Brunsvick, a senior official in the French UNESCO Commission who would go on to serve as president of the

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[194] Ethan Pollock, "From Partiinost' to Nauchnost' and Not Quite Back Again: Revisiting the Lessons of the Lysenko Affair," *Slavic Review* 68, no. 1 (2009): 97–98; and Vucinich, *Empire of Knowledge*, 275.

[195] Tromly, *Making the Soviet Intelligentsia*, 187-88.

IBE in the late 1980s, shared with Soviet Permanent Delegate Kemenov his aspiration for UNESCO national commissions to form the foundation of a "'Big Europe,'" or "a commonwealth of all European governments including the USSR and the people's democracies," to oppose the "'Little Europe'" enshrined in the Treaty of Rome creating the European Economic Community (EEC) and the Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) that spring. "For this," he speculated, "it is necessary to foster close relations between European UNESCO commissions, strengthen the exchange of delegations, students, cultural figures, materials, and so forth." The relative independence of these commissions in Western Europe, he reasoned, would help to circumvent the political factors preventing integration.[196] Although it is not clear what the Soviet government thought of this idea, it demonstrates the forgotten centrality of UNESCO to relations between European nations in the first two decades after the Second World War and the diverse possibilities for the USSR to contribute to international governance during the Cold War.

Mindful of the overlap of UNESCO's mandate and Soviet talents as well as the organization's importance in multilateral relations, the commission aimed to introduce the USSR to the world and welcome UNESCO into the Soviet Union in 1957. On top of work on the first UNESCO event in the Soviet Union (a meeting of the International Congress of Sociologists on "the question of peaceful coexistence" in Moscow), the commission invited UNESCO observers to tour the eastern bloc and consult with officials in Moscow on how to stimulate Soviet UNESCO activity. In May, Prem Kirpal, the Indian director of the UNESCO Department of Culture, traveled for seventeen days to Prague, Bratislava, Leningrad, and Moscow to evaluate the national commissions of the two countries and iron out plans to increase the involvement of

[196] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 7, ll. 44-45.

the communist world in the international organization generally as well as the "East-West" project in particular. In line with the Soviet state's new fixation on improving the image of the Soviet Union in the eyes of foreign visitors, the Czechoslovakian and Soviet commissions busied the Indian UNESCO director with an unrelenting schedule of ballets, banquets, plays, concerts, tours, and other displays of Soviet and Czechoslovakian cultural feats while peppering him with flattering remarks that showed, in his words, the "high esteem in which [UNESCO] is held" in both countries. At times, this performative celebration of UNESCO had a comedic effect. For example, as Kirpal walked through the halls of the M. E. Saltykov-Shchedrin State Public Library in Leningrad, he spotted a set of unremarkable, bureaucratic papers from the UNESCO Executive Board (known as 47/EX documents) set out "in a glass case in a prominent part" of the library. In Moscow, the Soviet UNESCO Commission had Kirpal sit down for an interview with the deputy editor of *Sovetskaia kul'tura* on television and give a talk on Moscow radio in order to raise awareness of UNESCO's program among the educated strata of Soviet society. On the one hand, the UNESCO executive found the Czechoslovakian UNESCO Commission better "organized" and more "active" than the Soviet UNESCO Commission, commenting that the USSR suffered from "less familiarity" with the organization and came off as preoccupied with using UNESCO as a bullhorn through which to advertise the Soviet way of life.[197] "For some time," Kirpal wrote in his report, "the main task of UNESCO in the USSR will be to explain its program and disseminate its publications among large and numerous groups of intellectuals in a vast country." On the other hand, he emphasized that his Soviet acquaintances exuded

[197] Czechoslovakia, for example, embraced UNESCO much more enthusiastically than the USSR and benefitted from a longer history of participation in the international organization. In 1957, the country's commission helped UNESCO prepare an anthology of the works of John Amos Comenius, a Czech philosopher and pedagogue who espoused an internationalist worldview in the early modern era. UNESCO considered Comenius as an ideological predecessor and found common ground with the Czechoslovak UNESCO Commission by taking advantage of Comenius' status as a national icon in the country. GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 1, l. 156.

excitement over UNESCO ventures, especially the “East-West” project, which provided a means for the Soviet Union to depict itself as a civilization reconciling Asian and European cultures. Furthermore, Kirpal identified tangible signs that the Soviet UNESCO Commission took seriously the education of the Soviet population on UNESCO’s purpose and enterprises. Indeed, the production of UNESCO publications in the Soviet Union had already evoked intense curiosity from diverse layers of the Soviet public.

Ignoring the protests of the US, UNESCO also directed the head of its Bureau for Relations with Member States (BMS), Jean Chevalier, to conduct a similar fact-finding mission in the Soviet Union from July 26 to August 14. A French academic who, according to the Soviet permanent delegate, had connections with the French foreign ministry, Chevalier went to Moscow on the invitation of the Soviet government to observe the World Youth Festival and to take in the state of UNESCO operations in the Soviet republics. In Moscow, he inspected three UNESCO exhibits in the Library of Foreign Literature, the Moscow Pedagogical Institute, and the House of the Central Union of Journalists of the USSR. Set up to enlighten the thousands of youth at the festival about UNESCO’s work to realize world peace, the exhibits contained photographs and publications “organized by theme” about the international organization for the scrutiny of those taking part in what became the seminal spectacle signifying the rejuvenation of Soviet internationalism after Stalin. In the opinion of Chevalier, the UNESCO exhibitions did not live up to the extravagance of other attractions at the festival in terms of their capacity to turn the heads of youth with flashy graphics. Although the exhibition received enough attention to run out of brochures handed out to inquisitive passersby, Chevalier lamented that the “small

exhibition" on "UNESCO aims and activities" in the Library of Foreign Literature was "quite pathetic" and unremarkable in the context of the overall festival.[198]

The collaboration between UNESCO and Soviet officials in 1957 lay the basis for a substantial uptick in Soviet contributions to the organization. In their annual reports for 1958, the Soviet UNESCO Commission and Delegation proudly described how they had boosted the number of Soviet citizens studying abroad on UNESCO grants; selected Soviet scholars and other specialists to go to dozens of UNESCO conferences, symposia, and seminars; and secured acceptance of the "majority" of their proposals at the tenth session of the UNESCO General Conference that fall.[199] Such statements of satisfaction, however, concealed a growing disgruntlement among members of the commission and delegation with their powerlessness not only to revolutionize overnight the ponderously bureaucratic, Western-dominated international organization into a "progressive" instrument for solving the problems the USSR considered most "pressing," but also to motivate Soviet domestic bodies to respond to the incessant demands of the organization.

Throughout 1957 and 1958, a stream of rejections of Soviet specialists for jobs in the UNESCO Secretariat, along with a refusal to publish polemical Soviet articles in UNESCO publications, fed a perception in the Soviet UNESCO Commission and Delegation that UNESCO conducted a policy of systematic discrimination against the USSR. In light of UNESCO's focus on striking up a dialogue between Asian and European cultures through the "East-West" project, the USSR grew progressively angry over the absence of the PRC and the presence of Taiwan in the international organization. While UNESCO kept the door open for

[198] GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 2, ll. 95-124.

[199] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 6, ll. 200-08.

scholars from mainland China to participate in the project, the USSR repeatedly failed to get resolutions passed revoking the status of Taiwan as a UNESCO member state—an action that the PRC saw as a precondition for it to contemplate joining the international organization. In 1958, the Central Committee went so far as to order the Soviet UNESCO Delegation to notify the UNESCO Executive Board in September that the USSR might "reconsider" its membership in UNESCO if the organization did not reverse its position on the China issue.[200] This intensification of the Soviet push to force UNESCO into accepting the PRC as a member state coincided with the falling out between Khrushchev and Mao over their personal distaste for each other and the more radical path taken by the Chinese as exemplified in the start of the Great Leap Forward that year.[201] On the level of cultural relations between the two communist powers, the deputy head of international affairs of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party politely but firmly overruled the Soviet UNESCO Commission's plan to include the work of Chinese scholars in the "East-West project," hinting that the USSR should completely abandon one of the seminal initiatives of the UNESCO program in the late 1950s.[202] Caught between seeking common ground with UNESCO and appeasing their hardliner communist ally, the Soviet Union found itself in total "isolation" during debates over China in UNESCO and privately vented its exasperation that India and other Asian countries, motivated by their own quarrels with their communist neighbor, declined to side with the USSR on the China question.[203]

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[200] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 12, ll. 44-47.

[201] For a thorough description of Khrushchev's icy relationship with Mao see Taubman, *Khrushchev*, 389–95.

[202] RGANI, f. 5, op. 30, ll. 73-75.

[203] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 12, l. 57.

Sensing American machinations behind all of these setbacks, Soviet UNESCO intermediaries pinned the blame for their lack of progress on the American Director-General Evans and placed their hopes for undermining Western control of the organization on ousting him in the next election for the top UNESCO post in the fall of 1958. In the course of their plotting, Soviet officials learned the convoluted political intrigue and deal making part-and-parcel to the operations of UN specialized agencies.

The USSR found a large number of willing partners from across the ideological and international spectrum in their attempt to remove Evans from the director-generalship. In his five-year tenure, the former librarian of congress and New Dealer from Texas had alienated most of the secretariat and the cultural aristocracy of the majority of UNESCO member states by abetting McCarthyist investigations into the political leanings of Americans employed by the secretariat. As the Soviet UNESCO Delegation developed a picture of how Evans governed the international organization, it also got a taste of the seamy underside of UNESCO and how it functioned behind the scenes. The off-the-record practices of patronage, careerism, and mud-slinging of those closely involved in the international organization only confirmed many of their preconceptions about the power relations dictating supposedly neutral international organs. In a September 1957 article in the London *Evening Standard* that drew the attention of the Soviet UNESCO Commission, Foreign Affairs Correspondent Sam White likened Evans's reign to an "eastern monarchy" filled with "sycophants" who had replaced "the top-notch" experts once governing the organization. "In Paris," White explained, "it is well known that UNESCO is going through some sort of crisis; that in UNESCO there is widespread antipathy for the director-general . . . and that there are allegations directed at him of vanity, nepotism, and a lack of initiative." The British journalist summarized how Evans had enraged UNESCO staff

members when he spent a luxurious weekend in a castle outside Paris at the same time that the devaluation of the franc set off "a state of alarm and agitation" among UNESCO employees over possible cuts to their salaries.[204] Ruffling feathers further in the secretariat, the American UNESCO boss gratuitously personalized his executive role by distributing to UNESCO workers his own newsletter. Funded by the UNESCO budget but prepared by an Australian friend of Evans who had no official position in the organization, this "UNESCO House News" featured reports about the director-general's daily work and humorous articles meant to improve the "morale" of the secretariat, such as a piece on the "UNESCO cat" that "hung around the building."[205]

In addition to alienating his colleagues in the UNESCO bureaucracy, Evans outraged important member states other than the Soviet Union. The British and French, for example, expressed bewilderment that he signed off on UNESCO sending to Egypt radar equipment as part of the emergency educational assistance package following the Suez Crisis.[206] More than a hint of anti-American elitism and disdain for all things "low-brow" coming out of the US at mid-century colored much of this resentment of Evans from those invested in this premier organization for cultural affairs. European and Soviet officials agonized together over a shared fear that, in the hands of Evans, UNESCO might fall victim to the Americanization of European life after the war. "I want to put two guns in his hands, then he would be an American cowboy and not the UNESCO director-general," the Spanish representative to the executive board confessed to Kemenov. Similarly, their Belgian counterpart on the board disparagingly referred

[204] These quotes are from a translation of the article into Russian, so they may not be exactly identical to the original *Standard* article. GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 7, ll. 74-75.

[205] Ibid., l. 26.

[206] Ibid., l. 80; and GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 6, l. 122.

to Evans as the "dude from Texas" in conversation with the Soviet permanent delegate, observing that the director-general "lacked culture." Jean Thomas, the French deputy director-general, although speaking out on behalf of Evans as one of the only UNESCO officials genuinely trying to help the USSR, characterized him as an arrogant American exceptionalist. Evans, he reflected, "is convinced that the American way of life is the very best in the world, that American politics is the best in the world, etc. In everything Evans is convinced of this in general and in advance, as something indisputable, as all Americans believe."[207]

Confident of amassing sufficient support to beat Evans, the Soviet delegation spent over a year meeting with dozens of UNESCO powerbrokers and corresponding with Soviet embassies around the world in search of a desirable opponent.[208] Because American nationals directed three UN specialized agencies (UNESCO, ILO, and the International Atomic Energy Agency, or

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[207] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 7, ll. 5; 13; 141. In light of this widespread resentment, the Soviet UNESCO Delegation, which negotiated with other member states and employees of the secretariat over the election, evinced in their reports back to Moscow an optimism over their prospects for overthrowing Evans. Yet the delegation, when colluding with secretariat officials and other UNESCO players to elect a different director-general, suffered from an unfamiliarity with the intrigues surrounding UNESCO electoral politics and therefore often overlooked the ulterior motivations of their coconspirators. As novices in the games various actors played in UNESCO, the delegation and commission had to rely on information they received from their partners on the political history of the international organization before the USSR joined as well as the intentions of other individuals with which their Western colleagues had closer relations. As a result, the Soviet Union became a pawn in the strategies of those harboring their own reasons for wanting Evans gone. For example, Maheu, who at the time was the UNESCO permanent representative to UN headquarters in New York, pushed the USSR to make a variety of moves against Evans. While the French philosopher and UNESCO veteran behaved as though he wanted to take the Soviet UNESCO Delegation under his wing, he essentially used the USSR as a weapon against Evans, for whom he had a strong dislike. Maheu told the Soviet permanent delegate that he would resign in protest if Evans was reelected. Remarkably, the Soviet UNESCO Delegation followed Maheu's advice to visit particular governments to advocate against Evans and to refrain from announcing whether or not they would support Evans "until the last minute." In a series of conversations with members of Soviet officials in 1957 and 1958, the French philosopher and UNESCO veteran also seemed to have purposefully narrowed down his endorsement of potential replacements to himself. By sharing negative opinions with the Soviet UNESCO Delegation and other Soviet officials on various candidates, he first ruled out anyone for the director-generalship outside of continental Europe; he then whittled the pool down to someone from France; and then excluded everyone except himself. As a MID official described the Frenchman's comments during one of these conversations, Maheu said that "he could think of no one else and therefore 'in the end' France might approve of Maheu's candidacy." Ibid., ll. 5-8; 22-28; 29-31; 79-84; and GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 11, ll. 195-97.

[208] MID sent out hundreds of advisories to Soviet embassies around the world telling them to search for and vet different statesmen as well as cultural and academic figures in their respective countries for the position. For an example, see GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 7, ll. 77-78.

IAEA) and two of the three UNESCO directors-general since 1946 had come from the "Anglo-Saxon" countries, the Soviet UNESCO Commission and Delegation felt entitled to put forward a candidate from either the people's democracies or the Soviet Union. Keenly aware of the unlikelihood that a communist would make it through the nomination phase in the executive board or the election in the general conference, however, they smartly raised the idea only as a means of compelling the Americans to compromise on a nominee from either a European country outside NATO or a nonaligned Asian country. Identifying India and Scandinavia as the best possible regions from which to select a candidate, the Soviet UNESCO Delegation privately endorsed either the Swedish former UNESCO Department Director Alva Myrdal (a renowned social scientist, the wife of the famous sociologist Gunnar Myrdal, and a future winner of the Nobel Peace Prize for her disarmament activism), or the Indian Dr. Zakir Husain (a member of the UNESCO Executive Board who had recently been elected as governor of Bihar province and would go on to serve as the third president of India in the late 1960s).[209]

After confidants of the Soviet UNESCO Delegation in the UNESCO Secretariat ruled out these names since a Scandinavian and an Indian already led two organs in the UN system (UN Central in New York and the FAO), the Soviet Union settled on getting behind either the head of the higher-education system in France or a longtime UNESCO devotee from Brazil.[210] By the summer of 1958, these two candidates represented the best alternatives in the face of a new threat from a dark horse candidate who represented for Soviet officials an even worse selection than Evans. In the late spring and over the summer, Vittorino Veronese, an Italian lawyer, diplomat, and current chairman of the UNESCO Executive Board, became the most popular

[209] Ibid. ll. 29-30; 80; 107-110; 125-27; 141; and GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 11, ll. 114-16; 161-62; 195-97.

[210] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 7, l. 57.

prospective replacement for Evans among noncommunist UNESCO member states. Owing to his staunch Catholicism and close ties with the Vatican, the specter of Veronese as director-general set off a panic in the Soviet UNESCO Commission and Delegation over a perceived spread of influence of Catholics in the international organization. While Veronese had an edge over Evans in his total support among member states, the anti-Catholic sentiments expressed by some Western secretariat leaders, who suggested in conversations with the Soviet delegation that Veronese would not run without the permission of the Vatican, only fueled Soviet fears of a Catholic conspiracy to take over UNESCO and other specialized agencies. The Soviet permanent delegate also worried that Veronese, who assented to most American proposals as chairman, would strengthen the pro-American bent of UNESCO more effectively than Evans given his administrative skills and popularity in Western Europe.[211] When the executive board met in Cologne to coronate a new director-general that September, the "international situation" made the entire session unusually tense, not only because of its location in the FRG but also because the West Germans had thrown their support behind Veronese. Kemenov, as the Soviet representative to the board, portrayed the talks taking place that month between French and German leaders Charles de Gaulle and Konrad Adenauer over Franco-German cooperation on Berlin and European unification as shaping the mood of the meeting.[212] To Kemenov's dismay, a further narrowing of the field in the race for the director-generalship left the USSR with no good options. After the Brazilian abruptly withdrew his candidacy, Kemenov voted for a Belgian in the first two rounds of voting and then a Frenchman in the third. But in the fourth and final

[211] Ibid., ll. 30; 91; GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 11, ll. 114-16; GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 12, l. 47; and GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 2, ll. 32-33.

[212] For a description of the issues discussed at the meeting between de Gaulle and Adenauer, see Michael Sutton, *France and the Construction of Europe, 1944-2007: The Geopolitical Imperative* (New York: Bergahn Books, 2007), 86–88. For Kemenov's contextualization of the session of the executive board in the international politics of that month, see GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 12, l. 57.

round, Evans and Veronese became the frontrunners, with the Italian as the clear favorite. Forced to choose between two unacceptable nominees and realizing that Veronese would likely win, Kemenov cast his vote for Evans—the man whom the USSR had set out initially to depose at all costs. Two months later, however, the general conference confirmed Veronese as the new UNESCO chief.[213]

For conservative elements in the Soviet apparatus handling UNESCO affairs, the election of Veronese symbolized the entrenched Western hegemony within the organization that made the Soviet decision to enlist in it a failed experiment from the start. On October 10, three weeks after the executive board nominated Veronese, Chairman Zhukov passed along to other commission members a "completely secret" and "urgent" memorandum in which he floated the idea of giving UNESCO an ultimatum at the upcoming general conference. If the organization did not reverse course on banishing Taiwan, he suggested, the USSR would "temporarily suspend" its UNESCO membership and payment of its annual dues. Zhukov acknowledged that the "previous boycott of this organization" had been "inaccurately construed abroad as a rejection by the Soviet Union of international cooperation in science and culture." He also conceded that Soviet participation in UNESCO had "improved the prestige of the USSR in the international arena." Nevertheless, he contended that a variety of "political and financial considerations" had cast doubt on the value of the organization. On top of the daily costs of running the commission and delegation, the Soviet Union, as the second largest financial contributor to UNESCO behind the United States, contributed nearly $2 million annually in 1958 for the UNESCO budget. According to the Soviet chairman, about half of this budget went to sustaining the salaries of UNESCO Secretariat personnel, the vast majority of whom hailed from Western countries. Since Taiwan did not have

[213] Ibid., ll. 60-62.

to pay its membership dues, Zhukov calculated that another $90,000 of Soviet money given to UNESCO helped cover the unofficial debts of what he viewed as an illegitimate member state. The rest of the budget financed UNESCO's "program of activities." But because the director-general had the authority to divide these funds among various projects approved by the general conference, Zhukov asserted that Veronese would continue the tradition of Evans of using Soviet money to publish "anti-Soviet" articles and sponsor "reactionary" NGOs.

The commission chair also predicted that the financial burden on the Soviet Union would become only heavier in the near future. In sessions of the general conference and executive board, smaller member states, especially countries receiving technical assistance from UNESCO, consistently voted to increase the organization's budget. At the September session of the executive board, for instance, only Franco's Spain stood with the Soviet representative against upping the money pouring into UNESCO's accounts. The Polish board member, flustered by his orders to side with the Soviet Union on such an unpopular move, "stepped out into the hall" in order to avoid voting against the will of the overwhelming majority of countries. To save face on the world stage while withdrawing from UNESCO, Zhukov believed that the Soviet UNESCO Commission should remain intact so as to maintain its contacts with other countries and send "observers" to UNESCO events. He also suggested the USSR divert its two-million-dollar UNESCO disbursement to bilateral relations with Asian and African countries, which "would have an immeasurably larger political effect than spending the same money through UNESCO channels." This reallocation, Zhukov concluded, "would force the countries of Asia and Africa, who enjoy the 'charity' of UNESCO, to more sharply raise the issue of the lawful rights of the PRC in this organization, as well as in other organizations related to the UN."[214]

[214] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 11, ll. 265-71. Many other countries involved in the UN regularly echoed some of Zhukov's criticisms of UNESCO (its bloated bureaucracy, inattention to "political" problems and skyrocketing

On October 25, the Central Committee directed the commission to make a final decision on whether to quit UNESCO based on the results of the general conference that November. On the eve of the conference, Zhukov publicly lambasted UNESCO for catering to American anticommunism in an article for *Pravda*, "Wither UNESCO?"[215] This attack on the organization startled UNESCO leaders, who brought it up in meetings with the Soviet UNESCO Delegation years later.[216] The awarding of the Nobel Prize to B. L. Pasternak weeks before the conference likely aggravated this apprehension over the prolongation of Soviet membership in an international organization enacting a program over which the USSR had little control. After a televised roundtable of Nobel Prize laureates on "Man and Scientific and Technical Progress" at the 1958 UNESCO General Conference achieved a viewership of 40 million people in Western Europe, the commission heard rumors that UNESCO intended to put on a similar roundtable for winners of the Nobel Prize for Literature, thereby daring the USSR to bar Pasternak, its only recipient of the prize in this genre, from coming.[217]

Zhukov's signaling of a potential Soviet exit from UNESCO met widespread opposition from the Soviet UNESCO Delegation as well as other members of the commission. When the socialist delegations to the general conference got wind of the deliberations, they issued a strong dissenting opinion to the commission and Central Committee. A. N. Kuznetsov, the head of the

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budget) over the years. As the largest donor to the UN, for example, the US has repeatedly raised some of these issues throughout its participation in international organizations. With the exception of the political grievances Zhukov aired, the banality of these gripes about UNESCO, in comparison to the anti-cosmopolitan diatribes of the 1940s, suggests a normalization of the Soviet relationship with the international organization. But the fact that Zhukov served as the head of the body tasked with promoting UNESCO in the Soviet Union differentiated Zhukov's remarks from other critiques of the organization in Western newspapers.

[215] G. A. Zhukov, "Kuda idet IuNESKO?," *Pravda*, November 3, 1958, 4.

[216] GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 15, ll. 279-80.

[217] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 6, l. 279; and GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 13, ll. 72-73.

Soviet delegation to the general conference and deputy chair of the Soviet UNESCO Commission, wrote that Zhukov's article had sparked "animated" discussion not only in the UNESCO Secretariat and Western European press, but also at the socialist countries' coordinating meeting for the conference. "The delegations of the USSR, BSSR, Ukrainian SSR and other socialist countries," he stated bluntly to the commission, "expressed the opinion that we should not leave UNESCO or suspend membership contributions, and that it is necessary to take steps to develop and intensify our work in this organization." To make the case for the USSR staying in UNESCO, Kuznetsov portrayed the proceedings of the general conference as a constructive experience. Instead of taking their previous "passive" stance on issues important to the Soviet Union, the weakly-developed countries had "bitterly opposed imperialism and colonialism" in a way not seen before. The growth in votes in favor of the Soviet position on China and the upturn in the number of times the Americans found themselves in the minority "clearly" manifested this newfound progressivism. "The exit of the Soviet Union from UNESCO," Kuznetsov maintained, "would leave these countries without support in the face of the American bloc." Moreover, the USSR had secured a standing in UNESCO "better and more durable than in any other UN specialized agency." On top of giving the Americans a chance to "increase their influence" in the organization, Soviet abdication of its seat at UNESCO would prove a lasting embarrassment for both the Soviet Union and the people's democracies. "An exit from UNESCO would be used by our enemies to organize a smear campaign against the Soviet Union," Kuznetsov anticipated. "Such a step would be completely incomprehensible to Asian and African countries and put the socialist countries, which already left UNESCO and returned to it again, in an uncomfortable position after an exit by the Soviet Union." Rather than faulting

UNESCO, Kuznetsov reproached the commission for its lackadaisical efforts to force Soviet domestic institutions to do their part.[218]

In January 1959, commission member Mozhaev rebutted Zhukov in an original and groundbreaking Marxist-Leninist analysis framing *noncommunist* international organizations as a *positive* product of historical evolution. Tracing the advent of this trend in diplomacy and the proliferation of international organizations over the previous century, the GKKS official declared that multilateral institutions proceeded from the progressive advancement of science and an awakening of human consciousness. "The huge increase in the number of international organizations and the strengthening of their role in international life," he theorized, "is a reflection of the objective process of the further complication and development of the system of international relations, caused by the unprecedented rise of science and technology and the enormous growth of the consciousness of peoples." Moreover, the entry of the USSR into these organizations and especially UNESCO, Mozhaev assessed, had made this type of international interaction "one of the main forms of peaceful coexistence and international cooperation among states with different socioeconomic systems."

Mozhaev enumerated the unique benefits international organizations presented to the Soviet Union. While bilateral avenues shut down when Cold War crises erupted, international organizations extended constant lines of communication. "Every time there is an exacerbation of the international situation, our bilateral relations with capitalist countries (especially in the field of culture) are greatly reduced or completely eliminated," he observed, citing the Suez Crisis and the Hungarian Revolution. But "cultural exchange through international organizations (UNESCO and others) continued during this time." If certain elements of the "bourgeois intelligentsia"

[218] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 6, ll. 280-84.

desired to reach out to Soviet "scholarly and cultural figures" but had reservations about doing so due to "possible repression by the official powers of their country," they could resort to international organizations. Mozhaev also highlighted three tangible objectives of Soviet participation in multilateral bodies: 1) to disseminate Soviet propaganda through the more than one thousand publications released by international organizations (which could infiltrate countries lacking cultural treaties with the USSR); 2) to "expose" the "reactionary" policies of "imperialist states"; and 3) to obtain information on "foreign science, technology, and culture." Yet the USSR, Mozhaev disapprovingly appraised, had overlooked this essential machinery of international politics to its own detriment. "It is safe to say," he lectured, "that there is not one category of our foreign policy that is more neglected or poorly controlled than work in international organizations. We cannot put up with this situation."[219]

By the spring of 1959, the collective outcry from the rank and file convinced Zhukov, MID, and the Central Committee to keep the USSR in UNESCO. Having sold itself as the vanguard of peace and internationalism to the world, the Soviet Union could not extricate itself from the international organizational system without the risk of becoming irrelevant to the major problems communism promised to solve. Notwithstanding the real biases toward the West at the core of these institutions, Soviet *mezhdunarodniki* (internationalists) on the commission and in the delegation recognized that a "boycott" of the organization would conger up in international public opinion memories of the Stalinist past that most of them regarded as harmful to their country's reputation. Whatever the failures of the UN in mitigating Cold War tension, UNESCO, as a symbol of long-term international cooperation, played the normative role of inducing its member states to commit to sustaining a minimal degree of international transactions in the fields

[219] Underlining in document. GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 2, ll. 198-208.

of education, science, and culture. For the Soviet Union, the need to gain a foothold in the burgeoning world of international organizations trumped the expectation that the USSR would get any material payoff from the policies of these bodies. By joining UNESCO, the USSR tacitly conceded that traditionally Western international organizations were the main vehicles for tackling international issues. But just as Marxism-Leninism held that workers would create a better society by seizing the means of production developed under capitalism, the commission and delegation aspired to undermine Western control of these “bourgeois” international organizations in order to remake them for their own purposes. The next section examines how the USSR sought to supplant the hidden roots of this Western supremacy where they lay firmly planted in the UNESCO bureaucracy.

SECTION 2

“NO NEUTRAL MEN”: A DAY IN THE LIFE OF A SOVIET INTERNATIONAL CIVIL SERVANT, 1956-1967

In the summer of 1956, Iu. V. Dubinin, the future Soviet ambassador to the United States (1986-1990) and official herald to the American public of M. S. Gorbachev's "new thinking," found himself in a pickle. Content with his first assignment abroad as a low-level functionary at the Soviet embassy in Paris, the twenty-six-year-old graduate of the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO) had to come to terms with the possible derailment of his plans for a stable career trajectory through the Soviet diplomatic ranks when Moscow abruptly ordered him to apply for work as a French-Russian translator in the UNESCO Secretariat. After some cajoling from the Soviet ambassador to France, S. A. Vinogradov, Dubinin resolved to fight for the job and to show up for UNESCO's language examinations a stone's throw away from the Arc de Triomphe at the Hotel Majestic on Paris's Avenue Kléber. Having passed the exams, Dubinin met with Émile Delavenay, the director of the UNESCO department overseeing translation who had gained international notoriety during the Second World War collecting, analyzing, and broadcasting letters from Vichy and occupied France as assistant director of the BBC's European Intelligence Department.[220] But when the veteran propagandist informed Dubinin that the department had decided to waitlist his candidacy, the discussion erupted into a heated argument that ended with the novice Soviet diplomat storming out of the room with a sardonic "farewell."[221]

Nevertheless, the intervention of Soviet Permanent Delegate Kemenov forced UNESCO to promptly enlist Dubinin. No sooner had he signed on to UNESCO than the international

[220] Martyn Cornick, "The BBC and the Propaganda War Against Occupied France: The Work of Émile Delavenay and the European Intelligence Department," *French History* 8, no. 3 (1994): 316–54.

[221] In his memoirs, Dubinin uses the word "*proshchai*" when retelling his sarcastic declaration of "farewell" at the moment of his departure. If this rather cinematic exit actually took place and is not an exaggeration filled with a retrospective glossing of confidence, then he either used the French words "adieu" or perhaps "au revoir" when conversing with Delavenay. Iurii Dubinin, *Diplomaticheskaia byl': Zapiski posla vo Frantsii* (Moskva: ROSSPEN, 1997), 49–54.

organization sent him to work at the ninth session of the UNESCO General Conference that November in New Delhi, India, where Prime Minister Nehru welcomed UNESCO delegates from dozens of nations to a city at the center of the burgeoning nonaligned movement.[222] But en route to the conference, Dubinin and his coworkers literally flew through a hotspot of the bipolar geopolitical conflict that both UNESCO and the nonaligned nations aspired to transcend. During a late-night pit stop in Cairo, as he whiled away the layover sipping lemonade peddled by Sudanese vendors in the airport, Dubinin noticed a throng of European-looking families meandering about with "anxious faces" and suitcases in hand. Suddenly, the troupe of UNESCO translators heard: "To the plane! Fast! Faster!" Once on board, Dubinin learned that the faces he had seen belonged to British and French evacuees. Upon arrival in New Delhi, he also got wind that his was the last civilian flight to leave the airport before Western powers bombed it in the opening salvos of what the world would come to know as the Suez Crisis.[223]

Over the next three years, Dubinin experienced the ambiguous mixture of anxiety, alienation, sense of accomplishment, and feelings of international solidarity part-and-parcel to the everyday life of a Soviet international civil servant—a breed of Soviet identity peculiar to the post-Stalin era. After unexpectedly landing his position in the UNESCO Secretariat, he camped out of a Peugeot in the French countryside; mastered the unfamiliar challenge of impromptu interpretation; became proficient in the esoteric terminology required for translating the texts of international organizations; engaged in battle with UNESCO superiors suspicious of the allegiances of their Soviet subordinates; and, on the last night of his stay in Paris, accepted an invitation for dinner at the villa of his boss and erstwhile nemesis, Delavenay. As Dubinin

[222] Nehru's speech can be found in "Records of the General Conference, Ninth Session: New Delhi, 1956" (UNESCO, 1958), 9–11, 9/C Proceedings, UNESDOC.

[223] Dubinin, *Diplomaticheskaia byl'*, 56–58.

remembered forty years later, the two one-time bitter foes departed "as good colleagues, and let bygones be bygones."[224]

In the following four chapters, I provide the first case study of the Soviet experience of the international civil service. By examining the quotidian routines of Soviet professionals sent to work in the UNESCO Secretariat, I offer a picture of the initial, formative decade in which the Soviet Union began to develop practices to deal with this novel type of interaction with international organizations. The USSR's campaign to mobilize Soviet specialists from a variety of professions to live in Paris and take on the role of international civil servant in UNESCO represents a rare example of Soviet citizens not only living in the capitalist West for an extended period of time, but also navigating a foreign work environment surrounded by Western colleagues and subordinate to Western supervisors. Leaving influential positions and putting on hold promising careers at top Soviet institutions, hundreds of Soviet international civil servants lived and worked for years at a time at UN organizations during the Cold War. The cream of the crop of the Soviet professional class, these Soviet UN employees carried their experiences in this setting back home with them as they continued to shape Soviet foreign and domestic policy following their tenure in the UN system.

Having sworn an oath of loyalty to their new employers that they would transcend their allegiances to governments or political movements and neutrally serve the interests of the international organization alone, these Soviet professionals, along with their non-Soviet colleagues, represent an overlooked but consequential group of players on the field of international relations during the Cold War. Unlike the diplomats who have taken center stage in most histories and journalistic accounts of the UN, but who only sporadically visited the halls of

[224] Ibid., 59–79.

the organization to rattle off prepared speeches or wrangle with UN representatives before returning to their respective missions, members of the international civil service toiled day in and day out at the headquarters of UN institutions to compose policy proposals for upcoming general assemblies or executive councils and to ensure the execution of the resolutions approved by member states. Coming from the wide array of countries belonging to the UN constellation of international agencies, they did the dirty work and pulled the strings that determined the implementation of these organizations' programs. Because they took on the responsibility to put into practice and to flesh out the details of the vague decisions of the better known representative organs, secretariat desk jockeys possessed an unparalleled power to shape the course of UN action from behind the scenes.[225]

Although a very small number of Soviet diplomats worked in the secretariat at UN Central in New York before the death of Stalin, concerted efforts to plant Soviet nationals in UN

[225] Most histories of the United Nations discuss briefly either the initial mapping out of the secretariat at the founding conferences of the international organization or the series of scandals revolving around international civil servants over the years. However, they usually do not go into great depth on the workings of the secretariat, either focusing on the secretary-general as a key figurehead who stands in for the entire international bureaucracy or fixating on American attacks on this entity (see the next chapter for more on the latter). The following is a sampling of these histories: Thomas Hovet, *Bloc Politics in The United Nations* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960); Luard, *A History of the United Nations*; Robert Hilderbrand, *Dumbarton Oaks: The Origins of the United Nations and the Search for Postwar Security* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1990); Stanley Meisler, *United Nations: A History* (New York: Publishers Group West, 2011); and Mark Mazower, *No Enchanted Palace: The End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the United Nations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009). In a recent history of the idea of international governance and organization, Mark Mazower provides the most in-depth discussion of the rise of the international civil service of any general history of the United Nations. But he does not use archival sources or offer any substantial new information: Mark Mazower, *Governing The World*, 143–48. In regard to histories or analyses of the international civil service, a large amount of work exists authored by either political scientists or legal experts. However, much of this literature, with the exception of ILO official Jacques Lemoine's study from the 1990s, consists of broad strokes rather than detailed examinations of the dynamics of these bureaucracies. They also only tangentially touch on Soviet involvement in secretariat life and often only cover the main secretariat in New York: Georges Langrod, *The International Civil Service: Its Origins, Its Nature, Its Evolution* (Leyden: A. W. Sijthoff, 1968); Robert S. Jordan, ed., *International Administration: Its Evolution and Contemporary Applications* (London: Oxford University Press, 1971); Douglas Williams, *The Specialized Agencies and the United Nations: The System in Crisis* (New York: St. Martin's Press in association with the David Davies Memorial Institute of International Studies, London, 1987); and Jacques Lemoine, *The International Civil Servant: An Endangered Species* (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1995).

administrations began only after the new leadership in the Kremlin resolved to enroll the Soviet Union in the world government's specialized agencies.[226] From the perspective of the post-Stalinist Soviet leadership, the secretarial nodes of the UN network constituted the real ruling class of an international organizational system that obscured its hierarchical structure with a façade of democracy designed to legitimize a Western, bourgeois controlled world order. As the Soviet permanent delegate to UNESCO wrote in 1965, "nearly all questions about the practical activity of UNESCO are decided in the bowels of the secretariat and often personally by the director-general, while the member states are only informed of the adoption of these decisions."[227] Soviet foreign-policy officials therefore judged Soviet infiltration of these civil services as the key to establishing influence in, and gaining insider knowledge from, one of the primary venues of confrontation in the Cold War.

Yet the few scholars who have studied the Soviet view of the international civil service have dismissively depicted communist authorities as either curiously apathetic to the only permanently operating establishments of the UN or simply eager to use them as outposts for espionage in light of their auspicious placement in some of the main governing hubs of the West.[228] While the USSR, along with other states, did exploit the secretariats as convenient

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[226] The USSR ratified the charters of these organizations over a two-year period from 1954 to 1956. See chapter 2.

[227] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 31, l. 92.

[228] Casual references to suspected Soviet espionage abound in the limited literature on international secretariats. For an example, see the most extensive study of the international civil service in the English language: Lemoine, *The International Civil Servant*. In his 1964 monograph, *The Soviets in International Organizations: Changing Policy Toward Developing Countries, 1953-1963*, Alvin Z. Rubinstein provides the most extensive analysis of "Soviet personnel in international secretariats" published to date. After understandably concluding that "conditions are not yet ready for a definitive study of Soviet performance on international secretariats," he cannot resist including the conjecture that "Khrushchev's pressure for more posts" in the secretariats did not amount to "convincing evidence that in taking this stand Moscow is genuinely interested in substantially increasing the number of its nationals working for the UN or is prepared to assign them for longer periods." To the contrary, I maintain, and the archival evidence clearly shows, that getting Soviet nationals into the secretariat became a major priority, if not an obsession, for the Soviet UNESCO Commission and others dealing with international organizations. Alvin Rubinstein, *The*

covers for its intelligence agents, these authors, who did not have access to Soviet archives and who rely on either personal experience or word-of-mouth claims of stereotypical communist deviousness, gravely understate the importance Moscow attached to these institutions and fail to appreciate the role of international administration in the country's dialogue with the outside world. After all, the disgruntlement that the UN civil service produced in Soviet ministries and commissions dealing with UN affairs led to one of Khrushchev's more infamously unsuccessful propositions concerning international organizations—the replacement of the executives of all secretariats, from the UN secretary-general to the UNESCO director-general, with "troikas" of eminent statesmen from the socialist, neutral, and capitalist blocs.[229]

Moreover, an explanation of the vexation of Soviet officials with UN secretariats sheds light on a longstanding catch-22 with which Soviet and Russian foreign-policy dignitaries have grappled from the inception of the idea of world governance. If Soviet and Russian leaderships have long felt compelled to participate in international organizations because their absence permitted the West to control the actions of these bodies, their ingrained suspicion that the same arenas operated with built-in structural biases toward the West lent these efforts to get involved a feeling of futility that undermined Soviet (or Russian) prospects for success in these organizations. In short, my study of Soviet international civil servants shows that one of the

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Soviets In International Organizations: Changing Policy Toward Developing Countries, 1953-1963. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1964), 287–88.

[229] Gaiduk's history of the participation of the USSR in the United Nations details the negotiations and ultimate failure of Soviet insistences that a "triumvirate" replace the office of the secretary-general. While he correctly attributes the timing of this proposal to Dag Hammarskjöld's handling of the 1961 crisis in the Congo, Gaiduk does not situate this almost universally panned concept in the broader context of Soviet dissatisfaction with the entire secretariats of international organizations and their inability to pull these civil services out of the clutches of Westerners. As subsequent chapters will show, the proposal to replace not only the office of the secretary-general but also that of the UNESCO director-general with three-person teams of statesmen from the First, Second, and Third Worlds evolved out of a deeper anger over Western hegemony within the international organization that went beyond the ephemeral Soviet outrage over events in the Congo. Gaiduk, *Divided Together*, 260–62.

greatest vulnerabilities in Soviet thinking about the world stemmed from a contradiction between the need to become an active player in the international community and a refusal to accept and convince its population of the legitimacy of this community's institutions as impartial mechanisms for fair interaction with other states. The necessity of placing Soviet nationals in secretariat positions, which required they transcend national and other parochial interests to serve an international ideal, clashed with a deeply held belief that the claims of neutrality justifying the existence of these personnel amounted to little more than euphemistic language cloaking Western dominance. In other words, the implicit and explicit codes of conduct that defined a good international civil servant created a work culture that required Soviet employees to assimilate values of "neutral" conduct and loyalty to an internationalism that the Soviet state perceived as a hostile ideology perpetuating Western hegemony within international organizations and, vicariously, the broader international community these organizations claimed to represent. As Khrushchev told journalist Walter Lippmann in a 1961 interview, "while there are neutral countries, there are no neutral men."[230] At the same time that he voiced this distrust of international secretariats, the Soviet first secretary recognized the importance of these offices and decided to permit Soviet agencies responsible for the involvement of the USSR in international organizations to take the risk of dispatching Soviet citizens to labor under a foreign power structure and ethical regime.

Because the UNESCO Secretariat represented the largest employer of Soviet citizens of any of the administrative bodies of the UN's constituent agencies, and recruited from a wider

[230] In Lippmann's words, this declaration meant that "the Soviet government has now come to the conclusion that there can be no such thing as an impartial civil servant in this deeply divided world, and that the kind of political celibacy which the British theory of civil service calls for is in international affairs a fiction." Quoted from a republication of the original *New York Herald Tribune* article: Walter Lippmann, "Interview with Khrushchev," *Survival* 3, no. 4 (1961): 155.

pool of Soviet cadres because of its broad mandate of science, education, and culture, it offers the best means to exhibit how Khrushchev's desire to weaken Western control of the United Nations system put Soviet citizens in problematic situations illustrative of the broader pitfalls the Soviet Union faced when challenging the United States and Western Europe on the international stage. On the one hand, the USSR expected Soviet secretariat employees to secretly violate the rules governing the conduct of international civil servants, maintaining in private an unfailing allegiance to, and constant liaison with, the Soviet state and the Communist Party. This entailed the devising of an elaborate set of practices geared toward supervising, educating, and policing those assigned to the UNESCO Secretariat. On the other hand, in order to achieve the major objective of the USSR to rival Western countries in the number of citizens working in the secretariat, and as a result gain more control of the machinery of the international organizational system, Soviet UNESCO workers paradoxically had to excel in their positions as international civil servants in the eyes of Western colleagues by adhering to the code of conduct of the international civil service and thereby prove the desirability of future Soviet candidates for placement in UNESCO.

In essence, Soviet international civil servants had to negotiate the jurisdictions of two antithetical power structures and ethical regimes—the international civil service and the communist state-party apparatus. Furthermore, these two authorities respectively controlled what I call the "public" and "private" lives of "*sovsotrudniki mezhdunarodnykh organizatsii*," or "Soviet employees of international organizations." To many historians of the Soviet Union and the communist world, the use of these two categories as an analytical framework for scrutinizing the everyday worlds of individuals living in socialist societies has proven problematic at best. Given that this bifurcation of social reality into separate spheres originated in analyses of the rise

of classical liberalism and its attendant attributes ("civil society," "public opinion," "bourgeois" family life, etc.) in Western Europe and North America, many scholars have had to creatively manipulate the parameters of this binary to make it applicable to a social order in which, as historian Deborah Field has observed of the Khrushchev era in her thoughtful probing of these concepts, the "contradictory policies of the Soviet state" at times melded the "public" and "private" while at other times "allowed some separation between the two," making their "meanings . . . both intangible and variable during this period."[231] This amorphousness begs the question as to whether the distinction bears any relevance at all to communist countries.

For my purposes, however, the public/private scheme helps to convey the singularity of Soviet international civil servants as a genus of "Homo Soveticus." Although the strict opposition of public and private modes of being does not universally correspond to all social circumstances that have existed in the modern West, my study benefits from the fact that the statutes of the international civil service clearly defined the boundary between and enforced two discrete public/official and private/personal spheres in its members' routine spatial and temporal itineraries. In particular, these regulations prohibited those subject to them from allowing themselves to manifest any signs of their political, nationalistic, or ideological preferences not only in the UNESCO workplace but also in public view generally, relegating these aspects of their identities to the private sphere, or to what the social theorist Jeff Weintraub designated as that part of life which is "hidden or withdrawn" from the public gaze.[232] Since this meant that the

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[231] Deborah E. Field, "Everyday Life and the Problem of Conceptualizing Public and Private during the Khrushchev Era," in *Everyday Life in Russia Past and Present*, ed. Mary Cavender et al. (Bloomington; Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2015), 164.

[232] Jeff Weintraub, "The Theory and Politics of the Public/Private Distinction," in *Public and Private in Thought and Practice: Perspectives on a Grand Dichotomy*, ed. Krishan Kumar and Jeff Weintraub (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997), 5. Field also mentions this definition in her analysis but uses it differently and more tangentially to her main discussion than I do. See Field, "Everyday Life and the Problem of Conceptualizing Public and Private during the Khrushchev Era," in *Everyday Life in Russia Past and Present*, 168.

Soviet UNESCO Delegation in Paris could not openly exert control over Soviet members of the UNESCO staff, and found itself restricted to policing them in the areas of leisure, socializing, and domesticity associated with the private sphere of the West, the communist identities of these Soviet nationals became personalized, intimate, and consequently more amenable to reconception in the absence of the constant intervention by the Soviet state, Communist Party, and fellow comrades that occurred in workplaces or other public spaces back home.

Thus I argue that the lives of Soviet international civil servants demonstrate what happens when Soviet "subjects" enter the constructed "bourgeois" division of life into public and private spheres. In the 1950s and early 1960s, both of these spheres in the West were shaped by the conformist cultural milieu of the postwar white-collar workforce as famously depicted in American writer Sloan Wilson's 1955 novel *The Man in the Gray Flannel Suit*.[233] Investigated at length in contemporaneous scholarship such as C. Wright Mills' 1951 *White Collar: The American Middle Class* or William H. Whyte's 1956 *The Organization Man*, the corporate and state bureaucracies dominating Western postwar public life created a sense of conformity to a "system" or "machine" before the onset of the youth movements of the late 1960s. While Soviet responses to the rise of Western consumerism during these decades have long fascinated scholars of the post-Stalin era, historians have yet to produce substantive research on how this conformity, a less alluring side of Western society than its material products, might temper Soviet enchantment with the idea of the West if experienced firsthand.[234] Characterized by its discontents among the Western intellectual elite as breeding "phonies" and "one-dimensional

[233] Sloan Wilson, *The Man in the Gray Flannel Suit* (Cambridge: Da Capo Press, 2002).

[234] Reid's study of Soviet reactions to the 1959 American National Exhibition exemplifies this focus on Western consumerism. However, she complicates the common assumption that Soviet citizens lusted after Western material goods. Susan E. Reid, "Who Will Beat Whom?," 855-904.

men" devoid of an authentic individuality, the era's cultural archetype of the new "company man" of the capitalist world accentuated the division of life into a private world of domesticity and a public performative persona.[235] In the private sphere of the American middle class, for example, the historian Elaine Tyler May identifies the policy of "domestic containment," or the fortification of the home as a bulwark against communism, as one of the distinguishing features of American society in the 1950s.[236] In the public sphere of the 1950s, sociologist Erving Goffman highlighted the role of performance in social situations, delineating the "dramaturgical problems" constituting mundane forms of social interaction and putting under the limelight the "stage craft and stage management" of interpersonal relations.[237] The theme of performance as an intrinsic aspect of public life similarly surfaced in Western discourse about the communist bloc in the 1950s. In his reflections on the "captive minds" of Polish intellectuals who conformed to the new communist regime, the Polish émigré and poet Czeslaw Milosz accused his former compatriots of "becoming actors" not "on a theater stage, but in the street, office, factory, meeting hall, or even the room one lives in."[238]

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[235] Literary critic Abigail Cheever has explored this search for authenticity in American culture during the postwar era. She argues that most of these intellectuals feared the uniformity in American life rather than the prospect of conformity. In other words, they worried that individuals had a sameness to them that preceded the influence of social forces. Contrary to popular memory of the 1950s, these thinkers viewed conformity as a necessary component of social cohesion. For my purposes, however, this is a distinction without a difference. Regardless of whether they viewed conformity as good or bad, these intellectuals still explored the trend toward conformity in social life during this period. Abigail Cheever, *Real Phonies: Cultures of Authenticity in Post-World War II America* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2010), 1-22; 191-213. For discussions of "phonies" in J. D. Salinger's iconic 1951 novel and Herbert Marcuse's 1964 description of the "one-dimensional man," see J. D. Salinger, *The Catcher in the Rye* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1991); and Herbert Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1991).

[236] For a definition of "domestic containment," see the introduction to Elaine Tyler May, *Homeward Bound: American Families in the Cold War Era* (New York: Basic Books, 2008), 1–18.

[237] Erving Goffman, *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life* (New York: Anchor Books, 1959), 15.

[238] Czeslaw Milosz, *The Captive Mind* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1953), 54.

The Soviet citizens who worked at UNESCO and lived in Paris experienced a peculiar version of this dichotomization of life into a private realm and a public guise. A bureaucracy of over 1,000 employees from mostly Western European and North American countries, the UNESCO Secretariat obligated Soviet citizens not only to engage in petty politics, social intrigue, and careerist calculations, but also to *perform* as international civil servants and *conform* to the international civil service in the complex public interactions of their workday while leaving their Soviet identity at home. Outside of the workplace and in the "Soviet colony" centered around the Soviet embassy, these Soviet UNESCO workers were subject to a Soviet variant of "domestic containment" designed to shore up their communist loyalties as part of a Soviet "family" or collective and fortify them against the corrupting influences of the secretariat as well as their broader Western environs in the French capital.

While other researchers have provided new insight into how Soviet citizens assessed the West after episodic contact with it through exhibitions, travel, and material culture, this section of my dissertation therefore contains the first assessment of a small group of the Soviet professional elite whom the Soviet state more fully immersed in Western society than even the most privileged of their fellow countrymen. In contrast to Soviet diplomats, tourists, trade representatives, reporters, and technical experts, who when traveling abroad either remained largely sequestered in Soviet ambassadorial compounds or visited the West only for limited durations under the meticulous watch of their minders, Soviet UNESCO employees, left to their own devices outside the Soviet colony in Paris and in the public sphere as international civil servants, had to maneuver through a Western work culture and cope with their foreign counterparts by independently reinterpreting and elaborating on the mission given to them by the

Soviet foreign-relations complex.[239] Owing to this public dimension of Soviet secretariat members' time abroad, they present a rare opportunity to showcase the complexity and diversity of Soviet reactions to the Western world and how these perspectives depended not so much on calculated decisions, but on a wide variety of factors, including the interpersonal or material contingencies and power relations at play.

I take my cue from the "theory of practice" articulated by French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, focusing on how Soviet international civil servants learned to adapt to their unusual position in the UNESCO Secretariat and the impact of this learning process on their views of the Soviet Union.[240] Instead of couching these opinions as determinations based on rational deliberation over the plusses and minuses of the Western world, I concentrate on the ways in which Soviet UNESCO workers came to understand as self-evident the norms or expectations of the UNESCO bureaucracy not because of a conscious choice to do so, but due to a more basic need "to just get by" each day as company men in the UNESCO power structure and ethical regime. While on the surface, for instance, the fact that UN Under-Secretary-General Arkadii Shevchenko became the highest-ranking official ever to defect from the Soviet Union in the late 1970s implies that secretariat officials harbored a proclivity to make grand political or moral judgments on the USSR, his memoirs suggest that what bothered Shevchenko most was not the USSR's violations of the UN's *Declaration of Human Rights*, but the more mundane burdens his

[239] There are dozens of studies of these briefer sojourns of Soviet citizens in the West. For a few examples of analyses of Soviet perceptions of the West, see Anne Gorsuch, *All This Is Your World: Soviet Tourism at Home and Abroad After Stalin* (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2011); Gorsuch and Koenker, eds., *The Socialist Sixties*; and Donald J. Raleigh, *Soviet Baby Boomers: An Oral History of Russia's Cold War Generation* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 210-17.

[240] Pierre Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, trans. Richard Nice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977). I developed my thinking on the application of Bourdieu's theory of practice to international organizations when reading Vincent Pouliot's use of these ideas in his 2010 work on Russia-NATO relations from the 1990s to the late 2000s. Vincent Pouliot, *International Security in Practice: The Politics of NATO-Russia Diplomacy* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

Soviet bosses put on him that contradicted and disrupted his job as under secretary-general. These included making him "act like an idiot at the UN" by "defending a Soviet position while at the same time pretending to act objectively" as under secretary-general; do "political work which had nothing to do" with his profession as a "diplomat" but which "intruded" into his "personal" life; and, "most distasteful of all," take on the function of acting as a "moral watchdog" over his "fellow Soviets in New York."[241] These words convey how Shevchenko's defection grew out of his dissatisfaction with life under the dual power structures and ethical regimes the Soviet state had foisted upon him by sending him to work in the UN Secretariat while still holding him answerable to Soviet codes of conduct.

Because of the pressure of balancing these two regimes, however, most Soviet international civil servants had decidedly mixed reactions to their time in the West. In reports back to Moscow, they expressed sentiments reminiscent of the gripes harbored by Westerners alienated from the daily grind of Western middle-class life, including feelings of loneliness, anxieties over their material situation, and negative thoughts about their coworkers in the secretariat. Indeed, only a tiny handful of Soviet nationals working in UN secretariats defected. The vast majority of Soviet UNESCO employees battled through these ups and downs of their work and eagerly returned to their homeland upon the expiration of their contract. But Shevchenko's shame over living a lie, along with irritations over the work his Soviet overlords had delegated to him, reflects an internalization of the unstated and stated ethics of the international civil service that many Soviet secretariat staff underwent through the *practice* of these ethics on a daily basis.

[241] Arkady Shevchenko, *Breaking with Moscow*, 1st ed. (New York: Knopf, 1985), 10.

Although most Soviet international civil servants consciously preserved their fealty to the Soviet cause, I argue that Soviet nationals hired by UNESCO unconsciously absorbed the values of the international civil service. The partitioning of their lives into a public performance of neutrality as UNESCO company men and a private, personal consciousness of communist identity instilled by the Soviet state through clandestine chores–as well as political and leisure activities–effectuated a tension between their daily UNESCO tasks, or the broader mission the Soviet Union assigned to them of becoming international civil servants, and the requirement that they maintain their day-to-day allegiance to the USSR both in their private lives and secretly at UNESCO. As long as they could fulfill UNESCO and communist assignments or goals at the same time, they held on to an uncontested conviction that they worked as faithful missionaries of the communist gospel abroad. However, when their Soviet superiors' aspirations for control over them interfered with their UNESCO work, or when the Soviet Union's failure to live up to UNESCO's norms of international exchange created obstacles in their work life, these citizens developed an increasing frustration with their own government's practices and its apparent weaknesses in playing the game of international cooperation. In the long run, the dispatching of Soviet citizens to work in international organizations threatened to spawn a small but influential class of Soviet professionals who, while mostly hostile to the West and patriotic as communists, gradually grew aware of the shortcomings of their own system and the imperative that the Soviet Union accede to the norms dictated by international organizations if it wanted to compete internationally.

Viewed from this perspective, violations of the rules imposed by the Soviet state on Soviet international civil servants represented not just acts of individual disobedience but acts of conformity to an alternative regime. Instead of treating instances of indiscipline as assertions of

individual autonomy by a liberal subject, I show that Soviet UNESCO employees broke the rules of the Soviet state out of a necessity to meet the expectations of the international civil service.[242] Similarly, the few defectors among this group cited the norms of the international civil service to justify their flight. In the eyes of the members of the Soviet colony whom these deserters left behind, their betrayal did not derive from their own personal decision-making. Rather, it revealed that they had come under the influence of UNESCO, its ethos, and the shadowy Western forces governing the organization.

I arrange the next four chapters thematically to contribute a multidimensional portrait of Soviet international civil servants in their first decade of existence. In chapter 3, I set the stage for Soviet entry into the UNESCO Secretariat, tracing the origins and evolution of the concept of the international civil service and its ethical regime before 1956 in order to spotlight the main rules and ethical code imposed on Soviet UNESCO workers throughout the Cold War. In chapter 4, I evaluate the Soviet Union's campaign to undermine the Western domination prevailing at UNESCO headquarters, spelling out the hiring methods of the international organization and how the Soviet UNESCO Commission tried to mobilize a sufficient supply of qualified candidates for secretariat posts back in the USSR. In chapter 5, I proceed to a reconstruction of the private lives of Soviet international civil servants, depicting how the Soviet UNESCO Delegation struggled to police its flock of secretariat officials living in the French capital during their time off from UNESCO day jobs. Finally, in chapter 6, I chronicle the conundrums, missteps, as well as triumphs Soviet jobholders encountered, committed, and attained in UNESCO offices and hallways, selecting examples that speak to the extent to which they

[242] For an insightful critique of the role the "liberal subject" has played in scholarship on the Soviet Union as a means of understanding Soviet subjectivities, see Anna Krylova, "The Tenacious Liberal Subject in Soviet Studies," *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 1, no. 1 (2000): 119–46.

assimilated to, or recoiled from, the new mores and power relations they had to contend with in their public performances.

CHAPTER 3

BLUE BUREAUCRATS, RED CONSCIENCES: THE LEFF AFFAIR AND THE FORMATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL SERVANT, 1919-1956

As international legal scholar Jacques Lemoine contends, the creation of an international civil service represents a novel achievement of the twentieth century. In accordance with the great power emphasis on limited cooperation among sovereign, restoration-oriented empires in the diplomacy initiated at the 1815 Congress of Vienna, no permanent, international secretarial service detached from governmental control existed for administrative needs at the landmark diplomatic congresses of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.[243] International gatherings outside traditional diplomacy in the area of international jurisprudence, including the 1868 Geneva Conference, the 1874 Brussels Congress, and the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conferences, proceeded without intermediary personnel and thanks to the sponsorship of individual governments and private philanthropists.[244] Nonetheless, the growing prevalence of "conference" diplomacy between the European powers required some degree of enhanced coordination of records and communication among participating European countries. Consequently, representatives from visiting national delegations began to shoulder the secretarial duties of translation, drafting, and serving as rapporteur, while the host country often

[243] Lemoine, *The International Civil Servant*, 15–17.

[244] For a discussion of the move to set up an international legal system and its own issues with creating a neutral body capable of deciding cases, see the historian Mark Mazower's discussion of the subject: Mazower, *Governing the World*, 65-93.

selected one of its diplomats to serve as secretary-general, the impresario of the conference tasked with organizing and keeping a common record of the proceedings.[245] Additionally, a handful of international organizations launched in the latter half of the nineteenth century, such as the International Red Cross, the International Telegraph Union, and the International Postal Union, although comprising national chapters maintaining limited relations with small, central bureaus, in many respects presaged the international civil services of the next century.[246]

International affairs scholar Robert S. Jordan argues convincingly, however, that the founders of the League of Nations modeled the international administration of this intergovernmental body not on these nationally controlled and often purely technical international agencies, but on the modes of management of a much more expansive and powerful transcontinental behemoth: the British Empire. Originating in what Jordan identifies as the presumption that "there should be a bureaucratic cadre of nonpolitical officials who would serve whatever 'government of the day' the sovereign empowered to rule," the structure and practices of the international secretariat of the League derived from the methods the British developed to coordinate wartime policy implementation following the end of the Second Boer War (1899-1902) and throughout the First World War.[247] As these secretarial functions became more influential in their management of state organs responsible for consulting the prime minister on wartime operations, the various inter-Allied coordinating agencies set up between 1914 and 1918 to deal with issues such as wheat supply and maritime transportation adopted these secretarial practices, leading to an increasing recognition of the need for secretarial

[245] Lemoine, *The International Civil Servant*, 16–17.

[246] Ibid., 21–22; and Iriye, *Global Community*, 10–11.

[247] Robert S. Jordan, "The Influence of the British Secretariat Tradition on the Formation of the League of Nations," in *International Administration: Its Evolution and Contemporary Applications* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), 27–39.

services internationally.

At the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, this wartime experience stood in stark contrast to the failures of conference diplomacy in the years preceding the war. Many attendees believed that, in the event of an international crisis, having an independent "consultative machinery which could serve the needs of all parties, and thus be a 'neutral' arena,'" would help prevent the breakdown in diplomacy that led to the outbreak of hostilities in 1914.[248] Hence, in Jordan's words, a burgeoning British system for "coordinating statecraft," which arose out of "Britain's imperial role in protecting its dominions as well as its colonies, became an important contribution to the development of a form of international administration . . . designed to help prevent a recurrence of warfare among the industrial states of Europe."[249]

If the shape of the League's secretariat proceeded from the British and Allied experiences of concerting the activities of diverse institutions, the particular norms and regulations of the new international organization derived from the broader bureaucratic practices emerging in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in Western European states. Under the auspices of its first secretary-general, former British foreign officer Sir Eric Drummond, the League's secretariat developed standards that obligated the newly invented international civil servant to conform to organizational principles indistinguishable to those highlighted by German sociologist Max Weber as the main aspirations of modern administrative organization

[248] Ibid., 40–45.

[249] Ibid., 28–29. The secretariat form of governance also belonged to a broader constellation of designs for reforming the British Empire that had significant influence on the Peace Conference's planning for a postwar order. According to historian Mark Mazower, the League, a combination of "American missionary zeal and British imperial calculation," owed its realization to British ideas derived from the schemes of Leonard Woolf and Lord Robert Cecil, as well as the aspirations of South African statesmen Jan Smuts to fashion a "league of democracies" that, in the same vein as his proposed British "commonwealth of nations," would coopt elements of British imperial and constitutional traditions to form a union of "civilized peoples" under a "tripartite structure of executive council, assembly, and secretariat." See Mazower, *Governing the World*, 116–36.

in the West. Most importantly for our purposes, the international civil service demanded what Weber identified as the separation of "official activity from the sphere of private life," and "an acceptance of a specific duty of fealty to the purpose of the office . . . "—i.e. the "segregation" of private interests from the fulfillment of official duties. In the case of the League, the need to foster an international workforce disinterestedly carrying out the work of the organization meant that the exclusion of "private interests" from the workplace and "fealty" to one's vocation necessitated the sequestration of national, political, and other less universal manifestations of identity to the private sphere for the sake of impartial service to the abstract concept of an "international community."[250] Article 1 of the League's *Staff Regulations* enshrined this removal of more parochial affiliations from public international life as one of the main commitments of the international civil servant:

> The officials of the secretariat . . . are exclusively international officials and their duties are not national, but international . . . . they pledge themselves to discharge their functions and to regulate their conduct with the interests of the League alone in view. They are subject to the authority of the secretary-general, and are responsible to him in the exercise of their functions. . . . They may not seek or receive instructions from any government or other authority external to the secretariat of the League of Nations.[251]

In other words, the creation of independent international administrations, comprising personnel from a variety of countries who worked exclusively for a worldwide organization, represented an internationalization of the bureaucratic practices of the modern state.

Throughout the interwar period, Drummond took on the daunting task of translating this idea of allegiance to an abstract notion of the state, which had emerged within national and

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[250] Max Weber, *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*, ed. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich, 2nd ed., vol. 2 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 957; 959.

[251] Quoted from Eric Drummond et al., *The International Secretariat of the Future: Lessons from Experience by a Group of Former Officials of the League of Nations* (London: Oxford University Press and the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1944), 19.

imperial contexts, into a vehicle for fostering international cooperation in the League's offices for the purposes of implementing policies reflecting the will of a society of nations. In 1931, Drummond outlined to prospective British civil servants the achievements of the mechanism he had crafted over the previous decade. Growing from a collection of four planners responsible for sketching the blueprint of the new bureaucracy in a room on Manchester Square in 1919, to a staff of 698 persons representing 43 nationalities operating out of Geneva in 1931, the League Secretariat, Drummond explained, consisted of "the majority of ministries which are found in a national civil service," complemented by treasury, translation, and other technical sections formed out of the most effective approaches of other "national services." To dispel the myth that, as secretary-general, he directed a conglomeration of nationally segregated divisions ("an English, a French, and a German section"), Drummond justified his decision to constitute these divisions by specialty, stressing that the "daily collaboration of individuals from various contries [sic] and continents has seldom given rise to difficulties, since all are inspired with the same spirit and working for the same end." Additionally, the requirement that these officials "serve the League as a whole and not any particular government . . .[had] been admirably observed, though for certain mentalities it is difficult, and great care has therefore to be taken in the choice of members of the secretariat."[252]

Whatever the failures of the League's parliamentary and executive branches to prevent the spiral of crises of the 1930s and the recommencement of full-blown warfare in 1939, the leaders of the League continued to promote this experiment as a remarkable success worthy of retention into the postwar era. As the Allies began to turn the tide of the war and looked to the

[252] Eric Drummond, "The Secretariat of the League of Nations," *Public Administration* 9, no. 2 (April 1931): 230–35. Mazower also emphasizes the small size of the League's civil service when discussing its origins, but draws on a different source: Mazower, *Governing the World*, 145.

creation of a new international organizational system following victory, The Royal Institute of International Affairs sponsored a study by Drummond and five other senior League officials on the "practical lessons" of their "direct experience of how international machinery works." The group published in 1944 a pamphlet, *The International Secretariat of the Future*, in which they exhorted the Grand Alliance to emulate their endeavor in forging an international civil service.[253] The great powers tasked with framing the new organization in the fall of that year at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, which agreed to incorporate some kind of international civil service into the postwar body, left undetermined the exact structure of the administration.[254] While Soviet delegates pressed for a curbing of the secretary-general's freedom to hire staff without consulting member states, introducing proposals at the 1945 San Francisco Conference as well as the successive meetings of the UN Preparatory Commission that would mandate governmental approval of candidates for positions and lead to the effective nationalization of various branches of the UN workforce, the majority of the delegates rejected these measures.[255]

In this way, the UN inherited, with slight modifications, the bureaucratic backbone of the League of Nations that the Western victors of the First World War had modeled on the ideal of a modern apparatus rising above particularistic interests for the sake of a larger international political entity. In Chapter XV, Article 100 of the UN Charter, participants in the San Francisco Conference continued the League's precedent of guaranteeing the "international

[253] Drummond et al., *The International Secretariat of the Future: Lessons from Experience by a Group of Former Officials of the League of Nations.* UNESCO officials would refer to this book when debating future problems in the international civil service. For example: "Statement of the UNESCO Staff Association on Personnel Policy and the International Character of the Secretariat," May 27, 1953, AG 10: STA 3/4 Dossiers 9.1 à 9.3 Fonctionnaires américains, 1953-1957, UNESCO Archives.

[254] Luard, *A History of the United Nations*, 25–26.

[255] Ibid., 1:65–66; 75–78.

character" of staff for the new international organization.[256] Because the Soviet Union before 1953 eschewed UN specialized agencies, the Western-dominated conferences that founded UNESCO and other UN subsidiary organs followed the example of the UN with little resistance. Article VI, Paragraph 5 of the UNESCO Charter, which laid out guidelines for the creation of the UNESCO Secretariat, contained little more than a rephrasing of Article 1 of the League's 1933 *Staff Regulations*, replicating the fissure of life as an international civil servant into the roles of public internationalist on the job and private citizen with national, political, and other identifications off the clock. The Charter also barred any staff, including the director-general, from acting in the interests of any government.[257]

In the heady years after the establishment of UNESCO in 1946, the Western Europeans and, to a lesser extent, Americans, who made up the overwhelming majority of UNESCO staff, set out to create a workplace in the spirit of the League Secretariat, in which they could perform international cooperation on an everyday level as an act of allegiance to the internationalist ideals of the UNESCO Charter.[258] Dominated by a Western work culture that

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[256] Article 100 read as follows: "1. In the performance of their duties the Secretary-General and the staff shall not seek or receive instructions from any government or from any other authority external to the Organization. They shall refrain from any action which might reflect on their position as international officials responsible only to the Organization; 2. Each Member of the United Nations undertakes to respect the exclusively international character of the responsibilities of the Secretary-General and the staff and not to seek to influence them in the discharge of their responsibilities." "Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice" (United Nations Conference on International Organization, 1945), 18, United Nations Treaties Collection, https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/CTC/uncharter.pdf.

[257] For comparison to the League's regulation, Article VI, paragraph 5 states: "The responsibilities of the director-general and of the staff shall be exclusively international in character. In the discharge of their duties they shall not seek or receive instructions from any Government or from any authority external to the Organisation. They shall refrain from any action which might prejudice their position as international officials. Each State Member of the Organisation undertakes to respect the international character of the responsibilities of the director-general and the staff, and not to seek to influence them in the discharge of their duties." "Conference for the Establishment of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation Held at the Institute of Civil Engineers, London" (UNESCO, 1945), 96, ECO/CONF./29, UNESDOC.

[258] Of the 309 employees of the UNESCO Secretariat in 1950, 167 were from Western Europe and 60 from North America (45 from the United States and 15 from Canada). Not including officials from the Western-oriented countries of Latin America and Asia, Australia and New Zealand, and persona non grata from Eastern Europe

expected the separation of its employees' personal political convictions from their official duties, the UNESCO Secretariat, as a neutral means of international administration, remained untested by the diverse claims for representation that would fill its offices and hallways in the decades following decolonization and the end of Stalinist isolationism. Yet the first major challenge to this Western ethos of international service emanated not from the Communist East or nonaligned South, but from inside the West itself.

* * *

On May 4, 1951, David Neal Leff, an American program specialist working since 1949 for UNESCO's Department of Reconstruction, went to the US Consulate in Paris with his wife to renew their passports. Instead of performing the perfunctory procedure Leff had grown accustomed to that lasted "only a few minutes," US consular officials interrogated the couple separately about their travel outside the United States since birth; forced them to sign affidavits of their statements; and explained that approval of renewal of their passports would have to go through Washington. Three months later, the US Consul took their passports and "without warning locked them in a drawer," commenting curtly that Leff could retrieve them only when his family was "ready to board the boat for the United States." The consul general also offered scant advice. "If my government doesn't want me to be abroad, I go home," he told Leff. "My advice to you, young man, is to go home."[259]

Unbeknown to Leff, US authorities had confiscated his passport under Article 51.135 of the Regulations of the Secretary of State, an amendment made to US passport rules in

originally allied with governments-in-exile in London, Westerners therefore made up 227 of 309 employees in the UNESCO Secretariat, or more than two-thirds of its staff. "Report on the System Employed in Assessing Geographical Distribution of Posts in the UNESCO Secretariat," October 1, 1958, 5, Annex 1, 10 C/32, UNESDOC.

[259] David N. Leff, "Statement by David N. Leff, Supplementary to Hearing of 27 June 1953: Seizure of My Passport, and My Efforts to Obtain Recourse," June 30, 1953, 1, AG 10: STA 3/4 Dossiers 9.1 à 9.3 Fonctionnaires américains, 1953-1957, UNESCO Archives.

compliance with the 1950 McCarran Internal Security Act giving the American government the right to refuse issuance of a passport, except for return to the United States, to persons accused of supporting the "world communist movement."[260] Left in the dark about the accusations levied against him, Leff continued to urge UNESCO officials to ascertain possible remedies to his situation. His Israeli boss, Dr. Jacob Zuckerman, who on a business trip to New York could only infer from the terse responses of State Department officials that Leff could do "little or nothing" to retrieve the passports, warned him not to "jeopardize" the UNESCO Department of Reconstruction "by risking the notoriety of further action."[261]

Irrespective of the allegations against Leff, his pedigree before joining UNESCO had made him ripe for the "world communist movement." Born in New York City in 1918, Leff received his bachelor's degree in history and journalism from Stanford University in 1939.[262] Fresh out of college in the final years of the Great Depression, the twenty-two-year-old witnessed firsthand the destructive potential and ruthless inhumanity many at the time interpreted as the inevitable seeds of a dying capitalist system's decay. As a "case review supervisor" for the Migratory Labor Program of the US Department of Agriculture from 1940 to 1942, he "certified destitute farm families as eligible for federal aid" in Arizona and California, ensuring "uniform application of relief criteria" while training staff for "camp and

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[260] See the following amendment published at some point in late 1950 or early 1951: "Supplement to Passport Regulations: Title 22-Foreign Relations; 2 Part 51-Passports; Subpart B-Regulations of the Secretary of State," n.d., 1–2, AG 10: STA 3/5 Dossiers 9.4 à 9.7 Fonctionnaires américains, 1953-1957, UNESCO Archives.

[261] Leff, "Statement by David N. Leff, Supplementary to Hearing of 27 June 1953: Seizure of My Passport, and My Efforts to Obtain Recourse," 2.

[262] Upon completion of his undergraduate degree, Leff conducted academic work that would prepare him for his future career promoting education through publicity at UNESCO eleven years later. He not only published a book on American aviation strategy in the Asia-Pacific region, but also designed the maps for T.A. Bailey's *A Diplomatic History of the American People*. Bailey wrote *The American Pageant*, one of the seminal and still widely used textbooks of American history in high schools across the United States. David Neal Leff, *Uncle Sam's Pacific Islets* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1940); and Thomas Andrew Bailey, *A Diplomatic History of the American People* (New York: F.S. Crofts & Co., 1940).

relief office administration" in a region inundated by thousands of poverty-stricken "Okies" from the Dust Bowl who had migrated west throughout the 1930s. Leff then moved from supervising aid for Uncle Sam to overseeing and collaborating in an act of ethnic cleansing perpetrated by the US government. For six months in 1942, he worked as chief of the Reports and Procedure Section for the Japanese Evacuation Program of the Farm Security Administration (FSA). In this position, he "was ordered by the War Department to handle the agricultural phases of evacuating some 125,000 Japanese from the Pacific Coast," implementing "procedures for registering and reassigning the lands of Japanese farmers" and writing the final report on this operation for the secretary of war. Following this rapid population transfer in the name of national security, Leff traveled to Mexico, where from 1942 to 1943 he assisted the FSA in the launching of the "Mexican Labor Importation Program" (Bracero Program), a mobilization of cheap Mexican labor for exploitation in support of the American war effort. "As a wartime labor supply measure," Leff later explained, "the United States imported under contract several hundred thousand Mexican laborers to work as farm hands and railroad track workers." His assignment included the setting up of the recruiting center in Mexico City, where he "interviewed, examined, fingerprinted, X-rayed, photographed, signed up and ticketed" prospective laborers and later served as "chief escort for many of the special trains" taking them north.[263]

After these expeditions among the impoverished and persecuted masses of American society, Leff transitioned to another phase of his career that not only endowed him with the arcane knowhow and qualifications requisite for a UNESCO functionary, but also introduced

[263] An annotated, detailed and itemized list of Leff's career prior to UNESCO can be found in the lengthy forms the organization required its employees to fill out in order for the Establishment Committee to "examine the qualifications, classification and contractual situation of all staff members." See: David N. Leff, "Particulars of Staff Members in Service August 1951," 1951, AG 8: Personnel Records: David N. Leff, UNESCO Archives.

him to a country where communists acted as national saviors. Presumably impressed with his quick accumulation of experience in handling and administering aid to uprooted peoples, the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations of the US Department of State recruited Leff to come to Washington in 1943 as an associate divisional assistant preparing draft resolutions for the upcoming Atlantic City Conference for the establishment of UNRRA. Following brief stints in the secretariat of this conference and as a designer of the original UNRRA staff manual and "'passport,'" Leff enrolled in a "special UNRRA field training course" on the Balkans at the University of Maryland in 1944. Within months, the new reconstruction organization shipped him off to Cairo, Egypt, and Bari, Italy, as part of the "advance party" of the UNRRA Yugoslav mission. Attached to the military-liaison team that entered Yugoslavia before the UNRRA mission, Leff took on the post of field observer in 1945, making surveys of the economic situation in Dalmatia and Montenegro, but soon left for an appointment as a public relations officer "sending despatches [sic] in 'journalese'" to UNRRA headquarters. In light of his apparent talent in this respect, the Belgrade UNRRA Mission hired him as assistant director of public information to educate Yugoslavians and "the people of the world" on the "plight and needs of a war-devastated country, and what UNRRA was doing about it." In this capacity, Leff not only composed visual, audio and print materials, including a "multi-panel pictorial exhibit" that traveled around Yugoslavia and Europe, but also continued to produce numerous field surveys on Displaced Persons (DPs) and "famine situations." These surveys undoubtedly forced him to deal with, and recognize the allure of, J. B. Tito's partisans. Finally, in order to raise awareness among his fellow Americans of UNRRA relief efforts, Leff finished his time with the organization on a lecture tour of the

United States in 1946.[264]

Thus, over the course of seven short years, Leff had served the US Department of Agriculture, the US Department of State, and the UN—three institutions all closely connected in American public opinion with two of the most famous suspected American communists of the postwar Red Scare: Henry A. Wallace (US Department of Agriculture) and Alger Hiss (US Department of State and the UN). Yet regardless of this extensive background working with the victims of capitalism and subsequently their self-proclaimed liberators in Eastern Europe, and despite his justifiable apprehension as an American national living abroad without a valid identification, Leff had good reason to believe that his career at UNESCO would remain beyond the grasp of American authorities no matter what political beliefs he adhered to in his private life. When he came to Paris of his own volition a mere two years before his passport problems and applied for a position in UNESCO, had the organization not "cleared him verbally" with the US Delegation?[265] At any rate, since he had taken the international civil servant's oath of allegiance to UNESCO, relinquishing under threat of disciplinary action any responsibilities to governments or interests outside of the international organization, what business did the American legal system have in investigating his personal convictions or the work he conducted in the service of the international community? And because his superiors at UNESCO had also sworn to govern with the interests of the organization alone in mind, how could they, legally and in good conscience, succumb to any government pressure to purge him and other members of an international workforce meant to transcend the national interests of its

[264] Ibid.

[265] Although the American government in the 1940s did not have the same security procedures it would later set up for American citizens, UNESCO officials often sought approval for American candidates as a measure of good faith. A written note in Leff's personnel file confirms the US Delegation cleared him upon appointment: "Untitled Attachement to Application of David N. Leff," 1949, AG 8: Personnel Records: David N. Leff, UNESCO Archives.

member states?

Unfortunately for Leff, events taking place at the same time across the Atlantic Ocean undermined any such assumptions of protection he may have entertained. Because of the instrumental role New Dealers played in the founding of the UN and the internationalist ideology the new organization preached, isolationist and anticommunist activists in the US Congress and the American public had long suspected that UN headquarters in Manhattan functioned as an outpost for Soviet espionage and communist activity on American soil. In 1949, as the fear of an expanding communist world order intensified following Mao Zedong's ascent to power in China and the USSR's first test of an atomic bomb, the trials of Alger Hiss, who had presided over the 1945 UN Conference in San Francisco as secretary-general, and the arrest of accused spy Judith Coplon at a rendezvous with a Soviet UN Secretariat official, V. A. Gubichev, further convinced anticommunist crusaders in the US government that the UN served as a safe haven for communist elements operating under the cover of the international civil service.[266] Facing an increasingly hostile host government and eager to uphold the reputation of the organization, the Norwegian Trygve Lie, as the first UN secretary-general, along with his assistant secretary-general for administrative and financial services, the American Byron Price, set up that same year an information-sharing liaison with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the State Department in order to receive security clearance for candidates applying to work in the UN administration—a practice that would later expand

[266] The historian of "McCarthyism" Richard Fried demonstrates how the anticommunist paranoia among the American public and US government officials, which had its origins in the interwar period, reached its peak in 1949 and laid the groundwork for much of the persecution of the early 1950s: Richard Fried, *Nightmare in Red: The McCarthy Era in Perspective* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 87–91. The international legal expert Carol Crosswell offers a thorough overview of the Gubichev case and its implications for early discussions of the immunities of officials of international organizations: Carol McCormick Crosswell, *Protection of International Personnel Abroad: Law and Practice Affecting the Privileges and Immunities of International Organization* (New York: Oceana Publications, 1952), 57–63.

to all US nationals employed by the organization in New York.[267]

Over the next four years, Lie purged US citizens from the UN administration with the justification that communist associations and political convictions fell into a special category of private persuasion that threatened the neutral public identities of these officials. During the early 1950s, with the UN backing the Western push to destroy communist forces on the Korean peninsula, the secretary-general fired a handful of UN workers on temporary contracts who, according to the intelligence of American authorities, posed a security risk to the United States. In late 1952 and early 1953, a grand jury convened by Roy Cohn (the famous legal guru of the McCarthy era), as well as a series of hearings of the Internal Security Sub-Committee of the US Senate Judiciary Committee, called for testimony a group of American nationals working in the UN Secretariat, many of whom refused under the fifth amendment to answer questions in relation to "past or present membership in the Communist Party." In response, Lie terminated the contracts of these employees on the grounds that, notwithstanding an international civil servant's right to "private personal opinions and beliefs," he or she had a "clear obligation under the Charter and Staff Regulations to take no part in any activity, either open or secret, aimed at subverting or overthrowing a member government." In addition, he stressed the importance in his decision of "the fact that the United States is the host country to the permanent headquarters," arguing that these citizens' silence before American investigators had "cast unjustified suspicion upon their fellow staff members" and imperiled "the position of the whole organization in the host country."[268] In this manner, Lie rejected accusations that he

[267] Luard, *A History of the United Nations*, 1: 353–54.

[268] Lie made these statements before the Plenary Meeting of the Seventh Session of the UN General Assembly on March 10, 1953. Trygve Lie, "The Personnel Policy of the United Nations: Text of the Secretary-General's Statement Before the Resumed Seventh Session of the General Assembly" (United Nations, Department of Public Information, 1953), 7–11, AG 10: STA 3/4 Dossiers 9.1 à 9.3 Fonctionnaires américains, 1953-1957, UNESCO Archives.

had violated his oath as an international civil servant in bowing to the pressures of a government, characterizing his actions as a special case in which the interests of the organization aligned with the need to maintain good relations with its host country by abstaining from abetting individuals supposedly subversive to that country.

The seizure of Leff's passport inaugurated the expansion overseas to UN specialized agencies of this hunt for communists working in the UN system, but was also colored by a deep-seated animosity among the American public toward UNESCO in particular. Although located outside of the United States and therefore exempt from accusations of operating as a front for communist activity on American territory, UNESCO's ideological mission of promoting internationalist sentiments of mutual understanding and exchange of peoples in the perennially contested spheres of education, science, and culture, made it the most vulnerable of all the specialized agencies to attacks from those fearful of the "one-world" and "globalist" aspirations understood as the underpinnings of the UN project. Historian Anthony Q. Hazard describes how, in the early 1950s, this disdain for UNESCO among the American public spurred congressmen, the press, and conservative civic groups, such as the Daughters of the American Revolution, to activate a sustained nationwide campaign to stymy the penetration of UNESCO ideology into American intellectual life and institutions. In 1953, for example, public pressure from disgruntled parents and the press succeeded in compelling the Los Angeles school board to ban all UNESCO materials and events from city schools in response to outrage over the usage of UNESCO publications to instill "international understanding" in students.[269] The perception that UNESCO acted as a bullhorn for agitators of a hybrid movement of communist "one-worlders" only intensified American suspicions of the small

[269] Hazard, *Postwar Anti-Racism*, 64–76.

clique of US nationals working for the organization.

The combination of these ingrained misgivings and the US government's interest in weeding out all Americans with dubious connections embedded in the UN drove the expansion of the so-called "loyalty investigations" from their original focus in New York to specialized agencies in Geneva and Paris. In order to obviate a more radical bill introduced in December 1952 by US Senator Patrick McCarran that required all American international civil servants to obtain clearance from the government or face imprisonment and fines, President Harry S. Truman, eleven days before leaving office, signed Executive Order 10422 on January 9, 1953.[270] In effect, this decree extended to all American UN officials the same elaborate regime of security clearances and background checks Truman had set up for federal workers after the formation of the Federal Employee Loyalty Program in the weeks before the president's enunciation of the Truman Doctrine in March 1947.[271] Secretary-General Lie responded to the new order by allowing American authorities to use the international territory of UN headquarters for fingerprinting and investigating UN workers. Meanwhile, on February 6, 1953, the US permanent delegate to UNESCO, Charles A. Thomson, sent all American UNESCO employees, including Leff, a stack of forms to complete in a week's time that included directions for submission of fingerprints to the US Consulate, along with questions

[270] "Executive Order 10422: Prescribing Procedures for Making Available to the Secretary General of the United Nations Certain Information Concerning United States Citizens Employed or Being Considered for Employment on the Secretariat of the United Nations" (Office of the Federal Register, January 9, 1953), Codification of Presidential Proclamations and Executive Orders, National Archives, http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/codification/executive-order/10422.html. See also: Jacques Mercier, "The Independence of International Officials in the Judgments of the Tribunal of the International Labour Organisation," n.d., 3, AG 10: STA 3/6 Dossiers 9.8 à 9.13 Fonctionnaires américains, 1953-1957, UNESCO Archives.

