
This selective annotated bibliography compiles documents that the federal United States government has made available regarding campaigns for decolonization in Sub-Saharan Africa, with the exception of South Africa, from 1955 to 1965. The documents highlighted in this bibliography include communications of the Department of the State, declassified Central Intelligence Agency files, official correspondence and exchanges among U.S. representatives, National Security Council discussions, foreign policy decisions and recommendations.

The documents are presented chronologically under broad geographic scope. Because of the abundance of materials available covering a wide geographic area, this bibliography is not comprehensive but, rather, emphasizes sources that best represent American concerns about the region as a whole during this important geo-political moment.

Intended to aid the researcher of United States Foreign Policy in Africa’s era of independence, this bibliography also serves as a timeline of evolving U.S. policy and analysis of political discourse related to Africa.

Headings:

Africa – History – 20th Century

Africa – Politics and Government

United States – Foreign Policy – Africa
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT DISCOURSE AND DIPLOMACY IN THE ERA OF AFRICAN INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENTS: A SELECTIVE ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT INFORMATION

by
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Introduction

1960, the Year of Independence, was the peak of African decolonization. Though some countries, particularly Portuguese territories, endured a protracted struggle into the 1970s, the climate of optimism that dominated the decade between 1955 and 1965 was not unwarranted. Beginning with Ghana’s severance from Britain in 1957, the continent underwent a drastic and rapid transition to self-governance that created close to 30 newly independent nations by 1965. The process of decolonization already well underway at the 2nd gathering of the All-African Peoples’ Conference in January of 1960, participant nations expected total liberation across sub-Sahara within 3 more years.

Subsequent to its violent participation in and disentanglement from the African slave trade, the United States underwent an extended era of non-involvement during which the government rarely aided or intervened in African nations, beyond allowing Trans-Atlantic trade and commerce. With the achievement of independence in over a dozen countries in Sub-Saharan Africa by November, 1960—the United States was rattled out of its isolationist position and forced to take a stance on the issue of decolonization and to establish economic, military, and political ties with new African nations.

The compiled annotated bibliography that follows explores the evolution of U.S. policy and thought on African relations during the era of independence through a breadth of federal government reports, communications, and research papers. The documents explored herein show a consistently moderate approach that was steeped in contemporary
Cold War concerns. Circumspect and conservative in their advocacy of African self-determination, U.S. officials sought to maintain European alliances while securing new African nations for the Free World. This declaration in a Department of State Bulletin by Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Joseph C. Satterthwaite, captures the prevailing policy in post-World War II African relations:

We support African political aspirations where they are moderate, nonviolent, and constructive and take into account their obligations to and interdependence with the world community. We also support the principle of continued African ties to Western Europe. We see no reason why there should be a conflict between these two concepts.¹

Careful not to antagonize European allies, U.S. officials still saw a great benefit in advocating African self-determination. Displaying sympathetic support to Africans, leaders reasoned, would help establish a level of trust and influence by the U.S. to counter Communism and shape a polity and economy in line with the West’s interests. However, support often depended upon African leaders demonstrating loyalty to the West. Early in the wave of decolonization, U.S. officials equated anything less than enthusiastic procapitalism as a potential Communist threat. This extremism was abandoned as leaders realized such policy alienated potential African allies whose mixed economic systems posed no threat to the Free World. Official U.S. foreign policy remained intact; its application became more flexible as the Kennedy administration eased formerly rigid standards for African liberation.

What a moderate U.S.-African policy looked like in practical terms was minimal involvement. Because of the relative ease of transition to independence among most

European territories, the United States could vocalize support of African self-determination, claiming affinity with its own revolutionary beginnings, without having to prove its position with financial or military backing. Though an explicit American policy on Africa came late into the political transition of the continent, the U.S. did offer financial assistance to development and infrastructure projects and took an interest in aiding in the cultivation and education of a newly democratic citizenry with radio broadcasts and translations of works like the *Federalist Papers*. Nigeria, favored for its anti-communist conservative leadership, and the Congo whose stability was desirable to deter Communist opportunism, were the primary beneficiaries of American aid.

The principal colonial powers that had carved up the continent in the late 19th century “Scramble for Africa” and by 1955 still claimed holdings were Portugal, France, Belgium, Spain, and Italy. The preparedness and strategies of response for the nationalist momentum in their territories varied among the European colonizers. Britain and France adopted a realistic approach that did not resist the widespread anti-colonial spirit but attempted to acclimate it into amicable relations in post-independence. Portugal was the most repressive of the colonial managers and the least receptive to indigenous African demands for freedom and independence in Lusophone countries, Angola and Mozambique among them. West Africa included a high concentration of small French-dominated territories, Guinea and Mali among the most scrutinized in Federal hearings and reports, along with Britain’s Ghana, who were allied around more militant politics and a Marxist philosophy that U.S. officials worried could slip into the Communists’ grip.

The predominant theme in the documents spanning over ten years is how to maintain a steadily moderate position for the security of the Free World during the Cold
War. Yet other themes also emerge in the government documents compiled in this bibliography.