[271]According to Fried, the 1947 Executive Order 9835 and its Loyalty Program for the federal government "helped fix the assumptions, language, and methods that fueled the assault on American liberalism mounted by McCarthy and other anti-communist politicians" as well as earlier efforts initiated by President Franklin D. Roosevelt during the Second World War. Fried, *Nightmare in Red*, 59–74.

concerning possible membership in the almost 200 organizations, ranging from the Abraham Lincoln Brigade to the American Committee for Yugoslav Relief, Attorney General Tom C. Clark classified in 1947 as "totalitarian, fascist, communist, or subversive."[272]

The United States took advantage of its place as the largest contributor to the budgets of UN specialized agencies to compel them to force their employees to do the paperwork prescribed under Executive Order 10422. On February 20, US Assistant Secretary of State John Hickerson alerted the American acting director-general of UNESCO, John W. Taylor, that "continued support" of UN organizations by the United States could not "be assured" without "full cooperation of all the heads of the specialized agencies" in the ongoing cases, adding that the State Department expected the termination of the contracts of US citizens "demonstrated to be or likely to be engaged in subversive activities."[273] Days later, the head of the UNESCO Bureau of Personnel and Management (BPM), William Farr, advised all Americans under his purview that not submitting the forms "may prejudice their reputation and cause embarrassment and damage to the organization," but refrained from intimidating UNESCO employees with outright dismissal.[274] The UNESCO rank-and-file resisted this push

[272] For a summary of FBI activity on the international territory of UN headquarters in New York, see: "Statement of the UNESCO Staff Association on Personnel Policy and the International Character of the Secretariat," 3. For Thomson's letter: Charles A. Thomson, "Letter to US Citizens Who Are Members of the UNESCO Secretariat," February 6, 1953, AG 10: STA 3/4 Dossiers 9.1 à 9.3 Fonctionnaires américains, 1953-1957, UNESCO Archives. The list of organizations that UN officials were not allowed to be involved in was the same as that from 1947. However, this list had actually been developed since 1942, with groups continually being added to it. For a discussion of the evolution of the list: Fried, *Nightmare in Red*, 67–68. The questionnaire UNESCO employees had to fill out was identical to the form for employment in the US Federal Government and Thomson attached the list of organizations to it: Department of State, "Identification and Personnel Data for Employment of United States Citizens," n.d., AG 10: STA 3/4 Dossiers 9.1 à 9.3 Fonctionnaires américains, 1953-1957, UNESCO Archives.

[273] An excerpt from Hickerson's letter from February 20,1953 can be found in: Gordon Mcintire, "FAO Policy Concerning the Independence of the International Civil Service," June 13, 1955, 2, AG 10: STA 3/4 Dossiers 9.1 à 9.3 Fonctionnaires américains, 1953-1957, UNESCO Archives.

[274] William Farr, "Annexe," March 2, 1953, AG 10: STA 3/4 Dossiers 9.1 à 9.3 Fonctionnaires américains, 1953-1957: PEM/Memo/A.2766, UNESCO Archives.

to dictate the personnel policies of the UN system in violation of the stipulations in the UNESCO Charter that forbade the director-general from acquiescing to "instructions from any government" and the contrivance by a member state to "seek to influence [UNESCO staff] in the discharge of their duties."[275] While one American UN employee outside UNESCO refused to fill in the documents, Leff and two other US citizens turned a deaf ear to appeals of the US and the director-general to hand in the questionnaire, making UNESCO a focal point of American anticommunist attention and ire.[276]

Having failed to coerce Leff to "board the boat" home and corral him into completing through correspondence an application originally intended for its own personnel, the US government changed tactics, introducing formal legal procedures to coax Leff into divulging his political orientation. In April 1953, a special grand jury, which was formed in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York earlier that year to investigate US nationals working in the secretariats of the UN system, summoned Leff to testify in person on May 21 in relation to alleged "'conspiracy to commit offence or to defraud the United States," making him the first person in US history to receive a subpoena from a grand jury abroad.[277] After Leff declined to show up in New York because of concerns American immigration

[275] "Conference for the Establishment of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation Held at the Institute of Civil Engineers, London," 96.

[276] Office of US Representatives at UNESCO, "Letter to United States Citizens on UNESCO Staff Concerning Developments on Executive Order 10422," June 4, 1953, 1, AG 10: STA 3/4 Dossiers 9.1 à 9.3 Fonctionnaires américains, 1953-1957, UNESCO Archives.

[277] The letter to US citizens contains a description of the grand jury: Office of US Representatives at UNESCO, "Letter to United States Citizens on UNESCO Staff Concerning Developments on Executive Order 10422," June 4, 1953, Appendix 1, AG 10: STA 3/4 Dossiers 9.1 à 9.3 Fonctionnaires américains, 1953-1957, UNESCO Archives. Leff claimed in a letter to an American civil liberties organization that US authorities had never subpoenaed anyone outside of US territory for a Grand Jury: David N. Leff, Letter to Corliss Lamont, Committee for the Defense of the Bill of Rights, May 5, 1955, 2, AG 10: STA 3/5 Dossiers 9.4 à 9.7 Fonctionnaires américains, 1953-1957, UNESCO Archives. An article in the Michigan Law Review confirms the unprecedented nature of this move on the part of a US Grand Jury: André A. Schwartz, "Federal Criminal Procedure: Subpoena of Nonresident Citizen as Witness before Grand Jury," *Michigan Law Review* 62, no. 6 (April 1964): 1072.

services would not let him return without a passport to his family and workplace in Paris, Director-General Taylor suspended Leff with pay pending the results of a UNESCO investigation, citing Staff Regulation 1.4 and Staff Rule 92 that empowered him to discipline subordinates for "conduct incompatible" with the responsibilities of a UNESCO employee.[278] However, on July 28, the UNESCO Appeals Board, a judiciary committee responsible for oversight of administrative compliance with UNESCO regulations, nullified this decision and reinstated Leff. Since the grand jury had not indicted Leff for a specific crime and abstained from making their summons compulsory by imposing a penalty on him for not appearing, the board found no "prima facie evidence" of any kind of "serious misconduct."[279]

The favorable ruling of the UNESCO Appeals Board did not mark the end of Leff's headaches, but the beginning of a second phase in which the exacerbation of his tribulations stemmed in large part from the election that summer of Luther Evans to replace Taylor as director-general. As soon as Leff returned to work, Evans, expressing his disagreement with the UNESCO Appeals Board decision, proposed that UNESCO transfer him along with his position and family to New York so he could testify before the grand jury without losing his job. Rejecting this offer on the principle that UNESCO had no business intervening in "purely personal matters between a citizen and his government," Leff argued in an "interview" with the

[278] John W. Taylor, Letter to David N. Leff, May 22, 1953, AG 10: STA 3/5 Dossiers 9.4 à 9.7 Fonctionnaires américains, 1953-1957: Ref. No. ODG 360248, UNESCO Archives. Other "loyalty" cases showed that Leff's apprehension of getting trapped in the United States had merit. One employee of the UNESCO technical assistance section agreed to appear in New York at the Grand Jury's request, but ended up stuck there because the State Department had taken her passport. Authorities also arrested an official working at the UNESCO Patzcuaro Fundamental Education Center in Mexico for "traveling without a passport" as he left a plane at Idlewild Airport: "Case of Mr. Leff," *The Times Educational Supplement*, March 19, 1954, 2, AG 10: STA 3/4 Dossiers 9.1 à 9.3 Fonctionnaires américains, 1953-1957, UNESCO Archives.

[279] "Conclusions Extracted from Recommendations of UNESCO Appeals Board," n.d., 6–9, AG 10: STA 3/5 Dossiers 9.4 à 9.7 Fonctionnaires américains, 1953-1957: CAP/16, UNESCO Archives; and J. Mercier and David N. Leff, Letter to Frank J. Donner (drafted but Not Signed), August 2, 1953, 1–4, AG 10: STA 3/5 Dossiers 9.4 à 9.7 Fonctionnaires américains, 1953-1957, UNESCO Archives.

director-general on August 3 that the organization had picked up where US officials had left off by persecuting him for his absence before the grand jury even though the US had not reacted with punitive action. He emphasized that the administration's desire to dispatch him to New York, while solving the problem of separation from his family, represented a violation of his "contractual rights" to obtain a "stable pattern" of employment alongside "congenial" associates and at a location where he desired to "build a useful life-work." Furthermore, because he helped run the UNESCO Gift Coupon Program in Paris, a project coordinated by UNESCO but managed by national commissions in member states, the relocation of his position in this specialty to the United States meant the placement of him under the auspices of the State Department's National Commission for UNESCO. In essence, Evans wanted to reassign Leff outside of UNESCO and into the clutches of the member state seeking to end his career.[280]

Although Evans reassured Leff that his proposition stood as purely "voluntary" in nature, he implied to other UNESCO staff that Leff remained vulnerable to dismissal if he refused. At the same time, the director-general persisted throughout the fall of 1953 to pressure Leff to accept his recommendation as an adequate solution to his predicament. According to members of the UNESCO Staff Association (STA) present on behalf of Leff at his interview, Evans became "very angry" and responded to objections with "strong, and even abusive, terms," advising his employee that "he would consider as evidence of diminished integrity any attempt by Leff to 'quibble' over small changes" to the description of his duties after leaving

[280] David N. Leff, Written Record of "Interview" and "Statement," August 3, 1953, 1–6, AG 10: STA 3/4 Dossiers 9.1 à 9.3 Fonctionnaires américains, 1953-1957, UNESCO Archives. Evans issued this proposal in written form: Luther H. Evans, Letter to David Leff, August 6, 1953, AG 10: STA 3/4 Dossiers 9.1 à 9.3 Fonctionnaires américains, 1953-1957: Annex F, ODG/401.403, UNESCO Archives.

for New York.[281] Discounting Leff's move to assuage the UNESCO leadership by asking the organization to request that the grand jury convene in Paris, Evans informed Leff on December 3 that he had resolved to move unilaterally, now ordering Leff to prepare by December 17 to leave for New York with the threat of termination.[282] Four months later, the UNESCO Appeals Board annulled Evans' instructions, but the US government intervened again in direct response to the board's repeated successes in interrupting Evans' actions.[283] On March 11, Judge Henry W. Goddard of the Southern District of New York ordered Leff to show cause before the court on March 25 as to the reasons the judge should not hold Leff in contempt for not responding to the subpoena issued the year before. As a result, Evans instructed him in a letter dated March 22 to adhere to the court's command. After Leff disobeyed the court's injunction to show up on the aforementioned date, Judge Goddard signed a bench warrant authorizing the US district marshal to arrest Leff. [284] On March 31, Senator McCarran introduced an unsuccessful bill to

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[281] Ibid., 1–2; and J. Mercier and David N. Leff, Letter to Frank J. Donner, 1–3.

[282] Luther H. Evans, "Dr. Evans to Mr. Leff," December 3, 1953, AG 10: STA 3/4 Dossiers 9.1 à 9.3 Fonctionnaires américains, 1953-1957: ODG.414.668; and David N. Leff, Letter to Director-General Luther H. Evans, December 7, 1953, AG 10: STA 3/4 Dossiers 9.1 à 9.3 Fonctionnaires américains, 1953-1957: Annex R, UNESCO Archives.

[283] See reference to this decision in the ruling of the ILO Administrative Tribunal from the fall of 1954: "International Labour Organisation Administrative Tribunal: Ordinary Session of August-September 1954, Sitting of 6 September 1954, Judgment No. 15 in the matter of Mr. David Leff," September 20, 1954, 5, AG 10: STA 3/4 Dossiers 9.1 à 9.3 Fonctionnaires américains, 1953-1957: WS/094.38, UNESCO Archives.

[284] *The New York Times* reported on the show cause order from March 11: "Contempt Action Filed on U.N. Aide," *New York Times*, March 12, 1954, AG 10: STA 3/4 Dossiers 9.1 à 9.3 Fonctionnaires américains, 1953-1957: Annex no. 24, UNESCO Archives. For documentation of the court's decisions: United States of America vs. David Neal Leff, C. 143-309, The United States District Court, the Southern District of New York, March 25, 1954, AG 10: STA 3/4 Dossiers 9.1 à 9.3 Fonctionnaires américains, 1953-1957, UNESCO Archives; Order For Attachment, United States of America against Leff, C. 143-309, United States District Court, Southern District of New York, March 25, 1954, AG 10: STA 3/4 Dossiers 9.1 à 9.3 Fonctionnaires américains, 1953-1957, UNESCO Archives; and US Attorney J. Edward Lumbard and Clerk William V. Connell, Bench Warrant, The United States of America vs. David Neal Leff, March 25, 1954, AG 10: STA 3/4 Dossiers 9.1 à 9.3 Fonctionnaires américains, 1953-1957, UNESCO Archives. The prosecutors responsible for presenting the case told the press that they pushed forward as a response to the ruling of the Appeals Board in favor of Leff that took place three days before they proposed a show cause order: David N. Leff, "Letter to Corliss Lamont, Committee for the Defense of the Bill of Rights," 1–2. Apart from ordering him to show up on March 25, Evans continued to pressure Leff in a series of "interviews" to return to the US: "Note on Two Interviews with the Director-General," March 29, 1954, AG 10: STA 3/4 Dossiers 9.1 à 9.3 Fonctionnaires américains, 1953-1957, UNESCO Archives.

Congress that would punish noncompliance with a call for testimony before a grand jury with forfeiture of American citizenship.[285] Auspiciously for Leff, however, the Staff Association convinced the director-general to agree to wait to dismiss Leff until the judge had considered a cross-motion filed by his attorneys to cancel the warrant based on the fact that, since the Walsh Act of 1926 that permitted the serving of subpoenas to witnesses outside of US borders only pertained to subpoenas related to court trials, the grand jury had no jurisdiction over Leff.[286]

Meanwhile, yet another branch of the elaborate American congressional and judicial apparatus concocted to deal with alleged communists set its sights on Leff. In the summer of 1953, President Eisenhower, as an amendment to Truman's Executive Order 10422, institutionalized the American government's hunt for American international civil servants in the form of the International Organizations Employees Loyalty Board (IOELB).[287] This board sent Leff an "interrogatory form" in March 1954 and invited him to voluntarily appear before it at the American embassy in Paris that July. After Leff refused to grace the IOELB with his presence for reasons of conscience and fear of inadvertently committing perjury, the board notified Evans that they had "reasonable doubt as to the loyalty of David Neal Leff."[288] As a

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[285] S. 3230, 83rd Cong. (1954), March 31, 1954, AG 10: STA 3/4 Dossiers 9.1 à 9.3 Fonctionnaires américains, 1953-1957, UNESCO Archives; and "Congressional Record-Senate: Statement by Senator McCarran [copy]," March 31, 1954, AG 10: STA 3/4 Dossiers 9.1 à 9.3 Fonctionnaires américains, 1953-1957, UNESCO Archives.

[286] Leonard B. Boudin, "Notice of Cross-Motion, United States of America v. David Neal Leff, United States District Court, Southern District of New York," April 6, 1954, AG 10: STA 3/4 Dossiers 9.1 à 9.3 Fonctionnaires américains, 1953-1957, UNESCO Archives. April 6 1954: According to Leff, his lawyer "opposed the contempt citation on the basic legal ground that the law (Walsh Act of 1926) which provides for the subpoenaing of witnesses outside the territory of the United States applies only to court trials and not to Grand Jury investigations. In fact, the subpoena served on me was the first Grand Jury subpoena in American history ever served abroad": David N. Leff, "Letter to Corliss Lamont, Committee for the Defense of the Bill of Rights," 2.

[287] The State Department offered a detailed explanation to Executive Order 10459, which created the Loyalty Board for international civil servants. John Foster Dulles' name appears at the bottom of it, but it is unclear whether he wrote it or merely authorized it: Department of State, Unclassified Verbatim Text, June 22, 1954, AG 10: STA 3/4 Dossiers 9.1 à 9.3 Fonctionnaires américains, 1953-1957, UNESCO Archives.

[288] See the second ruling of the ILO Administrative Tribunal: International Labour Organization Administrative Tribunal: Ordinary Session of April 1955, Sitting of 26 April 1955, Judgment No. 18 in the matter of Mr. David N.

result, Evans forewarned Leff that he would not renew his contract upon expiry—a decision once again overruled by the UNESCO Appeals Board two months later with the rationale that Leff's nonattendance did not "constitute a lack of integrity or a violation of the obligations defined in the existing Staff Rules and Regulations".[289] In the meantime, the ILO Administrative Tribunal, a judiciary branch of the ILO charged with legal questions involving international civil servants in the UN, upheld in September the overruling by the UNESCO Appeals Board of Evans' attempt to deliver Leff to New York in December 1953, while also castigating his threats of dismissal after the show cause notice in March 1954.[290]

Notwithstanding these setbacks, Evans persevered in his uncompromising posture toward Americans he believed had comported themselves insubordinately. On December 10 1954 (Human Rights Day), the director-general utilized the broader powers recently bestowed on him by the UNESCO General Conference in Montevideo to suspend Leff and six other members of the secretariat for displaying a lack of "integrity" in their conduct as international civil servants in rebuffing the overtures of the IOELB that July.[291] As Leff resorted to the by now familiar route of appeal to the ILO Administrative Tribunal, US District Judge Sylvester

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Leff, 2–3, AG 10: STA 2.1/2 Documents de l'Association, Circulaires, Comptes-rendus, Rapports, STA 259-611, 1954-1957: St.AC/398-Annex 1, WS/055.13, UNESCO Archives.

[289] For a summary of Leff's experience with UNESCO in relation to the IOELB, see the Appeals Board decision: H. Puget, "Appeals Board Case Nos. 18, 19, and 20," November 2, 1954, AG 10: STA 3/5 Dossiers 9.4 à 9.7 Fonctionnaires américains, 1953-1957: CAP/18-19-20, UNESCO Archives. For a general outline of the work of the IOELB leading up to the July hearings: "Resume of Legal Advice from the Staff Association Lawyers Concerning the Visit of the International Organizations Employees Loyalty Board to Europe," July 1, 1954, AG 10: STA 3/4 Dossiers 9.1 à 9.3 Fonctionnaires américains, 1953-1957: Document 68-69, St.A. Memo/2169, UNESCO.

[290] "International Labour Organisation Administrative Tribunal: Ordinary Session of August-September 1954, Sitting of 6 September 1954, Judgment No. 15 in the Matter of Mr. David Leff."

[291] "UNESCO Staff Association Press Release: UNESCO Staff Association Protests Measures Taken Against Seven Colleagues," December 11, 1954, AG 10: STA 3/4 Dossiers 9.1 à 9.3 Fonctionnaires américains, 1953-1957: S.A. P/R 2, UNESCO Archives. The following report of the UNESCO Staff Association contains a thorough overview of the broader powers granted to the director-general at the General Conference in Montevideo: "Staff Association: Extraordinary Session of the Staff Assembly, Monday 20 December 1954 at 5 p.m. Report of Executive Committee (Item 2 of Proposed Agenda)," December 20, 1954, AG 10: STA 2.1/2 Documents de l'Association, Circulaires, Comptes-rendus, Rapports, STA 259-611, 1954-1957: St.AC/362, UNESCO Archives.

Ryan dismissed the contempt proceedings of the previous year because a specific court order had to authorize a subpoena given abroad and include travel expenses.[292]

Over the next two years, Leff wandered through a Kafkaesque maze of successful appeals and ensuing countermeasures thrown at him by the office of the director-general and the American legal system. In April 1955, the ILO Administrative Tribunal rejected the reasoning behind Evans's choice not to renew the contracts of Leff and other US nationals, but in May Leff received another subpoena from the grand jury.[293] In October 1956, the UNESCO Executive Board lost its bid at the Hague International Court of Justice to abrogate the findings of the ILO Administrative Tribunal, but Evans insisted that reinstatement of Leff remained "inadvisable" and opted instead to pay him an indemnity. Unable to return to his country of origin and trapped in France without a passport, Leff vowed to fight on.[294]

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[292] While the judge cited these reasons when he dismissed the contempt charge, Leff notes that other political events may have also played a role. In a letter written to the president of the UNESCO Staff Association, Leff notes that Roy Cohn, the creator of the Grand Jury and an aide to Senator McCarthy who gained notoriety for initiating much of the anti-communist persecutions of the early 1950s, had recently been "implicated in the confession of false evidence on the part of one Harvey Matusow." Such accusations would soon lead to Cohn's downfall. Anecdotally, Leff also claimed that Cohn tried to visit him in Paris in April 1953: David N. Leff, "Letter to Pierre Henquet, President, UNESCO Staff Association," February 10, 1955, AG 10: STA 3/5 Dossiers 9.4 à 9.7 Fonctionnaires américains, 1953-1957, UNESCO Archives.

[293] "International Labour Organization Administrative Tribunal: Ordinary Session of April 1955, Sitting of 26 April 1955, Judgment No. 18 in the matter of Mr. David N. Leff"; Jacques Mercier, "The Independence of International Officials in the Judgments of the Tribunal of the International Labour Organisation," 6–8; and David N. Leff, "Letter to Corliss Lamont, Committee for the Defense of the Bill of Rights."

[294] Significantly, not only the USSR but also the French and British representatives to the Executive Board voted against the appeal of the ILO Administrative Tribunal's ruling. This conveys the relatively isolated position of the US among its *western* allies in this hunt for communists in the international civil service: Jacques Mercier, "The Independence of International Officials in the Judgments of the Tribunal of the International Labour Organisation," 13–14. For the Hague Advisory Opinion, see: "I.C.J. Communique No. 56/17 (unofficial)," October 23, 1956, AG 10: STA 3/4 Dossiers 9.1 à 9.3 Fonctionnaires américains, 1953-1957, UNESCO Archives. For Evans' refusal to rehire Leff and offer of indemnity, as well as Leff's promise to fight on, see: David N. Leff, "Letter to Colleagues," December 13, 1956, AG 10: STA 3/5 Dossiers 9.4 à 9.7 Fonctionnaires américains, 1953-1957, UNESCO Archives.

In the years immediately preceding the inception of efforts in the USSR to mobilize Soviet citizens to work in international organizations on an unprecedented scale, the so-called UN "loyalty" investigations of Leff and other UN officials sparked an intense debate that contested, clarified, and eventually reinforced the boundaries demarcating the realm in which an official had the right to a private, political life, on the one hand, and the reasonable outer limits of the public, neutral personae international organizations expected their employee to maintain, on the other. The question of Leff's status in UNESCO became a major crucible of the viability of fostering an apolitical "*esprit de corps*" among employees of international organizations from diverse political and national backgrounds, out of which the norms of conduct imposed on the lives of Soviet international civil servants throughout the Cold War emerged.

The conflicting viewpoints driving the controversy over whether Leff had violated the norms of conduct incumbent on an international civil servant revolved around competing interpretations of UNESCO Staff Regulation 1.4, which both Taylor and Evans had cited in their multiple decisions to discipline Leff. The regulation mandated in Weberian fashion a public loyalty to the interests of the office and a relegation of the proclivities arising from personal identity to a sphere outside the public gaze, emphasizing that "members of the secretariat shall conduct themselves at all times in a manner consonant with the good repute and high purposes of the organization" by abstaining from "activity that is incompatible with the proper discharge of their duties." This included "any action, and in particular any kind of public pronouncement, which would adversely reflect upon their status." While the regulation underscored that UNESCO personnel did not have to "give up religious or political convictions or national sentiments," it also delimited the sanctioned space for political action to a private sphere that could not encroach on the international civil servant's role as a neutral cog of the

international organizational machinery, stressing that employees should "at all times exercise the reserve and tact incumbent upon them by reason of their international responsibilities."[295] The root of disagreement during the loyalty investigations resided in three ambiguities in this statute: the definition of "private" as opposed to "public" political participation; doubt over whether communism, as a uniquely revolutionary, totalizing ideology, could remain confined to a private world without *inevitably* culminating in public subversion; and the extent to which the director-general had the power to determine the answers to the latter two questions on the basis of one UNESCO member state's designations of acceptable political affiliations.

The UNESCO director-generalship asserted that the resistance of Leff and his colleagues to revealing their political inclinations through testimony amounted to a *public* act that threatened to "adversely reflect upon their status" as UNESCO functionaries and, vicariously, the reputation of the organization. Repeatedly denying that measures taken against Leff amounted to a violation of his own pledge to work solely for the good of UNESCO, Evans insisted that his imperative that Leff cooperate with US authorities had no relation to "'McCarthyism, witchhunting [sic] or political persecution.'"[296] Even though US authorities had not accused Leff of a violation of the law until 1954, the director-general characterized Leff's refusal to testify as "a serious matter which can gravely damage the prestige and reputation of the organization," implying that the United States' expectation that UNESCO officials fulfill their duties as citizens of their respective countries aligned with the interests of the organization to have publicly

[295] I quote Staff Regulation 1.4 from: "International Labour Organization Administrative Tribunal: Ordinary Session of April 1955, Sitting of 26 April 1955, Judgment No. 18 in the Matter of Mr. David N. Leff," 16.

[296] Quoted from: President, Staff Association, "Letter to Head, Bureau of Personnel and Management," April 15, 1954, 1, AG 10: STA 3/4 Dossiers 9.1 à 9.3 Fonctionnaires américains, 1953-1957, UNESCO Archives.

responsible and reputable individuals in its employ.[297] Thus, UNESCO officials averred that their qualms with Leff did not derive from his political beliefs in isolation, but from his willful, publicized defiance of the legal system of a UNESCO member state.

The machinations Evans resorted to for the purpose of garnering sufficient authority to get rid of Leff, however, show that the director-general wanted to diminish the scope of, and exert more control over, opportunities for his subordinates to engage in politics outside the workplace and thereby expunge communism from the ranks of the organization. At the eighth session of the UNESCO General Conference in 1954, Evans managed to secure the adoption of an amendment to the staff regulations that disallowed all political activity with the exception of voting.[298] This regulation clearly targeted communism, the bête noire hanging over the conference, as a marginalized mode of political involvement that, unlike the mainstream parties dominating American electoral politics, relied heavily on a wide array of agitation tactics, such as meetings, rallies, demonstrations, the circulation of literature, etc. The assumption that communism exacted the total commitment of its followers, and hence subversion of all other duties, implicitly motivated this whittling down of permitted politics to the confines of the voting booth.

The director-general also pushed through an amendment that permitted him to punish Leff retroactively on the basis of his personal political history. The prosecutor responsible for Leff's show-cause order claimed the fixation on Leff grew out of a 1946 report in a communist

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[297] Quoted from a letter submitted for Evans during the first hearing at the ILO Administrative Tribunal. "International Labour Organisation Administrative Tribunal: Ordinary Session of August-September 1954, Sitting of 6 September 1954, Judgment No. 15 in the Matter of Mr. David Leff," 3.

[298] The exact wording of the amendment: "Staff members may exercise the right to vote but shall not engage in any political activity which is inconsistent with or reflects upon the independence and impartiality required by their status as international civil servants." "Records of the General Conference, Eighth Session, Montevideo, 1954: Resolutions" (UNESCO, 1955), 19, UNESDOC.

newspaper, *The People's World*, on "a reception in Mr. Leff's honor sponsored by the American Committee for Yugoslav Relief." The attorney general had placed this committee on his list of "subversive" organizations a year after Leff made this fateful visit in his official capacity as an UNRRA representative on a lecture tour in 1946.[299] To strengthen his actions against Leff, Evans succeeded in gaining the power to fire a member of the UNESCO Secretariat "if facts anterior to the appointment of the staff member and relevant to his suitability and which reflect on his present integrity come to light" that would have prevented hiring in the first place.[300]

In short, UNESCO officials maneuvered to exert the organization's formal regimen of control over the entirety of their employees lives, to diminish the range of political identities UNESCO employees harbored in their private lives and pasts with the goal of appeasing the anticommunist bellicosity gripping the US government.

In contrast, the leaders of the UNESCO Staff Association and its umbrella, the Federation of International Civil Servants' Associations (FICSA), struggled to uphold the divide between the public neutrality of the international civil servant and his or her right to a private life of political freedom. The STA not only afforded emotional and philosophical solidarity with Leff through the passing of resolutions expressing opposition to the loyalty investigations, but also allotted financial and logistical assistance through a "special fund" and the arrangement of his legal services in New York and Europe.[301] More importantly, the STA and FICSA leaderships

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[299] Quoted from: David N. Leff, "Letter to Mr. Dawes, President, UNESCO Staff Association," April 14, 1954, 2, AG 10: STA 3/5 Dossiers 9.4 à 9.7 Fonctionnaires américains, 1953-1957, UNESCO Archives.

[300] "Records of the General Conference, Eighth Session, Montevideo, 1954: Resolutions," 19.

[301] "UNESCO Staff Association Circular St. AC/421," June 27, 1955, AG 10: STA 3/4 Dossiers 9.1 à 9.3 Fonctionnaires américains, 1953-1957, UNESCO Archives; and Staff Association's Council, "UNESCO Staff Association, Second Ordinary Session of the Staff Assembly, 29 June at 6 p.m., Item 4 of the Agenda, Draft Resolution," June 29, 1955, AG 10: STA 3/4 Dossiers 9.1 à 9.3 Fonctionnaires américains, 1953-1957, UNESCO Archives.

formulated thoughtful and vigorous defenses of the UNESCO employee's ability to lead a multidimensional political life without violating the neutralizing norms regimenting his or her public behavior. The STA took issue with Evans's moves to aggrandize power in the months before the 1954 Montevideo Conference, depicting the director-general's utilization of nebulous language, especially the word "integrity," as an imprecise standard of conduct that endowed the director-general with inordinate leeway in choosing to dismiss an employee. Warning against attaching any kind of "political connotation" to the concept of integrity, "since it is almost impossible to determine at what point the participation of a staff member in some national political activity becomes inconsistent with his obligations as an international civil servant," the two unions called for a strict definition of the term that condemned only comportment deemed "morally reprehensible and punished by law."[302] In response to the resolution reducing the UNESCO employee's political life to suffrage, the STA underscored the prerogative of its members to retain a full spectrum of "interdependent" national civic obligations outside the office, including freedom of association as "one of the fundamental human and democratic rights." From their perspective, the mere act of voting had "no great significance unless it is preceded by a process of enquiry which may be carried out, for instance, in connexion with affiliation to a legally constituted political party."[303]

[302] Noting that "integrity" had different nuances in meaning in English and French, the two working languages of UNESCO, the STA and FICSA argued against the use of this word as a means of determining loyalty in an organization that was both multilingual and multicultural. In French, the word integrity has the more narrow meaning of "honest and good faith," while in English, the term has a more politically loaded definition of "sincerity, virtue and respect for moral principles." For the STA's in-depth discussion of the "standard of integrity," see "Comments of the UNESCO Staff Association on the Common Personnel Policy of the United Nations and UNESCO (provisional)," April 5, 1954, 3–5, AG 10: STA 3/4 Dossiers 9.1 à 9.3 Fonctionnaires américains, 1953-1957: St.AC/286, UNESCO Archives.

[303] Ibid., 4–5.

After advocating for the buttressing of an inviolable nonpublic domain in which the international civil servant as a citizen enjoyed the classic liberal freedom of alignment of thought and action with particularistic interests, the STA reiterated the sacrosanctity of the public neutrality of the international civil servant. But "the problem," they explained, resided in the need to "strike a balance between . . . the need to form an independent and impartial international secretariat and . . . the desire to respect the interests of staff members who have a right not to be cut off from their national political heritage." As a "solution," FICSA and the STA rejected rules against concrete political activity, arguing instead for reliance in designating misbehavior on the passage in Staff Regulation 1.4 that obligated UNESCO staff to act with the "tact and reserve incumbent on international civil servants."[304] This proposal simultaneously upheld the international civil servant as a personification of impartial international administration and exonerated Leff of accusations that he had displayed a lack of integrity that infringed on his public role. It put the onus on the UNESCO employee to avoid the deliberate enunciation of political convictions in the workplace and in the public eye, but also justified and even endorsed the alleged misconduct that had compelled the director-general to go after Leff in the first place: the persistent avoidance of succumbing to the McCarthyist imperative that he confess his political beliefs.

In their opinions in favor of Leff, the ILO Administrative Tribunal concurred with the definition the STA advanced in its writings on the case, constructing for the future international civil service a dichotomous ideal of its staff members as both liberal civil subjects and abstract public servants deprived of the right to openly express political perspectives or flaunt evidence of their sociocultural habitus. In the second hearing of Leff's case in April 1955 concerning the

[304] Ibid., 5.

question of whether the director-general had acted in the interests of the organization in not renewing the contracts of American nationals, the ILO Administrative Tribunal declared that the regulations "clearly" provided for "the entire freedom of conscience . . . in respect of both [UNESCO employees'] philosophical convictions and their political opinions," but also enforced "the duty to abstain from all acts capable of being interpreted as associating them with propaganda or militant proselytism in any sense whatever."[305] This implied that international civil servants could hold political views and associations provided they bar these influences from dictating their primary public identities or interfere with official tasks.

Significantly, the tribunal also suggested that *Evans*, not Leff, had gravely undermined the independence of the UNESCO Secretariat in his response to the affair. "It will suffice to realise," the judges observed, in the event that another of "the seventy-two states and governments involved in the defendant organization brought against . . . one of its citizens, an accusation of disloyalty and claimed to subject him to an enquiry in similar or analogous conditions," the position Evans took set a "precedent obliging him to lend his assistance to such enquiry and . . . invoke the same disciplinary or statutory consequences, the same withdrawal of confidence, on the basis of any opposal by the person concerned to the action of his national government." Thus, if Evans aided the United States in its persecution of Leff and his American colleagues, he had also to abet all member states with equal rights under the UNESCO Charter in their exercise of similar means of control over citizens. This hypothetical meant that, "in matters touching on conscience," international employees would work in "a state of uncertainty and insecurity prejudicial to the performance of their duties" likely to "provoke disturbances in the international administration such as cannot be imagined to have been the intention of those who

[305] "International Labour Organization Administrative Tribunal: Ordinary Session of April 1955, Sitting of 26 April 1955, Judgment No. 18 in the Matter of Mr. David N. Leff," 6.

drew up the constitution of the defendant organization."[306] The court's identification of Evans as the principle source of the challenge to the international civil service simply conferred official sanction to a feeling widely shared in the international secretariats of the UN. By bowing to the wishes of the Americans, the director-general opened up a Pandora's box of claims on nationals in the secretariat from governments with all types of sordid histories of heavy handed oppression and transgression of international law. As Evans's own man tasked with personnel policy, Farr, explained to Leff in 1953, UNESCO was "worried stiff about the possibility of other member states using this subpoena method to withdraw their nationals, but probably would not cooperate if such regimes as the Spanish, Egyptian or South African tried it."[307]

The composition of the ideal international civil servant expressed in the ILO Tribunal rulings informed the philosophy, values, and expectations constituting the work culture of the international secretariats of the UN for decades to come. In 1954, the International Civil Service Advisory Board (ICSAB) reinforced and nuanced these formulations in its seminal *Report on Standards of Conduct in International Civil Service*, a foundational text that, as Lemoine wrote in the early 1990s, "remains a classic which still today guides the international official" and "is given to each new official on appointment" in the UN system.[308] Instead of discouraging the preservation of "political views or national characteristics," ICSAB argued that "the highest type of loyal international civil servant" could possess both public neutrality and private predilections by placing "international obligations" before his or her own interests, adding that staff could accept this prioritization more easily if they comprehended that, "from the long-range point of

[306] Ibid., 8–9.

[307] "Summary of Interviews with William Farr, Director of Personnel, 17 April-28 May 1953," n.d., AG 10: STA 3/4 Dossiers 9.1 à 9.3 Fonctionnaires américains, 1953-1957, UNESCO Archives.

[308] Lemoine, *The International Civil Servant*, 43.

view," national and other interests "can only be served by the promotion of world peace and prosperity and the successful progress of the international organizations toward these objectives."[309] Moreover, the job of the international civil servant presupposed that its occupant internalize a regimen of self-censorship and regulation of behavior, to "keep himself under the strictest observation." Far from needing to "be a neuter in the sense that he has to have no sympathies or antipathies," the ICSAB report continued, a functionary of the UN system had to "be fully aware of the human reactions and meticulously check himself so that they are not permitted to influence his actions."[310] In terms of distinct activities, this entailed abstention from certain "public manifestations" of political inclinations, such as running for, or holding, office; the expression of political views in speeches or the press; involvement in a "political campaign committee" or finance; and petitioning.[311]

The United States imposed a clearance process on US citizens applying for spots in international organizations into the 1980s.[312] Yet the "waning zeal" of American investigators, the legal chastening of Evans, and the election to the post of secretary-general in 1953 of Dag Hammarskjöld, who for the most part rejected Lie's obedience to the US government, guaranteed that the ILO Administrative Tribunal and the ICSAB report gained supremacy in

[309] Quoted from Ibid., 43-44.

[310] Ibid., 45-46.

[311] Ibid., 47.

[312] The investigations were deemed unconstitutional in 1986. Ibid., 118. In the years after the subsiding of "McCarthyism," many in the US government bemoaned the obstacles these investigations created for getting more US nationals into UN secretariats. For an interesting discussion of these obstacles, see Comptroller General of the United States, "Report to the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs: Greater US Government Efforts Needed to Recruit Candidates for Employment by U.N. Organizations" (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Comptroller General of the United States, May 16, 1977), 20–21.

fostering the work culture and outlining the role of the international civil servant.[313] In the case of UNESCO and other UN specialized agencies outside the United States, the overabundance of Western European officials, who had little sympathy for American zealotry and often came to UNESCO because of a strong devotion to the internationalist ideal, bolstered this conception of the international civil servant as the quintessential standard foisted on all members of the secretariat throughout the latter half of the twentieth century.

For Leff, regrettably, the reinvigoration of the principles safeguarding his career came too little too late. A sacrificial lamb to the internationalist project, he had no option but to choose between the ideological sides of a conflict poised to tear the UN ideal to shreds. In March 1957, Leff telephoned Kemenov, the Soviet permanent delegate to UNESCO, who arranged a meeting for Leff and his wife with the first secretary of the Soviet UNESCO Delegation. Describing how their political evolution made them "convinced of the aggressive intentions of American imperialism," the couple recounted, in the first secretary's words, their lifelong "active participation in progressive social activities" and resolve to "devote themselves to the struggle for peace, friendship among peoples, and the best ideals of the American people." Yet in a clear indication that the US investigations had accomplished little more than radicalizing their victims, Leff told his Soviet interviewer that his "final worldview" had not cemented until "the bitter struggle against the State Department and its agent, Luther Evans."[314] While he assured the first secretary that he could "calmly answer the questions posed by the 'American secret police' [*okhranka*]," Leff nevertheless reasoned that, if he returned to the United States to continue the

[313] Hammarskjöld explicitly outlawed political participation that required party discipline. This rule, however, was never enforced and, as will be seen in the subsequent sections, Soviet employees were treated with the same expectations of other international civil servants at UNESCO. Lemoine, *The International Civil Servant*, 48.

[314] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 9, ll. 92-93.

battle, “he would not consider himself worthy to bear the name of a man, since in this case he would have bargained with his conscience” by capitulating to his persecutors. “Today's America is bleak,” Leff went on, “and the clouds of a surging reaction are threatening its future, but I believe, as does my wife, that not long from now, when the people of the USA understand the reactionary essence of American imperialism, neither McCarthy, nor Dulles, nor their imitators will hold out.” When that time came, he predicted, his country would need “people who could lead the fight for the best ideals of mankind, and who were ready to do anything in the name of those ideals.” In anticipation of this future, Leff explained that he had come to the delegation confident that his “single hope” lay in seeking, “for this current phase, political asylum in the Soviet Union, so that we can prepare there for the coming fight for a free, socialist America.”[315]

The Soviet UNESCO Delegation, remarking on the passion with which Leff presented his case and the couple’s “ideological-theoretical preparation,” sent Leff’s asylum application to the chairman of the Soviet UNESCO Commission, who passed it along to MID and the Central Committee with a request for advice on the matter. After months of unanswered reminders, the Soviet UNESCO Delegation grew impatient and in October advised the Soviet UNESCO Commission and MID that the Leff family, as members of the American Communist Party, found themselves in a “difficult situation.” Since Leff now worked for a private company that wanted him to travel, he faced the prospect of once again losing his job due to his inability to obtain a passport. Even worse, because US authorities had scheduled a new trial for him on November 24, the delegation and Leff both feared he faced “deportation from France and imprisonment.”[316] At last, Leff managed to relocate to Prague in 1959 after accepting an

[315] Ibid., l. 94.

[316] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 11, l. 124.

"invitation" from the Czechoslovakian UNESCO Commission to "undertake a long-term research project."[317] Once settled down in his new socialist environs, he took on odd jobs meeting Western visitors and translating Czech scientific writings, but soon became a radio personality and editor for the North American Service of *Radio Prague*.[318] One source claims that he "was first to relay in English the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia" over the airwaves during the 1968 Prague Spring. After the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, Leff rejoined the West, serving as an editor for *Bioworld*, an American periodical covering innovations in the health sciences. He died in 2004.[319]

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[317] David N. Leff, "Letter to Mr. Harry Dawes, Chief, Bureau of Personnel and Management," June 18, 1959, AG 8: Personnel Records: David N. Leff, UNESCO Archives.

[318] Leff's history after his move to Prague in 1959 remains spotty. However, there are numerous propaganda and scientific publications containing his name as either translator or author, while he is frequently mentioned in relation to *Radio Prague*. For example, the following article refers to Leff only in relation to another American living in the communist country at the time: Katherine Clark, "Draft-Evading Doctor at Prague is Pleased over Supreme Court Ruling on Citizenship," *The Washington Post, Times Herald*, March 26, 1963, A28.

[319] For the claim that he was the first to report the Soviet invasion in 1968, as well as a good overview of the latter part of Leff's life, see his obituary: "David Leff," in *Newsletter of the National Association of Science Writers*, vols. 52–53 (Berkeley: NASW, 2003), 58.

CHAPTER 4

IN SEARCH OF "SOVSOTRUDNIKI": UNESCO RECRUITMENT PRACTICES AND SOVIET MOBILIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL CIVIL SERVANTS

As Leff voyaged east, Soviet specialists headed west to take up the foreign vocation of international civil servant. Before the USSR could effectively use the international civil service to bend UNESCO in its favor, the Soviet UNESCO Commission had to identify experts from Soviet educational and cultural organs capable of getting into the specialized agency. The Soviet Union's rejection of these organizations before 1953 gave Western countries carte blanche to staff the UN with their own nationals and reach overwhelming numerical superiority in their secretariats. Under Stalin, the USSR did not have a single citizen in any of the secretariats of the UN specialized agencies and only a small number at UN headquarters.[320] Beginning in 1955, the Kremlin mobilized Soviet human resources in the hope of reaching parity with the West in its share of citizens staffing UNESCO and other UN administrations. Yet the USSR had to grapple with a number of mechanisms built into UNESCO's bureaucratic machinery that reproduced the preponderance of Westerners in the international organization.

A major facet of this ingrained Western dominance arose out of the UNESCO leadership's goal of reconciling a high turnover rate among its staff with the need to cultivate a group of permanent workers invested in the organization. Similar to other Western European

[320] Before 1953, UN headquarters, which employed over 1,000 international civil servants, had, with the exception of translators, no more than fifteen Soviet nationals working for it at any given time. Rubinstein, *The Soviets in International Organizations*, 258. In 1957, on top of the dozens of UNESCO employees from US allies in Asia, Latin America, and Oceania, 181 Western Europeans and 49 North Americans made up over two-thirds of UNESCO's 340 staff members.

postwar international organizations, including the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), the Western European Union, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the personnel policies of the UNESCO Secretariat consisted of a contradictory hybridity of an American style of recruitment and a European administrative system. For its hiring practices, UNESCO drew on the "American job principle," relying on an open, competition-driven application process for positions that required specializations in the fields of education, science, and culture. These posts usually took the form of isolated assignments with renewable but short-term, multiyear contracts. This situation led to frequent hunts for replacements for people who had left their careers to serve as UNESCO officials. At the same time that it adopted this method of recruitment, however, UNESCO adhered to a variant of the "continental European notion of a career service," designed to accrue staff capable of developing a general knowledge of the intricacies of international organizations in order to enable them to don multiple hats over time and thereby accumulate the qualifications and experience necessary to make a career out of service in UNESCO. To foster this stable workforce, UNESCO extended to successful temporary employees "permanent contracts," which promised a career trajectory and path for promotion through the UNESCO ranks from P-1 to P-5, or even a D-1 or D-2 slot as department director.[321]

These techniques of recruitment and retention produced two strata of international civil servants within the UNESCO Secretariat. On the one hand, the "American" principle forced the

[321] This analysis of the hybrid structure of the secretariat is based on my own research, as well as a paper produced by the UNESCO Advisory Council on Personnel Policies published in 1960 intended to reevaluate the effectiveness of UNESCO recruitment and address the question of the desirability of strengthening the European model of a career civil service. Specifically, my analysis is based on an annex to this paper that discusses this hybridity in regard to other organizations. The council describes this discussion as also "strictly applicable to UNESCO": Advisory Council on Personnel Policies, "Principles of Recruitment and Promotion, Professional Staff (Paper for Consideration), Annex I: Extract from 'On the Establishment of a European Civil Service by Dr. Ernst Kern' in *Revue Internationale Des Sciences Administratives*, Vol. XXV-1959-No. 1," May 1960, 14–17, AG 10: STA 3/12 Commission de la carrière Documents, 1960-1963, UNESCO Archives.

secretariat to fill positions of professionals who, having come to the organization on what amounted to extended sabbaticals from their primary careers, served only temporarily. On the other hand, UNESCO's use of the "European" model of civil service yielded an entrenched cohort of Western bureaucrats who, having for the most part cut their administrative teeth on the global stage in other international organizations or Western European colonial services, made their careers and reached the heights of both informal and formal power within the UNESCO Secretariat.[322] This permanent class of officials, the majority of whom joined the organization in its early days or at its inception, conceived of themselves as veteran insiders embodying the institutional knowledge that preserved the organization's *"esprit de corps"* and work culture.[323]

These Western Europeans and Americans dominated the secretariat's leadership and held a monopoly of permanent contracts long after the USSR joined UNESCO. Because the Soviet Union, in fear of ideological contamination, forbade its citizens to live abroad for more than five years, Soviet prospective appointees, rarely able to ascend to this upper echelon of UNESCO society, looked to the temporary directorships and posts left open by those transients hired under

[322] As the British and French empires underwent their slow-motion collapses after the Second World War, many of the officials who had served in the colonies of the two Western European metropoles put their linguistic talents and the lessons they learned from traveling across cultures to use in the UN system, creating a legacy of European domination in international administrations that reinforced Soviet perceptions that the UN represented little more than a veil for colonial domination. For example, W. G. Eagleton, a high-ranking UNESCO employee who oversaw technical aid for the UNESCO Department of Education in the late 1950s and traveled to Moscow and Tashkent to work with Soviet institutions on UNESCO issues, established his international connections and pedagogical experience in India before its independence. According to a Soviet report on Eagleton's visit to Moscow in 1959, the Englishman had served as a high-ranking officer in the British Raj before joining UNESCO in the late 1940s. He had also made a name for himself as an influential professor of English literature at the Maharaja's College, Mysore, where he became (in his words) a "best friend" of the future first Vice President of India and UNESCO devotee, Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan. GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 14, ll. 162-64.

[323] These UNESCO stalwarts made up the core constituency of the UNESCO Staff Association that had defended Leff and the idea of the international civil servant during the early 1950s. And, to be clear, just because an employee joined the organization as a specialist did not mean that he or she could not eventually receive a raise or permanent contract. Many UNESCO permanent officials began as temporary specialists and subsequently ascended through the ranks of the organization. However, the fact that these two classes had a certain degree of mobility does not belie the existence of two distinct strata within the UNESCO staff that possessed different degrees of authority and power based on experience and tenure.

the "American principle."[324] But in 1959, up to 60 percent of UNESCO officials held permanent contracts.[325] In 1962, permanent-contract holders increased to 65 percent of the 1,058 posts in UNESCO, leaving only 37 vacated temporary spots for the Soviet Union to procure that year.[326] As a result, both the Soviet UNESCO Commission and Delegation perceived permanent contracts as "the main obstacle for improving the representation of socialist as well as neutral countries," castigating them for turning "the UNESCO Secretariat into a kind of 'retirement home' [*pensionnyi dom*] for an entire caste of 'international civil servants'—émigrés mainly from England and France."[327] The farther up the secretariat hierarchy Soviet officials looked, the more they came to regard permanent contracts as the key to Western rule over UNESCO. In the opinion of V. A. Kovda, the Soviet director of the UNESCO Department of Natural Sciences during the first half of the 1960s, the UNESCO "higher-ups" (*verkhushka*) consisted of a "group of friends who, after ten to twelve years of working together," had "essentially become a clique" pursuing their own interests in the international organization. "The principle of a permanent contract for UNESCO cadres," he continued, "is a very great evil." Because workers on these contracts "are guaranteed a high salary" and "a large pension in the future," they had "no real incentive to actively work for the benefit of UNESCO member states." Kovda also concluded that, "due to this principle, it is almost completely impossible to free the UNESCO apparatus from parasitical and harmful elements."[328] K. M. Pushkov, the lone Soviet specialist in the UNESCO department charged with hiring (the Bureau of Personnel and Management, or BPM)

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[324] GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 16, l. 212.

[325] GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 12, l. 5.

[326] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 19, l. 105; and GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 24, l. 133.

[327] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 20, l. 224.

[328] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 16, l. 40.

in the early 1960s, cast the careerism UNESCO fostered in its staff as the fruit of a capitalist mindset pervading the organization. "Any refusal of requests for an increase in rank," he observed of his Western colleagues in a report to the Soviet UNESCO Commission in 1960, "is seen as a personal insult, an infringement on the 'natural' desire of people to receive more . . . since . . . in accordance with their bourgeois, selfish psychology, there is no distinction made between private enterprise and the international organization."[329]

In an attempt to bridge the chasm between the number of UNESCO officials hailing from the West and those from the socialist or rapidly decolonizing regions of the globe, BPM complemented the American and European forms of administration with an affirmative action dimension known as "geographical distribution," which gave member states target quotas of positions. Based largely on the proportions of member states' financial contributions to UNESCO, this quota system worked to the advantage of the Soviet Union as the second largest contributor to the organization behind the United States. Seeking to assure that all governments had the chance to send at least one of their nationals to work in UNESCO, BPM sought to increase staff from "underrepresented" and "nonrepresented" member states while gradually reducing the number of persons from "overrepresented" member states. But because geographical distribution showed preference only to Soviet employees fitting the idiosyncratic profile of a given job, it did little to mollify the USSR's feelings of disenfranchisement. By way of example, the Soviet UNESCO Commission received in October 1960 a description of a low-level opening as program assistant in the UNESCO Department of Education requiring "knowledge of, and practical experience in primary education and primary school teacher-training in more than one country; acquaintance with primary education developments in Asian

[329] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 16, ll. 76-77.

countries; administrative experience in an international organization," as well as "good knowledge of English or French, and a working knowledge of the other language."[330] As this chapter will illustrate, the search for a Soviet citizen with these attributes proved difficult.

To strike a balance between the demand for specialized expertise, equitable representation of member states, and the cultivation of a corps of officials with knowledge of the workings of international organizations, BPM set up a convoluted series of stages of selection with different levels of criteria emphasizing all three needs. While this procedure lent a degree of entitlement to countries such as the USSR bereft of a sufficient presence in the secretariat, it also gave antecedence to those already working in Western-dominated international organizations and persons with skills and professional experience widespread in the West but rare in the socialist bloc. When a vacancy appeared in the secretariat, UNESCO posted a job advertisement in the UNESCO building and subsequently sent a notice to UNESCO regional centers, other UN specialized agencies, and the national commissions of underrepresented or nonrepresented member states with a deadline of three months to apply. Although this order of notification allowed the Soviet Union and other states under their quota to act before the overrepresented countries in Europe and North America, if the director of the department containing the position favored a specific UNESCO employee, the director-general had the power to give priority to those already initiated in the UN club by limiting the circulation of this information to other specialized agencies or UNESCO headquarters, where the announcement would be posted for five to seven days before broader dissemination.[331] After the three-month deadline to submit applications passed, BPM sorted the applications into the following groups, again giving

[330] GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 11, l. 106.

[331] As an important exception, UNESCO had to circulate open spots of directorships to all UNESCO member states.

preference to applicants from the UNESCO community: A) candidates already employed by UNESCO; B) nominees selected by member-state governments; C) persons who apply without "consultation" with their governments; and D) previously rejected applicants.[332]

Once BPM completed its sorting task, it forwarded all applications to the hiring department, which made a recommendation for a single candidate or a shortlist of those most suitable to a personnel committee. On paper this committee comprised up to twenty members of various nationalities, but it actually had a strong majority of Westerners. According to a 1962 report by the Soviet UNESCO Commission, eight years after the USSR joined UNESCO, and two years following the influx of newly decolonized African countries, "two Americans, two Englishmen, two Indians, three Frenchmen, and only one Soviet person" composed the committee. This ad-hoc group approved the final candidate based on five measures: 1) education; 2) language ability; 3) experience in specialization; 4) experience in international organizations; and 5) geographical distribution. Although the fifth measure leveled the playing field, the second and fourth measures tilted the competition back in the other direction. The second benchmark, aiming to ensure that all candidates could communicate in English and French (the two "working languages" used daily in the organization), marginalized those from outside the "Anglo-Saxon" world and *Francophonie*, granting supremacy to native English and French speakers while making other languages second-class vernaculars. Similarly, because no Soviet citizen, apart from the sprinkling of people already working in the UN, had experience in international organizations, the fourth measure counteracted the efforts of the USSR to expand its number of UNESCO staff members.

[332] The Bureau also unintentionally drew the indignation of its Soviet interlocutors because it was governed by an established group of Westerners. In the late 1950s, for instance, fourteen of the fifteen members of the Bureau of Personnel and Management came from Western countries. GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 14, l. 66.

The committee then submitted its recommendation to the director-general, who could still unilaterally appoint someone of his own choosing. In this manner, the process depended on the whim of an office occupied by an American from 1953 to 1958, an Italian from 1958 to 1961, and a Frenchman from 1961 to 1974. In the words of a Soviet official in BPM in 1962, the USSR felt that its "political opponents" controlled "a bureaucratic machine" in which, "for all the seeming democracy in the selection of candidates, the real master is the director-general, who has the last word in the appointment of any employee."[333]

In addition to these structural prejudices in UNESCO's approach to recruitment, the mere fact that UNESCO and other specialized agencies placed their headquarters in Western Europe granted a leg-up in the application process to those already living in, and accustomed to, Western European social, cultural, and political environs. As a matter of logistics, it made sense to hire Western Europeans in certain situations. Because the USSR and other member states considered it impractical for financial reasons to dispatch personnel to Paris for clerical and technical UNESCO occupations, local French citizens filled the vast majority of UNESCO jobs as typists, secretaries, watchmen, receptionists, and custodians. In the opinion of the UNESCO leadership, this use of local manpower seemed self-evident. In the suspicious minds of the Soviet UNESCO Delegation, French domination of these seemingly mundane functions enabled Westerners to control the everyday operations of the organization. If a Soviet employee needed a memo transcribed, a letter delivered, or trash emptied, he or she relied on personnel whose foreignness made them suspected spies. In a 1964 letter to S. K. Romanovskii, the chair of the Soviet UNESCO Commission at the time, Soviet UNESCO and embassy officials advanced a desperate and partially successful proposal to use the wives of Soviet UNESCO officials for these tasks,

[333] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 24, ll. 135-36.

complaining conspiratorially that the existing situation allowed the French, and vicariously the French director-general, René Maheu, "to control practically all activity of any employee of the UNESCO Secretariat."[334] The mounting unease over the influence of the French in UNESCO also led P. I. Ershov, the Soviet deputy director-general of UNESCO from 1960 to 1964, to press the Soviet permanent delegate in 1962 to propose moving the international organization to "a neutral country (Geneva, Stockholm, Vienna)" in order to cleanse it of the "direct moral and psychological influence of being in Paris" and in close proximity to NATO headquarters.[335] Likewise, the UNESCO leadership worried that the USSR conspired to infiltrate its organization with communist propagandists and intelligence agents. In the spring of 1958, Director-General Evans outraged his Soviet counterparts when he declined to hire the engineer S. A. Shumovskii for the directorship of the UNESCO Department of Natural Sciences after the American *Look* magazine exposed Shumovskii's role in the 1930s as a Soviet intelligence operative who groomed spies in the American aeronautical industry from his base at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT).[336] UNESCO departments also balked at hiring Soviet professionals who had worked or studied at institutions considered too closely affiliated with the Communist Party. In 1964, senior UNESCO officials fought against the appointment of a nominee to serve in the UNESCO Department of Social Sciences for the simple reason that he had graduated from the

[334] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 25, ll. 133-34; and GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 28, l. 124. The hesitancy to send lower-level "technical" workers to Paris reflected the broader policy of the Soviet embassy in Paris to avoid employing Soviet citizens as chauffeurs and typists. This arose from the perceived deficit (among these less educated Soviet citizens) of knowledge of foreign language and political training. For a discussion of this issue at the Soviet embassy in 1965, see the minutes of the meeting of diplomatic personnel that August: GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 30, ll. 232-36.

[335] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 21, l. 134. NATO was forced to move the Supreme Headquarters of Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) from its home outside of Paris to Brussels, Belgium, in 1967.

[336] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 7, ll. 106-10; 130-33; and GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 9, ll. 124-29. For a brief discussion of Shumovskii's place in the history of Soviet espionage in the United States, see: John Earl Haynes and Harvey Klehr, *Venona: Decoding Soviet Espionage in America* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), 50.

Academy of Social Sciences of the Central Committee, which the director of the UNESCO Department of Social Sciences characterized as a school for "party propagandists."[337]

Far from operating on neutral ground, as the status of UN buildings as "international territory" would suggest, the hiring proclivities of UNESCO and other UN recruiters bore strong imprints of the social networks, cultural expectations, and political circumstances of the locales of these international organizations. Socially, an "old boy" network stretched out beyond the walls of UNESCO to UN specialized agencies in Geneva, Rome, and Vienna, creating a situation in which UN employees alerted each other to vacancies or hired longtime acquaintances from the small world of international organizations before scoping out newcomers. For example, in August 1957, Dubinin and one of his Soviet colleagues informed the Soviet UNESCO Delegation that their boss in the UNESCO Russian Translation Section, the "white émigré" André Salomon, had suggested they work as adjunct Russian interpreters in the founding conference of the IAEA in Vienna that October. But without consultation with the USSR as an obviously interested party and the largest pool of native Russian speakers, conference planners chose another émigré, the head of the UN European Office's Russian Translation Section in Geneva, to oversee Russian translation at the conference. Further enraging and confusing Soviet officials, Salomon later revoked his offer to transfer the two Soviet translators to the conference, explaining that its organizers planned to find translators among the émigré community in Vienna. Complaining to the Soviet UNESCO Delegation that Salomon had "become quite active in notifying Russian émigrés living in Paris of opportunities for employment in Vienna," Dubinin

[337] For the controversy over this institution in 1966, see: GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 31, l. 155.

warned of "a danger existing from the first days of the new agency that the Russian Translation Section will be staffed mainly by émigrés."[338]

Soviet promoters of candidacies had to learn what personal characteristics Western recruiters found desirable in prospective international civil servants. In 1960, a Soviet employee of the European Division of the United Nations Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF) reported to Moscow in a memorandum–which then circulated among all agencies dealing with the UN–that the executive director of UNICEF, the American Maurice Pate, had dismissively referred to one Soviet applicant as a "sleepy librarian," hinting that the organization would reject her on the basis of affability irrespective of her qualifications. The Soviet UNICEF official advised Soviet agencies to avoid including such people on lists of candidacies in the future: "An element of 'personality' [*lichnost'*]," he explained, "has a large role in the positive decision of the question of acceptance for work in UN secretariats, i.e. the personal appeal to foreigners of this or that candidate, his erudition, experience, etc."[339]

At UNESCO regional centers outside of France, Soviet success in acquiring positions depended on the vicissitudes of Cold War bilateral relations and Western European politics. For the first seven years of Soviet participation in UNESCO, members of the secretariat, with an eye toward maintaining the international organization's relations with West Germany, obstructed Soviet efforts to station its pedagogical specialists in UNESCO's three major educational institutes. As Leo Fernig, an expat South African acting as deputy director of the UNESCO Department of Education, explained to a Soviet UNESCO employee in 1958, a small circle of UNESCO officials (whom he referred to as "little men believing they are conducting grand

[338] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2 d. 11, ll. 100-101.

[339] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 17, ll. 5-6.

policy") had undermined the nongovernmental status of these institutions by citing the West German government's potential negative reaction when denying requests from the Youth Institute to send a Soviet representative.[340] At last, the Gauting Institute managed to make the vice president of the USSR Committee of Youth Organizations a member of its governing board in 1960.[341]

The UNESCO leadership did take some steps to place Soviet citizens in their administration in the years immediately after the USSR joined UNESCO. From 1956 to the beginning of 1958, the director-general reserved openings for Soviet citizens provided that they had the necessary linguistic, administrative, and specialized skills. In the summer of 1956, Malcolm Adiseshiah, a UNESCO assistant director-general and renowned Indian education specialist, visited Moscow to personally evaluate candidates for senior and low-level spots considered opportune for Soviet specialists. But in its initial bids to proffer people corresponding to UNESCO's high standards, the nascent Soviet apparatus presented to UNESCO blatantly unqualified candidates who made a negative impression on the organization's leadership. In conversation with the Soviet UNESCO Commission, Adiseshiah claimed that "in the UNESCO Secretariat it was felt that one could not take candidates proposed by the USSR seriously" since "not a single one" of the nearly thirty Soviet applicants under consideration in 1956 "matched the description of the vacant position." To prove his point, he noted the offering of a Soviet orientalist (*vostokoved*) as director of the UNESCO Department of Natural Sciences.[342] At the same time, many Soviet applicants eventually hired by UNESCO only exacerbated the

[340] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 7, l. 115.

[341] GARF, f. 9519, op. 1 d. 5, ll. 2-4.

[342] Ibid., l. 79.

organization's disinclination to look to the socialist country for labor when they showed up for work months after their planned start date on account of the copious red tape involved in obtaining Soviet exit visas.[343]

The few early successful Soviet aspirants usually possessed an amalgam of foreign-language capability, sociability, and experience in administering large bureaucracies that focused on narrow educational, scientific, or cultural fields. For example, in 1957 UNESCO recruiters chose T. A. Beliaeva, the head of the Exchange and Acquisitions Department of the Lenin State Library in Moscow, as chief librarian at the UNESCO library on the first floor of its headquarters. After having interviewed Beliaeva on behalf of UNESCO, a UN technical assistance recruitment officer traveling through Moscow described her as a "very likeable, cultivated and pleasant person," remarking favorably on her twenty years of experience at the Lenin Library and responsibility for managing 110 staff members divided among six sections. Although she declared "herself not to be an expert in bibliography" and could communicate in English only "hesitantly," the recruitment officer stressed Beliaeva's fluency in French and predicted she would "become a good staff member within three months' time."[344] Nonetheless, the selection of Beliaeva resulted from a deliberate skirting of the application process that UNESCO performed only as a brief act of favoritism toward the USSR. While BPM advertised the librarian post "in the house," it chose to mention it confidentially to the Soviet UNESCO Delegation before alerting other member states and consciously passed over an assistant UNESCO librarian who they deemed equally qualified for the job.[345]

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[343] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 20, l. 226.

[344] W. Farr, Note on Madame Beliaeva, January 28, 1957, AG 8: Personnel Records: Beliaeva, Mrs. T., UNESCO Archives.

[345] Personnel Division, Letter to the Director-General on Post CUA-07, Librarian P-4, March 5, 1957, AG 8: Personnel Records: Beliaeva, Mrs. T.: PEM/RAD/IA/120, UNESCO Archives.

Despite Beliaeva's success story, UNESCO department directors sometimes had to fire or transfer some of the Soviet hopefuls given preferential treatment in the late 1950s because of their lack of qualifications needed for a job. In 1957, the director of the UNESCO Department of Program and Budget hired a Soviet national for a post but quickly decided not to renew his contract because "he did not have the necessary preparation in the area of budgets and finances for the performance of his duties."[346] This embarrassing early termination occurred in spite of the fact that the director knew of the Soviet employee's deficiencies before taking him on as a subordinate. This suggests that senior UNESCO staff pressured departments to forego proper vetting of Soviet candidates' professional background.[347] Owing to "insufficiencies" on the part of a flood of Soviet candidates in language capabilities as well as experience in administration and international organizations, the picture remained dim for the USSR throughout much of the 1950s. As Adiseshiah bluntly remarked in 1957 to the Soviet side concerning a recent vacancy, UNESCO needed a "miracle" to pick a Soviet national.[348]

For Soviet participants in conferences and other UNESCO activities, the sparseness of Soviet international civil servants created the overall impression that the Soviet UNESCO Commission and Delegation had utterly failed to fulfill their mandate. On March 31, 1960, N. A. Figurovskii, the director of the AN SSSR Institute for the History of Natural Sciences and Technology, after traveling to Paris for the first session of an editorial committee for one of UNESCO's reports on scientific research, presented the Central Committee with a laundry list of complaints about "the very small number of Soviet people in the UNESCO apparatus" and the

[346] GARF, F. 9519, op. 2, d. 9, ll. 73-74.

[347] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 7, ll. 46-49.

[348] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 9, l. 71.

USSR's overall "insufficient use of the opportunities of international cooperation" that the international organization had to offer. Embarrassed by this assessment of their work, the Soviet UNESCO Commission rebutted Figurovskii's conclusions in a note to the Central Committee, pointing out that he had not only been speaking from a position of ignorance (given that he incorrectly stated that the USSR had "only one man" in UNESCO), but also underestimated the "difficulties" they faced finding candidates who fit the job description for a vacant office.[349]

Beginning in 1958 when the USSR Council of Ministers transferred the Soviet UNESCO Commission to GKKS, however, the USSR started to make strides in planting its people, and hence gaining substantial influence, in the secretariat. The number of Soviet nationals in the organization's offices expanded from just eight at the beginning of 1957 to twenty in the spring of 1962. Although the cohort of Soviet nationals employed by UN Central in New York exceeded this number by far, the number of officials working in UNESCO outpaced Soviet progress in other UN specialized agencies. In 1962, for example, the USSR had only fifteen people in the UN Bureau of Technical Assistance Operations (BTAO), thirteen in the FAO, six in the ILO, and three in the WHO.[350] By 1965, the Soviet Union's share of personnel working in UNESCO ballooned to thirty-six.[351] From 1956 to 1967, a total of at least fifty Soviet citizens left elite posts in Soviet educational, scientific, cultural or diplomatic institutions to work in the UNESCO Secretariat for more than a year while dozens of Soviet linguists served temporarily as translators under contract with the international organization. Although most of these Soviet

[349] RGANI, f. 5, op. 35, d. 128, ll. 50-59.

[350] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 9, l. 74; and GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 21, l. 98.

[351] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 29, ll. 344-46.

international civil servants were male and Russian, a handful came from the western and eastern Soviet republics and a tiny portion were female pedagogues or librarians.

The Soviet UNESCO Commission especially rejoiced over the acquisition of the offices of heads of divisions and departments, which they could transform into Soviet fiefdoms within the organization. In 1958, one Soviet employee became head of a division in the UNESCO Department of Education. A year later, UNESCO named a Soviet scientist as deputy director of the UNESCO Scientific Regional Center in Jakarta, Indonesia.[352] The USSR then added a few directorships that positioned the communist country to exert influence on all UNESCO activity in the natural sciences and educational assistance to the developing world. At the end of 1959, Kovda, a soil scientist and senior member of AN SSSR, assumed the directorship of the UNESCO Department of Natural Sciences; two years later, V. S. Martynovskii, the director of the Institute for Refrigeration in Odessa, received the deputy directorship for technical education of the UNESCO Department of Education; and in 1963, UNESCO assigned another Soviet specialist to a senior position at the recently created UNESCO Institute for Educational Planning.[353] In 1961, the international organization also tapped Ershov, a former ambassador to Switzerland and the first Soviet envoy to Israel after the creation of the Jewish state in 1948, to serve as one of the organization's deputy directors-general.[354] More importantly, the USSR gradually developed a pool of Soviet citizens who had gained the experience in international organizations that UNESCO sought for its staff as conference attendees, experts, and translators.

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[352] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 14, l. 51; and GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 2, l. 6.

[353] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 6, l. 395; GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 21, l. 176; and GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 29, l. 323.

[354] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 22, l. 371; and P. I. Ershov, "Curriculum Vitae," n.d., 3–4, AG 8: Personnel Records of Mr. P. Erchov, UNESCO Archives. Ershov led the Soviet mission to Israel until 1953. For a description of Ershov's time in Israel, see Yaakov Ro'i, *Soviet Decision-Making in Practice: The USSR and Israel, 1947-1954* (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1980), 174.

Martynovskii exemplified this trend, having spent the late 1950s as a UNESCO technical expert at the Indian Technological Institute in Bombay, India.[355]

That said, the USSR perennially fell short of its goal to reach the quota range for personnel assigned to the country in accordance with its role as the second largest contributor to the UNESCO budget. In 1958, Soviet international civil servants made up 30 percent of their quota in the secretariat. This percentage rose to 36 percent in 1962, but decreased to 33 percent in 1963, and would fluctuate in the same range for the next decade.[356] For comparison, in the early 1960s England and France enjoyed a presence amounting to as much as 220 percent and 410 percent of their quotas respectively.[357] While at least one Soviet national served at any given time in the majority of UNESCO divisions, the departments of social sciences and culture, as well as the cultural exchange service, went years without a single Soviet employee.[358] Thus, the Soviet Union continued to occupy less than 5 percent of UNESCO positions while paying up to 17 percent of the international organization's annual expenses.[359] The communist state fared no better in other quarters of the UN. In 1962, Soviet secretariat workers accounted for only 3 percent of ILO staff. Of the more than 1,000 bureaucrats working at UN headquarters in New York, 7 percent came from the socialist bloc, 67 percent from NATO countries, and 26 percent from the "neutral" countries.[360] That the communist superpower, far from outpacing Western

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[355] For biographical information on Martynovskii, see: Vladimir Martynovskii, "Curriculum Vitae," n.d., 1–4, AG 8: Personnel Records: Martynovsky, V., UNESCO Archives. For his selection as a UNESCO technical expert in Bombay, see: UNESCO Technical Assistance Programme, Letter to Mr. Vladimir Martinovski, December 17, 1956, AG 8: Personnel Records: Martynovsky, V., UNESCO Archives.

[356] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 11. l. 267; GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 21, l. 99.

[357] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 20, l. 224.

[358] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 19, ll. 103-5; and GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 20, l. 199.

[359] GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 15, l. 323.

[360] Rubinstein, *The Soviets in International Organizations*, 267–68.

Europe or the United States, struggled to surpass even tiny nations such as Belgium and the Netherlands in representation at UN offices begs the question of why, apart from what Soviet representatives somewhat justifiably decried as UNESCO's policy of "discrimination," the USSR failed so miserably in meeting their own expectations of concentrating manpower in these administrations.[361]

The missteps of the Soviet UNESCO apparatus in delivering professionals to work in the UNESCO Secretariat stemmed from the total lack of experience of the USSR's foreign-relations structure in selecting candidates *in response* to the demands of a foreign institution. As chapter 1 illustrated, the Soviet Union under Stalin abstained from multilateral international organizations with secretariats, conducting bilateral cooperation with the noncommunist world. Soviet agencies supervising the international exchange of persons before the Second World War, such as VOKS and its smattering of "friendship societies" abroad, facilitated the travel of delegations and individuals for episodic sojourns in the West. In contrast to these bilateral transactions, in which a hierarchy of Soviet gatekeepers chose intellectuals suitable to go abroad, UNESCO and other postwar international organizations reserved the right to act as principal arbiter of who should "represent" the USSR in their administrations.[362] The challenge of crafting a mechanism to supply citizens not only ideologically "prepared" enough to pass Soviet litmus tests for travel abroad, but also compatible with whatever specialization UNESCO happened to need, left the coordinators of Soviet participation in UNESCO scurrying to uncover ways to generate such a system *ex nihilo*.

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[361] GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 1, l. 193.

[362] Although it focuses on the travel of Westerners to the Soviet Union, Michael David-Fox's work on cultural diplomacy during Stalin's reign provides a comprehensive history of VOKS and these societies. Specifically, chapter 2 discusses the role of VOKS in greasing the wheels of the Soviet bureaucracy in order to grant permission for trips abroad to Soviet intellectuals, mainly on the basis of patron-client relations: David-Fox, *Showcasing the Great Experiment*, chap. Going West: Soviet "Cultural" Operations Abroad.

The Soviet state turned over to a single agency–the Soviet UNESCO Commission–the daunting task of selecting "candidates for positions in the UNESCO apparatus and its related organizations." The dearth of Soviet citizens trained in the two UNESCO working languages became the central hurdle for the commission. The USSR faced a severe shortage of foreign-language speakers that hampered not just the USSR's ability to supply international civil servants, but also the superpower's capacity to carry out its increasing commitments in more pressing matters of international relations. In November 1955, Foreign Minister Molotov wrote to the Central Committee appealing for the party's permission to send fifteen teachers of English, French, and German from MID's Higher Diplomatic School (VDSh) and MGIMO to live and study in London, Paris, and Berlin for six months. "Although the majority of [diplomats]," Molotov noted, "can work with documents and the foreign press, as well as conduct simple conversations in foreign languages, a significant portion of diplomatic personnel are still not fluent in foreign languages, which is especially manifested in an insufficient knowledge of spoken language." The rudimentary skills in Western languages acquired by these diplomats, he claimed, exhibited the poor quality not only of their teachers, but also of their teachers' teachers. Acknowledging their "good theoretical preparation," Molotov contended that the teachers at Soviet foreign-service academies fell short of instilling fluency in their students "since they themselves are cut off from the language environment and in their day studied with people for whom the foreign language was not native."[363]

If MID, four months after the Geneva Summit and at the onset of "peaceful coexistence," lacked a contingent of diplomats fluent in major European languages to execute the sensitive facets of Soviet foreign policy, the Soviet Union endured a veritable vacuum with

[363] RGANI, f. 3, op. 8, d. 338, ll. 143-44.

respect to English- or French-speaking specialists in agencies with no relation to foreign policy. Unlike a few of the experts the USSR commissioned to help "weakly-developed countries," Soviet UNESCO employees did not have the benefit of bringing with them an interpreter. Thus the commission embarked on a quest to single out specialists fluent in at least one of the two working languages and proficient in the other. In response to a flood of letters mailed regularly by the commission, dozens of Soviet ministries, universities, and academies insisted they did not employ anyone who knew one of the two UNESCO working languages and fit the job description. In a bid to display the multinational character of the USSR, the commission also addressed pleas for applicants to the ministries of education of the Armenian and Azerbaijani SSRs, the Central Committee of the Tajik SSR, as well as other regions of the "Soviet East," almost all of which gave negative answers.[364]

Much to the chagrin of members of the commission who saw the relative proficiency of MID personnel in foreign languages as a panacea for their paucity of multilingual applicants, UNESCO, with the exception of translators and deputy directors-general, rejected Soviet candidates whose sole professional experience consisted of diplomatic service.[365] The Soviet UNESCO Delegation in Paris also wanted MID officials to serve in UNESCO, but for different reasons than those driving the commission. Financially, the delegation lamented that MID neglected to bridge the divide between "midites" and "nonmidites" (*midovtsy* and *nemidovtsy*,

[364] GARF, f. 9519, op 1, d. 3, ll. 24; 27-28. The commission generally had more success with Russian institutions, but here too, the vast majority of responses were negative. For an example of a positive responses from the RSFSR Ministry of Education, see: Ibid., ll. 25; 29.

[365] For one of many examples of UNESCO refusing to employee Soviet apparatchiks from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, see: GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 21, l. 108. The deputy executive positions of UN organs were often given to a high-ranking Soviet diplomat. While these positions required adherence to the ethics of the international civil service, a "gentlemen's agreement" gave these positions equally to Western, "neutral," and Soviet individuals as a way to counter criticism concerning the monopoly of the West over the top posts of UN organizations: Lemoine, *The International Civil Servant*, 95–96.

or diplomats from MID and non-diplomats) working abroad, emphasizing that this differentiation bred confusion over how to scale the salaries of Soviet UNESCO employees deprived of official diplomatic ranks. Politically, the delegation bemoaned the unpreparedness of Soviet UNESCO workers for handling routine interactions with foreigners. At a 1965 meeting of diplomats at the Soviet embassy in Paris, Sobakin, the Soviet permanent delegate, objected to the fact that "nonmidites" under his purview, "arriving to work in UNESCO, are often encountering diplomatic work for the first time, and thus have no work experience in this field, no skills establishing contacts and working with foreigners, even though, as a rule . . . they are good workers." To compensate for this inexperience, he continued, "it is necessary to create some kind of short-term courses for the preparation of cadres for international organizations, where Soviet specialists–not diplomats–would be given their first skills for working abroad."[366] These dilemmas led the delegation to needle the Soviet UNESCO Commission over the prospect of enlisting MID apparatchiks. "It should be kept in mind," the commission retorted after one of these missives, "we need for work in UNESCO predominately specialists of various branches of education, higher education, science, and culture, with current experience in these spheres."[367]

For all the handwringing over the inaccessibility of MID's diplomats, the roots of the commission's ineptitude grew out of deeper discrepancies between UNESCO's conception of the right of nationals to transnational movement, and the aspirations of the Soviet state and party to control its people. In essence, the USSR fell short of its goal of contesting Western control over the secretariats of UN organizations because of the inherent disadvantages it

[366] GARF, f. 9519 op. 2, d. 30, ll. 232-33.

[367] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 29, l. 44.

suffered from the incongruity between the open, spontaneous, and competitive recruitment of UNESCO and the Soviet state's highly insular, top-down, vertical style of mobilization.

The closed nature of Soviet society barred it from contributing to one of the most lucrative sources of UNESCO recruitment: nationals applying voluntarily and independently of their governments. The USSR divested itself of the opportunity to attract people through the monetary and material incentives UNESCO pitched to non-Soviet prospects. A career at UNESCO or other specialized agencies lured many Western Europeans with its promises of a good salary, a lofty mission, and life in a dynamic world capital. Further stiffening competition to the detriment of the Soviet Union, in 1962 Director-General Maheu increased the salaries of UNESCO employees in order to incentivize the recruitment of specialists with greater prestige.[368] In contrast, since the USSR confiscated Soviet international civil servants' salaries and redistributed them as smaller stipends (see the next chapter), MID found it difficult to formulate a method of payment for its UNESCO employees commensurate with the expensive living standards of European cities.[369] For this and other reasons discussed later, the Soviet UNESCO Commission grappled with the question of how to stymy the high attrition rate among Soviet UNESCO workers who requested permission to return to the homeland before the expiration of their contracts.[370]

Moreover, while the United States, the United Arab Republic, and a few African countries imposed security clearances on subjects interested in working for international organizations, the USSR stood alone in its enforcement of examinations of candidates'

[368] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 20, l. 255.

[369] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 13, l. 178; and GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 25, ll. 133-35.

[370] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 26, ll. 235-36.

"ideological preparation" for living abroad and uncompromising posture against the acceptance by one of its citizens on his or her own volition of an offer from UNESCO.[371] In line with established protocol, UNESCO sent individual invitations to the personal addresses of Soviet academics, experts, and others interested in working for the organization. This provoked AN SSSR to complain to the commission that diffuse outreach to its members "greatly complicates" work "in the selection and arrangement of appropriate candidacies in those instances when invited comrades for this or that reason cannot go."[372] The commission forwarded these grievances to the delegation, instructing it to urge UNESCO to use the commission as the lone conduit for correspondence with Soviet citizens.[373] The preclusion of voluntary applicants from the USSR put the communist country at a disadvantage. In 1963, of the 1,269 applications received by UNESCO for 40 vacancies open to external competition, 965 came from individuals applying of their own will and 304 originated in proposals from governments. While the official UNESCO missions of France, the United States, West Germany, and India put forward 7, 43, 10, and 5 candidates respectively, UNESCO accepted 242, 125, 29, and 35 applications from nationals of these countries who appealed to UNESCO for work independently of their governments. In the same year, the Soviet UNESCO Commission passed along just sixteen applications.[374]

Oddly enough, the USSR encountered rivals from within the socialist camp during the *concours* for admission to the UNESCO bureaucracy. With the exception of brief boycotts of the UN during the Korean War, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and several other people's democracies

[371] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 14, ll. 162-64.

[372] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 17, l. 78.

[373] Ibid. l. 53.

[374] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 26, l. 234.

participated in UN specialized agencies from their founding, continuing to host UNESCO activities even after communist takeovers in the late 1940s turned these nations inward and away from the West (see chapter 1). Because of this longer history of interaction with the international organizational system, Eastern European countries tended to outshine the unschooled USSR in the game of give-and-take at the center of the race to people the secretariat. This led to considerable discord among the eastern-bloc nations when multiple socialist applicants found themselves jockeying for a single post. After Director-General Evans in 1957 simultaneously offered the deputy directorship of the UNESCO Department of Social Sciences to Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the USSR with not "a word about negotiations to fill this position carried out with the other countries of the socialist camp," the chairman of the Soviet UNESCO Commission accused Evans of purposefully pitting the communist allies against each other in competition for secretariat slots.[375] Nonetheless, Eastern European officials privately acknowledged their own culpability for this problem. In 1965, the Ukrainian permanent delegate to UNESCO, N. T. Reshetniak, in conversation with the Czechoslovak permanent delegate, Ludek Golubek, expressed regret over the existence "in the past" of "unhealthy competition for receiving places in the secretariat among candidates of socialist countries."[376]

The USSR's sequestration of its inhabitants from the outside world generated another self-defeating tendency in the form of chronic reluctance to furnish detailed backgrounds of its candidates for UNESCO posts. In the cases when Soviet domestic institutions managed to deliver applications to UNESCO on time, they provided UNESCO with cursorily composed or incomplete forms without the required photograph of the applicant, a thorough curriculum

[375] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 9, l. 89.

[376] GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 65, l. 22.

vitae, contact information for professional references, etc. As the Soviet permanent delegate groused to the Soviet UNESCO Commission in 1959, "the applications are composed in such a way that it is sometimes difficult to get an idea of our candidate." Given the unlikelihood of UNESCO scheduling an interview with a specialist working in the Soviet hinterlands, and the fact that this paperwork often constituted the only lens through which UNESCO could evaluate suitability for a job, the delegate begged the commission for an answer as to "why we do not give more detailed data on the work of our candidates, even if this data does not always correspond to reality."[377]

The bungling of Soviet applications arose out of a fundamental disagreement between the USSR and UNESCO officials over whether to assess the merit of prospective employees on the basis of personal accomplishments or the status of member states on the world stage. The international organization's position that Soviet applicants undergo scrutiny as *individuals*, bearing their own professional and moral attributes disassociated from the prestige of their country, conflicted with the commission's arguments that UNESCO take in people because of the USSR's *collective* educational, scientific, and cultural achievements. Frustrated with what had become by 1959 a routinized rejection of its candidates, the USSR utilized diplomatic pressure to achieve its ends. While Soviet representatives to the executive board and general conference annually introduced resolutions enunciating the importance of geographical distribution in the shaping of the secretariat, Foreign Minister Gromyko and other senior diplomats demanded in meetings with the director-general a Soviet presence in the secretariat on par with the USSR's standing as a "great power" and UNESCO's second largest financial

[377] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 14, l. 52.

benefactor, advising the organization not to bite the hand that fed it.[378] Successive directors-general, correctly interpreting these demarches to cut off funding as empty threats, reminded their Soviet interlocutors of the USSR's deficit of competitive applicants. Replying to a protest from the delegation in 1959, Director-General Veronese took exception to the Soviet assertion that "an objective consideration of the qualifications of presented candidates would show that these qualifications meet the requirements that are necessary for occupation of these positions." In light of this incorrect claim, Veronese shot back, he could "only come to the conclusion" that the delegation was "insufficiently aware of the nature of the described work and the statements submitted by Soviet candidates." Referring to the Soviet presumption that the USSR's reputation trumped the meritocratic hiring process, the director-general pointed out that "a simple confirmation from Soviet authorities that, in their opinion, a candidate is fully qualified to receive a position, cannot replace a full [application] form."[379] After all, the very premise motivating Soviet officials to air such grievances violated the ethics governing the international civil service. In answer to a question from a Soviet UNESCO worker as to the reason no Hungarians had become part of the UNESCO bureaucracy, Veronese advised his subordinate: "there are no representatives of governments in the secretariat, but only international civil servants, who cease to be citizens of their countries and become citizens of the world."[380]

Meanwhile, Soviet functionaries in Moscow contemplated various measures designed to engender a steady availability of Soviet citizens suitable for the international civil service. In

[378] For examples of the "great power" argument and discussion of resorting to the cutting of the USSR's contribution, see: GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 6, l. 175; and GARF, f. 9519, op. 1 d. 15, l. 333.

[379] GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 12, l. 4.

[380] GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 1, l. 322.

1958, the Soviet UNESCO Commission began a long battle to browbeat each domestic ministry, academy, and university relevant to UNESCO into creating multiyear "plans" for mobilizing personnel as well as "reserves of cadres" filled with either ten to fifteen or twenty to twenty-five experts waiting in the wings for an open spot in the organization.[381] From 1958 to 1967, these entreaties, along with a petition for the Soviet Institute of International Relations (IMO) to establish a department focused on training international civil servants and an appeal for UNESCO to set up language courses for Soviet citizens in Moscow, repeatedly fell on deaf ears.[382]

The commission realized it had to convince Soviet agencies relevant to UNESCO of the importance of the international organization, educate chiefs of these agencies on "the objectives" of their participation in UNESCO, and impose a system of accountability through the imposition of "personal responsibility on the heads of the organizations or their deputies for work related to UNESCO." To this end, the commission proposed the convening of meetings in the Central Committee with the USSR Ministry of Culture, the USSR Ministry of Higher and Secondary Special Education (MINVUZ), the RSFSR Ministry of Education, and other organs. [383] To rectify the "incorrect position" of these institutions toward UNESCO, the commission and delegation also tried to lure Soviet professionals for assignments by highlighting the educational opportunities of working abroad.[384] When looking for a good fit for a post in the UNESCO Department of Social Sciences in 1959, the delegation stressed to the commission that a specialist on "modern bourgeois sociology" at the AN SSSR Institute of

[381] For a couple of examples, see: GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 8, ll. 44-45; and GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 2, l. 207.

[382] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 14, l. 85; and GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 26, l. 255.

[383] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 6, l. 175.

[384] The phrase "incorrect position" comes up repeatedly. For an example, see: GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 26, l. 160.

Philosophy would find it worthwhile to serve in UNESCO since he could get acquainted with his foreign counterparts and their latest work.[385]

Yet the stonewalling on the part of these domestic organizations derived from the inadequacy of their international departments, which remained chronically overworked and understaffed. The USSR Council of Ministers, the Presidium, and the Central Committee spent most of the time they allotted to international organizations pressuring Soviet establishments into cultivating reserves of technical experts for travel to the decolonizing world. And even with respect to this higher priority, Soviet authorities judged ministerial and academic administrations as woefully deficient. A memorandum written for the Soviet UNESCO Commission and the State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations (GKES) claimed in 1961 that an "unsatisfactory situation" with the reserves of experts for weakly-developed countries resulted from the fact that each agency carried out this project "on a case-by-case basis," in a "disorganized" manner and "without the necessary accountability." In MINVUZ and other Soviet ministries, the supervision of reserves of cadres fell on the shoulders of "essentially a single employee who is also responsible for a lot of work in the selection of specialists for bilateral agreements and therefore cannot ensure the timely selection and registration of specialists for recommendation to UNESCO."[386]

The systemic defiance of the commission's recruitment requests also reflected the Soviet leadership's disregard for the need to integrate new agencies overseeing international cultural and educational diplomacy into the preexisting chains-of-command governing the network of Soviet institutions at home. Although Malenkov and Khrushchev embarked on

[385] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 13, ll. 127-28.

[386] GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 14, l. 193.

"antiministerialist" campaigns from 1954 to 1957 aimed at ridding the Soviet bureaucracy of the "parallelism" and "hyper-centralisation" typifying Stalinist administration, these moves toward decentralization, better interministerial coordination, and clear-cut divisions of labor among organs of the Soviet state overlooked the urgency of eradicating their insularity by forcing compliance with the Soviet UNESCO Commission's unprecedented commitment to link domestic agencies to international institutions.[387] Lacking what the commission, in a crossed-out complaint from 1958, characterized as the crucial wide-ranging "authority to effectively implement and coordinate activities related to the practical participation of the Soviet Union in UNESCO affairs," Soviet-UNESCO intermediaries had little recourse to official instruments of coercion in their drive to mobilize Soviet professionals from an eclectic collection of agencies specializing in everything from television broadcasting to nuclear physics.[388]

In fact, the power relations between the Soviet UNESCO Commission and domestic institutions were often reversed. The power of Soviet ministries and organizations to accede to or spurn appeals for applicants afforded these bodies considerable leverage over the commission. In January 1966, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR revolted against both the Soviet UNESCO Commission and the international organization on behalf of Ukrainian institutions, notifying Moscow and Paris that Ukraine would not submit experts for

[387] Yoram Gorlizki, "Anti-Ministerialism and the USSR Ministry of Justice, 1953-56: A Study in Organisational Decline," *Europe-Asia Studies* 48, no. 8 (1996): 1279–1318.

[388] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 6, l. 176. In 1965, the commission looked to how the US Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, a State Department organ founded in 1959, elicited American interest in UNESCO work, circulating among commission members a lengthy application form the Bureau obliged a professor at the College of William and Mary in Virginia to complete before he applied to UNESCO. But Soviet officials likely found the American method of delivering prospects for the secretariat hard to emulate because of a more vigorous culture of volunteering for international organizations in the US evolving out of a greater public awareness of UNESCO and a relatively laissez-faire stance toward international mobility. GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 65, l. 182.

UNESCO technical assistance to weakly-developed countries until the republic filled its quota in the UNESCO Secretariat. The motivation for the Ukrainian authorities' rebellion issued from a long-simmering anger that, in spite of UNESCO's recognition of the Ukrainian SSR as an independent member state, Soviet central authorities reserved complete control over the nomination of prospective experts from the peripheral republics. "The current procedure of registering Soviet experts for UNESCO (and other international organizations)," the Ukrainian deputy minister of foreign affairs explained in a letter to the commission, ascribed to GKES alone the ability to "select and present candidates, including those from the Ukrainian SSR and BSSR." Since GKES, "having received requests from all UN agencies for experts from the USSR, the Ukrainian SSR, and the BSSR, completes them in all instances (with insignificant exceptions) only as experts from the Soviet Union," the deputy minister griped that Ukrainian emissaries to UNESCO could not "guarantee to this or that international organization that experts selected in the republic will definitely be presented as candidates of Ukraine."[389]

But the Ukrainian protest also manifested a far-reaching dissatisfaction over the botching of the Soviet venture to get its nationals into the secretariat. While agreeing with the warning of the Soviet UNESCO Delegation that "the refusal to present candidacies of Ukrainian experts does not scare the secretariat," the ministry believed its boycott served as a justifiable riposte to the disincentivizing cycle of application and rejection the country's professionals had weathered at the hands of UNESCO over the previous decade. Ukrainian organizations, the deputy minister stressed, met "significant difficulties in the preliminary selection of candidates for UNESCO in connection with the fact that the number of specialists who speak foreign languages well in the republic is limited." On the one hand, when UNESCO

[389] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 31, ll. 221; 223.

turned down these "qualified workers, with whom the organizations for which they work are reluctant to part with," Ukrainian academies and ministries "in the future refuse to give us new candidates." On the other hand, "the organizations from which UNESCO headquarters have taken people then show significantly greater interest in the presentation of new candidates." Thus, he concluded, the Ukrainian UNESCO Commission would find it "significantly easier to interest republican institutions" in sending its people to UNESCO for work as experts "if we could prove to these institutions that UNESCO actively cooperates with us and helps fill our quota in the headquarters itself."[390]

The problem, however, resided not in the unwillingness of either side to cooperate, but in the powerlessness of the Soviet UNESCO Commission to function effectively as a middleman caught between two irreconcilable systems with antithetical ways of doing business. The commission found itself detached from the Soviet domestic order and deprived of the authority and incentives needed to wrangle Soviet specialists from their home institutions. Furthermore, the reclusion, obfuscation, and great-power entitlement displayed by Soviet organs did little to help curry the favor of an international organization shot through not only with Western cultural predispositions and social networks, but also with normative structural biases toward voluntary international mobility, information sharing, and individualized meritocracy. The recruitment practices of the UNESCO Secretariat ensured that the majority of its employees came from Western European and North American countries throughout the 1950s and for much of the 1960s. As chapter 6 will demonstrate, this majority made the secretariat a difficult and often hostile work environment for the Soviet international servants scattered across the departments of the organization.

[390] Ibid., ll. 220; 223-25.

By the late 1960s, the brief window in which the USSR could feasibly catch up to the West in its command over the nuts-and-bolts of international organizations had closed. With the founding of the Group of 77 developing nations in 1964 and its institutionalization in 1967, the main adversary competing with countries in the Soviet orbit for the benefits of the policy of geographical distribution gained a powerful lobbying arm that outmatched the USSR's meager tools of diplomatic pressure at UN agencies. In 1967, the fourteenth session of the UNESCO General Conference consummated a shift in the making since 1960 from viewing geographical distribution as equally encompassing the socialist and non-Western world to rendering utmost preference to African nations.[391] Over the course of the 1970s, a fresh influx of member states into the international organization and changes in how the organization calculated geographical distribution reduced the size of the USSR's personnel quota for workers in the UNESCO Secretariat, while the claims of historically underrepresented groups that transcended nationality and ideological blocs (e.g., women) also made it harder for the USSR to acquire new openings. As a consequence, the Soviet Union did not hit the low end of its target quota range until the twilight of the communist era in the mid-1980s.[392]

[391] The general conference included a resolution on staff policy that singled out the African states explicitly for geographical distribution. While the USSR and other socialist countries still enjoyed preferential treatment as underrepresented member states, the focus clearly shifted away from the socialist countries to the developing world, which placed the most emphasis on the importance of the UN system because of its role as a vehicle for economic development. "Records of the General Conference, Fourteenth Session: Resolutions" (UNESCO, 1966), 131, UNESDOC.

[392] For a sampling of reports on geographical distribution and the USSR in the secretariat after 1967, refer to the following reports: "Geographical Distribution of Secretariat: Report by the Director-General," September 20, 1974, 15, 18 C/60, UNESDOC; "Geographical Distribution of Staff: Report by the Director-General," September 24, 1976, 20, 19 C/60, UNESDOC; Executive Board, "Staff Policy: General Long-Term Plan for the Recruitment and Renewal of Staff: Geographical Distribution of Staff," August 28, 1980, 44, 110 EX/33, UNESDOC; and Executive Board, "Geographical Distribution of the Staff and Revision of the Quota System," September 11, 1987, 36, 127 EX/38, UNESDOC.

CHAPTER 5

COMMUNISTS BY NIGHT: INTERNATIONAL CIVIL SERVANTS AND LIFE IN THE SOVIET COLONY IN PARIS

For Soviet specialists who made the cut for the UNESCO team, the precondition that they separate their political selves from a public guise of international civil service opened up ways of being that differed drastically from what Deborah Field has depicted as the "messiness and variability of Khrushchev-era *byt*," i.e. the absence of a fixed partition between public and private spheres for Soviet citizens.[393] Unlike in the USSR, where the official script of communist identity encroached on both leisure time and the public setting of the workplace, in Paris Soviet authorities could tend only to the communist identities of Soviet UNESCO workers in a private sphere artificially delineated by the rules of the international civil service. During the workday, the neutral candor mandated for UNESCO employees excluded any moves by the Soviet state and the Communist Party to safeguard their citizens' allegiance. In the evenings and on weekends, the trappings of "bourgeois" culture and lifestyles threatened to tempt Soviet secretariat staff away from the communist path. To shore up communist loyalty in this hostile context, the Soviet UNESCO Delegation and embassy enacted their own version of "domestic containment." Conspiring to monopolize the private lives of those working in UNESCO, these officials sought to recapitulate in this sphere a microcosmic iteration of the social, cultural, and political world constituting Soviet society back home. But in the first three years that Soviet

[393] Field, "Everyday Life and the Problem of Conceptualizing Public and Private," in *Everyday Life in Russia Past and Present*, 177.

citizens worked in the secretariat, these attempts to shepherd their flock into a sealed off bubble in the heart of the French capital faced significant challenges arising from the general disarray in the social organizations (*obshchestvennye organizatsii*) of the Soviet embassy in Paris and Moscow's inability to foresee and respond to the ramifications of shipping its people abroad to take on the wholly novel role of Soviet international civil servant.

Beginning in 1956, the delegation strived to integrate its brood of international civil servants into the embassy's branch of the USSR's recently reinvigorated network of trade unions. Under the leadership of Khrushchev, the All-Union Council of Trade Unions (VTsSPS) enacted reforms designed, as historian Junbae Jo demonstrates, to facilitate worker engagement by ridding the Soviet trade-union bureaucracy of the "red-tape" existing under Stalin and promoting "voluntary participation in the decision-making process" governing industries as well as state entities.[394] In line with this thrust toward "democratization," the Local Committee (*mestnyi komitet*, or *mestkom*) of the United Professional Organization of the Soviet embassy in France–which oversaw trade-union chapters of the diplomatic and technical personnel of the trade mission, the Soviet Information Bureau (Sovinformbiuro), the consulate, the embassy, and the Soviet UNESCO Delegation–set out to make the trade union a "school of communism" that would cultivate among their several-hundred fellow countrymen a tightly knit solidarity founded on heightened involvement in the cultural, social, political, and work life of the Soviet outpost in France.[395]

Before the latter half of 1959, however, these revitalizing reforms had little to show in terms of increasing the efficacy of the trade union as a vehicle for inspiring Soviet nationals

[394] Junbae Jo, "Dismantling Stalin's Fortress: Soviet Trade Unions in the Khrushchev Era," in *Soviet State and Society Under Nikita Khrushchev*, 122-30.

[395] The local committee cited this famous Leninist quote in a July 1958 report. GARF, f. 7709, op. 26, d. 586, l. 30.

stationed in Paris to exhibit the level of communist initiative and discipline considered obligatory for living and working in foreign lands. By the late 1950s, the United Professional Organization's lackadaisical and bumbling administration of its activities had allowed the Soviet collective to become wracked with what trade-union leaders perceived as chronic absenteeism, dilly-dallying, apathy, unruliness, bickering, and negligence. "It is no secret," a leader of the local committee noted at a meeting in December 1959, "that we have many violations of discipline." Soviet personnel who had offices in the embassy, trade mission, and other Soviet organs made a habit of coming to work late, leaving their "nooks," drinking coffee, and "playing" on their typewriters.[396] An earlier report from March 1959 detailed how Soviet citizens had also abdicated their role in making the sporadically held social functions of the Soviet colony into fertile ground for political self-improvement. The decision of the trade union to hold political lectures and discussions in a movie theater before the weekly screening of movies for entertainment meant that participation in these main mechanisms of ideological control oscillated with the magnitude of enthusiasm for the film. "Attendance of lectures is almost 100 percent on those days when a new, interesting film is being shown," the local committee scolded in its report. "But unfortunately," it went on, "this is not always for everyone a sign of high consciousness, but the desire, sometimes, to get the best seat in the hall. When the lecture or discussion is going on without a motion picture, a good half of the seats in the hall remain empty." As evidence, the local committee cited a lecture in 1958 presented by a Soviet employee of the UNESCO Department of Education on Khrushchev's educational reforms to "strengthen the connection between school and life" that drew a paltry eight people. On occasions when the feature cinematic presentation attracted a respectable audience, some attendees pelted speakers

[396] GARF, f. 7709, op. 26, d. 740, l. 42.

with heckles of “time’s up!” and “its time to finish!” Others completely ignored the lecturer, flipping through newspapers and magazines or engaging in “private conversations” among themselves.[397]

The composers of the report excoriated Soviet citizens on assignment in France for laxity in their personal lives. Referring to a recent speech by a member of the trade union that “focused on the fact that we have not eliminated gossip and rumors interfering with normal, harmonious work,” the local committee instructed the social organizations of the embassy to “wage an implacable struggle against the peddlers of gossip or rumors” and “show intolerance of violators of the rules of the socialist community, severely punishing them.” It also called for more than the “temporary campaign” that followed several recent episodes of “excessive consumption of alcoholic beverages,” entreating everyone to wipe out the blight of heavy drinking that threatened to erode the self-restraint incumbent on those representing the USSR to the outside world. By the same token, the local committee warned its colleagues “not to forget for a minute that any rashness or carelessness could be used by the enemy to harm the interests of our state,” advising its peers to “always eradicate instances of excessive talkativeness on the telephone” and the “improper flinging around of documents.” Those at the helm of the trade union worried that their colleagues had lost sight of the heightened risk, “in the conditions of working abroad,” of ideological corruption and the unwitting betrayal of their homeland. “We must keep this in mind,” the report concluded, “since some comrades, having lived for a time in Paris and thinking that they have adjusted to the city and local environment,” had started to “forget that they live in

[397] Ibid., ll. 215-16.

a capitalist country where, along with friends, we have many enemies who are just looking for chances to use the recklessness and carelessness of a Soviet person."[398]

But if the local committee for all Soviet agencies in Paris felt the "especially important significance" of the "education of our comrades in the spirit of collectivism," the trade-union chapter of the Soviet UNESCO Delegation, which consisted of a combination of delegation officials and Soviet UNESCO employees, recognized their unique duty in this regard. "The social organizations of the UNESCO collective," the delegation noted in one of its annual reports, "have tried in their work not to let out of their sight their special significance given that the majority of members of the professional organization . . . constantly work in hostile surroundings in an international organization where the Western countries preserve dominant positions." This urgency pertained all the more so since "the conditions of work and everyday life (*byt'*) of members of the [trade] union," the "vast majority" of whom "live in isolation, in private apartments in different regions of Paris," generated "significant additional difficulties for the educational work of the social organizations in comparison to the embassy, trade mission, and other Soviet institutions" in Paris.[399]

In fact, from 1956 through the first half of 1959, the woefully understaffed delegation could not keep track of which people fell under its watch, let alone mold them into a sodality of devoted communists resistant to the dangerous influences inherent in becoming UNESCO personnel.[400] The bizarre story of I. M. Zhukova epitomizes the prevailing disorder in the

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[398] Ibid., ll. 217-20.

[399] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 29, ll. 325-26. The 1956 statute establishing the Soviet UNESCO Delegation gave MID and the Soviet UNESCO Commission responsibility to "maintain necessary contact with Soviet citizens working in the UNESCO Secretariat through the delegation." GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 1, ll. 36-37; 144-46.

[400] Throughout the late 1950s, the Soviet UNESCO Delegation simply did not have the manpower to oversee Soviet citizens working in the UNESCO Secretariat. In 1958, for example, the Soviet permanent delegate was absent from Paris traveling on business for all but sixty-four days. As a result, the adviser of the delegation had to fill his position

delegation's drive to establish "*kontrol'*" over Soviet international civil servants in the late 1950s. An epidemiologist who left the USSR for unknown reasons at the height of Stalin's terror in 1938, Zhukova went to work as an assistant with the UNESCO Preparatory Commission for the creation of UNESCO in 1946 and stayed on for eight years.[401] Throughout Zhukova's tenure, her standing with the Soviet state continued to be shrouded in mystery. While she retained her Soviet citizenship, the preparatory commission hesitated to hire her, thinking it undesirable to "employ anyone of Russian nationality who does not have the full confidence of the Soviet government."[402] "I think it is clear," a UNESCO source eventually concluded after conversations with the Soviet embassy, "that she is not persona ingrata though not particularly persona grata,

for ten months. That same year, the delegation had no First Secretary and lost its attaché. GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 6, ll. 214-15.

[401] For the many positions Zhukova occupied from 1946 to 1954, see the "Personnel Records of I.M. Zhukova" in the UNESCO Archives. For a brief discussion of Zhukova's role as UNESCO's liaison to the WHO, see Joseph Needham's speech in Krishna R. Dronamraju, *If I Am To Be Remembered: The Life and Work of Julian Huxley with Selected Correspondence* (River Edge, NJ: World Scientific Publishing Co, Pte. Ltd., 1993), xv.
Zhukova's personal history reflects how many persons displaced from their homelands found a new life and career in international organizations such as UNESCO. Born in St. Petersburg in 1899, Zhukova studied at universities in Kiev and Petrograd/Leningrad during the Russian Revolution and Civil War; received a doctorate in medicine from Leningrad State University in 1924; and worked for epidemiological laboratories in Leningrad and Baku in the late 1920s and the 1930s. After leaving the USSR, she became a "research student" at the Strangeway Research Laboratory in Cambridge in 1938 and subsequently accepted a fellowship from the Baltimore-based Finney Howell Research Foundation to research cancer in a Glasgow laboratory from 1941 to 1943. Upon completion of a two-year gig as a senior pathologist with both the Yugoslav Mission of the Allied Military Liaison for Civilian Population and UNRRA's Belgrade bureau from 1944 to 1946, Zhukova secured a recommendation for a UNESCO post from her UNRRA boss because of his belief that her acquaintance with "most of the important University people throughout Europe" could help the new international organization. Once at UNESCO, the forty-seven-year old doctor proved "markedly successful" in forging contacts with the medical world and "winning the good-will of medical scientists generally towards [sic] UNESCO." As a UNESCO official, she also notably served as the primary liaison to the WHO. More interestingly for this study, she became an unofficial mediator between the UNESCO leadership and Soviet diplomats during attempts to coax the USSR into participating in UNESCO's founding conference. Irina M. Zhukova, "Curriculum Vitae," n.d., 1–5, AG 8: Personnel Records of I. M. Zhukova, UNESCO Archives; Andrew Topping, M.D., Letter to Dr. Kotschnig, January 31, 1946, AG 8: Personnel Records of I. M. Zhukova, UNESCO Archives; Joseph Needham, "Report from Dr. Needham," September 28, 1946, AG 8: Personnel Records of I. M. Zhukova, UNESCO Archives; and E. Arnales, "Record of Conversation with Dr. Zhukova (confidential)," October 23, 1946, AG 8: Box 1934, X07.211 (470), UNESCO Archives.

[402] Walter M. Kotschnig, Letter to Dr. Andrew Topping, February 5, 1946, AG 8: Personnel Records of I. M. Zhukova, UNESCO Archives.

and that we shall be doing no harm to her or ourselves if we appoint her."[403] After the USSR joined UNESCO, Zhukova's rootlessness sowed considerable confusion in the Soviet UNESCO Delegation. Laid off by UNESCO in 1954, Zhukova moved into a hotel room where she lived off her savings.[404] But the Soviet UNESCO Commission, evidently motivated by Zhukova's Russianness and unaware of her reputation for chronically disrupting the "normal work of the secretariat," nominated her in the fall of 1956 for a senior post in one of the UNESCO regional centers in Asia.[405] Although the UNESCO leadership refused to grant her a new career in the organization and warned the Soviet UNESCO Delegation that her character as a "bickerer and malingerer" suggested that her appointment would "be detrimental to both UNESCO and the USSR," Zhukova used the fact that the USSR had forgotten to withdraw her nomination for over a year as ammunition in her incessant demands to the director-general for a UNESCO job. Stoking even more alarm for the Soviet UNESCO Delegation, she infiltrated the collective of Soviet UNESCO employees. In a letter to the chairman of the Soviet UNESCO Commission in January 1958, the Soviet permanent delegate voiced his bafflement that Zhukova, whom he mistakenly assumed to be one of his own, had breached the rules of conduct for Soviet citizens abroad by traveling outside of France and cherishing as a "best friend" a New Zealander in the

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[403] Letter to Dr. Joseph Needham, May 1, 1946, AG 8: Personnel Records of I. M. Zhukova, UNESCO Archives. Although the latter has no author, the executive secretary and deputy executive secretary of the Preparatory Commission notified the Soviet ambassador in London that they intended to hire Zhukova eight days after this letter was written. This suggests that the conclusion quoted above in relation to the Soviet government's view of Zhukova played an important role in her final acceptance for work: Julian Huxley and Jean Thomas, Letter to H.E., The Soviet Ambassador, May 9, 1946, AG 8: Personnel Records of I. M. Zhukova, UNESCO Archives.

[404] Zhukova also got bogged down in a legal battle with UNESCO over their culpability for medical expenses arising from injuries she suffered when hit by a car in 1952. This litigation continued through 1964. Henry Dawes, Letter to the Director-General; Subject: Mrs. Zhukova's Transportation of Household Effects, October 23, 1958, AG 8: Personnel Records of I. M. Zhukova, UNESCO Archives; and Luis G. Marqués, Letter to Mr. R. J. B. Rossborough; Subject: Mrs. I. Zhukova, January 29, 1965, AG 8: Personnel Records of I. M. Zhukova, UNESCO Archives.

[405] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 5, ll. 1-2; and Nikolai Mikhailov, Pis'mo k general'nomu direktoru, no. 6222-37/48, September 13, 1956, AG 8: Personnel Records of I. M. Zhukova, UNESCO Archives.

secretariat "who is hostile to the USSR." The delegate also criticized Zhukova's penchant for "unnecessarily" dropping in on the delegation for the purposes of "recounting various items of gossip, trying to learn our opinion on various issues, and proposing to some employees to rent an apartment with her." He ended his message with a request for "some information on Zhukova, since her explanations are not entirely clear as to how she came abroad and got a job in UNESCO, whether there was permission for this from our organs, etc."[406] The commission's response that Moscow had no information on Zhukova's identity, not to mention the delegation's lack of wherewithal to recognize her over the course of a year and a half as a floater living in *de facto* exile, laid bare the reality that Soviet trade-union administrators in Paris had a deficit of knowhow and experience to tap when corralling their secretariat associates into a sealed off fraternity.[407]

The initial shortsightedness of Soviet authorities also led to longer-term problems in the delegation's campaign to assimilate Soviet UNESCO employees into the general Soviet diplomatic corps stationed in Paris. As a result of their indeterminate status as both secret representatives of the Soviet Union and international civil servants, Soviet UNESCO staff

[406] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 11, ll. 151-52.

[407] Ibid., l. 153. Zhukova's story has a sad ending. While she behaved as though she intended to return to the USSR, Zhukova consistently requested extensions on the amount of time UNESCO held her belongings, stalling whenever they insisted on delivering her household effects from their storage facility to an address of her choosing in the Soviet Union. It soon became clear that Zhukova had no plans to return to her native land. As one UNESCO official put it, "there is more to this case than meets the eye." The last documentation the UNESCO archives have on Zhukova places her during the summer of 1964 in the Hospital Boucicaut, a paupers' hospice in the fifteenth arrondissement, after she suffered a fracture of her femur from yet another vehicular accident. Following a visit to Zhukova in the hospital, an employee of the Bureau of Personnel, C. Jalaguier, recounted how Zhukova described herself as "very alone" and in need of urgent help. According to Jalaguier, Zhukova's situation was "very critical" since she had "no resources or domicile." M. Marquès, Letter to Gérard Bolla, April 15, 1964, AG 8: Personnel Records of I. M. Zhukova, UNESCO Archives; and C. Jalaguier, Letter to M. Marquès; Subject: "Signalement de l'état de Santé du Dr Zhukova," July 1, 1964, AG 8: Personnel Records of I. M. Zhukova: PER/T.63/923, UNESCO Archives.

members became a special category possessing a series of privileges and burdens that would alienate them from the rest of their comrades living in Paris into the 1960s and beyond.

The ambiguous place of Soviet international civil servants, as both employees of an international organization and involuntary members of a labor organization controlled by the Soviet state, fed a perception among these specialists that the trade union offered little more than yet another superfluous financial encumbrance unreflectively imposed on them by distant officials in Moscow. In January 1958, the chairman of the Local Committee of Soviet Institutions in France, G. N. Petelin, reported to the Central Committee of Trade Unions of State Institutions that Soviet UNESCO staff had a habit of refusing to hand over membership fees to the trade-union cashier because they also paid monthly contributions to the UNESCO Staff Association—the nonmandatory UNESCO labor body that some Soviet citizens joined without the approval of their Soviet supervisors.[408] That many of these UNESCO employees had racked up debts to the Soviet trade union as a result of their contempt for this double tax led the local committee to "repeatedly" browbeat these citizens into meting out their arrears or incur "more radical measures."[409] The Central Committee of VTsSPS reacted with barely concealed shock that Soviet nationals belonged to a foreign labor organization in the first place. "Soviet citizens," the committee emphasized, "can be members of foreign trade unions only with the special permission of appropriate organizations."[410] Despite these admonitions, international civil servants from the USSR stubbornly withheld sizeable sums of money from the local committee into the 1960s—a pattern of insubordination that may have emanated in part from the Soviet

[408] GARF, f. 7709, op. 26, d. 586, l. 3.

[409] Ibid., l. 71.

[410] Ibid., l. 2.

UNESCO detachment's perception that they occupied the status of second-class citizens within the Soviet society revolving around the embassy. One Soviet UNESCO worker, at a conference of Soviet trade unions in France in February 1963, expressed a widely held concern that "our UNESCO organization does not enjoy the same rights among other organizations of the colony" in everything from representation on committees to the procurement of rooms for mothers and children at the embassy's dachas.[411]

The feeling of alienation among Soviet international civil servants in Paris sprung not only from their status as the only fulltime employees of a Western organization, but also from their unique living arrangements. Soviet specialists employed by UNESCO gained unprecedented physical space to carve out private worlds inconceivable to citizens assigned to other Soviet institutions with longer histories of activity on foreign soil. The vast majority of diplomats, trade negotiators, and correspondents working for the embassy, military attaché, trade mission, and press agencies such as TASS resided together on the Boulevard Suchet, the Rue du Général Appert, and the Rue de Prony in Soviet-owned residential buildings replete with "red corners" and the prospect of neighborly surveillance policing domesticity.[412] Meanwhile, Soviet UNESCO personnel lived alone or with their families in "modestly" furnished apartments

[411] GARF, f. 7709, op. 26, d. 1573, l. 123.

[412] The red corners, which Soviet officials intended to host "conversations on pressing political questions, the discussion of films and new literature, etc.," consisted of a television, Marxist-Leninist literature, and other accouterments designed to foster collective, communist education during leisure time. However, these centers of communist learning often took on an apolitical function that contradicted their original purpose. The local committee of the Trade Union of the Soviet embassy complained in 1959 that these corners "do not always correspond to their name" and "are sometimes simply called 'television [corners],' which more accurately describes them." The local committee argued that these televisions often brought a corrupting influence to the buildings since parents either left their children alone watching French television "all evening" or sat with them before the television completely "indifferent to the fact that many evening broadcasts are not designed for children and only have a negative influence on their upbringing": GARF, f. 7709, op. 26, d. 740, ll. 225-26. For the locations of the residential buildings, see: GARF, f. 7709, op. 26, d. 586, l. 44.

"scattered in the most diverse districts of Paris."[413] As a result, the latter possessed tangible privileges in terms of living space, leasing apartments that had at least two rooms; ranged from twenty-five to fifty square meters in size; and equipped with furniture as well as utilities included in the rent.[414] In contrast, Soviet envoys making their homes in the domiciles of the Soviet colony lived in "overcrowded conditions" that did not meet the "necessary sanitary requirements." Of the twenty-nine families (ninety-two people) occupying the residence on Boulevard Suchet in 1958, ten had two-room apartments with about seven and a half square meters of space per person, while the other nineteen each nestled in one room with six square meters per person. On the second and fourth floors, eight and nine families respectively, or twenty-seven and twenty-eight people, used a single bathroom and communal kitchen.[415] The situation hardly looked better seven years later when on average five to six families shared a kitchen, ten families shared a single bathroom, and one toilet existed for every fifteen inhabitants.[416]

In other words, while these diplomats, trade representatives, and journalists lived in cramped surroundings reminiscent of communal apartments (*kommunalki*), Soviet secretariat workers benefitted from an expansion in domestic space–and hence privatized intimacy–similar to those who moved into the *khrushchevki* springing up all over the USSR in the late 1950s and

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[413] GARF f. 9519, op. 2, d. 25, l. 112; and GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 15, l. 120.

[414] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 31, ll. 93-95.

[415] GARF, f. 7709, op. 26, d. 586, ll. 44-45.

[416] As the Soviet ambassador to France, V. Zorin, and the secretary of the embassy profkom, A. Tokarev, noted in a complaint to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Council of Ministers, and the chairman of VTsSPS, this lack of living space meant the buildings violated fire safety regulations and failed to meet the sanitary requirements that governed housing back in the USSR. Moreover, by July 1965 even diplomats and other non-UNESCO Soviet personnel in Paris began to rent their own apartments since the "housing crisis" had become so bad that the embassy and its residential buildings simply ran out of room to lodge any new officials moving from the USSR to Paris: GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 30, ll. 161-62.

the 1960s. Curiously, this meant Soviet nationals drafted into the international civil service had an easier time than many diplomats hosting foreign "contacts." For example, twelve days after the inauguration of John F. Kennedy on January 20, 1961, a Soviet hand of the UNESCO Bureau of Personnel and Management reported to Moscow the details of a discussion he had at his apartment during a "return reception" with an American UNESCO functionary who had sailed on one of Kennedy's combat ships during the Second World War. The two talked about the personality of the new president and the likelihood of a break with the foreign policy of the Eisenhower administration.[417] Four years later, the Soviet ambassador to France, V. A. Zorin, protested that the absence of "normal living conditions" had long deprived diplomats "of the opportunity to host any kind of meetings with foreigners," which he described as a "business necessity." The congested abodes of distinguished diplomats also provoked "perplexed questions and critical comments from the French, which undermines the prestige of the USSR in France."[418]

The discrepancy between the comforts and privacy afforded to Soviet secretariat jobholders and to other USSR emissaries to France derived from Moscow's initial oversight of the importance of making space for their new UNESCO functionaries on Soviet properties. Left to their own devices in the procurement of housing, Soviet UNESCO employees began their time in France desperately looking for a place to live. In his memoirs, Dubinin describes how he and

[417] GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 15, ll. 57-58.

[418] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 30, ll. 161-62. A similar situation existed in the main building housing the USSR Mission to the UN on East Sixty-Seventh Street in Manhattan during the early 1960s. Shevchenko describes in his memoir how the jumble of offices and residential floors made life unbearable in the mission when he arrived for work as a disarmament policy wonk for the Soviet delegation to the UN in the summer of 1963: "Because so many people lived there, the smells of borscht and cabbage cooking hung in the air on every floor. In the elevators it was routine to meet diplomats' wives carrying bags of dirty laundry on their way to the basement washing machines. It was a poor arrangement; there was not enough office space for Mission personnel, and it was completely inappropriate for use as a residence." Shevchenko, *Breaking with Moscow*, 156–57.

his Soviet UNESCO colleagues "roamed around the city to look for an apartment" in November 1956: "Having learned from newspapers and any other advertisements or acquaintances of a more-or-less suitable offer, you had to call or show up at the noted address, introduce yourself, then inspect [the apartment], conduct negotiations on conditions, [and] simply bargain over the rent, which we then paid out of pocket." But as the twin crises in Hungary and Egypt filled the headlines and Parisians raided stores to stock up on salt for antiradiation baths and other staples in preparation for nuclear war, most French proprietors recoiled at the idea of harboring tenants from the other side of the Iron Curtain. Dubinin recalls that landlords, upon learning of his Soviet citizenship, "either hung up the phone or slammed the door."[419] Even officials of the Soviet UNESCO Delegation, which merited all the formal pomp and circumstance of a diplomatic mission, had trouble finding accommodations. Arriving in Paris in the summer of 1956, the families of the second secretary and stenographer of the delegation could not find apartments and spent the summer moving "from room to room, living temporarily in the rooms of embassy employees who travel to the USSR for vacation or business."[420]

To make matters worse in terms of promoting a tighter "collective" of Soviet citizens involved in UNESCO, the "completely unsuitable" conditions of the working premises the embassy freed up for the Soviet UNESCO Delegation presented it with "great difficulties in carrying out the required 'educational work' (*vospitatel'naia rabota*) among members of the collective."[421] The apparatus supervising Soviet participation in UNESCO, which amounted to anywhere from five to fourteen people from 1956 to 1967, worked in two small, "dark and

[419] "Salt baths," according to Dubinin, were rumored in France at the time to cure radiation. Dubinin eventually found an apartment on the Rue de Courcelles that he shared with another Soviet UNESCO employee, but soon moved to a place "not far" from Les Invalides and therefore close to UNESCO. *Diplomaticheskaia byl'*, 63–69.

[420] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 3, l. 182.

[421] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 16, ll. 105-06.

cramped" rooms among the residential quarters of the embassy where "technical personnel live (surrounded by kitchens, toilets, and a lot of noise due to a proximity to families and children)." While the delegation rented four rooms at UNESCO headquarters, it hesitated to handle its steady deluge of sensitive documents there since, according to the Soviet permanent delegate, these offices fell under "round-the-clock surveillance of the French."[422] MID also withheld an adequate supply of low-level service staff for financial reasons and because of a shortage in the USSR of less-educated workers with the foreign-language skills compulsory for service abroad.[423] The delegation griped for years over the elimination of the position of cook-cleaner in 1958. Apparently, the presence of only one "part-time cleaning lady" for the apartments of high-ranking Soviet UNESCO dignitaries forced the Soviet permanent delegate to settle in a hotel temporarily in 1960. More seriously, the dearth of "technical personnel" indentured to the delegation curtailed the ability of Soviet international civil servants to fill their nonworking hours with tasks in support of Soviet interests in the international organization. Given that the lone, elderly clerical worker the delegation employed in 1960 was "not physically in a state to do all the work" of typing, answering phones, etc., secretariat functionaries chose not to work in the embassy after the end of their day at UNESCO.[424]

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[422] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 15, ll. 113-14.

[423] For a discussion of the shortage of technical personnel knowing foreign languages, see the minutes of a meeting of diplomatic personnel at the embassy in 1965: GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 30, l. 235.

[424] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 15, l. 116. Because Moscow responded with "repeated refusals" to the delegation's requests for an additional technical worker to deal with the avalanche of paperwork flowing through its offices, the Soviet UNESCO operation in Paris had a feeling of chaos to it. In 1964, Soviet Permanent Delegate Pavlov wrote Minister Gromyko and his deputies at MID to complain that one technical worker could not possibly deal with all of the documents the delegation produced and received. "Only the non-secret correspondence of the delegation with the Center," Pavlov noted, "has increased from 322 incoming and 542 outgoing documents in 1960 to 715 and 1,185 respectively in 1963." These numbers excluded not only confidential information, but also the approximately 6,000 pages of correspondence in English and French between the Soviet UNESCO Delegation, UNESCO, and delegations from other member states. Moreover, their technical worker, Bobovnikova, also worked for the BSSR and Ukrainian UNESCO Delegations; typed up classified documents in the "special room" at the embassy; and managed the delegation's offices at UNESCO headquarters as well as its premises across town at the Soviet

To correct these irregularities, the delegation vociferously lobbied MID throughout the 1950s and 1960s to grant them permission to purchase a building in France for members of the delegation and Soviet secretariat workers to live and work in as one communist collective. But the motivation for these entreaties originated not only in a want of working space and desire to gather all Soviet citizens under the same roof, but also a mounting urgency to mollify the increasing disgruntlement of Soviet UNESCO employees over their material situation.

In accordance with a resolution of the USSR Council of Ministers adopted on December 1, 1958, the MID Directorate of Cadres conferred on all Soviet citizens working in international organizations a Soviet diplomatic title corresponding to their rank in the international civil service (the UNESCO P-2 classification equaled the position of attaché and later third secretary in the Soviet embassy, the P-3 tier became equivalent to first secretary, etc.). Each month, every Soviet UNESCO staff member handed in to the Soviet embassy's bookkeeper the difference between the much higher wages they drew from their UNESCO rank and the pay grade ascribed to them on the basis of the directorate's pay scale for embassy personnel in Paris (e.g., a UNESCO P-3 salary minus the salary of the first secretary).[425] In short, the Soviet state, in clear contravention of the sovereignty of the international civil service, secretly expropriated the surplus earnings of its people in the UN.

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embassy. "Thus," Pavlov explained, "comrade Bobovnikova, performing the duties of secretary and typist, is forced to 'migrate' [*kochevat'*] from one office to another" and was absent from both offices for either the morning or the afternoon. Whenever Bobovnikova left to compose classified documents, no one answered the phone. As a result of these absences, "all sent and received UNESCO foreign correspondence . . . is not registered, which could lead to the loss of certain documents having great significance." Pavlov then recounted how in 1962 the delegation had lost a checkbook with 800 dollars owed to the international organization. "If this book had not been found and handed over," he concluded, "the delegation could have been placed in a very unpleasant situation." GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 120, ll. 80-82.

[425] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 14, l. 21; and GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 23, ll. 160-63. See also the annex to: Vladimir Il'ich Ponomarev, Letter to Director-General René Maheu, October 15, 1964, AG 8: CAB/1/8, UNESCO Archives. This method would continue through at least the late 1970s: Shevchenko, *Breaking with Moscow*, 173–74.

On the surface, the standardized "extortion" of clandestine dues from its subjects generated a number of benefits for the USSR.[426] First of all, it allowed the communist country to collect the foreign currency it perennially coveted while also redeeming a considerable portion of its annual financial contribution to UNESCO. In 1963, the Soviet ambassador to France and Soviet permanent delegate to UNESCO proudly reported to MID that they retrieved from levies on salaries more than $107,000 of the approximately $3 million the USSR doled out to the international organization annually.[427] Secondly, it set fiscal limits on the extent to which Soviet subjects could use their place on the comparatively generous payroll of Western institutions to partake in the capitalist consumer society around them. Thirdly, it hypothetically lessened the likelihood that jealousy would germinate among diplomatic personnel over the exceptional pecuniary perks international civil servants amassed thanks to their unique assignment.

Yet the strategy had the unintentional repercussion of engendering extremely "difficult material conditions" for secretariat post holders.[428] Thanks to what Soviet authorities in France plaintively characterized as "the mechanical distribution to Soviet workers in the UNESCO Secretariat of salaries of diplomatic workers of Soviet institutions in Paris without attention to local conditions," Soviet UNESCO employees became house poor. While their counterparts receiving the same compensation in the Soviet embassy paid a fixed rate of 5 to 8 percent of their salary to live in the residential properties owned by the USSR, occupants of stations in UNESCO

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[426] Shevchenko uses this Western legal term to describe the seizure of salaries from workers at UN headquarters. I use it in this context not to make a value judgment, but to stress that the practice was done secretly because it flagrantly transgressed the laws and ethics on which the international civil service was founded. Shevchenko, *Breaking with Moscow*, 174.

[427] For calculations on the earnings from this practice refer to: GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 23, l. 161. UNESCO collected contribution on a biannual basis. For the 1963-64 period, the USSR gave UNESCO about 6,000,000 dollars: GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 19, l. 53.

[428] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 23, l. 162.

forked over 25 to 35 percent of their monthly remuneration on "speculative prices" for the "cheapest apartments in the current rental market of Paris."[429] Though MID bore the full cost of the apartments leased by Soviet directors of UNESCO departments and provided a 50 percent subsidy for the rents of P-4 and P-5 servants, the large number of Soviet citizens with P-2 and P-3 spots swallowed the whole expenditure for their living space.[430] Aggravating their financial woes, the secretariat crew ran into the unfamiliar financial responsibilities of having to put up deposits for their apartments several months in advance and foot the bill for rent during summer vacations back to the USSR without recourse to the savings they would have accumulated if their government left their salaries intact.[431] And whereas embassy representatives had access to diplomatic vehicles and the Soviet state reimbursed them for gas, UNESCO workers (except for directors) spent their own money on the car, auto insurance, and fuel they relied on to travel for tête-à-têtes with foreign contacts.[432] All of this raised a quandary for the members of the Soviet UNESCO Delegation: the more they excelled in getting people into the secretariat, the greater the quantity of Soviet nationals who found themselves isolated from their countrymen, struggling to make ends meet, and pouring money into the French economy "completely free of charge."[433] Desperate for a solution, Soviet UNESCO emissaries, when pleading with Moscow to bankroll a communal house for the Soviet UNESCO Delegation and Soviet secretariat workers, reasoned

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[429] Ibid., l. 161; GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 13, ll. 178-80.

[430] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 29, l. 73.

[431] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 23, l. 162.

[432] Ershov, as a high-ranking deputy director-general, received a *Volga* from Moscow. Otherwise, Soviet UNESCO employees either took public transportation or bought cars. These employees were given a 10 percent stipend for meeting with foreigners and obtaining "scientific-technical information" from universities and specialists across France. However, this small bonus proved "insufficient" for costs. GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 29, l. 73.

[433] Despite the fact that this money came from UNESCO salaries, Soviet officials repeatedly expressed the opinion that they wasted their *own* money by renting apartments from the French: GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 15, l. 119; and GARF, f, 9519, op. 2, d. 25, l. 112.

that the rent charged to secretariat workers who moved into this house "after a certain amount of time would compensate for the cost of the building, and it would bring a net profit."[434] But thanks to a combination of MID's frugality and the sparseness of vacant real estate in central Paris, the delegation would not acquire its own premises until the late 1970s.[435]

As the annual "growth in prices and sharp rise in rents" in Paris throughout the 1960s exacerbated the economic hardships of Soviet UNESCO cadres stuck with stagnant pay, their "unequal position" within the Soviet colony fomented a smoldering angst that surfaced from time to time in their meetings with superiors.[436] According to I. Kiselev, an adviser in MID's Fifth European Division who interviewed Soviet secretariat bureaucrats in February 1964, "all comrades expressed bewilderment with the unfair treatment of workers occupying P-2 (five people) and P-3 (six people) positions" as a result of the state's failure to provide them with subsidies for housing. "Such a situation," the MID inspector stressed, "elicits irritation and, I would say, discontent from this group of people, and especially the wives," considering that many UNESCO hirelings left prestigious jobs in the USSR to work in the international organization.[437] For instance, B. I. Sobolev, who promoted international cooperation in television broadcasting as a P-2 program specialist in the UNESCO Department of Information, endured a long battle to get a raise in his attributed diplomatic rank from attaché to third secretary in light

[434] GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 12, l. 15.

[435] A. N. Nikolaev, Chrezvychainyi i polnomochnyi: Vekhi sud'bi (Moskva: Realii, 2002), 705–07.

[436] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 23, l. 162; and GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 25, l. 101. In 1965, the annual growth in rent amounted to 5-7 percent annually: GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 31, ll. 93-94.

[437] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 25, l. 112.

of his former position as head of the All-Union Association for the Exportation and Importation of Films (Soveksportfil'm) and a pressing paternal obligation to support three children.[438]

The state's exactions on the salaries of international civil servants incited resistance to the timely payment of these tolls. In a March 1964 letter to the Soviet UNESCO Commission, the chief of MID's Monetary-Financial Directorate highlighted multiple cases where "some workers allowed delays in the delivery to the cashier . . . of salaries received by them in international organizations." He also bemoaned the fact that persons belonging to the UNESCO detachment had come up with several strategies to skirt the USSR's confiscatory regulations. "A number of employees," the executive of the directorate demurred, "upon returning to the USSR, do not close their current accounts in foreign banks, continuing to handle currency located in these accounts through other persons by the sending of power-of-attorney documents or bank checks." Because such defiant actions led to "definite damage to the state budget and are direct violations of the currency legislation of the Soviet Union," he reiterated that all income producers toiling in international organizations had to surrender their entire salary to the cashier before the fifteenth of every month for redistribution. The MID director then declared that they must close their foreign bank accounts before departure and ask the relevant authorities of these international organizations to transfer any outstanding payments to the USSR Bank of Foreign Trade in Moscow for appropriate dissemination.[439]

In early 1966, MID reduced the amount Soviet UNESCO employees paid for rent to just 2 percent of their monthly salary. But what at first had the appearance of a successful resolution to the longstanding class envy within the Parisian Soviet colony led only to more cries of

[438] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2 ,d. 14, ll. 21-22. Information on Sobolev's biography can be found in: "Curriculum Vitae" of B. Iu. Sobolev, June 29, 1956, 1–5, AG 8: Personnel Records of Solobev, B., UNESCO Archives.

[439] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 26, ll. 91-92.

inequitable treatment. That February, Sobakin, the Soviet permanent delegate, lamented to Minister of Foreign Affairs Gromyko that the provision of subsidies to Soviet secretariat specialists without a similar adjustment to the rents paid by members of the Soviet UNESCO Delegation had spawned an "abnormal situation," in which "the adviser of the delegation and the Soviet permanent delegates of the Ukrainian SSR and BSSR . . . are in much worse material conditions than even the employees of the secretariat of the category of P-3 (which corresponds to first secretary)."[440] Sobakin revealed the fundamental flaw inherent in the Soviet government's insistence on aggrandizing control over the livelihoods of its nationals employed by UNESCO. The alignment of UNESCO ranks with MID's gradations of embassy personnel arbitrarily made otherwise incomparable UNESCO jobs comparable to less reputable diplomatic posts, thereby providing a language of just hierarchy that some diplomats and most secretariat workers drew on to express resentment and dissatisfaction over disparities in income. Distant decision-makers in Moscow became bearers of the brunt of the blame for any unjustness in this classificatory grid because of their lethargic responses to the steep hikes in prices on the French market. In the minds of Soviet individuals laboring daily in the secretariat alongside non-Soviet colleagues who reaped the full rewards of their paycheck, the realization of the culpability of the Soviet state for their acute material privations threatened to metastasize into feelings of animosity that Soviet handlers in Paris would have a hard time reversing.

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In order to preempt any insubordination in light of such trying circumstances, the Soviet trade-union apparatus in France, after the half-hearted and lackluster measures taken from 1956 to 1959, ramped up its push to routinize activities intended to ensure that the civic life of its

[440] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 31, ll. 314-15.

subjects, including those employed by international organizations, were the exclusive domain of Soviet workers' organizations. In March 1959, the local committee of the Soviet embassy commanded all of its subsidiary trade unions to "establish strict supervision" over attendance at political, ideological, and business meetings.[441] Six months later, MID announced in a circular to all Soviet agencies dealing with UN secretariats that it would step up its oversight of international civil servants' communications with their corresponding delegations after a realization that secretariat workers were "essentially left to fend for themselves."[442] Because the authors of this circular cited the musings of an English director in the UN Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) as evidence for this opinion, the Soviet UNESCO Commission and Delegation shrugged off their assessment as groundless hearsay from a "foreign bureaucrat," defending their minding of Soviet UNESCO employees as adequately stringent.[443] And to be sure, the delegation had conducted political work among its own employees from the inception of Soviet involvement in the UNESCO Secretariat. As early as 1958, it scheduled regular "production meetings" every Saturday for the gathering of all secretariat jobholders while arranging for delegation officials to get together "almost daily" with each Soviet member of the UNESCO staff "in specially appointed places to discuss and provide assistance with the resolution of work and personal issues that arise."[444] But after 1959, the delegation's trade-union committee, along with the attendant party organization, escalated the attention it paid to devising strategies to use these get-togethers to infuse Soviet UNESCO staff with a sufficient level of

[441] GARF, f. 7709, op. 26, d. 740, l. 254.

[442] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 14, ll. 101-03.

[443] Ibid., ll. 104-05.

[444] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 6, l. 212.

"vigilance" and orient their work toward the foreign-policy objectives of the USSR.[445] Owing to the fact that these convocations either did not occur regularly or "were not always sufficiently well-organized," in 1962 the trade union made individual delegation officials responsible for a discreet group of UNESCO employees in a specific department and for filling the free time of international civil servants with supplemental "office meetings" held twice a month.[446]

Amid the clamor of dishes and shouts of children, the delegation turned these assemblies near the kitchen and living quarters of the embassy into a venue for the giving of marching orders to Soviet international civil servants and the solicitation from them of unauthorized intelligence about the confidential inner workings of UNESCO. Transgressing the rules of the international civil service in relation to its immunity from governmental interference, the Soviet mission charged its band of UNESCO employees with advancing Soviet objectives in the international organization up until the point that it would instigate severe reprimand from their bosses.[447] Secretariat specialists not only read accounts of their work and happenings in their departments before the entire collective, but also submitted records of conversations, reports, and memoranda divulging insider knowledge that the delegation forwarded to the Soviet UNESCO Commission for reference when formulating policy toward the international organization. Soviet bodies responsible for their country's involvement in the organization evaluated the performance of "their" UNESCO functionaries on the basis of their success as one-person paper mills who could slap together documents summarizing the internal life of UNESCO, commending "the

[445] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 6, l. 211.

[446] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 20, l. 229; GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 19, l. 117; and GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 26, l. 251.

[447] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 6, l. 211; and GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 21, l. 121. Obviously Soviet UNESCO employees received constant counsel on the true objectives of their work from Soviet officials. In a special instance, the chairman of the Soviet UNESCO Commission, S. K. Romanovskii, presented a speech to the collective in which he put before the collective of Soviet employees of the UNESCO Secretariat and workers of the delegation "concrete tasks of the future." GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 19, l. 117.

most proactive and informative of them" for making the most of "their official positions and ability to establish contacts."[448]

Anxious to discern the image of the Soviet Union and reactions abroad to the country's foreign policy, the Soviet UNESCO Commission wanted these accounts to detail the political proclivities of foreigners laboring in UNESCO and the extent to which secretariat personnel from other countries showed "sympathy" for, or "hostility" to, the USSR. Despite the lengthy stream of paper it received from Paris, the Soviet UNESCO Commission continued from year to year to express dissatisfaction with the irregularity and quality of their nationals' dispatches, griping over signs that UNESCO workers "carelessly" and "hastily" drew up "formal" or "abstract" narratives. Throughout 1961 and into early 1962, the commission devised a series of guidelines that enumerated the specific minutiae it expected in these communiqués. In a letter to the Soviet permanent delegate, the commission compiled a nuanced list of how the delegation could organize "a smarter and fuller use of Soviet specialists working in the UNESCO Secretariat" by supplementing general observations with more actionable data. In order to create a card index that would catalogue upcoming vacancies in the interest of their "main task" of filling the USSR staff quota, the commission ordered these employees to provide studies of "foreigners working with them," the "actual conditions of work in vacant positions," as well as "recommendations and proposals on the issue." To mitigate its own disorganization and tardiness, the commission adjured them to give advance notice of upcoming UNESCO activities and deliver, at the request of any Soviet agency,

[448] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 6, l. 213. For a more concrete example, Soviet officials praised Deputy Director-General Ershov because he "timely informs [us] of the intentions and actions of the UNESCO leadership (Maheu and his deputies)," but also criticized his "irregular composition of records of conversations with foreigners, in which, undoubtedly, there is information that presents a definite interest." GARF, f, 9519, op. 2, d. 21, l. 105. In fact, as the next section will illustrate, Ershov had a tremendously difficult time informing the delegation compared to other Soviet UNESCO employees due to his high-profile position.

"systematically" annotated UNESCO publications containing "relevant information on the development of science, culture, and education in foreign countries."[449] The commission also called on its secretariat charges to fit their observations into the broader Soviet narrative of the geopolitical and ideological struggles of the Cold War. In a separate batch of remarks on the 1960 annual report of the delegation, the commission advised that workers in UNESCO had to go "deeper in terms of content" by furnishing "analytical pieces with syntheses and conclusions." In particular, it wanted them to pigeonhole their findings into an interpretation of UNESCO's "role and influence in the ideological battle between the countries of the aggressive imperial bloc and the socialist camp; the Western colonizers and the rising countries of the East; and the reactionary and progressive forces of the scientific and cultural intelligentsia."[450] Apparently, authorities in Moscow had little sensitivity to the fact that their UNESCO employees had to cope with a full-time job in the international organization as well as these political and professional chores foisted on them during their nonworking hours.

The unique position of Soviet international civil servants, who traveled around the world as emissaries of an international organization, also enabled them to gain access to the classified material of governments receiving assistance from UNESCO. In the summer of 1965, G. E. Skorov, a D-1 "senior consultant" at UNESCO's International Institute for Educational Planning, spent two months in Tanzania as part of a taskforce to produce educational materials on Tanzania, Nigeria, and the Ivory Coast for African pedagogues enrolled in courses on educational planning in Dakar, Senegal. While composing an analysis for the Dakar classes on "linking educational planning with economic development," Skorov found the time to leak to

[449] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 20, ll. 61-62. For more on the battle between Soviet UNESCO employees and the international organization over the content and dissemination of UNESCO publications, see chapter 8.

[450] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 16, ll. 109-11.

the Soviet embassy in Dar es Salaam the contents of "major conversations" he had with representatives of the Tanzanian government on "the termination of Soviet-Tanzanian negotiations on the giving of economic aid to Tanzania," along with "a copy of some confidential documents" on the Tanzanian five-year plan and a "secret inquiry, prepared for the president of the republic on the expected sources of financing for the Tanzanian five-year plan," all of which found their way to Soviet agencies dealing with international economic assistance.[451]

Beyond wanting to give their delegates to the executive board or general conference a leg up on representatives of other member states, Soviet custodians intended these assignments as a monitoring tool for ensuring that their UNESCO officials interpreted the organization through the prism of Soviet ideology and resisted the real threat that Soviet UNESCO employees' acclimation to the routine role of serving a foreign power structure would defile their resolution to prioritize Soviet objectives. Because "international bureaucrats," the authors of a 1962 commission memorandum explained, found themselves "surrounded by and in subordination to UNESCO employees who are alien and often hostile to the Soviet Union–among whom a significant portion consists of agents of foreign intelligence services"–and received "constant reminders of the 'objectivity' and 'impartiality' required by the leadership of the UNESCO Secretariat," Soviet citizens in UNESCO had "difficulty carrying out the policy of using UNESCO in the interests of the Soviet Union," at times developing "notions to the effect that the vocation of secretariat employees is the 'exemplary fulfillment of their service obligations to UNESCO' and not the fulfillment of those to the delegation." Consequently, they exhibited a "tendency to some 'autonomy,' the closing of themselves off into the range of issues of their

[451] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 30, ll. 139-41.

own ‘administrative’ work.” To vanquish this drifting sentiment toward the internationalist ideal, members of the delegation delivered a “firm rebuke.” As the memorandum concluded with a tinge of dialecticism, the delegation “constantly and systematically” saw to it that “workers of the UNESCO Secretariat see the whole sum of problems in using UNESCO in the interests of the Soviet Union and do not limit themselves to the narrow confines of ‘their part of work’ in the UNESCO Secretariat.”[452]

On top of micromanaging the business affairs of its phalanx of UNESCO assignees, the trade union endeavored to regiment their behavior in the foreign environment of the West through an assortment of “ideological-educational” activities designed to inure them to the challenge of holding fast to a proper Soviet worldview when confronted with the antagonistic ideas pervading their work hours. Immediately after UNESCO neophytes arrived in Paris, the delegation carried out “explanatory work” aimed at “familiarizing them with the specific conditions” of Soviet life in Paris, the “working conditions in UNESCO,” and the “practical problems of material arrangements (finding an apartment, salaries, etc.).”[453] In 1962, the party organ and trade union of the delegation launched a new “system of political education” intended to inculcate members of the Soviet UNESCO detachment with both a Marxist-Leninist framework for processing their foreign surroundings and a “correct” view of the actions taken by the USSR at home and abroad. A combination of didactic indoctrination and an emphasis on voluntary engagement indicative of the post-Stalinist approach to trade-union work, this political-education initially encompassed two seminars led by different members of the delegation and the secretariat cohort (“On Major Problems of the Economics and Politics of

[452] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 21, l. 118.

[453] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 26, l. 247; and GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 6, l. 213.

Capitalist Countries" and "The Use of International Organizations"); individual recitals of personal "theoretical and political education"; and independent studies on topics such as "The Economic Problems of France" and "The Ideology of Right-Wing Socialism."[454] In response to recommendations from the collective, the delegation revamped its curriculum the following year, increasing the number of seminars offered with an eye toward aligning them with "the major events in the life of the party and country" while simultaneously utilizing "local factual material and information on the situation in UNESCO."[455] Throughout 1963 and 1964, it also saddled its students with the occasional performance of presentations before the UNESCO trade union ("On the Communist Attitude Toward Labor," "Questions of Discipline," "On Methods of Preparation for Conversations and Records of Them," etc.); invited guest lecturers to expound on vigilance abroad and the recent decisions of the Communist Party; and encouraged UNESCO employees to give "special reports" on the international organization at "theoretical conferences" of the United Professional Organization.[456]

The delegation's social organizations also subjected their coterie to individualized scrutiny and ideological guidance. In the pursuance of "the creation of a healthy, comradely environment in which every person feels respect and recognition from the collective and at the same time knows that the collective is demanding of him," the delegation had Soviet international civil servants periodically perform *samokritika* (self-criticism) before the entire UNESCO group and arranged for "individual discussions with comrades on questions of

[454] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 22, ll. 383-85.

[455] The delegation added seminars that would improve Soviet international civil servants' knowledge of issues pertaining to world politics and hence UNESCO. These included colloquia on "The Study of Foreign Policy of the USSR and International Relations at the Present Stage" and "The Question of World Economic Development," both of which were led by Soviet members of the UNESCO Secretariat. See: GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 26, ll. 240-41.

[456] More than a third of the lectures given to the entire Soviet colony were by members of the UNESCO group in 1964. Ibid., ll. 240-41; and GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 25, ll. 326-28.

compliance with the rules of conduct abroad."[457] In the wake of violations of the norms of behavior in foreign countries, the trade union held congregations of the UNESCO contingent to review and condemn the wrongdoings of their peers.[458] On the whole, Soviet officials favorably assessed the attendance of their underlings in these activities after 1959, concluding over several years that the "turnout has been satisfactory, the participation of the audience high" with "all or nearly all present" speaking in the course of meetings.[459]

Apart from direct methods of ideological tutelage, the wider United Professional Organization built and oversaw in the heart of the French capital a "Little USSR" designed to consume every facet of the lives of Soviet citizens on assignment in "the city of light." Ever mindful of the enticements and lifestyle alternatives the West had to offer, the French branch of the Soviet trade-union network, in its own program of domestic containment, worked to conserve its members' sense of belonging to a Soviet community by stacking their leisure time with a mélange of cultural, athletic, educational, and touristic activities. On the one hand, this use of social functions as a means of sustaining communist loyalty reflected the general efforts under Khrushchev to reinvigorate the civic or communal dimension of the communist project back in the USSR. As the historian Polly Jones points out, "an understandable, although paradoxical, feature of 'de-Stalinization' which ran concurrently with its emphasis on individual well-being and private freedoms was . . . a renewed attention to mobilizing the population to participate in public initiatives and collective life."[460] On the other hand, Soviet international civil servants

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[457] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 26, l. 245; and GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 29, l. 327.

[458] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 28, ll. 66-83.

[459] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 26 l. 242.

[460] Polly Jones, "Introduction," in *The Dilemmas of De-Stalinization: Negotiating Cultural and Social Change in the Khrushchev Era* (New York: Routledge, 2006), 9.

living in Paris experienced both a privileged and more intensive version of this increased focus on the civic obligations of the Soviet citizen owing to their unique but perilous location abroad.

The embassy put on a variety of prosaic cultural pastimes as well as a series of more extraordinary events symptomatic of the privileged place of Soviet nationals sent abroad. On Wednesday and Saturday evenings, following one of the political lectures or conferences, the trade mission held in its poorly ventilated and overcrowded movie theater the screening of a mixture of (usually old) Soviet and French films borrowed from Soveksportfil'm.[461] Less routinely but more important for injecting comrades with a sense of communist purpose, the local committee orchestrated the showcasing of the cultural achievements of the motherland in person for its members. It not only dished out tickets for performances of artistic troupes on tour from the USSR (the Bolshoi Ballet at the Paris Opera House, a joint performance of the Moscow Circus and Ensemble of the Soviet Army at the *Palais de Sports*, etc.), but also recruited an eclectic group of visiting Soviet cultural luminaries and French celebrities sympathetic to the Soviet Union for intimate meet-and-greets with the Soviet collective throughout the late 1950s and early 1960s, including the legendary performer, Yves Montand; his wife, the giant of French cinema, Simone Signoret; the renowned Soviet ballerina, O. V. Lepeshinskaia; the classical music virtuoso, M. L. Rostropovich; the acclaimed Soviet writer, M. A. Sholokhov; and the pioneering cosmonaut, Iu. A. Gagarin.[462] Not satisfied with such spectator forms of cultural experience, Soviet trade-union officials simultaneously harvested the aesthetic talents of their compatriots through the organization of a choir and various amateur performances, lamenting

[461] Filmgoers periodically complained that the colony could not obtain new Soviet films and that the French movies selected for viewing were both "harmful" and "unworthy." GARF, f. 7709, op. 26, d. 586, l. 37; and GARF, f. 7709, op. 26, d. 740, ll. 104; 152.

[462] GARF, f. 7709, op. 26, d. 586, l. 41; GARF, f. 7709, op. 26, d. 740, l. 154; and GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 26, ll. 244-45.

that such grassroots entertainment begged for more participation. “There are a lot of people among us,” the authors of a 1959 report of the local committee repined, “[who] have some sort of talent about which the comrades around them do not even know.”[463]

For intellectual enhancement, a small room on the fifth floor of the embassy–and, after 1959, in the trade mission–housed a library, which the trade union believed “should not simply be a place for the issuance of books for home, but become a true center of cultural-educational work.”[464] Open Wednesdays and Fridays from six to nine in the evening, the library offered a collection of around 5,000 books surrounded by walls and tables adorned with photo displays “reflecting some moments in the life” of the collective.[465] Although occasionally benefitting from the donation of works from comrades anxious to lighten their load upon return to the USSR, the librarian accumulated the majority of her inventory on weekly treks around Paris to bookstores where she bought Soviet literature and works written by “progressive” French authors.[466] The library *aktiv* also tried to convene “readers’ conferences,” throwing together in 1959 a book club on Galina Nikolaeva’s *Bitva v puti* (*Battle On the Way*) that turned “uncomfortable” for the organizers when readers criticized the novel. In the stacks, library cardholders could find scattered among a preponderance of dated Soviet fiction a mishmash of French language textbooks, pamphlets from the Higher Party School, editions of Soviet political studies, and official party histories ordered from Moscow. As the chief information hub for the trade-union organization, the library clearly looked to emulate the reading culture of the

[463] GARF, f. 7709, op. 26, d. 740, ll. 223-24.

[464] Ibid., l. 228.

[465] GARF, f. 7709, op. 26, d. 1004, l. 67; GARF, f. 7709, op. 26, d. 586, l. 28; GARF, f. 7709, op. 26, d. 740, ll. 156-57; and GARF, f. 7709, op. 26, d. 1573, l. 136.

[466] GARF, f. 7709, op. 26, d. 740, ll. 156-57.

homeland, supplementing its bibliographic catalogue with over fifty subscriptions to Soviet periodicals that included mainstream serials and newspapers such as *Pravda*, *Trud* (*Labor*), and *Kommunist*; journals pertaining to diplomatic, academic, party, and trade-union matters such as *Mirovaia ekonomika* (*World Economy*), *Voprosy istorii KPSS* (*Problems of the History of the CPSU*), *Partiinaia zhizn'* (*Party Life*), and *Sovetskie profsoiuzy* (*Soviet Trade-Unions*); as well as lifestyle or literary magazines such as *Ogonek* (*Flame*), *Zvezda* (*Star*), *Novyi mir* (*New World*), and *Inostrannaia literatura* (*Foreign Literature*).[467]

To keep the bodies of their mental laborers in good shape, the physical-education sector of the United Professional Organization supplied the equipment and turf for an array of games and athletic contests. Along with sponsoring a fishing club and purchasing miscellaneous items for a variety of diversions (ping pong balls, nets, chess sets, checkers, etc.), the sector rented volleyball and tennis courts not far from the Eiffel Tower and, during the summer months, in Neuilly-sur-Seine to the west of Paris.[468] For the facilitation of healthy competition among their comrades, Soviet institutions set up independent competitions in ping pong, chess, the Russian sport *gorodki*, volleyball, and pool. Expanding the stimulation of rivalry to the interinstitutional and international level, the embassy's local committee organized playoffs not just among the Soviet agencies, but also between Soviet squads and national teams from the "brotherly socialist countries located in Paris."[469] After the Soviet lineup took first place in a volleyball tournament

[467] GARF, f. 7709, op. 26, d. 1004, ll. 67-69.

[468] Opportunities for using these courts, however, remained limited. The city opened the courts near the Eiffel Tower only from seven to eight o'clock in the evening. Because the gatekeeper closed the doors at eight o'clock sharp, "comrades" could "only play for 30 minutes." GARF, f. 7709, op. 26, d. 586, l. 37; and GARF, f. 7709, op. 26, d. 740, ll. 102-103; 150.

[469] GARF, f. 7709, op. 26, d. 1573, l. 138; and GARF, f. 7709, op. 26, d. 740, l. 151.

in 1962, for example, the Czechoslovak ambassador to France awarded a "crystal cup" to the champions.[470]

The embassy designated sacred hiatuses in the workaday routines of its citizens for the enactment of national rituals and pastimes that concretized the communist worldview, hosting a combination of cultural and sporting activities in exclusively Soviet spaces to celebrate major Soviet holidays (New Year's, International Women's Day, the 150th Anniversary of the Battle of Borodino [1962], anniversaries of the October Revolution, etc.).[471] In the course of "evenings of rest" on these special dates, the trade union planned elaborate ceremonies commemorating key events in the Soviet national and historical mythos, along with amateur concerts, games, lotteries, and dancing after dinner.[472] Farther afield, the embassy's dacha in the picturesque Parisian suburb of Mantes and the trade mission's chateau in the sleepy commune of Montsoult became important sanctuaries in which Soviet citizens could retire from the drudgery of their foreign entanglements to revel in the warm weather after winter's end and mark traditional communist jubilees outdoors. On May Day in 1962, the Mantes premises served as the venue for merrymaking and a special buffet to which representatives of the people's democracies received invitations. "The presence of guests," the writers of the local committee's annual report recalled of the "*maevka*," "gave this day a real feeling of a holiday of international solidarity of workers, promoting the strengthening of friendship among collectives of diplomatic delegations of countries of the socialist camp in France."[473]

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[470] GARF, f. 7709, op. 26, d. 1573, l. 138.

[471] GARF, f. 7709, op. 26, d. 586, l. 135.

[472] GARF, f. 7709, op. 26, d. 1573, l. 41.

[473] GARF, f. 7709, op. 26, d. 586, l. 135.

In the spring and summer months of every year, the UNESCO faction took part in weekly *voskresniki*, or Sunday work trips, on the grounds of the Mantes retreat. Intended to instill in their participants a sense of shared ownership of Soviet property in accordance with the emphasis back home on the "beautification" (*blagoustroistvo*) of Soviet neighborhoods during the Khrushchev era, the *voskresniki* incorporated a medley of short-term landscaping projects into their schedule (e.g., the building of a children's playground, the renovation of the walls of the estate, the upkeep of athletic fields, etc.).[474]

The province of the local committee, going beyond the alimentation of a discrete Soviet realm cordoned off from the vagaries of the bourgeois society they inhabited, also encompassed the crucial challenge of interpreting that strange new world for the Soviet itinerants. Eager to give its members "an impression of the country in which they are located, of its culture, daily life, and population," the trade union selected guides from among its ranks to lead the Soviet population in France on excursions to the sites of Paris and beyond. In the late 1950s and first three years of the 1960s, tourist groups tended to concentrate their visits on the run-of-the-mill attractions of France's medieval and nineteenth-century artistic and architectural icons, such as Notre Dame, the Pantheon, the Grand Palais, the Banque de France, and the artwork of the Louvre, as well as the castles of the Loire, Fontainebleau, Compiègne, and Chantilly.[475]

But when an old hand of the Soviet UNESCO Delegation, N. S. Ratiani, began to play a leading role in the sightseeing operation of the colony in 1962, she helped attune the excursions to the desire of the Soviet trade-union system for an explication of French history through a

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[474] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 26, l. 244; and GARF, f. 7709, op. 26, d. 740, l. 219. For a discussion of the renewed attention to "beautifying" Soviet neighborhoods, see Jones, "Introduction," in *The Dilemmas of De-Stalinization: Negotiating Cultural and Social Change in the Khrushchev Era*, 9.

[475] The Bank, the local committee made sure to note in its 1959 report, interested the tourists "from the point of view of architectural design." GARF, f. 7709, op. 26, d. 586, l. 40; and GARF, f. 7709, op. 26, d. 740, l. 145.

distinctly Soviet mirror. While the UNESCO trade union began that year to set up for newcomers "regular introductions" to the country, and the embassy's local committee purchased a bus for expeditions instead of holding fast to the previous practice of relying on expensive French charter companies, Ratiani led the way in the reengineering of the itineraries of these daytrips in accordance with complaints that the current circuits did not accentuate France's revolutionary tradition and so as to make the nation's heritage conform with the teleological narrative legitimizing the USSR's preeminence in world history.[476] Up to 1962, "the local committee placed great emphasis on the visiting of castles, cathedrals and other historical sites related to the Middle Ages of France," the annual report from that year observed. "This, of course, is valuable," the writers admitted. "Soviet people need to know this side of the history of France." Yet the authors of the report stressed that Soviet excursion organizers "should not in anyway forget that the history of France is exceptionally rich with events related to heroic revolutionary struggles of its proletariat," asking why they did "not organize excursions to historic places in Paris related to the Paris Commune" or "show our comrades the Red Belt of Paris, the residents of which always have been a mainstay of the French revolutionary movement?" To bring home the contemporaneity of Marxist-Leninist teachings on the inevitability of the development of class-consciousness under capitalism, the trade-union rapporteurs made a pitch for "excursions to places where in 1962 there were mass political demonstrations of French workers, as a result of which the De Gaullist government was forced to make peace in Algeria and put an end to the provocative ventures of the fascist thugs of the OAS [*Organisation de l'armée secrète*]," the

[476] Ratiani and the delegation's leadership in the revamping of the excursions of the colony, including the creation of introductory tours and the procurement of a bus, are discussed in the minutes of a February 1963 report-election conference of the trade union and its final report: GARF, f. 7709, op. 26, d. 1573, ll. 123; 134-36.

French paramilitary organization that executed terrorist acts in response to the French president's moves toward granting Algeria independence in the early 1960s. [477]

Heeding the call for the provision of a panorama of French monumentality and social geography congruent with the Soviet state's founding ideology, Ratiani's Soviet UNESCO Delegation and the local committee crafted for its members a real-life montage of the local communist tradition and its tangible achievements in the present-day. In May 1963, the Soviet UNESCO Delegation invited colleagues from other Soviet institutions to explore "Leninist places in Paris," examining the "apartment-museum" of V. I. Lenin on Rue Marie-Rose, strolling through a park where Lenin "often was," and surveying a rotunda and lecture hall in which the legendary revolutionary delivered speeches. Later that spring, Soviet UNESCO employees and delegation functionaries pulled off their own "collective trip" to the red city of Saint-Denis where the communist mayor, together with a *député* of the parliament from the French Communist Party (the stalwart ally of the USSR, Fernand Grenier), "told the participants in the excursion of the working conditions of the communist municipality of Saint-Denis, the life of the workers, the struggle for their rights." After accompanying their Soviet friends to the house of the composer of *The Internationale*, Pierre De Geyter, the representatives of the communist-controlled commune showed off the city's "Sports Palace, which was constructed by the municipality for the workers," as well as "the hospital [and] new housing blocks that were constructed with city funds for the workers." Lest their peregrinations cease to highlight the flaws of the Western political order, the Soviet UNESCO chapter made sure to fit in between these communist pilgrimages a viewing of a session of the French National Assembly, "which was the material for subsequent conversations on bourgeois parliamentarism and the current

[477] Ibid., l. 133.

regime in France."[478] The next year, the delegation completed a junket to the Flins Renault factory that "contributed to a familiarization with the country, its history, and the situation of the French working class."[479]

Aside from the rather desultory hodgepodge of recreational and cultural outings described above, the local committee, conspiring to obviate the need for its constituents to resort to French social services, built up its own welfare infrastructure and communal enterprises within the Soviet colony. The UNESCO group had access to a cafeteria (*stolovaia*) that won high praise from Soviet international civil servants. "Nowhere in Paris," one UNESCO worker remarked, "can you find meals like those in our cafeteria."[480] The provision of healthcare also became a central concern in the trade union's quest to exempt the colony from dependency on interaction with French institutions. But the medical wing of the trade union, for much of the 1960s, consisted of a single doctor with a rudimentary proficiency in French who divided her day into mornings receiving patients at the embassy and afternoons riding public transportation to make house calls, often for what the doctor dismissed as "trifles" not needing medical attention.[481] From a financial standpoint, the physician's penchant for refusing to give referrals to

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[478] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 26, l. 243. An obituary in *The Independent* contains a detailed summary of Grenier's relationship with communism and the Soviet Union from the Bolshevik Revolution through the 1960s: D. S. Bell, "Obituary: Fernand Grenier," *The Independent*, August 14, 1992, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/people/obituary-fernand-grenier-1540387.html.

[479] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 29, l. 329. Even here, however, evidence indicates that the enjoyment of excursions throughout France and to the dachas fell largely to secretariat workers and other underprivileged diplomatic personnel within the social structure of the Soviet colony precisely because they did not have the means to embark on their own vacations outside the framework of official trade-union leisure activities. As a 1959 report of the Soviet embassy's trade union explained, "some comrades with official cars often take no part in excursion work and spend their leisure time outside of the collective. Some, even during collective trips to Mantes or Montsoult, try to 'get rid' [*izbavit'sia*] of passengers, i.e. our comrades who do not have cars." GARF, f. 7709, op. 26, d. 740, l. 149.

[480] GARF, f. 7709, op. 26, d. 740, l. 166.

[481] The local committee complained that many employees "do not consider how busy the doctor is and call her to [their] home for trifles."

affordable French specialists led to a drain of foreign currency because many patients went to French clinics anyway and asked the embassy to swallow the costs *ex post facto*.[482]

In addition to extending to Soviet workers the amenities necessary for living in France without excessive interaction with the host government or society, the United Professional Organization provided the political and social preconditions for them to raise their families in a Soviet milieu. To busy the housewives who tagged along with their husbands to France, the local *zhensovet* (women's council) ran a cluster of *kruzhki* (circles) for sewing and the study of French.[483] In the UNESCO group, a male employee from the delegation or secretariat coached female spouses on politics and the "contemporary international situation" in colloquia that resembled the political-educational program for the men.[484] Loath to entrust their children to the French educational system, the *zhensovety*, in conjunction with a "Parents' Committee," aided in the running of a small elementary school (for pupils grades 1-5) whose teachers sometimes moonlighted as social workers responsible for inspecting the home environments of the colony's progeny. In 1959, the new faculty of the school went to all of the children's residences in order to assess how children spent their free time and "the living conditions of each student"—"where

[482] The medical sector had a list of "doctor-communists" who provided cheaper services. It urged its citizens to go to these physicians. GARF, f. 7709, op. 26, d. 1573, ll. 156-58.

[483] GARF, f. 7709, op. 26, d. 740, l. 224. The *zhensovet* was part of a larger system of such councils that had been organized in 1957 to get women to be more active in politics and community service in their local neighborhood. Melanie Ilic, "What Did Women Want? Khrushchev and the Revival of the *Zhensovety*," in *Soviet State and Society Under Nikita Khrushchev*, 104-121.

[484] While a small group of Soviet women worked in the secretariat, they were usually without a husband. Otherwise, the vast majority of Soviet international civil servants were men. GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 22, l. 383; and GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 26, l. 241.

the children prepare for lessons, whether they have a special place, a children's corner, and whether they sit correctly while doing homework."[485]

Realizing that their children felt "deprived in Paris of courtyards where they can play" and "special institutions" where they could "receive extracurricular education," the "Children's Sector" of the local committee crammed the downtime of its tykes with hobbies and engagements propitious to rearing well-rounded *Homo sovietici*.[486] During recess, pupils either played on the embassy grounds in good weather or stayed indoors reading Soviet children's journals (*Pioneerskaia pravda*, *Murzilka*).[487] After school let out in the afternoon, the children converged in *kruzhki* for skillful hands (*umelye ruki*) arts-and-crafts projects, walking expeditions, embroidery, carving, housekeeping, and the theatrical performances of fairy tales.[488] On the weekends, the youngsters went to the Bois de Boulogne for "observation of nature with the coming of fall," and took field trips to the zoo, inner-city gardens, or the editorship of *L'Humanité*. In observance of key holidays on the Soviet calendar, parents and teachers made their offspring both the object and subject of the festivities. With the coming of the forty-second anniversary of the October Revolution in 1959, the school searched for a veteran of either the Great Patriotic War or the Civil War to engage in a "conversation" with the children on the momentousness of the Bolshevik ascent to power. It also cast the young ones as acolytes in the solemn "ceremonial meeting" planned for the holy day and had them make displays attesting to

[485] Once students graduated from the fifth grade, they returned to the USSR to take up studies at Soviet secondary schools. During their time in France, they were taught in Russian and only learned French in outside *kruzhki*. GARF, f. 7709, op. 26, d. 740, ll. 4-7.

[486] GARF, f. 7709, op. 26, d. 1573, l. 139.

[487] GARf, f. 7709, op. 26, d. 740, l. 3.

[488] Ibid., l. 161.

their knowledge of the USSR's revolutionary genesis.[489] Once school ended and vacations kicked off, the dacha in Mantes became the site of a daycare and pioneer camp bustling with campfires, around which the children performed the usual pioneer rituals.[490] At other times, the dacha metamorphosed into a safe space for families in the midst of dangerous political turmoil that seemed to corroborate for Soviet nationals their country's depiction of the capitalist organization of society as inherently conducive to the rise of fascism. When what the local committee construed as a "wave of OAS terroristic activity" spread across France and Algeria before and after the signing of the March 1962 Évian Accords, parents formed a night watch at the dacha to protect juveniles from the rightwing terrorist network.[491]

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Thus, from the delegation's tiny corner in the embassy to the dacha in Mantes, Soviet international civil servants had at their disposal a diversity of activities designed to make a home away from home and relieve the pain of "culture shock" that put at risk their communist fealty and resolve to fulfill Soviet objectives. But to what extent did all the aforementioned tactics for building an inviolable Soviet enclave in the center of the West, especially after their intensification in 1959, succeed in making the collective of Soviet secretariat workers insusceptible to the atomization part and parcel to its members' daily isolation as well as impervious to the taboo inveiglements of life abroad? Irrespective of their chaperons' asseverations to the contrary, the unprecedented arrangements of Soviet secretariat bureaucrats,

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[489] Ibid., ll. 4; 8.

[490] Ibid., l. 158; and GARF, f. 7709, op. 26, d. 586, ll. 42-43.

[491] GARF, f. 7709, op. 26, d. 1573, ll. 139-140. Obviously, most of the violence perpetrated by the OAS took place in Algeria. For much of the war, however, the reach of the organization also extended into France. Alistair Horne's masterful *A Savage War of Peace* details the events that transpired that spring after the signing of the agreements supposedly ending the war. Alistair Horne, *A Savage War of Peace: Algeria, 1954-1962* (New York: New York Review Books, 2006), 520-34.

who resided throughout the French capital and worked in complete sequestration from the Soviet body politic, greatly curbed the delegation's ability to monitor the ideological sanctity of their subordinates. In reality, Soviet international civil servants enjoyed more freedom to explore the West and dabble in its forbidden fruits than any other Soviet citizens stationed abroad.

Despite the best efforts of the delegation leadership to give the impression in their reports to Moscow that they ran a tight ship of frequent interaction with their peers in the secretariat, the UNESCO mission suffered from persistent disorganization, truancy, and communication breakdowns among its own officials. In his 1964 assessment filed for MID, Kiselev painted a picture of the reigning disorderliness in the delegation's business: "At the party bureau and operational meetings, it is repeatedly noted that the necessary daily routine is lacking; no one knows where workers are, in the UNESCO building or in the embassy; . . . [and] some workers cannot be found for several days." Alarmingly, the MID adviser gleaned from his conversations that the inveterate erraticism in the schedules of workers went all the way to the top of the delegation. "Many employees," he disclosed, "complained that Comrade A. P. Pavlov [the Soviet permanent delegate from 1961 to 1965] himself often arrives to work late, arranges a lunch break for himself at a different time than all of the employees, and therefore there is little chance to communicate with him."[492] Such unreliability on the part of its functionaries only added to the preexisting difficulties encountered by the delegation when plotting regular chitchats with their people in the secretariat. As Pavlov himself admitted in a report from the same year, meetings for "mass-political and ideological-educational work" transpired not as often as he would have wanted on account of "the fact that part of [the Soviet UNESCO

[492] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 25, ll. 108-09.

collective] are formally officials of international organizations and have their own daily schedule, in many ways different from the schedule of the delegation."[493]

Kiselev also discovered in his interviews information that belied the delegation's assertions that it counseled UNESCO operatives on how to approach their jobs in the international organization. In 1962 and 1963, "collaborative work of employees of the delegation and the secretariat on documentation, information, reviews, [and] evaluations" took place willy-nilly and without any planning whatsoever. Additionally, some members of the delegation and secretariat posse fretted over inadequate guidance from Moscow as to how they should approach UNESCO. "In conversations," Kiselev commented, "workers drew attention to the fact that the commission and MID's Division of International Economic Organizations (OMEO) in the course of the year did little to orient the collective of Soviet employees in UNESCO." In particular, the agencies seldom sent directives on "precisely what issues should be further studied" and hardly ever specified "what kind of political information" they considered interesting enough for their correspondents in the secretariat to relay to the Center.[494]

This widespread confusion precipitated a trend among a segment of Soviet international civil servants toward social fragmentation, estrangement, and disassociation from the centers of social activity put in place to shore up their allegiance to the Soviet state. Although many UNESCO staff members partook in the happenings of the broader colony, Kiselev regretted that events in the delegation's "club" in 1963 drew only "a small portion of the employees of the delegation, the secretariat and their wives, while evening entertainments, lectures, or presentations for the collective itself, with the exception of one instance, are not held at the

[493] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 26, l. 248.

[494] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 25, ll. 113-14.

delegation." Similarly, the MID inspector learned from the wives that they "almost do not know each other" and "live in isolation." In general, Kiselev reported that his interlocutors inundated him with "complaints of isolation and the absence of a collective of UNESCO employees."[495]

Perhaps inevitably, Soviet UNESCO employees preferred to spend their nonworking hours with the delights on offer in Paris, one of the cardinal hubs of Western culture and consumerism. As Kiselev mentioned in his dispatch to Moscow, "a small group of workers have fallen for French cinema, frequently visiting cafes and at the same time are rarely seen at the club of the embassy."[496]A fascination with Western culture–or, equally plausibly, a desire to profit off it–also emboldened one Soviet UNESCO translator and career teacher at the Moscow State Pedagogical Institute of Foreign Languages to break the domestic laws of the USSR. In August 1964, Moscow customs officers arrested M. G. Anisenko upon his return to the Soviet Union following a half-decade stint at the international organization. Notwithstanding the delegation's past evaluations of the former UNESCO hand as a "politically literate, ideologically and morally steadfast" person who bore the qualities of a "good family man," Soviet customs found in Anisenko's suitcases dozens of "anti-Soviet" clippings from satirical newspapers and the "bourgeois" daily *Le Figaro*; ten issues of the humor magazines *Le Rire*, *Comics Magazine*, *Fou Rire*, and *200 Histoires Pour Rire*, which contained jokes about the Soviet Union; a copy of Albert Camus's *The Rebel* among seven other banned books; three spy novels from Jean Bruce's prohibited *OSS 117* series; one-hundred and twenty-four issues of "tabloid, entertainment and semi-pornographic magazines" such as *Playboy*, *Lui*, *Cinémonde*, and *Jours de France*; and a

[495] Ibid., l. 111.

[496] Ibid., l. 108.

couple of "semipornographic," parodic dictionaries.[497] Thus, a positive assessment of an international civil servant's character and ideological scrupulousness did not necessarily reflect their immunity to Western ideas and cultural products deemed anathema to the preservation of communist purity.

But Soviet UNESCO professionals' experimentation with material and intellectual contraband became less of a source for unease than the possibility that any feelings of alienation developed living abroad would make them fall off the radar of the delegation and into the clutches of Western intelligence agencies. The case of M. N. Kuznetsov, a P-4 editor in the UNESCO Russian Translation Section, illustrates the high degree of independence Soviet UNESCO employees possessed compared to other Soviet citizens on assignment in foreign countries. It also reveals the anomie they experienced as individuals expected to live in public as essentially Western citizens with Western jobs but secretly subject to the heavy-handed coercive methods of a Soviet state deeply suspicious of its citizens living outside the country.

In the afternoon on New Year's Day 1962, Kuznetsov disappeared from his home and office for six days, leaving a cryptically short note to his wife that he would "return on the sixth." A day later, his wife reported to Ambassador Vinogradov that her husband had gone AWOL. On January 8, just a day after Kuznetsov resurfaced at his desk in UNESCO headquarters, MID whisked him back to Moscow for not sleeping in his apartment and leaving Paris without prior approval—two actions that clearly breached the USSR's rules of conduct for citizens working abroad.[498] In light of his unblemished record and lengthy tenure in Paris, Kuznetsov's dereliction of his duties must have surprised his Soviet higher-ups. After all, the delegation, only eleven

[497] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 27, ll. 127-28.

[498] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 23, ll. 37; 39; 46-47.

months prior to his absconsion, had portrayed the four-and-a-half-year veteran of UNESCO as a "politically steadfast, morally sound" man who took an "active" part in the social life of the delegation as the leader of a seminar on the "Economics and Politics of Capitalist Countries."[499]

When meeting with the deputy chairman of the Soviet UNESCO Commission on January 13 and the head of the MID Directorate of Cadres on January 24, Kuznetsov narrated a long history of marital strife to justify his illegal departure, telling his Soviet questioners that his twelve-year marriage had gradually "become more strained" and that, despite a hope things would "settle down," his "not very good" relationship with his wife had "only worsened" following their move to France in September 1958. Kuznetsov claimed that the delegation had nonetheless ignored his persistent implorations for permission to go back to the USSR in order to secure a divorce. As a result of this frustrating situation, he had begun to stay at work until two or three o'clock in the morning during the month leading up to the episode in question. But every time Kuznetsov arrived home from one of these nights burning the midnight oil, he found "the door locked with the key and the doorbell disconnected." Tired of banging on the door, "disturbing the neighbors," and still finding himself locked out, the stranded husband chose on several occasions to either check in to a hotel or sleep in his car, determining that "this way he would 'not bring harm to anyone'" even though he knew the rules binding him to an address registered with the Soviet embassy. With respect to the nearly weeklong absence under investigation, Kuznetsov argued that his "familial relations" had finally "forced him" to take a vacation.[500] As a consequence, he had gone to see the sights of Paris and subsequently traveled

[499] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 20, l. 260; and GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 22, l. 383.

[500] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 23, ll. 35-37.

hundreds of miles south to the French Riviera, where he toured the city of Nice and the principality of Monaco after a stopover in Dijon.[501]

In these interrogations, Kuznetsov revealed how his lengthy stay abroad had endowed him with a markedly non-Soviet presumption of entitlement to autonomy in mobility and decision-making. Instead of confessing his wrongdoing and begging for forgiveness when his Soviet inquisitors pressed him to "realize his guilt," the former UNESCO translator "behaved extremely disingenuously, answered in monosyllables," and "took on the posture of an offended man."[502] By way of response to questions as to why he had not apprised the Soviet permanent delegate of his journey beforehand, Kuznetsov retorted that he had obtained a leave "in the prescribed manner in the UNESCO Secretariat" from his boss, a Soviet citizen at the helm of the Russian Translation Section, and that "anyone else could arrange a leave quite easily without asking permission of the delegate."[503] In this riposte, Kuznetsov exploited the ambiguities in the overlapping and contradictory hierarchies spawned by the USSR's covert strategy for subverting the international civil service. His reference to the official green light that he received from his Soviet superior in UNESCO obfuscated his blatant use of the procedures of the secretariat to shake off Soviet surveillance and functioned as a face-saving technique to exonerate him of accusations of premeditated rebellion. At the same time, he granted UNESCO authority over whether he had the right to take a break from work, thereby challenging the goal of the Soviet state to reserve for itself total control over citizens employed by international organizations. As the object of the competing ethical regimes and power structures of the international civil service

[501] Ibid., l. 50.

[502] Ibid., ll. 37-38.

[503] Ibid., ll. 37; 50.

and the Soviet UNESCO Delegation, Kuznetsov tactically surrendered to the former jurisdiction over his life when the latter got in in his way, undermining the Soviet state's postulate that "its" international civil servants were nothing more than undercover sycophantic diplomats.

In the bipolar framework ingrained in the minds of his Soviet cross-examiners, however, Kuznetsov's delinquency, instead of coming across as an act of creative disobediance in which an individual deployed the rules of one of his masters to defy the other for his own ends, had all the signs of the machinations of Western espionage. The multiple accounts of the incident submitted by Kuznetsov's wife to Vinogradov certainly corroborated their hunch that Western spies had turned the UNESCO interpreter. As the concerned spouse imparted to the ambassador, Kuznetsov had recently treated her and their nine-year old son "poorly," stayed out late, and responded to their queries as to what he did on these late nights with one word—*delishki*, or the Russian equivalent of muttering "work stuff." She further recited how on December 31, the night before Kuznetsov walked out of the apartment, two French-speaking strangers called their residence, introduced themselves to her as "friends of your husband," and asked the woman if they could speak with the man of the house. "His refusal to tell me the names of these persons and describe how he had acquired acquaintances unknown to me," the communist housewife recollected, "naturally aroused my suspicions." To contextualize Kuznetsov's behavior, she reminded Vinogradov that her "husband worked in an international organization, the environment of which is fundamentally different from the environment of Soviet institutions," requiring Soviet UNESCO employees to labor "constantly in foreign surroundings" where they encountered "people of different nationalities, views, attitudes, and intentions." She then couched her rationalization for the denunciation of her significant other in language that attributed to the secretariat the kind of cosmopolitanism that Stalinist sermons

had cast as threating to contaminate Soviet nationals with infectious sympathies. “Being in this heap, in this motley stream,” she reasoned when alluding to her husband’s workplace, “one can perchance fall into its current and begin to swirl in it. Thus, hearing the call of strangers who also described themselves as friends, I thought of this stream and, fearing my husband had compromised himself and driven by a sense of obligation, I came to you.”[504]

Taking their lead from the misgivings articulated by his partner, the MID and Soviet UNESCO Commission officers asked Kuznetsov again and again if he had met with anyone during his unauthorized furlough and how he preoccupied himself generally outside of his work life. The accused replied that he had traveled by himself and normally frittered away his downtime relaxing at home, going to museums and libraries, or sometimes playing chess with Soviet UNESCO colleagues. When asked if he had arranged a rendezvous with someone on New Years’ Eve, Kuznetsov acknowledged that he had socialized with a Spanish communist’s Soviet-Latvian wife whom he knew from the secretariat, but insisted that he “did not have a relationship with her.”[505] Whatever the nature of his movements and fraternizations, MID and the Soviet UNESCO Commission promptly closed his case, returning the disgraced cadre to his previous post at the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences and alerting its executives of “his improper behavior abroad.”[506]

The decisive steps MID and the Soviet UNESCO Commission took in reaction to Kuznetsov’s desertion spoke to their alarm over the convergence of his flight with the calls he fielded from foreigners rather than a concern over his temporary decampment *in vacuo*. Indeed,

[504] Ibid., ll. 46-48.

[505] Ibid., ll. 37; 50.

[506] Ibid., l. 49.

the regular violation on the part of Soviet UNESCO workers of the protocol for logging business travel outside of France compelled the delegation to pester MID in 1963 to decentralize the process so that the delegation could license some of them to fly out of Paris with little notice for "urgent" and "unforeseen" trips.[507] Nevertheless, the Kuznetsov affair represented the exception instead of the rule in terms of how Soviet UNESCO officeholders comported themselves. By and large, Soviet international civil servants, while undoubtedly bending the codes of conduct to their advantage when beyond the gaze of their taskmasters, retained a strong loyalty to the Soviet mission that fed off the plethora of social and cultural activities the Soviet colony carried out for precisely this purpose.

But the alternation of micromanagement from their Soviet guardians and relative freedom-in-isolation that Soviet UNESCO staff underwent in their lives outside the workplace led to a *personalization* and *privatization* of their communist identities. Expected to preserve fidelity to the USSR with the help of only a rudimentary version of the Soviet public sphere that reinforced the communist faith of their countrymen back home, UNESCO officials from the Soviet Union had to weather, and concoct fittingly communist countermoves to, the "provocations" of everyday Western life unsupervised and alone. They also had to reconcile their dual jobs as secret agents of their government and servants to an international organization with little help from Soviet authorities, who remained banned from snooping around the offices of the secretariat and had developed an understanding of UNESCO inferior to their minions working within its walls. As the next chapter will demonstrate, the long hours these communist individuals labored in the "motley stream" of the secretariat forced them to reconceptualize and refashion what it meant to faithfully champion the Soviet cause on the

[507] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 24, ll. 1-2.

world stage.

CHAPTER 6

INTERNATIONAL CIVIL SERVANTS BY DAY: THE COLD WAR OF EVERYDAY LIFE IN THE UNESCO SECRETARIAT

Each weekday morning, Soviet international civil servants commuted to UNESCO headquarters to work in the secretariat, where they faced a UNESCO ethical regime and power structure radically different from the regulations imposed on them in their downtime by the proxies of the Soviet state in Paris. Upon securing their posts in UNESCO, all newly hired Soviet nationals had to sign a pledge that they would "solemnly undertake to exercise in all loyalty, discretion, and conscience the functions entrusted" to them as UNESCO staff members. They had to promise to "discharge these functions and regulate" their "conduct with the interests of UNESCO only in view, and not to seek or accept instructions" from "any government or other authority external to the organization."[508] As Soviet secretariat personnel found out, this entailed making decisions and completing tasks that at times contradicted their orders from the Soviet UNESCO Commission and Delegation, both of which could not openly infiltrate the walls of UNESCO to lend a guiding hand to their charges.

In addition, their oath to serve the international organization necessitated that they obey, collaborate, and share coffee breaks with Western bosses and other officemates bearing attitudes and personalities informed by and embodying a variety of national backgrounds, ideologies, and individual quirks. These coworkers did not fall into the clear-cut categories of friend or foe with

[508] Quoted from the pledge one Soviet candidate signed upon entry into the UNESCO workforce: V. P. Birucov, "Annex I," November 30, 1956, AG 8: Personnel Records of Mr. V. Birioukov, UNESCO Archives.

which Soviet professionals tried to organize the new social landscape they inhabited. Rather, they constituted the *sui generis* culture of the international organization's permanent workforce. In his 1978 retrospective on UNESCO, Richard Hoggart, a British pioneer of academic cultural studies who served as UNESCO deputy director-general in the early 1970s, aptly described this culture of the international organization not only as a cosmopolitan microcosm of the international community, but also as a secluded and self-absorbed society consumed with petty social tensions. "The internal life of the secretariat," he wrote, "is exceptionally intense and inbred; UNESCO headquarters is a cocoon, a hothouse, a vast and uneasy hamsters' nest. For many members of staff, UNESCO and its internal affairs form a total world, a continuous drama almost wholly concerned with the staff's own common life."[509]

Surveying this confusing environment and often working alone in departments with hundreds of foreigners, Soviet UNESCO employees had to assign meaning to the humdrum office politics they encountered by appropriating and refashioning elements of the Soviet narrative of international struggle between capitalist and communist countries, using this narrative to interpret and act on the mundane conflicts, alliances, and uncertainties of their workplace. Moreover, they had to solve the inscrutable puzzle their country placed before them––how to excel at playing the "rules of the game" of the international civil service while not letting these rules shape them.

In this chapter, I offer an exploration of the range of ways Soviet international civil servants coped with these challenges. In particular, I show that these newcomers to the world of international organizations came up with original and highly personalized narratives, selectively reframing official Soviet presumptions of the outside world into plots sometimes at odds with the

[509] Richard Hoggart, *An Idea and Its Servants: UNESCO From Within* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1978), 112.

sanctioned positions of their Soviet superiors toward the international organization. As Soviet international civil servants attempted to explain their milieu in reports to the Soviet UNESCO Commission and Delegation, they produced a collection of musings on their foreign environs remarkably heterogeneous in their tenor and topics, which ranged from gossip about foreign colleagues to elaborate but sometimes half-baked schemes for Soviet cultural diplomacy.[510] The stories Soviet UNESCO employees told about themselves did not simply reflect, due to a desire to please their Soviet bosses or a heightened political militancy, an exaggerated imagining of their daily battles as miniature reproductions of the worldwide struggle to determine whether the capitalist or communist system was superior. Rather, their accounts reveal a reduction of international politics to the level of the mundane in order to make sense of why their government had sent them into the unknown and often baffling circumstances of the UNESCO Secretariat.

Moreover, Soviet UNESCO employees viewed the UNESCO bureaucracy through categories of thinking prevalent in the Soviet society they had left behind. In her study of late-Stalinist middle-brow literature, literary critic Vera Dunham highlights the appearance in Soviet discourse during late Stalinism of a class of middling bureaucrats who formed the base of social support for the Soviet state in the late 1940s.[511] "Public in employment but private and inner-directed in its strivings," this new social group bore a remarkable resemblance to the depictions of middle-class professionals pervading 1950s American culture. "The Soviet middle class does consist of many Soviet Babbitts and organization men, as well as of white-collar mid-culture

[510] Anne Gorsuch describes an official communist "script" governing the behavior of Soviet citizens abroad and determining how they were evaluated by their minders in reports to authorities in the USSR. She argues that this script, which contained officially sanctioned lines praising the achievements of the Soviet Union, did not always translate well when performed in front of non-Soviet audiences. See Gorsuch, *All This Is Your World*, 128-29.

[511] Dunham argues that the Soviet state struck a "Big Deal" with this new breed of Soviet citizens. For Dunham, the Soviet state received the allegiance of this class in exchange for material goods and a tacit sanctioning of middle-class values. Vera S. Dunham, *In Stalin's Time: Middle Class Values in Soviet Fiction* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1990), 13-14.

men and women," Dunham maintains. The rise of this new class enabled the reemergence, after the idealism following the revolution, of an archetype with deep roots in Russian history known as *meshchanstvo*. The *meshchanin*, or a person typifying this archetype, displayed a knack for "social climbing," "careerism," and "complacent vegetation" as well as a "fervor for possessions" reminiscent of the *nouveau riche* populating the postwar suburbs and working in the corporations of the West.[512]

After Stalin's death, the Soviet press and intelligentsia made these bureaucrats scapegoats for the economic and technological stagnation of the past. "Technological innovation conflicts between noble innovators and scheming bureaucrats," the historian Denis Kozlov notes, "became a fashionable topic in literature and journalism in 1956." As Kozlov explains, the most famous of these attacks on Soviet bureaucrats, V. D. Dudintsev's 1956 novel *Not by Bread Alone* (*Ne khlebom edinym*), impressed on Soviet readers "a powerful image of Soviet industrial management as a corrupt yet omnipotent bureaucratic machine that resisted improvement and innovation, a system in which capable administrators were exceptional, and against which the chances of a lonely inventor were practically nil."[513] This embrace of dynamic innovation reflected a broader yearning during the Thaw to overcome the legacy of Stalinism and "bureaucratism" by returning to the revolutionary roots of the Soviet project in the ideas of Lenin and the idealistic experimentation of the 1920s.[514] The Soviet search for an authentic communist

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[512] Ibid., 4-5; 19-21.

[513] Denis Kozlov, *The Readers of Novyi Mir: Coming to Terms with the Stalinist Past* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013), 90–91.

[514] Writing in the 1960s, dissident Soviet historian Roy Medvedev blamed "bureaucratism" for the betrayal of the revolutionary ideals of socialism in his well-known analysis of Stalinism. Roy Medvedev, *Let History Judge: The Origins and Consequences of Stalinism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989), 836–46. Historian Stephen Bittner explores the idealization of the early days of the Soviet Union in his history of the experience of the Thaw on Moscow's famous pedestrian street, the Arbat. In his words, "nostalgia for the 1920s was a central component of

mission unspoiled by bureaucratic malfeasance paralleled the search for authentic individuality in American culture in the 1950s and early 1960s discussed in the introduction to this section in chapter 3.[515]

Soviet international civil servants drew on this anti-bureaucratic language to read their foreign workplace. Specifically, they type-casted adversarial bosses and colleagues as Western versions of the corrupt Soviet bureaucrats described by Dunham and Dudintsev. To retain their status as outsiders in the UNESCO Secretariat, Soviet UNESCO employees portrayed themselves in reports to Moscow as champions of the revolutionary "romanticism" of the Khrushchev era in battle with an entrenched bureaucracy whose Western employees corrupted the lofty internationalist values shared by the USSR and UNESCO. By identifying privately as authentic communists, they differentiated themselves from the "phony" neutral men who pretended to serve an internationalist ideal and the conformist work culture of the UNESCO Secretariat as defined by the ethics of the international civil service. At the same time, Soviet UNESCO workers had to perform the role of international civil servant, putting on what Goffman calls a "personal front" that accorded with their position in the UNESCO Secretariat. They also had to comport themselves with a degree of collegiality. In Goffman's terminology, Western UNESCO employees had the power to determine the "definition of the situation" in UNESCO, or to shape social interactions by making "a moral demand upon" Soviet citizens, "obliging them to value and treat . . . [them] in the manner that persons of . . . [their] kind have a right to expect."[516] The bifurcation of their lives into a private Soviet sphere and a public sphere

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Thaw culture." Stephen V. Bittner, *The Many Lives of Khrushchev's Thaw: Experience and Memory in Moscow's Arbat* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008), 75.

[515] See the introduction to this section and Cheever, *Real Phonies*.

[516] Goffman, *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life*, 13; 23-24.

of international civil service engendered contradictions each Soviet professional in UNESCO struggled to reconcile. To both excel under the UNESCO regime and fulfill their objectives as communists in the organization, Soviet nationals tried to carve out their own niches within the UNESCO bureaucracy so that their personal communist identities aligned with the ethics of the international organization.

No matter how fervently these communists claimed to represent their country in the international organization, however, they could not remain immune to UNESCO culture and ethics. As Milosz observes in his contemplation of Polish intellectuals who put up a façade of fealty to the communist regime, "conscious acting, if one practices it long enough, develops those traits which one uses most in one's role, just as a man who became a runner because he had good legs develops his legs even more in training."[517] Thus, I also demonstrate that Soviet UNESCO employees, out of a need to get by day to day, adopted the norms, practices, and values they had to adhere to in their public lives as international civil servants.[518] While remaining allegiant to the Soviet state, a number of them began to advocate in their missives back home a frustration with their government's interference in their public assignments as international civil servants and a consternation with its refusal to conform to the expectations UNESCO had of its member states.

This chapter also sheds light on how the Soviet diplomatic, press, and trade corps dealt with the elaborate code the Soviet Union formulated for ensuring their communist purity while

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[517] Milosz, *The Captive Mind*, 55.

[518] As mentioned in the introduction, I draw on the theoretical approach to social power and relations articulated by the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu. Put simply, I am motivated by Bourdieu in my investigation into how Soviet citizens, as social actors with preexisting dispositions or a Soviet "habitus," learned the rules of the game of their new social "field" of the UNESCO Secretariat and how they came to take some of the rules of the game of this field as self-evident not out of a conscious or rational choice to do so, but out of their daily need to use the resources available to them in the power struggles of this new social reality. See Pierre Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*.

stationed abroad. For Soviet secretariat workers, no fixed, geographical border separated the noncommunist, foreign world of the "West" and the Soviet community as it did for their compatriots back home. Instead, officials in the Soviet embassy and Soviet UNESCO Delegation defined what it meant to be in the Soviet colony, and hence to be a faithful communist, on the basis of behavior, or whether Soviet UNESCO employees abided by the demanding and impractical set of rules imposed on Soviet citizens in foreign countries. Soviet secretariat personnel therefore experienced the bipolarity of the Cold War not as a distant drama unfolding in the news, but as a struggle to maintain discipline in the "enemy's rear" and as a division of their everyday actions into those acceptable to their Soviet handlers and those transgressing these limits. Soviet authorities enforcing these statutes obstructed the jobs they sent Soviet UNESCO employees to do, thereby inviting the disobedience of international civil servants seeking to negotiate the UNESCO and Soviet ethical regimes foisted on them by these two competing power structures.

I begin this chapter with an assessment of the job performances of Soviet specialists as international civil servants, chronicling their accomplishments and mistakes in this novel profession. I then describe how they understood and reacted to their foreign coworkers and the UNESCO work culture. The next portion of the chapter investigates the extent to which Soviet secretariat functionaries adopted the ethics and norms of the international civil service and how they compared the practices of the Soviet UNESCO Commission and Delegation to those of the international organization. Finally, I end the chapter with an analysis of how Soviet UNESCO employees navigated the disciplinary regime prescribed for them by their Soviet managers, illuminating the accomplishments and failures of the Soviet state in preserving the communist

identities of their people at UNESCO and preventing them from becoming full-fledged international civil servants.

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Given the demand of the Soviet UNESCO Commission and Delegation that their workers in the UNESCO bureaucracy violate the ethics of the international civil service, the performance of Soviet UNESCO employees at the international organization depended on their adeptness in concealing their clandestine work from UNESCO supervisors. But Soviet professionals under the watchful gaze of their UNESCO overlords could hardly hide their ulterior obligations to the Soviet state. Within the first two years of Soviet enlistment in the UNESCO Secretariat, the organization's administrators grew wise to the forbidden errands run by their communist personnel, uncovering the practice of the Soviet UNESCO Delegation of violating, in the words of the classified documents of the Soviet UNESCO Commission, the "internal rules" of the secretariat by forcing the cohort of Soviet UNESCO translators ("having in mind a better use of this group" than their official jobs in the secretariat) to "process various materials" circulating between the delegation and the organization.[519] For example, on November 28, 1957, Roger Barnes, the director of the UNESCO Languages Division, summoned Dubinin into his office, flung a paper written in French that he had received from the Soviet UNESCO Delegation on the table, and coyly stated: "excellently written document Mr. Dubinin." After Dubinin denied he had ever seen the typed pages before him, Barnes, sardonically sniping that only Dubinin "could translate into French so well," proceeded to recite the oath of the international civil service. "To read to me this oath in such circumstances," Dubinin remembered in his memoirs, "was tantamount to a reprimand for violations of the ethics of an employee of the UNESCO

[519] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 7, l. 65; and GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 21, l. 117.

Secretariat, since working for someone else, including one's own government, . . . should not be done by secretariat employees."[520] To "avoid possible future misunderstandings," Barnes sent Dubinin a memo in which he reminded the future ambassador that he must seek approval of the chief of the Russian Translation Section any time he vacated his desk "during working hours for any considerable length of time (say, more than ten minutes)." Barnes also stressed that the Soviet translator must leave "official consultations" with the Soviet UNESCO Delegation to his boss.[521]

The fact that Soviet citizens completed chores for their delegations remained an open secret in UNESCO and throughout the UN system for the duration of the eastern bloc's existence. Hoggart observed that, in his time at UNESCO, "the Soviets" found it "almost impossible to believe that a member of the secretariat is not also a member of his national civil services, or at the least a dutiful mouthpiece and reporter."[522] In the early 1980s, Shevchenko corroborated these conjectures. "Through an elaborate organizational structure," he explained, "the Soviet mission maintains full control over the daily work of Soviet nationals in the secretariat."[523] As Lemoine remarked in his analysis of the international civil service from the

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[520] Dubinin, *Diplomaticheskaia byl'*, 65–66.

[521] With respect to "official consultations," Barnes emphasized that Dubinin could discuss topics of translation with Russian/Soviet associates but only in an unofficial way. "This does not prevent you," he wrote, "from discussing informally with any of your friends, for example, matters of Russian terminology; but such informal consultations, useful as they may be, are not part of your official duties and must therefore not interfere with or delay the performance of your official duties." He also implicitly told Dubinin that the renewal of his contract depended on him learning English so he could not only translate from Russian to French and vice versa, but also from Russian to English and vice versa. Roger Barnes, "Memo DPL. 57/370," December 3, 1957, 1–3, AG 8: Personnel Records of Mr. Y. Doubinine, UNESCO Archives.

[522] Hoggart, *An Idea and Its Servants*, 45.

[523] He went on to describe this control: "All these staff members are part of the *Ob'edinennye referentury* (United Sections) of the Mission, where they receive direct instructions about how they should do their jobs in the secretariat and what their specific contributions should be to the work of the Mission itself." Shevchenko, *Breaking With Moscow*, 294-95.

early 1990s, "the appetite of Soviet officials for photocopies of documents in draft–which in most cases will officially reach the USSR mission in a matter of days–is well known."[524]

Yet so long as Soviet UNESCO servants did not get caught red handed or allow their patriotic commitments to interfere with their official transactions, the UNESCO administration refrained from taking punitive measures in response to these suspected violations. Indeed, the majority of grievances Western UNESCO bosses aired to the Soviet UNESCO Delegation or submitted in their internal performance evaluations concentrated on Soviet specialists' lack of the necessary ingenuity, qualifications, or competency to fulfill that part of UNESCO work conferred on them. The diversity of these critiques suggests that the nature of the foibles Soviet UNESCO employees exhibited throughout the workday depended more on their personal qualities than a common Soviet pedigree. Sobolev, when he came up for promotion in rank as a program specialist in the Department of Mass Communication in the early 1960s, received chastisements for needing "guidance when dealing with new situations," having strengths "primarily on the administrative rather than the creative side," and finding it "difficult to be critical of his own shortcomings" or solve "unforeseen problems." In contrast, Dubinin won plaudits in one assessment from 1958 for demonstrating in his work as a translator "a lively and receptive intelligence which enables him to readily assimilate new ideas and adapt himself to new situations."[525]

But even complaints pertaining to professional performance sometimes stemmed from the difficulty Soviet citizens faced when trying to handle their dual missions and UNESCO's

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[524] Lemoine made these remarks when discussing Shevchenko's tell-all memoir, noting that "the 'revelations' of the former Soviet under-secretary-general for political and security council affairs confirmed what was widely suspected in the secretariats of the United Nations and of the agencies." Lemoine, *The International Civil Servant,* 61-62.

[525] Émile Delavenay, "Within-Grade Increment," December 19, 1958, AG 8: Personnel Records of Mr. Y. Doubinine, UNESCO Archives; Tor Gjesdal, "Within-Grade Increment," April 21, 1960; and "Within-Grade Increment," June 3, 1962, AG 8: Personnel Records of B. Solobev, UNESCO Archives.

consequent frustration with their hesitancy to show sufficient exuberance in their capacities as international civil servants.[526] The occupational tribulations of V. P. Biriukov, who began his UNESCO career in January 1957 as a P-2 program assistant in the Public Liaison Division of the Department of Mass Communication, spotlight the bind in which these personnel found themselves. In July 1957, the Israeli director of the Department of Mass Communication, Dr. Jacob Zuckerman, notified the Soviet UNESCO Delegation that he had no choice but to give Biriukov a negative evaluation and dismiss him after his probationary contract expired that August. In response to the Soviet envoy's inquiries as to what made Biriukov "not suitable" for the post, Zuckerman named what the third secretary labeled as the usual laundry list of "platitudes," which included complaints that Biriukov "supposedly did not have work experience in international organizations; that he, supposedly, showed little initiative and that, finally, his knowledge of English, not to mention his knowledge of French, was lacking." Zuckerman finished his review of Biriukov's conduct with the aside that—in the Soviet secretary's paraphrasing of the director's words—"in five minutes" he could "have an ideal Anglo-Saxon in this position."[527] But Biriukov's incompetence had more to do with his impossible mission of appeasing both UNESCO and his superintendents in Moscow than any personal failings.

Although the Soviet UNESCO Commission and Delegation dismissed Zuckerman's disparagement of their fellow countryman's "inactivity" as part of a pattern of discrimination, they admitted in correspondence with each other that his criticisms were "largely justified" and stemmed from the antithetical job descriptions imposed on him by UNESCO and the Soviet

[526] A lack of "initiative" and "creativity" remained a constant refrain in UNESCO evaluations of Soviet professionals. For one of many examples apart from the case of Biriukov (described below), see: Tor Gjesdal, "Within-Grade Increment," April 22, 1960, 2, AG 8: Personnel Records of B. Solobev, UNESCO Archives.

[527] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 7, ll. 35-36.

government.[528] Biriukov's responsibilities included what he characterized as "the promotion of the expansion of the network of contacts" between communist institutions, UNESCO and those wanting to use UNESCO as a means of communication with socialist professionals; "the dissemination of informational materials on the general nature of UNESCO activities" to "nongovernmental" organizations, academies, and other agencies in the communist world; and the advertisement of the UNESCO Gift Coupon Program east of the Iron Curtain.[529] In essence, UNESCO expected Biriukov to act as chief UNESCO propagandist in the USSR and its Eastern European satellites. Thus, the "complaints" directed at Biriukov, the Soviet camp recalled, "were caused mainly by the fact that Biriukov was instructed to increase the propaganda of UNESCO activity in the Soviet Union and the people's democracies. Owing to the fact that we are not interested in UNESCO propaganda in the USSR, Biriukov could not fulfill this instruction."[530] To save face in UNESCO while simultaneously abiding by Soviet preferences, Biriukov chose "carefully the addresses of organizations," only mailing them "suitable material" and "trying to prevent the expansion of contacts especially with social organizations and individual people."[531]

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[528] Ibid., l. 36; and GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 13, ll. 52-54.

[529] He also had similar duties for the Scandinavian countries. Of course, these nations did not present the same kind of problems as those in the eastern bloc. As Biriukov put it in February 1959, he was tasked with kick starting relations between the eastern bloc and UNESCO immediately after the USSR joined the organization: "In this period [the calendar year of 1957], there were almost no relationships between these countries and the division, and my position was founded by UNESCO specifically to establish and increase contacts with organizations and individual representatives of science and culture in these countries, direct contacts with the division of relations along with other divisions and services of UNESCO, and indirect [contacts] with interested organizations and persons of other countries seeking relations with these countries through UNESCO." See Biriukov's annual reports to the Soviet UNESCO Commission and Delegation: GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 10, ll. 72-73; and GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 6, ll. 268-72. For corroboration of his description, see the official job description to which he responded and applied for in the UNESCO Archives: "Summary Post Description," July 27, 1956, AG 8: Personnel Records of Mr. V. Birioukov, UNESCO Archives.

[530] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 14, l. 78.

[531] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 6, ll. 269-70. But after the end of Biriukov's second probationary contract in December 1957 and a year of limbo within the Public Liaison Division, Zuckerman transferred him to the photo library of the Division of Visual and Auditory Information. While UNESCO officials believed that his professional background, as a coordinator of the exportation and importation of films and newsreels from North America for Soveksportfil'm,

Regardless of these cases, the majority of UNESCO workers from the USSR excelled in their official, public positions in terms of the immediate tasks assigned to them, ascending the UNESCO ranks with little resistance and earning praise from their supervisors for their "intelligent," "level-headed," "practical," and "industrious" approach to their responsibilities.[532] In order to prove themselves to be competent international civil servants, Soviet UNESCO personnel resorted to one of three tactics for survival: 1) the harmonization of their Soviet interests with their public UNESCO duties on the basis of the shared ideals of UNESCO and the USSR; 2) the making of their private, Soviet designs acceptable in public by exploiting the lack of knowledge of the Soviet Union in the international organization to become an advocate for the introduction of Soviet practices or information in their particular field; or 3) the remaking of their public settings so that their immediate environs in the UNESCO Secretariat conformed to the culture and composition of personnel of Soviet organizations back home. The careers of A. K. Zhegalova, S. A. Tangian, and Kovda offer examples of how each of these tactics played out.

The case of Zhegalova represents how some Soviet citizens reconciled their roles by exploiting the common universal ideals espoused by the USSR and UNESCO. Once she adapted to the standards of the international organization, she became a distinguished figure in the UNESCO community. A former diplomat and teacher who served for three years in the

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would help him in producing posters and slides for this department, Biriukov again managed to provoke the dissatisfaction of his coworkers because of what he depicted as internal office politics. He eventually finished his career at UNESCO in the less ambiguous role of Russian translator. Biriukov claimed that his difficulties in the photo library grew out of the fact that he had once been offered his supervisor's job. He also attributed his poor work to the poor selection and quality of the photos in the library. GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 6, ll. 271-72.

[532] In 1964, for example, more than one-third of Soviet UNESCO employees either earned increases in rank or received promises from the UNESCO leadership that they would obtain such a raise in the next year. However, many UNESCO executives grumbled to Soviet emissaries about the weak language skills of Soviet recruits. GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 29, l. 321. The administrators overseeing Sobolev and Dubinin gave them mostly positive remarks notwithstanding the criticisms mentioned above. For other examples of positive evaluations of Soviet workers, see Tor Gjesdal, "Within-Grade Increment," March 31, 1958, AG 8: Personnel Records of Mr. N. Kovalsky, UNESCO Archives; and Rudy Salat, "Within-Grade Increment," May 23, 1960, AG 8: Personnel Records of Mrs. T. Beliaeva, UNESCO Archives.

UNESCO Department of Education, Zhegalova created a niche in which she could distinguish herself as both a proselytizer of Soviet notions of women's equality and a valued member of the secretariat.[533] Arriving at UNESCO headquarters in November 1956 when the majority of the international organization's executives were at the general conference in New Delhi, Zhegalova took advantage of what she called a relatively "more peaceful atmosphere" of a half-empty building to "become acquainted with the main program documents and the nature of the activity" of her new workplace. In the first four months of her time at UNESCO, the fifty-three-year-old Soviet pedagogue quickly grew overwhelmed not only by the strange environment of UNESCO but also by an onslaught of duties that included the review of the program adopted in Delhi for the broader department, participation in a flurry of department-wide meetings conducted exclusively in English, and the drafting of a two-year plan for her division. "All of this required great exertion," she remembered in a 1957 report to the Soviet Union, "but also helped me to more quickly become familiar with this new and very specialized work, with its basic outline." Although she had no record of past employment in an international administration, she oversaw a Western dominated office ("two Americans, one Canadian, one Indian, three Englishwomen, and three Frenchwomen") with specialists who boasted years of experience working in international organizations. These pedagogues, according to Zhegalova, had "a very weak understanding of public education in the Soviet Union" and abided by "the theoretical tenets of bourgeois pedagogy—first and foremost American and English research in this area." In her capacity as

[533] According to a 1956 letter to Director-General Evans from the chief of the bureau of personnel and management about Soviet candidates for the secretariat, Zhegalova had worked for four years in "the Soviet Ministry for Education where she was chief of the Information Division." It is not clear, however, which "Soviet ministry of education" employed her. She also worked as a "secondary school teacher in history from 1928 to 1935" and "served for three years at the Soviet embassy in Paris." This biography suggests that the Soviet UNESCO Commission recruited her because of her dual experience in a UNESCO specialization (education) and diplomatic work. William Farr, "Soviet Candidates," July 9, 1956, 1, AG 8: Personnel Records of B. Sobolev: PEM/Memo No. 4168, UNESCO Archives.

head of the Division of Secondary Education, Zhegalova orchestrated UNESCO's projects to improve polytechnic education while also arranging activities to reform curricula and teaching aids for secondary schools. She also steered UNESCO's initiative to introduce "into the curricula of secondary schools issues that contribute to the education of children in the spirit of international understanding." The latter, which aided in the spread of the "Model UN" movement, entailed the advancement of teaching about the UN and human rights as well as the maintenance of UNESCO's "associated schools," which were located in dozens of countries and functioned as spaces for "experimentation" in such teaching.[534]

Zhegalova also made history in the sphere of Soviet engagement in multilateral diplomacy, becoming the first Soviet national to represent a noncommunist international organization at the proceedings of another international organization. No sooner had she settled into her role than the UNESCO leadership dispatched her to UN headquarters in New York where Zhegalova, as the sole UNESCO delegate, participated from March 14 to April 10, 1957, in the eleventh session of the Commission on the Status of Women (UNCSW), an annual conference hosted by ECOSOC and founded in 1946 to promote and safeguard the rights of women internationally.[535] Her presence in Manhattan sparked an outcry from the American Right and particularly the grassroots campaign in Southern California to purge schools of UNESCO-based curricula. In the two months after she left New York, concerned Americans

[534] Her job improving polytechnic education included the accumulation of knowledge concerning "the state of polytechnic education" throughout the world, the organization of regular conferences on this topic, along with the preparation of UNESCO experts assigned to aid educational systems in developing countries. Her attempts to reform curricula and teaching aids for secondary schools included supporting a multinational consultative committee on the topic; convening conferences attended by teachers from UNESCO member states; and hosting a seminar to study portrayals of the West in Asian textbooks. GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 10, ll. 68-71. For more on associated schools and the ideologies behind UNESCO's education reform, see chapters 1 and 8.

[535] Ibid., l. 68; and GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 7, l. 28. For a brief history of the UNCSW, see Michael Haas, *International Human Rights: A Comprehensive Introduction* (London: Routledge, 2008), 200.

latched on to Zhegalova as the face of the hidden communist conspiracy to use the UN as a vehicle for the global spread of "totalitarianism." In a letter to the editor of the *Los Angeles Times* published on May 28, American citizen Marian Pollack articulated her outrage at UNESCO's employment of the Soviet citizen. "We are spending," she noted, "a half million dollars to investigate United States citizens who seek employment in international organizations . . . and yet, sitting over these people in UNESCO is a communist from Moscow, Russia. How stupid can we get?"[536] In the same edition of the *LA Times*, Jean Nugent demanded that "the public should be informed" of Zhegalova's hiring by UNESCO.[537] Catherine Thorp of Santa Monica cited Zhegalova's control of the production of "high-school level" educational publications as reason to ban UNESCO materials from American schools. "Is it not enough," she wondered, "for UNESCO to be explained to our children, both the good and the bad, as it is at present? Why must they be instructed in it as these radical groups demand?"[538]

Zhegalova also later became a fleeting person of interest for FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover and the main object of suspicion in a chapter on international organizations in the widely read 1964 book, *None Dare Call it Treason*, a foundational text of the anticommunist American Right.[539] But despite her reincarnation as a symbol of the creeping Red menace among American

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[536] Marian Pollock, "Letter to the Editor," *Los Angeles Times*, May 28, 1957, B4.

[537] Jean Nugent, "Letter to the Editor," *Los Angeles Times*, May 28, 1957, B4.

[538] Catherine A. Thorp, "Letter to the Editor," *Los Angeles Times*, June 8, 1957, B4.

[539] In February 1961, a woman from Wapato, Washington, after disclosing her interest in the John Birch Society, penned a letter to J. Edgar Hoover in which she inquired as to whether "the chief of the secondary education division of UNESCO of the United Nations is Mrs. A. Jegalova [sic]" and if it was "true she was the former chief of the Inspection Division of the Soviet Ministry of Education, and that she is a Russian communist?" But the aides to the FBI director maintained that the FBI had "no identifiable data" on Zhegalova and emphasized that the woman's letter contained "no allegation" that she was currently in the United States. "It should be noted," they wrote, "that the headquarters of UNESCO is in Paris, France." In fact, Zhegalova no longer held her post in UNESCO by this time, having returned to the Soviet Union in 1960. Nevertheless, she remained the personification of the threat emanating from UNESCO for many anticommunist crusaders long after her retirement. In 1963, a citizens' organization, the "Watch Washington Club," produced a pamphlet that asked its readers to ponder Zhegalova's role

conservatives, Zhegalova earned praise from the UNESCO leadership for how she handled her trip. René Maheu, who at the time held the office of UNESCO permanent representative to the UN in New York, told the Soviet permanent delegate that Zhegalova had "brilliantly dealt with her mission" even though she "faced great difficulties" given that "she had never been to the United States and did not know English well."[540] Nevertheless, Zhegalova managed to use her trip to New York to gather intelligence for Soviet agencies, relaying to the Soviet UNESCO Commission information she had learned from Maheu regarding the annual meeting of the US National Commission held in Washington, D. C., that year.[541]

Upon returning to Paris and until her retirement in late 1959, Zhegalova combined her dual roles as a Soviet patriot and international civil servant by demonstrating the progressive ideals of the Soviet Union as a champion of women's rights in the international arena. In addition to expanding the pedagogical research in her division for the 1961-1962 program to focus on the development of "female education" in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, she

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in UNESCO, which they labeled a "UN propaganda machine," and noted that this organization had the support of the National Education Association (NEA), the largest labor union for educators in the United States. In his 1964 book, *None Dare Call it Treason*, John Stormer used Zhegalova as his prime example of how international organizations served as fronts for the spread of communism. This book–which the historian Richard Hofstadter called "a masterful piece of folkish propaganda" in his seminal 1964 work, *The Paranoid Style in American Politics and Other Essays*–drew an immense readership during Barry Goldwater's 1964 presidential run and became a required text for those on the anticommunist American Right throughout the Cold War. In the book's section on "internationalism," Stormer bases his opposition to the use of education materials under the "blue UN 'seal'" in American public schools on Zhegalova's supposed control of these publications. Noting her alleged past in Soviet educational ministries, Stormer declared that Zhegalova would refuse to "approve any program originating in her department which is detrimental to world communism. If she did, the Kremlin would quickly call her home." For Hoover's correspondence, see: [Redacted], Letter to Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, Director Federal Bureau of Investigation Washington, D. C., February 9, 1961, File 62-HQ-104401-12, archive.org, https://archive.org/details/FBI-John-Birch-Society; and "Note on Yellow," n.d., File 62-HQ-104401-12, archive.org, https://archive.org/details/FBI-John-Birch-Society. For the pamphlet written by the "Washington Watch Club" and the information related above on Stormer's comments, see: Irene Thomas Keeley, *Know the United Nations: A Page from American History, 1945-1963* (Columbus, Ohio: The Washington Watch Club, 1963), 3; John A. Stormer, *None Dare Call It Treason* (Florissant, Missouri: Liberty Bell Press, 1964), 207; and Richard Hofstadter, "Goldwater and Pseudo-Conservative Politics," in *The Paranoid Style in American Politics and Other Essays*, (New York: Vintage Books, 2008), 111.

[540] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 7, ll. 27-28.

[541] Ibid., l. 154.

received in 1958 from Director-General Evans the unofficial status as the point person "responsible for all work UNESCO does relating to women issues." Observing in the same year that Zhegalova was "greatly respected" and had fostered "great authority" in UNESCO, the Soviet permanent delegate to UNESCO moved to nominate her for the position of UNESCO deputy director-general. In the year leading up to her retirement, she prepared a preliminary report on discriminatory policies in education that would, in her words, "serve as the basis" for one of UNESCO's landmark legal achievements, the 1960 Convention Against Discrimination in Education (CADE).[542] In 1959, she traveled back to New York to sit again on the UNCSW and then took part in a series of meetings and conferences at the UNESCO Institute for Education in Hamburg. "This has allowed me," she wrote, "to become better acquainted with the direction and content of the organization's activities, . . . its staff, and a number of educational specialists."[543] Finally, she participated in a seminar on adult education hosted by "international women's" NGOS in London and facilitated the travel of other Soviet representatives to not only UNESCO conferences, but also events put on by the French and English national commissions.[544]

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[542] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 11, l. 155; and GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 6, ll. 353-54. CADE remains in effect as of 2016 and has around 100 countries as signatories. According to the Austrian international legal scholar Wolfgang Benedek, the convention originated in the context of segregation in the United States and apartheid in South Africa. It represents one of the first attempts to battle discriminatory policies in education on an intergovernmental level. In Benedek's words, "*the main obligation* of states ratifying CADE is the elimination and prevention of discrimination, which includes any distinction, exclusion, limitation or preference which . . . has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing equality of treatment in education." Wolfgang Benedek, "The Normative Implications of Education for All (EFA): The Right to Education," in *Standard Setting in UNESCO: Normative Action in Education, Science and Culture*, ed. Abdulqawi A. Yusuf, vol. 1 (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2007), 296.

[543] Maren Elfert, "'A Special Project': The Establishment of the UNESCO Institute for Education," in *Towards an Open Learning World: 50 Years, UNESCO Institute for Education* (Hamburg: UNESCO Institute for Education, 2002), 19. According to a commemorative history of the Hamburg Institute published by UNESCO, the FRG took especial interest in the institute as a space "for dialogue between East and West" throughout the Cold War. In 1956, the USSR began to participate in its conferences and by 1959 would have a permanent representative on the governing board of the institute. Maren Elfert, "From Post-War 'Experiment' to Institution," in *Towards an Open Learning World: 50 Years, UNESCO Institute for Education*, 35.

[544] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 6, ll. 353-58.

Another Soviet member of the UNESCO Department of Education, Tangian, seized on the reputation of Soviet public education among pedagogical circles in the West to act as a source for fresh ideas for reforming education in the developed and developing worlds. In December 1956, the thirty-year-old Armenian graduate of the V. I. Lenin Moscow State Pedagogical Institute (MGPI) joined the Education Clearing House, UNESCO's largest division, as a P-3 program specialist and worked there for more than five years. Functioning as the preeminent global hub for the collection and dissemination of educational information, the Education Clearing House compiled research on the structures of public education systems and methods of teaching in all countries with available sources in order to create multilingual publications (reference works, monthly bibliographies of pedagogical work, reports, monographs, serials, etc.), which served as the main sources of knowledge of international educational trends for ministries of education, teaching associations, and libraries worldwide. Assigned to the sector of the division that sent statistics and other forms of information in response to requests and questions, Tangian spent his day finding and dispatching materials to fulfill what he characterized as a "very diverse" array of inquiries on "the kind of educational system in a given country; how professional teaching is organized in a given country; how language is taught in the schools of various countries; what is being done for the education of blind or deaf children and how to organize this type of education; and so forth." While the appeals mainly came from "government organs of different countries wanting to carry out reforms, changes, or innovations in the public education of their country," Tangian specified that he "most often" fielded calls from "weakly-developed countries wishing to get to know the experience of, and situation with, an issue in developed countries, especially us."

The problem with this, Tangian stressed, arose out of the fact that, "by the time I arrived to the [Clearing House], there was no literature on the Soviet Union, and what was there, was not published in the Soviet Union and bore a predominantly anti-Soviet character." This repository included "a few outdated brochures on specific issues and a number of works by bourgeois authors that present public education in our country in a distorted manner." Thus, the Soviet UNESCO worker explained that, "with the available materials, the [Clearing House] could not give information in response to requests, which come quite often, on public education and different aspects of education and teaching in the USSR." Tangian blamed this dearth of Soviet publications on the willful neglect of his Western colleagues, citing as evidence his ability to find a 1954 monograph by the preeminent educational scholar, E. N. Medynskii, in a Parisian bookstore. "UNESCO acquired the book," he complained, only after he "bought it, brought it in, and showed it to the [UNESCO] workers, with the address and store noted, all of which, however, they knew very well." In his first two years, the young Soviet pedagogue therefore made it his vocation to revamp UNESCO's collection and succeeded in getting his bosses to weed out "bourgeois" literature on the Soviet Union while ensuring that "only Soviet publications can be used to discuss Soviet education." As a result, he managed to throw together "a considerable collection . . . on education in the USSR" that consisted of "party books, brochures, journals," and other sources sent from Moscow. This allowed him to exploit UNESCO as a conduit through which the Soviet Union could distribute materials to "countries like Australia with no diplomatic relations with the USSR."[545]

As one of the few Soviet nondiplomatic personnel traveling on business throughout Western Europe, Tangian also became an unofficial spokesman for the achievements of his

[545] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 6, ll. 254-62; and GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 10, ll. 74-75.

country in the field of education by casting his expertise on Soviet pedagogy as an important contribution to UNESCO from a loyal international civil servant whose main concern was international improvement of educational practices. In 1959, he took part in a seminar on "access to the pedagogical profession" hosted by the Hamburg Institute. Although he represented UNESCO and not the Soviet Union at this event, Tangian acceded to the request of the institute to bring legal documents outlining the position of the Soviet state with respect to the topic of the seminar, reported on Soviet education, and met with participants from other countries who wanted to hear more about the Soviet perspective on teaching. When attendees expressed points of view at odds with Soviet ideology, he also "thought it necessary" to voice his disapproval. After an Englishman argued that the international "decline in the quality of teachers was somehow inevitable" due to the increasing intellectual demands of the profession, Tangian called this thinking "Malthusian." In reply to participants who proclaimed that there "should be more of a prevention of the profession becoming largely female" because of women's domestic responsibilities, he pointed out that "it was necessary to find conditions in which women had the same rights as men." At a press conference, Tangian responded that, while he was "attending the meeting as an observer from UNESCO," he felt it permissible to note that, "in the USSR, the situation differs from other countries; the Soviet government ensures the preparation of the requisite amounts of qualified teaching cadres through planning."[546] In 1960, Tangian led a seminar at the Sorbonne's *L'Institut d'étude du développement économique et social* (IEDES) on

[546] He also held long talks with the deputy director of the institute, who impressed Tangian with his stories of his experiences in the Resistance while imprisoned in Dachau and Buchenwald as well as his participation in the "Worker-Priest Movement," which consisted of a group of Catholic priests who worked alongside and lived among the working class after the Second World War before the movement was condemned by the Catholic Church in the 1950s because some of the priests cooperated with communists. GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 13, ll. 119-23. For an outline of the history of the Worker-Priest Movement and citations for further reading on the subject, see Rebecca Clifford, Nigel Townson, and Péter Apor, "Faith," in *Europe's 1968: Voices of Revolt*, ed. Robert Gildea, James Mark, and Anette Warring (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 231.

the "role of planning in the development of education in the USSR." Later that year, he gave a lecture to the Society of Secondary School Teachers in the Swiss canton of Vaud on "the role of education in Soviet society" that attracted 400 people. After this session, which lasted three hours due to the number of questions from the audience, the newspaper *La Tribune de Lausanne* published an extensive article on his talk.[547]

If Zhegalova synchronized her private worldview and her public role by profiting from the overlapping ideals of her two masters and Tangian repackaged his political biases as filling a gap in the international organization's repository of information about Soviet educational practices, Kovda wielded the power of his position to turn his dominion within UNESCO into a Soviet outpost nestled in the heart of the organization. From 1959 to 1965, the professor of soil science at Moscow State University and member of AN SSSR governed, as the director of the UNESCO Department of Natural Sciences, one of the most fiercely contested spheres the international organization dealt with throughout the Cold War and oversaw the department's "regional centers" scattered around the developing world. Located in Montevideo, Cairo, New Delhi, and Djakarta, these UNESCO satellite offices allied with educational establishments to cultivate education in Latin America, the Middle East, South Asia, and Southeast Asia respectively.[548]

Kovda executed his duties as a director and UNESCO envoy with the vigor of a loyal international civil servant. In 1959, he visited Vienna as the official UNESCO delegate to the

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[547] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 16, ll. 24-25.

[548] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 13, l. 31. Kovda worked at the Soil Institute of AN SSSR from the 1930s through 1958. While holding positions at a number of Soviet institutions over the years, Kovda also served as the chief scientific adviser to Guo Moruo, the first president of the Chinese Academy of Science (CAS) in the PRC, from 1954 to 1955. For an outline of Kovda's professional career, see "Biograficheskaia spravka, Kovda Viktor Abramovich," Informatsionnaia sistema arkhivy Rossiiskoi akademii nauk, accessed December 17, 2016, http://isaran.ru/?q=ru/person&guid=7EF8FBB1-6667-3A17-8225-F112EEB14D9F.

Board of Governors of the IAEA, for which he drafted "preliminary plans" for UN interagency cooperation in the training of nuclear physicists, engineers, and technicians in "weakly-developed countries"; acted as liaison between the IAEA and major scientific NGOS; and formulated proposals to improve on how the two organs encouraged the peaceful use of atomic energy.[549] Later that year, he traveled to Tunis, where he again donned the hat of UNESCO representative to kick off a series of expeditions and courses focused on salinization and irrigated soils in the Middle East that fell under the auspices of the UNESCO Arid Zones Program. A joint project launched by UNESCO and the FAO for the purpose of studying ways to transform desert into arable land, the Arid Zones Program produced maps depicting the fertility of soil globally and became one of UNESCO's most famous contributions to agricultural education.[550] As the main driver behind the program during his tenure at UNESCO, Kovda showed off to the world the Soviet agricultural expertise famously championed by Khrushchev, delivering the introductory remarks to the courses in the Tunisian parliament. "The work of the courses," the Soviet pedologist remarked in his report to the Soviet UNESCO Commission, "is a major international event in the Middle East. The president and government, as well as the press, tried to show that after liberation from the French, Tunisia is growing, developing, and playing a special role in the politics of the Middle East."[551] As director, Kovda also became the primary

[549] Kovda leaked his report to UNESCO on his time in Vienna to the Soviet UNESCO Commission. While the IAEA engaged in the "technical" work of promoting the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, the UNESCO departments of natural and social sciences dealt with the educational dimension of this initiative, fostering research and raising public awareness concerning advancements in radiobiology, or the study of the risk of radiation exposure to public health and the latest preventative measures. GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 13, ll. 13-30.

[550] According to international affairs scholar J. P. Singh, Kovda "spearheaded" this project during his time as director. J. P. Singh, *United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO): Creating Norms for a Complex World* (New York: Routledge, 2011), 78. For an outline of the achievements of, and the ideology behind, the Arid Zones Program, see Diana K. Davis, *The Arid Lands: History, Power, Knowledge* (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 2016), 145–53.

[551] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 14, ll. 90-92.

mediator between UNESCO and the Pugwash Movement, lobbying for UNESCO to more actively participate in the movement by sending scholars to its conferences and declaring to the director-general that the *Report of Working Group 4: Science and Technology in Developing Nations*, which the twelfth meeting of the Pugwash Conference adopted in 1964, represented "a veritable manifesto for the Department of Natural Sciences of UNESCO."[552] By the end of his first two years in the department, even the American permanent delegate to UNESCO commended Kovda for his openness to American input and accomplishments as director.[553]

As soon as the AN SSSR scholar had arrived at UNESCO, however, he made it his mission to reconfigure the department so that it resembled the academies that employed him back in the USSR. In his five years at UNESCO, Kovda carried out a plan to cleanse the department of Westerners and people it with scientists from either the socialist or "neutral" countries. Before he signed on as director, the department had employed only one or two professionals at any given time from the socialist or neutral countries. By 1961, of the twenty-four persons staffing the department, six program specialists came from the eastern bloc (four from the USSR and two from East European countries) while three were from the neutral bloc.[554] In 1962, out of the forty program specialists in the department, ten came from the socialist countries (five from the USSR and five from its satellites), three were citizens of neutral countries, and "seven or eight" of those who hailed from the West had proved themselves

[552] V. Kovda, "Report on 12th Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs, Udaipur, India, 27 January-1 February, 1964," March 19, 1964, 1–2, AG 8: Pugwash CAB.1/21: Memo 58,997–C/6, UNESCO Archives; 12th Pugwash Conference, "Report of Working Group 4, Science and Technology in Developing Nations," February 1964, 1–10, AG 8: Pugwash CAB.1/21, UNESCO Archives; and Ralph A. Krause, "Report on Mission to the 13th Pugwash Conference," October 1, 1964, 2, AG 8: Pugwash CAB.1/21: SS/Memo 64/I321, UNESCO Archives.

[553] GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 15, l. 194.

[554] These numbers do not include the twenty-two Soviet scientists then working as UNESCO experts in India, Afghanistan, Egypt, and Burma. GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 16, ll. 27; 30; and GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 20, l. 289.

"friendly" or "honest" toward Soviet policies.[555] At the end of 1963, eleven socialist specialists (seven from the USSR and four from socialist countries) worked in the department, which had recently downsized to thirty-three total employees. Thanks to Kovda's maneuvering, Soviet officials believed that, in comparison to the paltry presence of Soviet citizens in other departments, they had the "strongest position" in the Department of Natural Sciences.[556]

In addition, the Soviet director, in the face of "resistance" from the UNESCO leadership, dramatically restructured the department to mirror the organization of Soviet academic institutions and reoriented the expenditure of its three-and-half-million-dollar budget toward UNESCO's increasing interest in lending assistance to the developing world. "The department," he recalled in his 1961 report, "was inherited in a very neglected state: the work program for 1959 and 1960, prepared by [the former director], was very weak, reflecting little the needs and interests of the progressive forces of the world headed by the USSR." In order to strengthen "international cooperation and aid to the weakly developed countries," Kovda began in his first days in office "a radical revamping of the structure of the department based on the organizational experience of scientific institutions of the USSR." By 1961, the department consisted of a directorate (a director, two deputies, an administrative-financial adviser, and a "scholar-secretary" modeled on the chief academic secretary (*glavnyi uchenyi sekretar'*) of AN SSSR); a division for international cooperation (for congresses and relations with NGOs) similar to the

[555] The classification of "neutral" and "socialist" countries changed depending on shifts in the international alignments of the time. While Kovda characterized Cuba as "neutral" in 1961, he categorized it as a "socialist" country in 1962. Moreover, the fact that a staff member came from a socialist country did not always mean they cooperated with the Soviet director and his instructions from Moscow. In his 1962 report, Kovda described employees from Czechoslovakia and Cuba as not always "reliable." Ibid., ll. 294-95.

[556] The American presence in the department shrunk from year to year. In 1962, four Americans worked in the department and in 1963 just three US citizens were laboring under Kovda. For more on the politics of international scientific cooperation in UNESCO, see chapter 9. GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 19, l. 107; and GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 25, l. 239.

international divisions of AN SSSR departments; a division for the study of natural resources; a commission for oceanography; a division for the training of scientists; and a division for technological sciences.[557] While the UNESCO General Conference rejected Soviet efforts to establish Russian as an official working language, Kovda, in his corner of the organization, circulated Russian research, forced the publications wing of the department to produce Russian translations of some monographs, and introduced "at the spur of the moment" the use of Russian "on an equal basis with others" at meetings of the Oceanographic Commission.[558]

The Sovietization of the department allowed Kovda to implement an agenda that fulfilled "the directives received from the Soviet UNESCO Commission and AN SSSR." With a group of likeminded cadres and an amenable structure in place, he achieved the adoption of a biennial plan as well as a preliminary ten-year plan for the department replete with Soviet initiatives centered on "the vital interests of the newly liberated countries of Africa and the formerly dependent or colonial countries of Asia and Africa." These plans incorporated blueprints for the "development of international scientific cooperation" between scientists and NGOs; assistance for "the development of theoretical sciences in all countries"; support for developing countries in their search for the "quickest way to industrialize"; and aid to these countries in the founding of technological institutes, universities, or national academies of science geared toward producing "national cadres." Armed with around 130 experts sent to more than forty countries and an influx of financial resources from the UN Expanded Program of Technical Assistance (EPTA), Kovda helped supervise the creation of over ten major centers for higher scientific education in "weakly

[557] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 16, ll. 27-30.

[558] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 20, ll. 303-04.

developed nations" and the establishment of academies of science in more than five countries.[559] "The development of the work of the department," he concluded in his 1961 report to Soviet authorities, "has permitted the USSR and other socialist countries to exert a lot of influence on these countries." Kovda also predicted that the stimulation by his department of scientific inquiry in the developing world would "also quicken the weakening and collapse of the system of colonialism while enabling the growth of a working class and progressive intelligentsia in these backward countries."[560] With these actions, Kovda not only turned UNESCO's scientific initiatives away from the solipsistic preoccupation of the West with collaboration among European and North American nations, but also helped to engineer the reorientation of UNESCO's scientific ventures toward a sustained focus on providing aid to the emerging Third World—a lasting legacy that would shape UNESCO's activities for decades to come.

Thus, Zhegalova, Tangian, Kovda and others found their own unique ways of reconciling their dual roles as agents of the Soviet state and international civil servants. By doing so, they successfully showcased the qualifications of Soviet specialists and fulfilled the objectives of the Soviet state while also serving UNESCO. However, in order to secure these achievements, Soviet UNESCO employees faced an array of difficulties as they navigated the ideologically murky environment of the secretariat.

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[559] While the Technical Assistance Board (TAB), which allotted EPTA funds, decided which countries should receive aid, Kovda and other UN administrators bore the responsibility to execute the creation of these places of learning. In 1961 and1962, the Department of Natural Sciences contributed to the founding of several technological and mechanical engineering institutes in India; an oil institute and the Latin American Center for Mathematics in Argentina; the Latin American Center for Physics in Brazil; a faculty of engineering at the University of Concepción in Chile; the Technological University of Ankara in Turkey; the Pacific Ocean Institute for Seismology in Japan; and the Center for Scientific Instruments in Egypt. In these two years, the department also distributed aid for the creation of national academies of science in the Philippines, Pakistan, Ghana, Nigeria, and Guinea. Some of these institutes, such as the Bombay Technological Institute in India, were already under construction before Kovda arrived. However, the completion of many of these universities and academies were the direct result of his efforts. For more on the contribution of the Soviet Union to UNESCO projects in developing countries, see chapter 9.

[560] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 16, ll. 27-33.

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Regardless of the relative success of some Soviet specialists at upholding their public personae as international civil servants, the majority of Soviet UNESCO workers also expressed in correspondence with Soviet agencies feelings of anxiety, anguish, and enmity emanating from their struggle to reconcile the dual roles of Soviet agent and UNESCO staff member in the foreign surroundings of the secretariat. The success of Soviet UNESCO employees in adapting to UNESCO workplace standards represents a remarkable achievement given that they had not only to learn on the job the ins-and-outs of international administration but also work shoulder-to-shoulder with colleagues representing political ideologies and sociocultural backgrounds that Soviet citizens had been told all their lives to distrust and despise. Soviet UNESCO staff wrestled with the disparity between their private, Soviet motives and their public guise as international civil servants *alone*, receiving little useful instruction from their Soviet handlers as to how they should reconcile their subversive objectives with UNESCO's requirement that they cooperate and have productive relationships with their foreign UNESCO workmates for the good of an internationalist ideal transcending the interests of any one country.

In this section of the chapter, I analyze the reports sent back to Moscow of eight Soviet UNESCO employees in order to assess how Soviet international civil servants interpreted and presented their non-Soviet UNESCO colleagues and the culture of the international organization. Instead of a neutral civil service that promoted international cooperation between East and West, the secretariat became a microcosmic field of interaction in which the contemporaneous global power struggles and negotiations between the USSR and its Western adversaries played out among coworkers in the petty politics of the everyday workplace. In their missives to officials in

the USSR, Soviet UNESCO employees had to grapple with the diversity of experiences and nuanced political inclinations constituting the characters of these acquaintances.

As chapter 3 demonstrated, a small number of Western communists and a sizeable population of left-leaning individuals made up the personnel holding offices in the UNESCO Secretariat. In the cryptic words of Kovda, "there is a communist organization in UNESCO. We do not have official relations with them, but we know these people. They know us."[561] As a corollary to the extensive notes they took on these card-carrying members of communist parties, Soviet international civil servants described in their reports the ideological persuasions of secretariat officials whose sentiments toward the USSR fell on a spectrum that ranged from cooperative objectivity to strong admiration. In 1961, Martynovskii, as deputy director for technical education, offered itemized sketches of his coworkers in the UNESCO Department of Education for his bosses in Moscow. Among those under his command, Martynovskii singled out the most politically progressive and favorably inclined toward the Soviet Union. They included a South African specialist of Russian descent in the UNESCO Division of Adult Education who "thinks of herself as a communist" and had a penchant for going on rants about "reactionaries in UNESCO"; a Uruguayan chemical engineer who exhibited "sympathy" with, and "interest" in, the Soviet Union; as well as the Burmese head of the UNESCO Division of Technical Education—a former official in the Burmese Ministry of Education (and close confidante of Prime Minister U Nu), who spoke of the Soviet Union with "great warmth" and had sent his nephew to study in the USSR after traveling there as part of the Burmese negotiating team that successfully lobbied for Soviet assistance in the building of a technological institute in

[561] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 16, l. 207. Soviet professionals stationed at the international organization had cordial enough relations with the communists inside UNESCO that on at least two occasions they arranged with the USSR Committee of Soviet Youth Organizations for the children of these foreign comrades to attend pioneer camps in the Soviet Union. GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 21, l. 182; and GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 26, ll. 19-20; 88.

Rangoon in the wake of the 1955 tête-à-têtes between Khrushchev and Nu.[562] Martynovskii also presided over a number of persons from Asia, Latin America, and Africa who, while not openly identifying with the Soviet cause, spoke affectionately of states oriented away from the West. For instance, a twenty-nine-year-old mestizo mechanical engineer from Nicaragua assigned to the UNESCO Division of Technical Education harbored a strong dislike for American foreign policy and expressed "his approval of Castro in Cuba" despite having gone to a university in the United States.

Martynovskii also got to know individuals with unique and diverse worldviews, whose opinions did not always correspond to the rigid Soviet classificatory grid. An Egyptian in the same division as the Nicaraguan passed muster for Martynovskii because of his faith in Gamal Abdel Nasser as "the socialist leader of the Arab world" and a deep hatred of the British and French following the 1956 Suez Crisis. At the same time, however, the Soviet deputy director took note of the Nasserite's curiously positive characterization of West Germany as one of the few Western nations "against imperialism." Moreover, a contradiction existed between Martynovskii's orders from Moscow to advance the Soviet cause in UNESCO by supporting these foreign comrades and his need to run a department based on the performances of his subordinates. While Martynovskii lauded the Uruguayan engineer as "one of the most honest and

[562] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 21, ll. 177-82. This meeting between Khrushchev and Nu led to a flourishing of educational, technical, and cultural ties between the two countries. For assessments of the opening up of relations between Burma and the USSR after 1955, as well as the agreement over the creation of a technical institute in Rangoon that would be built and funded by the Soviet Union, see Richard Butwell, *U Nu of Burma* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969), 186; Nikita Khrushchev and Sergei Khrushchev, *Memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev*, vol. 3 (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2007), 761-63; and Oscar Sanchez-Sibony, *Red Globalization: The Political Economy of the Soviet Cold War from Stalin to Khrushchev* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 147.

good" people under his purview, he called the Burmese expert "somewhat of a weak worker" who passed off his own responsibilities to others if he did not receive instructions directly.[563]

Despite this smattering of allies throughout the UNESCO bureaucracy, Soviet employees reacted with suspicion to what they perceived as an overabundance of enemy influence in the halls of the international organization. For the first three years of Soviet enlistment in the secretariat, even the usage and interpretation in UNESCO of the Russian language fell under the control of individuals whom the USSR viewed as vile traitors to the homeland. Because the Soviet state had yet to establish the Soviet UNESCO Commission and Delegation when it joined the international organization in April 1954, it provided only one of the six Russian translators needed for the eighth session of the UNESCO General Conference in Montevideo that December. As a result, the secretariat recruited five Russian émigrés from UN agencies in New York and Geneva. After the USSR began to regularly engage with UNESCO in 1955, the lack of Soviet candidates for permanent translation jobs forced UNESCO to retain several of these émigrés for the purpose of setting up the Russian Translation Section at its headquarters in Paris.[564] By the time the Soviet UNESCO Commission set its sights on this division in 1957, these individuals were responsible for the translation and interpretation of the Russian language within the secretariat and at all other UNESCO functions. "The Russian Translation Section," the Soviet permanent delegate griped to the Soviet UNESCO Commission in May 1957, "is especially littered with anti-Soviet persons. These are, for the most part, white émigrés

[563] GARF, f 9519, op. 2, d. 21, ll. 178-79.

[564] B. W. Pringle, August 10, 1954, AG 8: Personnel Records of Prof. B. Nicolsky: PEM/APS/IA/1875, UNESCO Archives; and William Farr, "Russian Language Staff," September 3, 1954, AG 8: Personnel Records of M. A. Salomon: PEM/APS/IA/Memo. 2030, UNESCO Archives. One of these translators, Boris Nicolsky, commuted to UNESCO while on vacation from his normal job as a professor at a university in Geneva. Roger Barnes, April 30, 1957, AG 8: Personnel Records of Prof. B. Nicolsky: DPL.139.358, UNESCO Archives.

associated with reactionary French and American intelligence agencies."[565] Although Dubinin and one other MID official became translators in the fall of 1956, émigrés occupied the two editorships of the section responsible for revising all translations.[566] The section chief, André Salomon—a naturalized French citizen since 1949 and legal analyst who had lost his Russian citizenship along with other émigrés in November 1920—oversaw all "administrative issues," including the hiring of temporary translators for sessions of the general conference and executive board as well as the completion of performance evaluations for employees.[567]

Soviet officials expressed concern that these bitter foes of communism might ideologically contaminate Soviet translators and turn them into agents of Western governments. According to the Soviet permanent delegate in a 1957 letter to Moscow, two graduate students from the Moscow State Institute of Foreign Languages (MGIIIa), who worked as temporary translators in UNESCO, had "allowed unnecessary familiarity" with these émigrés, "even addressing them with "'*ty*'" (the informal "you" in Russian) in defiance of the Soviet UNESCO Delegation's warning that they displayed "an unserious, irresponsible attitude" by establishing "acquaintances" with these turncoats.[568] In 1959, an adviser to the delegation reported that Salomon had developed a habit of monitoring the comings-and-goings of Soviet translators in a

[565] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 10, l. 8.

[566] The Soviet UNESCO Commission and Delegation described the powers of the émigré editors in internal correspondence. GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 7, l. 65.

[567] For a Soviet description of Salomon's powers, see GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 11, l. 102. Similar to other Russian émigrés, Salomon led an itinerant life after leaving the Soviet Union, residing in several countries before ending up in France and taking up a diverse array of occupations. He produced a legal analysis of the preamble to the *UN Charter* in 1946; worked from 1946 to 1948 for the United States Riviera Recreation Area (USRRA) (an organization that helped US GIs recuperate while on furlough from their posts throughout occupied Europe); edited a history of the International Refugee Organization (IRO) in Geneva in 1951; and served as an attaché in the Norwegian government from 1950 to 1951. André Salomon, "Curriculum Vitae," December 1, 1953, 4–14, AG 8: Personnel Records of M. A. Salomon, UNESCO Archives.

[568] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 10, l. 8.

bid to "prove to the head of the UNESCO Language Division, Barnes, that Soviet translators violate the code of conduct of international civil servants." The Soviet adviser also nervously recounted how Salomon had maneuvered to "'organize a close friendship' between the son of one of the white émigrés and the Soviet translator, Tsukanov."[569]

Instead of framing their protestations to UNESCO as motivated by these political concerns, the Soviet UNESCO Delegation complained about these émigrés' utilization of an "antiquated, bureaucratic" Russian language no longer spoken in the USSR, explaining in 1957 to the head of UNESCO translation services, Delavenay, that these exiles, "whose native language perhaps was Russian," had become "completely cut off from the living Russian language" and consequently could not "translate into the modern Russian written language."[570] Although Delavenay agreed that the Russian Translation Section should consist only of Soviet specialists and promised to replace the expatriated Russians when they retired or their contracts expired, the Soviet UNESCO Commission continued to have difficulty finding Soviet nationals with the requisite experience translating in international organizations. And while the émigré translators, having attained proficiency in the esoteric terminology of UNESCO, received enthusiastically positive assessments from their superiors, Soviet agencies preferred to send temporary translators who did not remain at UNESCO long enough to become conversant in the

[569] In order to safeguard their translators' ideological purity, the Soviet UNESCO Delegation "had to take special measures to prevent the development of these acquaintances." It made sure to flood "the leisure time of these translators" with other activities and urged Moscow to "pay special attention to the political maturity and personal qualities of employees sent." In 1959, the delegation also began to have, "immediately upon [the translators'] arrival [to Paris], an instructional conversation about how to behave in UNESCO as well as a few meetings focused on the issue of contact with foreigners." GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 6, ll. 212-13; and GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 10, l. 8.

[570] GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 1, l. 87; and GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 7, l. 71. In addition to these complaints, Dubinin and other Soviet translators complained that the entire process of translation in UNESCO created numerous "semantic inaccuracies and even distortions." According to the translators, UNESCO protocol required them to translate the oral speeches or comments of Soviet representatives to UNESCO events from Russian into English or French and then *back* into Russian again. In other words, all spoken Russian had to be translated into the normative Western languages used by the organization, which meant that the remarks of Soviet delegates lost their originality and turned into anglicized or francized versions. GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 10, l. 81.

organization's argot.[571] Throughout 1958, the "struggle" over the Russian Translation Section became, in the words of two Soviet translators, "particularly acute," as the émigrés, worried that their jobs might "be in jeopardy," exploited the fact that the "head of the section was in their hands" to ensure that they "not only keep their posts, but also take open ones."[572] By 1959, the Soviet Union had taken over the three editorships in the section and five of the six slots as translators.[573] At first, Salomon, coming across to the chief of the UNESCO Bureau of Personnel as "very disturbed" at the prospect of a retirement forced on him to appease the Soviet state, quarreled with UNESCO over the original conditions of his agreement. But in June, he acceded to the recommendation that he abandon his place as section head, leaving it open for a Soviet citizen who took the helm even though UNESCO leaders judged him as "not yet fit for the job."[574]

Outside the Russian Translation Section and in other departments dedicated to education, science, and culture, Soviet citizens hired by UNESCO met a diverse assembly of individuals who either willfully divulged or, in the eyes of Soviet citizens, unconsciously exuded their anticommunist political predilections as well as national and class histories. In particular, they surmised that the invisible hand of the American government lurked behind any actions

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[571] GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 1, ll. 87-88; and GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d, 6, l. 252. For a few examples of performance reviews of the émigrés, see Émile Delavenay, "Performance Report–Professional," March 29, 1955, 1–2, AG 8: Personnel Records of Prof. B. Nicolsky, UNESCO Archives; and Émile Delavenay, "Notes Professionnelles (Services Organiques)," January 21, 1957, 1–2, AG 8: Personnel Records of M. A. Salomon, UNESCO Archives.

[572] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 6, l. 248.

[573] Ibid., l. 249.

[574] Harry Dawes, "Mr. André Salomon," January 27, 1959, 1–2, AG 8: Personnel Records of M. A. Salomon: PER/Memo A. 4870, UNESCO Archives; and GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 6, l. 212. Fear that émigrés would regain control of the Russian Translation Section continued to plague the Soviet UNESCO Commission and the Soviet UNESCO Delegation for years after they acquired all the high-ranking positions in the section. In 1962, the delegation sent one of its own officials to work as a translator in UNESCO "due to the threat of admittance into the Russian Section of persons from other countries or White Émigrés." GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 21, l. 117.

UNESCO officials took that went against the interests of their native country. Director Kovda considered his superiors in the UNESCO leadership as lackeys of UN headquarters in New York and, vicariously, its host, the United States. When justifying his inability to sway UNESCO policy in favor of the USSR, Kovda expounded on how "the fundamental directives of UNESCO go from New York through Hammarskjöld with whom [Director-General] Maheu has constant consultations."[575] Martynovskii, in his position overseeing the primary division in UNESCO responsible for aid to "weakly-developed" countries, viewed Americans and pro-Westerners under his watch as saboteurs. "The American UNESCO employees," he complained, "clearly carry out a pro-Western policy, . . . directing their efforts so as to link UNESCO with organizations—such as the International Bank for Reconstruction, the Ford Foundation, and the Carnegie Endowment—where "the influence of America is greater than it is in UNESCO." He proceeded to call one of his underlings from Peru "a great neutralizer of the actions of Soviet employees of this organization" who sought to "curry the favor of the Americans" by transferring UNESCO development projects from Martynovskii's clutches to the UN Special Fund in New York.[576] N. A. Koval'skii, a specialist in the UNESCO Department of Information, noticed that the tone and behavior of his boss, Tor Gjesdal, took on "anti-Soviet tendencies" after the Norwegian director had returned in late 1958 from an official visit to the United States during which his work had faced criticism from the American government. Shortly after his trip, Gjesdal had "permitted himself to go on anti-Soviet tirades on various occasions" and failed to

[575] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 16, l. 40.

[576] GARF, f. 9159, op. 2, d. 21, ll. 176-78. In another sign that Soviet ideology shaped how its citizens in UNESCO viewed their counterparts, one Soviet specialist dismissed his English colleague as a lackey of American business. "It is alleged," the Soviet employee wrote, "that the secret of his career advancement is the support of major financial corporations in the USA." Ibid., l. 21.

appear at an event at the Soviet embassy in Paris "even though he knew that such an invitation was for a very small group of persons and his absence would be noticed."[577]

A number of Soviet witnesses to the pervasive sway of the US government in the secretariat wanted to emulate the methods their American opponents employed in this respect. As a consultant in the Television Division of the UNESCO Department of Information and the former head of Soveksportfil'm, Sobolev sent to Moscow a lengthy scheme for how Soviet agencies could catch up to their American competitors in the battle over propaganda in UNESCO media, basing his observations on the chummy relationships between American representatives of the United States Information Agency (USIA) and his non-Soviet coworkers in the department. In March 1957, Sobolev reacted with surprise when Director Gjesdal turned down his offer to send an official invitation to the head of the USIA Visual Media Section for the screening of a UNESCO promotional video "on the distribution of UN and UNESCO stamps." But Gjesdal's refusal, to the alarm of Sobolev, derived from the close, informal connections between UNESCO and the USIA rather than a manifestation of anti-Americanism. As Gjesdal told Sobolev, he could simply call the head of USIA since he was an old friend. Bristling over his exclusion from a dinner his UNESCO colleagues put on for their USIA cronies before the screening, Sobolev described this movie presentation as part of a series of routine, informal pre-screenings for Western diplomats of featured films which, although slated for release to the public under the official imprimatur of UNESCO, consisted of little more than syntheses of

[577] GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 1, ll. 403-06. In an indication that such assessments of Western bosses depended on the individual circumstances and experiences of the Soviet employee as well as the level of tension existing between the West and the communist bloc at any given time, another Soviet professional working under Gjesdal came to quite a different conclusion about the character of the director of the Department of Information two years later. In 1962, Iu. A. Poliakov commended Gjesdal as a "smart man" who treated him (and other Soviet subordinates) "not as a unit in the department . . . but as a representative of the USSR, which he has to approach with care and respect." Poliakov further claimed that Gjesdal only displayed hostility to the Soviet Union when under "pressure from above." GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 21, l. 216.

USIA propaganda footage sugarcoated with UN themes of international cooperation. To counter this, Sobolev argued in favor of setting up "centers for Soviet information" in Soviet embassies throughout the world modeled on the USIA outlets located in American embassies in Paris and other world capitals. These centers would develop relations with UNESCO and governments similar to those enjoyed by their American analogues and thereby gain access to the insider crowd that Sobolev had encountered at the showing.[578]

For many Soviet international civil servants, the power relations and administrative procedures permeating the UNESCO Secretariat replicated in miniature the tyrannical relations of production undergirding capitalism. In a 1957 analysis of her work settings, Zhegalova claimed to have lifted the veil of false bourgeois democracy that concealed the hierarchy and Western domination deeply ingrained in her department. "All of the most important issues concerning the so-called 'policy of the department,'" she explained, "are discussed at meetings convened by the director of the department or one of his two deputies" and attended by the rest of the department. Although "this organization of work is seemingly of a democratic nature," Zhegalova warned that, "essentially, these meetings have almost no practical significance for reaching decisions," all of which depended on the whim of the department director and director-general. In reality, she assessed, "the style of work of the Department of Education is the same as

[578] According to Sobolev, the film combined seemingly innocuous documentary footage and a brief discussion of UN stamps with a justification of American foreign policy objectives in Venezuela. His interpretation consists of a uniquely Soviet approach to cinematic analysis and conveys the suspicion that many Soviet UNESCO employees harbored when it came to the self-promotion and public-relations work of international organizations. In Sobolev's words, "the film had the goal of showing the 'good' American imperialism brings to the Venezuelan people. The [reel] begins with the story of UN and UNESCO stamps in order to give . . . the impression of objectivity of all subsequent [parts] of the film's narrative and to present the 'special concern' of the USA for propagandizing UN ideas." It also stressed "the 'interest' of the USA in the cause of peace." However, the "viewer," Sobolev went on, is then "led to the second, main plot of 'aid,' which is provided in the interests of 'peace and shared prosperity' from the USA to other countries, especially Venezuela." The final part of the film, Sobolev continued, consisted of "an entertaining segment of a race of greyhounds in the USA, which would seem harmless, but in fact is very important, since it gives the viewer the impression that the whole thing . . . is far removed from politics—an ordinary newsreel, not having any propagandistic goals. In fact, this is not even a usual bourgeois newsreel, but specifically manufactured propagandistic film material." GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 11, ll. 28-33.

that of the whole UNESCO Secretariat—organized in the American form of a complex bureaucratic machine in which, first and foremost, the concentration of all threads of control are characteristically in the hands of the 'boss.'" In this power dynamic, Zhegalova cast herself and the only other Soviet workmate in the department as forming a small but bold resistance against this bureaucratic hierarchy reminiscent of the struggle of the innovative protagonist in Dudintsev's *Not by Bread Alone*. "Such a situation," she continued, "causes the discontent of department specialists and, particularly, in the preparation of the first versions of the 1959-1960 program, there was a collective discussion of these projects as a result of 'pressure from below.'" But if non-Soviet personnel hoped new leadership would reform this unequal system, Zhegalova argued that social relations within the department would remain the same, warning of a recently appointed director that "it is unlikely he will make any essential changes." When this new chief "provoked ridicule and even outrage" over his request for photos of each of his subordinates so he could "get to know them," Zhegalova boasted that only she and her Soviet accomplice refused to consent to this appeal, dismissing it as an example of the administrator's American "style of work."[579]

Soviet archetypes of the Western or nonsocialist "other" pervaded the political profiles of UNESCO officials that Soviet citizens dispatched to the Soviet UNESCO Commission. Portraying their supervisors as personifying communist caricatures of authoritarian figures from the old orders socialism sought to replace, Soviet UNESCO employees, rather than questioning the legitimacy of UNESCO's purpose and philosophy, saw themselves as fighting against a UNESCO aristocracy that, thanks to its authoritarian and capitalist impulses, had defiled the values and lofty pursuits the USSR and UNESCO had in common. Skorov, for instance, in his

[579] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 10, ll. 68-71.

1962 report as part of the UNESCO Department of Social Sciences, painted a scathing picture of Department Director André Bertrand as a petty, miserly, corrupt, and mediocre bureaucrat bearing the characteristics of a *meshchanin*. Dismissing Bertrand as "a creature" of Director-General Maheu, Skorov branded the esteemed French legal theorist as an indentured servant to the UNESCO leadership who "could have never risen to, or even stayed in the position of department director . . . without strong support from Maheu."[580] In return for what Skorov derided as Bertrand's "cushy job" at UNESCO, the director had degraded himself through obsequious groveling before Maheu, paying "a truly slavish devotion" to the director-general by seeking guidance "from the master when deciding any major issues" and allowing a "brutality and humiliation" that only a "person who has lost his own dignity and is fully dependent on the top brass [*nachasl'stvo*] could endure."[581] Skorov represented Bertrand as a man "who is only afraid of force. And force for him is embodied in the person of the director-general and in no way in the general conference and its resolutions." Skorov excoriated Bertrand for playing the broker in an international pay-for-play scheme, alleging that he used "his directorship to quite unashamedly extract different kinds of material benefits" and in this way infected the international organization with a bourgeois desire to capitalize on his position for monetary gain. "Returning from business travel to Latin America, Asia, the USA, and Africa," Skorov angrily

[580] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 21, l. 24. Skorov depicted Bertrand as a man of "modest abilities" who did not deserve his position and had failed to find any other work in France. However, other sources indicate that Bertrand was highly respected in the French legal community and was a highly accomplished legal scholar. Before coming to UNESCO, he had served as the director of studies at the École Nationale d'Administration, which trained the "top civil servants" of France. For more on Bertrand's biography, see Samy Friedman, "André Bertrand, 1913-1968," *International Social Science* Journal 21, no. 1 (1969): 5; and Peter Lengyel, *International Social Science: The UNESCO Experience* (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1986), 34.

[581] In the mind of Skorov, this obsequiousness and corrupt coveting of "cushy" positions in the international organization trickled down from Bertrand to other employees of the department. According to the Soviet secretariat official, a "smug" Swiss colleague "of limited intelligence" did everything that "Bertrand commands" and never showed any kind of initiative" or dare express his views, while "acting only on the instructions of the boss." Skorov also declared that the Swiss coworker was a person who, like Bertrand, considered "UNESCO as an opportunity for a comfortable and easy existence."

recalled of Bertrand, "he regularly thanks his correspondents in these countries through official mail, which is read by the entire department, for expensive gifts for his wife and himself, pleasure trips and meals, etc." To reciprocate, Skorov claimed that Bertrand, "often against the wills of the bosses of the divisions and negative evaluations written by all employees surveyed in departments, quite arrogantly 'pushes for' these acquaintances from other countries or from France to get UNESCO grants, lucrative contracts, etc." Skorov monitored the director for malfeasance so closely and meticulously that he managed to espy the money-grubbing of the capitalist world in the minute transactions of Bertrand's day. "Additionally," the Soviet professional discovered of his chieftain, "Bertrand is astonishingly stingy. In the UNESCO restaurant, he leaves one new franc for tea, and in payment for coffee at the bar, he puts twenty centimes in the box and takes back ten."[582]

Apart from individuals who epitomized the American, capitalist, and despotic influences pervading UNESCO, Soviet secretariat personnel worked side-by-side with a motley crew of globetrotting experts who incarnated a range of backgrounds and political persuasions at odds with the communist cause. The presence of a cohort of cosmopolitan Europeans with colonial pedigrees reinforced the Soviet presumption that the UN and its aid to decolonizing nations facilitated the neocolonialist project of the capitalist West. Skorov castigated the deputy head of a division in the Department of Social Sciences as "a typical Dutch colonial official who served a longtime in Indonesia and then, after the expulsion of the Dutch from their former colony, spent ten years as a UNESCO expert in India." This specialist "in agrarian questions" also elicited the ire of Skorov because of an "openly anti-Soviet article" on collectivization in the Soviet

[582] Other Soviet secretariat workers conflated negative personal qualities with antagonism toward the USSR. Martynovskii described an Australian peer in his department as "a careerist" and "servant of the Americans" who was also "a dirty type" and "drinker." GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 21, ll. 24-25; 182.

countryside that he had published before the Second World War. “This is a rabid reactionary,” Skorov concluded, “an obstinate man, a dyed-in-the-wool and difficult person.”[583] Writing in the wake of the massive move toward independence of French West Africa, Martynovskii criticized Europeans who spoke with approbation of the West’s cultural legacy in recently independent countries. He railed against a French pedagogue by the name of Guitton for attaching “very great significance to the fact that in the former French colonies education is conducted in French.” This mixed with Martynovskii’s annoyance at Guitton’s stickling perfectionism concerning the use of the French language in UNESCO.[584]

More awkwardly for Soviet UNESCO functionaries, they labored in close quarters with Eastern European and Soviet refugees who had experienced the darkest sides of Soviet rule. For instance, Skorov had to cultivate a professional relationship with Dr. Witold Zyss, a Polish Jew representing Israel who bore witness to Soviet policies of annexation and forced labor. Skorov wrote of Zyss that, “after the annexation of Western Ukraine by the USSR, his family was deported to the Arkhangelsk region where he learned the Russian language working for two years in a labor camp.” Managing to escape the USSR through Central Asia and Iran during the Second World War, Zyss wound up in Israel and then attended law school in France. In light of the impact of this personal history on Zyss’s attitude toward the USSR, Skorov designated the Polish émigré a “reactionary to the bone” who “retains a deep hatred of the Soviet Union.”[585]

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[583] Ibid., l. 26.

[584] “A typical bureaucrat,” Martynovskii griped, “he usually tries to rewrite all letters arriving for his signature, saying that almost no one in UNESCO knows the French language.” Ibid., l. 180.

[585] Skorov originally referred to the annexation of Western Ukraine as a “reunification” (vossoedinenie) and then crossed this word out, replacing it with a word that could mean accession to, annexation, or incorporation (prisoedinenie). Ibid., l. 28.

Yet not all of the conduct and personal bearing of secretariat staff members fit so easily into the preconceived Soviet binary of friend or foe. In a sign of the degree to which the ideological framework and presumptions that Soviet UNESCO employees brought to UNESCO determined how they selectively appraised the qualities of their coworkers in official representations to Moscow, Skorov intuited political motives from Bertrand's professional behavior and disregarded the overtures of cordiality and neutrality that the French director displayed in person. "In Bertrand's work," Skorov stated, "he persistently pursues a line hostile to the Soviet Union, not taking into account the [Soviet] delegation, overriding my memorandums, rejecting my proposals that take into account our interests, taking the side of my employees when they appeal to him against me, etc." But this propensity to act as a "staunch ideological and political enemy" of the USSR was "masked by a personal politeness and 'objectivity' that, at times, can be misleading in relation to the true essence of his politics." Skorov maintained that Bertrand, who self-identified as a Radical Socialist (i.e., a member of the center-left French Radical-Socialist Party), observed at work "an exceptional caution when expressing his views." For Skorov, this explained why the "deep antipathy" of his boss to "the socialist system" and his unyielding "hostility to the Soviet way of life" only surfaced in "matters not directly related to UNESCO where he is not afraid to give himself away (for example, in discussions of pressing issues such as the international situation or the French political situation)."

Because the Soviet UNESCO Commission and Delegation encouraged Soviet UNESCO workers to see through any pretenses of "objectivity" in their foreign colleagues, Soviet UNESCO employees often dismissed the complexity and inconsistencies in comportment and action that they encountered when interacting with these foreigners, searching instead for the true

ideological essences of these superficially "neutral" men. Consequently, as Skorov's assertion that Bertrand gave "himself away" demonstrates, if foreigners with a background or outlook defined as adversarial to communism treated Soviet international civil servants amicably, Soviet specialists discarded these conciliatory acts as part of a façade concealing their inner ill will. Irrespective of the rules of neutrality governing the international civil service, Soviet citizens employed by the secretariat viewed this imperative of impartiality as a veneer thinly disguising national, political, and other particularistic dispositions.[586] When sketching the character of a Taiwanese member of the Department of Social Sciences, for example, Skorov had to make contradictory claims when searching for a way to reconcile the exiled Chinese official's nationality with his actual mien. At first, Skorov stressed that this staff member was "neutral" to the USSR. But even though Skorov admitted he had no communication with the Taiwanese worker in accordance with directives from Moscow, he proceeded to compensate for this comparatively positive rendering by asserting that, "when faced with him at work, I see that in practice he does hinder cooperation with the USSR."[587]

In Martynovskii's corner of the secretariat, a Belgian, who spent his years before UNESCO as a colonial inspector of polytechnic education in the Congolese city of Kasai, behaved "very business-like" and "objectively," going so far as to critique the Belgian colonial venture in casual conversation with Martynovskii. "However," Martynovskii added, "I doubt his sincerity. Judging from his behavior, he is pro-American." Similarly, Martynovskii called a West

[586] Gorsuch describes a similar phenomenon but reversed, noting that Westerners often expressed suspicion about Soviet claims regarding the successes of their country. Gorsuch, *All This Is Your World*, 109.

[587] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 21, ll. 24-26.

German he superintended "a very industrious person" who "tries to appear as an objective UNESCO employee but pretty clearly reveals his pro-Western sympathies."[588]

Another Soviet explanation for impartial treatment from ideological rivals rested on the precept that the presence of the USSR in UNESCO forced the opposition to engage in fair play. "The authority of the Soviet Union," Sobolev proudly declared in a 1959 report on his work, "has helped me noticeably." As an example, he outlined the political leanings of two of his supervisors. On the one hand, Sobolev portrayed the French administrator of the Division of Visual Media, Jean Keim, as "anti-Soviet personally" due to his experience as the cultural attaché in the French embassy in Moscow in the mid-1950s. In the same vein, he characterized his other boss, the American head of the Television Division and former editor-in-chief for television news for the Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS), Henri Cassirer, as "an enemy of the Soviet Union and informant" reporting to the USIA.[589] Yet Sobolev also lauded Keim for rejecting a proposition advanced by Cassirer to offer the Walt Disney Company the contract to make a cartoon about UNESCO and recommending instead that, "on the grounds that this would upset the equilibrium in UNESCO's general policy concerning Soviet cinematography," the international organization hire a Czechoslovakian firm for the project. Although Sobolev partially interpreted this "neutrality" as a sign of Keim's anti-American "French nationalism," he postulated that the "correlation of forces of countries in UNESCO" compelled the Frenchman to "keep more or less an objective line and, in any case, advertise his objectivity."[590]

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[588] Ibid., ll. 179-80.

[589] Cassirer, a Jew who fled Nazi Germany after the outbreak of the Second World War, became one of the first editors of American television news in the late 1940s. At UNESCO, he pioneered the use of television for educational purposes throughout the world, disseminating documentaries and other pedagogical aids to countries in Africa and elsewhere. For more on Cassirer, see his obituary: Brian Groombridge, "Henry Cassirer," *The Guardian*, February 18, 2005, https://www.theguardian.com/media/2005/feb/18/broadcasting.guardianobituaries.

[590] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 6, ll. 237-38.

Plodding through the workday surrounded by this alien society, Soviet international civil servants came to see the mundane personal affronts they weathered in the workplace as attacks on the Soviet Union generally. In the offices of the UNESCO Department of Natural Sciences, the Cold War raged on an interpersonal level between Director Kovda and his American deputy, Dr. Hilliard Roderick. From Kovda's standpoint, as the US Department of State increasingly grew uncomfortable with the power the Soviet scientist exerted over this key department in the international science battles between the superpowers, the American nuclear physicist purporting to be his right-hand man had changed "from a relatively simple and cheerful man" to a "gloomy and hostile" subversive. As evidence, Kovda ran through a list of petty offences committed by Roderick in the spring of 1961. "He regularly rummages through my papers on the desk in my absence," the Soviet director fretted to the Soviet UNESCO Commission. "He tries," Kovda went on, "to barge into my office to hear at least part of my conversations with visitors or at least see the faces of these people. In fights over staff or the budget in the department and during difficult or intense work, he is aloof." Kovda bristled over attempts to "discredit" him or others coming from "socialist or neutral countries."[591] In particular, he accused Maheu of trying to "exclude the names of Soviet scholars in reports of the Western press" while attributing the "successes of the work of the department" to Western scientists. Maheu also supposedly sent his "henchmen" to "disrupt" or "make a mess" of the department at the behest of the US.[592]

On multiple occasions, Soviet nationals drew indirect reprimands from their UNESCO supervisors for their inability to conceal their outrage over manifestations of collusion between

[591] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 16, l. 39.

[592] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 17, l. 49; and GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 16, l. 39. Even though Kovda viewed Roderick as an enemy of the Soviet Union, he and other Soviet specialists charged with overseeing UNESCO affairs claimed that the US Delegation to UNESCO disliked Roderick because he was "too cooperative with the Soviet director of the department." GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 23, l. 53. He also blamed Maheu for the insufficient funds allotted to the Department of Natural Sciences by the international organization. GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 20, l. 293.

American and UNESCO officials. Fashioning himself as a conscientious warrior for the Soviet Union abroad in his 1960 and 1962 reports to the Soviet UNESCO Commission, Sobolev repeatedly rehashed a story of how he thwarted moves by Gjesdal and Cassirer to "direct the work" of his division to "please their overseas rulers" by propagating "bourgeois ideology" and the advertising of "'UNESCO activity.'"[593] According to the Soviet expert, Gjesdal agreed in October 1960 to give an interview to CBS during which the reporter planned to ask Gjesdal to speak at length on "the growth of racism in relation to Jews in the USSR and West Germany" following an uptick in anti-Semitic incidents in the FRG earlier that year. Upon hearing of the topic of the CBS segment, Sobolev barged onto the set and, "in front of everyone," berated "an enraged" Gjesdal for agreeing to participate in a program "incompatible with the UNESCO Charter" in light of its failure to present "a stark contrast" between "racism in West Germany" and the "policy of friendship of the peoples in the Soviet Union." Although Sobolev assured the cancellation of the interview, he, too, suffered consequences for his actions. In Sobolev's rendition of the events, Gjesdal accused him of "undermining the authority of the UNESCO leadership and insubordination" but was "forced to back down" after the intervention of the Soviet UNESCO Delegation and a threat of resignation from his Soviet underling. Yet the director removed Sobolev from the cutting-edge UNESCO initiative of producing educational television programs for developing countries, banishing him to an assignment in which he busied himself with "an 'independent' area of work—the renting out of UNESCO films, which stands apart from the fundamental activity of the Department of Information."[594]

[593] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 16, l. 56.

[594] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 16, ll. 56-58; and GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 21, l. 164.

The more Soviet secretariat workers asserted their communist identities, the more their UNESCO associates treated them as pariahs unworthy of inclusion in the internal workings of the international organization. P. D. Tarabaev, a program specialist who served as liaison with the USSR and several other states in Europe and North America for the UNESCO Bureau for Relations with Member States (BMS), felt that his advocacy for the Soviet viewpoint in UNESCO stigmatized him in the eyes of his counterparts in the bureau. "As earlier," Tarabaev despaired in 1961, "the bureau leaders and my section head, McPhee, have done everything possible to isolate me from decisions on major issues and not allow my influence, as a Soviet man, on the development and execution of secretariat programs or plans and those of the bureau." At first, "this was done very timidly and cautiously." But in reaction to Soviet proposals at a 1960 session of the UNESCO Executive Board to cut the staff and administrative powers of the BMS as well as Tarabaev's unwavering resolve to "actively intervene" with a "Soviet point of view" in the bureau, BMS officials began to deploy "such tactics . . . on the spur of the moment, practically openly." If, before the session, his colleagues had treated him "warmly," they began afterward to approach him only for "strictly business" matters, attempting "to create an atmosphere of some isolation" around him. While the BMS leadership had previously invited Tarabaev to meetings and sought his input on bureau affairs, they began to embargo him—and, symbolically, the Soviet Union—as retaliation for the actions of his homeland and his own obstreperousness. "Thus," he lamented, "from December 1961 to January 1962, they stopped inviting me to any senior meetings or sessions at all. They stopped showing me drafts of programs and work plans, etc. It felt like they were receiving some kind of instruction from the top in relation to me."[595]

[595] GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 35, ll. 325-28; and GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 3, l. 431.

Indeed, from low-level workers, such as Tarabaev and Sobolev, to the highest-ranking Soviet bigwigs in the secretariat, throughout the 1950s and 1960s such ostracization became a systemic practice that UNESCO administrators applied to Soviet workers if they revealed their ulterior motives too blatantly. Even Deputy Director-General Ershov turned into an outcast among the premier executives of the international organization. As a 1962 memorandum composed by the Soviet UNESCO Commission put it, the director-general, his two other deputies, and "many . . . employees of the UNESCO apparatus," used "all their strength to attempt to isolate Ershov, to keep him in the dark and bypass him in the decision of a number of issues; to present him with a fait accompli or instruct him to resolve issues in a way clearly disadvantageous to the Soviet Union." Furthermore, "there were cases of direct deception of Ershov from individual workers in the apparatus of the UNESCO Secretariat."[596] Thus the lack of official disciplinary actions taken by the UNESCO leadership for Soviet violations of the oath of the international civil service did not mean that Soviet professionals dispatched to the international organization avoided informal retribution from their colleagues in response to these transgressions. If Soviet UNESCO staff members let the communist dimension of their identities dictate their work lives and thereby color their public personae as international civil servants, they encountered a strong backlash from a work culture shaped by the ethical regime of the international civil service and its mandate that these servants maintain a public "neutrality" while relegating their political selves to the private sphere. Ironically, a combative advocacy of the Soviet platform or a blatant relaying of information to Soviet authorities therefore undermined

[596] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 21, ll. 104-05. Like other Soviet UNESCO employees, Ershov described how Westerners in the international organization abused their power. Although the authors of the memorandum noted that Ershov's ignorance of the English language had "exacerbated" his isolation, Ershov confirmed that the director-general had repeatedly usurped his authority as deputy. "Maheu," he wrote, "has tasted power and has begun to give orders as if it was his own estate (*votchina*)." Ibid., l. 135.

the goal of Soviet UNESCO employees to gain access to insider knowledge about the secretariat and exert influence on the UNESCO decision-making process.

Soviet specialists had to keep their resentments private and appear as sociable and harmonious members of the UNESCO team at work if they wanted to excel in their roles as moles within the international organization. And in stark contrast to the tension-laden environment of antagonists and protagonists in the Cold War that Soviet personnel depicted in their annual reports to Moscow, UNESCO authorities, in their work-performance evaluations, portrayed their Soviet employees across the board as congenial and agreeable contributors to an international workforce created to show a supranational cooperation. For example, when Sobolev repeatedly boasted in his reports to the Soviet UNESCO Commission about his protestations during the CBS interview with Gjesdal in October 1960, he may have put an eagerness to show his reliability as a crusader for the Soviet cause before a desire to paint an accurate picture of his regular behavior at UNESCO. In an evaluation of his performance just three months after the CBS episode, Sobolev's UNESCO managers did not mention the incident and applauded him as "polite, patient, . . . highly conscientious" as well as "courteous and discreet in his contact with others, both inside and outside the house."[597]

Unable to bring up their negative thoughts about UNESCO at work, Soviet UNESCO personnel found outlets for their communist views of the international organization either at the social functions put on by the Soviet colony in Paris or in the secret communications they maintained with the Soviet state. However, even the Soviet UNESCO Commission and

[597] Tor Gjesdal, "Within-Grade Increment," January 10, 1961, 3, AG 8: Personnel Records of B. Sobolev, UNESCO Archives. Most UNESCO evaluations of Soviet international civil servants contained positive assessments in the box titled "Human Relations." For some other examples, see: Tor Gjesdal, "Within-Grade Increment," August 17, 1957, 3, AG 8: Personnel Records of Mr. N. Kovalsky, UNESCO Archives; and Émile Delavenay, "Within-Grade Increment," July 7, 1960, 3, AG 8: Personnel Records of Mr. V. Birioukov, UNESCO Archives.

Delegation overruled and "corrected" the thoughtful conclusions that these specialists derived from a communist analysis of their firsthand knowledge of UNESCO. When Sobolev presciently warned in 1961 that the organization had begun to turn its attention away from the Western, anticommunist crusade for the "free dissemination of information" and divert its resources to development programs for the decolonizing world, his Soviet principals in the embassy and back in Moscow ignored the evidence Sobolev presented. "Sobolev is not really correct," they advised, "when he reduces all UNESCO work to attempts by Western countries to strengthen their positions in the weakly-developed countries. One cannot, of course, underestimate US intentions to use UNESCO for ideological sabotage of the Soviet Union."[598]

Tarabaev earned a similar rebuke from his Soviet handlers when he professed to them opinions at odds with the Soviet consensus on who posed a threat to their interests in UNESCO. In a 1961 memorandum, Tarabaev commented with surprise that "employees of the secretariat from the USA" had taken "very sober positions" in meetings by displaying a "good attitude" toward the Soviet Union and having objected "frequently and reasonably" to the more mendacious proposals of their Western colleagues. He also complimented Maheu as a "man holding a 'sober, healthy, and objective position.'" In reply, the deputy chair of the Soviet UNESCO Commission in Moscow admonished Tarabaev for "idealizing Maheu" and "taking at face value the ostensible objectivity of American UNESCO bureaucrats" without an adequately

[598] For more on this transition in UNESCO's focus, see chapter 9. Sobolev described the "free dissemination of information" campaign as a "smokescreen created to divert our attention and energy away from the main design of the imperialists to create in weakly-developed countries 'national cadres' who could be the preachers of a 'capitalist paradise,' traitors to national interests." He supported this argument by noting that his department, which oversaw UNESCO information operations, allotted only 3 percent of the budget to this area of work. "If [the free dissemination of information campaign's] initiators took it seriously, not for demagogic purposes but as a means to give them some kind of practical results in terms of the ideological subjugation of other countries, then one can be sure that they would not use for this three percent of the budget." Despite this evidence, the Soviet permanent delegate responded with the criticism that his claims were "declarative in nature, not supported by concrete facts." GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 16, ll. 53-54; 80.

critical posture. “It is completely obvious,” he wrote, “that Maheu and other leading UNESCO bureaucrats from Western countries have done everything under various pretexts to refuse to satisfy a number of requests of the socialist countries and the USSR in particular.”[599] Likewise, Skorov drew a rebuke when he cast doubt on the feasibility of accomplishing the Soviet foreign-policy goal of finding common ground with foreign social scientists or government functionaries and converting them to Marxism-Leninism. “While in the departments of natural sciences, education, or culture,” Skorov wrote in a 1962 report, “one could find some sort of common values, whether it be the elimination of illiteracy in the world, the support of scientific discoveries, or the exchange of indisputable cultural values, . . . in the Department of Social Sciences such values do not and cannot exist.” Insisting that the “antipodal” natures of the West and the Soviet Union did not represent a “discovery” on his part but “ABC’s, known to all,” Skorov proclaimed that “the conceptions of the social sciences and Marxist ideology accepted in socialist countries” faced rejection “not only in the Department of Social Sciences but also in all of the administrative apparatuses of all UNESCO member states, including the weakly-developed countries.” All of this compelled him to have qualms over the necessity of his continued service in the secretariat. “Experience shows,” he repined, “that 90 to 95 percent of my working time is spent on goals that do not have anything to do with the interests of the Soviet Union, which naturally raises the question of how desirable it is for me to remain in this position.”[600] In a riposte to this jeremiad, the Soviet UNESCO Delegation reminded Skorov that only his superiors had the right to determine political strategy in UNESCO and question the value of his service to the international organization. Meanwhile, his job remained confined to

[599] Unlike the Americans, he described the majority of the French in UNESCO as “reactionary, often dirty, and provocative” in their actions. GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 21, ll. 73; 85-86.

[600] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 21, ll. 29-32.

following orders and passing "considerations and proposals" back to his commanding officers that did not contradict but affirmed the prevailing presumptions of these organs.[601]

Although Soviet international civil servants spotted a few political friends among the hundreds of foreigners in the UNESCO Secretariat, the ubiquity of Westerners in the secretariat made the culture of the organization a hostile setting for these isolated Soviet nationals. The power of the West in the international organization thus derived not only from their monopoly of official positions of authority, but also from the psychological effects their strength in numbers had on employees from the communist bloc. The real or imagined antagonism Soviet UNESCO staff members encountered made their ambitions to influence the policies of the international organization in a direction favorable to the Soviet Union exceedingly difficult and put the USSR at a clear disadvantage in the arena of international organizations.

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While Soviet UNESCO employees acquired a unique grasp of the situation in UNESCO and how to improve on Soviet participation in the organization, their insight fell on deaf ears if it contradicted the general assessment prevailing in the Soviet UNESCO Commission or Delegation. Of course, all states formulate foreign policy through a hierarchical, centralized process in which foreign ministries draw selectively from the intelligence of their diplomatic missions. But unlike members of foreign services who answer only to the governments they

[601] The Soviet UNESCO Delegation "could not agree" with Skorov's assumption that the West and communist countries shared common values in education, science, and culture. It also disagreed with his assertion that Western domination in the Department of Social Sciences meant that the department had "no value." With respect to the skepticism Skorov expressed concerning the allure of Marxism-Leninism in UNESCO and its member states, the delegation sarcastically retorted that, "first of all, among 'all UNESCO member states' is a group of socialist countries; secondly, there is a noticeable growth in interest in Marxist ideology among a sizeable part of the intelligentsia in the weakly-developed and even capitalist countries." It also stressed its disagreement with the notion that weakly-developed countries had no interest in Marxism by placing a typed question mark and exclamation point in parentheses "(?!)" after their reference to this comment. The delegation added that it considered it "wrong" to "raise the question of whether comrade Skorov should further work in this position." Ibid., ll. 22-23.

represent, Soviet international civil servants had to appease two authorities with starkly different expectations. Notwithstanding the presumption of Soviet officials in the embassy and back in Moscow that they alone could speak as the authoritative arbiters of the general policies of the Soviet Union with regard to UNESCO, Soviet professionals working in the secretariat regularly expressed frustration with Soviet behavior toward the international organization while asserting that *they*—and not those who represented the Soviet state from a distance—possessed a better understanding of how the USSR should approach UNESCO due to their intimate, immediate, and lengthy exposure to its inner workings. Because of this superior knowledge of UNESCO, Soviet secretariat members articulated in their reports back to the commission bold and sweeping suggestions for improving Soviet relations with the international organization. Instead of following the official Soviet line of placing the blame for their country's difficulties on the Western biases of UNESCO, they began to echo the critiques of Soviet involvement in the UN agency voiced by their foreign counterparts in the organization.

In the year following the decision to enroll its specialists in the UNESCO Secretariat, the first cohort of Soviet secretariat jobholders sent to UNESCO gained the impression that the Soviet state had sent them to an international organization with which it had little desire to cooperate or even fulfill its basic duties as a UNESCO member state. Reflecting at the end of 1957 on his inaugural year working in the Division of Public Relations of the Department of Information, Biriukov criticized Soviet agencies for their hermitic reticence toward the outside world, imploring them to take a more active part in the give-and-take the international organization expected from member states. "In the area of activities [of the division]," Biriukov complained in his report to the commission, "the Soviet Union is one of the least active countries. Correspondence with the USSR is basically limited to the Soviet UNESCO

Commission. Answers from the commission are of an episodic character and do not show any initiative." Biriukov lamented that the Soviet Association for the Promotion of the UN (ASOON) and the UN Information Center in Moscow had "completely ceased" to respond to UNESCO requests. Other Soviet organizations, "as a rule," did not respond to the approximately 2,000 letters from his division. "As a result," Biriukov disapprovingly lectured the commission, "[the division] has developed the impression that the Soviet Union does not want, in reality, to participate in UNESCO work." Because UNESCO "determined the activity of a country . . . on the basis of the number of letters" it received and had a propensity to formulate policies propitious to the most proactive member states, he argued for the necessity of "strengthening correspondence with UNESCO" through an increase in information supplied. He also stressed that the "negative attitude on the part of Soviet organizations" in this respect adversely affected the ability of other communist states to receive the perks UNESCO had to offer, warning that his boss had told him "directly" that the secretariat "would wait until the Soviet Union determines its relationship" with programs before allowing the "peoples' democracies" to sign up for them.[602]

Nearly all annual reports submitted by Soviet secretariat personnel over the first decade of Soviet participation in UNESCO chided Soviet domestic institutions for their unresponsiveness to UNESCO requests and the dereliction of their duty to prove the competency of the Soviet Union by coming across as reliable partners. The lone socialist employee in the Department of Natural Sciences in 1958 opined that Soviet authorities abdicated their responsibility for communicating with the department. "It should be noted," he divulged to the Soviet UNESCO Commission, "that our organizations are constantly violating the deadlines for work and delaying responses on the participation of our specialists in meetings, which rightly

[602] GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 1, ll. 102-04.

draws complaints from UNESCO and other organizations participating in the preparation of meetings."[603] As director of the same department four years later, Kovda rattled off a plethora of instances of "unacceptable holdups, interruptions, and even stagnation in movement and the resolution of issues" as well as "nonarrivals, delays, instance of tardiness, and silences" on the part of Soviet officials. The mistakes of Soviet domestic entities, Kovda stressed, undermined the prestige and efficacy of the Soviet Union on the international stage as well as, vicariously, his own reputation and clout in the international organization. "I, as a Soviet director," Kovda remonstrated, "am put in a difficult situation by this. It is very hard for the USSR to receive a vacancy in UNESCO, the right to participate in meetings, or membership in international committees. We cannot allow that on account of slowness we miss these real opportunities for information and propaganda." More fundamentally, "the amount of work in science and technology through UNESCO," Kovda wrote in 1962, "has grown rapidly over the past years. Our commitment and participation in international life has taken on a permanent nature. Meanwhile, the tempo and form of the organization of work in Moscow remains such as it was four to five years ago."[604] Since the Soviet UNESCO Commission had no means to coerce Soviet

[603] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 6, l. 225.

[604] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 16, l. 113; and GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 20, ll. 304-14. Ershov also made known his annoyance with the delegation and the Soviet UNESCO Commission. "In the commission and delegation," the deputy director-general wrote in 1962, "there exists a kind of inexplicable fear to approach UNESCO and demand information even about questions and decisions initiated by the Soviet UNESCO Delegation at the executive board or general conference." This produced among the UNESCO leadership an "impression that the Soviet UNESCO Commission has no interest in UNESCO activity." GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 21, l. 137. Even Skorov, who viewed his presence in the Department of Social Science as pointless, interpreted the absence of Soviet scholars at gatherings in the social sciences hosted by UNESCO in 1963 as a sign that, "in a number of Soviet institutions, there exists an underestimation of the role of international meetings in the area of the social sciences as a means of ideological hardening and political education of our young cadres." Although he conceded that, "unfortunately, the subjects of meetings convened by UNESCO" were "irrelevant" to the Soviet Union and avoided "the pressing or important problems of our times," Skorov maintained that "to completely ignore these meetings is also not right since every meeting with the opponent is a military school" that promised to "accelerate the ideological-theoretical growth of our scholarly youth, help them learn foreign languages and find the most effective ways to fight against bourgeois ideology and disseminate our ideology." GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 24, l. 57.

organs to readjust to the demands of international transaction, the protestations from Soviet UNESCO employees over their country's handling of UNESCO interaction did little to alter the internal workings of the Soviet system and drew only rote assurances that the Soviet UNESCO Commission and MID would "take under consideration" their concerns.

The desire to enhance Soviet involvement in UNESCO emanated from a general consensus among Soviet secretariat workers that the 1954 enrollment of the USSR in the organization represented a positive step in their country's relations with the international community. Even if some Soviet specialists posted in the secretariat disdained their own narrow lines of work or the politics of their respective departments, they pushed back against conservative elements at home who used the perceived shortcomings of UNESCO as a pretext for a retreat from participation in international organizations. "In hindsight," Dubinin recalled in his memoirs, "the step taken at the time by our country to take part in UNESCO may seem simple and self-evident. But that was not the case then." As he remembered nearly forty years later, Dubinin and the rest of the Soviet UNESCO collective circled the wagons after reading the November 1958 article in *Pravda* ("Wither UNESCO?") by the chairman of the Soviet UNESCO Commission, Zhukov.[605] The article's depiction of UNESCO, in Dubinin's words, as "not only useless, but harmful to our country," and its posing of "the question of the withdrawal of the Soviet Union" from the international organization, sparked a small-scale revolt among Soviet citizens working in the secretariat. Understanding that Chairman Zhukov "himself had weight" in Soviet politics and that "behind him stood a powerful trend" of backlash against the new policies of the Khrushchev era, Soviet secretariat personnel discussed the article and "were unanimous in the necessity of fighting to preserve the participation of the Soviet Union in

[605] For more on this article, see chapter 2.

UNESCO." Appealing to Moscow, they launched a letter-writing campaign that helped to convince the Soviet leadership to give UNESCO a chance.[606] When Soviet Permanent Delegate Pavlov raised the possibility of a Soviet exit from UNESCO again four years later, Deputy Director-General Ershov shrugged off the issue as already settled. "It is time," he avowed, "to remove this question from the agenda." By urging the Soviet UNESCO Commission no longer to "speak of participating or not participating" in the organization, Ershov joined his fellow Soviet professionals in UNESCO to lobby successfully for the normalization of the Soviet presence in UNESCO and multilateral diplomacy in general. Soviet abdication of its influential place as the second largest contributor to the UNESCO budget, Ershov contended, "would be a significant concession to the Westerners in this field of the battle between the two systems, untie the hands of the colonialists," and "facilitate their activity in the weakly-developed countries." While acknowledging that bilateral relations often served Soviet objectives abroad better than the multilateral diplomacy of UNESCO, Ershov noted that many countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America had yet to secure bilateral agreements with the USSR and would hesitate to do so when faced with American pressure. "It follows," he reckoned, "that we must use . . . international organizations for the introduction and spread of our influence in these countries."[607]

Some Soviet UNESCO workers even lobbied for broader changes in the ways the Soviet Union did business with the outside world, advocating proposals emblematic of the UNESCO ethos of international integration without discarding, and largely as a product of, their allegiance to the Soviet Union. For example, in a spate of writings to the Soviet UNESCO Commission from 1960 to 1962, Tarabaev, as a member of the bureau facilitating relations between UNESCO

[606] Dubinin, *Diplomaticheskaia byl'*, 77-78.

[607] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 21, ll. 135-36.

and the communist bloc, not only aptly summarized the collective befuddlement and dismay of Soviet secretariat staff members at the bumbling of their comrades in the USSR, but also drew on the bureau's dealings with Western countries to suggest normative avenues for reform that would more closely align the practices of the Soviet bureaucracy with those of the international organization. Listing the missteps his fellow Soviet colleagues in UNESCO had enumerated in previous messages, Tarabaev confessed his view that the UNESCO leadership was "not entirely pleased with the approach the USSR and other democratic countries have taken toward UNESCO." This "very unpleasant impression" in the secretariat of the "silence" of the Soviet UNESCO Commission, he cautioned, had "created a definitely undesirable relationship" that informed the secretariat when considering Soviet proposals for further collaboration. "It seems to me that many states and their national commissions," Tarabaev underlined in his report, "having paid attention to their UNESCO relationship and sometimes giving the appearance of interest or proactivity in UNESCO, are very successful in getting secretariat posts and funds, sending experts, increasing their countries' authority and prestige in the international arena."[608]

Tarabaev went beyond regurgitating the frequently articulated sources of vexation for Soviet secretariat workers, questioning the attributes of Soviet participation in UNESCO that made the USSR an outlier among the international organization's member states. When he first

[608] Tarabaev criticized the failure of the Soviet UNESCO Commission, since its formation in 1955, to submit to UNESCO a required annual, multi-page report on its basic structure, personnel, and workings. "These materials," he explained, "are seen by all staff and the leadership of UNESCO and [are used to] judge the activities of the national commissions of all countries." According to Tarabaev, his boss in the bureau found the yearly refusal to submit this information "strange and incomprehensible." Apparently, the commission had only once made an effort to supply these details, but the document "was so poor (only 1.5 pages typed)" that the bureau "did not think it necessary to publish it so as not to undermine the Soviet Union as a great power and one of the primary participants in UNESCO." Tarabaev also expressed frustration with the inability of the commission to ensure specialists hired by UNESCO showed up on time for work in the secretariat. "Such instances," he warned, "should not be permitted to continue, otherwise we contradict ourselves: on the one hand, we request the position and on the other we do not send the person on time." However, Tarabaev claimed that UNESCO executives excluded from this criticism of the communist bloc the Polish UNESCO Commission, which his UNESCO supervisors "held up as an example" for other socialist states to emulate because of its eagerness to partner with the international organization. GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 1, ll. 294-98.

joined the international organization in 1959, Tarabaev revealed his bemusement with Soviet subversion of the ethics of the international civil service. Although all Soviet citizens hired by UNESCO understood that their loyalty lay with the Soviet Union, Tarabaev felt a degree of perplexity over his dual role in the international organization after taking the oath of the international civil service. In his first letter to the Soviet UNESCO Commission in February 1960, he betrayed a reluctance to violate this oath when approached by delegates from the communist states eager to elicit unauthorized "advice" and "clarification" from him. "How can I remain in such a case both an official of the secretariat and a representative of the USSR?"[609] Furthermore, Tarabaev made clear his irritation with the frequent displays of open hostility toward the international organization sanctioned by the Soviet state. Resolving to "share" with the Soviet UNESCO Commission "the reaction in the UNESCO Secretariat" to an article highly critical of the international organization published in *Novoe vremia* and written by V. V. Zagladin (a future member of the Central Committee and contributor to Gorbachev's "new thinking" in the late 1980s), Tarabaev rebuked the commission for allowing this article to throw into jeopardy the fragile relationships that Soviet UNESCO employees had cultivated in UNESCO. "Some UNESCO activities," he admitted, "naturally cause and will cause complaints and criticism from us. But when writing such articles and criticism of UNESCO activities one must do so . . . with knowledge of the specifics of all UNESCO work and do so thoroughly, justifiably, concretely and consistent with a certain diplomatic tact." To prove his point, Tarabaev noted that Zagladin's "absolutely correct" statements suffered from a lack of "any convincing example" or "concrete evidence" and came across in the eyes of the UNESCO

[609] Ibid., l. 299.

directorship as "propaganda and pressure on UNESCO without any justification."[610] Tarabaev asserted that these uncorroborated attacks threatened to undo the alliances that his Soviet colleagues in Paris had fostered in UNESCO. "It is necessary," he counseled, "to keep in mind UNESCO practice, the composition of its personnel, and especially the relationships between the Soviet UNESCO Commission, our delegation and individual Soviet employees of the secretariat on the one hand, and the secretariat and its employees on the other."[611]

A few months after this polite panning, Tarabaev laid out for Soviet authorities the deficiencies in the initiative led by Soviet foreign-policy organs to showcase the USSR as a beacon of hospitality. In an August 1960 conversation, Roger Caillois, a French employee of the Department of Culture and renowned sociocultural theorist, related to Tarabaev a series of complications he had experienced while traveling that month to attend the International Congress of Orientalists in Moscow.[612] According to Tarabaev, no one came to pick up Caillois at

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[610] In regard to UNESCO's penchant for printing more Western than Soviet scholarly essays and popular articles, Tarabaev gave an account to the commission of a conversation he had with the head of UNESCO publications, who reminded the Soviet employee that "the large number of publications by Western authors was due to the fact that Soviet authors are very reluctant to write for UNESCO and, if they agreed to write, their articles are presented for publication late and sometimes only after a year."

[611] GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 3, ll. 429-32. In his letter, Tarabaev did not mention that the *Novoe vremia* article, published during the presidential campaign of the Catholic John F. Kennedy, likely drew outrage from members of the secretariat because it not only attacked UNESCO but also the religion of its director-general, Vittorino Veronese, who actively participated in Catholic civil society in Italy before arriving at UNESCO. A dispatch from UNESCO headquarters, the article contained the usual Soviet criticisms of UNESCO, including the exclusion of China from, and the admission of Taiwan into, the international organization; the refusal of UNESCO to get more involved in "political questions," such as disarmament; the failure of UNESCO to hire enough Soviet specialists to fill the quota allotted to the USSR; and its refusal to grant socialist "NGOs" consultative status. Additionally, Zagladin conducted an interview with Veronese, who provided a basic outline of the activities of the organization for the Soviet reader. However, the article also criticized the fact that the Catholic Church had supposedly gained an inordinate amount of influence in the organization. "Among UNESCO workers, especially of Italian origin," Zagladin wrote in clear reference to Director-General Veronese, "there is a significant number of people connected to clericalism." The author went on to suggest that UNESCO put too much of an emphasis on the study of religion as a result of this Catholic influence. It is likely that this attack on the director-general inspired Tarabaev to write his complaint even though he could not defend Catholicism or Veronese openly lest he appear too confrontational. V. Zagladin, "V IuNESKO," *Novoe vremia*, June 3, 1960, 25–27.

[612] Caillois is another example of a highly respected academic or cultural figure working at UNESCO in the late 1950s and 1960s. A disciple of surrealism and then a close collaborator with Georges Bataille in the 1930s, Caillois lived out the Second World War in Argentina and after returning to France introduced the work of Argentinian

Sheremet'evo International Airport after a twelve-hour flight delay prevented him from arriving. Fed up with receiving no answer when telephoning the AN SSSR Institute of Oriental Studies and the Hotel Ukraina, the distinguished guest and editor of the influential UNESCO journal *Diogenes* took a taxi to the hotel and booked a room without the help of his Soviet hosts. The next day, he found his own way to the Institute of Oriental Studies and "was shown basically no attention from anyone" throughout the first session of the congress, waiting for almost five hours to register as a speaker and meet with the coordinator of the congress. "The Soviet UNESCO Commission," Tarabaev concluded after telling this story, "should pay attention to or assist and support all UNESCO representatives visiting the USSR (of which, by the way, there are not a lot), which would greatly contribute to strengthening cooperation with UNESCO and facilitate the work of our delegation to UNESCO in Paris."[613]

The next spring, after witnessing the efficient and relatively open bureaucratic mechanisms for travel in Western countries, he criticized the intentionally labyrinthine defenses the Soviet state erected against foreign visitors. Comparing the wall of bureaucratic tape that closed off the USSR from the outside world to the relatively free international mobility existing in the West, he sent a thorough outline of the hurdles impeding the smooth entry of UNESCO emissaries into the USSR for official gatherings considered by UNESCO a required component of sustaining a functioning relationship between member states and the international organization. The Soviet administrator pointed out that the organization of the trips of secretariat

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writer Jorge Luis Borges to his native country. He is also well known for his reflections in *Man, Play and Games*, an analysis of the social function of play and games. Roger Caillois, *Man, Play and Games* (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1961). For a biography and overview of Caillois's work, see the introduction to Claudine Frank, ed., *The Edge of Surrealism: A Roger Caillois Reader* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2003), 1–56. For a brief discussion of his role in popularizing Borges, see J. M. Coetzee, "Borges's Dark Mirror," *The New York Review of Books*, October 22, 1998, http://www.nybooks.com/articles/1998/10/22/borgess-dark-mirror/.

[613] GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 15, ll. 254-55.

members to the “majority” of UNESCO member states did not, “as a rule, pose any kind of difficulties” because of the laxity of immigration rules for making visits to other countries outside of the communist bloc. In such cases, Tarabaev elaborated, a “letter is sent to the country where an employee is going stating the objectives and tasks of the mission, the country responds, and the employee, having a so-called UN Passport (Laissez-Passer) is sent on the mission. Cases of refusal are very rare.” The painlessness of this procedure, he assessed, derived from the fact that “secretariat employees, being from Western countries, as a rule, do not need visas for entry to the majority of Western countries, and they organize trips very simply and often.”

In his quest to obtain clearance for UNESCO officials to go the Soviet Union, Tarabaev had to wander through an opaque maze of nonresponses, waiting periods, unexplained deferments or rejections, and blame shifting—all of which the international organization “often construed as a clear obstacle to the expansion of contacts and relations between the East and West, between UNESCO and countries of the socialist camp.” The bureau typically sent the Soviet UNESCO Commission an official letter one-and-a-half to two months before the proposed trip that contained details on the reason for travel, the length of stay, date of entry, methods of transportations, and biographical information. “I am aware of things and can report,” he scolded the commission, “that practically none of these official letters in this respect have received any kind of answer from the commission, which is clearly at odds with the practice of UNESCO activities.” With no clue as to whether the commission assented to their arrival in the Soviet Union, non-Soviet secretariat employees had to mail their visa application to MID in Moscow at least one month before their planned departure. Since the consulate in the Soviet embassy in Paris doled out visas only once MID got around to evaluating applications and approving them, UNESCO Secretariat representatives routinely obtained their visas, if at all, just

"a few days" before their departure. "It should be noted," Tarabaev remarked to drive the message home, "that receiving visas for entry into other countries of the socialist camp (Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and others) is much better and easier. These countries, as a rule, issue their visas to UNESCO workers after 10-15 days. Cases of refusal basically do not exist." He therefore felt it imperative to "honestly and openly say" to the commission "that the question of the organization of such trips of secretariat employees to the USSR" required "radical changes and improvement" because it was "the most difficult while causing the most talk among UNESCO figures. The thoughts expressed by me," he concluded, "are not expressions of any kind of rebuke of our commission, but only the pursuance of the goal of helping it in its work and its dealing with issues in the organization of trips of employees of the UNESCO Secretariat to the USSR in the near future."[614]

In other words, when the Soviet state could not live up to UNESCO's norms and created obstacles in the work lives of Soviet international civil servants, these specialists nursed a mounting dissatisfaction with their own government's practices and became aware of the weaknesses of the Soviet system in its approach to UNESCO. In contrast to their Soviet higher-ups who demanded UNESCO adjust to the Soviet system in its approach to recruitment and other areas of cooperation, Biriukov and other Soviet UNESCO workers came to take it as *self-evident* that the USSR should take measures to reciprocate the overtures from UNESCO and integrate into the international organizational system by setting up mechanisms for a more reliable exchange with the international organization. Soviet international civil servants relied on the due diligence of the Soviet UNESCO Commission to act as a willing partner and considered it an annoying hindrance in their public lives if the commission did not meet its end of the bargain.

[614] GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 20, ll. 11-15.

Moreover, when the Soviet state compounded this failure to live up to UNESCO's norms of smooth international cooperation with aspirations for total control and supervision of their public work lives, these citizens developed an even greater frustration with their own government that bred discontent among Soviet UNESCO employees against such Soviet meddling in their public roles as international civil servants. The Soviet UNESCO Commission and Delegation moved to suppress what they referred to as instances of "autonomy" among Soviet workers "in relation to the Soviet UNESCO Delegation and the Soviet UNESCO Commission."[615] In January 1964, the commission passed a resolution that forced each Soviet secretariat staff member to abide by six-month "individual work plans" that listed a variety of tasks for each Soviet worker to fulfill and strict deadlines for their completion. Writing up these work plans without any input from Soviet UNESCO employees on the ground, the commission devised each plan and added directions based on their assessment in Moscow of what the Soviet Union wanted from the international organization.[616] The unfeasibility and impracticality of this caused disgruntlement from its inception. "This transition," the Soviet UNESCO Delegation wrote in its annual 1964 report about the introduction of these plans, "did not take place without the resistance of certain Soviet secretariat employees unhappy with the increase of supervision on the part of the delegation over their work in UNESCO." But the delegation assured the commission that the "attempts of individual Soviet secretariat employees to speak against the

[615] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 19, l. 117. "Autonomy" entailed a Soviet UNESCO employee making a decision at any point during his workday that contradicted or did not align closely enough with the stances of the Soviet UNESCO Commission, Delegation, or representatives to the executive board and general conference. For example, the Soviet permanent delegate berated Skorov in May 1963 for agreeing to a proposal made by Bertrand on the inclusion of authors from different countries in a work of collective essays and not criticizing this proposal as harshly as a Soviet representative had done when speaking at the sixty-fifth session of the executive board that year. "The mistake by Skorov is obvious," the delegate complained. And it arose from "his tendency toward 'autonomy' in relation to the Soviet UNESCO Delegation." GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 28, l. 202.

[616] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 26, l. 253; and GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 30, ll. 168-78.

delegation's planning of their work and the supervision of this work as well as [their] correspondence with the center was not met with support from the collective," receiving "a firm rebuke by the leadership . . . of the social organizations (on the level of the UNESCO collective as well as the general professional organization of the colony)."[617]

In short, Soviet specialists in the secretariat unfavorably compared how the Soviet Union related to UNESCO to the smooth and voluntary involvement of other member states, indicating that the international organization compelled Soviet citizens working in its bureaucracy to urge their government to conform to its practices. While Soviet personnel understood the UNESCO Secretariat as a reproduction of the dynamics of the international community in miniature in which the West shaped its rules, they also realized that the USSR had to play by these rules if it wanted to benefit from membership in the international organization. Additionally, the Soviet UNESCO Commission and Delegation could meddle outside the private sphere of the Soviet colony and in the public duties of Soviet international civil servants only to a certain point. Although the state sought to regulate the niceties of their jobs through "planning," Soviet UNESCO employees tended to search for a degree of independence because of the need to act spontaneously to meet the requirements of the international organization. The next section of this chapter will demonstrate how Soviet UNESCO specialists skirted the regulations imposed on them by their Soviet bosses.

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For Soviet UNESCO employees, the foreign work culture and inflexible demands of their Soviet higher-ups combined to make their secretariat jobs burdensomely complex. These contradictory and fluid responsibilities and milieus depressed morale within the Soviet UNESCO

[617] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 29, ll. 330-32; 338-39.

collective. Moreover, this situation led to a normalization of small acts of disobedience among Soviet UNESCO staff members as well as rare but drastic instances of outright rebellion. While the former did not suggest disillusionment with communism or resistance to the Soviet state, the latter laid bare anxieties widely shared by the entire UNESCO cohort that were seldom addressed and never completely resolved.

From 1956 to 1967, nearly every Soviet professional hired by UNESCO voiced feelings of homesickness and a desire to return to the USSR, couching these requests as dissatisfaction with the deprivations of living abroad for an extended period. "In conversations," a MID official reported in 1964, "one hears many times, 'I would rather leave here.'"[618] Soviet international civil servants grew weary of life in Paris because of their own personal or professional circumstances as well as a feeling of superfluity in their administrative jobs in the secretariat. "One of the important tasks of educational work in the collective," the Soviet UNESCO Delegation advised in 1963, "should be the final overcoming of the still present sentiment among Soviet UNESCO employees to leave UNESCO."[619] Unable to locate candidates to replace them, however, the Soviet UNESCO Commission forced those Soviet citizens eager to return to their regular lives for professional, health-related, or familiar reasons to stay at UNESCO against their own will. Tangian, for example, ended up spending almost six years at UNESCO even though his Soviet managers had initially promised him he would work at the international organization for only two years. Several times during his tenure at UNESCO between 1956 and 1962, Tangian beseeched the Soviet UNESCO Commission to relieve him of his position upon the expiration of his two-year contracts. "Having been abroad for a long time, I cannot with all good

[618] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 25, l. 111.

[619] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 19, l. 118.

intentions be fully informed of everything that happens in my profession," he wrote in 1960. Apart from emphasizing the benefits he could bring to education in the USSR, Tangian commented that his wife, who had tagged along with him to Paris, also could not "work in her specialty" abroad. To make matters worse, his son had suffered from chronic sickness since they had left Moscow.[620] Similarly, Zhegalova cited familial reasons for wanting to go home, insisting in 1958 that further time alone in Paris and without her family would "be very difficult" for her.[621] Rejecting her rationale and these entreaties from Tangian, the commission instructed the two secretariat workers to "understand that the Soviet UNESCO Commission cannot accept being deprived of positions in the UNESCO apparatus that were acquired with great effort."[622] In 1960, A. B. Letnev, a translator in the secretariat, attempted to convince the commission to let him go back to the AN SSSR Institute of Africa and Asia. Grumbling that his "repeated requests to leave UNESCO have come to nothing," he advertised his skills as a specialist in the study of the West African "national bourgeoisie" in addition to a proficiency in African languages (Mandingo and Swahili). "Being aware of the great importance of work in international organizations," he assessed, "I am also aware that I am not working where, given the great urgency of the problems of Africa, Africanists are in the greatest need now."[623] Martynovskii also exhibited, in the words of the commission, an "escapist mood," preferring to rejoin the more exciting explorations of the laboratory for refrigeration technology in Odessa (where he had originally worked and continued to advise several graduate students from afar) rather than retain his "clerical" position in UNESCO. In response, the commission reminded the Soviet scientist

[620] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 15, ll. 126-27.

[621] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 11, l. 22.

[622] Ibid., l. 221.

[623] GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 12, l. 217.

that "you, obviously, underestimate the important work you are called to complete. We ask you to understand that, in light of the decisions of the Twenty-Second Congress of the CPSU, the work that you are now doing is not at all less significant than teaching and research."[624]

In spite of these pangs of homesickness, almost all of the Soviet international civil servants at UNESCO bided their time until they received a summons back home. For one Soviet UNESCO employee, however, the onerous demands the Soviet state placed on him became so unbearable that he defected.

In late October 1964, Iu. A. Poliakov, a worker in the Public Relations Division of the Department of Information, stopped by the bar on the first floor of UNESCO headquarters. As he sipped on a cup of a tea, a man sitting nearby with a beer got up and approached him. The stranger, as Poliakov later meticulously recollected in his report to Soviet authorities, was "a large and slightly hunched-over" figure of "approximately 1.75-1.80 meters height" who looked between forty and forty-five years of age; had "an oblong, tanned face with wrinkles"; and sported an outdated pair of brown horn-rimmed glasses, "slicked back" dark hair that was greying, as well as a rose-colored mustache "in the Hitlerian style."[625] In his "large" mouth, Poliakov observed, were "yellowing, dirty teeth—all of irregular shapes and pointing every which way, especially the two upper front ones." Overall, his face struck Poliakov as "typical" but, "as they say," one that he had "seen somewhere before." Wearing a taupe suit, grey vest, a "stale white shirt with a crumpled collar," this "odd-ball," as Poliakov called him, pointed his stubbly fingers at the package of recent editions of Soviet newspapers Poliakov had brought with

[624] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 21, l. 110; and GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 17, l. 200. Martynovskii even found specific professors from his institute in Odessa who would be willing to take his place in UNESCO. Nevertheless, the commission refused his request. GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 12, l. 42.

[625] Poliakov drew the glasses in his report.

him for evening reading and inquired in French as to whether the Soviet secretariat worker read Russian. Upon hearing Poliakov's citizenship and that he served in the secretariat, the man asked if Poliakov knew the whereabouts of V. I. Ponomarev, a Soviet employee of the Administrative Division of the UNESCO Bureau for Administrative Planning and the Budget. In reply to Poliakov's response that he was traveling on business to one of the Scandinavian countries, the man sardonically remarked that "Soviet people" were "ill-informed" and that, "according to his information," Ponomarev was in London and said "'hi' to his comrades." To what he dismissed as Poliakov's "naïve" question as to whether UNESCO had sent Ponomarev to London, the mysterious "chap" (*diadia*) retorted "with a smirk" that Ponomarev's "business trip had finished back in Stockholm" and that he had "'chosen freedom'" by going to London and "resigning" from his UNESCO post.

Poliakov queried his interlocutor about the reasons for Ponomarev's presence in London, if the man had seen Ponomarev in London with his own eyes, and whether he knew of Ponomarev's visit to the British capital because he belonged to the English delegation to the thirteenth session of the UNESCO General Conference, which was to take place in the coming weeks. The man quipped that Ponomarev was in London to "look around and get used to a new life"; he admitted that he had not met Ponomarev but had come to Paris with this message from a "friend"; and he rejoined that no, he did not belong to any delegation and was just "passing through." After Poliakov asked if he came to UNESCO with the express purpose of "passing along a 'hello'" from Ponomarev to Soviet UNESCO employees, the man "chuckled" and responded: "'And do you know why Ponomarev 'stayed'? He expressed dissatisfaction with this here (he pointed at the newspapers with information from Moscow of the resignation of N. Khrushchev) and that the Soviet authorities take half the salary received from UNESCO by you

Soviets. Is this true? Is this fair?'" Poliakov barked back that he had "never heard" of such a procedure for seizing portions of the salaries of Soviet UNESCO employees and that Ponomarev, "in zeal for his new masters," evidently had consumed all kinds of "anti-Soviet tall tales." The conversation went on in this circular fashion for a while longer until the man held out his hand and requested permission to "pass along" a "hello" from the Soviet UNESCO collective back to Ponomarev. Refusing to shake hands with "a traveling salesman for a traitor," the stunned Soviet bureaucrat stormed out of the bar only to realize after a "few minutes" that he had forgotten his newspapers. But when Poliakov returned to collect his items, the man had disappeared. Throughout this tense dialogue, Poliakov remembered, the unknown visitor to UNESCO spoke French "clearly," but also began his statements twice in English. "I believe that all of the above," Poliakov suggestively concluded, "is not an accidental event and that the chap could appear (he or another) among other comrades."[626]

Ponomarev's apparent defection came after a long and uneventful five-year tenure at UNESCO. Beginning work at the international organization in August 1959, he spent his days roaming the halls of UNESCO, conversing with directors and deputy directors in order to compile surveys "with the goal of changes in the program and preparing recommendations for the director-general on staff structure." These recommendations entailed the devising of plans for the reclassification of ranks, the freezing of hiring, and the elimination of "excess" positions in the secretariat. For the Soviet UNESCO Commission, Ponomarev used his bailiwick to level the playing field between the West and communist countries in UNESCO recruitment while also cultivating a "broad circle of acquaintances" from which he could extract intelligence on UNESCO deliberations that informed the commission as they devised strategies on how to

[626] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 28, ll. 62-65.

approach the UNESCO program and budget. On the whole, the UNESCO bureaucrat earned favorable marks from his Soviet taskmasters but suffered repeated chidings from them for his hesitance to vigorously agitate the Soviet cause in the secretariat and behaving "too 'modestly,'" or without the "initiative" and "persistence" incumbent on him.[627]

In hindsight, this unwillingness to push the Soviet line may have betrayed a festering disenchantment with the intrusiveness of his Soviet masters rather than merely a personality quirk. In the spring of 1964, six months before his defection, the Soviet UNESCO Delegation twice requested that the Soviet UNESCO Commission call Ponomarev home as soon as possible after hearing that Ponomarev had done "poor" work in his new position in the Department of Education, where he had been transferred earlier that year. Apparently, the delegation also worried that Ponomarev's discipline was "decaying" because he had repeatedly embarked on business trips without alerting them. Much to the chagrin of the delegation, the Soviet UNESCO Commission, keen to avoid depleting the UNESCO collective in the run up to the general conference that fall, refused to summon Ponomarev, ordering him in September to return to the USSR on October 23, or seven months before his UNESCO contract expired in May 1965.[628]

Hoarding three-months of dues he owed to the Soviet state from his UNESCO salary for future use during his escape, Ponomarev prepared for his journey into the unknown.[629] But "to the last minute," one of his fellow Soviet UNESCO employees remembered, Ponomarev pretended to return to the Soviet Union, "registering for an apartment and buying furniture" in Moscow. Although his conference in Stockholm lasted from September 20 to September 26,

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[627] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 16, l. 69; and GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 21, ll. 38-44; 114.

[628] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 28, ll. 74-75.

[629] In September, the UNESCO profbiuro had also formally censured Ponomarev for withholding the money he owed the Soviet embassy. Ibid., l. 67.

Ponomarev, the Soviet permanent delegate claimed, "covered his tracks" by reporting to Soviet officials that he also intended to travel to Copenhagen until October 5. Instead of going to the Danish capital, he was last seen at the conference in Sweden on September 26. At a UNESCO reception on the day of his expected return to Paris, an American in the secretariat told a Soviet colleague that Ponomarev had failed to show up to work. The next day, the Soviet UNESCO Delegation, unsure as to whether the Soviet bureaucrat had definitively defected, informed Moscow of these rumors. On October 9, Ponomarev's wife came to the delegation to "express concern about her husband." Realizing their worst fears had come to fruition, the delegation quickly escorted her to Moscow and began a long campaign to press the UNESCO leadership, who they suspected knew of Ponomarev's whereabouts, to reveal where he had fled.[630]

On October 19, Director-General Maheu found on his desk a letter written in English in which Ponomarev explained his defection by citing his gripes with the control the Soviet UNESCO Delegation wielded over his life in Paris. Just as Leff had forsaken the capitalist world because of the American government's demand that he return to his native country, Ponomarev divulged to Maheu how the decisions of his Soviet handlers to call him home had impacted his decision-making. "[The Soviet UNESCO Delegation] (Vakroushev [sic], with Pavlov's eyes shut)," he clarified, "succeeded in putting me in a bad light in the eyes of my superiors in Moscow and made me 'persona non-grata.' They then caused me to write first of all to the chairman of . . . [the Soviet UNESCO Commission] and then to the chief of PER [Bureau of Personnel], asking to resign my post." Portraying himself as a loyal international civil servant calling out his country for violating the norms of the international civil service, Ponomarev alerted Maheu that Soviet officials had overruled his personal resolve to stay on at UNESCO. "I

[630] Ibid., ll. 66; 69; 82.

must state emphatically," he continued, "that at no time did I wish to resign. I loved my work at UNESCO and wished to continue in it. For a long time," Ponomarev revealed to Maheu, "I had been becoming more and more disillusioned with the conduct of affairs in the USSR, but this action of the Soviet UNESCO Delegation brought matters to a head. I know that the only safe thing for me to do was to remain in the West where I knew I should be free." Ponomarev then exhaustively explained his primary reason for forfeiting his Soviet citizenship—the extraction of levies from his UNESCO salary by MID. Informing Maheu of the system each Soviet secretariat worker dealt with when surrendering part of their pay to the Soviet embassy, he attached a table demonstrating how much money his government had taken from him during his employment with UNESCO. Requesting that UNESCO consider this a "tax" on his payments when the UNESCO financial office calculated remaining funds owed to him, he asked UNESCO to transfer this sum to the Chemical Bank, New York Trust Company at UN headquarters in New York.[631]

On November 3, ten days after Poliakov's bizarre run-in at the UNESCO bar, the attaché of the Soviet embassy paid a visit to Maheu to discuss the Ponomarev affair. As in other documented defections, the Soviet official sought to shame its prodigal subject and those suspected of playing a part in his escape, passing along to Maheu a letter supposedly written by Ponomarev's wife asking after the "fate of her husband." As the attaché subsequently reported, the director-general claimed that as the executive of an international organization "he could not and does not have the right to keep track of and interfere in the personal lives of UNESCO bureaucrats." But after rereading the letter, Maheu admitted to the attaché that he had unsuccessfully sought to learn where Ponomarev had gone by sending a letter to the Swedish

[631] Vladimir Il'ich Ponomarev, Letter to Director-General René Maheu, October 15, 1964, 1–8, AG 8: CAB/1/8, UNESCO Archives.

ambassador to France. Additionally, Maheu disclosed that he had not only received a letter from Ponomarev two weeks earlier, but had also done some sleuthing and learned from UNESCO personnel who worked with Ponomarev that he was a "withdrawn," quiet man who "several times" had mentioned "he would like to work permanently at UNESCO." Maheu then composed a letter to Ponomarev's wife expressing regret that he did not know what had happened to her husband. The Soviet embassy forwarded a copy of this letter, along with the attaché's record of the conversation, to the KGB.[632] Later on, employees from the Soviet consulate went to the apartment of the Ponomarev couple in Paris; inspected the eight boxes containing their household items (clothing, shoes, books, etc.); confiscated those items that clearly belonged exclusively to Ponomarev as compensation for the money he owed to the Soviet state from his UNESCO salary; and shipped what remained to his wife in Moscow.[633]

On November 11, Vinogradov, the Soviet ambassador to France, summoned all members of the UNESCO collective to the embassy for a reflection on the causes of Ponomarev's defection. "This treacherous act," Vinogradov declared to those assembled, "is a stain on our entire organization in France. It is even more unpleasant that we have never had such instances. Today, we must determine the reasons for such an action and draw conclusions so that in the future this will not be permitted."[634] Many Soviet UNESCO employees, who learned of the defection through press reports, made clear their outrage at the delegation and embassy for keeping them in the dark about the recent events.[635] Diplomatic personnel used their time with Soviet UNESCO staff to instruct them on how to deal with what they described as an

[632] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 28, ll. 56-60a.

[633] Ibid., ll. 84-85.

[634] Ibid., l. 66.

[635] Ibid., l. 74.

embarrassing moment for both the Soviet contingent in Paris and the Soviet Union in the international arena. The flight of Ponomarev came in the weeks before what Soviet UNESCO intermediaries expected to be a high point in their relations with UNESCO. Recently, the Soviet UNESCO detachment had rejoiced over the decision of the international organization to select N. M. Sisakian, a Soviet Armenian biochemist at AN SSSR, to serve as president of the UNESCO General Conference, which began fifteen days after Ponomarev failed to surface in Paris. "It is too bad," one UNESCO worker observed, "that this betrayal took place right now when we are having great successes in UNESCO. Our scholar was chosen as president of the general conference. Our influence has increased in some parts of UNESCO."[636] Because Ponomarev did not have access to "encrypted correspondence" or "state secrets" (i.e., he was not an official agent of a Soviet intelligence organization working under the cover of the international civil service), Soviet authorities focused their worries on how his absconsion would undermine the reputation of the USSR.[637] Vinogradov identified the process equalizing UNESCO salaries with

[636] Ibid., l. 76.

[637] Ibid., l. 69. UNESCO, along with other international organizations, offered the USSR and other countries a convenient place to put their intelligence agents. Cryptic references to several Soviet UNESCO employees knowing how to keep "state secrets" appear in a handful of annual evaluations of their work performance. However, I only came across such an allusion for one or two of the Soviet citizens working at UNESCO at any given time. Nevertheless, the little evidence available on the presence of agents of Western and communist intelligence services in UNESCO suggests that the international organization functioned as a major outpost for capitalist states eager to either spy on each other or communist activities in France as well as communist countries keen on gaining information on the governments of Western Europe and NATO headquarters (SHAPE), which was located in Paris until 1967 and then relocated to nearby Brussels. In 1957, for example, an official in the French government, according to the Soviet UNESCO Delegation, tried to "recruit" a Soviet member of the UNESCO Secretariat who was subsequently sent home for "violations of discipline." In 1965, a French UNESCO employee reported to a Soviet colleague that another French UNESCO worker had been approached by French intelligence services and asked to report on "everything interesting from her point of view" in conversations she had with "representatives of socialist countries." Apparently, the woman refused. GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 14, l. 12; and GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 30, l. 115. In 1969, a more spectacular espionage incident rocked the international organization. That summer, a Romanian employee of the UNESCO Secretariat by the name of Iacobescu failed to arrive in his home country on vacation from his UNESCO job. As the UNESCO director-general soon learned, the *Direction de la surveillance du territoire* (DST), the French agency responsible for domestic counterintelligence, had arrested Iacobescu in August for espionage and kept him in solitary confinement at the Santé prison in Paris. According to the DST, Iacosbescu had served as the chief handler of a French employee of NATO who had acted as a mole inside the headquarters of the Western alliance for Iacobescu and the Romanian government. The DST had also arrested a member of the

those of Soviet diplomats as the most damaging piece of intelligence Westerners would obtain from Ponomarev given his disgruntlement over this arrangement. "This is not that bad," he reassured his audience, since, "in the end," the surrendering of payments by Soviet secretariat staff to the Soviet embassy was "their business" and not that of the secretariat. With respect to the repercussions of the event on the image of the USSR on the world stage, Vinogradov reasoned, "the press will not write much about Ponomarev. He is minor and the harm to our government is small. He is being used mainly as propaganda."[638]

Nevertheless, since the British Home Office had announced the day before the meeting at the embassy that it would grant Ponomarev asylum, the ambassador and the Soviet permanent delegate warned the UNESCO crew that they would have to weather "questions of a provocative nature" from the press and probing by members of foreign intelligence services such as the individual who had accosted Poliakov.[639] To prepare them for this onslaught, Pavlov and

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Romanian UNESCO Delegation for his involvement in this spy ring as well as a Frenchman who later committed suicide. Because Iacobescu had given the names of other individuals involved in the espionage operation, French authorities eventually released him in October on the condition that he leave France and return to Romania immediately. However, soon after his release, he was mysteriously killed in a car crash in France. No evidence exists that Ponomarev was officially involved in such clandestine operations. Yet as I demonstrated in chapter 5, to a certain extent, *all* Soviet citizens employed by international organizations essentially acted as unofficial spies for their government, passing along a steady stream of restricted information and pilfered documents in violation of their obligations as international civil servants. However, this role greatly differed from the gathering of classified intelligence from foreign governments. Office of the Director-General, "Affaire Iacobescu," October 17, 1969, 1–6, AG 8: CAB/1/8, UNESCO Archives.

[638] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 28, l. 70.

[639] Ibid., l. 66. Indeed, the French press would soon make a sensation out of the Ponomarev story, prowling around UNESCO headquarters in search of sources privy to the case. When an adviser to the Soviet UNESCO Delegation met with the president of the UNESCO STA, he sought assurances that non-Soviet secretariat workers would refuse to talk to reporters. The STA president assured him, in the words of the adviser, that the newspaper "*France-Soir* had received all information and also the photograph of Ponomarev from the police" and not from the international organization. He added that some in French society wanted to politicize the incident. "In the words of one of the correspondents of this newspaper," the adviser recalled of the STA President's comments, "certain French circles 'want to make this case a political matter.'" The STA president had hinted they would do so by casting all Soviet secretariat personnel as spies: "In the beginning there were even plans to show that many Soviet employees supposedly are 'not at all' involved in UNESCO matters, yet these circles rejected this plan after the intervention of Maheu, who supposedly opposed these plans." The STA president also told the Soviet adviser that the "vast majority" of UNESCO personnel "condemned" Ponomarev. Although "there were those who 'gloated somewhat,' these . . . were 'very small.'" Ibid., ll. 86-88.

Vinogradov gave the UNESCO cohort four directives on how to comport themselves when foreigners "inquire about this traitor": first, "do not make a tragedy of this"; second, "do not make any contacts with Ponomarev and rebuff attempts by Western intelligence to mediate in the establishment of such contacts"; third, "say to those who will begin sympathetic conversations about Ponomarev, that 'it serves him right,' that we have no business with traitors or betrayers and do not want to have any"; and fourth, "do not answer questions about the system of deductions" from the salaries of Soviet UNESCO employees.[640]

In terms of the longer lasting implications, however, the comments made by Soviet UNESCO employees and diplomatic officials in the course of this meeting reveal an unspoken concern that the motivations driving Ponomarev to take his drastic leap into the unknown were not the symptoms of one anomalous Soviet "traitor," but anxieties widely shared among all Soviet UNESCO personnel who lived and worked under the dual power structures and ethical regimes imposed on them by the Soviet state and the international organization. Rather than focusing on how to adjust the rules governing Soviet citizens abroad to lessen such apprehensions, the gathering became a ritual designed to reaffirm, through a collective condemnation of the defection, the necessity of these rules. Those assembled isolated the causes of this defection to the person of Ponomarev (by combing through his past to unearth overlooked misbehavior) and deflected blame onto others for the incident without altering the status quo.

Soviet UNESCO workers wracked their brains for evidence that would prove Ponomarev represented an anomaly among an otherwise tightly knit fraternity. As the person entrusted to shore up this collective, Soviet Permanent Delegate Pavlov set the tone and laid out the key premise of the meeting—namely, that Ponomarev must have been an impostor all along and that

[640] Ibid., l. 69.

his crime derived from a carefully concealed but deep-seated pathology rather than a spur-of-the-moment decision. "In reality, [Ponomarev] was a stranger to us, a hostile man, skillfully wearing the mask of a Soviet man and communist." Despite this mask, Pavlov argued that he could discern in hindsight some clues of Ponomarev's true personality, including his "greed" for money.[641] Furthermore, he disputed the claim of the stranger in the UNESCO bar that Ponomarev had resolved to abandon the USSR because of the recent "change in leadership," noting that the ouster of Khrushchev had occurred on October 14 while Ponomarev had left for Great Britain by the end of September.[642] Others distanced themselves from their former comrade by stressing that they "did not like him," highlighting his penchant for "money grubbing" in the form of withholding cash from the embassy cashier; his grumblings about a lack of access to a car, travel restrictions and the premature departure imposed on him; his aloofness or status as an "unusual man" who "rarely" took part in the social activities of the Soviet UNESCO Delegation and always went "somewhere alone"; as well as his bad reputation among non-Soviet members of the secretariat as a "loafer" who performed his functions in UNESCO "poorly." Kovda suggested that Soviet workers should have listened to their Western colleagues in the secretariat when they had called Ponomarev "lazy." Perhaps, he mused, the Soviet side had reacted in a self-defeating manner by shrugging such criticism off as anti-Soviet hostility. "This was construed," he recalled, "as ill-will toward our employee. I share responsibility with those who knew about this." [643]

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[641] Ibid., l. 67.

[642] Ibid., l. 68. The removal of Khrushchev from office was not announced to the public until October 16. For the date of Khrushchev's ouster and its public announcement in *Pravda*, see: Taubman, *Khrushchev*, 620.

[643] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 28, ll. 70; 72; 76; 78-79.

At the same time, multiple attendees expressed surprise at the absence of any omens of Ponomarev's apostasy. "Ponomarev always seemed outwardly observant and loved to teach others," Kovda admitted in spite of this criticism. "He created the impression of a keen observer. I cannot remember an instance that would cause a feeling of suspicion with respect to him."[644] Alarmingly, the question arose as to whether most of the Soviet secretariat detachment had exhibited the conduct that supposedly set Ponomarev apart. A. S. Kisel', an adviser to the Soviet UNESCO Delegation, listed the sins shared by others in the room:

> 1) He never paid deductions on time. . . . But others do this. It is insufficient to make political conclusions. 2) He never paid his trade-union dues on time, but others also do this. 3) His [travel] routes were chosen arbitrarily . . . but among us there are others who do this. This means that this is not enough to suspect him. 4) His trips abroad were incorrectly registered in the record book. But this happens with us sometimes.[645]

The top diplomatic officers participating in the review feared that the habitual transgression of the codes regulating their subordinates signified their deeper transformation from Soviet subjects into international civil servants. "We are Soviet people in UNESCO—representatives of our country first and foremost, and then international civil servants," Ambassador Vinogradov impressed on those present. "This is a fundamental matter of principle, it is bad if a Soviet person thinks of himself as only an international civil servant."[646] Romanovskii, the chairman of the Soviet UNESCO Commission who had traveled to Paris for the conference, assured the Soviet secretariat group that their government valued their service precisely because it carried a risk of contamination by foreign ideologies. "Sometimes," he judged of the morale of his underlings, "an underestimation of comrades' work slips into your

[644] Ibid., l. 76.

[645] Ibid., l. 78.

[646] Ibid., l. 70.

statements. All you do is extremely necessary and important for state affairs. You work in difficult conditions and are surrounded by enemies, thus your work is all the more important and serious." Romanovskii also piled on to the critique put forward by Vinogradov, worrying that Soviet secretariat specialists had begun unconsciously to assimilate to the culture of the international organization surrounding them. "There are among you comrades," he detected, "who consider themselves international civil servants. But from the minute that they begin to think of you as only bureaucrats and not communists, there is nothing for you to do in UNESCO. We must think of you as Soviet people and communists. If you are only bureaucrats, you do not suit us." Rather than prioritizing their Soviet missions, these Soviet professionals, in the opinion of Romanovskii, had slowly begun to view their Soviet superiors and the marching orders they received from them as bothersome distractions from their jobs at UNESCO. In short: "There is a kind of sickness in our employees in the UNESCO Secretariat," he continued. "They think of themselves as international civil servants and the Soviet UNESCO Delegation as something like an overseer (*nadziratel'*) of these secretariat employees. This is not right." Because of a need to negotiate their daily lives in the secretariat, they had allowed the ethical regime and values of the international civil service to shape their actions, dilute their senses of Soviet selfhood, and instill in them an unhealthy and even dangerous "individualism" or "autonomy" antithetical to the Soviet notion of an obedient and unified Soviet collective. "Our secretariat employees go to work in UNESCO, getting assignments from the Soviet UNESCO Delegation," Romanovskii further commented. "That's how it should be, but it's not. . . . Some of our secretariat employees don't want to maintain regular contact with the delegation. Perhaps I'm mistaken. In any case, our people working here are good but they still don't have the needed unity and discipline."[647]

[647] Ibid., ll. 72-73.

Several Soviet secretariat workers pushed back against these accusations. “This case is exceptional,” one piped in. “We secretariat employees are members of a union and only in a technical sense international civil servants.”[648] Another stated that no division existed between those in the UNESCO bureaucracy and the delegation but undermined this assertion by castigating the delegation for not alerting them of the defection.[649] Vinogradov overruled these dissensions. “We need UNESCO more than UNESCO needs us,” he stressed. “We do not need, of course, to complicate our relations, but the main thing is that we defend our interests working in UNESCO. Why do we send our people to UNESCO if they turn into bureaucrats there?”[650]

No one among those assembled could come up with a solution to this problem. While a few contributors reiterated the requirement that each Soviet UNESCO employee comply with the frequently broken regulations for Soviet citizens abroad (prior approval and registration of travel; the maintenance of contact with the Soviet embassy in the country visited; the timely relinquishment of outstanding arrears, etc.), others contested the appropriateness of intensifying punishment for breaking these rules. A diplomat in attendance disagreed with the “necessity of imposing penalties in the trade-union procedure on comrades who have committed a violation,” proposing instead more “comradely criticism” through education and friendly “prompting” whenever someone witnessed misbehavior among their fellow countrymen. A handful of others echoed this vague remedy, calling for one-on-one talks with those showing “insufficiencies” as well as increased “solidarity” and “friendship” in the collective.[651] “Work in UNESCO is peculiar,” a Soviet secretariat specialist emphasized. “Often, we are surrounded by foreigners,

[648] Ibid., l. 80.

[649] Ibid., l. 74.

[650] Ibid., l. 83.

[651] Ibid., ll. 69; 80.

we sit alone at work. Our people, working in such an environment, should be checked up on, but they should be trusted."[652] Adjourning the meeting, Ambassador Vinogradov endorsed this antidote. Underscoring that the Soviet state did "trust" its people in the secretariat, he encouraged them to "rally the collective" and "better know and help each other" so that the "collective is cohesive and united."[653] These appeals for more "comradely criticism" and "prompting" carried not so subtle hints of an escalation in what historian Anne Gorsuch describes in her study of Soviet tourists as pervasive "mutual surveillance" indicative of a prioritization of "discipline over independence" in Soviet travel to the capitalist West. Yet the pleas for having "trust" in Soviet UNESCO staff members indicates that Soviet citizens in the secretariat expected their state to grant them a degree of responsibility for their own ideological maintenance very different from the constant minding Soviet tourists were subject to during their briefer stays abroad.[654]

In spite of these calls, a blame game erupted in a series of letters over the next two months over whether loose supervision by the delegation or inadequate political preparation in Moscow by the Soviet UNESCO Commission had precipitated the whole debacle. The delegation chastised the commission for ignoring its entreaties that Ponomarev resign from UNESCO before the general conference. Soviet Permanent Delegate Pavlov also accused the secretary of the Soviet UNESCO Commission of purposefully declining these pleas because of an alleged "close, friendly relationship" between his family and that of Ponomarev, proposing a review of how the commission vetted candidates for UNESCO positions. Retorting that they knew of the "shortcomings and mistakes in the selection of cadres," the commission argued for a

[652] Ibid., l. 75.

[653] Ibid., l. 83.

[654] Gorsuch, *All This Is Your World*, 119.

"careful and comprehensive study of recommended candidates" in order to make sure that "all of those without exception" sent to UNESCO had accrued experience in "life and practical activity––in party organs, the state apparatus, foreign institutions and organizations." At the same time, the commission faulted the delegation for "major insufficiencies in political-educational work, . . . a conciliatory attitude toward violations of discipline, an absence of a real struggle to strengthen discipline, and insufficient attention to comrades at work in UNESCO."[655]

Notwithstanding intangible moves toward more "vigilance" and "solidarity," Soviet authorities could do little to solve the dilemma in their campaign to populate the secretariats of international organizations with unflinching devotees—the conflict between the *foreign* culture of international organizations into which they had pushed their people headfirst and the *antiforeign* cloistered collective they sought to preserve.

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The Soviet state defined foreign and antiforeign behavior for its international civil servants, delineating the border between an imagined Soviet community in the heart of Paris and a hostile, outside "other" existing only as a product of their own conception of how their citizens should comport themselves. Good behavior consisted of abiding by the rules for conduct abroad; attending the social and cultural events of the Soviet colony; and following the impractical orders that Soviet officials composed in Moscow with little attention to the complex social relations of the UNESCO Secretariat. This conception of propriety and impropriety determined the outer limits of the "Soviet colony" on the basis of individual conduct rather than geographical or spatial boundaries. Put differently, these Soviet UNESCO employees experienced the bipolarity of the Cold War not only as an abstract battle between capitalist and communist countries, but

[655] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 29, ll. 44-45.

also as a bifurcation of their lives into the permissible and forbidden. Like the Iron Curtain, however, the partition separating anti-Soviet and Soviet ways of being turned out to be quite permeable. If foreign products, ideologies, and lifestyles made their way from West to East in the broader Cold War of cultures, Soviet international civil servants could step back-and-forth over the fluid line demarcating East and West in their own lives (by not registering their travel; withholding funds owed to the Soviet state to purchase illicit goods on what could be called the "black market" of Paris; and displaying "autonomy" by ignoring the directives of Soviet authorities) as long as those policing this line either remained unaware of these transgressions or refrained from punishing them for it. Soviet international civil servants lived in an inverted world in which the Soviet culture dominant at home functioned as a subculture under siege from the surrounding foreignness of the West and an international organization that competed with the Soviet colony to monopolize their lives. As Gorsuch notes of Soviet travel to the West in the 1950s and 1960s, the experience of Soviet nationals abroad reflects the broader paradoxical nature of the "Thaw" as characterized by "optimistic opening" but also "anxiously authoritarian" impulses—as a time during which the Soviet Union began to approach their people as "responsible and reliable" enough to witness the foreign world while still worrying that "these very changes permitted . . . behaviors and beliefs which threatened to outrun a sometimes apprehensive regime."[656]

Rather than insulating Soviet international civil servants from the threat of corruption by non-Soviet elements, the "authoritarian" aspects of the Soviet disciplinary regime did not operate as consistently or constantly as the Soviet UNESCO Delegation claimed in its reports. The enforcement of the coercive features of Soviet governance abroad took place haphazardly and

[656] Gorsuch, *All This Is Your World*, 4.

annoyed these employees because of its arbitrariness. To survive under the dual ethical regimes and power structures of UNESCO and the Soviet state-party apparatus, Soviet professionals had no choice but to break the rules made up in Moscow and commit small acts of disobedience on a daily basis because these rules did not reflect the routine dilemmas, ambiguities, and contingencies inherent in their lives as Soviet international civil servants. In other words, Soviet standards of behavior engendered noncompliance in every action they sought to regulate. So long as their Soviet superiors resisted adjusting their expectations and definition of communist purity to the daily realities their subjects had to negotiate, they risked incurring a spectrum of delinquency, the severity of which depended on the extent of success Soviet international civil servants achieved in playing the contradictory parts UNESCO and the USSR demanded of them.

Minute misbehaviors did not mean an outright rebellion against the communist cause. While many of their fellow comrades back home dressed in Western fashion, traded in Western material items, and pondered Western ideas while still participating as active citizens in Soviet social and political life, most Soviet UNESCO employees ventured outside the permissible without ever exhibiting signs of an outright rejection of the underlying ideology or legitimacy of their native land.[657] With a few exceptions, all Soviet professionals dispatched to UNESCO from 1956 to 1967 returned to their permanent career trajectories as scholars, teachers, or diplomats once their time at the international organization had come to an end. A few went on to bigger and better things in the international arena, drawing on their lessons learned at UNESCO in the 1950s and 1960s as they took on more powerful positions in the UN system. Before moving on to Washington and his more famous role as ambassador to the United States in 1986, Dubinin briefly served as the Soviet ambassador to the UN. Tangian ended up repeatedly returning to

[657] Yurchak best describes the place of the West in Soviet domestic society under "late socialism." Yurchak, *Everything Was Forever Until It Was No More*, 158-206.

UNESCO over the subsequent decades. The Soviet UNESCO Commission recruited him to assist in shaping Soviet policy toward UNESCO in Moscow following the expiration of his contract in 1962. After 1964, and throughout the 1970s and 1980s, he went back to UNESCO for a higher spot in the Department of Education; ascended to the post of UNESCO deputy director-general; published a book on UNESCO; and drew on his time at the organization to contribute to a Soviet encyclopedia on Africa.[658] Other former Soviet UNESCO employees faded into obscurity. Having hob knobbed with the elite diplomats of the world and contributed to the drafting of international treaties for three years, Zhegalova retired in late 1959 to a tiny, cramped sixteen-square-meter apartment on the Sukharevskaia stretch of Moscow's Garden Ring, where she lived with her daughter, son-in-law, and granddaughter. In January 1960, she took advantage of her international résumé, writing to the Soviet UNESCO Commission a request for help in finding a better living space. Finally, in September 1961, the deputy chair of the commission appealed to the Council of Worker's Deputies of the Dzerzhinskii District to aid in her relocation on account of her age, ill health, and "extensive and useful work" in the international organization. This request originated in the personal intervention of Ambassador Vinogradov in the matter. In a letter to the commission, the envoy vouched for her as someone who proved to be an "exceptionally capable and dedicated worker" in "such a difficult organization as

[658] For a brief description of Tangian's time at UNESCO, see N. M. Kanaev, *Dorogami IuNESKO: Vospominaniia diplomata* (Moskva: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 2006), 259. For his book on UNESCO and the encyclopedia he contributed to, see S. A. Tangian, *Razvivaiushchiesia strany: obrazovanie i IuNESKO* (Moskva: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1973); and A. A. Gromyko and V. M. Vasev, eds., *Afrika: Entsiklopedicheskii spravochnik* (Moskva: Sovetskskaia entsiklopediia, 1986). In 2004, Tangian wrote another monograph, *Neoliberal Globalization: The Crisis of Capitalism or the Americanization of the Planet?*, in which the seventy-eight-year-old scholar relied heavily on UNESCO sources to take a critical look at the consequences of a unipolar, post-Cold War world. S. A. Tangian, *Neoliberal'naia globalizatsiia: Krizis kapitalizma ili amerikanizatsiia planety?* (Moskva: Sovremennaia ekonomika i pravo, 2004).

UNESCO."[659] Evidently, the ambiguous status of Soviet international civil servant had some long-lasting perks.

[659] The former secretary of the Soviet UNESCO Delegation requested similar assistance. GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 4, l. 257; and GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 17, ll. 151; 153-54.

SECTION 3

“A WINDOW OPEN ON THE WORLD”: SOVIET CITIZENS AND THE INTERNATIONAL PUBLICS OF UNESCO, 1955-1967

In 1959, A. A. Zvorykin, a former deputy editor of *Bol'shaia sovetskaia entsiklopediia* (The Great Soviet Encyclopedia, or BSE), wrote a lengthy and impassioned letter to the editor of the French newspaper *Le Monde*. Responding to a series of articles spotlighting the USSR by a French writer who had recently traveled to the communist country, the Soviet academician rebutted the author's characterization of the Soviet Union as an empty, careerist society by recalling an encounter he had with a Tatar man on a train from Moscow to Kuibyshev. In the course of their discussion, the man had asked Zvorykin to define the meaning of "culture" because his wife had accused him of lacking it. "Tell me, what is culture?" The Tatar queried. "Is it correct pronunciation, knowing how to dress, how to behave? I think that culture is the inner world of a man, his dignity, his worthiness of being called a man." In his letter, Zvorykin expressed agreement with the stranger on the train and admonished the French writer for portraying the Soviet people as "spiritual monstrosities" devoid of inner worlds. Because of their humility, Soviet citizens who enthusiastically joined communist brigades in the Virgin Lands Campaign, or who "gave all their strength, knowledge, and life" to defeat the Nazis, had not disclosed their "intimate thoughts and experiences" to the French visitor. But his compatriots, Zvorykin maintained, were "a people of big ideas," sacrificing everything to build a communist society. "Soviet people wear coats that are not as short as those in Paris," he continued, "they wear shoes with heels different from those worn by Parisians, but can one really assign the Soviet world to prehistory, and the European countries to history on the basis of this?"[660]

Zvorykin's riposte, which he sent to the Soviet UNESCO Commission unsolicited, evinced a raw emotion and originality quite unlike the diatribes in official Soviet journals directed at Western intellectuals. The letter clearly manifested his desire to convince Westerners

[660] GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 20, ll. 90-95.

of the positive qualities of the Soviet citizenry. “If the author of the articles and the editorship had the goal of helping readers understand the ‘Soviet enigma,’ then my comments could be useful to the author and to readers,” Zvorykin submitted. “If the author deliberately distorted Soviet reality, then I, using the rules of *Le Monde*, would like to speak out against these distortions, especially since *Le Monde* editors should be interested in helping French readers understand Soviet reality.”[661]

But Zvorykin would have never read the *Le Monde* articles if he had not traveled to Paris that year for a meeting of the international commission of UNESCO’s “Project for a History of the Scientific and Cultural Development of Mankind,” a collaborative project that brought together historians from different countries to write a single, unified narrative of world history from the ancient civilizations through the first half of the twentieth century. Incorporating Zvorykin and other Soviet citizens into global discussions inspired by UNESCO’s Western internationalist ethos, such UNESCO collaborative projects, as well as the organization’s conferences and publications, opened up opportunities for Soviet nationals to engage the foreign world, experiment with its intellectual products, and serve an internationalist ideal in ways unimaginable during the late Stalinist era.

The final section of this dissertation explores Soviet participation in this array of eclectic activities put on by the UNESCO Secretariat, which determined not only the themes of these events but also the settings and rules governing them. I show that these activities constituted international publics in which Soviet citizens from a variety of professions conversed in-person or through UNESCO publications on a range of international topics as well as on issues pertaining to their fields of specialization. At UNESCO events and through UNESCO

[661] Ibid., l. 89.

publications, Soviet citizens joined what I call an international public sphere and an international reading public respectively. In these publics, Soviet citizens spoke from their own subjective perspectives when confronted with new ideas or contingencies, thereby asserting their right to membership in these publics as individuals possessing their own opinions. Given their reliance on government support and the participation of illiberal states, UNESCO's spaces for international interaction and Soviet comportment in them do not represent a mirror image of the prescriptive models of a "transnational public sphere" or "global civil society" envisioned by social theorists as critical oppositions to national or global governing entities in the age of globalization.[662] But I maintain that UNESCO publics provided Soviet citizens a space in which they could become public intellectuals representing the interests of their country while critically reappraising the Soviet state and society. Adding diversity to the voices heard in these international publics, Soviet participants in UNESCO events contributed to international discourses in education, science, and culture.

If Soviet bilateral exchanges underscored Soviet friendship with specific countries, UNESCO activities offered Soviet citizens a means of being internationally minded, incorporating them into a community encompassing all nations. These initiatives included them in collective efforts to improve the world in a variety of ways and in the spirit of an internationalism sharing the same ideals with the proletarian solidarity at the heart of the USSR's worldview but using different means to attain them. Soviet citizens found in UNESCO's multilateral program a way of acting simultaneously on behalf of the USSR and a broader internationalist notion of a common world good. In other words, they became both Soviet

[662] These theoretical studies envision what "must" or "should" take place to have a "true" transnational public sphere. In contrast, I approach UNESCO's publics as works in progress. See: Nancy Fraser, "Transnationalizing the Public Sphere: On the Legitimacy and Efficacy of Public Opinion in a Post-Westphalian World," in *Transnationalizing the Public Sphere*, ed. Kate Nash (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2014), 8–42.

citizens and citizens of the world. In order to succeed in these activities, however, the USSR had to align its practices with the standards of UNESCO and thus further conform to UNESCO norms for international intellectual cooperation. Taken together, these diverse UNESCO ventures involved Soviet nationals in the intensifying transnational flow of knowledge in the second half of the twentieth century.

Although Western bureaucrats continued to define the culture and practices fashioning these publics through the end of the 1960s, the USSR, by the early 1960s, rivaled Western member states in the number of UNESCO conferences it hosted, the amount of written materials it submitted to UNESCO publications, and the size of its contingent of experts sent to weakly-developed countries through UNESCO.[663] Once it had resolved to stay in the international organization after the debates in the 1950s over the value of UNESCO (discussed in chapter 2), the communist country attained a stronger position in the organization than in any other UN specialized agency thanks to the tireless work of the Soviet UNESCO Commission and Delegation as well as the Soviet international civil servants profiled in section 2. But the ability of the West to dictate the terms of the international organizational system attenuated the impact of these gains on international affairs. As soon as the Soviet Union had a degree of influence in UNESCO, the United States sought to diminish the significance of the UN specialized agency by creating or reinvigorating international organizations still dominated by the West. These organizations either challenged UNESCO's monopoly over international educational cooperation or coopted the UN organ for their own purposes. In the 1960s, the US also launched intensive bilateral programs to compete with UNESCO in the increasingly important sphere of educational technical assistance as decolonization gathered pace. Despite their criticisms of the international

[663] Throughout this chapter, I use the Soviet term "weakly-developed countries" (*slaborazvitye strany*) to refer to all non-Western countries.

organization, Soviet officials therefore defended UNESCO against these new competitors, viewing it as their best chance to shape multilateral educational, scientific, and cultural diplomacy.

Chapter 7 contains both a detailed case study and an overview of the Soviet experience of the emerging international public sphere promoted by UNESCO. The first half of the chapter tells the story of Zvorykin's part in the writing of the *History of Mankind*. In the second half of the chapter, I analyze how the USSR sought to relocate a portion of the events constituting the international public sphere outside the West. Chapter 8 shifts focus to the international reading public engendered by UNESCO through the books, popular magazines, specialized journals, and other materials it disseminated worldwide. Finally, chapter 9 assesses Soviet performance in UNESCO's educational technical assistance programs in the context of decolonization and as the international organization evolved in the 1960s to reflect a pluralizing world order.

CHAPTER 7

SOVIET PARTICIPATION IN THE UNESCO INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC SPHERE

Despite Spender's depiction of the 1956 Venice conference as an exercise in futility, the conferences, collaborative projects, and other events organized by UNESCO served as unique venues in which the opposing sides of the Cold War came together to present their opinions on a given subject, cultivate international contacts in their professional fields, and work with foreign colleagues on shared issues and problems. These gatherings compelled Soviet professionals, academicians, and other citizens to put human faces on the one-dimensional caricatures of bourgeois intellectuals pervading Soviet publications, complicating their understandings of the outside world and how the Soviet Union should go about cajoling "progressive forces" in the West to their side. Soviet specialists also carried back to the USSR and implemented in their fields elements of the Western internationalist ethos, further integrating their country into the international discourses promoted by the international organizational system.

Of the so-called collaborative "major projects" initiated by UNESCO in the 1950s and 1960s (the "East-West" project, the Arid Zones Program to study agriculture in desert climates, the Latin American Education Project to assist schools in South America, etc.), the *History of Mankind* stands out for its immersion of Soviet scholars in the Western internationalist ideology of UNESCO because of its expectation that historians from divergent ideological and national backgrounds come to a consensus on world history from the Bronze Age to the 1950s. Unlike other projects that invited many specialists from a variety of fields to participate in separate conferences or other social events, the *History of Mankind* required its writers to cooperate for

years at a time and therefore develop a rapport in order to ensure success. In 1947, Director-General Huxley, inspired and aided by British sinologist and biologist Joseph Needham, kick started the planning for this mammoth undertaking with an eye toward aligning the *History*'s narrative with Huxley's "Scientific World Humanism" and its evolutionary conception of the past and future. But before the USSR joined the project, a number of highly influential historians altered and amended this initial vision. In 1949, Lucian Febvre, the founder of the famed *Annales* school of history, began to assist in mapping out the six-volume work, emphasizing the necessity of moving away from both the eurocentrism pervading contemporaneous scholarship and the "evolutionist" stance advocated by Huxley. In 1952, Febvre became the editor of the project's journal, *Cahiers d'Histoire Mondiale* (Journal of World History), which functioned as both a workshop for the *History of Mankind* and one of the first laboratories for exploring world history from a noneurocentric perspective. After the creation in 1950 of an international commission to oversee the venture and the selection of Paulo Carneiro, a Brazilian who had donned a number of hats in UNESCO, to lead it, the American historian Ralph Turner added his own twist to these debates by echoing Huxley's focus on linear evolution while casting the United States as the crowning achievement of this process. From the project's inception until its conclusion in 1969, several dozen scholars from a range of UNESCO member states sat on the international commission or served as author-editors and "corresponding members" for one of the six volumes of the *History*.[664]

This collective of historians, who practiced disparate methodologies, contributed to the content of the commission's final product. Yet a common thread connected these diverse voices––a consensus on the need to highlight the importance of exchange between different cultures

[664] For an overview of the first seven years of the project, see Duedahl, "Selling Mankind," 103–23.

from the beginning of human history. Thus, the *History of Mankind*, in its overarching scope and thematic contours, mirrored the broader mission of UNESCO to raise awareness of the positive role of communication between peoples hitherto walled off from each other. By bringing together historians representing the international community, the founders of the *History* project envisioned the venture as an international public sphere of debate that would construct a narrative legitimizing UNESCO's internationalism in a way similar to histories designed to bolster nationalist identity through the elaboration of a shared cultural and scientific heritage. In other words, the effort represented an "invented tradition" of international intellectual exchange, articulating a "usable past" for UNESCO's internationalist project that would portray the organization as the continuation of a long-running practice of international communication rather than a novel creation of the internationalist trend of the postwar era.[665]

One of the most publicized of UNESCO's ventures in the mid-1950s, the *History of Mankind* attracted the attention of the Soviet Union a year before the country had set up the Soviet UNESCO Commission and Delegation in the beginning of 1956. In January 1955, Guy Métraux, the secretary-general of the project's international commission, asked the chief academic-secretary of AN SSSR, M. N. Tikhomirov, to charge Soviet specialists with writing five articles on specific topics in Russian history for publication in *Cahiers*.[666] Although Tikhomirov and the president of AN SSSR described the journal as containing pieces with

[665] For a concise overview of the concept of "invented tradition," which historian Eric Hobsbawm uses to describe the rituals of modern nations, see Anthony D. Smith, *Nationalism and Modernism: A Critical Survey of Recent Theories of Nations and Nationalism* (London: Routledge, 1998), 117–21.

[666] The five topics were: the origins of the Kievan state; the peculiarities and interrelations between Byzantine and Russian culture; the establishment of Mongol rule in Crimea; the cultural differences of Western Slavs and their relationship with Scandinavian and German tribes; and the contribution of the Mongols to the scientific and cultural development of Eurasia. For the original letter in French, see Guy S. Métraux, "SCH/55/No. 1856," January 28, 1955, AG 8: SCHM Box 13, 2.51 (6), UNESCO Archives. For the Russian translation, see: ARAN, f. 457, op. 1, d. 435, ll. 46-48.

"Atlantic" or "pro-American" biases, the AN SSSR Presidium found it "desirable" not only to send the five articles, but also to enlist Soviet scholars for the larger *History* project.[667] Following talks with Soviet diplomats in Paris, Carneiro mailed outlines of each of the six volumes to AN SSSR for comment. He also invited the Soviet Union to select a preeminent scholar to sit on the executive bureau of the international commission and identify five other experts to contribute to the writing of the volumes.[668] In June, the Bureau of the AN SSSR Division of Historical Sciences chose five of its academicians to become corresponding members.[669] In September, AN SSSR nominated Zvorykin as a member of the international commission.[670]

The considerable influence of the USSR on the final version of the *History* resulted from Zvorykin's dogged and well-orchestrated campaign to corral Soviet historians to write and revise the drafts of the work during his tenure as a member and, after September 1956, vice president of the international commission.[671] His deft navigation of the politics of both a Soviet academic world undergoing drastic changes after the end of Stalinism and an international commission leery of communist dogma enabled him to impress on his Soviet colleagues the importance of the project while convincing members of the UNESCO initiative to take Soviet positions seriously. Zvorykin's story illustrates how UNESCO's international public sphere provided a space in which those members of the intelligentsia belonging to the first generation to benefit

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[667] Ibid., ll. 52-54.

[668] Paulo E. de Berrêdo Carneiro, "SCH/55/No. 1953," March 31, 1955, 1–2, AG 8: SCHM Box 21, 2.629.2, UNESCO Archives.

[669] ARAN, f. 457, op. 1, d. 399, l. 21.

[670] A. V. Topchiev, September 20, 1955, 1–2, AG 8: SCHM Box 13, 2.51 (6), UNESCO Archives.

[671] Métraux invited Zvorykin to serve as vice president in a letter written on September 21, 1956. Guy Métraux, September 21, 1956, AG 8: SCHM Box 26, 2.727, UNESCO Archives.

from Soviet policies (the so-called *vydvizhentsy* who ascended from working-class backgrounds to commanding positions in Soviet society during the 1930s) could debate, learn from, and collaborate with their non-Soviet peers after weathering the tumult of the purges, war, and isolationism.[672]

Born in the provincial town of Murom in 1901 to an engineer, Zvorykin enlisted in the Red Army and joined the Communist Party in 1919.[673] While in the army, he divided his time between serving as a political worker (*politrabotnik*) among his fellow soldiers and attaining an education at one of the *rabfaki* (*rabochie fakul'tety*) preparing the lower classes for higher education as part of the social revolution implemented by the Bolsheviks to upend the old order. As a result, Zvorykin obtained a degree from the Moscow State University Department of Social Sciences in 1925. After leaving the army in 1926, he traveled to the Donbass to help build socialism. He then studied in Moscow at the technical and economic institutes of the Institute of Red Professors (IKP) and the Communist Academy, where he trained in the history of technology, edited the journal *Tekhniki*, and defended his dissertation on "Reconstruction of the Coal Industry" in 1934. Upon graduation, he became the director of the Section for the History of Technology at the Communist Academy and the deputy chairman of the Commission for the History of Technology of the All-Union Committee for Higher Technical Education (VK VTO), two prestigious positions at the height of his field.[674]

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[672] Sheila Fitzpatrick, "Stalin and the Making of a New Elite, 1928-1939," *Slavic Review* 38, no. 3 (1979): 377–402.

[673] In 1920, Zvorykin lost his party card while returning to the front "during an illness" but reentered the ranks of the Communist Party in 1925. According to his personnel file in ARAN, he avoided receiving any negative comments during the party purges of 1921, 1924, 1929, and 1934.

[674] See Zvorykin's personnel file in the Archives of the Russian Academy of Sciences: ARAN, f. 425, op. 3, d. 19, ll. 1-8.

While his rapid rise from an uneducated soldier to the top of Soviet academia speaks to the success of Soviet policies of social mobility for loyal communists, it also made Zvorykin a major player in the darker side of the Stalin revolution. In 1932, AN SSSR opened the Institute for the History of Science and Technology (IINiT) in Leningrad under the direction of N. I. Bukharin, the former member of the politburo who would become a central figure of the Stalinist purges in the late 1930s. To a certain extent, Bukharin's vision for international cooperation in the investigation of the history of technology on a worldwide scale represents in spirit a predecessor to the aspirations Zvorykin would hold in regard to the *History of Mankind* project. A year before the creation of IINiT, Bukharin led a Soviet delegation to the International Congress for the History of Science and Technology in London, at which he got the idea from an "English scholar" of founding a Soviet equivalent of the Nobel Prize in order to attract foreign scientists to the USSR. The first report of IINiT also proposed that a collective of Soviet experts produce a "history of the technology of all times and peoples" similar in content to the future UNESCO project.[675]

In the 1930s, however, Zvorykin ended up on the opposite side of a bitter contest between scholars located in Moscow and those employed by Bukharin's IINiT in Leningrad for control over an area of expertise central to Marxist-Leninist theory. As one Russian historian explains, "the Moscow-based specialists-*vydvizhentsy*, headed by A. A. Zvorykin and E. F. Radulov, were naturally alien to both specialists of the old school and the unorthodox Marxists of the 1920s who fell under the influence of Bukharin."[676] In the spring of 1936, the Soviet state

[675] Iu. I. Krivonosov, "Institut istorii nauki i tekhniki: Tridtsatye–gromovye, rokovye...," *Voprosy istorii estestvoznaniia i tekhniki*, no. 1 (2002): 42–48.

[676] E. I. Kolchinskii, "50 let so dnia osnovaniia Sankt-Peterburgskogo filiala IIET. Istoriia nauki v gorode na Neve," *Voprosy istorii estestvoznaniia i tekhniki*, no. 3 (2003): 21–22.

exploited the temporary absence of Bukharin to dissolve IINiT, arresting or firing the entire staff and gifting the title of the institute to the Muscovite group and AN SSSR. The decision to transfer the institute to Moscow enraged Bukharin. In June 1936, as the historian Iu. I. Krivonosov shows, Bukharin excoriated the Academy of Sciences for closing the institute and for handing over its "inheritance to Comrade Zvorykin, head of the Moscow historians who blasted the work of the institute from the position of the school of [historian] M. N. Pokrovskii, condemned by the party."[677] But the pervasive culture of denunciation soon brought down Zvorykin as well. In October 1937, the editors for technical-theoretical literature of the Division of Scientific-Technical Information (GRTTL-ONTI) denounced Zvorykin for "replacing a political line with emotionality" and lacking "self-criticism" in one of his recriminations of IINiT and its "Trotsykite-Bukharinist sabotage on the front of the history of technology." Around the same time, the academy fired him from his post. Although Zvorykin got his job back in January 1938, the AN SSSR Presidium voted to dissolve the institute that March.[678]

Nevertheless, Zvorykin managed to escape imprisonment and execution, continuing his studies and teaching at the Moscow Mining Institute until the outbreak of the Second World War. The upheaval of the war years opened up an opportunity for Zvorykin to relaunch his career. In 1943, the People's Commissariat for the Coal Industry (NKUP) recruited Zvorykin after he received a "serious injury" fighting in Stalingrad and on the Central Front. In 1946, he became the editor of the science and technology section of *Pravda* but resigned in 1948 to

[677] Krivonosov includes the full letter from RGASPI in his article: Krivonosov, "Institut istorii nauki i tekhniki: Tridtsatye–gromovye, rokovye...," 58; 67-68.

[678] ARAN, f. 425, op. 3, d. 19, ll. 16-19; 49; 55.

assume the deputy editorship of the *BSE*—a post he would stay in until he stepped down from his duties to concentrate on the *History of Mankind* project in May 1956.[679]

Once he signed up for the *History* project in 1955, Zvorykin set out to recruit not only Soviet specialists from a diverse array of institutions, but also representatives from other countries in the communist world willing to coproduce with noncommunist scholars. In addition to Soviet historians in the AN SSSR Division of Historical Sciences, he eventually corralled AN SSSR scholars specializing in oriental studies, natural sciences and technology, transportation problems, sinology, and ethnography, as well as employees of an assortment of Soviet journals and universities, to review drafts of chapters.[680] Keen to rebut Eastern European émigrés writing for *Cahiers* and the *History*, Zvorykin found academics from Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia to address issues related to their countries. Although he also courted five scholars from mainland China to work as corresponding members, the PRC declined to allow them to attend meetings of the international commission due to the presence of Taiwan in UNESCO.[681]

Zvorykin acknowledged that the late arrival of the socialist camp to the project meant that the author-editors of the volumes might ignore its input. As he wrote to the Central Committee in 1955, the international commission had already labored for almost five years, publishing in

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[679] K. A. Shchadilova, "Riadom s nim liudi stanovilis' luchshe (K stoletiiu so dnia rozhdeniia A. A. Zvorykina)," *Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniia*, no. 12 (December, 2001): 82. A Politburo resolution "on activities to improve the newspaper *Pravda*" confirms that Zvorykin served as an editor of the section in 1946: Nadzhafov and Belousova, eds., *Stalin i kosmopolitizm*, 53–54. Zvorykin would officially remain deputy editor until 1959, but was relieved of all duties to work on the project in 1956. RGANI, f. 5, op. 35, d. 38, l. 37.

[680] ARAN, f. 457, op. 1, d. 232, l. 43; and RGANI, f. 5, op. 35, d. 144, l. 118.

[681] A letter to Carneiro from January 1956 contains a list of the first of proposed scholars, including from the PRC. A. Zvorikine, December 26, 1955, 1–2, AG 8: SCHM Box 21, 2.629.91, UNESCO Archives. For more on conversations between China, the international commission, Zvorykin, and AN SSSR, see A. V. Topchiev, May 4, 1956, 1–2, AG 8: SCHM Box 13, 2.51 (6), UNESCO Archives; "Resolution adoptée par le bureau de la commission," May 10, 1956, AG 8: SCHM Box 26, 2.727, UNESCO Archives; and RGANI, f. 5, op. 35, d. 38, ll. 27-28.

Cahiers "a significant amount of work that would determine the content of the volumes."[682] Yet Zvorykin quickly became enmeshed in a twentieth-century version of the "Republic of Letters," engaging with Western scholars on the widest range of topics spanning world history. From 1956 to 1962, the regular circulation of the outlines and drafts of the volumes forged a network for the transmission of ideas across the geopolitical divide of the Cold War. By June 1956, Soviet scholars had sent comments and alternative outlines for the first four volumes through the eighteenth century.[683] Copies of these voluminous materials would then go to the author-editors, who would send their own musings on Soviet ideas back to Zvorykin. At the more than ten meetings of the international commission's bureau from 1955 to 1962, discussions revolved around these Soviet criticisms, which touched on the periodization of the volumes, whether the "material" or "spiritual" should have primacy in the texts, and the descriptions of stages of civilizational development in each volume (e. g., whether the Roman Empire had a slave-based society).[684] Soviet perspectives on world history also reached a wider academic audience when the editors of *Cahiers* published a special issue of their journal devoted exclusively to Soviet authors in 1958.[685]

Buoyed by the initially open-minded reception Soviet opinions received from his noncommunist collaborators on the *History* project, Zvorykin rallied his fellow Soviet academicians to present the Soviet perspective in the international public sphere with the same fervor with which he had battled the "Trotsykite-Bukharinist sabotage" in the 1930s. In a letter to

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[682] RGANI, f. 5, op. 30, d. 133, l. 48.

[683] Louis Gottschalk, "Answer from Professor Louis Gottschalk to Professor A. A. Zvorikine's Comments on the Plan for Volume IV," June 7, 1956, 1–2, AG 8: SCHM Box 21, 2.629.91, UNESCO Archives; and GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 1, l. 87.

[684] Ibid., l. 91; and RGANI, f. 5, op. 35, d. 38, ll. 26-36.

[685] RGANI, f. 5, op. 35, d. 144, l. 118.

Central Committee Secretary D. T. Shepilov in May 1956, Zvorykin referenced his first two trips to Paris to have talks with participants in the UNESCO project to underscore "the necessity of overcoming the fear and unwillingness" of some members of the Soviet intelligentsia to "expand scholarly relations with bourgeois scholars." Denouncing the "sectarian sentiments" he encountered when enlisting Soviet historians to take part in the initiative, Zvorykin cited a number of the "typical remarks" he heard from Soviet scholars resisting his implorations that they contribute to the *History* and *Cahiers*:

> 'Why would I ruin my list of works with a reference to ones published in bourgeois publications'?; 'Soviet scholars and scholarship can have no common language with bourgeois scholars and scholarship'; 'an examination of the outlines of the volumes [of the *History*] reveals reactionary and idealistic conceptions, Soviet scholars will not be able to cover issues from their position, so there is no sense in working with bourgeois scholars'; 'we must limit our work to critical comments about the author-editors of the volumes and not give any positive material, since it will only lead to attacks on us'; 'it is hardly advisable to participate in work prepared by bourgeois scholars since they use our observations of factual errors in their work but do not consider our principled comments, our participation will only improve bourgeois works.'

Characterizing such opinions as "harmful remnants [*vrednye perezhitki*] of the isolation of Soviet scholarship in previous stages," Zvorykin argued against writing off Western scholars as uniformly adversarial to the USSR. The receptiveness of the author-editors of the *History* volumes to Soviet changes to their texts, he maintained, proved that only the obstinacy of Soviet historians prevented them from "widely showing the achievements of Soviet scholarship, propagating their ideology, and establishing contact with progressive scholars."[686] Because Zvorykin believed that this reclusiveness and animosity toward Western academics derived from the fact that Soviet academicians met their foreign counterparts "in isolation from each other"

[686] RGANI, f. 5, op. 35, d. 38, ll. 17-18. Zvorykin also continually complained about the refusal of some Soviet academicians to offer their work for publication in *Cahiers*. This may have derived in part from the lack of a financial incentive since Zvorykin, with the approval of the Central Committee, seized all the royalties these Soviet scholars received from the journal for their work. RGANI, f. 5, op. 30, d. 133, l. 50.

and without knowing anything about these strangers, he proposed collecting a corpus of knowledge on the political and intellectual proclivities of Western thinkers, suggesting to Shepilov the assembling of a card index with "detailed information about the sociopolitical views and scholarly tendencies of foreign scholars" in order to rectify the "indiscriminate approach" to them.[687] Zvorykin presented his interactions on trips to Paris as fieldwork on the nature of the bourgeois scholar, developing his own taxonomy of what he understood as an understudied species. For Zvorkyin, a few "reactionary" author-editors and corresponding members, buoyed by American "hegemony" over the commission, sought to block any Soviet influence on the volumes. But the French contingent displayed "a desire to more deeply and fully know the work of Soviet scholars" that went beyond a curiosity for the "new data" of Soviet scholarship and into the realm of "theory and methodology."

In the hours of unofficial and official rendezvous with these French historians in their apartments and at the commission, Zvorykin, who spoke French, forged congenial relationships based on a shared appreciation for historical inquiry. At the apartment of Charles Morazé, the author-editor of Volume V on the nineteenth century who specialized in historical population movement and belonged to the *Annales* school, the Soviet envoy spent four hours not only debating the *History*, but also discussing whether economics or demographics explained historical developments and events as diverse as the revolutions of 1848 and postwar reconstruction in the USSR. The Russo-French Historian Vadim Eliseev, one of the author-editors of Volume III on the Middle Ages and the exiled son of the former owner of the Eliseevskii grocery store in Moscow, eagerly showed Zvorykin his personal library of Russian books and praised the new trend of the post-Stalinist Soviet intelligentsia toward "reproducing

[687] RGANI, f. 5, op. 35, d. 38, l. 22.

the founding tenets of Marxism" in their work. In reports on meetings of the international commission in 1956, the Soviet sojourner stressed the responsiveness of most author-editors to Soviet critiques of their volumes.[688]

Inspired by these commendations of Soviet intellectual production, Zvorykin devised a set of rules for how to live up to the sociability required in an international public sphere dominated by bourgeois scholars who bristled at Soviet invective aimed at their scholarship.[689] Because the international public sphere aimed to engender "mutual understanding" through cooperation, Soviet diatribes undermined Soviet aspirations to win over Western scholars to their cause.

"It is necessary," Zvorykin wrote to the Central Committee in January 1956, "to have a different approach to the work of scholars who, although methodologically alien to Marxism, have a great interest in Soviet scholarship." Calling for "flexible tactics with these scholars," he advised that Soviet specialists should "note the positive in their research" but at the same time "laboriously and with tact explain the incorrectness of their methodological positions."[690] Zvorykin's relationships with some of the Western historians demonized by the Soviet press shaped his advice for how to win over the "progressive" intellectuals of the West to communism. "We often paint all bourgeois scholars the same dark color," he observed. "This is a mistake." Rather, Zvorykin contended, "each has his own political, social, and scholarly persona." For instance, the January 1956 issue of *Voprosy istorii* (Problems of History) urged "Soviet historians to unmask contemporary reactionary historiography," conflating the burgeoning

[688] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 1, ll. 84-105.

[689] I draw on Sluga's discussion of this concept of "sociability." See introduction.

[690] Ibid., ll. 82-83.

American school of business history with the "geohistory" of the *Annales* pioneers Fernand Braudel, Febvre, and Zvorykin's friend, Morazé. "After meeting these historians," Zvorykin concluded, "it seems to me wrong to confuse them with those developing a 'history of business.'" Evaluations of the geohistorians should instead begin with articles written in "calmly restrained tones," noting "the positive these historians offer while at the same time showing the futility of the demographic criteria for explaining history."[691] As another example, Zvorykin referred to a piece published in the sixth issue of the 1955 volume of *Voprosy filosofii* (Problems of Philosophy) that labelled Morazé, "on the basis of one book . . . an apologist for the Cold War." "Morazé's book," Zvorykin pointed out, "was brought into the USSR as a single copy located in the AN SSSR special fond [*spetzfond*]. Kon, the author of the article, uses this work to critique Morazé. But how does he use it? The book is reduced to . . . . . only the preface." A perusal of Morazé's monograph "demonstrates that there was no basis for the author's accusations of aggressive propaganda," Zvorykin continued. "In personal conversations, Morazé noted to me that, to the contrary, the book underscores that the Soviet Union has so many internal tasks to develop its country that it has no interest in military conflict."[692]

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[691] Zvorykin's defense of Febvre, Braudel, and other members of the *Annales* school presaged the rise in popularity during the 1960s of these French historians among those Soviet scholars who wanted to challenge the rigid Marxist-Leninist paradigm supported by the Soviet state and party. As historian Roger D. Markwick maintains, "the works of the founding fathers of the *Annales*, Marc Bloch and Lucien Febvre, were little known in the Soviet Union until the 1960s." However, this changed in 1958 when Braudel organized a "Franco-Soviet Symposium" that would continue to gather biennially. In the 1960s, the *Annales* school would heavily influence the famous Soviet Medievalist A. Ia. Gurevich, who would call its delineation of the "concept of '*mentalités*'" a "'Copernican revolution'" in his thinking about the past. Roger D. Markwick, "Cultural History under Khrushchev and Brezhnev: From Social Psychology to *Mentalités*," *The Russian Review* 65, no. 2 (2006): 296–97.

[692] Zvorykin also brought up another historian on the commission, Philippe Wolf, with whom the Soviet scholar had traveled to Toulouse to examine cathedrals. "He, as a faithful Catholic," Zvorykin recounted, "approached the bowl of water, wet his fingers, and crossed himself. But he is nevertheless a progressive scholar." To prove this, Zvorykin described Wolf's interest in economic influences on historical development. "Explaining to me the increase in histories of the Middle Ages," Zvorykin went on, "he emphasized that the history of the Middle Ages was mainly studied as political events in France, but he had set the task of reconstructing this history focusing mainly on an analysis of economic phenomena." Ibid., ll. 97-98; and RGANI, f. 5, op. 35, d. 38, ll. 17; 21-22.

This kneejerk hostility complicated Zvorykin's own goal of demonstrating Soviet willingness to engage in international cooperation during his second visit to Paris for a meeting of the international commission in May 1956. After listening to Sir Charles Leonard Woolley, a giant in the field of archeology and one of the author-editors of Volume I on ancient history, go on a defensive rant lambasting the criticisms written by the Soviet historian V. V. Struve of Woolley's draft of Volume I, Zvorykin discovered that Struve had formulated his objections from a mistranslation of Woolley's work. Although Struve had composed, in Zvorykin's words, "an excellent review" with a "large number of specific criticisms" exhibiting "the high level" of Soviet historical research, he had also included "harsh epithets and accusations of racism against Woolley based on an incorrect interpretation of English words."[693]

On top of his suggestions for how to woo bourgeois scholars more politely, Zvorykin discerned that Soviet academicians could more effectively influence their Western peers if they accentuated the nonpolitical aspects of their work and illustrated through "serious, well-reasoned articles" that "scholarship can only develop based on Marxism." Providing anecdotal evidence of Western historians' prioritization of objectivity, Zvorykin recollected a conversation with Eliseev about the latter's involvement in the Resistance during the Second World War. "'Morazé here and I took part,'" Zvorykin quoted Elissev. "'We have medals, but we do not wear them now. We did it for France.'" For Zvorykin, this humble boast indicated that Eliseev wanted to convince him that "scholars . . . should be engaged purely with scholarship."[694] As Zvorykin in

[693] At first, Zvorykin took offense when Woolley dismissed Struve's remarks as "Marxist-Leninist propaganda." As Woolley spoke, J. M. Romein, an author-editor of Volume VI sitting next to Zvorykin, passed a note to the Soviet scholar noting Woolley's old age as an excuse for his rudeness (the note said: "he's 76 years old"). But Zvorykin ignored this apology for the scholar, reporting to Moscow that the "issue was not his age." Later on, however, Zvorykin wrote that he had managed to develop "good personal contact with Woolley and full mutual understanding." Ibid., ll. 29-30.

[694] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 1, l. 98.

1959 put it in a letter to Central Committee Secretary M. A. Suslov, to attract Western academics to communism, the Soviet intelligentsia had to target Western intellectuals with literature that spoke the detached "language of scholarship on issues of history, economics, sociology, philosophy, etc." instead of brandishing political propaganda "'on the forehead.'"

Zvorykin also supported the normalization of scholarly exchange between the capitalist and communist blocs. On the one hand, he urged Suslov to direct Soviet scholars to submit their work to Western academic periodicals, citing several instances when Soviet scholars, by ignoring calls for articles from Western editorships, had allowed "secondhand" knowledge from Russian experts in the West to misrepresent Soviet scholarship. "In general, we need to appear not only in publications prepared by us, but most of all in foreign journals and collections," Zvorykin advised. "The appearance of our articles in foreign journals and our participation in discussions on the pages of these journals could be greatly significant for the propagation through specific media of our ideas among bourgeois scholars," he predicted. "The opportunities in this respect are truly enormous."[695]

On the other hand, Zvorykin oversaw the incorporation, on a small scale, of the Western internationalist framework shaping the *History* project into the Soviet practice of world history and the history of culture. Using his control over the UNESCO venture as justification for experimentation, he founded a printed "forum" for exploring world history that would help to internationalize the Soviet historical profession after the isolationist years of Stalin's rule. In January 1957, he pulled together an editorial board to publish *Vestnik istorii mirovoi kul'tury* (Herald of the History of World Culture), an academic journal intended to function as the Soviet equivalent of *Cahiers*. Conceived of as a space to fill in the "blank spots" (*belye piatna*) in

[695] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 14, ll. 248-51.

Soviet knowledge about the history of cross-cultural contact while fostering dialogue between foreigners involved in the *History* and the Soviet team working on the enterprise, *Vestnik* represents a landmark in the de-Stalinization of Soviet historical writing because of its treatment of formerly taboo scholarship as worthy of serious consideration. "Even with the existence of ideological difference among historians and, especially, historians of culture," the editorship wrote in its introduction to the first issue, "principled and progressive scholars will always find a chance to work together. . . . Our cooperation with Western scholars in the preparation of [the *History*] illustrates this convincingly."[696]

To showcase this new approach to foreign intellectual production, *Vestnik* editors included articles from *Cahiers*, the outlines of the volumes of the *History* with Soviet commentary attached at the end, and notes about recent international historical conferences outside of the province of the UNESCO initiative. While other Soviet periodicals (e. g., the compendium *Vsemirnaia istoriia: V desiati tomakh*, or *World History: In Ten Volumes*, which AN SSSR launched in 1956 and completed in 1965) featured traditional universal histories through a Marxist-Leninist lens, *Vestnik* showcased landmark articles from *Cahiers* that would shape the bourgeoning field of world history as practiced in North America and Western Europe, including historian Marshall Hodgson's "Hemispheric Interregional History as an Approach to World History," which paved the way for historical research deemphasizing the West as a superior civilization.[697] Whenever a Western historian connected to the *History* died, Zvorykin

[696] "Ot redaktsii," *Vestnik istorii mirovoi kul'tury*, no. 1 (February 1957): 1–3.

[697] See Marshall Hodgson, "Hemispheric Interregional History as an Approach to World History," *Cahiers d'Histoire mondiale* 1 (1954): 715-23. For the republication of the article in *Vestnik*, see Marshall Khodzhon, "Mezhregional'naia istoriia polusharii kak metod izucheniia mirovoi istorii," *Vestnik istorii mirovoi kul'tury* 1, no. 1 (1957): 9–16. According to Duedahl, Hodgson's article called for "a postwar world history" that contained "a systematic critique of the basic presuppositions of Western historiography." Duedahl, "Selling Mankind," 120. Historian Edmund Burke III argues that Hodgson's piece in *Cahiers* represented an earlier version of his more famous 1963 article that became a foundational text in world history. Hodgson's "hemispheric interregional

made sure to provide appreciative obituaries celebrating their life-long contributions to the field.[698]

Most importantly in terms of the internationalization of Soviet historical work, Zvorykin made *Vesntik* accessible to scholars in the West, leading the way in translating Soviet research for a foreign audience. During his trips to Paris in 1956, the head of the Soviet *History* operation took note of the disappointment of his new acquaintances over the fact that the USSR had ceased publication of translations of Soviet articles in Western languages under Stalin. In response to these complaints, Zvorykin petitioned the Central Committee to reintroduce this practice into Soviet publications and ensured that *Vestnik* contained in each of its issues multiple contributions in English, French, and German.[699] While "the journal is designed to acquaint Soviet scholars with the works of foreign scholars, to critically shed light on these works, and to host scholarly discussions of specific problems," Zvorykin clarified in his letter to Suslov in 1959, it also "is designed for foreign scholars. There is a special section in which the major works from the USSR appear in foreign languages."[700]

With a fluctuating circulation that ranged from 2,300 to 3,000, *Vestnik* ended up in the collections of libraries, universities, and individual subscribers across the Soviet Union and

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approach" criticized "Western exceptionalism," probing "the possibility of telling the tale of humanity from the perspective of global history and not in a skewed, Western, self-justificatory version." Edmund Burke III, "Marshall G. S. Hodgson and the Hemispheric Interregional Approach to World History," *Journal of World History* 6, no. 2 (1995): 243.

[698] For instance, an obituary of the recently deceased Febvre took up the last pages of the first issue of the journal. V. Vidal', "Lius'en Fevr," *Vestnik istorii mirovoi kul'tury*, no. 1 (February 1957): 244–46. Zvorykin clearly admired Febvre. In a report submitted to the Central Committee shortly after Febvre's death, the Soviet scholar quoted him to prove to his superiors that the project had a "progressive" character. RGANI, f. 5, op. 35, d. 38, l. 40.

[699] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 14, ll. 248-53; and GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 1, ll. 96; 104-05.

[700] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 14, l. 251.

reached over twenty-five countries in Europe, Asia, and the Americas.[701] The journal also facilitated correspondence between foreign scholars and Soviet contributors outside the *History* project. For example, Zvorykin received a letter from the editor of an American journal asking for permission to republish an article from *Vestnik*.[702] But due to a conspicuous absence of an advertising campaign to raise awareness of the periodical among the Soviet population, *Vestnik* never earned a wide readership outside the walls of Soviet academic institutions. "Until now," Zvorykin complained in a 1961 report, "there has been some kind of strange 'conspiracy of silence': there have been no reviews of our journal." Zvorykin attributed this to its publication of foreign literature at odds with official Soviet ideological positions. "The journal is unique," he continued, "we publish foreign authors who sometimes criticize Marxist scholars on issues and do not agree with them, which led to the fact that the mass press has approached our journal somewhat warily."[703]

In January 1961, *Vestnik* finally received a review in the first issue of the journal *Kommunist*.[704] That same month, when the AN SSSR Bureau of the Division of Historical Sciences deliberated over the status of the journal, bureau members attacked what they perceived as its superficial eclecticism and publication of random articles, its ambiguous place among the AN SSSR network of institutions, as well as its loss of purpose in light of the fact that the *History* project had begun to wind down. As historian A. A. Guber put it in the course of the conversation, the question arose of whether they should merely "consider it as a specific

[701] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 6, l. 405.

[702] ARAN, f. 457, op. 1, d. 343, l. 6; and GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 10, ll. 144-45.

[703] ARAN, f. 457, op. 1, d. 343, l. 9.

[704] Zvorykin described the review as "positive" and hoped it would attract a broader audience to the journal. Ibid., l. 9.

auxiliary of the organ of the international organization" or give it "the task of covering from all points of view all areas of culture."[705]

But what began during this meeting as a disparaging appraisal of the lack of thematic and ideological direction in the content of *Vestnik* turned into a broader discussion of the need for a systematic development of the study of the history of culture as a substantive interdisciplinary field rather than merely a byproduct of other social and economic processes. "The existence of such a journal," historian I. V. Belza remarked, "seems to me extremely significant since this kind of journal allows for the opportunity to develop such an important discipline as, from my point of view, the history of culture." Belza argued that the history of culture, as a new category in Soviet historical studies, could encompass recent topics in Western scholarship, including Western "Humanism" and the "important ideological question" of cultural exchange between different countries. Other members of the bureau agreed that AN SSSR had ignored the history of culture as a valuable lens onto the past during the Stalinist era and after the lapse in publication of the multivolume *History of Russian Culture* initiated in 1939 by the Institute for the History of Material Culture (IIMK).[706] "In relation to this," AN SSSR Corresponding Member V. M. Khvostov asserted, "the journal is needed. It is the first, and thus far the only, and as yet small cell (it has a tiny contingent) for the organization of this work."[707]

The ambitious aims of *Vestnik*, along with its lack of personnel necessary to fulfill these aims, spurred the bureau to investigate culture from an interdisciplinary angle. The bureau requested that the AN SSSR Presidium approve the creation of an interdivisional "scientific

[705] Ibid., l. 20.

[706] Two volumes of the *History of Russian Culture* were published in the late 1940s but a third volume never materialized. Ibid., ll. 35; 36-37; 43.

[707] Ibid., l. 39.

council" (*nauchnyi sovet*) to focus exclusively on the history of culture through *Vestnik* and the UNESCO project.[708] Historian Roger D. Markwick describes these scientific councils as enjoying a "relative autonomy" from the "party-state" that "made them important rudiments of civil society" in the decade following the death of Stalin and the transformation of the Soviet historical profession enabled by Khrushchev's reforms.[709] Thus, Soviet participation in the *History* not only introduced Soviet historians to the nascent Western genre of world history, but also opened up new spaces in which historians could test "revisionist" methodologies within the relatively relaxed ideological parameters prevailing as a result of de-Stalinization. But this propensity to break with tradition, along with its financial insolvency, won *Vestnik* few supporters within AN SSSR or the party bureaucracy. Consequently, the journal ceased publication eleven months after the founding of the scientific council, ending a four-year run.

The decision to shut down the journal in 1961 took place amid a deterioration of relations between Soviet scholars and the international commission for the *History of Mankind*. Although Zvorykin expressed satisfaction that some of the volumes on premodern history incorporated Soviet suggestions, the content of Volume VI on the twentieth century produced sharp debates between its author-editors and Soviet scholars. In the words of Zvorykin, the author-editors—one of whom was Caroline Ware, an American professor of history at Yale University—had composed Volume VI "in the spirit of the American way of life" and had infused it with "slanderous attacks" on the communist bloc.[710] In 1959, Zvorykin had inundated the author-editors of this volume with over 500 pages of comments and proposals for revisions. Over the

[708] Ibid., ll. 58-60.

[709] Roger D. Markwick, *Rewriting History in Soviet Russia: The Politics of Revisionist Historiography, 1956-1974* (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 69.

[710] Zvorykin gives an overview of the Soviet assessment of the volumes in a 1961 report to the Bureau of the AN SSSR Division of Historical Sciences. ARAN, f. 457, op. 1, d. 343, ll. 11-14.

next three years, Zvorykin and the Soviet UNESCO Delegation threatened several times to reject the volume.[711] Among other aspects, Soviet academicians took umbrage with what Zvorykin described as the text's characterization of the Cold War as a battle between "the world of democratic states headed by the USA" and "the world of totalitarian states"; its emphasis on the cultural and scientific achievements of the capitalist West at the expense of a thorough appreciation of socialist successes; as well as its cursory treatment of cultural and scientific life in Asia, Latin America, and Africa.[712] From Zvorykin's perspective, the negative caricaturing of the USSR in the text reflected the ideological biases of his Western colleagues and contradicted the norms of sociability by which the Soviet academician had advised his Soviet colleagues to abide. The author-editors' acceptance of this anti-Soviet language revealed the Western tilt of the project and the power dynamics governing UNESCO's supposedly neutral bid to write a universal history through international cooperation.

Over the next three years, Soviet officials conducted extensive negotiations over the themes and fine points of the volume, making inroads into the controversial stretches related to the Soviet Union.[713] Yet the *History of Mankind* project fell victim to irreconcilable differences between the author-editors and Soviet historians. In 1960, the author-editors placed Soviet objections as endnotes to the main text but refused to rethink their "basic approach" at such a late stage, noting that the number of comments they had received from the USSR and other countries

[711] RGANI, f. 5, op. 35, d. 144, l. 95; and GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 13, ll. 278-82.

[712] Ibid., ll. 92-93.

[713] Soviet officials waged a multipronged campaign to change the volume between 1959 and 1962. For examples of accounts of meetings between the Soviet side and the international commission, see GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 26, ll. 35-36a; 87; GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 12, ll. 260-67; and GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 16, ll. 6-19.

amounted to (and actually far exceeded) the same length as that of the volume.[714] In early 1962, the international commission and Zvorykin agreed to begin an alternative Volume VI that would display Soviet and other non-Western interpretations of the recent history of science and culture.[715] As Zvorykin and his team composed a draft of this dissenting historical worldview, the international commission published Volume VI replete with copious Soviet endnotes in 1966. When the commission formally dissolved in 1969, its final report to UNESCO stated that it had resolved to set up a committee of historians whose responsibilities would include realizing the Soviet version of the history of the twentieth century ("Volume VI-2").[716] In the end, however, this attempt to accommodate the Soviet side never came to fruition.

The *History of Mankind* went out with a whimper rather than the bang originally intended when it began in the late 1940s. Because the field of world history had changed and expanded substantially in the 1950s and 1960s, the six published volumes had an outdated methodological framework and thus had almost no substantial impact on Western historiography. But for Soviet scholars, it served as an experiment in how to negotiate the international public sphere of the postwar era and relate to foreign scholars as colleagues. In the course of his travels to Paris for deliberations with foreign historians, Zvorykin discovered that UNESCO's international public sphere expected its participants to perform sociability when engaging each other. Realizing that the brash, uncompromising stance Soviet academicians took toward their bourgeois counterparts

[714] The vast majority of the comments came from Soviet scholars. However, the Catholic Church, the Israeli government, and other actors tracking the project also contributed complaints. ARAN, f. 457, op. 1, d. 232, l. 43; and Author-Editors of Volume VI, "Twentieth Century," "SCH/Memo/No. 953. The Completion of Work and Transmission of Final Manuscript of Volume VI for Approval and Publication," April 16, 1960, 1–2, AG 8: SCHM Box 26, 2.731, UNESCO Archives.

[715] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 20, ll. 265-70.

[716] Paulo E. de Berrêdo Carneiro, "Report by the President of the International Commission for a History of the Scientific and Cultural Development of Mankind to the Director-General of UNESCO," August 22, 1969, 4, 83 EX/24, UNESDOC.

ran counter to this etiquette, Zvorykin advocated for a softer, nuanced approach to non-Soviet scholars reminiscent of the tact he took in his letter to *Le Monde*. He proposed that the Soviet intelligentsia abide by the behavioral norms of this public sphere in order to advance its own interests within the international organizational system. Although the final product received little attention in the West and was never published in the communist bloc, the experiment of writing the *History of Mankind* contributed to the de-Stalinization of the Soviet historical profession, opening up new methodological avenues for historical inquiry. In the words of historian Poul Duedahl, the *History of Mankind* had significance "not so much in the form of a concrete achievement but as a process. It was the first coordinated attempt to involve experts from around the world to reach agreement on a common understanding of history and thus the first truly international account of the history of mankind."[717]

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Apart from the *History of Mankind* and other "major projects," UNESCO and its associated NGOs oversaw hundreds of annual conferences, seminars, and symposia as well as permanent committees that constituted an international network of venues in which experts debated the myriad subjects falling under the international organization's broad mandate of education, science, and culture (seismology, oceanography, political science, elementary education, polytechnic training, textbook writing, museum curation, architecture, television broadcasting, library science, and so on). This network served as an international public sphere in which scholars, artists, technicians, and others identified common problems, exchanged knowledge, and cultivated relationships that transcended the nation state. For the Soviet foreign-policy establishment, these events also presented opportunities to showcase the achievements of

[717] Duedahl points out that terms used in the *History*, such as "civilization" and "mankind," had already fallen out of fashion by the late 1960s. Duedahl, "Selling Mankind," 129–30.

the USSR to a diverse selection of the intellectual elite of both the West and the weakly-developed countries.

In the 1950s, the Soviet UNESCO Commission and Delegation struggled to achieve this objective because of the West's ability to dictate the settings and terms of these events. For the first four years of Soviet participation in UNESCO, Spender's depiction of Soviet citizens dispatched to UNESCO conferences as silent mountains with little to contribute resembles how at least some of these experts comported themselves. Indeed, Soviet specialists at times behaved as anything but communist militants. Before the decision to stay in UNESCO in 1959, they received little instruction on what the Soviet state wanted them to accomplish at these meetings apart from directives to "observe" and to "see." Referencing the case of a 1958 conference of "utmost importance" on "electronic computing" to which twenty-five Soviet scientists went without specific instructions, the Soviet UNESCO Delegation, in its annual report for 1960, stressed that the "preparation for these meetings should be serious. We should know what we want to achieve in each particular instance."[718]

The Soviet UNESCO Commission and Delegation realized that the cultural milieus and settings of UNESCO activities held outside the USSR worked against the attempts of Soviet participants to showcase their strengths and talents on the world stage. The linguistic hegemony of the French and "Anglo-Saxon" countries in the international organization made Soviet conference attendees bystanders to the proceedings. "Many who go to meetings," three Soviet UNESCO intermediaries noted in a letter to MID in 1961, "do not speak English, which curtails their ability to participate. Some sit silently at the conferences because they don't know the language." This silence "can be used in the 'bourgeois press' to hurt the 'prestige' of the Soviet

[718] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 6, l. 338.

Union."[719] Because of the red tape around the process for obtaining exit visas, mistakes made by both Soviet and UNESCO bureaucrats, as well as the slow flow of mail through the "Iron Curtain," other Soviet specialists tapped to go to UNESCO events showed up late, failed to register, or never made it at all. One Soviet pedagogue turned up at UNESCO headquarters for a 1963 meeting on textbook publishing after it had already concluded.[720]

Since the adversaries of the Soviet Union not only outnumbered socialist delegates at UNESCO functions but also controlled the settings and mechanics of this international public sphere, the Soviet UNESCO Commission and Delegation became determined to wrest control of some of these sites of international contact from their enemies by merging UNESCO's internationalist network with the socialist internationalist events put on inside the USSR. Beginning in 1957, the commission and delegation lobbied UNESCO to dole out money for events in the Soviet Union. From 1957 to 1959, the delegation navigated the labyrinthine UNESCO bureaucracy in pursuit of three grants for a seminar on "Youth and Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy," an "International Youth Tourist Camp," and an "International Work Camp."[721]

Soviet officials failed to get UNESCO funding for these meetings in the 1950s because of their inexperience in dealing with the arcane bureaucratic system governing these grants. On the occasions that the USSR managed to apply to the right UNESCO department, the competitiveness and strict timeline of the application process for UNESCO support made it

[719] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 17, l. 67.

[720] These instances of lateness or absences surfaced regularly in reports over the first decade of Soviet participation in UNESCO. For this example, see GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 19, ll. 24-25.

[721] For an overview of funds received by the USSR from UNESCO's "Participation Programme" through February 1959, see: Vladimir Stepanek, "Participation Programme for the Soviet Union, Byelorussian S.S.R. and Ukrainian S.S.R.," February 17, 1959, 1–2, AG 8: Box 1936, UNESCO Archives. For an analysis of these three proposals, see: Director, Department of Education, "ED/5/58.024: Proposals from USSR National Commission for Assistance to Youth Projects," February 7, 1958, 1–3, AG 8: Box 1936, UNESCO Archives.

difficult for the USSR to win funds for events on its own territory. As a Soviet UNESCO employee explained in 1960, the UNESCO General Conference approved all allocations every two years and had a limited budget for proposals in the intervening period. If UNESCO agreed to review Soviet ones submitted outside of the framework of the general conference, the application "cycle" typically took six to eight months between the receipt of a request from the communist bloc and the signing of a contract. "Late submissions from the socialist camp," the Soviet UNESCO worker advised, "are considered by some as ignoring the UNESCO program, as a form of pressure on UNESCO." The vague language Soviet officials used to fill out UNESCO applications also evoked suspicion from the international organization. When the Soviet UNESCO Commission wrote "and others" in its listing of countries invited to send representatives to conferences, UNESCO worried that this phrase could allow representatives of pariah nations not belonging to UNESCO (the GDR, PRC, DPRK, etc.) to show up at these events in contravention of the international organization's regulations.[722] The refusal of UNESCO to appease Soviet supplications contributed to the Soviet desire to leave UNESCO when Commission Chairman Zhukov raised this prospect in the fall of 1958. Discussing the issue during the fallout from Zhukov's article in *Pravda*, a member of the UNESCO Secretariat noted the anger of Soviet officials over UNESCO's rejection of their requests for funding. "Mr. Jukov [sic] repeated several times and in very grave terms," the UNESCO employee recalled in a report, "that he considers this situation as being extremely serious, that he is fighting for UNESCO in Moscow but for the moment without much success, since he has no ammunition to fight with."[723]

[722] GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 3, ll. 425-27.

[723] Vladimir Stepanek, "BMS/Memo. 10.233: Relations with the Soviet Union," February 12, 1959, 1–2, AG 8: Box 1936, UNESCO Archives.

Once it had decided to remain in UNESCO in 1959, however, the USSR redoubled its efforts to send representatives to as many of these activities as possible. As the Soviet UNESCO Delegation wrote in 1960, they believed "that Soviet representatives must be at all meetings and conferences."[724] As a result, the number of these international events at which Soviet professionals showed up grew exponentially in the first half of the 1960s. In 1958, Soviet specialists traveled to only twenty-eight events organized by UNESCO or UNESCO-affiliated NGOs.[725] In 1961, the sum of Soviet nationals appearing at UNESCO meetings increased to eighty.[726] In 1965, the UNESCO Department of Education alone hosted Soviet educators at fourteen conferences while other departments and NGOs brought in dozens of others.[727]

In addition, the Soviet UNESCO Commission and Delegation renewed its push for UNESCO to abandon its aloofness to "the most pressing" debates of the time as well as its "one-sided orientation" toward the West and take on more "political" issues, including racial prejudice, disarmament, and "peaceful coexistence." This genuine concern that the organization avoided immediate political problems only intensified after October 1962 when UNESCO failed to respond to the prospect of imminent nuclear war created by the Cuban Missile Crisis. "The crisis in the Caribbean Sea," the Soviet UNESCO Delegation reflected in its annual report for that year, "showed the weakness and imperfection of UNESCO (and the UN as well), its inability to seriously intervene in the development of conflicts leading to thermonuclear catastrophe, its inability to settle such conflicts, or to even decisively raise its voice in some way

[724] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 6, l. 338.

[725] GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 2, l. 1.

[726] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 20, l. 213.

[727] In its annual report for the year, the Soviet UNESCO Delegation does not list the number of Soviet citizens attending UNESCO events. It only lists the most "important" of them. However, all evidence indicates that this number likely exceeded one-hundred. GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 32, ll. 1-71.

against threats of war." But the delegation expressed hope that the USSR provided an example in the organization for how to realize peace in the era of the Bomb. "It is important, however, to note that the circle of the intelligentsia of the West and neutral countries connected to UNESCO," the report continued, "were able to see the value of peace and the ability of the Soviet Union, along with all peace-loving forces, to block the way to war [and] curb the most aggressive and adventurist imperialist circles." The delegation argued that the crisis had given the Western and "neutral" intelligentsias involved in UNESCO a chance "to witness firsthand how the possibility of compromise between the USSR and US could be realized, and what this can achieve in relation to cooperation in the areas under UNESCO's mandate in general."[728]

In 1963, Soviet officials overseeing UNESCO affairs presented a program for the "reorientation" of the organization. As part of this push, Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet L. I. Brezhnev and MID Minister Gromyko urged Director-General Maheu during a meeting in Moscow to overhaul the international organization in line with this platform. Owing to "resistance" to these reforms from the "pro-Western (and, to a significant extent, pro-French)" secretariat, however, the Soviet UNESCO Delegation dismissed the "first, very modest, insufficient steps" of the UNESCO Executive Board to realize these changes after a year of attempted implementation.[729]

From 1960 to 1964, the commission and delegation repeatedly petitioned to increase the number of UNESCO conferences, seminars, and other convocations occurring within the USSR, flooding UNESCO with long lists of possible joint initiatives. The moves culminated in unsuccessful proposals submitted by the Soviet UNESCO Commission to MID from 1963 to

[728] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 23, ll. 183-84.

[729] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 26, ll. 97-99.

1966 that called for the creation of a UNESCO regional center for Eastern Europe in Moscow and one for "socioeconomic development" in Tashkent similar to those coordinating UNESCO ventures for other regions in Havana, Cuba; Accra, Ghana; Cairo, Egypt; Djakarta, Indonesia; and elsewhere.[730] Notwithstanding the challenges of the application process, dozens of meetings bringing scholars, specialists, and youth to the Soviet Union became commonplace by 1962. In that year, for instance, the UNESCO Department of Natural Sciences helped schedule at least five international scientific conferences in Moscow and Tashkent.[731]

Since UNESCO accepted membership contributions only in the currencies of those countries most often receiving financing from the international organization for activities in their jurisdictions (American dollars, British sterling, and French francs), the Soviet UNESCO Commission believed that hosting UNESCO events in the USSR would convince the UNESCO leadership to receive Soviet membership contributions in rubles and therefore reverse course on their discriminatory policy of transacting solely in Western currencies. In other words, payment of membership dues by the USSR in its own currency would allow the country to retain its own foreign currency reserves instead of forking over millions of American dollars to UNESCO annually.[732]

Attempts to reshape the venues of internationalism took on more urgency in the context of the Soviet crusade to lure the intellectual classes of decolonizing regions away from the West. As the commission warned in a 1963 memorandum, the Western countries exploited UNESCO events on their soil to win over figures of influence in the non-Western world without "the

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[730] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 25, ll. 10-11; and GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 19, l. 86.

[731] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 23, ll. 205-14.

[732] Ibid., ll. 53-55; and GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 25, ll. 295-301. The Director-General explained his rejection of this thinking in a 1965 letter to the chair of the Soviet UNESCO Commission. René Maheu, "DG/7/5/35/2," April 14, 1965, 1–3, AG 8: Box 1938, Xo7.21(470) D, UNESCO Archives.

expenditure of their own funds," using "the attendance of representatives of the weakly developed countries at these events to propagate the 'Western way of life.'" The "Westerners" did this by taking advantage of UNESCO events to not only display "'the highly developed nature' of education, science, and culture in imperialist countries," but also to advertise "their countries as 'centers for international association.'"[733] The Soviet UNESCO Commission argued that if the USSR hosted international meetings sponsored by UNESCO, this would give "foreign specialists, including those from Asia, Africa, and Latin America, the opportunity to directly get to know the life and achievements of the Soviet people."[734] As Commission Chairman Zhukov maintained, a "conference for workers from Asia and Africa on the implementation of education in native languages" slated to happen in Central Asia in the fall of 1960 would serve as both a means of defeating Western neoimperialism and a chance to impress on those traveling from twenty-five countries how Central Asia stood out as a model for blending indigenous culture and modern progress.[735]

A few UNESCO-endorsed events played an important role in the evolution of Soviet cultural politics in the Khrushchev era. For example, the holding in Leningrad during the summer of 1963 of the International Writers' Congress, which UNESCO and the Community of European Writers had planned, served as an opportunity for the Kremlin both to dispel fears in the West of the beginnings of an "ideological pogrom" in the Soviet Union and to reconcile

[733] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 19, l. 53.

[734] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 25, l. 297.

[735] According to Zhukov, this conference would counter the influence of Western pedagogical experts, who sought to prevent the cultivation of indigenous languages and thereby "preserve elements of the dependence of educational systems" in Asia and Africa on their former imperial masters. At the same time, the conference would familiarize Asian and African educators with "the practical positive experience of the national republics of the Soviet Union in the creation of national cadres while simultaneously showing their rapid economic and cultural growth in the years of Soviet power." GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d, 14, ll. 148-49.

Khrushchev with I. G. Erenburg after the Soviet premier had attacked the Soviet writer and other members of the intelligentsia that March in a meeting at the Kremlin. Attended by Jean-Paul Sartre, Simone de Beauvoir, and other literary luminaries of the Western and Soviet worlds, the International Writers' Congress devolved into vicious quarreling between Western and Soviet writers over the value of modernist and existentialist literature (the works of Marcel Proust, Franz Kafka, James Joyce, and Samuel Beckett) until Erenberg cooled the tensions between the two warring camps.[736] Having scorned the organization at the Wroclaw Congress in the context of the late 1940s antiforeign and anti-cosmopolitan campaigns, the Erenberg of the early 1960s embodied the overlapping values of Soviet socialist internationalism and the Western internationalism of UNESCO. The émigré cultural critics Petr Vail' and Aleksandr Genis recall how Erenberg's life, as portrayed in the memoirs he published that decade (*People, Years, Life*), had impressed on the generation coming of age in the 1960s that "the USSR is not an island, isolated from the rest of mankind in time and space." Erenberg's journey through the twentieth century represented a vision of the integration of Soviet culture into world culture reminiscent of UNESCO's aspiration to build an international community with a shared cultural heritage. "Everything in this grandiose panorama must serve the conception of one world, in which only talent and style distinguish people and ideas," Vail' and Genis observed of his memoirs. "The main character of the book is Erenberg himself. For him, a cosmopolitan making the globe his home, the earth is a brotherhood of artists, transforming the patchwork map into a single empire of art."[737]

[736] Taubman, *Khrushchev*, 600-01; and Rubenstein, *Tangled Loyalties*, 354-62.

[737] Petr Vail' and Aleksandr Genis, *60-e: Mir sovetskogo cheloveka* (Ann Arbor: Ardis, 1988), 34–35.

In the fall of the same year in which the conference in Leningrad took place, Erenberg again displayed this cosmopolitan worldview at a UNESCO roundtable in Paris commemorating the seventh centenary of the birth of Italian poet Dante Alighieri. "The greatness of Dante is evident," Erenberg told the audience, "if only from the enthusiasm his work arouses in every part of our disunited world, whether among the inhabitants of inferno, real or imaginary, among those who do not regard themselves as living in purgatory, or among the illusory shades of paradise." Citing Dante's passion for politics to defend Soviet writers criticized by Western intellectuals for their political "commitment," the aging writer seemed to use his speech to justify his own controversial relationship with the Soviet state and Stalin, arguing that art created by political passion transcended the specific historical context and battles giving rise to that passion. "What now remains of the feud between the Guelphs and Ghibellines, the religious dogmas, and the doctrines of Aristotle or Plato? Dante's *Divine Comedy* itself, the power and the music of his poetry—with all due deference to Cato of Utica and his like," Erenberg remarked in praise of Dante's epic poem written in political exile and in reference to the Roman statesman who appears in the poem in purgatory because of his suicide under the tyranny of Caesar.[738] The last line of Dante's *Divine Comedy*, "'the love that moves the suns and the other stars,'" disproved the importance of the rightness or wrongness of a specific point of view shaped by the historical moment. "Every child now knows that Dante was wrong in thinking that the Sun and the other heavenly bodies revolve round the earth," he concluded. "But every modern man with a spark of humanity in him knows in his heart that love indeed moves the Sun and the other heavenly

[738] For an analysis of Cato's role in Dante's work, see the editor's note in Dante Alighieri, *The Divine Comedy of Dante Alighieri: Purgatorio*, ed. Robert M. Durling and Ronald Martinez, vol. 2 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 591–92.

bodies, including this planet, not very large it is true, but important nonetheless, the one we call the Earth."[739]

Other UNESCO gatherings in the Soviet Union had less of an impact on the Soviet cultural literati and the high diplomacy of the Cold War but still laid bare the commonalities and differences between Soviet and Western internationalisms. One of the first activities inside the Soviet Union to receive UNESCO funds, the 1960 "International Summer Student Courses" at the International Youth Camp in the Crimean town of Gurzuf, highlights the points of convergence and dissimilarities between the competing internationalisms of UNESCO and the USSR. It also illustrates the difficulties Soviet officials faced when balancing the ideological messaging they intended for these events and the need to get UNESCO sponsorship.

In March 1960, the Soviet UNESCO Commission applied for a UNESCO grant of $8,000 for these courses, or what amounted to a short summer camp taking place from June 1 through June 17 and organized by the USSR Student Council and the Bureau of International Youth Tourism, "Sputnik." Requesting this grant to help fund the travel of over 120 representatives of student organizations from all over the world, the commission argued that the theme of these courses, "Students, International Cooperation, and World Culture," echoed UNESCO's ideals and fell within the mandate of UNESCO's "East-West" project due to the anticipated presence of youth from Asia, Africa, and Latin America.[740] At first skeptical of the proposal, UNESCO

[739] For an abridged version of the speech, see Ilya Ehrenburg, "Dante: The Primacy of Poetry," *The UNESCO Courier*, January 1966, 16–21.

[740] Sergei Lapin and Sergei Slipchenko, March 19, 1960, 1–2, AG 8: 008 (477) MP 03-East West Major Project, Participation, Ukraine S.S.R., UNESCO Archives. UNESCO footed the bill for the travel of students from mostly left-leaning student organizations, including an Algerian from the Union of Muslim Students of Algeria; a French student from the Black Africa Students Federation in France; the director of the Department of Cultural Relations at the University of Chile; an Indian from the Federation of Indian Students in London; an Iraqi from the General Union of Students of Iraq; a Jordanian from the Union of Jordanian Students; and a Peruvian from the Revolutionary Front of that country. "Compte Rendu sur l'utilisation d'aide de l'UNESCO pour les Cours Informationaux d'Été des Étudiants en 1960," n.d., 1–2, AG 8: 378.18 A 06(477) "60" AMS, UNESCO Archives.

eventually elected to allot $4,000 to the courses since "it would be difficult to refuse" the application in light of the fact that it was the first such request from the Ukrainian SSR. At the same time, UNESCO conditioned its contribution on the stipulation that the program include a significant portion dedicated to UNESCO, requiring that 25 percent of the courses focus exclusively on the organization's "East-West" project and its work to demonstrate the value and mutual influence of Asian and Western cultural traditions. The organization also required that an official from the UNESCO Department of Education attend the courses and use the time reserved for UNESCO to hold a discussion on the project.[741]

Promoted in a colorful and chic brochure as a fun social gathering of youth representing different cultures, the summer courses sought to showcase the Soviet Union as a center not only of scientific and cultural progress but also of "international association" in the spirit of the 1957 World Youth Festival. In the daytime, foreign students sat with Soviet peers in seminars translated simultaneously into Russian, French, English, and Spanish on short-wave radio receivers and led by experts covering a wide range of topics oriented toward reconciling world peace with the latest technological innovations and political developments. These included, among others, workshops on "Culture and National Independence," "Science and the Twentieth Century," "Students and Disarmament," and "Cinema: A Means of Mutual Understanding Among Peoples." At night, students socialized at film screenings, an "International Student Ball," and informal meetings with Soviet celebrities. On the weekends and during the last three

[741] G. Nannetti, "Request from Ukraine–Assistance for International Seminar for Students," May 17, 1960, AG 8: 008 (477) MP 03-East West Major Project, Participation, Ukraine S.S.R., UNESCO Archives; and M. Rudolf Salat, "Projet Majeur Orient-Occident: Programme de Participation; Demande d'assistance de La R.S.S. d'Ukraine (Transmise par l'URSS) pour un Stage de Jeunesse," May 24, 1960, 1–2, AG 8: 008 (477) MP 03-East West Major Project, Participation, Ukraine S.S.R., UNESCO Archives.

days of the program, students toured along the coast of the Black Sea, visited Yalta, inspected a Soviet collective farm, and explored Moscow.[742]

For UNESCO's "25 percent" of the schedule, the international organization sent Anoush Khoshkish, a French employee of the Department of Education, to deliver opening remarks to the program, give a lecture on UNESCO's work to promote mutual understanding through the "East-West" project, present a film on the project followed by a discussion, and hand out UNESCO informational materials to participants. Despite some planted questions about the absence of China in UNESCO and the excessive administrative costs of the international organization, Khoshkish portrayed the response of his audience in his report as critical but genuinely positive and stressed that the UNESCO film was "well received." But the secretariat employee also took note of the polemical tenor of the discussions. To his surprise, those at the courses from the over forty countries outside the eastern bloc, and especially the youth hailing from decolonizing nations, outdid their Soviet hosts in their militant stances on international politics. "It was interesting to observe during the political discussions," Khoshkish reflected, "the moderation of participants from the USSR and people's democracies compared to the fanatic tone of the representatives of the extreme Left of the economically liberal countries or still yet the fervent nationalists of the Middle East and Africa. The Soviet participants at times held themselves back to calm the spirits." The heated arguments dominating the courses coincided uneasily with UNESCO's vision of pacifistic intellectual and social bonding across cultures. "The positive aspect [of the courses] was more apparent as soon as the presentation of UNESCO ideals and activities were grafted onto the program," Khoshkish observed in a somewhat self-

[742] The original, Russian-language brochure can be found in Russian archives: GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 5, ll. 259a-266b. A French translation can be found in the UNESCO archives: "1960," n.d., AG 8: 378.18 A 06(477) "60" AMS, UNESCO Archives.

congratulatory manner. “In fact, from that moment on, one could see a shift in points of view, from the ‘East-West’ [*Est-Ouest*] political axis to the ‘East-West’ [*Orient-Occident*] cultural axis.”[743]

These two “axes” shaping the discourse of the 1960 courses derived from the competing internationalisms of the Cold War. On the one hand, UNESCO and its representatives’ aversion to fractious political debate represented the institutionalization of a Western consensus centered on multilateral, “apolitical,” cultural cooperation while emphasizing congenial engagement as opposed to conflict. On the other hand, the students attending the courses formed a tenuous alliance between the socialist and anticolonial movements challenging this consensus. Thus the event in Crimea brought together and fostered a dialogue between a Western internationalism interested in gradually reforming the status quo and a revolutionary internationalism intent on remaking this world order. Moreover, the vocal and disruptive presence of youth from the Western Left and countries seeking independence from colonial domination reflected and presaged the upheaval that would unsettle the bipolar paradigm of the Cold War over the course of the 1960s.

The politically charged atmosphere of the summer courses made UNESCO officials hesitant to support future Soviet ideas for UNESCO activities. When the Soviet UNESCO Delegation appealed for assistance in the carrying out of the 1961 World Youth Forum in Moscow, one UNESCO official wondered whether “such a meeting called in the present period of international tension and mistrust [can] be effective in bringing about international

[743] Khoshkish described the questions on China and UNESCO spending, about which the Soviet UNESCO Commission and Delegation consistently complained, as “pre-meditated.” A. Khoshkish, “Rapport de Mission en U.R.S.S. en vue de participer au Stage d’Études International pour Étudiants à Gourzouf dans la R.S.S. d’Ukraine.,” August 8, 1960, 1–9, AG 8: 008 (477) MP 03-East West Major Project, Participation, Ukraine S.S.R., UNESCO Archives.

understanding and cooperation."[744] Regardless of these concerns and persistent protestations from the US over the political motivations behind Soviet solicitations of UNESCO funds, the international organization continued to allocate resources to Soviet events but enforced its contractual right to oversee a portion of their program. If Soviet officials failed to adequately incorporate UNESCO content into its functions, the organization demanded the USSR either return the money allocated for the activity or find other ways of disseminating UNESCO's message. For instance, the Youth Section of the UNESCO Department of Education compelled the Soviet UNESCO Commission to send a photo exhibition to different cities in the USSR after the organizers of the 1961 World Youth Forum abruptly bumped the international organization's presentation from the schedule.[745] Keen to utilize UNESCO's funds and the organization's public-relations arm to draw "progressive" elements of the world's educated classes to its internationalist meetings, the Soviet UNESCO Commission and Delegation had to ensure that at least part of these get-togethers contained UNESCO themes as interruptions to the otherwise Soviet-controlled internationalist programs.

Soviet hosting organizations tended to fare better in the eyes of UNESCO observers when they put on conferences concerned with educational training or a specific scientific topic. In 1962, Ruth Lazarus, an expatriate South-African UNESCO official who worked with W. E. B. Dubois on education in Africa, spoke favorably of her time alongside four Soviet and African women on the steering committee of the "Seminar for African Women on Women's Education," which took place that September in Tashkent.[746] Bringing to the capital of the "Soviet East" a

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[744] "World Youth Forum," August 1960, 1, AG 8: 369.4 A 06 (470) "61" AMS/MP 03, UNESCO Archives.

[745] Pierre Francois, "ED763/9," August 22, 1961, 1–2, AG 8: 369.4 A 06 (470) "61" AMS/MP 03, UNESCO Archives.

[746] Dubois and Lazarus exchanged letters that year to discuss UNESCO's involvement in education in Africa See: *Du Bois, W. E. B. (William Edward Burghardt), 1868-1963. Letter from W. E. B. Du Bois to Ruth Lazarus,*

mixture of teachers, healthcare workers, and members of parliament from an Africa undergoing rapid changes due to decolonization, the committee conceived of the seminar as a site for African women to share their experiences in educating the populations of their respective countries while studying "the experiences of Asian Soviet republics in the field of irradication [sic] of illiteracy and further education of women." Introduced by the female chairman of the Uzbek Supreme Soviet, Ia. S. Nasridinova, the seminar consisted of five sessions in which African women led talks about the state of education for women in their countries and Soviet pedagogues gave lectures exalting the progress in Soviet society of liberating women from the destitution of ignorance. Toward the end of the seminar, the African women went on field trips to Soviet educational institutions and traveled to the other Central Asian republics.[747]

The high praise offered by Lazarus in her report on the seminar reveals how the civilizing missions of the USSR and the international organization converged in the shared goal of educating the world's population through the tutelage of the more "advanced" countries. In a draft of the final report, Lazarus quoted a delegate from Togo who viewed Soviet Central Asia as a model for her own country's development. The seminar, this representative extolled, was "a valuable experience not only because of its theme but because it was held in in a country which not so long ago had had the same problems as we have, and we are able to judge your results for ourselves. This experience will aid us in our own work."[748] The African women, Lazarus added in the final version of her assessment for UNESCO, "were able to see for themselves the

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January 4, 1962. W. E. B. Du Bois Papers (MS 312). Special Collections and University Archives, University of Massachusetts Amherst Libraries.

[747] Representatives from the following countries participated in the seminar: Basutoland, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Liberia, Mali, Morocco, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Tanganyika, Togo, and Tunisia. Ruth Lazarus, "Mission Report," October 26, 1962, 1, AG 8: 371.042 A 06(470) "62" AMS, UNESCO Archives.

[748] Ruth Lazarus, "Draft: African Women Meet Together in Central Asia," October 15, 1962, 3, AG 8: 371.042 A 06(470) "62" AMS, UNESCO Archives.

enormous changes that had taken place in the lives of women who only a few generations ago were veiled, and were for the most part illiterate, and lacked basic social and political rights."[749]

The eagerness with which the USSR pressed UNESCO to confer its seal of approval on Soviet international gatherings speaks to the centrality of such multilateral meetings to the geopolitical contest of the Cold War. In the 1950s and 1960s, the Soviet UNESCO Commission campaigned to erode the West's ability to determine the culture and rules governing an emerging international public sphere run by UNESCO and other international organizations. Zvorykin and other Soviet specialists struggled both to adapt to and overturn Western power over this sphere at meetings, conferences, and other events happening mainly in Western Europe or North America. In the 1960s, the Soviet UNESCO Commission also moved to chip away at Western hegemony by merging Soviet internationalist events with the UN's institutionalization of internationalist solidarity.

This effort proved mutually beneficial to both the USSR and UNESCO. Thanks to Soviet aspirations to exploit UNESCO as a sponsor of its cultural-diplomatic offensive, the international organization extended its influence into the communist world by conditioning sponsorship on the requirement that any event either incorporate the input of UNESCO or simply conform to a theme currently boosted by the international organization. Soviet petitioning for UNESCO support proved remarkably successful for the USSR given its late entrance into the world of organizing the international public sphere. In 1965, Director-General Maheu could deflect Soviet complaints about discrimination in this area of activity by noting that the organization's general review of the matter had "led to the holding of more meetings in the USSR than in any other

[749] Ruth Lazarus, "Mission Report," 2–3.

member state" during that year.[750] In response to a proposal put forward by the Soviet UNESCO Delegation for a conference on human rights in the Soviet Union at the end of 1964, the director of the UNESCO Department of Social Sciences worried that this would incur political trouble for the international organization since it had just finished a conference on the "Biological Aspects of Race" in Moscow. The director warned that approval of the human rights conference would mean that UNESCO had placed in the USSR "in a period of three years two out of three major meetings on human rights and eradication of racial prejudice," which "might be objectionable."[751]

Regardless of their location, UNESCO meetings enabled Soviet professionals to act as public intellectuals engaged in a reciprocal exchange of knowledge across borders for a common global good during the Cold War. As the historian Maria Rogacheva illustrates in her study of Soviet scientists working in the "scientific town" of Chernogolovka near Moscow, in-person gatherings abroad were some of the only opportunities for Soviet scientists to "keep in touch with the progress of the international scientific community in their respective fields" following the isolationism of the Stalinist era.[752] But this intellectual discourse between the capitalist and communist blocs did not take place in a void. Because the settings, terms, and etiquette of these events dictated the results of this discourse, the sites of interaction between the intelligentsias of the competing ideological systems became objects of contestation equal in significance to the substance of the debates. The USSR therefore sought to exploit the overlapping ideals of

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[750] During the year, UNESCO planned to fund more than seven conferences in the Soviet Union. René Maheu, "DG/7/5/35/2," 1.

[751] Julian Hochfeld, "Soviet Proposal on Meetings which might be held in USSR during 1965-1966–Mr. Pavlov's Letter of 27 October and Mr. Wolfort's Memo of 4 November," December 4, 1964, AG 8: Box 1934, X07.211 (470), UNESCO Archives.

[752] Maria Rogacheva, *The Private World of Soviet Scientists from Stalin to Gorbachev* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 155.

UNESCO and the USSR to decenter the international organization's activities from the West while accruing foreign currency from these gatherings and courting the educated classes of the weakly-developed countries.

In the context of the midcentury spread of mass media across the globe, however, the international public spawned by UNESCO encompassed more than experts trekking from East to West and vice versa for in-person communication. In particular, the international organization seized on the increasing ease with which written materials traveled across borders to spread its internationalist message. The next chapter investigates how the reading public generated by UNESCO offered a bullhorn for Soviet propaganda while also affecting the lives of Soviet citizens who had no opportunity to travel abroad.

CHAPTER 8

SOVIET PARTICIPATION IN THE UNESCO READING PUBLIC

While a stratum of the Soviet intelligentsia had the privilege of attending UNESCO events or representing the USSR at meetings the communist country hosted at home, UNESCO publications introduced the organization's activities to a broader segment of the Soviet population. Translated into multiple languages, these materials produced an international reading public unique in its inclusion of citizens from countries where authoritarian governments filtered information coming over the border.[753] As an aggregator of data on education and a news source on global developments under its mandate, UNESCO manufactured a pre-internet global network that facilitated the internationalization of the flow of knowledge about education, science, and culture. Aware of the wide net of this reading public and the accessibility of UNESCO materials to readers sheltered from Soviet propaganda by their governments, the Soviet UNESCO Commission and Delegation viewed UNESCO publications as one of the only channels through which they could disseminate positive coverage about the Soviet Union worldwide.

"Anti-Soviet slander" in the articles, books, or other written work released by the international organization remained a constant source of consternation among Soviet officials

[753] For example, the international organization boasts that Nelson Mandela read *The UNESCO Courier* (which I discuss in the second half of this chapter) while imprisoned on Robbin Island because it was one of the few publications allowed into the prison that covered current world events. Annar Cassam, "Mandela: Reading *The Courier* on Robben Island," March 31, 2012, http://www.unesco.org/new/en/testing/africa-relaunch/resources/africa-department/news/mandela_reading_the_courier_on_robben_island/.

from the early days of the country's participation in UNESCO through the late 1960s. Beginning in 1957, the Soviet UNESCO Delegation regularly met with UNESCO bureaucrats to complain about any hint of bias, such as comparisons between Nazi Germany and Soviet communism or unflattering portraits of the PRC.[754] Although other UNESCO member states voiced their dissatisfaction in this respect from time to time, the USSR stood out for its zero-tolerance of any reference considered detrimental to its reputation. On several occasions, the Soviet UNESCO Delegation went so far as to call for the elimination of small advertisements in the back of UNESCO periodicals of books with content deemed hostile to the USSR even if the advertising blurb itself had no disagreeable phrases.[755] In correspondence with Moscow, the delegation attributed these attacks to the personal political motivations of those who controlled the divisions overseeing UNESCO publishing.[756]

While some of these accusations had merit given the domination of the UNESCO Secretariat by nationals from the capitalist world, the failure of Soviet domestic institutions to monitor UNESCO publications and present information for them undermined the delegation's position. After a conversation in August 1957 with the UNESCO leadership about a book composed by a Western scholar that understated the number of Soviet citizens who knew a foreign language, the Soviet UNESCO Delegation learned that two Soviet academicians had

[754] For examples, see GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 1, ll. 54-55; and GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 8, l. 147.

[755] Countries with histories of conflict with other UNESCO member states also protested to UNESCO about its publications. The Soviet permanent delegate referenced India's gripes concerning literature about Pakistan in a conversation with Director-General Evans in the spring of 1957. GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 7, l.16; and GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 15, l. 257.

[756] In 1957, Kemenov blamed the Polish émigré who headed the division responsible for UNESCO's *Currents of Sociology* for the journal's "harmful publications." In 1960, a Soviet UNESCO employee pointed to the power of an American when explaining the "anti-Soviet tendencies" of the UNESCO Department of Information. One UNESCO executive threatened to resign over this badgering, telling the Soviet permanent delegate that they had made his job "impossible." GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 1, l. 55; 404; and GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 15, l. 349.

initially approved this information and another had never responded to a final request for approval of the data. “These cases are, unfortunately, not unique,” an adviser to the delegation wrote to MID Deputy Minister A. V. Zakharov. To demonstrate this, the adviser cited a failure the previous week to respond to a request for comment on a UNESCO report on continental shelves. “If there are unsatisfactory provisions in this report,” the adviser maintained, “then it will be difficult to protest because of our silence.”[757]

The Soviet UNESCO Commission realized that Soviet contributions to the international organization’s printed materials offered the best means of giving the international community a “correct” understanding of their country, since UNESCO publications reached broad swaths of the world’s population. In his memorandum to Soviet leaders from the late 1950s, Mozhaev stressed that the UNESCO imprimatur on Soviet scholarship would legitimize this information as reliable in the eyes of foreigners. “It is necessary,” Mozhaev wrote, “also to take into account that international organizations are one of the most important channels of foreign propaganda for governments, one of the strongest ways of shaping public opinion.” Because the publications of international organizations were “specialized, i.e. calculated in accordance with the profile of the organization for specific parts of the population or specific specialists,” they had a “purposefulness, credibility, clarity, and concreteness” governmental propaganda did not. The over 700 periodicals and more than 300 individual publications issued by international organizations annually, he added, “more easily and quickly penetrate borders and are rarely subject to confiscation.”[758]

[757] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 7, ll. 103-04.

[758] GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 2, l. 200.

Each year, the international organization released millions of copies of its popular magazines and academic journals to its more than 70 member states as well as countries not belonging to the organization.[759] The *UNESCO Information Bulletin*, an international newswire service, went out to 4,000 newspapers and 1,000 radio stations in 130 countries.[760] The Soviet UNESCO Commission laid out in a 1957 memorandum how it should use such UNESCO conduits to funnel Soviet written material into four target areas otherwise largely untouched by Soviet propaganda campaigns: 1) countries with no diplomatic relations with the USSR; 2) countries with which the Soviet Union had diplomatic ties but in which it was "hard to get accurate information about the USSR (e.g., Switzerland, a number of Latin American countries)"; 3) countries lacking diplomatic relations with the USSR where "national liberation is taking place" (e.g., "the Belgian Congo, French West Africa"); and 4) countries with "provincial presses" which, unable to afford "expensive press agencies, . . . prefer the *UNESCO Bulletin* since it is distributed free of charge (e.g., the Scandinavian countries, France, Belgium, etc.)."[761] This strategy bore fruit in the first two years of its implementation. In 1958, Soviet articles appeared not only in UNESCO periodicals but also in at least forty-four national and local newspapers as syndicated reproductions.[762]

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[759] These numbers oscillated slightly over the years. For a summary of the circulation of some of these periodicals in 1961, see GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 20, ll. 234-54.

[760] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 6, l. 400.

[761] GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 2, ll. 165-66.

[762] The Soviet UNESCO Commission kept tabs on how the US National Commission exploited UNESCO publications to disseminate information. In 1959, for example, Chairman Zhukov noted that Columbia University had responded to a request for books in the *UNESCO Information Bulletin* from a university in Ghana in 1957 by sending 686 books. He also cited the receipt of 2,000 books by a library in Nigeria from Columbia. GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 13, ll. 47-48. Soviet articles likely surfaced in more than 44 newspapers since the report references just one article on Soviet museums, which was reproduced in 44 newspapers that year. GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 6, ll. 189-91.

Toward the end of the 1960s, the Soviet foreign-policy apparatus shifted its focus to UN statistical publications. UN "statistical periodical directories and yearbooks," the Soviet UN Ambassador N. T. Fedorenko wrote in November 1966 to the heads of all agencies dealing with the world body, "are widely distributed to all countries of the world and are considered the most serious sources of statistical data." These documents, Fedorenko stressed, not only served as reliable starting points for research among "government and business circles, the intelligentsia, students, etc.," but also formed the basis for the composition of reports around which sessions of the UN General Assembly, ECOSOC, the Security Council, the European Economic Community (EEC), and other international organizations revolved. Thus, UN statistical compilations offered a means to shape perceptions of Soviet productivity by validating claims of success in a variety of areas, including industrial output, public health, employment, and education. If "individual statistical data published by Soviet publications," Fedorenko maintained, "is met with distrust in the West and Western propaganda often tries to cast doubt on its veracity, the accuracy of such data is not contested when published in UN publications and those of specialized international organizations." Scolding Soviet organs for having overlooked these documents, Fedorenko urged them to turn over more frequently to UN organizations the most recent statistics from the USSR Central Statistical Directorate (TsSU SSSR) and align this data with existing international standards instead of relying on outdated information. He singled out what he identified as an incorrect listing in *The UNESCO Statistical Yearbook* of the amount of spending on education in the USSR as "one of the lowest figures in the world" behind the Republic of Congo-Léopoldville.[763] In response, the Soviet UNESCO Commission acknowledged that the *Yearbook* contained "a number of instances of insufficient and incomplete information" and pledged to

[763] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 33, ll. 206-12.

send more accurate data, but disputed the notion that the table on educational expenditures cast the Soviet Union as trailing behind the Congo.[764]

From the mid-1950s onward, UNESCO directors expressed a willingness to include some Soviet content in publications put out by their departments.[765] But the pervasive politics of the Cold War, along with the UNESCO Secretariat's method of planning publications, complicated these intentions. In 1957, the appearance of Soviet publications and other media evoked condemnations from the US National Commission, which admonished UNESCO for facilitating "Soviet propaganda."[766] Inside UNESCO, many considered Soviet protestations as manifestations of a hubristic disregard for the rights of other member states to appear in the literature of the international organization. As the head of the "East-West" project observed in conversation with Soviet emissaries, "if every government sends two articles, the USSR sends ten."[767] The dismissal of Soviet dissatisfaction concealed a more fundamental reason for the organization's rejections of Soviet submissions. In reaction to Soviet anger, UNESCO launched a review of how frequently Soviet materials appeared in UNESCO publications in the summer of 1961. The UNESCO employee who completed the review blamed a tendency of the organization to rely on its own people in the secretariat instead of recruiting authors from member states, noting that "a very large part of our publications" came from either "the secretariat itself, or are given by contract to NGOs." Since most of the UNESCO staff and affiliated NGOs hailed from

[764] The commission suggested that the UN ambassador had "misread" the table. Ibid., ll. 215-17.

[765] The director of the UNESCO Department of Mass Information (which soon removed the "mass" from its name) made clear his excitement to receive Soviet materials in a conversation with the attaché of the Soviet UNESCO Delegation. GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 1, l. 7.

[766] For instance, the Americans lashed out at the UNESCO Department of Information when they realized that a catalogue of films for children listed more Soviet movies than American ones. GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 7, l. 19.

[767] GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 16, ll. 235-36.

Western Europe or North America, the Soviet UNESCO Delegation viewed this preference as advantageous to the West. Moreover, the long-term plans for publications cobbled together by UNESCO insiders from Western Europe and North America left little room to incorporate topics of interest to the Soviet Union.[768] These built-in biases corroborated the many accusations from the Soviet UNESCO Delegation that Western bureaucrats had undue influence over the publication activities of the international organization.[769]

Meanwhile, the Soviet UNESCO Commission met resistance from domestic institutions uninterested in making their specialists write for UNESCO. In September 1957, MID Deputy Minister Zakharov chided Soviet organizations for their inactivity. "A practice has been established in these organizations of only fulfilling UNESCO orders for writing specific articles and brochures on issues of interest to UNESCO or those that follow the tastes of the UNESCO bureaucrats and apparatus," he wrote to the heads of Soviet agencies. "Instead," the deputy minister urged these institutions to "take the initiative and send to UNESCO brochures and materials on specific issues of Soviet science and culture, the illumination of which we are interested in abroad."[770] This perceived underperformance of Soviet institutions continued into the 1960s. In 1966, the Soviet UNESCO Commission castigated the Soviet "News" Printing Agency (*Agentstvo pechati* "*novosti*," or APN) for refusing to send articles to the international organization for free. Furthermore, Soviet academicians did not turn in to UNESCO manuscripts for books until years after their respective deadlines. To make matters worse, the commission bemoaned the "poor quality" and "crude" nature of work put forward by Soviet experts who did

[768] Vladimir Stepanek, "BMS/3/Memo. 154: Participation of the USSR in UNESCO Publications," September 27, 1961, 1–2, AG 8: Box 1938, X07.21(470) D, UNESCO Archives.

[769] GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 15, l. 349.

[770] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 11, ll. 117-18.

not “keep in mind the character of UNESCO publications and their reading public” of foreigners averse to Soviet polemics and more accustomed to engaging prose as well as high quality graphics or pictures aimed at laymen. All these shortcomings resulted in UNESCO returning final drafts to Moscow for “revision.”[771]

In spite of Soviet disorganization and UNESCO’s predilection for keeping its publication activities “in house,” Soviet output for UNESCO increased in the 1960s to the point that it rivalled its American adversary in some departments.[772] This resulted from a reversal by UNESCO of its policy of not releasing its plan for future publications to member states as well as a Soviet commitment of more personnel to invigorate its work related to publications following the 1961 review by the international organization.[773] To further bolster Soviet contributions to the publications of all UN specialized agencies in 1964, the USSR Central Committee and Council of Ministers also jointly ordered central ministries and institutes of higher education to complete three tasks to strengthen the Soviet position on publishing through the UN: 1) select every two months the “most easily translatable” works published in the USSR on questions of agriculture, industry, and the training of cadres; 2) prepare a “long-term plan for the publication of literature in foreign languages on issues of economics and planning”; and 3)

[771] Examples of the commission and delegation complaining of the lateness and low quality of Soviet submissions are numerous, especially in the first three years of the Soviet push to get their authors published. For examples, see GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 6, ll. 268; 173; 334; GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 9, l. 95; GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 14, l. 50; and GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 20, l. 212.

[772] GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 7, l. 274.

[773] The Soviet UNESCO Delegation assigned each of its members as well as Soviet employees in the UNESCO Secretariat a specific publication to work on. At the same time, UNESCO gave the delegation a broad overview of its publication plans. GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 20, ll. 61-62; and William Farr, “Mass Communication Publication Plans 1961/62,” July 13, 1961, 1–4, AG 8: Box 1938, X07.21(470) D, UNESCO Archives.

compose in foreign languages several series of brochures and books on "trade between the capitalist and socialist countries."[774]

As a consequence of these actions, the Soviet Union tripled the number of books, articles, and informational features published by UNESCO from 60 in 1958 to 187 in 1963. To the satisfaction of the Soviet UNESCO Commission, this upward trend continued in subsequent years through 1967. In the early 1960s, the Soviet UNESCO Delegation became so fixated on boosting Soviet publications that it kept track of the individual pages of UNESCO publications on which Soviet compositions appeared (304 in 1961, 362 in 1962, 1136 in 1963, etc.).[775] The high demand among non-Soviet readers for insight into Soviet society spurred UNESCO to stockpile Soviet literature. Each year, the organization received so many visitors as well as letters requesting such material that UNESCO had to regularly reprint Soviet publications.[776] Thus, readers from all over the world could find in UNESCO publications bibliographies of Soviet works; translations of classics from the Soviet republics; books on the teaching of different subjects in the USSR; commemorative reflections on literary, cultural or scientific figures from the Russian or other ethnic traditions making up the USSR; social-scientific analyses of contemporary issues such as disarmament and state planning, as well as others.[777]

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[774] RGANI, f. 3, op. 16, d. 456, ll. 9-13.

[775] After 1963, the Soviet UNESCO Delegation ceased counting the total number of publications, but noted each year through 1967 that the number "had increased significantly." At the same time, it listed the amount of Soviet material placed in specific publications of interest. See: GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 2, l. 4; GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 26, l. 263; and GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 32, l. 53.

[776] GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 10, l. 187; and GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 6, l. 229. The Soviet UNESCO Commission and Delegation also received dozens of requests annually for literature from libraries in India and Indonesia, American and British academic journals, and UNESCO regional centers. For some examples, see: GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 4, l. 12; GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 7, l. 37; GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 8, ll. 155-57; 175-77; and GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 10, l. 100.

[777] For some examples of individual Soviet publications, see the "publications" sections of the annual reports of the Soviet UNESCO Delegation. In 1964, for instance, the delegation boasted of contributions on "the Social Sciences

In a sign of Soviet success in taking advantage of UNESCO as a bullhorn for its cultural-diplomatic campaign to improve its image internationally, one Soviet book distributed by the international organization, *The Equality of Rights between Races and Nationalities in the USSR*, caused a furor throughout the United States and contributed to the realization in the US of the negative implications of American racial discrimination for US foreign policy. Begun as a Soviet rejoinder to a 1954 UNESCO publication written by an American that outlined the recent gains of the Civil Rights Movement, *The Equality of Rights* laid out the standard Soviet narrative of how the captive nationalities under the tsar had achieved liberation under socialism. It also contained attacks on the colonial domination and racial strife wrought by Western nations, including American segregation. Upon its release in 1962, the Kennedy administration protested that UNESCO had lent its credibility as a prestigious international organization to Soviet propaganda. As the world watched James Meredith, under federal escort, become the first African American to enroll at the University of Mississippi that fall, *The Equality of Rights* provoked a broader discussion in the US on what damage events in the South might do to the country's reputation abroad. According to historian Anthony Hazard, at least eighty national and local American newspapers published articles dedicated to the book while editorial boards vented their anger that tax dollars went to a platform for the world communist movement. Meanwhile, Congress held a hearing on *The Equality of Rights* and reporters compelled President Kennedy to comment on the controversy at a press conference in early 1963.[778]

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in the USSR," translations of stories about the Armenian national legend David Sassoun, and an overview of polytechnic education in the Soviet Union. GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 29, l. 174.

[778] Hazard's study of UNESCO's impact on American understandings of "race" contains a detailed analysis of the fallout in the US from the publication of *The Equality of Rights*. My outline and contextualization here of the controversy in the US is an overview of his much more extensive research. Hazard, *Postwar Anti-Racism*, 132–39. For documents related to the prolonged process of producing *The Equality of Rights* and Soviet observations of the attacks from American "reactionary circles" on this book, see GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 6, l. 334; GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 20, l. 211; GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 26, l. 273; and GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 32, l. 305.

As one of the leading vehicles for the internationalization of specialized knowledge in the postwar era, UNESCO thus became a key disseminator of information from the Soviet Union to regions of the world otherwise inaccessible to Soviet propaganda. The international organization legitimized Soviet information, giving it an air of objectivity or neutrality. But from the perspective of Soviet officials, the Western control of the secretariat responsible for publishing these materials meant that their adversaries defined what constituted "objective," journalistic, academic, and statistical portrayals of social life. Far from viewing their publications as "propaganda" spoiling the neutrality of UNESCO, they believed Soviet writers had the right to speak as authorities on their country and counter the one-sided hegemony wielded by Western member states over an international organization presuming to act as a neutral mechanism for international intellectual cooperation.

Yet the outward flow of Soviet information through UNESCO to an international audience came at a cost. If the USSR wanted to use UNESCO to export its ideas and demonstrate its expertise abroad, it also had to import UNESCO publications and disseminate them to the Soviet public. This implicit expectation influenced the deliberations of UNESCO employees who determined whether to publish an author from the Soviet Union. In July 1957, Soviet Permanent Delegate Kemenov warned Chairman Zhukov that UNESCO's reception of a complaint from a librarian in Moscow that she did not receive certain UNESCO literature gave "grounds for accusations that Soviet citizens in the UNESCO Secretariat only seek to place our materials in UNESCO publications and that they do not want to support the publication in the Soviet press of at least short [pieces of] UNESCO information on the cultural life of other countries."[779]

[779] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 11, ll. 25-26.

This trade-off placed Soviet UNESCO intermediaries in the predicament of having to allow "undesirable" or "harmful" content into the Soviet Union. Most of this material came from the UNESCO Department of Information, which Soviet officials derided as a Western controlled "kind of 'advertising agency' promoting UNESCO activity and the director-general's personal plans."[780] For each of these publications, the USSR signed a contract that barred Soviet censors from significantly altering any part of a text and committed the Soviet UNESCO Commission to disseminating UNESCO materials to the fullest extent of its abilities. In the contract for the UNESCO *Bibliographical Newsletter*, for example, the Soviet UNESCO Commission agreed to "distribute the *Bulletin* as widely as possible among the cultural and educational institutions of its country." Article V of the contract also stated that "the presentation of the said *Bulletin* shall be subject to approval by UNESCO before publication; the form and substance of the text shall be respected and only such minor changes shall be made in translation as are necessary to produce a good literary text." In addition, UNESCO reserved for itself two pages in every issue "to advertise certain UNESCO publications."[781] As the rest of the chapter will illustrate, the Soviet UNESCO Commission sometimes deleted a passage or omitted an article on their own or at the behest of the General Directorate for the Protection of State Secrets in the Press (Glavlit), but tended to honor the pledge to release UNESCO literature unedited.

Of course, the USSR trailed far behind other UNESCO member states in terms of the number of periodicals and individual works it let flow across its borders. The country admitted only one-tenth of what its communist ally Poland took in annually and only moderately increased

[780] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 26, ll. 179-80.

[781] "Agreement between the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization and the National Commission of the USSR for UNESCO," December 30, 1959, 1–2, AG 8: Box 1939, X07.21(470)NC/P, UNESCO Archives.

the number of UNESCO publications it brought in each year, declining to participate in the UNESCO Coupon Program and other initiatives designed to facilitate the circulation of UNESCO materials.[782] Aware of the lack of knowledge about UNESCO among Soviet academicians and professionals as well as a pervasive apathy toward the international organization among Soviet institutions, the Soviet UNESCO Commission prioritized UNESCO resources that educated the Soviet intelligentsia on the mission of the international organization as well as literature relating to what the chairman of the commission described in 1957 as "useful factual and reference material for specialists." These included "brochures from the series 'Documentation through UNESCO,' 'What is UNESCO?,' and 'Technical Assistance and the Role of UNESCO,'" along with "reports of meetings of experts, results of UNESCO research, etc." Likewise, the commission tried to exclude "undesirable material," such as "UNESCO propaganda postcards, posters, and placards."[783] This selectivity puzzled scholars who had traveled to UNESCO conferences and learned about journals or monographs unavailable in the Soviet Union.[784]

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[782] The UNESCO Coupon Program allowed readers of UNESCO publications to buy these products of the international organization without dealing with the complications of currency conversion. GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 15, l. 202; and GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 16, ll. 183-84.

[783] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 9, l. 53. The commission also refused to take part in exchanges with organizations from Western member states through UNESCO if deemed harmful. For instance, the commission rejected an appeal from the Catholic Tape Recorders of America passed along by UNESCO to set up an exchange of tape recordings between citizens of the Soviet Union and its organization. GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 13, ll. 39-42. As previous chapters have illustrated, few Soviet citizens had ever heard of UNESCO. Indeed, many Soviet citizens remained ignorant of its role in the Soviet Union. In 1965, for example, A. G. Mamedov from Baku wrote the Soviet UNESCO Commission asking for UNESCO's help in improving his "living conditions" and housing situation. The commission replied that it had no role in providing welfare to Soviet citizens. GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 65, ll. 96-97.

[784] Upon returning from a UNESCO conference in March 1960, the Soviet chemist, N. A. Figurovskii, complained to the Central Committee about the lack of translations in the Soviet Union of UNESCO research and urged it to permit the introduction into Soviet academic libraries of the UNESCO scientific journal *Impact*. Noting that the commission had, in fact, given *Impact* to a "very limited number" of libraries in the USSR, an employee of the commission rejected this request and reminded the Central Committee that their main goal was to put Soviet work in UNESCO publications, not UNESCO publications in the Soviet Union. RGANI, f. 5, op. 35, d. 128, ll. 50-59. Other individuals living in the USSR contacted the international organization directly for UNESCO paraphernalia. In addition to soliciting the Public Liaison Division in Paris for economic and educational literature, a professor with a

Notwithstanding the occasional suppression of a UNESCO publication, the influx of UNESCO popular magazines, bulletins, newsletters, academic periodicals, and books into the Soviet Union represented an unprecedented move to permit more unfiltered foreign information into the country than the limited amount of literature imported through bilateral cultural agreements. Soviet universities, artistic unions, press agencies, and cinematography organs regularly added to their libraries and catalogues UNESCO journals, news bulletins, films, and television programs.[785] The international organization's publications diversified and helped to make constant the trickle of foreign information, from novels to films to scholarship, seeping into the Soviet Union and broadening the outlooks of Soviet citizens in the 1950s and 1960s. As Vail' and Genis remembered two decades later, the "Renaissance" of Soviet culture in the 1960s fed on this inward flow of foreign media. "The culture of the Stalin era existed in a stylistic vacuum. When its borders began to collapse, Western culture from different epochs and of different trends came tumbling down on bewildered spectators and readers," the two émigrés recollected. "The mix of different Western styles had one quality—it was different from the norms of Soviet culture. Different [*otlichnoi*] means better. Or worse. But not equal. It had to be adjusted to Soviet society, to sink into the context of the correct ideology. Or uproot [it]."[786]

Across the Soviet Union and its constituent republics, eight UNESCO "depository libraries," or specially designated points of access for all UNESCO publications, sprang up in the

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foreign sounding name at the Patrice Lumumba University of Friendship Among Peoples in Moscow asked UNESCO in 1964 to send him "twelve large photographs, together with captions, instructions for display and a guide for classroom discussion in English (UNESCO in Africa: A New Photo-Poster)." Mark M. P. Lyakurwa, August 3, 1964, AG 8: Box 1939, X07.21(470)NC/P, UNESCO Archives.

[785] For a list of Soviet institutions with UNESCO media in 1960, see GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 2, ll. 73-75.

[786] Vail' and Genis, *60-e*, 33-34.

1950s and 1960s.[787] According to Chevalier, the UNESCO director who visited the USSR in the summer of 1957, the staff at these depository libraries stressed to him the "great demand" for UNESCO materials in general and described to him how these publications were "read with great interest" in their libraries. "I myself," he wrote, "could ascertain this fact by the worn nature of some of these volumes, which shows that these books are frequently checked out."[788] Individual organizations and citizens "mainly from the union republics" also "often" sent letters with requests for UNESCO publications to the Soviet UNESCO Commission or directly to the international organization.[789]

One UNESCO periodical, the *UNESCO Bulletin for Libraries* (*IuNESKO Biulleten' dlia bibliotek* in Russian), became the primary means through which Soviet librarians kept in touch with the latest developments in their specialization abroad. A bimonthly publication, the *Bulletin* contained articles on the work of librarians in different countries, statistics on holdings in libraries internationally, news on international conferences on library science, the addresses of national book-exchange centers, and bibliographies of new literature in the field. The first issue translated into Russian in January 1957 presented articles on "new methods and technology for the dissemination of scientific knowledge," the photocopying services of the Japanese

[787] Several of these libraries were in Moscow and Leningrad. The others were located at universities or academies of science in several of the capitals of Soviet republics and other major cities, including Kiev, Kharkov, Minsk, and Vilnius. The book publisher *Mezhdunarodnaia kniga* also stocked UNESCO publications. The Soviet UNESCO Commission and Delegation often expressed eagerness to expand the number of these libraries. GARF. F. 9519, op. 1, d. 14, l. 50; and *Bibliography of Publications Issued by UNESCO or Under its Auspices: The First Twenty-Five Years, 1945 to 1971* (Paris: UNESCO, 1973), 381–85.

[788] GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 2, ll. 115-16.

[789] Quoted from a letter from a member of the Soviet UNESCO Delegation who asked the commission to increase the number of depository libraries in 1961 based on the number of letters they received from individuals and Soviet institutions interested in UNESCO publications. GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 14, l. 51. Requests from private citizens went through Glavlit for "*kontrol'*" before they made their way to the recipient. In 1961, for example, a citizen from Kazan received a letter telling him to pick up a book he had ordered from UNESCO in Moscow. The commission corresponded with Glavlit to ensure that they approved of the book. GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 4, ll. 116-18.

Parliamentary Library, the microfilm collection of *The Glasgow Herald*, and a summary of the proceedings of a Brazilian Seminar on book exchanges, among others.[790] When proposing the translation of the serial to the Central Committee in August 1956, Chairman Mikhailov expressed his hope that it would "help educate Soviet librarians on the technological and organizational achievements in library science abroad while also propagating the achievements of the USSR in library science."[791]

Using funds and equipment supplied by UNESCO, a team of librarians and editors under the leadership of Rudomino at VBGIL worked on a two-month deadline to put together the Russian translation of the *Bulletin* and send it out to libraries across the USSR.[792] With a circulation of over 3,000 in its first decade, the *Bulletin* drew more than 2,000 Soviet subscribers in addition to the several hundred copies handed out free of charge to Soviet depository libraries.[793] Chevalier reported in 1957 that "large national libraries" also used the journal as a reading assignment in library-science courses. Overall, Chevalier recalled seeing the *Bulletin* in "all the libraries" he visited in Moscow, Minsk, and Kiev, describing it as "well distributed" and "highly appreciated" in the Soviet Union. "But apart from praise, two critical observations were voiced," he cautioned. These misgivings concerned the absence of Soviet statistics and a

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[790] "Novye metody i tekhnika rasprostraneniia nauchnykh znanii," *Biulleten' IuNESKO dlia bibliotek* 6, no. 1 (January 1957): 5–7; "Fotokopiroval'naia sluzhba iaponskoi natsional'noi parlamentskoi biblioteki," *Biulleten' IuNESKO dlia bibliotek* 6, no. 1 (January 1957): 8–9; "Mikrofil'mirovana krupnaia shotlandskaia gazeta," *Biulleten' IuNESKO dlia bibliotek* 6, no. 1 (January 1957): 9; and "Brazil'skii seminar po voprosam knigoobmena," *Biulleten' IuNESKO dlia bibliotek* 6, no. 1 (January 1957): 20.

[791] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 3, l. 110.

[792] GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 2, l. 215; and GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 12, l. 42.

[793] GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 10, ll. 161-64.

reference to the people's democracies as "satellite states" of the USSR in a recent article.[794] In 1958, the Soviet UNESCO Commission also instructed Rudomino to protest stories on Taiwan, threatening to cease publication if UNESCO spotlighted the country again. The commission never followed through on this ultimatum.[795] In her memoirs, Rudomino, the founder and long-time director of VGBIL after whom the library is now named, recalls that the introduction of UNESCO work into her life represented a transformative moment and a central part of her experience of the "Thaw" as well as the post-Stalin era generally.[796]

UNESCO-printed publications reached far beyond narrow groups of Soviet professionals in fields under the international organization's mandate. *The UNESCO Courier*, a popular magazine intended to foster international cooperation through the publicizing of UNESCO activities as well as the latest world news in the spheres of education, science, and culture, found its way to the far reaches of the communist world and into the hands of Soviet students, workers, pensioners, and underground artists. Cherished by its readers behind the Iron Curtain, the magazine involved Soviet citizens in an international reading public shaped by the Western internationalist ethos at the core of UNESCO.

The background of the founding editor of *The Courier*, the American journalist Sandy Koffler, speaks to the overarching Western internationalist framework of the project as well as the tension within the publication between Western liberal-democratic ideals and its aspirations to operate as a universal, neutral medium for underscoring international cooperation as the root

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[794] UNESCO sent an amendment to this article. But Chevalier warned that the secretariat "should be more careful and avoid all stereotyping formulations, which could be evaluated as alien to the competence of UNESCO." GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 2, l. 109.

[795] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 12, l. 42.

[796] In the late 1960s, she also became the vice president of the International Federation of Library Associations (IFLA), which was essentially an appendage of UNESCO. M. I. Rudomino and A. V. Rudomino, *Knigi moei sud'by: Vospominaniia XX veka* (Moskva: Progress-Pleiada, 2005), 323–28.

of progress and peace. According to a 1959 profile of the editor composed by a Soviet UNESCO employee, Koffler had worked in the Psychological Warfare Division of the US military during the Second World War. In this division, he supervised the Spanish service of *Voice of America* and then edited the newspaper released by American occupation authorities in Italy before joining UNESCO in 1947. "His political beliefs are left/liberal," the Soviet UNESCO bureaucrat assessed. "He condemns McCarthyism, the persecution of blacks, and the 'firm' policy of the State Department. . . . He considers himself a friend of the Soviet Union."[797]

First published in 1948 in newspaper format as a platform for publicizing the UNESCO program, *The Courier* had become by the mid-1950s a glossy magazine covering a hodgepodge of stories on education, science, culture, or any topic tangentially related to world peace. Packaged with a bright and colorful cover (see figure 3) and replete with black-and-white or sometimes color pictures clearly intended to catch the eye, the graphic design and accessible



[797] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 6, ll. 228-29.

Figure 3. Covers of *The UNESCO Courier*. Top Row: English and Russian translations of the January 1957 issue of *The UNESCO Courier*. This issue was the first to be published in the Soviet Union. Middle Row: A November 1960 *Courier* issue in English and Russian. Notice that a slight alteration is made between the English issue title, "A New Magna Carta for Children," and the Russian issue title, "Declaration of the Rights of the Child," to make it more accessible in the USSR. UNESCO approved of such alterations in wording for translation purposes if these corrections did not change the content. Bottom Row: The August-September 1966 double issue of *The Courier* celebrating the twentieth anniversary of the international organization in English and Russian. Sources: UNESDOC for English-language versions; the Russian State Library (in which I examined the full copies of the Russian translation of the magazine) and Ozon.ru for the Russian-language versions.

writing of *The Courier* resembled the appealing layout of the US State Department's *Amerika* or the American magazine *Life* but with a global perspective and scope in accordance with the magazine's motto, "a window open on the world," which appeared on the upper-right corner of the cover.[798]

Published in seven languages in addition to the Russian version, *The Courier* stood out for the eclecticism of its areas of focus. But the mishmash of themes investigated on the pages of the magazine all spoke to the broader internationalist purpose of UNESCO to create enlightened and culturally sensitive citizens of an international community. To fulfill this mission, *The Courier* published articles falling into three broad categories: 1) news features designed to stoke civic engagement on an international scale by exploring global problems and the actions taken by UNESCO or other organizations to solve these problems; 2) "trend stories" describing new directions in education, the arts, or the sciences and oriented toward piquing the interest of the "common man" in these supposedly universal realms of human endeavor; and 3) profiles intended to familiarize readers with other cultures by highlighting how a sphere of human activity (writing, music, painting, etc.) had benefited from the contribution of one or more cultures. Among many other topics, monthly issues explored the global production of books; the "food we eat" (which had articles on cultural differences in food etiquette, world hunger, airline cuisine, recipes from different countries, etc.); the indigenous art of Oceania, Africa, and pre-Columbian America; amateur athletics; blind sculptors; "women in the new Asia"; safety tips for

[798] As the rest of this chapter will show, *The Courier* played a role in providing uncensored information about the outside world to Soviet readers in a way similar to that of the magazine *Amerika*, which Soviet officials had banned in 1952 but began publishing again in 1956 following the Geneva Summit the previous year. Historian Walter Hixson describes the content and history of *Amerika* in his book on the American cultural offensive behind the Iron Curtain. Yet he does not investigate the Soviet reception of the magazine through archival sources, relying instead on American assessments of the magazine's success. Walter L. Hixson, *Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture, and the Cold War, 1945-1961* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), 117–19.

driving and other everyday activities; the "demographic crisis"; the "world's highways"; and the UN-backed "world mobilization against malaria" in the early 1960s.

Although averse to covering political events found in newspapers, the magazine also sometimes took on controversial questions dominating world headlines. For instance, it dedicated a special issue to the problem of racism in 1960 in reaction to a flurry of anti-Semitic crimes in Western Europe, the American Civil Rights Movement, and the Sharpeville Massacre in South Africa.[799] The editors also reserved the last four to five pages for a "Letters-to-the-Editor" section, brief updates on UNESCO undertakings, instructions on how to subscribe, advertisements of books for sale (UNESCO's catalogues *Study Abroad* and *Vacations Abroad*; a historical work on *The Jewish People*; a study on *Race Relations and Mental Health*, etc.), and announcements of overstocked pamphlets from recent UNESCO exhibitions offered free to subscribers.[800]

The content of *The Courier* therefore introduced its Soviet readers to new ways of thinking internationally as well as a kind of internationalist civic voluntarism that complicated the Soviet narrative of political action as reducible to a binary choice between progressive and reactionary forces. In September 1956, the Soviet UNESCO Commission asked the Central Committee for permission to publish *The Courier* in Russian for a Soviet audience.[801] After the Central Committee approved the proposal and the Soviet UNESCO Delegation signed a two-year

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[799] See the covers and articles of issues two, four, five, and nine from 1957; issue six from 1959; issues four and eleven from 1960; issue four from 1961; issue one from 1964; and issue two from 1966.

[800] "Over 74,000 Fellowships and Scholarships Offered This Year," *The UNESCO Courier*, 1957, 35, UNESDOC; "From the UNESCO Newsroom," *The UNESCO Courier*, October 1960, 34, UNESDOC; "Just Published: Vacations Abroad," *The UNESCO Courier*, 1961, 35, UNESDOC; and "Two New UNESCO Books on Race," *The UNESCO Courier*, 1960, 35, UNESDOC. For more information on the "Letters to the Editor" section, see the rest of the chapter below.

[801] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 3, ll. 190-91.

contract, the Soviet Foreign Literature Publishing House (IIL, renamed "Mir" in the 1960s) got to work preparing the first edition for that January, hiring as editor-in-chief of the Russian version V. N. Machavariani, a translator and editor at IIL who had spent the late 1940s at the Soviet embassy in Washington, D. C. as head of press operations.[802] IIL also organized a ten-person team to assemble articles by Soviet authors to submit to the magazine.[803] Despite initial problems finding the appropriate intaglio printing press in Moscow and a window of only four weeks between receipt of the final English version and the printing deadline, the editorship managed to regularly release *The Courier* to the Soviet public from 1957 through the 1980s.[804] In an indication of the lack of awareness of the existence of UNESCO in the USSR, the Russian editors placed a short preface at the beginning of the third issue in March 1957 for those who bought *The Courier* but had no idea what the acronym in the title of the magazine meant. "A number of readers of the Russian edition of *The UNESCO Courier*," the editors noted, "have

[802] For reference to Machavariani's time in the US, see N. V. Novikov, *Vospominaniia diplomata: Zapiski, 1938-1947* (Moskva: Izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1989), 386.

[803] GARF, f. 9614, op. 1, d. 172, l. 61.

[804] The technical problems of publishing the Russian version derived from the expensive production of the original *Courier*, which the Soviet editorship had to duplicate. For the English, French, and Spanish editions, UNESCO used the publishing house of the company Georges Lang in Paris. This company put out popular, flashy magazines of higher quality than those produced in the USSR, including *Marie Claire*, the weekly newspaper *Paris Match*, as well as the French circulations of *Time Magazine* and *Life*. GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 32, l. 97. Regarding the short timetable for publishing the Russian edition, Gjesdal, the director of the UNESCO Department of Information, in a letter attached to the original draft contract guaranteed the Russian editorship four weeks to work on the project. While he promised that most materials would be sent long before the deadline, he warned that unexpected changes necessitated this quick turnaround. "Practice has shown that last-minute changes of captions, titles, and sometimes of photographs must be made; sometimes this can only be made on the 'vandyke,'" Gjesdal wrote. "It is therefore difficult for the secretariat to bind itself contractually to giving you what will be absolutely the complete and final text before the 'vandyke' stage has been reached which is normally not latern [sic] than four weeks before the publication date." Because of this demand for a quick turnaround, there continued to be "systematic breakdowns" in the process as late as 1965. GARF, f. 9614, op. 1, d. 168, l. 47; GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 31, ll. 228-29; and Tor Gjesdal, "GC/ND/MC/53," November 26, 1956, 1, AG 8: Box 1939, X07.21(470)NC/P, UNESCO Archives.

asked us to describe the work of UNESCO. We respond to this request of our readers on the next page."[805]

For the Soviet UNESCO Commission, launching the Russian *Courier* justified their argument that the magazine should incorporate more Soviet material into the magazine, which the USSR saw as a unique channel for spreading its ideology due to its large and diverse global readership.[806] Writing in 1965, V. I. Goliachkov, a Soviet journalist who that year became the first citizen from the communist bloc to join the main *Courier* editorship in Paris, estimated that the 375,000 copies of *The Courier* sold internationally passed through the hands of "close to one and a half million people." To substantiate this claim, Goliachkov pointed out that copies of the monthly in libraries went home with multiple readers. "This is a huge readership," Goliachkov declared, "and its significance grows even more given that the magazine is distributed in Europe, Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The publication is popular among student youth, the intelligentsia, and the elderly." But the push to get more Soviet articles in the magazine ran into familiar challenges from the start. Like other offices in the UNESCO bureaucracy, the editorship of *The Courier* had established a way of doing business molded by its Western composition. After his arrival in 1965, Goliachkov explained to Moscow why contributing authors mostly came from "the European and American continents." The Soviet employee detected that "Koffler has created a specific author '*aktiv*' (of about fifteen to twenty people) formed over many years of work in the editorship. . . . These authors appear on the pages of the magazine from year to year." Thus, "what happened before the appearance of a Soviet [citizen] in the editorship directly

[805] "Chto takoe IuNESKO?," *Kur'er IuNESKO*, March 1957, 33–34.

[806] Machavariani repeatedly urged the Soviet UNESCO Commission to propose an increase in the circulation of *The Courier* "to consolidate the results of negotiations at UNESCO" by showing "a spirit of cooperation." Quoted from one of these pleas from 1960: GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 14, l. 182.

depended on the 'mood' of the editor-in-chief and the efforts of the Soviet UNESCO Delegation to put pressure on him."[807] This author "collective," the Soviet permanent delegate elaborated in his annual report for 1964, had in the past "put forward seemingly 'neutral' popular science articles and only raised any 'real' problems from the position of the Western countries."[808]

Beginning in 1957, Soviet officials therefore launched an unrelenting drive to include Soviet articles in *The Courier* and convince the editorship to tackle "actual" problems that would cast the USSR in a favorable light. Aiming to get at least two Soviet articles into each issue, the Soviet UNESCO Delegation presented to UNESCO in 1957 fourteen possible topics for articles by Soviet authors (Arctic exploration, the elimination of illiteracy in Soviet Central Asia, the reading habits of Soviet citizens, Soviet archeology, a photomontage of a day in the life of a Soviet student, etc.).[809] At first, this strategy of pressuring the editorship paid off. In 1958, eleven Soviet articles appeared in *The Courier*, informing the magazine's readers of aspects of Soviet society as varied as nature reserves in the USSR, the Leningrad School for Choreography, Soviet book publishing, and the one-hundredth anniversary of the Russian stamp.[810] If one overlooks the nationalities of authors from the secretariat, this number made the USSR the leader in accepted articles among UNESCO member states for that year.[811] In December 1959,

[807] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 32, ll. 97-99.

[808] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 29, l. 266.

[809] GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 1, ll. 11-12.

[810] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 6, ll. 189-91.

[811] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 6, l. 226.

Machavariani also persuaded Koffler to throw out plans for the January 1960 issue and dedicate it to the life and work of Russian writer A. P. Chekhov.[812]

Yet *The Courier* editorship continued to frequently reject Soviet submissions even as it welcomed Soviet input, citing the polemical tenor of these pieces and their uncritical flouting of the successes of the USSR. In conversations with Machavariani and the Soviet UNESCO Delegation, Koffler recommended that Soviet contributors to the magazine compose work "more interesting, engaging, and better done journalistically," keeping "in mind foreign readers" instead of filling pages with "a dry recitation of different vague facts" while "piling on excessively voluminous numbers" too "serious" for the noncommunist layman. "It would be easier for [Koffler] to promote an article if it does not have an openly propagandistic nature and talks not only of what has been done, but also how it was done, what were the difficulties, what problems have yet to be solved," Machavariani paraphrased Koffler's suggestions to him. "Such material would be more effective propaganda than simple self-congratulation." Soviet writers, Koffler suggested, should "let readers draw their own conclusions."[813] In meetings with Koffler, an official from the Soviet UNESCO Delegation retorted that this advice revealed the implicit Western bias of the international organization: "UNESCO employees disdain the word 'propaganda,' they prefer to speak of how they stand outside politics, are impartial and objective

[812] While pleased that *The Courier* had the portrait of a famous Russian writer on its cover, the commission, which wanted only Soviet Chekhov experts to write for the issue, made known its displeasure that foreign authors would also contribute. GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 1, ll. 169-71; 222-23; 517-18; and GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 14, l. 182. For the actual issue, see issue one for 1960 in UNESDOC.

[813] Underlined passages in original text. GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 1, l. 416; and GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 14, l. 180. Unlike non-Soviet authors who investigated events in regions outside their native land, Soviet journalists insisted on writing about their own society. When the Soviet UNESCO Delegation or Machavariani did supply articles about an international question, they tended to contain comments that would offend other members of the UNESCO community. For example, an employee involved in the production of *The Courier* refused to consider one of the rare Soviet articles with an international outlook because it attacked the ILO. The UNESCO bureaucrat warned a member of the Soviet UNESCO Delegation that this article would start a "'little war'" between the two UN specialized agencies. GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 1, l. 518.

employees. But all this . . . is only words, UNESCO, in reality, openly conducts a specific policy and propaganda."[814] Koffler also ridiculed the photos attached to Soviet articles as "lifeless," "uninteresting," "staged," "inartistic," and "unimaginative." In their internal correspondence, Soviet officials admitted that their articles lacked the aesthetic appeal of the materials originating in the West. Worryingly, this sorry state of Soviet printing took on "a political significance," Machavariani wrote to the Soviet UNESCO Commission in 1960. "The level of our technology," he wrote, "is judged not only by our achievements in space exploration, but also by other indicators," including the shoddiness of the country's publications sent abroad. "The reasons for the poor quality of the inserts are the poor quality of colors, paper, equipment, and typeface, as well as insufficient training of personnel."[815]

Koffler also faced mounting pressure, from both inside UNESCO and from Western member states, either to stop publishing Soviet pieces altogether or reduce their frequency following the surge in Soviet pieces in *The Courier* in 1957 and 1958. According to Soviet UNESCO envoys, Gjesdal, as head of the UNESCO Department of Information, "repeatedly" reproached Koffler in 1959 for "taking a liberal attitude toward the Soviet Union," demanding that "*The Courier* cease printing Soviet materials at the same levels as 1957-1958."[816] This reprimand grew out of a flood of complaints from the capitalist West about Soviet dominance of the pages of *The Courier*. While the West Germans disparaged an article on an exhibition in Moscow of Czech glass for its sugarcoating of Soviet domination of Eastern Europe, American officials chastised Koffler for accepting a Soviet biography of the novelist L. N. Tolstoi,

[814] GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 16, l. 247.

[815] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 14, l. 180; and GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 12, l. 138.

[816] GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 1, l. 403.

labelling the editor a "'Leftist'" and a "'Red American.'" One reader from the US declared in a letter to Koffler that he would unsubscribe from *The Courier* because it afforded too much space to "Soviet propaganda."[817]

Under the strain caused by unyielding attacks from both sides of the Cold War, Koffler came to a breaking point in 1960. In a series of meetings with Machavariani and the Soviet UNESCO Delegation that year, the editor displayed a clear annoyance with the persistent criticisms directed at him by Soviet officials and, at one meeting, stormed out of the room visibly "upset." As Machavariani wrote after a conversation with Koffler in October of that year, "the situation has changed for the worse. Talk has now become quite difficult with the editor Koffler, who very kindly received me last year and with whom it was quite easy to agree on questions of interest to our editorship."[818] Koffler defended his performance at a subsequent meeting with the first secretary of the Soviet UNESCO Delegation, begging the diplomat to understand his unenviable position. "'I understand you, but understand my position. You are offering me materials that could produce an explosion like dynamite,'" he pleaded. "My situation is very delicate and difficult. One member of the [US] congress said directly that the US should leave UNESCO because *The UNESCO Courier* is involved in Soviet propaganda. I am in low standing with my colleagues and the American UNESCO Delegation considers me unreliable.'"[819]

During this fallout in 1960 and 1961, Koffler drastically reduced the number of pages allotted to the USSR. To retaliate, the Soviet UNESCO Delegation sought, without success, to remove Koffler from the editorship. Blaming Koffler's hostile attitude on the collapse of talks at

[817] Ibid., l. 414; GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 12, ll. 138-39; and GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 16, l. 246.

[818] GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 1, l. 415.

[819] GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 15, l. 314.

the May 1960 Paris Summit between Khrushchev and Eisenhower after the shooting down of Gary Powers's U-2 spy plane over the USSR, the Soviet UNESCO Delegation regretted that the editorship had also postponed the release of a special issue entirely devoted to the Soviet Union even though it had reached the final stages of planning.[820] Over the next two years, however, the number of Soviet entries went up again. In November 1963, the Soviet UNESCO Commission and Delegation celebrated the decision of the editorship in Paris to put theater director K. S. Stanislavskii on the cover.[821] They also rejoiced when the whole November 1963 issue covered the 1963 Moscow Partial Test Ban Treaty and half of the June 1964 installment of the magazine told the story of Ukrainian poet T. H. Shevchenko. From 1965 to 1967, *The Courier* highlighted other subjects endorsed by the USSR (apartheid, outer space, teaching popular science, etc.).[822] Nevertheless, Machavariani and the Soviet UNESCO Delegation persisted in their badgering of the editorship for its "bourgeois cultural-theoretical traditions."[823]

Yet Soviet officials worried more about what Koffler and his coworkers put in *The Courier* than what they left out. Because the Russian editorship had to faithfully reproduce and distribute the magazine "as widely as possible" in accordance with the contract, the most heated clashes between Soviet representatives and the editorship in Paris concerned the magazine's treatment of topics anathema to official Soviet ideology. In violation of the contract, Machavariani and his contingent in Moscow sporadically made changes to the Russian version

[820] GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 24, l. 139; and GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 20, l. 67.

[821] See the cover and content of issue ten from 1963. For Soviet discussions of this issue, see GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 25, l. 3.

[822] See issues six and eleven from 1964, issue two from 1965, issue five from 1966, and issue three from 1967 in UNESDOC.

[823] Ibid., ll. 266; 269; and GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 25, l. 100. See also the cover and content of issues six and eleven from 1964.

of the magazine, replacing an article or advertisement with the work of a Soviet author or an announcement about a Soviet event. In the late 1950s, Koffler, likely hoping to preserve good relations with the Soviet editors, let these revisions slide. When the Soviet iteration of the magazine substituted an article on Islam by Marshall Hodgson with a Soviet overview of the Khorezm Oasis in Uzbekistan in February 1958, Director-General Evans and his deputy advocated for making a "strong protest" to the Soviet UNESCO Delegation and threatened to stop financing the Russian version if such changes happened again.[824] In contrast, Koffler, according to the attaché of the Soviet UNESCO Delegation, "personally regretted that there was an attempt to exaggerate" the action and noted that the Russian editorship had on other occasions made modifications with his "verbal agreement."[825] But in the aftermath of the fallout between Koffler and his Soviet counterparts over Soviet contributions to *The Courier* in the early 1960s, the editorship in Paris began to enforce strict Soviet adherence to the contract. In an hour-long argument between Koffler and the first secretary of the Soviet UNESCO Delegation over an article on a series of FAO reports on world hunger slated for publication in 1962, the American editor, who came across as "annoyed," disputed the first secretary's characterization of the FAO findings as "Malthusian" and "misanthropic," ruling out the possibility of "withdrawing or revising the article" in the Russian replica and reminding the first secretary that "*The Courier* in all languages must be identical."[826] In such cases when Koffler ignored Soviet complaints, the Russian editorship took the risk of removing some of the most sensitive parts of the original. "These protests," Soviet Permanent Delegate Pavlov fretted in 1963, "have had no influence on

[824] GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 1, l. 154; Marshall Hodgson, "Islam in World History," *The UNESCO Courier*, February 1958, 18–20, UNESDOC; and Sergei Tolstoi, "Taina peskov Khorezma," *Kur'er IuNESKO*, February 1958, 16–21.

[825] GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 1, l. 153.

[826] GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 34, ll. 208-09.

the content of foreign publications of the magazine and we are forced to make unilateral decisions to change the content of the Russian edition. All this leads to a situation fraught with complications."[827]

Tensions over Soviet censorship came to a head in the fall of 1963 when Koffler approved for the November issue an exposé of UNESCO's educational assistance to the Congo (discussed in the next chapter) by UNESCO employee Garry Fullerton. In a conversation with the editor-in-chief, the second secretary of the Soviet UNESCO Delegation stated that his government opposed the "one-sided" depiction of the Congolese conflict in the article. In response, Koffler accused the USSR of "'doing everything in its power to ruin *The UNESCO Courier*,'" remarking that the Soviet Union incorrectly assumed he worked for the US even though he had served UNESCO for seventeen years. "If the Russian editorship did not put the Fullerton article in the November issue of *The UNESCO Courier*," the second secretary recorded Koffler advising, "then the Soviet side for a second time will have flagrantly violated the contract concluded with the UNESCO Secretariat concerning the identical publication of *The UNESCO Courier* in all languages."[828] Although the Russian editorship only cut out some controversial passages, Director-General Maheu unsuccessfully attempted to put on the agenda of the next session of the UNESCO Executive Board this and other instances of Soviet bowdlerization of the magazine.[829]

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[827] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 24, l. 396.

[828] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 28, ll. 215-18; Garry Fullerton, "UNESCO in the Congo," *The UNESCO Courier*, November 1963, 4–11, UNESDOC; and Garri Fullerton, "Deiatel'nost' IuNESKO v Kongo," *The UNESCO Courier*, November 1963, 4–11.

[829] With relief, the Soviet UNESCO Delegation reported that the issue was dropped from the agenda of the executive board "after energetic intervention by the delegation in consultation with the Center." GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 26, l. 190.

Feuds over the content of *The Courier* flared up intermittently for the rest of the decade. In a 1965 letter to "Match" (a nickname given to Machavariani by Koffler), for example, the American editor ruled out the elimination, at the request of the USSR, of an article written by the chairman of the coordinating committee of UNESCO's international voluntary work camps that contained references to the American Peace Corps.[830] Viewing the Peace Corps as an adversary in the battle for the "weakly-developed" countries and fearful of the prospect of UNESCO setting up its own "international peace corps" inspired by the American program, the Russian editorship translated the essay, but deleted all mentions of the Peace Corps, thereby drawing a written complaint from the article's author.[831]

Despite these scattered omissions, *The UNESCO Courier*, as "a window open on the world," gave its Soviet readers a unique look at how the noncommunist world sought to improve global welfare through international collective action. Archival sources paint a picture of a sizeable and enthusiastic readership of *The Courier* in the USSR. Initially, the Russian *Courier*, which cost two rubles and fifty kopecks, had a circulation of 20,000 in the Soviet Union. Nine months after its debut, the editorship raised its output by 3,000 and, by 1962, distributed 25,000 copies. While the Soviet UNESCO Commission and Delegation intermittently petitioned the Central Committee for an increase of the magazine's dissemination to 50,000 beginning in 1958, its level stayed at 25,000 through the late 1960s.[832] On the one hand, the production of the Russian translation fell far behind the 50,000 English-language printings of the magazine and

[830] GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 116, ll. 159-61; Arthur Gillette, "In 50 Developing Nations, 20,000 Volunteer Workers for Progress and Friendship," *The UNESCO Courier*, August 1965, 57–59, UNESDOC; and Artur Zhillet, "My molody, nas kasaetsia vse," *Kur'er IuNESKO*, August 1965, 57–59.

[831] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 31, l. 228.

[832] GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 2, l. 11; GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 3, l. 191; GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 23, l. 375; GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 31, l. 226; and GARF, f. 9614, op. 1, d. 170, l. 71.

paled to the bestselling French translation, which had a circulation of 150,000 in the early 1960s. On the other hand, the number of Russian copies of *The Courier* surpassed the 10,000 copies put out in German, Arabic, and Japanese.[833]

Observers from the UNESCO Secretariat who traveled to the Soviet Union testified to the popularity of the magazine. During his tour of the country in the summer of 1957, Chevalier asked the attendants at a kiosk in Minsk if they had heard of *The Courier*. "They told me that they received five copies, which were immediately sold out," Chevalier recalled.[834] By 1959, *The Courier* had drawn such a large following that its readers grumbled over the scarcity of the magazine. As Machavariani imparted to his Soviet superiors, "UNESCO received a letter from the Soviet Union with a complaint about the impossibility of subscribing to or obtaining it in kiosks. UNESCO workers who visited the USSR saw how *The Courier*, in one day, was bought up in the kiosks and then resold in secondhand bookstores." Thus, the Soviet editor asserted, "the demand for the periodical in the USSR exceeds by far its circulation (23,000)."[835]

The magazine ended up in the hands of citizens with no opportunity to travel abroad. In 1958, for example, E. S. Kuznetsov, a future activist in the dissident movement, enlisted in the army in the hope of getting "to see some other country" and, as he asserted in retrospect, "maybe manage to flee" the Soviet Union. But when his superior officers declined to station him outside the USSR because of his unreliable record, Kuznetsov spent his time at a military base in the

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[833] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 20, l. 248. The Soviet UNESCO Commission exported about 2,000 of these copies to Eastern Europe, UN agencies, and the rest of the world. The commission sent these copies to Czechoslovakia so that it received the Russian version with its occasional alterations. In other countries, schools used the Russian translation as a teaching aid in Russian language classes. While I could not find confirmation that the circulation of *The Courier* increased to 50,000 after 1967, there are references to the continued growth of its circulation. GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 2, ll. 180-81; GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 11, l. 249; and GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 7, l. 61.

[834] GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 2, l. 113.

[835] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 14, ll. 178-79.

Saratov province reading *The Courier*, which he had not "heard of" beforehand, along with the Soviet journal *Inostrannaia literatura*. While not a direct cause of his dissent, the UNESCO magazine and *Inostrannaia literatura* gave Kuznetsov an idea of what was "really going on in the West" and therefore extended to him new ideas contradicting the official line of the Soviet state. After he received his discharge papers in 1960, Kuznetsov participated in the famous unauthorized readings of poetry on Mayakovskii square in Moscow and later played an active role in the underground organization that unsuccessfully plotted to assassinate Khrushchev in the early 1960s.[836]

For other Soviet citizens, *The Courier* did more than simply enlighten passive readers on global issues, foreign ways of life, and collective international movements revolving around the UN. Through its "Letters-to-the-Editor" section, the magazine also empowered Soviet readers to take part in global conversations unlike any other in which they had participated. Thanks to its broad internationalist framework, *The Courier* remade Soviet readers into active participants in an international reading public comprising curious citizens representing a diversity of cultural outlooks and worldviews.

It did so by exploiting on an international scale the simultaneous experience of events through print that had enabled the emergence of national consciousness. Historian Benedict Anderson describes how the development of nationalism depended on this cognizance of "simultaneity," or a world in which "an American," who "will never meet or even know the names" of his fellow citizens, will nevertheless have "complete confidence in their steady,

[836] Quoted from an interview he gave in 1995 to L. V. Polikovskaia, who, following the dissolution of the USSR and while working at the NGO "Memorial," assembled a collection of oral histories about those involved in the Mayakovskii readings. Kuznetsov would later spend time in prison for his part in the conspiracy to assassinate Khrushchev. Before he emigrated to Israel, Kuzenstov also plotted to hijack a plane and fly it to the Jewish country in the 1970s. Liudmila Polikovskaia, *My predchuvstvie...predtecha...: ploshchad' Maiakovskogo, 1958-1965* (Moskva: Zven'ia, 1997), 215–28.

anonymous, simultaneous activity." The advent of nationalism as a category of identity also relied on the formation of a mass-produced "print-capitalism," and the subsequent homogenization of a variety of regional vernaculars into "print-languages." For Anderson, the nation came into existence when isolated populations speaking a range of vernaculars "became capable of comprehending one another via print and paper. In the process, they gradually became aware of the hundreds of thousands, even millions, of people in their particular language field, and at the same time that *only those* hundreds of thousands, or millions, so belonged."[837]

The Courier built on this already established consciousness of worldwide simultaneity to inculcate its readers with an internationalist identity, transcending the exclusivity of nationalism by making language differences irrelevant through multilingual translation. Because of UNESCO's insistence that *The Courier* stay unaltered in translation, the magazine forged an imaginary international community inspired by Western internationalism and based on a discourse surrounding global topics and problems. By accepting letters written by citizens in their many native languages, and then publishing them in a magazine translated back into those languages, *The Courier* created a common readership spanning the world and conversing through the same medium. This readership could wrestle with the same subjects in the same articles and contribute opinions that would, in turn, address a global audience comprehending the letter writers' references. The magazine therefore forged an international reading public in which citizens living in cities as varied as New York, Cairo, Paris, Tokyo, or Moscow thought about

[837] Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (New York: Verso Books, 2006), 26-44. As mentioned in the introduction, Glenda Sluga draws on Anderson's work to suggest that a similar phenomenon occurred among Western internationalists, but she does not provide analysis on a specific case in which this occurred, using it as an overarching framework instead. See the introduction for a discussion of her framework for understanding internationalism.

global issues with an awareness of their connection with an international community transcending narrow national interests.

In their letters to *The Courier*, Soviet nationals presented themselves as concerned citizens of this international community. Their desire to communicate with foreign readers in order to realize world peace resembled the ways in which some of their fellow citizens used letter writing to Soviet "thick" literary journals to practice citizenship domestically during the Thaw.[838] Many *Courier* readers made clear that they coveted the periodical as a means of reaching beyond Soviet borders. Victor Kassianenko, a "village schoolmaster" in Nagoriani, Moldova, bought a copy of *The Courier* during a visit to Kishinev because he had "been attracted by its striking appearance." According to his letter, published in the September 1958 issue, the schoolmaster "found its contents to be just as interesting and attractive as its cover and its presentation." He envisioned using the magazine as a global classifieds section to forge contacts abroad for the sake of international understanding and peace: "We are very keen," he wrote, "to contact schools in other lands, to exchange knowledge and ideas with them, to get to know our foreign colleagues really well and to develop mutual confidence, hoping that wisdom throughout the world will bar the road to collective suicide."[839]

The Courier also served as a tool for Ibrahim S. Aitov, an amateur horticulturalist and pensioner from Rostov-on-Don, to imagine himself as part of a global network of citizens passionate about spreading scientific knowledge as a means of realizing peace. "In your

[838] In his analysis of readers' responses to the major novels published in the Soviet journal *Novyi mir* during the Thaw, Kozlov shows how Soviet citizens demonstrated citizenship through letter writing to the editors of the journal. He does so by drawing on Sheila Fitzpatrick's study of letter writing under Stalin in which she differentiates between "supplicants" and "citizens." See Kozlov, *The Readers of Novyi Mir*; and Sheila Fitzpatrick, "Supplicants and Citizens: Public Letter-Writing in Soviet Russia in the 1930s," *Slavic Review* 55, no. 1 (1996): 78–105.

[839] For this segment, I spell the names of the letter writers as they are in the letters. Victor Kassianenko, "Letters to the Editor," *The UNESCO Courier*, September 1958, 33, UNESDOC.

magazine," Aitov began a letter published in the June 1959 edition, "I found a signpost showing me how an ordinary person can help to spread fundamental knowledge and also become an intermediary for the exchange of information on successful applications of science." Getting an "idea from a story you published about someone who excavated some animal fossils and decided to share these precious relics among museums in several countries," he wanted likewise to acquaint readers with the research he had conducted on his "small plot" in the Don Region cultivating grape vines capable of surviving freezing temperatures. Aitov assured the editors that he had "three of these vines and have already had grapes from them." He had also traded his specimens with a Chinese professor for "Chinese cherry," a "Chinese lemon tree," and "wild vines of the Amur region which are especially resistant to frost." To expand on his research, he wanted the magazine to help him shift this exchange westward. "Now," Aitov proclaimed, "I would like to share my modest stocks with some amateur horticulturists in Western countries and thus, in some small way, perhaps contribute to the maintenance of peace in the world." He concluded that this exchange should begin in the Nordic countries and felt that "perhaps through your magazine I could make contact with these countries."[840]

Like Aitov, other Soviet letter writers to *The Courier* wanted to both share knowledge originating in the Soviet Union and learn of the efforts of other countries on subjects of interest. After reading "with great interest" an article in the magazine about the Canadian town of Aklavik in the Arctic Circle, Sh. Akbulatov from Krasnoyarsk wrote a letter published in the July-August 1961 issue that drew attention to the Soviet experience of improving life in cold climes through the building of habitable dwellings in the Siberian town of Norilsk.[841] Similarly,

[840] Ibrahim S. Aitov, "Letters to the Editor," *The UNESCO Courier*, June 1959, 33, UNESDOC.

[841] Sh. Akbulatov, "Letters to the Editor," *The UNESCO Courier*, August 1961, 57, UNESDOC.

the self-described "regular reader, "A. Chetverikov from the village of Gory, wrote in a letter published in November 1960 that he was "especially interested" in the magazine's articles "that deal with health services," including "issues that dealt with the fight being waged to preserve animal and vegetable life, the purification of the atmosphere and achievements in the field of medicine." Emphasizing that the "preservation of health" remained an important topic "in our day, when all of mankind is making a tremendous effort for peace and progress," Chetverikov stressed that he "should like to see *The UNESCO Courier* print the opinions of authoritative scientists on yoga," which he characterized as "one of the miracles of human invention" and "an unusual science that preserves health and lengthens life, a science based on thousands of years' experience." But "unfortunately," he continued in what could be interpreted as a swipe at Soviet policy, "the articles that I have been able to get hold of express different opinions on the subject."[842]

An unpublished 1963 letter from V. Pimenov, a resident of Dnepropetrovsk, suggests that Soviet citizens knew when the Russian editorship censored the magazine and sought to circumvent Soviet censorship by contacting the editorship in Paris directly. Reacting to a debate among UNESCO readers that took place across multiple issues of *The Courier* about the universal language Esperanto, Pimenov articulated to the UNESCO editorship his disappointment that one letter, in which the General-Secretary of the Universal Esperanto Association Ivo Lapenna defended Esperanto, had appeared in all editions of an issue of *The Courier* except the Russian translation.[843] "Since the periodical 'K. Iu.' [*Kur'er IuNESKO*

[842] A. Chetverikov, "Letters to the Editor," *The UNESCO Courier*, November 1960, 33, UNESDOC.

[843] In line with its internationalist ambition of fostering a common identity transcending the nation state, UNESCO had supported since its creation an examination of the feasibility of the universal language as a viable antidote to cultural isolationism. At the 1954 session of the general conference, the international organization adopted a resolution praising "the results attained by Esperanto in the field of international intellectual relations and the rapprochement of the peoples of the world" as consistent with "the aims and ideals of UNESCO." In light of this

abbreviated] publishes identical content in each of its editions," Pimenov reasoned, "I anxiously awaited the appearance here in the Russian version of the sixth issue of 'K. Iu.' Unfortunately, Dr. Lapenna's article was not in it." Because he "(as well as all readers of the [Russian] edition), did not have the chance to read the response of Dr. Lapenna," Pimenov asked the editorship in Paris to send him the French edition of the issue.[844]

One Soviet *Courier* reader looked to the magazine as a venue to get research published outside the strictures of the Soviet press. In the spring of 1959, the Soviet UNESCO Commission intercepted a letter to Koffler from a Muscovite who described himself as "an ordinary citizen of the USSR," a mechanical engineer, and "a nonparty member" who did "not run or preside over anything." The Muscovite enclosed an article for publication that discussed the development of agricultural techniques capable of feeding large populations. After complaining that *Komsomolskaia pravda* had published a "corrupted" version of his article, he claimed that his scholarship and a *Courier* article on the importance of water in sustaining human life held remarkable similarities. Basing this affinity on an internationalist supposition that he and the UNESCO community both "proceed from the moral worldview of the future of humanity," he

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close relationship between the Esperanto community and the international organization, citizens from the USSR looked to UNESCO for information on the universal language. This was particularly the case with Esperanto enthusiasts from the Ukrainian SSR who had close connections to Esperanto since the creator of the language, Dr. Ludwig Zamenhof, came from the western regions of the Russian Empire. In 1960, for example, the chairman of the Esperanto section of the Odessa House of Scholars, V. I. Vershinin, wrote to the Soviet UNESCO Commission requesting that the commission inform UNESCO about plans in the USSR to celebrate the birth of Dr. Zamenhof. Vershinin made this request after he learned that Zamenhof had been mentioned by UNESCO as a candidate for their series of commemorations of "great people of the world." "Records of the General Conference, Eighth Session, Montevideo, 1954: Resolutions" (UNESCO, 1955), 36, UNESDOC; and GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 9, l. 234.

[844] In a letter to the editor in the March 1963 issue of *The Courier*, a Dutch reader by the name of Robert van Kuyk called Esperanto an "artificial language" without any roots in the "natural" evolution of culture in reply to an earlier letter extolling the new method of communication. Lapenna rebutted van Kuyk's excoriation in a long letter that took up the entire "Letters-to-the-Editor" section of the June 1963 issue of *The Courier*. Robert H. J. van Kruyk, "Drawbacks of Artificial Languages," *The UNESCO Courier*, March 1963, 33, UNESDOC; Ivo Lapenna, "The Case for Esperanto," *The UNESCO Courier*, June 1963, 31–32, UNESDOC; and V. Pimenov, November 25, 1963, 1–2, AG 8: Box 1934, X07.211 (470), UNESCO Archives.

underscored the need to secure the "life and happiness" not only of men, but also of nature, aligning his views with the push for nature conservation prevalent in UNESCO publications.[845]

As curators of a "window open on the world," the editors of *The Courier* received many other Soviet requests for knowledge about other cultures and places. For A. Kilunov, a "constant reader" from Sverdlovsk, the publication had value "from the point of view of humanism" because it "tells its readers about the life of other peoples, the problems which face them, about little-known civilizations and the latest achievements in science and technology." By giving this "fresh knowledge," Kilunov clarified that *The Courier* "sometimes helps me to see things with new eyes." He commended its support of "ideals of peace, humanism and friendship among peoples," while also urging the editors to "increase the size of the magazine" and "introduce a regular page of humour, to pay more attention to the everyday life and cultures of peoples and their traditions." In the same issue, a "group of students" who identified as "regular readers" from Moldova professed their wish that *The Courier* give "a detailed description of the Sorbonne University in Paris," specifically "its sections for the humanities, the university library, and the assembly hall." [846] V. S. Marin, a Muscovite who cast himself in a letter in the March 1959 issue as "a subscriber to your excellent magazine since January 1957 when it first appeared in Russian," requested a focus less on the past and more on the "world of tomorrow," as well as "special issues" covering topics as varied as cinema, jazz, painting, cybernetics, and "current trends in philosophical, political and religious thinking."[847] The theme of the striking and aesthetically pleasing appearance of *The Courier* surfaced in many of the letters. For example, in

[845] GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 8, ll.14-15.

[846] A. Kilunov, and a Group of Students, "Letters to the Editor," *The UNESCO Courier*, April 1961, 33, UNESDOC.

[847] V. S. Marin, "Letters to the Editor," *The UNESCO Courier*, March 1959, 34, UNESDOC.

a letter published in November 1957, Askold Kourkine, a "young reader" from Krasnoyarsk who found the articles "extremely interesting" and liked "the appearance of the magazine," petitioned the editors to produce "direct translations into Russian of the classical works of the Orient and Asian countries" because "the Russian reader who does not know French or English has no chance of getting to know these masterpieces of world literature."[848] In asking for the inclusion of translations of world literature in the magazine, Kourkine displayed his view of the publication as a vehicle for learning about the common heritage of humanity.

Perhaps because they perceived *The Courier* as one of the few unique publications available in the Soviet Union focusing on events around the world, Soviet citizens often demanded a dramatic expansion of the *Courier* "window" and the role it played in international affairs. Writing that, for him, "the day the current issue of *The UNESCO Courier* arrives is a holiday," Titas Milashius from Minsk viewed "*The Courier* as the encyclopaedic [sic] chronicle of the cultural and scientific life of our planet." However, he maintained in his 1964 letter that because "the window open on the world is small," the publication "should long since have been enlarged and polished up" so that it could "react immediately" to news of rocketry in the USA and the USSR, the Olympic Games, and other current events. The editors inserted a short response under his letter: "please, please, please, we have only thirty-two pages a month and we are not a news magazine."[849] In an instance of concrete, albeit brief, dialogue between citizens of the West and the USSR, the British citizen Charlotte Chalmers also responded to Milashius's letter six months later.[850]

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[848] Askold Kourkine, "Letters to the Editor," *The UNESCO Courier*, November 1957, 33, UNESDOC.

[849] Titas Alfonsovich Milashius, "Letters to the Editor," *The UNESCO Courier*, December 1964, 44, UNESDOC.

[850] Charlotte Chalmers, "Letters to the Editor," *The UNESCO Courier*, June 1965, 32. UNESCO, for a time, also arranged pen pals. However, they stopped this in the late 1950s because of the high number of requests, forwarding

Another Soviet letter writer, Muscovite David Eisenberg, viewed the magazine as an avenue for lobbying the UN to help unite the world under common policies and practices. In a June 1961 letter, Eisenberg expressed the conviction that the "foolish and harmful habits such as smoking, drinking of alcohol, and addiction to drugs are prevalent in all countries and show no signs of abating and are causing great injury to mankind." Because national policies (such as "the prohibition fiasco in the USA") had failed, he asserted that "it seems high time to give serious thought to raising the question on a world scale through the United Nations," proposing further that "the smoking hero," who made the noxious habit attractive on film, could "only be forced off the cinema, and consequently, off the TV screen if measures are adopted on an international scale." Eisenberg also called for an "international convention" against "drug-taking" due to the ability of smugglers to "circumvent the regulations of individual countries." Regarding the periodical as an international public forum in which specialists should inform the reading public on the matter, he implored the editorship to devote multiple issues of the magazine to the topic.[851]

Like any readership consisting of a plurality of perspectives, some Soviet letter writers objected to the aesthetic trends exhibited in *The Courier*. Ravil Vakhidov, from the city of Chimkent in the Kazakh SSR, wrote a letter published in November 1959 that criticized the artwork chosen to adorn the newly built UNESCO headquarters, which had been the subject of the November 1958 special edition of the magazine. Although his "favorite issues are those that deal with a special theme," Vakhidov questioned the choice of artists commissioned to decorate UNESCO's building, asking why only "abstractionists, surrealists, cubists, and not a single

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their readers to the International Federation of Organizations for Scholastic Exchanges (FIOCES). See the following bulletin: "Where to Write For Pen Friends," *The UNESCO Courier*, March 1959, 34, UNESDOC.

[851] David Eisenberg, "Letters to the Editor," *The UNESCO Courier*, June 1961, 41, UNESDOC.

realist" had been chosen when "the flags of eighty-one nations wave over the UNESCO building." He urged the editors of "our international journal" to consider giving "publicity" to "artists, prominent people in literature and art, who have not severed all connexion [sic] with real life." Yet he did not reject the necessity of including abstract imagery in the magazine. Rather, he requested that the organization and its periodical cater to his predilections *and* the preferences of others. "If UNESCO is an impartial organization," he reasoned, "it should have considered the tastes and interests of all people and not only the lovers of abstract art."[852] Other Soviet readers expressed bafflement and even disgust with the artistic styles described in the articles of the magazine. For instance, M. Cherkasova, a secondary school teacher in Moscow, asked the editors in 1961 to "explain the point of view of those people (I know there are many of them)" who think of abstract painting as works of art and who "allow" them to be reproduced on the UNESCO building. "What benefit," she asked, "do [Picasso's] drawings, published in your journal, bring to people and what pleasure do they give?"[853]

Soviet citizens criticizing or questioning the validity of the content of the magazine were participating in a global debate as critically engaged members of a wider readership. These Soviet readers evinced a skeptical and open-minded inquisitiveness about foreign concepts of art. Several Soviet letter writers wanted the periodical to inform them of non-Soviet opinions on the subject by fostering international dialogue in its pages. In the November 1959 issue, Dr. D. Romanov, a self-described "keen student of artistic questions" from Gorky, emphasized his frustration with Soviet aesthetic norms. "Since Soviet art critics deny the value of abstract art," Romanov regretted that he had "no opportunity to become acquainted with the arguments of the

[852] Ravil Vakhidov, "Letters to the Editor," *The UNESCO Courier*, November 1959, 33, UNESDOC.

[853] M. Cherkasova, "Letters to the Editor," *The UNESCO Courier*, August 1961, 57, UNESDOC.

followers of this artistic trend." He therefore requested that the editors "devote an issue of *The UNESCO Courier* to the question of abstract art, including articles by the great theorists of this school accompanied, of course, by photos of the best works." In his words, he looked forward to the inclusion of these photos because "the illustrations in your magazine are beyond all praise."[854]

Rurik Povileiko, a university student studying technology in Baku, shared this view of the publication as an international forum that did not have to conform to the aesthetic standards of the Soviet state. While he "was brought up to appreciate the works of painters like Nesterov, Repine [sic], and Vrubel," Povileiko presented himself as open to the foreign cultural trends that were given a "most convincing presentation" in the issue on the new UNESCO building. Stressing that his upbringing "does not mean that I think any less of paintings by Picasso or Matisse, and in no way do I rate Western painting as a falsification of art," he praised an article in *The Courier*, "The Language of Abstract Art," but maintained that "nothing that was said offered proof of the main thing: the aesthetic value of abstract art." He recommended that the periodical use its platform to put on an art show in which the contrasting artistic modes of communist and noncommunist art would be appraised. "I should like one of your future issues to be devoted to the subject of modern art, including conclusive arguments 'for' and 'against' abstract art," Povileiko requested. "It would also be useful to publish reproductions by modern painters, the realists, including Soviet artists. These reproductions could even be judged and commented on by Western critics; the results would be interesting."[855]

For Soviet functionaries representing the USSR, these statements of preference from

[854] D. Romanov, "Letters to the Editors," *The UNESCO Courier*, November 1959, 33, UNESDOC.

[855] Rurik Povileiko, "Letters to the Editor," *The UNESCO Courier*, June 1959, 33, UNESDOC.

readers undercut the fight to keep the content of *The Courier* within the parameters condoned by Soviet censors. In the fall of 1962, B. M. Galeev, the founder of the "Prometheus" art collective known for its experimental integration of light and other optic effects into musical performances, sent a letter to *The Courier* editorship in Paris in which he asked the editor to provide more information on Western aesthetic movements centered around fusing auditory and visual experiences.[856] "I know your periodical as a keen and intelligent judge of real art," the resident of Kazan commended. "Many issues of *The Courier* were a revelation for me." Alerting the editorship to the plans of his art collective to organize the "first performance" in the USSR of Russian composer A. N. Scriabin's *Prometheus: The Poem of Fire*, Galeev went on to pose a series of questions on the status of work on "the creation of a 'color' of music" in the West and what the Phillips Records Company had done "in this direction." He also made known his interest in learning more from *The Courier* about the "'visible music' of the kind in *Fantasia* by the American filmmaker and artist Walt Disney or that by the German [Walther] Ruttmann," who directed the Weimar-era avant-garde film, *Berlin: Symphony of a Metropolis*. "I have some thoughts on the aesthetic views of the new art and wanted to verify them," Galeev explained. "Our group, 'Prometheus,' and all music devotees would be thankful if you put in your magazine an article on the attitude of artists of the world to the introduction of colors and forms to music as an independent component."[857]

In an extraordinary attempt to comply with Galeev's wishes, the UNESCO editorship made an article by the French art historian Frank Popper, "Movement and Light in Today's Art:

[856] Galeev had likely just read the November 1962 issue of *The Courier*, which featured a cover story on "new horizons in music" and an article on world music from classical orchestras to jazz and juke boxes. Peter Lengyel, "Society Calls the Tune," *The UNESCO Courier*, November 1962, 4–7, UNESDOC.

[857] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 25, l. 5.

New Dimensions in Painting and Sculpture," the cover story of its September 1963 issue.[858] Released amid the ongoing disputes between Koffler and Soviet officials over censorship of the Russian translation, this piece evoked a furious reaction from the Soviet UNESCO Commission and Delegation, both of which "took energetic measures" to keep Popper's analysis off the pages of the Russian edition because of its "clearly unacceptable" subject matter and efforts to "defend proponents of abstract art."[859] When Koffler shrugged off these charges by erroneously claiming the Russian editorship had requested an article on the topic, flabbergasted members of the Soviet UNESCO Delegation attributed this response to Koffler's hostility toward their country. Only later did the Soviet UNESCO Commission and Delegation realize that Koffler had misconstrued Galeev's letter as an official supplication. "Koffler generally cannot understand that the letter of a Soviet reader cannot be considered a proposal by the Russian editorship of a topic," one Soviet UNESCO envoy admonished in an internal memorandum.[860]

Other Soviet readers of *The Courier* interpreted its articles as internationalist calls to action. In 1959, UNESCO kicked off a largescale campaign to relocate the monuments of the ancient Nubian region of Egypt (the temples of Abu Simbel, Philae, and others) in order to protect them from flooding precipitated by the construction of the Aswan Dam. During the campaign's early phases, the Soviet UNESCO Commission dispatched several archeologists to join fact-finding expeditions for the UNESCO project.[861] But because the USSR financed and

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[858] Frank Popper, "Movement and Light in Today's Art: New Dimensions in Painting and Sculpture," *The UNESCO Courier*, September 1963, 12–23, UNESDOC. In its most drastic alteration of *The Courier*, the Russian editorship scraped together a cover story about hydrological engineering for its version of this issue. See issue nine of the Russian edition.

[859] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 24, l. 395; and GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 28, l. 216.

[860] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 25, ll. 3-4.

[861] The reports of these archeologists contain a wealth of interesting detail about Soviet perceptions of the campaign. For an example, see GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 14, ll. 225-32.

took on a leading role in the building of the Aswan Dam, Soviet officials gave mixed signals about their view of the conservation enterprise and later refused to fully commit resources to the moving of the monuments. "The campaign, in the final analysis," the Soviet permanent delegate wrote in 1961, "had an anti-Soviet tendency since the preservation of monuments has been juxtaposed to the construction of the Aswan Dam, which, as is known, will be erected with the participation of Soviet specialists." The campaign therefore amounted to "an attempt to use the organization to counter the growing influence of the Soviet Union in the weakly-developed countries."[862]

To the chagrin of the Soviet UNESCO Commission, the editorship of *The Courier* assembled two special issues in February 1960 and October 1961 on the Nubia campaign.[863] The first issue published a statement by Director-General Veronese intended to rally the world's population to endorse the venture.[864] Consequently, the Soviet UNESCO Commission received letters from Soviet citizens eager to take part in the campaign. "In your journal . . . there is an appeal from the UNESCO Secretary-General [sic] to save the monuments of the ancient Nubia," two architects employed by the Voronezh Regional Planning Office (*oblproekt*) told the commission. Curious as to what the USSR had done to assist in the moving of the monuments,

[862] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 16, l. 91.

[863] The inconsistency of the stance of the Soviet UNESCO Commission on the Nubia campaign resulted in several arguments between the UNESCO editorship and the commission over the two issues. When the USSR had yet to reject the Nubia project, it sent an article to *The Courier* editorship with positive references to UNESCO's activities relating to the Nubia monuments. Because this article did not make the first issue, Koffler decided to publish it in the second issue after the USSR had backed away from the campaign. In other words, *The Courier* published an article indicating Soviet support for the Nubia campaign even though Soviet officials had made clear their hostility toward it. GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 20, ll. 63-66.

[864] Vittorino Veronese, "A Message from the Director-General of UNESCO," *The UNESCO Courier*, February 1960, 3, UNESDOC; and Vittorino Veroneze, "Obrashchenie general'nogo direktora IuNESKO," *Kur'er IuNESKO*, February 1960, 3.

the architects asked if they could put their architectural expertise to use in the campaign.[865] In another letter, two workers, Druzhinin and Malev from the "Cheliabinsk metallurgical factory" wrote that they had "read the call . . . to save the monuments of ancient Egyptian culture which might be flooded due to the construction of the Aswan Dam." The two laborers added that they "hoped the Soviet government will not stand aside." Beseeching the Soviet UNESCO Commission to forward their letter to the "relevant organization," Druzhinin and Malev volunteered for the campaign. "We very much want to directly participate in the work of this expedition and, not knowing where to write, are addressing you with the request to include us in this work," the two appealed to the Soviet UNESCO Commission.[866] In terse responses, the commission declined the offers of these workers to volunteer for the campaign.[867]

In May 1965, a select group of Soviet readers of *The Courier* aired their opinions on the magazine in person when the UNESCO editorship held its annual meeting that year in Moscow. Convened at the headquarters of the Soviet UNESCO Commission at the GKSS building on Kalinin Avenue (later renamed Novyi Arbat) in the Soviet capital, the 1965 meeting marked the first time the editorship had gathered outside of Paris.[868] Apart from sessions dealing with the magazine's two-year plan, circulation, and technical questions, the staff overseeing all translations of *The Courier* presided over the first *Courier* "readers' conference" at the Lenin State Library. Attended by 120 Soviet *Courier* readers, the conference gave these citizens a chance to ask the editors questions and discuss the future of the periodical. While the Soviet UNESCO Commission handpicked these attendees from central Soviet institutions and ensured

[865] GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 10, l. 40.

[866] Ibid., l. 31.

[867] Ibid., ll. 32; 38.

[868] GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 116, ll. 130-32.

that at least several of them raised questions echoing Soviet criticisms of the magazine, the UNESCO editors applauded the conference and resolved to replicate it in other countries.[869] "I was particularly struck by the accounts given to me of the special meetings arranged for the editors with readers of *The Courier* in Moscow," Director-General Maheu wrote to the chair of the Soviet UNESCO Commission. "I was pleased to learn of the interest and enthusiasm by readers and writers alike," he imparted. "I am encouraged by this to believe that *The Courier* can make an important contribution to the public's understanding of the organization's role in the development of international cooperation in education, science, and culture in the service of peace."[870]

The meeting in Moscow eased the tensions between the Soviet UNESCO apparatus and the main editorship in Paris. "This meeting approved our proposals on the need for the magazine to pay more attention to significant and pressing problems in UNESCO activity, better represent the positions of the socialist and weakly-developed countries, and recruit authors from these countries," Machavariani reflected at the end of 1965. "Our proposals were included in the thematic plan for 1966-67 and makes up its foundation."[871] To complement Soviet celebrations of the fiftieth anniversary of the October Revolution in November 1967, the UNESCO editorship published the special issue on the USSR that it had abandoned during the political battles of the early 1960s between Koffler and Soviet envoys. Filled with acclamations by Soviet authors of the advances of the USSR in education, science, and culture, the November issue temporarily realized the Soviet dream of turning *The Courier* into an arm of Soviet cultural diplomacy.[872]

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[869] For a summary of the proceedings of the readers' conference, see Machavariani's report. Ibid., ll. 275-76.

[870] Ibid. l. 272.

[871] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 31, l. 227.

[872] See issue eleven from 1967.

Still, Machavariani and his colleagues had no illusions as to the fundamental Western worldview shaping the magazine for the foreseeable future and persisted in their drive to force the editorship to stop "avoiding a deep, multiperspective analysis" of "politically sensitive problems."[873]

But for Soviet readers, this non-Soviet angle on global developments gave the magazine its value. Because the Soviet state sanctioned its dissemination but could not dictate its content, *The Courier* offered both a more acceptable means for Soviet citizens to learn about the outside world than the taboo radio programs of Voice of America (VOA) or the BBC and a less sanitized version of the content featured in other Soviet media spotlighting events abroad. More importantly, UNESCO's reading public extended to readers deep inside the Soviet Union a means of communicating with foreign readers of UNESCO publications as part of an international "imagined" community. The ideals of peace, international exchange, and the improvement of the welfare of the world's population pervading UNESCO publications overlapped with the socialist internationalist ideals preached by the Soviet state, allowing *Courier* readers to experiment with foreign ways of thinking internationally without contradicting the communist ideology of their homeland.

The Soviet UNESCO Commission agreed to print *The Courier* and other UNESCO materials inside the Soviet Union with the expectation that the international organization allot more space for Soviet writings in its publications. While the USSR succeeded in rivaling the West in the number of pages reserved for Soviet authors, they remained dissatisfied with the ability of Western UNESCO officials to determine whose work made it onto these pages. As Soviet officials bumped heads with Koffler and other employees of the UNESCO Secretariat, however, changes in the composition of UNESCO as a result of decolonization had begun to

[873] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 31, l. 228.

slowly chip away at Western hegemony in the international organization as a whole. The next chapter turns to how this revolution in UNESCO intertwined the fates of the USSR and UNESCO in the international organizational system.

CHAPTER 9

"MANY VOICES, ONE WORLD": SOVIET PARTICIPATION IN MULTILATERAL TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

By the early 1960s, the content of UNESCO publications and the themes of its conferences began to reflect a changing world order in which new nations with undetermined allegiances in the bipolar conflict of the Cold War demanded a seat at the table of the international organizational system. While the USSR's enlistment in UNESCO brought the number of the organization's member states to 70 in 1954, 124 member states sent delegations to the fifteenth session of the general conference in 1968.[874] The vast majority of these states had come into existence as a result of decolonization dating back to the Second World War but accelerating in the late 1950s and early 1960s. As leaders of these new countries took on the task of governing populations recently subjugated by their European masters, they looked to the UN and its specialized agencies to make amends for the historical injustices of colonialism through various forms of technical assistance, regarding these institutions as instruments for leveling the "playing field" between "rich" and "poor" nations.[875]

Outside of its well-established role as a hub for the international exchange of information and knowledge through the convening of conferences and the dissemination of publications,

[874] In 1968, delegations from eight "associate members" and observing non-member states also attended the general conference. For a list of these delegations, see "Records of the General Conference, Fifteenth Session: Proceedings" (UNESCO, 1968), 1210–296, UNESDOC.

[875] For an overview of the demands of the rising "Third World" in the 1960s, see Kennedy, *The Parliament of Man*, 121-23.

UNESCO had sought since its inception in 1946 to lay the foundation for peace by building up educational systems in the non-Western world. Like its other activities, UNESCO's early technical-assistance programs inherited their ideological underpinnings and personnel from Western intellectuals and statesmen. According to Sluga, UNESCO's Fundamental Education Program, launched in 1946, made the organization "the first of the new UN institutions to appoint natural and social sciences and economic experts to help emancipate colonial and postcolonial societies from their 'backwardness,' newly defined relative to their technological and economic rather than biological or 'civilizational' status." Director-General Huxley appointed a British colonial official to steer this program while using his own contacts and background in the British Empire to target its work. For example, Sluga describes how UNESCO teamed up with the British colonial apparatus in Tanganyika to train indigenous farmers in the growing of groundnuts. The venture, labelled by historians the "British groundnut fiasco" or the "East African groundnut scheme," stands out as one of the more prominent failures of the late colonial campaign to "modernize" African farming.[876]

More problematically for the Soviet Union, the United States, believing that economic prosperity offered the best antidote to the spread of communism internationally, voiced its support for the idea of UN technical assistance in the late 1940s. The first broad UN aid initiative, the Expanded Program of Technical Assistance (EPTA), which President Truman trumpeted in his 1949 "Four Points" inaugural address, evolved in part out of Cold War concerns over communism finding fertile ground in the impoverished decolonizing regions. Thus UN

[876] "UNESCO's involvement in a business venture prompted by the United Africa Company (a division of British Unilever)," Sluga explains, "would kill two birds with one stone—provide postwar Britain, and Unilever, with sorely needed oils and margarines, and ward off any potential criticism of Britain's 'sacred trust' with evidence that it was advancing the well-being of colonial populations." Sluga, *Internationalism in the Age of Nationalism*, 108-09.

technical assistance marked a global extension of the Marshall Plan.[877] In the 1950s and 1960s, Paul Hoffman, the former administrator of the Marshall Plan and an executive at the American Studebaker automobile company, directed the UN Special Fund (an offshoot of the EPTA that in 1966 merged into the UN Development Program, or UNDP), which approved and supervised the allocation of the bulk of educational aid through UNESCO.[878]

Owing to Stalin's disdain for the UN's endeavors in nonsecurity related matters, the USSR declined to participate in any of these undertakings to provide technical assistance before 1953. Three months after Stalin's death, however, the Soviet delegation to the sixteenth session of ECOSOC announced that the USSR had reversed course and would pledge over four million rubles ($1 million) to the EPTA annually.[879] But after a meeting in the summer of 1954 at MID headquarters in Moscow on the subject, UN envoys relayed to the UN secretary-general the Soviet foreign ministry's complete ignorance of how UN assistance programs worked, remarking on Soviet officials' unusual requests for detailed information on which countries would receive Soviet aid and into which sectors of the given country's economy this aid would go. At the same time, the UN representatives expressed their appreciation for the generosity of the Soviet state. "We had also been struck by the conviction that since January 1954 it had become firm Soviet policy to participate in TA on an extremely large scale (perhaps within well-defined limits of geography and fields of activity)," they observed.[880] To follow through on this policy, the Soviet

[877] Ibid., 110-11; and Gaiduk, *Divided Together*, 254.

[878] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 21, l. 82; and Stephen Browne, *The United Nations Development Program and System* (New York: Routledge, 2011), 35.

[879] RGANI, f. 3, op. 8, d. 58, l. 77. I rely on historical conversion rates from the Central Bank of the Russian Federation. "Kursy valiut za period do 01.07.1992," Tsentral'nyi bank rossiiskoi federatsii, accessed January 7, 2018, https://www.cbr.ru/currency_base/OldVal.aspx.

[880] "Report on the Visit to Moscow in Connection with the Utilization of the USSR Contribution to TAA Funds," n.d., 1–4, AG 8: Box 1940, X07.21(470)TA, UNESCO Archives.

state deposited the eight million rubles it pledged for 1954 and 1955 into an account opened under the name of the UN secretary-general in the USSR State Bank (Gosbank) and ordered the USSR Ministry of Foreign Trade (MVT) to oversee the export of equipment through the UN to other countries. By 1955, India, Pakistan, and Ceylon had submitted requests for a portion of these funds.[881] MVT also nominated twenty-two Soviet experts for the UN Technical Assistance Administration (TAA, which managed industrial assistance) as well as the programs of the specialized agencies to later only complain that UNESCO and the WHO had rejected these names "without valid reason."[882]

In the 1950s, the USSR had several small successes in using UN technical assistance as a means of showcasing Soviet achievements. For instance, the work of Soviet academicians as UNESCO experts in the construction and running of the Bombay Technological Institute complemented Soviet bilateral aid to India and received a high level of publicity both in the former British colony and internationally. But apart from the Bombay institute, the number of experts from Western states involved in UN technical assistance dwarfed the number of Soviet citizens employed for this purpose. While the number of Soviet UN experts ticked up annually from 1956 to 1960, Soviet nationals made up just 1 percent of the total number of experts enlisted in the UN Regular Program and EPTA before 1961. Meanwhile, 16 percent of these experts hailed from the UK, almost 13 percent from the United States, more than 9 percent from France, and 3.5 percent from the FRG (see Table 1). The USSR performed slightly better in its efforts to bring students from weakly-developed countries to study at its universities through UN

[881] The USSR also welcomed a number of "study tours" from India and other Asian countries. These tours allowed experts from the non-Western world to observe Soviet society firsthand. Dag Hammarskjold, "FI 345/02/USSR," June 30, 1955, 1–4, AG 8: Box 1940, X07.21(470)TA, UNESCO Archives.

[882] RGANI, f. 3, op. 8, d. 58, ll. 78-80; and A. A. Sobolev, May 21, 1955, 1–2, AG 8: Box 1940, X07.21(470)TA, UNESCO Archives.

fellowships, procuring almost 3 percent of the total number of such fellowships handed out by the UN in the late 1950s. For comparison, the UK, the US, France, and the FRG obtained approximately 10, 8.5, 8, and 5 percent of UN fellowships respectively (see Table 2).

Table 1: Number and Percentage of UN Experts from the USSR and Major Western Countries, 1956-1960						
Year	Total Number of Specialists in UN Regular Program and EPTA	British Specialists	American Specialists	French Specialists	West German Specialists	Soviet Specialists
1956	2,895	496	427	263	77	16
1957	3,183	515	423	296	100	28
1958	3,144	529	386	291	111	40
1959	3,215	499	382	310	129	43
1960	3,225	477	396	302	118	49
Total	15,662	2,516	2,014	1462	535	176
Total Percent	100%	16.06%	12.86%	9.33%	3.41%	1.11%

Table 2: Number and Percentage of UN Fellowships Sponsored by the USSR and Major Western Countries, 1956-1960						
Year	Total Number of UN Fellowships	Fellowships Sponsored by Great Britain	Fellowships Sponsored by US	Fellowships Sponsored by France	Fellowships Sponsored by West Germany	Fellowships Sponsored by USSR
1956	4,312	396	373	372	205	104
1957	4,940	499	473	389	285	95
1958	5,090	546	431	426	269	125
1959	5,677	575	517	385	287	127
1960	6,747	634	513	565	289	308
Total	26,766	2,650	2,307	2,137	1,335	759
Total Percent	100%	9.90%	8.61%	7.98%	4.99%	2.84%
Source of data for Table 1 and Table 2: GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 21, ll. 73-83.						

After 1960, the rendering of aid to weakly-developed countries began to supersede in importance all other multilateral activity for the UN, UNESCO, and the Soviet Union alike. In that year, the wave of decolonization crested when French West Africa broke up into independent states, Belgian rule collapsed in the Congo, and a handful of former British territories joined the community of nations. In anticipation of the entry of more than a dozen new African countries into the UN, Ralph Bunche, the African American UN under secretary-general for special political affairs, declared 1960 the "Year of Africa."[883] Later that year, the UN General Assembly adopted the "Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples," which endorsed the "right to self-determination" of "all peoples," thereby formalizing the international community's endorsement of the end of imperial control

[883] Paul Hofmann, "Bunche Says '60 Is Year of Africa," *The New York Times*, February 17, 1960, 15.

over countries fighting for liberation.[884] Originally instigated by the Soviet Union, the declaration became a victory for the communist country in the context of the Cold War after the US abstained from voting on it.[885] In response, President Kennedy put aid to weakly-developed countries at the center of American policy in the UN and further heightened the Cold War struggle to win over the "Third World" when he urged the general assembly to officially designate the 1960s the "Decade of Development" in 1961.[886]

Falling in line with its parent organization, UNESCO responded to this transforming world order by concentrating its spending on technical assistance to weakly-developed countries in the areas of education, science and, to a lesser extent, culture. This reorientation from a focus on "major projects" sponsoring academic exchange to material aid for the weakly-developed countries accelerated due to a massive influx of new member states into UNESCO that would constitute a powerful voting bloc in the international organization. In 1960 alone, the specialized agency inducted seventeen African nations into its ranks. In November, the eleventh session of the UNESCO General Conference elected the Ethiopian ambassador to France as the first ever African chairman of the general conference.[887] Because Africa had almost no representation in UNESCO before 1960, the continent's educational, scientific, and cultural needs received relatively little attention until these countries began sending delegations to the organization.[888]

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[884] General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV). "Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples," December 14, 1960, http://www.un.org/en/decolonization/declaration.shtml.

[885] Gaiduk, *Divided Together*, 263-64.

[886] Olav Stokke, *The UN and Development: From Aid to Cooperation* (Bloomington: Indian University Press, 2009), 137.

[887] "Records of the General Conference, Eleventh Session" (UNESCO, 1960), 25, 11/C/Proceedings, UNESDOC.

[888] Although the East-West project aimed to raise awareness of the contributions of non-Western cultures to the world's heritage, it dedicated most of its activities to Asia instead of broadening the scope of its "appreciation" to Africa. Besides, many Asian countries viewed the project as a failure. In conversations with a member of the Soviet UNESCO Delegation in the spring of 1960, UNESCO officials, while noting some of the "positive results" of the

To make up for this neglect of the world's second largest continent, UNESCO organized in the early 1960s a separate African Technical Assistance Program and stepped up its technical-assistance "operational activities" across the board. For these enterprises, UNESCO applied for financing from the UN Technical Assistance Board (TAB, the organ responsible for EPTA assistance through specialized agencies), the UN Special Fund, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), and the International Development Association (IDA).[889]

Buoyed by the rapid increase of UNESCO member states hostile to Western European nations or frustrated with the ambiguous stance of the US on their right to self-determination, the Soviet UNESCO Commission and Delegation set out in 1960 to win over new allies in the decolonizing world by presenting the communist bloc as an alternative to the former Western colonizers. To demonstrate the communist bloc's desire to assist these countries with the process of building postcolonial societies, the USSR, BSSR, and Ukrainian SSR doubled their collective annual voluntary allotments to UN technical assistance from the 900,000 rubles ($225,000) they gave annually between 1956 and 1960 to almost two million rubles ($2.2 million) in 1961.[890] At a meeting of socialist representatives to prepare for the upcoming session of the UNESCO General Conference in the fall of 1960, attendees rejoiced over the fact that the US would not have a "clean majority" at the conference for the first time and agreed that the socialist countries should exploit the "indignation" of other member states brought on by American policy.[891]

East-West project, related to the Soviet diplomat the view of some Asian delegates that it had amounted to "mostly noise, high sounding phrases with very little concrete." GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 7, l. 119.

[889] Sewell, *UNESCO and World Politics*, 200-03.

[890] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 21, l. 73.

[891] GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 1, ll. 401-02.

During the general conference, Soviet delegates conducted private conversations with emissaries from the new African states. With the blessing of African and Asian countries, they secured the unanimous approval of a resolution denouncing colonialism similar to the one passed by the UN earlier that year and in spite of the pleas to the conference from the English delegation to "forget the past." Additionally, non-Western countries backed the Soviet detachment's proposals to improve the geographical distribution of the UNESCO Secretariat and divert funds freed up from disarmament to educational, scientific, and cultural aid. The Soviet contingent at the conference also wrote admiringly of the unsuccessful efforts of the Cuban delegation, which spoke for the new government led by Fidel Castro, to pass resolutions condemning–somewhat contradictorily–the "interference of states in the internal affairs of others states" and American discrimination against African Americans.[892]

These successes at the 1960 general conference and the confidence of its Soviet attendees in an imminent post-Western UNESCO only strengthened the broader faith inside the Soviet Union at the beginning of the 1960s in an inevitable communist future both at home and abroad. In the summer of 1961, the Third Party Program of the CPSU not only proclaimed that the USSR would surpass the US in economic production by 1970, but also promised to Soviet citizens the realization of communism by 1980, or during the lifetime of the "present generation." In spite of the mismatch between the realities of Soviet life and this bold promise of a coming utopia, "these words," Vail' and Genis argue, "embellished the daily life of the people. 'The present generation'—this was clear to each person. This is when your grandson grows up. When the son marries. When you become an adult."[893] Beyond Soviet borders, Castro's declaration of the

[892] The resolution on disarmament did not gain approval from a majority of UNESCO member states. GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 16, ll. 7-13.

[893] Vail' and Genis, *60-e*, 9.

Cuban Revolution as "socialist" that year seemed to affirm the USSR's role as a vanguard nation in the teleological development of world history toward communism. In the eyes of many Soviet citizens, the Cuban Revolution reenacted the October Revolution in the non-Western world, further rekindling the socialist internationalist spirit inside the Soviet Union and offering a living example of the possibilities opened up by the collapse of Western empires for the universalist project of the USSR.[894] In the context of this global upheaval, UNESCO would serve as an international public square on which the Soviet Union would cajole the "national-liberation movements" of the decolonizing world to its side through aid and by making stinging rebukes in response to Western delegates excusing imperialism.

But the Soviet Union valued technical assistance through UNESCO and other international organizations less for its tangible impact on the economies of weakly-developed countries than for its symbolic demonstration of the communist recognition of these states as legitimate members of the international community. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the Soviet money, equipment, and personnel delivered abroad through bilateral agreements with Burma, Iraq, Yemen, Ghana, and others exceeded by far the size of Soviet contributions to UN-funded enterprises.[895] Just as the US conducted most of its technical assistance bilaterally but used the UN as a means of penetrating countries with which it did not have close relations, Soviet diplomats judged bilateral work to be "more effective" but saw the UN as a vehicle for infiltrating less friendly nations.[896]

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[894] For a description of the Cuban Revolution as a "metaphor" in Soviet society in the 1960s, see Ibid., 40-52.

[895] Soviet officials stated this fact several times in the 1950s and 1960s. For an example, see GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 14, l. 195.

[896] According to Kovda, the US State Department viewed bilateral agreements as "the best means" of doing business with weakly developed countries. "Yet bilateral agreements are not very popular in countries that have experienced the colonial yoke," he continued. "Thus, the State Department seeks to use the UN-UNESCO system because it is trusted in ex-colonial states." Writing several months later, Ershov declared that the USSR "must use various forms

The heightened interest of the Soviet Union after 1960 in UN development was also a reaction to the high level of importance that the United States under the Kennedy administration attached to it. During the first year of his presidency, Kennedy reinvigorated American participation in UNESCO as part of a multipronged aid program based on the modernization theories of social scientist Walt Rostow and other intellectual heavyweights of the American foreign-policy establishment.[897] As a sign of goodwill toward the international organization, Kennedy welcomed Director-General Maheu for a one-on-one meeting in his first year in office, making him, as Hazard points out, "the first American president to invite and host a UNESCO director-general at the White House."[898] Soviet international civil servants sensed this uptick in American attention to UNESCO in their daily lives in the secretariat. "In every way, US representatives boast among secretariat employees and especially member states that the USA contributes 30 percent of the budget, is the main financer of the Special Fund and technical assistance, and is always prepared to increase its contributions," Director Kovda, who regularly dealt with assistance projects in his capacity as head of the UNESCO Department of Natural Sciences, fretted in a 1962 report to the commission. "This is especially done to convince African, Asian, and Latin American governments that without the USA this kind of international work would somehow not exist."[899]

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of multilateral relations through international organizations" to "introduce and spread" their "influence" in countries lacking official relations with the communist world. As the Soviet experience with the UNESCO Africa program illustrated, however, this was easier said than done. GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 20, l. 308; and GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 21, l. 136.

[897] For a history of the influence of modernization theory on American foreign policy during this period of the Cold War, see Nils Gilman, *Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003), 155–202.

[898] Hazard, *Postwar Anti-Racism*, 112.

[899] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 20, ll. 309-10.

Unsettled by the renewed commitment to internationalism and multilateral diplomacy of the American president, Soviet officials anticipated with despair that UNESCO would become an instrument for achieving the American foreign-policy objective of containment through economic development. "Over the last five to seven months," Kovda reported in 1962, "there has begun to circulate from different UNESCO circles but essentially from a single source–Washington–the American slogan: 'We need a new Marshall Plan.'" The Soviet UNESCO director argued that the US hoped to gain control of multilateral technical assistance in order to buttress its bilateral aid and thus prevent the spread of communist movements in the weakly-developed countries. "'The Marshall Plan, in its time, stopped revolution in Europe,'" Kovda quoted the head of the UN Special Fund, Hoffman, as declaring. "'If we do not want a repeat of China, Cuba, the Congo, etc., we must invest significant funds and implement a broad new Marshall Plan in Latin America, Africa, and Asia, to keep them in the sphere of influence of the free world and neutralize possible revolutionary explosion.'" In Kovda's estimation, the UNESCO leadership echoed "this sentiment" but "in different ways." The Soviet UNESCO director also predicted that the US would seek "a depoliticization of UNESCO," or the removal of questions of peaceful coexistence, disarmament, race, etc. from its program, "and a transformation of its organs to fulfill the mission of this 'new Marshall Plan,' i.e. the suffocation of the revolutionary-liberation movement in African and Asian countries."[900]

To highlight the centrality of UNESCO to the competition between the capitalist and communist blocs for the decolonizing world, Kovda further claimed that President Kennedy was "personally involved with UNESCO" through his science advisers (Chairman of the President's Science Advisory Committee Jerome Wiesner and President of the American Association for the

[900] Ibid., ll. 310-11.

Advancement of Science Roger Revelle), who plotted to sway the UN and UNESCO "toward executing the 'orders' and 'instructions' of the Special Fund and the World Bank to create schools, colleges, scientific institutions, and universities under the control of the Atlantic bloc and first and foremost the USA."[901] In proposals to the Central Committee for improving the rendering of aid to weakly-developed countries through the UN and UNESCO, the Soviet UNESCO Commission pointed to the amount of resources the US State Department devoted to international organizations as reason to take multilateral channels to decolonizing nations seriously.[902] This reactive posture of the USSR demonstrates how the US shaped the agenda of international organizations.

UNESCO's performance as an intermediary between donor and recipient governments evoked regular attacks from the Soviet UNESCO Delegation for the disparity between the number of Soviet and Western specialists traveling to weakly-developed countries through the international organization. From the perspective of the delegation, UNESCO bureaucrats rejected Soviet candidates with the "excuse" that they submitted incomplete applications "with not enough information on their qualifications and work experience." Furthermore, the UN representatives-in-residence in the weakly-developed countries, who acted as liaisons overseeing UN operations on the ground, all came from Western countries and directed states examining prospective experts away from Soviet citizens with informal "'advice' or 'opinions.'" These misgivings led the Soviet UNESCO Delegation to argue in 1961 for the relocation of the process

[901] Ibid., l. 311.

[902] See for instance, a 1961 proposal to streamline and provide more oversight to the interagency process dealing with sending experts to the UN. GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 17, ll. 38-40.

of selecting experts from the unelected UNESCO Secretariat to a "Committee of Nine" composed of member states on the UNESCO Executive Board.[903]

Yet UNESCO's justifications for turning down Soviet nominees reflected the wishes of the recipient governments, many of which often insisted experts speak English or French fluently. The inheritance of English and French as national languages in former colonies made it much more difficult for Soviet citizens to meet the criteria of these states, revealing how the legacy of colonialism gave the US, France, and Great Britain a head start in the race to build the national economies and, in the case of UNESCO, educational systems of the non-Western world in their own image. UNESCO developed an assumption that Soviet nationals did not have the necessary language training and found ways to vet them for linguistic proficiency. When Soviet experts visited Paris for routine premission briefings, UNESCO Secretariat staff closely evaluated their language skills. Sitting in on one of these meetings in 1961, the first secretary of the Soviet UNESCO Delegation derided the tactics these UNESCO officials used to ascertain language ability. "It got to the point that the Head of the UNESCO Bureau of Relations with Member States Correa deliberately forced . . . [the Soviet experts] to speak in English, which put them in an uncomfortable position," he related to the Soviet UNESCO Commission.[904] In one instance reported by the Soviet permanent delegate in 1966, a Soviet botanist applying for a teaching position in Africa "could not name the simplest constituent parts of a flower in English" during an interview at UNESCO headquarters.[905] In order to level the playing field, the Soviet All-Union Technical and Industrial Export Organization (Tekhnopromeksport) agreed to pay for

[903] Ibid., ll. 23-24; 175-76; and GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 23, l. 29.

[904] GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 15, l. 315.

[905] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 31, l. 159.

interpreters to accompany all Soviet UN experts in their day-to-day activities.[906] But "the vast majority of governments of the weakly-developed countries categorically refuse to take experts with interpreters," the Soviet permanent delegate reported in 1964. "They prefer candidates who know the language from colonial powers, even the former metropoles."[907]

The politics and preexisting economic dependencies of a recipient government also played into the deliberations of weakly-developed countries over whether to let Soviet UNESCO personnel into their schools, universities, and other institutions prone to ideological contestation. As historian Oscar Sanchez-Sibony argues, "countries in the emerging Third World were already enmeshed in an intricate web of economic relations with their former colonial masters, and the calculus the leaders of these young countries had to make in seeking new relations was as frequently economic as it was political."[908] Although the governments of weakly-developed nations prioritized such economic ties, political calculations had as much of a bearing on their willingness to welcome Soviet experts through multilateral organizations. Because most recipient countries fell under what the Soviet UNESCO Delegation described as "the influence of strong imperialist powers," the USSR failed to insert its people into countries with which it did not already have budding bilateral ties. In response to Soviet criticisms of the lack of Soviet social scientists commissioned by UNESCO to serve in weakly-developed countries, the deputy director of the UNESCO Department of Social Sciences divulged to the Soviet permanent delegate that these "countries, as a rule, prefer to invite experts from the Western states for 'ideological reasons.'" Like other donor countries, the USSR also had to take into account the

[906] N. Smelov, "TAB/CM.747. Rev. 1," December 28, 1956, AG 8: Box 1940, X07.21(470)TA, UNESCO Archives.

[907] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 25, l. 89.

[908] Sanchez-Sibony, *Red Globalization*, 125.

cultural sensitivities of non-Western nations. In 1959, for example, Afghanistan declined to employ a female Soviet specialist since, in the words of the second secretary of the Soviet UNESCO Delegation, "the presenting of a woman for this post violates the traditions and customs of the country, where women are not allowed to be engaged in active political, scientific, or cultural activities."[909]

In the case of Africa, these political and cultural considerations made it all but impossible for the USSR to expand its soft power on the continent. MID tapped the Soviet UNESCO Delegation to act as one of its major outreach agents for cultivating relations with francophone African countries because of its location in Paris (the former metropole) and the avenues for unofficial overtures provided by the international organization. In March 1961, Soviet Permanent Delegate Kulazhenkov traveled to the Ivory Coast, Dahomey, Cameroon, and Nigeria to begin the process of establishing contacts and to probe the possibility of sending Soviet specialists to these countries. With the exception of Nigerian officials, all of the heads of state and ministers with whom the Soviet delegate met demurred when he broached the question of Soviet aid. Emphasizing their neutrality in the Cold War, the African leaders informed their Soviet guest that they would foster cultural and economic exchanges only after setting up formal diplomatic relations with the USSR at some undetermined point in the future. In what Kulazhenkov perceived as a sign of the lingering control of the French, they also opted to appeal to Paris before seeking help from other powers.[910]

While UNESCO afforded the USSR ways to reach these countries through publications and conferences, the right of African states to turn down specialists from UN specialized

[909] GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 1, l. 399; and GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 13, ll. 69-70.

[910] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 17, ll. 255-71.

agencies thus prevented Soviet UNESCO functionaries from utilizing the international organization as an indirect channel for dispatching its experts to nations wary of having Soviet citizens in their institutions. Although the Soviet UNESCO Commission compiled a list of 185 specialists to nominate as experts for the UNESCO Africa program, only a fraction of the names put forward ever made it to the continent because recipient governments not only required experts to have attained fluency in English or French, but also insisted that the chief of any mission be of French or English nationality.[911] Relaying these facts to the Soviet UNESCO Delegation, UNESCO incurred accusations that it conspired in a neo-imperialist plot to plant French and British advisers in their former colonies while facilitating American influence in the region.[912] "The secretariat leadership is also trying to bar the USSR from the Africa aid program, delaying a decision on the use of our contribution," a member of the Soviet UNESCO Delegation wrote in 1962. "UNESCO leaders try to present the matter as if the Africans do not want Soviet aid, that they supposedly prefer the British and French as experts." In contrast, UNESCO quickly spent the millions of American dollars from the IDA, the World Bank, and private funds (the Ford and Carnegie foundations) donated to its Africa program. "The secretariat leadership," the delegation asserted, "is ready to serve US interests in this regard."[913] Further curbing the ability of the USSR to exert influence on the African continent, Soviet educational institutions hesitated to welcome African students through UN technical-assistance programs. Because the

[911] The USSR also donated 235,000 rubles (approximately $260,000) to UNESCO's Africa program. GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 17, ll. 56; 159.

[912] Aide-Memoire on Exchange of Views on the African Programme between UNESCO and the USSR Delegation," May 12, 1961, 1–5, AG 8: Box 1938, X07.21(470) D, UNESCO Archives.

[913] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 20, ll. 201-03.

international organization chose these students, the Soviet Union had no opportunity to weed out individuals with anti-Soviet political views.[914]

The eruption of a proxy conflict between the capitalist and communist blocs in the neighboring Congo made West African states even more hesitant to appear as falling into the orbit of the Soviet Union. To comply with the UN's plea in July 1960 for its specialized agencies to provide the Congo with expertise in their areas of specialization, the UNESCO Executive Board took steps to rebuild the nation's secondary schools following a mass exodus of Belgian teachers from the country during the crisis. In November, Director-General Veronese sent out a call for French-speaking male teachers capable of "withstanding the Congo climate."[915] The international organization also began planning the construction of the National Institute of Education, which produced indigenous replacements for fleeing Belgian teachers.[916] In reply to Veronese's letter, the Soviet UNESCO Commission consented to furnishing a list of Soviet teachers for the Congo mission if UNESCO met certain conditions that ran counter to the UN's policy in the country. In particular, the commission demanded that the international organization collaborate with the Stanleyville government of Antoine Gizenga and avoid all contact with

[914] In July 1960, MINVUZ characterized as "unadvisable" a recommendation of the Soviet UNESCO Commission to lobby for the creation of a "UNESCO Special Fund" for African students. "The experience of past years shows that students from African countries accepted into institutes of higher education in the Soviet Union on grants from the United Nations," the deputy head of the ministry's division of foreign relations wrote to the commission, "are selected by related organizations abroad and arrive in the USSR with clearly hostile intentions and after their expulsion from universities make slanderous statements to the press of some capitalist countries." Instead, the deputy head stressed the importance of recruiting students through bilateral channels, which allowed Soviet domestic agencies to vet applicants. GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 15, l. 214; and GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 10, l. 287.

[915] GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 12, ll. 252-65.

[916] Josué Mikobi Dikay, "Education for Independence: UNESCO in the Post-Colonial Democratic Republic of Congo," in *A History of UNESCO: Global Actions and Impacts*, ed. Poul Duedahl (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 174.

Joseph Kasavubu's regime, which had come to power following the overthrow of Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba by Colonel Joseph-Désiré Mobutu in the fall of 1960.[917]

After the assassination of Lumumba in January 1961, UNESCO's continued supplementation of the UN military intervention in the Congo with educational assistance outraged the Soviet Union and strengthened the resolve among Soviet diplomats to forego multilateral aid efforts in Africa in favor of bilateral agreements with individual countries. Soviet UNESCO officials wrote off UNESCO's Congo initiative as a tool of Western imperialism, echoing Soviet recriminations of the UN as an accomplice in the murder of the Congolese politician. For the Soviet UNESCO Delegation, the international organization had "completely discredited itself in the eyes of the people of the Congo and other African states" by not only conducting "secret" negotiations with the Kasavubu government and the secessionist state of Katanga (which had orchestrated the execution of Lumumba), but also by pleading with Belgian teachers to return to the Congo. "The responsibility for sabotaging real educational aid to the Congo lies first of all with the UNESCO Secretariat, which carries out the policies of the colonialists," the delegation reported in March to Moscow.[918] Ignoring these vigorous objections, UNESCO's emergency operations in the Congo stretched into the mid-1960s and, as one historian concludes, "became an early testing ground for UNESCO's subsequent activities all over the Sub-Saharan continent."[919]

Shut out of African territories reluctant to alienate their Western European and American benefactors, Soviet UNESCO experts went primarily to African countries already aligned with

[917] GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 12, l. 251.

[918] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 16, l. 90.

[919] Dikay, "Education for Independence: UNESCO in the Post-Colonial Democratic Republic of Congo," 168.

the Soviet Union (Mali, Guinea). Despite apprehensions over drawing African students to the Soviet Union through the UN, the USSR also agreed to offer through the UNESCO Africa program fifty grants for three-year periods of study at Soviet pedagogical institutes beginning in 1961 and 1962. Narrowing the pool of possible applicants, the Soviet UNESCO Commission discussed ways to ensure the selection of persons with "the most desirable origin and social status" (i.e., those not "coming from rich families, the colonial administration, etc."). Other applicants from anti-Soviet states had to withdraw their candidacies at the behest of their governments. Out of the fifty grants advertised, UNESCO received fifteen grant applications for study in the USSR. Of these, eight students actually enrolled in a Soviet university.[920]

* * *

The USSR fared far better in getting its people hired by UNESCO to work as experts in weakly-developed countries beyond the scramble for Africa. In fact, the Soviet Union enjoyed a stronger position in UNESCO's technical-assistance program than in any other organ of the UN system. Similar to its efforts to place Soviet professionals in the UNESCO Secretariat, however, the USSR struggled to navigate the UN bureaucracy and align its methods for mobilizing its citizens to travel abroad with the byzantine procedures of the international organizational system.

Before recipient governments decided on start dates, the process for approving UNESCO technical-assistance projects fell to TAB and the Technical Assistance Committee (TAC) in New York. Much to the regret of the Soviet UNESCO Commission, the window between the green light from New York for a project and the start date often stretched no longer than two months.[921] To deal with these sudden solicitations, the Soviet state assigned the responsibility for

[920] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 17, l. 159; and GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 19, l. 100.

[921] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 14, l. 2.

recruiting Soviet citizens for technical-assistance jobs to the USSR Council of Ministers State Committee for Economic Relations (GKES).[922] Working in coordination with the Soviet UNESCO Commission and other organizations, GKES had the onerous duty of finding on short notice Soviet specialists with the linguistic and professional knowhow matching the obscure positions laid out in UNESCO job announcements. In January 1958, the Council of Ministers ordered all "relevant" Soviet institutions (i.e., those involved in pedagogy, scientific research, polytechnic education, and other fields) to form "reserves" of specialists on call for summons to serve as UNESCO experts. To prepare these cadres, the council exempted them from their normal work to attend language instruction two days a week. In preparation for the rare instances when recipient governments agreed to host an expert who relied on an interpreter, these institutions also received orders to find linguists working in their organizations to put in these reserves.[923]

The creation of reserves yielded a positive impact on the readiness of the Soviet UNESCO Commission to promptly answer calls for applications from the international organization. While the commission presented to UNESCO only three names in all of 1957, it handed over fifty in 1958.[924] But by the early 1960s, several of the key Soviet agencies in fields related to UNESCO had either produced pitiably small lists of Soviet employees for possible UNESCO missions or neglected to generate reserves at all. For example, the RSFSR Ministry of Education had just begun to constitute a reserve in 1960. Likewise, MINVUZ claimed that it had never received the resolution issued by the Council of Ministers instructing it to have a reserve.

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[922] Tekhnopromeksport had the relatively easy responsibility of hosting foreign students. This entailed meeting UNESCO fellows at the airport or train station, organizing their housing, and "observing the training process" in conjunction with UNESCO. Ibid., l. 206.

[923] Ibid., l. 29.

[924] Ibid., ll. 30-32.

In 1961, AN SSSR had managed to "register" only three of its academicians for a reserve expected to contain forty names. One of the better performing Soviet organs, the State Committee for Polytechnic Education, hit half its quota (thirty out of sixty). As noted in chapter 4, many of these entities employed a single person to handle bilateral and multilateral requests for personnel.[925]

In the context of UNESCO's new preoccupation with Africa after 1960, the Council of Ministers redoubled its efforts to sustain reliable sources of expertise, issuing a flurry of orders between 1960 and 1964 that founded a constellation of reserves scattered throughout the Soviet Union. In May 1960, seven Soviet republics received orders to open reserves in their ministries and committees with spots for 270 specialists.[926] Five months later, this target increased to 500. The council also passed down individual orders in response to UNESCO's needs at a given time. In December 1962, for example, it devised a plan for reserves of thirty-six researchers categorized by specialization (mechanical engineering, oil drilling, construction, hydrology, etc.).[927] In 1964, the Central Committee and Council of Ministers also passed a resolution ordering the widespread creation of reserves for posts in UN agencies engaged in economic and technical assistance. The resolution included a directive to MVT to open a special department dedicated to preparing "economist-internationalists" for work in UN organs. Accepting each year fifty persons with "advanced economic or technical education" and "experience in the national

[925] GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 14, ll. 191-98; and GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 17, l. 56.

[926] Eighty-two people from the RSFSR, fifty-two from the Ukrainian SSR, thirty-six from the Uzbek SSR, twenty-eight from the BSSR, twenty-six from the Georgian SSR, twenty-three from the Kazakh SSR, twelve from the Azerbaijani SSR, and eight from the Armenian SSR.

[927] GARF, f. 9606, op. 1, d. 931, l. 1-2.

economy," the department administered a three-year course to applicants approved by the Central Committee.[928]

But these edicts did little to overcome the shortage in foreign-language speakers who also happened to have the requisite scientific or educational backgrounds. The inability of the Soviet state to build repositories responsive to UNESCO's needs arose out of the inefficiencies of Soviet planning. Similar to how the disconnect between UNESCO's recruiting methods for secretariat employees and the centralized system put in place for this purpose by the Soviet UNESCO Commission put the USSR at a disadvantage in challenging Western domination of the UNESCO bureaucracy, the mismatch between the rolling appeals from the international organization for experts and the Soviet command system meant that UNESCO job openings caught Soviet officials by surprise. The top-down approach of picking specialists in advance for jobs could not keep up with the fluid and rapidly changing demands for experts.

Thus, of the forty-three individuals in Moscow reserves in 1963, only sixteen had an "active command" of English or French, ten had enrolled in English courses at MGPIIa, eight received language instruction from a teacher at their workplaces, and nine did not study or know a language for "various reasons." The deputy head of the Division of Foreign Relations of MINVUZ attributed the lack of foreign-language aptitude to an absence of "supervision" from responsible organs and the fact that many of those on the reserve, burdened with the same workload as their nonreserve colleagues, simply did not have the time to master a language.[929] Furthermore, the days spent by Soviet specialists in expensive language classes drained the Soviet economy of funds and labor. "The language preparation of experts torn away from

[928] RGANI, f. 3, op. 16, d. 456, ll. 9-13.

[929] Ibid., l. 3.

production," the Deputy Chairman of the Soviet UNESCO Commission A. A. Petrov deplored, "is extremely complicated—the huge expenditure of money for this preparation makes sense only if there is a strong belief in the possibility of effective use of the expert prepared through language courses."[930] The teaching of foreign languages to Soviet specialists remained a challenge into the late 1960s. While MGPIIa began offering ten-month courses for potential UNESCO experts in 1964, only 37 of the 130 Soviet citizens in its reserves signed up for these courses. "The situation is still difficult," a GKES official commented on language training in a letter to the Soviet UNESCO Commission in July 1966. "And, evidently, a noticeable improvement in this respect will not take place in the near future."[931]

Instead of decentralizing the procedure for finding Soviet specialists, the Soviet UNESCO Commission asked the Soviet UNESCO Delegation to come up with a plan that predicted the kinds of experts the organization would need in the future. "Without such a plan," Petrov wrote in October 1963, "Soviet institutions involved in selecting and preparing specialists for weakly-developed countries through UNESCO are forced to begin the search for specialists only after receiving relevant job descriptions." This led "to tardiness and the selection of specialists who do not always meet the professional and particularly the language qualifications listed." The "absence of a prospective plan," Petrov griped, "means that the reserve of experts is filled blindly and only to a minimal degree meets the needs of countries." The specializations to include in the reserves "(mechanical, electro-technical, chemical etc.)," he went on, were also "too general."[932] In 1965, GKES had yet to reform the bureaucratic practices that had made the

[930] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 24, l. 394.

[931] GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 127, l. 98; and GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 32, l. 76.

[932] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 24, l. 394.

reserves stagnate. That same year, Petrov decried, Soviet agencies still divided their reserves into the categories of specialization delineated in the decrees from the late 1950s and early 1960s.[933]

Notwithstanding Soviet frustrations over the disorganization reigning in their reserves, the Soviet UNESCO Commission and GKES gradually excelled in getting their people into UNESCO gigs as experts in comparison to the USSR's overall performance in UN technical assistance, which continued to lag behind its Western adversaries in the 1960s. At the end of 1958, the USSR had just eighteen citizens working in India and Afghanistan.[934] In 1960, twenty-four Soviet experts had taken up residence in weakly-developed countries—a number far greater than the size of Soviet contingents enlisted by any other UN specialized agency. The Soviet detachment that year rivalled the twenty-five Americans, twenty-five French, and twenty-three British specialists stationed by UNESCO in the weakly-developed countries.[935] By 1966, Soviet UNESCO experts accounted for 74 of the 110 Soviet professionals hired by all UN specialized agencies.[936] The position of Kovda as director of the UNESCO Department of Natural Sciences also endowed the communist bloc with the power to shape the missions of 130 experts in over forty countries as well as the programs of over ten institutes of higher education receiving UN Special Fund and EPTA aid through the department.[937]

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[933] GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 127, l. 98.

[934] The USSR also briefly had other experts in Burma and Egypt earlier that year. GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 2, l. 5; and GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 13, l. 64.

[935] In 1960, three Soviet nationals were stationed in weakly-developed countries through the ILO, five through the FAO, and one through the World Meteorological Association. Five others worked in lesser known UN organs. GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 17, l. 22.

[936] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 29, l. 314.

[937] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 20, ll. 32-33.

Some Soviet nationals transported south and east by UNESCO impressed colleagues at their host institutions with their knowledge, productivity, and comportment. S. F. Mirkotan, who spent four years in the Department of Physics at the Higher Industrial Institute in Baghdad, earned effusive praise from the institute's rector. From 1959 to 1963, Mirkotan wrote and published several physics textbooks used in the laboratories of the institute. These books, the rector declared, "will be useful as long as the institute itself exists and will remain as an unforgettable reminder of him among colleagues and students." Mirkotan also created four laboratories for physics, mechanics, electromagnetism, and optics; trained researchers; designed curricula for physics, mathematics, and chemistry; and grew the department from two to eleven faculty members. "Apart from his scientific achievements," the rector added, "his colleagues in the department, in other departments, and also myself, will feel the absence of our colleague, whose conscientiousness cannot be forgotten."[938]

Other Soviet UNESCO experts evoked ridicule not for their Sovietness but for their own difficult or odd personalities. According to the administrative assistant of the UN mission in Syria, the colleagues of Soviet academician Vosanchuk, whom UNESCO had assigned to the Department of Geology at the University of Damascus, spoke about his "eccentric character" with "a smile" and went out of their way to avoid him. "One gets the impression that 'during the Second World War, Vosanchuk suffered a very strong shock at the front that continues to this day,'" the first secretary of the Soviet embassy in Syria quoted the UN envoy as speculating. "'Vosanchuk has a unique philosophy and his own preconceived view that he is trying to impose on others,'" the UN functionary assessed. At one point during Vosanchuk's stay in Syria, the UN official "angrily" recounted to the first secretary, the Soviet professor drew the ire of the dean of

[938] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 33, ll. 204-05.

his department when he expressed a desire to travel to Beirut without the permission of the Soviet embassy and asked the dean to "not tell anyone" about his wish.[939]

Whatever their individual performances, the relatively high number of Soviet professionals drafted by UNESCO to serve in the weakly-developed countries paints a misleading picture of the geographical diffusion of Soviet UNESCO experts. While the USSR maintained a scattering of its personnel across the Middle East, it found itself almost completely shut out of Latin America and Francophone Africa, both of which fell into the spheres of influence of Western powers. In the 1960s, the Soviet UNESCO presence in Africa amounted to one or two experts at any given time in a handful of countries and the building of two educational institutions in Mali and Tunisia. The communist bloc as a whole had its weakest showing in the UNESCO missions posted to Latin America. In 1963, for example, a Cuban in Venezuela and a Hungarian in Argentina were the lone UNESCO experts from the socialist countries placed in South America.[940]

A heavy concentration of Soviet specialists participating in UNESCO technical assistance worked at the Bombay Technology Institute (later renamed the Indian Institute of Technology, Bombay, or IIT Bombay), which became the landmark achievement of Soviet aid to the weakly-developed countries through the UN in the 1950s and 1960s. As a Soviet memorandum summarizing Soviet contributions to all UN aid projects observed at the beginning of the 1960s, "the largest number of Soviet experts work in India, mainly through UNESCO (professors and teachers at the Bombay Technological Institute)."[941] The Bombay project proved a success for

[939] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 26, ll. 11-12.

[940] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 19, l. 100.

[941] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 21, l. 80.

the USSR precisely because the country's experts did not have to compete for the project in the normal application contest of UN aid. Indeed, UNESCO purposely set the initiative aside for the Soviet Union, giving a bilateral enterprise a façade of multilateral cooperation.

A bulwark of the nonaligned movement rejecting the bipolar alliances of the Cold War, India cultivated diplomatic ties with the post-Stalinist leadership as an alternative ally to the former imperial countries of the West. In the winter of 1955, Khrushchev, as part of his repudiation of Stalin's foreign policy of isolationism and neglect of countries outside of the socialist camp, visited India after receiving Prime Minister Nehru in the Soviet capital in the summer of that year. Over the next decade, the Soviet "friendship" with India strengthened due to a shared hostility toward the PRC kindled as a result of the fallout between Khrushchev and Mao beginning in 1958 and the 1962 conflict along the Indian-Chinese border.[942] The widespread showings of Indian films in Soviet movie theaters during the post-Stalin era manifested the mutual cultural exchange concomitant with this alliance. In her ethnographic study of Soviet perceptions of Indian cinema, historian Sudha Rajagopalan shows that these Indian films became one of the few foreign staples popular among Soviet moviegoers because they interrupted the "grey Soviet reality'" of daily life and "the monochromatic nature of Soviet imagescapes," offering an "'apolitical'" means of "'escape'" into melodrama until the dissolution of the USSR in 1991.[943]

From 1954 onward, India also enjoyed a sustained flow of bilateral economic as well as military aid from the Soviet Union in support of the fulfillment of its five-year plans. As

[942] Vojtech Mastny, "The Soviet Union's Partnership with India," *Journal of Cold War Studies* 12, no. 3 (2010): 50–63.

[943] Sudha Rajagopalan, *Indian Films in Soviet Cinemas: The Culture of Movie-Going after Stalin* (Bloomington: Indian University Press, 2008), 175.

Sanchez-Sibony concludes, however, this state-centric approach to modernization did not reveal a drift toward communist ideology but a policy of "import substitution" common to many weakly-developed countries in the non-Western world. "The World Bank and the consortium countries of the West," Sanchez-Sibony argues, "would continue as the main providers of economic development aid even as India persisted in framing this development within an import substitution strategy that relegated the Soviet Union to an important but secondary role, and moreover, one useful for mediating the liberal world."[944]

Nevertheless, the Indian government considered the USSR as a valuable source of expertise about planning as it struggled to raise the number of indigenous professional personnel necessary for rapid development. In the 1940s and 1950s, India suffered from a severe deficit of individuals with sufficient technical education to orchestrate its push for industrialization through its first and second five-year plans.[945] After 1945, its government therefore set into motion the founding of four technical institutes modelled "on the lines of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in the USA" and located in the east, west, south, and north of the country.[946] To build the fourth institute in the west, the Indian minister of scientific research and cultural affairs petitioned the Soviet delegation to the 1954 session of the UNESCO General Conference to ask the Soviet state to supply funds, equipment, and experts through UNESCO for the purpose of creating the Bombay institute, which would train indigenous engineers, scientists, and other professionals. In November 1955, the Central Committee agreed to supplement the $8.5 million the Indian government allotted for the construction of the institute's buildings with

[944] See Sanchez-Sibony's case study of Soviet-Indian relations in his book on Soviet relations with the weakly-developed countries: Sanchez-Sibony, *Red Globalization*, 157-69.

[945] Ibid., 160.

[946] Humayun Kabir, December 2, 1954, 1, AG 8: 62 A 01 (540) IITB/TA–"66": Part I to 31/XII/1956, UNESCO Archives.

an aid package consisting of fifteen Soviet experts, twenty fellowships for Indian students to study in the USSR, and 10 million rubles ($2.5 million) of equipment. [947]

Although UNESCO supported the venture as a starting point for Soviet involvement in UNESCO activities in the early months after the country joined the organization, the enterprise immediately ran up against a roadblock when it came under consideration by TAB. Because the deal resembled a bilateral accord between India and the USSR, the chief body responsible for UN aid through specialized agencies hesitated to approve it. Citing an ECOSOC resolution requiring all UN technical assistance to "'be made without limitation as to use by a specific agency or a specific country or for a specific project,'" the director of the UNESCO Technical Assistance Department also concluded in the spring of 1956 that it was "out of the question for a country contributing to the expanded program to be able to earmark its contribution or any part of it for the financing of a designated project" in the way that the Soviet and Indian governments had proposed. To satisfy these guidelines, TAB barred the two countries from directly communicating without using UNESCO as an intermediary and subjected the project to annual review instead of giving it a block grant in accordance with established practice. It also exacted promises from UNESCO that the organization would divert a small amount of money and experts from non-Soviet member states to the Bombay undertaking.[948]

In December 1956, a Soviet team of professors arrived on the shores of Powai Lake to the north of Bombay where they inspected the jungled terrain of the future site of the Bombay institute. In July 1958, the institute welcomed its first class of students to its temporary location

[947] "Final Report: Indian Institute of Technology, Bombay India" (Paris: UNESCO, 1968), 7; 9, UNESDOC; and RGANI, f. 3, op. 8, d. 336, ll. 119-21.

[948] Malcolm S. Adiseshiah, "45 EXB/Madrid/17 ADG," April 11, 1956, 1–2, AG 8: 62 A 01 (540) IITB/TA–"66": Part I to 31/XII/1956, UNESCO Archives; and Byron S. Hollinshead, "TA/616.629," May 15, 1956, 1, AG 8: 62 A 01 (540) IITB/TA–"66": Part I to 31/XII/1956, UNESCO Archives.

in the southern outskirts of the city in the Worli district.[949] Led by Martynovskii, whom we met in chapter six in his later role as the deputy director for technical education in the UNESCO Secretariat, the Soviet UNESCO mission earned praise from the international organization for the results of its first two years of labor. "It is most gratifying to note that, in spite of exceptionally difficult conditions, considerable preparatory work has been carried out by the team in planning laboratories and classrooms for the western higher technological institute," the director of the UNESCO Department of Natural Sciences who preceded Kovda wrote in April 1958. This work included "evaluating equipment and staff requirements, preparing syllabi, curricula and even textbooks, as well as research projects suitable for training specialists."[950]

The institute did not open its doors until 1960 following a ceremony installing the foundation stone of the campus presided over by Prime Minister Nehru.[951] In 1962, the year in which the first class of undergraduate students received their diplomas, IIT Bombay, in the words of one official, had "developed into one of the biggest teaching and research institutes in India."[952] The student body had ballooned from 140 in 1958 to 1,189 (973 undergraduate and 216 graduate students) with 148 professors and 670 researchers of Indian origin serving on the faculty.[953] By the time UNESCO ended its assistance in 1966, nine departments (specializing in aeronautical, electrical, mechanical, metallurgical, and civil engineering as well as chemistry,

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[949] "Final Report," 9; and V. S. Martinovsky, July 29, 1958, AG 8: 62 A 01 (540) IITB/TA–"66": Part II from I.I. 1957 up to 31.VI.58, UNESCO Archives.

[950] P. Auger, "Annual Reports, Western Higher Technological Institute, Bombay," April 3, 1958, 1, AG 8: 62 A 01 (540) IITB/TA–"66": Part II from I.I. 1957 up to 31.VI.58, UNESCO Archives.

[951] "Final Report," 10.

[952] V. Ounksov, "BMS/90/9 HS/71," August 8, 1962, 1, AG 8: 62 A 01 (540) IITB/TA–"66": Part IV from 1.6.62 up to 31.10.66, UNESCO Archives.

[953] "UNESCO's Experience in Assisting the Indian Institute of Technology at Bombay," n.d., 4–9, AG 8: 62 A 01 (540) IITB/TA–"66": Part IV from 1.6.62 up to 31.10.66, UNESCO Archives.

physics, and the humanities) trained more than 2,000 students and collaborated closely with Indian industries.[954] To overcome the language barrier, Soviet professors set up the Department of Russian Language, which they anticipated would make the institute "a center for the study of Russian for all engineering colleges in India."[955] In addition to publishing a textbook, a reader, and a dictionary, the Russian-language department organized a national conference on "problems of teaching Russian in India" and released a bimonthly newsletter. Sent to "all teachers of the Russian language in India," the newsletter sought to spur the "exchange of information and experience on the teaching of Russian in India" and contained articles written by the faculty of the department.[956]

The level of importance the USSR attached to the Russian-language department demonstrates the significance of the Bombay institute as a Soviet base for cultivating ties with Indian society and projecting its influence on the newly independent country's educational system. During the ten years Soviet nationals traveled through UNESCO to the institute, a Cold War in miniature played out between the Soviet-run Bombay institute and the American-funded Kharagpur Institute of Technology in the east of the country. In everything from its graduation ceremonies, language of instruction, and sports, to the deeper structure of its curriculum, the Kharagpur institute reproduced the milieu and core elements of the American format of higher education. "The Indian Ministry of Education and the leadership of the institute" in Kharagpur, a Soviet geophysicist who briefly served among the Americans at the institute observed, "consciously supports the Anglo-American influence" on the institute.[957] In contrast, IIT

[954] "Final Report," 13–24.

[955] GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d, 119, ll. 107-08.

[956] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 25, ll. 53-54.

[957] GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 5, ll. 280-81.

Bombay replicated many of the attributes of the Soviet educational model, including the Soviet "open defense" of theses, which took place in public and made one of the graduate students who produced some of the best written work "break down under cross questioning" in front of the UN resident representative.[958] But because a majority of teachers trained at the Bombay institute went for additional education abroad in the capitalist countries, the head of the collective of Soviet specialists assigned to Bombay felt that the hegemony of Western technical education in the outside world took the shine off some of the institute's accomplishments.[959]

Viewed in isolation, however, IIT Bombay was one of the most significant contributions of the USSR to international development in the 1950s and 1960s. Over the course of a decade, fifty-five Soviet experts contributed to getting the institute on its feet while four other academics (from the US, FRG, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia) served as token multilateral hires. After the termination of UNESCO aid, the USSR continued to dispatch its experts to Bombay through bilateral channels into the 1970s. Conversely, Soviet universities took in twenty-nine students from the institute as fellows between 1958 and 1964. On top of delivering the books and laboratory equipment used by the Bombay institute, the USSR also supplied the institute's first digital transistorized computer, the Minsk II, in 1966.[960] According to journalist Dinesh Sharma, the Minsk II, along with another Soviet computer (the EC-1030), helped spark the growth of computer science as an academic discipline in India. "The two Soviet computers," Sharma writes, "gave the computer faculty as well as students a very strong technical foundation in computer science and technology." Consequently, the Bombay institute became known for

[958] James Keen, December 30, 1959, AG 8: 62 A 01 (540) IITB/TA–"66": Part III from I/VII/58 to 30.5.62, UNESCO Archives.

[959] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 25, ll. 50-53.

[960] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 31, l. 364a; and "Final Report," 25–26; 31–33.

educating personnel "proficient in both hardware and software, resulting in their ready acceptance in American universities for higher studies despite having been trained on Soviet machines."[961] IIT Bombay remains one of India's premier scientific and technical institutions in the twenty-first century.[962]

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Because of these advances in the international organization, the Soviet Union went from doubting the value of staying in UNESCO in the late 1950s to realizing in the early 1960s their interest in preserving the UN specialized agency's place as a preeminent venue for multilateral diplomacy and technical assistance. But with the rapidly changing and increasingly pluralist world order, the rise of alternative international institutions would dilute the power and decrease the relevance of both UNESCO and the USSR in the sphere of multilateral technical assistance during the 1960s and beyond.

After President Kennedy's inauguration in the winter of 1961, the Soviet UNESCO Commission and Delegation grew progressively worried that the US would undercut Soviet power in UNESCO by diverting its resources to new international organizations with mandates similar to UNESCO but dominated by Western member states. In essence, Soviet UNESCO envoys, while predicting that the US would continue to "strengthen" its presence in UNESCO, also heard clear enunciations from US officials about the need to circumvent the Soviet Union by diversifying the international organizational system. Returning from a trip to the United States in April 1961, Roderick, the American deputy director in the UNESCO Department of Natural

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[961] Dinesh C. Sharma, *The Outsourcer: The Story of India's IT Revolution* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2015), 31–33.

[962] In 2018, the institute ranked third in the list composed by *US News and World Report* of the "best global universities" in India and ninetieth in the magazine's evaluation of the "best global universities" in Asia. Its Department of Chemistry also ranked 187th in the world. "Best Global Universities: Indian Institute of Technology Bombay," US News and World Report, 2018, https://www.usnews.com/education/best-global-universities/indian-institute-of-technology-bombay-501259.

Sciences, set off these alarm bells when he stated bluntly to Director Kovda that the US State Department intended to sap the power accrued by the Soviet director over international scientific cooperation and development. "'UNESCO in its present form does not fulfill the interests of the development of international scientific cooperation,'" the Soviet director recalled his deputy saying. "'If the situation does not improve,'" Roderick added, "'the US government will raise the question of the withdrawal of science from UNESCO and the creation of a new international organization for science. This new organization should be independent of UNESCO, which has been turned into a political organization.'"

Kovda speculated that the Americans resented their inability to have "unchecked control" over "international scientific life." More specifically, he discerned that the Americans fretted over his management of UNESCO's seismological missions in the Pacific Ocean, Latin America, and the Mediterranean. "'We suspect that the USSR, through these missions, aims to collect information on the network of seismic stations in relation to nuclear tests,'" Kovda recited an American document he had obtained. "'The USA seeks to create its own network of such stations around the globe (100 stations) and fears Russian interference.'"[963] The Soviet UNESCO director came to the defense of UNESCO in order to fend off these attempts by the US to undermine his own position. His response to Roderick shows how far the Soviet Union had come from dismissing UNESCO to appreciating it as one of their only outposts in the world of international organizations: "My Deputy Roderick told me one day: many in the US think it better for science to have its own international organization; in the sciences, there is little opportunity for UNESCO,'" Kovda remembered. "I replied to Roderick: 'UNESCO could ensure success in peaceful cooperation of scientists from different countries if the UNESCO director-

[963] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 17, ll. 47-48.

general changes his negative attitude toward science and provides the appropriate budget.'"[964] In short, as soon as Soviet officials felt that their country had gained a stake in the international organizational system, the US wanted to take it away.

Further stoking these anxieties within the Soviet UNESCO Commission and Delegation, the Kennedy administration, with the compliance of the UNESCO leadership, began to use Western-aligned international organizations to coopt UNESCO and make it complicit in programs designed to woo the weakly-developed countries away from the communist bloc. "Along with measures to strengthen its influence in UNESCO and transform its organs to execute the objectives of the 'new Marshall Plan' in Africa, Asia, and Latin America," Kovda warned in January 1962, "the State Department is increasingly reorganizing, strengthening, and financing parallel regional international organizations, entirely dependent on the USA and ready to replace the UN and UNESCO if the USA loses its influence in them." Kovda cited the Organization of American States (OAS), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the EEC, and the Colombo Plan for Economic Development in Asia as the main "regional international organizations" muscling their way into UNESCO's jurisdiction.[965] The OECD, Kovda concluded, "is essentially an organ of NATO" whose "plans in the areas of science fully replicate the plans of the [UNESCO] departments of natural sciences and education, including the giving of 'aid' to African countries and 'subsidies' to scientific unions." Likewise, the OAS "openly duplicates the UNESCO program for Latin America." By the spring of 1962, UNESCO and these organizations had cultivated "'working relations'" to "'exchange experience'" between their departments and legal bureaus on a number of matters

[964] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 21, l. 95.

[965] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 20, l. 311.

pertaining to economic development. “All this is done under the pretext of a need to agree on programs and avoid work redundancy,” Soviet Deputy Director-General Ershov assessed. “In reality, this peculiar distribution of obligations among various organizations is intended to use one, or all of them together, to perform American political tasks in those countries and regions where the US encounters significant difficulties bilaterally.”

Such collaboration eventually took the form of official agreements signed by UNESCO and each of these organizations. In the summer of 1961, for example, UNESCO and the OAS assembled a joint committee for the educational portion of the “Alliance for Progress,” the American-sponsored anticommunist economic initiative in Latin America. Director-General Maheu, Ershov reported in 1962, had folded under “pressure” from the OAS and sidelined the UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) from this joint venture. “The goal of this ‘correction,’” the Soviet deputy director-general asserted, “was in every way to limit or even exclude Cuban participation in the educational development program for Latin America, which will be implemented with UNESCO and OAS funds.” [966] Approved by the UNESCO Executive Board with either the abstention or endorsement of the majority of weakly-developed countries, the UNESCO-OAS committee alternated between using OAS and UNESCO secretariats in order to give the impression of “‘equality.’” In spite of this appearance of a partnership between the two organizations, the Soviet permanent delegate stressed that the OAS leadership wanted to “subordinate all UNESCO activity in the areas of science and education in Latin American countries to their plans, program and, particularly, the American program—the ‘Decade of Development.’”

[966] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 21, l. 133.

UNESCO signed analogous agreements with the EEC in October 1962 and the OECD in May 1963. "Thus, the US, its NATO allies, and others of the war bloc," the Soviet permanent delegate warned, "have begun to wrap their programs for weakly-developed countries, as well as the 'activities' of some openly pro-NATO and closed organizations such as the OAS, EEC, and OECD, in the flag and prestige of UNESCO, the FAO, the ILO, and some other UN specialized agencies."[967] On the one hand, Soviet UNESCO employees resisted carrying out orders to assist these organizations. Kovda, for instance, "evoked the malicious wrath of Maheu" when he refused to convene a meeting with the OECD in December 1961. On the other hand, the Soviet permanent delegate discerned a silver lining around UNESCO's decision to work with these institutions. "The maintenance of unofficial contacts with the workers in the secretariats of these organizations would help us obtain interesting information," he quipped in 1963.[968]

In another bid to coopt UNESCO for anticommunist development, the Kennedy administration conducted prolonged negotiations with the international organization to employ Americans enlisted in the State Department's new Peace Corps Program as an army of volunteers for educational development in the weakly-developed countries. Founded in the first nine months of Kennedy's presidency, the Peace Corps, along with the recently formed United States Agency for International Development (USAID), originated in efforts to contain communist expansion in the wake of decolonization. In the November 1960 speech in which he first publicly raised the idea of young Americans spanning out into the decolonizing world to win its populations over to the "free world," Kennedy cited the threat of Soviet professionals indoctrinating the new nations as grounds for mobilizing US citizens for service abroad in this

[967] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 24, ll. 217-22.

[968] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 20, l. 311; and GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 23, l. 105.

fashion. “For the fact of the matter is,” he told a crowd in San Francisco, “that out of Moscow and Peiping and Czechoslovakia and Eastern Germany are hundreds of men and women, scientists, physicists, teachers, engineers doctors, nurses, studying in those institutes, prepared to spend their lives abroad in the service of world communism.”[969]

In August 1961, the deputy director of the Peace Corps, the African American diplomat Franklin Williams, met with the leadership of all UNESCO departments to discuss how to incorporate Peace Corps volunteers into UNESCO’s technical-assistance program. “Williams tried to present the matter as if the ‘Peace Corps’ is an organization of ‘young idealists,’ mainly high-school and college graduates who voluntarily decided to devote themselves to assisting weakly-developed countries,” the Soviet UNESCO Employee K. N. Fedorov reported. “In the words of Williams,” Fedorov quoted the African American diplomat, “the goal of this activity is to give an opportunity to the local populations of weakly-developed countries to better know Americans, and for the Americans ‘to better know other peoples.’” In one of these meetings, Fedorov detailed how Roderick, in an attempt to undermine the Soviet position in UNESCO, “suggested to those attending to evaluate, <u>without concern for political questions</u>, the feasability of using members of the ‘Peace Corps’ in technical-assistance work done by the UNESCO Department of Natural Sciences,”—i.e. Kovda’s department. In response to Williams, Fedorov “expressed doubt as to whether UNESCO could use this unquestionably ideological organization without the agreement of <u>all UNESCO member states</u>.”[970]

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[969] John F. Kennedy: "Speech of Senator John F. Kennedy, Cow Palace, San Francisco, CA," November 2, 1960. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25928.

[970] GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 13, ll. 223-25.

Unsurprisingly, the Soviet UNESCO Delegation went to great lengths to thwart any agreement between the international organization and the American program. During subsequent deliberations in the secretariat and executive board, Soviet UNESCO staff members and delegates argued that the UN General Assembly should decide the question and stressed UNESCO's responsibility to maintain its neutrality. "Because the American 'Peace Corps' is of an anticommunist and colonialist nature and intended to propagate the 'American way of life' while strengthening the ideological influence of the West in Afro-Asian countries," the chairman of the Soviet UNESCO Commission wrote to the Soviet permanent delegate in August 1961, "the Soviet delegation should not allow the adoption by the executive board of a positive decision on the issue. In this respect, highlight the inappropriateness of using the funds, apparatus, and the flag of the United Nations for a national program like the 'Peace Corps.'" The chairman recommended that the delegation counter the American proposition with their own proposal to direct funds toward training indigenous cadres in the weakly-developed countries.[971]

While UNESCO commissioned only an "experimental" program that never sent a single Peace Corps volunteer to the weakly-developed countries, the US government secured more profitable agreements with other UN specialized agencies. In the fall of 1961, the Peace Corps finalized an agreement with the FAO to deploy these Americans as part of the agency's agricultural aid to weakly-developed countries.[972] For the Soviet Union, the whole ordeal spelled out how the biases baked into the UN made multilateral diplomacy an uneven playing field. Their disadvantages derived from the ability of their adversary to dictate the rules of the game. If the international organizational system ceased to work in favor of the US in the context of the

[971] Ibid., ll. 205-07.

[972] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 23, ll. 193-94.

Cold War, the Americans could simply change the terrain on which the two superpowers battled for control over international organizations in ways the USSR could not.

The panic set off among Soviet officials by the advent of new international organizations competing with UNESCO in its province of educational technical assistance demonstrates the extent to which the USSR had become invested in the UN specialized agency as its best bet to challenge the West in the international organizational system. After 1960, the Soviet UNESCO Commission and Delegation worked hard to fulfill Khrushchev's foreign-policy by catching up to the Western powers in the number of experts it sent to the weakly-developed countries through UNESCO. Coming late to the game of multilateral technical assistance, the USSR struggled to reach parity with the West in this sphere of UN activity, which had its ideological origins in the anticommunist American policy of containment through economic development. Recognizing the West's advantage in the Cold War competition to give UN aid to the weakly-developed countries, the Soviet UNESCO Commission and Delegation made their campaign to send Soviet experts to weakly-developed countries the central objective of the USSR's involvement in UNESCO as the process of decolonization quickened after 1960.

While the US plotted to take back control of multilateral diplomacy from the communist bloc and the weakly-developed countries through the creation of other international organizations and bilateral programs, the entry of new nations into the UN in the 1960s seemed to upset the balance of power in the world body to the USSR's benefit. In the second half of the decade, as the atrocities of the Vietnam War dominated international headlines, the Soviet UNESCO Commission and Delegation felt emboldened by what the delegate to a 1965 session of the UNESCO Executive Board characterized as "the loss of prestige of the United States" in

the international organization.[973] Exploiting the brutality of Western military escapades in their speeches at UNESCO, Soviet delegations to the organization's representative bodies harped on the "aggression" in Vietnam, the intervention of the OAS in the Dominican Civil War, and the admission of Portugal into UNESCO in 1965 in spite of the objections of African states over the war in Angola. The delegation to the fourteenth session of the UNESCO General Conference in December 1966 noted with satisfaction that the condemnation of American abuses in Vietnam by Premier A. N. Kosygin in a written "welcome message" to the general conference "evoked a wide response among the delegates and not a single representative, even from the West, spoke in defense of US policy."[974]

Yet the divergence of the core priorities of the USSR and the weakly-developed countries in UNESCO produced a rift between the two non-Western blocs that became increasingly apparent in the 1960s. For much of the decade, the USSR and US banded together in UNESCO to curb the dramatic increases in the budget supported by new member states eager to receive reparations from the superpowers and angered that "the USSR, USA, and others 'do not, and do not want to, meet the needs and interests of the weakly-developed countries' in UNESCO."[975] Troubled by the prospect that they would suffer "political damage" and find themselves "in isolation," Soviet emissaries scrambled to compromise with these countries but expressed annoyance in internal correspondence with their voracious appetites for more and more aid.[976] As both the capitalist and communist blocs found their power diminished in the representative bodies of UNESCO with the continued inflow of new member states, the US and USSR

[973] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 32, l. 283.

[974] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 30, ll. 65; 69; and GARF, f. 9519, op. 2 d. 33 l. 284.

[975] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 25, l. 66.

[976] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 22, l. 107.

therefore formed an alliance to counter the growing power of these countries during the major administrative and budgetary debates of the general conference. Thus, as the decade came to an end, the weight of the West as a force in UNESCO had declined, but the USSR's standing in the international organizational system did not improve as a result.

CONCLUSION

In January 1966, a delegation from MID traveled to Prague to brainstorm with their Czechoslovak counterparts over ways to stimulate the participation of the eastern bloc in the activities of international organizations. In the course of four days of talks in the Czernin Palace, Czechoslovakian diplomats described to the Soviet deputy foreign minister and the rest of the delegation how the stagnation of the Czechoslovakian economy had spurred them to implement a set of reforms designed to better use international organizations to gather intelligence on Western economies and bring in more foreign currency by getting their employees into secretariats and convening more conferences sponsored by these institutions on Czechoslovakian soil.

To accomplish this, the Czechoslovakian Ministry of Foreign Affairs had centralized its apparatus overseeing the country's involvement in all international organizations in its newly created Division for International Economic Organizations, a replication of MID USSR's Division for International Economic Organizations (OMEO). The Czechoslovakians had also assembled within this division an interagency committee for UN specialized agencies. By the end of the series of meetings, the Soviet and Czechoslovakian functionaries agreed to enhance collaboration between the countries of the communist bloc in the planning of their actions in these organizations. In addition, the Czechoslovakian hosts implored their Soviet visitors to abandon the policy of criticizing the ILO only as a "reformist" bourgeois labor organization, suggesting instead that they take advantage of its immense collection of knowledge about the labor experience of other countries (methods to increase labor productivity, revamp

management, better organize labor, etc.) to improve the dire state of the economy of the communist bloc.[977]

Returning to the USSR, the delegation submitted a memorandum urging MID to follow the Czechoslovakian model by clustering all of the coordinating entities responsible for international organizations into MID's OMEO, which had overseen the Soviet UNESCO Commission only from a distance to that point. Noting the "positive results" of its ally's reforms, the delegation recommended that MID take over "long-term planning" in this area of international relations. "The delegation," the report concluded, "believes that the intensification of political leadership on the part of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs in work related to international organizations requires a greater concentration of this work within the ministry." A year later, the Council of Ministers dissolved GKKS and transferred the Soviet UNESCO Commission to OMEO, where it would stay until the dissolution of the USSR in 1991.[978]

With the coming of détente between the capitalist and communist worlds after 1969, the incorporation of the Soviet UNESCO Commission into MID in 1967 marked the final step in the normalization of Soviet participation in the international organizational system. While the location of the Soviet UNESCO Commission during the 1950s and much of the 1960s in GKKS–a "social organization" independent from the Soviet Foreign Ministry–reflected the experimental phase of Soviet participation in international organizations under Khrushchev and during de-Stalinization, the merging of the commission into MID testified to the fact that multilateral diplomacy through such international organizations had become a core and permanent

[977] GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 31, ll. 255-57.

[978] Ibid., ll. 258-71; and I. V. Gaiduk, "SSSR-IuNESKO: Iz istorii sovetskoi mnogostoronnei diplomatii v gody kholodnoi voini," in *Mnogostoronniaia diplomatiia v gody kholodnoi voiny: Sbornik statei* (Moskva: Rossiiskaia akademiia nauk; Institut vseobshchei istorii; Tsentr po izucheniiu kholodnoi voiny, 2008), 81–82.

component of Soviet foreign policy. In so many words, the decision to move the commission to MID answered the question posed by Chairman Zhukov in his 1958 *Pravda* article of whether the USSR should maintain its membership in the organization with a resounding "yes," fulfilling Mozhaev's desire to see Soviet activity in international organizations "raised to the highest level of state policy." [979]

Just thirteen years before MID took over the commission as an established component of its foreign-policy apparatus, the Soviet state under Stalin had rejected UNESCO as a threat to the reconsolidation of its hegemony over Soviet culture and scholarship after the Second World War. Inspired by the movement for "world governance" in the West during the late 1940s, UNESCO embodied the "rootless cosmopolitanism" used by the Soviet state to label its internal enemies as traitors to the motherland. The Soviet boycott of the organization from 1946 to 1953 made UNESCO a de facto Western organization in which Western European and North Americans staffed its bureaucracy and defined its culture. As cascading crises fractured the world into capitalist and communist blocs after 1947, the international organization waded into the bipolar conflict, conducting projects in ex-enemy countries in coordination with the reconstruction efforts of the United States and instinctually advocating for liberal values throughout the world.

When Khrushchev ended the Soviet boycott of UNESCO in 1954, he foisted Soviet citizens into an organization deemed anathema to Soviet ideology by his predecessor and implicitly acknowledged noncommunist international organizations as an unavoidable dimension of international affairs. But from 1954 to 1959, Soviet officials quickly grew disillusioned with UNESCO and their failure to score immediate results. This initial struggle derived from the country's inexperience with multilateral diplomacy in institutions dominated by the West. Once

[979] See the Introduction and Chapter 2.

the USSR decided to stay in UNESCO in 1959, however, it made significant progress in influencing UNESCO activity, increasing the number of conferences it hosted, the frequency of appearances of its authors on the pages of UNESCO publications, and the size of its contingent of technical experts sent through UNESCO to weakly-developed countries.

Between 1954 and 1967, Soviet professionals, scholars, diplomats, and other citizens dismissed, explored, or embraced the internationalist project of UNESCO, which differed from the socialist internationalism of which their homeland acted as the primary wellspring. Moreover, these Soviet citizens became integral members of international publics that sought to transcend the bipolar conflict of the Cold War and bring the world closer together. Through working as international civil servants or technical experts, engaging in debate at conferences, and interacting with international publications, Soviet citizens became acquainted with alternate visions of how to attain world peace through international cooperation that both stood in opposition to and overlapped with the Soviet brand of internationalism.

While most of those who experienced the world of UNESCO rejected the Western domination of the international organizational system, they nevertheless argued that the USSR should adhere to the Western-written rules of the game of this system and adjust to its Western culture in order to bolster Soviet standing in the international community. Soviet international civil servants repeatedly complained about their country's neglect of UNESCO's norms for smooth-functioning international cooperation and chafed under the overbearing micromanagement of their overseers in the Soviet UNESCO Delegation. Zvorykin argued against Soviet attacks on bourgeois scholars and advised the Soviet academic community to comport themselves in accordance with the "sociability" and etiquette incumbent on those entering the international public sphere. To better converse with the foreign scholars involved in

the *History of Mankind*, he also promoted the use of Western languages in Soviet journals and appropriated elements of the Western genre of world history into Soviet historical scholarship. Similarly, the founder of Prometheus wanted his government to allow him to actively communicate with the UNESCO reading public while Soviet librarians jumped at the chance to keep abreast of the latest developments in their profession. With the exception of Ponomarev and several others, Soviet UNESCO participants did not express a conscious preference for Western internationalism over Soviet internationalism and retained their loyalty to their homeland and its cause. But many of them did begin to *practice* Western internationalism precisely because the Soviet state ordered them to excel in its institutionalized form.

Although militarily a superpower, the USSR would never make up for the time it lost under Stalin in the world of international organizations. By calling for an integration of the USSR into this system in order to overturn it, the faithful Soviet emissaries to this organization laid bare the tension between imitation and differentiation at the heart of Khrushchev's famous declaration that the Soviet Union would "catch up and overtake" the United States and the capitalist world. "Khrushchev's repeated assertion of the goal 'to catch up and overtake America,'" Reid observes, "was contradictory and risky, calling into question claims for the distinctiveness of socialist modernity and locking the USSR into constant disadvantageous competition on the territory and standards set by the United States."[980] The competition of internationalisms investigated in this dissertation exemplifies this contradiction and the consequent disadvantages underscored by Reid. Western and socialist internationalisms shared ideals (friendship among peoples, scientific progress, a celebration of cultures, world peace,

[980] Susan Reid, "Who Will Beat Whom? Soviet Popular Reception of the American National Exhibition in Moscow, 1959," in *Imagining the West in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union*, ed. György Péteri (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2010), 224.

etc.). But only one had become institutionalized in a way that made it recognized as the sole universal mechanism for realizing an international community. By joining UNESCO, the USSR legitimized this presumption to universality and provincialized its own internationalism as a particularistic ideology plotting to overturn the Western-based world order from within it. Although it attained a degree of success in UNESCO after 1960, the decision to join the UN specialized agency relegated Soviet internationalism to the position of acting as one of multiple voting blocs within an international organizational system whose pretensions of neutrality masked the power of the West to articulate its rules and man its bureaucracies in the first two decades of its existence. Soviet UNESCO intermediaries saw in the secretariat, or the heart of UNESCO shaping all of the organization's activities, systemic biases and discrimination where their Western counterparts saw the neutral workings of an administration.

On the one hand, these recriminations of the "bourgeois" tendencies of UNESCO and Soviet suspicions of the existence of Western conspiracies behind every decision made by the organization allowed the Soviet UNESCO Commission and Delegation to ignore the failure of their highly centralized, top-down methods for recruiting Soviet citizens to partake in UNESCO projects. If the Soviet Union wanted to succeed in UNESCO, it had either to launch a mobilization of its populace and put them on alert for sudden UNESCO requests or reform its system of creating empty reserves by decree in order to respond to the spontaneously arising needs of the international organization. The intense curiosity evinced by readers of *The UNESCO Courier* suggests that Soviet citizens might have volunteered for service in the international organization if the commission had done more to educate Soviet nationals on the opportunities it extended. Of course, this half-hearted embrace of UNESCO reflected the cautious, inconsistent, and partial opening up to the world indicative of the Khrushchev era in general.

On the other hand, these Soviet criticisms of UNESCO as a "bourgeois" organization were right. In the institutionalized form of UNESCO, "Western internationalism" lost its adjectival qualifier, becoming the "internationalism" shaping the structure of UNESCO and guiding the implementation of its program even as, in the 1950s and 1960s, non-Western countries started to enter the organization's ranks and alter the focus of its program. But this gradual process of de-Westernization of an organization founded in the West and shaped by its ideals angered American politicians as well as some Western Europeans who abhorred the fact that UNESCO had in fact become a universal organization less and less acquiescent to the wishes of Western governments. With the increasingly pluralist composition of UNESCO after decolonization accelerated in the 1960s, the ideological battle of the Cold War took a back seat to meeting the demands of weakly-developed countries for technical assistance. The US responded to this de-Westernization of UNESCO by turning to international institutions in which the West still enjoyed hegemony (the OAS, the OECD, EEC, World Bank, International Monetary Fund, etc.) and founding the Peace Corps as a robust bilateral program conducting assistance similar to the aid delivered by the UN specialized agency. Meanwhile, the USSR clung to UNESCO as one of the only noncommunist international organizations in which it had a semblance of influence.

Indeed, UNESCO soon became a bastion of anti-Western sentiment. In the 1970s and 1980s, the organization underwent a rapid transformation that made it more closely resemble an alliance of nonaligned nations than a tool of Western states. In the early 1970s, the PRC and the GDR both joined UNESCO in the context of the easing of Cold War friction brought on by détente and the West German policy of *Ostpolitik.* After Maheu retired from the director-generalship in 1974, the UNESCO General Conference voted to elect Amadou-Mahtar M'Bow, a

Senegalese national, as the first person from the Third World to hold the position of director-general. Under M'Bow, the international organization regularly endorsed viewpoints that ran counter to American interests. The dissatisfaction in Washington with UNESCO boiled over in the early 1980s when the international organization published *Many Voices, One World: Towards a New, More Just, and More Efficient World Information and Communication Order*. Composed by Seán MacBride, the chairman of UNESCO's International Commission for the Study of Communication Problems and an Irish Nobel laureate who had played instrumental roles in a number of international organizations, the report called for a "new world information and communication order" to end the concentration of mass media in the West and the reliance of the weakly-developed countries on Western information and means of communication.[981] From the perspective of the new American presidential administration of Ronald Reagan, the so-called "MacBride Report" amounted to little more than an attack on "freedom of the press" by the dictators of the communist bloc and the Third World who had turned the UN into a dysfunctional and corrupt abettor of tyranny. Citing the MacBride Report among other reasons, the US withdrew from UNESCO in 1984.[982]

UNESCO too suffered from a decline of its importance due to the proliferation of different actors crowding the international arena. In the 1970s, a multitude of new international organizations burst onto the scene eager to solve global issues ranging from public health to environmental degradation. From the beginning of the decade through the first half of the 1980s, the number of intergovernmental organizations and NGOs more than quadrupled, ballooning

[981] For a summary of the report, see Vir Bala Aggarwal and V. S. Gupta, *Handbook of Journalism and Mass Communication* (New Delhi: Concept Publishing Company, 2001), 59–61. For the entire report, see The MacBride Commission, *Many Voices, One World: Towards a New, More Just, and More Efficient World Information and Communication Order* (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 1980).

[982] For an overview of events leading to American withdrawal from UNESCO, see Meisler, *United Nations*, 228-31.

from 3,075 in the early 1970s to 14,216 in the mid-1980s.[983] The USSR also widened its participation in the international organizational system, enrolling in more than forty NGOs by 1977. Two years earlier, it had signed the Helsinki Accords. Formulated by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), these accords remain one of the most famous multilateral agreements of the era of détente and a landmark achievement of the human rights movement of the second half of the twentieth century.[984]

Yet UNESCO continued to symbolize international intellectual cooperation for many Soviet citizens until the dissolution of the USSR. At the height of M. S. Gorbachev's *glasnost'* and his "new thinking" about international relations, the director of the Tajik SSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Oriental Studies, A. Tursunov, wrote an article in the February 1989 issue of *Kommunist*, "The New Thinking: What Can UNESCO Do?" Explaining that he had worked the previous summer at UNESCO headquarters, Tursunov rattled off the ways in which the organization helped build "a general cultural foundation under the system of comprehensive security." But many UNESCO publications, he regretted, were "to this day not being made available to the Soviet creative intelligentsia." For instance, "it is particularly annoying," he chided, "that the *History of the Scientific and Cultural Development of Mankind*, written by a highly skilled international group of authors and considered by the international community as a noticeable phenomenon in world science, has not been translated into Russian."[985] In the same issue of *Kommunist*, another Soviet academician, Vice-President of AN SSSR V. N. Kudriavtsev, proposed in an article on "political reform and social science" that Soviet

[983] The majority of this growth occurred in the number of NGOs. Iriye, *Global Community*, 129.

[984] Ibid., 133; 136.

[985] "JPRS Report, Soviet Union: *Kommunist*, February 1989" (Foreign Broadcast Information Service, May 22, 1989), 82–85.

academicians follow UNESCO guidelines when setting out to realize *glasnost'* and cultivate "an atmosphere of openness, respect for the ideas and suggestions made by others and the existence of a variety of scientific schools and trends" in their workplaces. "In this case," he suggested, "it would also be useful to rely on global experience and, particularly, to take into consideration the recommendations of UNESCO on the status of the scientific worker and his role in contemporary society."[986]

For members of the Soviet intelligentsia who had come into contact with UNESCO, the organization therefore offered an alternative internationalist program of action once the Soviet brand of internationalism had grown hollow in the late 1980s. When the post-Stalinist leadership had decided to join UNESCO in 1954, it extended to a select number of influential Soviet professionals–such as the future ambassador, Dubinin–a chance to experiment with this alternative internationalism and adapt elements of it to Soviet society, introducing them to ideas that would become of use when Soviet ideology began to lose its grip under Gorbachev. The continued enthusiasm of Soviet readers for *The UNESCO Courier* into the 1980s demonstrates how UNESCO publications played this role. In 1990, Moscow-based Progress Publishers released an anthology of the best articles from *The Courier* over the years. In an overview of the history of the Russian translation, the editors of the anthology noted that the "large increase in the circulation of the Russian edition can serve as a testimony to the growth in popularity of the magazine among Soviet readers." The editors also characterized *The Courier* as an intellectual predecessor to Gorbachev's "new thinking" and the end of the Cold War.[987]

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[986] Ibid., 7.

[987] I. N. Brychev et al., eds., *Kur'er IuNESKO: Antologiia za 30 let* (Moskva: Progress, 1990), 5–6.

Thus, this dissertation has shown that the UN and its specialized agencies, despite their obvious failures, created an institutionalized network of events, publications, and workplaces through which the opposing sides of the Cold War remained in continual contact and got to know each other intimately and from a distance, whether they liked it or not and for better or worse. Long derided by its Western critics for its dysfunctional handling of security crises, concessions to authoritarian governments, bloated and corrupt bureaucracies, as well as liberal expenditures on conferences or other initiatives with little tangible impact on international affairs, the UN system and UNESCO in particular nevertheless served as a vital vehicle for binding the two sides of the Cold War to a spirit of internationalism and the pursuit of peace, integrating the USSR into an international architecture set up for these purposes.[988] As the arguments of those Soviet officials who opposed Zhukov's proposal from 1958 to leave UNESCO demonstrate, a withdrawal of the USSR from the international organization would have caused significant damage to the country's reputation abroad and undermined its renewed emphasis on the internationalist mission at the core of the founding ideology of the Soviet project. In the long run, the UN's commitment to international cooperation, of which UNESCO represented a maximalist version, preserved the internationalist ethos of the immediate postwar years through the bipolar and nationalist crises of the second half of the twentieth century, presaging and laying the diplomatic groundwork for the new iterations of internationalism exemplified in discussions of "globalization" and "global governance" that became popular in response to the collapse of communism in the last decade of the twentieth century.

Since the end of the Cold War, the countries that emerged from the communist bloc after 1989 have continued to take an active part in UNESCO. In 2009, the general conference chose

[988] A perfect encapsulation of this widespread derision can be found in the American diplomat and neoconservative pundit John Bolton's preface to a new edition of Hoggart's memoir. See Hoggart, *An Idea and Its Servants*, 1-9.

Irina Bokova, a former official in the Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs who received her education in the Soviet Union, as the first UNESCO director-general from Eastern Europe.[989] In the fall of 2016, the Chinese Ministry of Education gave UNESCO $5.6 million for the relaunching of *The UNESCO Courier*, which the organization had stopped publishing in 2011 after experiencing a budgetary shortfall caused by the US cutting off its annual contribution to the organization. Once the exclusive domain of an American editor, the new *Courier* features Mandarin prominently in its marketing and relies on the funding of one of the only nominally communist regimes to survive the revolutions of the late twentieth century. In a subtle endorsement of China's hostility toward Western notions of freedom of the press, the new motto of *The Courier*, "Many Voices, One World," is identical to the title of the 1980 MacBride Report.[990]

The Russian Federation has also stood out as a prominent UNESCO member state. In 2018, for example, it announced that it would lend the international organization the assistance of one of its ships from the Baltic Fleet for an oceanographic expedition to the Indian Ocean.[991] In contrast, the US has replaced the USSR as one of the most vocal critics of UNESCO. After leaving the organization in 1984, it reentered UNESCO in 2001 only to leave again in 2017 under the presidency of Donald J. Trump because of the organization's recognition of Palestine

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[989] Dan Bilefsky, "Bulgarian Who Is to Lead UNESCO Advocates Political Pluralism," *The New York Times*, September 24, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/24/world/europe/24unesco.html.

[990] "The UNESCO Courier—Like a Phoenix Reborn," UNESCO.org, October 17, 2016, http://www.unesco.org/new/en/media-services/single-view/news/the_unesco_courier_like_a_phoenix_reborn/; and "The UNESCO Courier—Many Voices, One World," UNESCO.org, n.d., https://en.unesco.org/courier.

[991] "Russian Research Vessel to Assist UNESCO in Exploring Indian Ocean," *TASS: Russian News Agency*, January 12, 2018, http://tass.com/science/984798.

as a member state.[992] In an inversion of their past attitudes toward UNESCO, the Russian Federation has therefore spent more time as a member state than the US has since 1991. Perhaps, this new, non-Western face of UNESCO is the real legacy of those silent, mountain-like Soviet observers whom Spender mocked in his novel but who realized better than he did the importance of that conference in Vienna on a spring day in 1956.

[992] The administration of President Barack Obama had already cut off funding to UNESCO. Eli Rosenberg and Carol Morello, "US Withdraws from UNESCO, the UN's Cultural Organization, Citing Anti-Israel Bias," *The Washington Post*, October 12, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2017/10/12/u-s-withdraws-from-unesco-the-u-n-s-cultural-organization-citing-anti-israel-bias/?utm_term=.3e1b6d2b8cb6; and Colum Lynch, "UNESCO Votes to Admit Palestine; US Cuts Off Funding," *The Washington Post*, October 31, 2011, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/unesco-votes-to-admit-palestine-over-us-objections/2011/10/31/gIQAMleYZM_story.html?utm_term=.4c9cae7ee5cc.

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