**No Precedent for Policy**

Commonly noted in the early years of examining the U.S.-African relationship is the lack of a historical policy or rapport with which to apply to the current situation of decolonization. Ignorance about the region necessitated testimony and translation of sources for a context and perspective that could inform sound policy decisions. The U.S. government demonstrated its commitment to a new policy of involvement when it founded the Bureau of African Affairs in 1958 and heightened interest among U.S. representatives accompanied Africa’s rise in international significance. Still, because of the delicate balance of maintaining old alliances while forging new, the U.S. was reluctant to create bold policy statements, which frustrated diplomats and officials who were looking for a cogent and resolute plan of action in Africa.

**Communism**

Cold War logic permeated popular and political discourse in this era. In their communications about Africa, U.S. officials exemplified this obsession with anti-Communism. As evidenced in the alarmed tone of many documents, friendliness to African liberation movements was significantly motivated by the effort to thwart Communist take over of Africa. Investigations into and examination of the political orientation of new leaders, analysis of information dissemination and propaganda in competition with the bloc countries, and brainstorming strategies for achieving Western supremacy over Communism in the continent were recurrent and overriding concerns in the government publications. Debates about whether African nationalism or forms of
socialism dangerously resembled Communism or whether nations undergoing rapid change would be more vulnerable to infiltration were common in the documents. For many African politicians who asserted a neutralist stance, the unrelenting emphasis on a Communist threat in broadcasts, speeches, and correspondence with their nations was unnecessary and unappealing and demonstrated the lack of understanding that the U.S. had for its colonial experiences, nationalist aspirations, and fears of neocolonialism.

**Self-determination**

The doctrine of self-determination was in favor among U.S. politicians whose interest in the policy was heightened with the advent of post-World War II development of the United Nations. Throughout the documents the phrase is championed as an American ideal embodied in the history and polity of the United States, and for Africans, when they are ready, a natural right with concomitant responsibilities. It was often noted that denial of African demands for sovereignty would be antithetical to America’s founding principles. However, some leaders distinguished self-determination from full independence, and argued that their support of African self-rule need not undermine relations and interests with Europe. Furthermore, U.S. policy preferred conservative leaders who made anti-Communism their priority, which was an unrealistic expectation among nations whose more pressing concerns were racism and colonialism.

**Pan-Africanism**

The movement to unite native Africans and those in the diaspora into a global community grew tremendously in the postwar years and peaked in the age of African independence. Principle leaders such as Ghana’s Kwame Nkrumah inspired a political and cultural consciousness that refuted colonialism and white supremacy. U.S. officials
were not consistent in how they interpreted or assessed pan-Africanism throughout the
documents. Some conflated its radicalism with Communism, others viewed its
unification of the continent positively as incompatible with the external dominance of the
Soviets, and still others found it mystifying or intriguing.

**Domestic Race Relations**

As they attempted build alliances with leaders in post-independent Africa and
help determine the direction of their political orientation, U.S. officials were aware that
the legitimacy and authority of American support were jeopardized by apparent
contradictions between its rhetoric abroad and its reality at home. Discussed in several of
these documents is the issue of racial discrimination and tension in the United States and
how to improve its image among Africans exposed to Soviet propaganda that highlighted
American racism. The surge in civil rights organizing in the United States and its global
visibility gave U.S. leaders reason to adapt their attitudes and advocate integration as a
geopolitical necessity. The U.S. administration had a global stake in integration—or at
least in presenting a public image that condemned segregation and trumpeted racial
progress through promoting the success of prominent African-Americans in Africa.

**Information Dissemination**

Many of the documents include discussions about information published and
distributed in African nations. There is a focus on providing tools for political education
and training as well as combating Soviet propaganda and creating broadcasts and
pamphlets that elicit emotional and visceral responses against Communism and for the
Free World.

**Representations of Africa**
Not only revealing for their description of events, policies, and political viewpoints, the documents explored also illuminate the idea of Africa in the public imagination. Language that characterizes the continent and its people as primitive, backward, child-like, exotic, emotional, provides insight into popular representations and accepted notions of Western difference—and superiority. These documents both relied on and reproduced stereotypes and distortions of “Darkest Africa” and promoted the myth of cultural evolutionism. These paradigms of difference justified a paternalistic model of assistance that presumed aid would lift Africa out of its supposedly prehistoric and underdeveloped state into modern civilization.

**Modernization**

For U.S. officials, aiding and abetting economic progress in Africa was a key component in securing the region for the safety of the Free World and combating the allure of Communism. The twin efforts of providing education in order to raise African hopes and desires for material wealth and offering financial backing of projects to enhance development were viewed as important political strategies to bring new nations into the Western fold. Couched within this rhetoric about modernization was the tendency to attribute and equate the notion of progress to external European and American sources and promote a paternalist dynamic that viewed Africa as a child whose growth and maturation depended on the beneficent West. One scholar argues that, in fact, European powers deliberately maneuvered the ease of transition to independence in Africa as a symbolic change that would preserve the West’s political and economic interests and control in its territories:

> Early independence was not granted out of some altruistic desire to allow majorities to be self-governing. The goal was to facilitate
independence in order to modernize and prolong unequal relationships. Europe wanted to avoid protracted armed struggles that would be costly and that could be expected to harden anti-imperialist demands and possibly shepherd to power individuals and organizations resistant to neocolonial manipulation and penetration.²

Congo Crisis

While not a focus of this bibliography, the U.S. involvement in the Congo through the United Nations was thoroughly documented and the topic comprises a sizeable portion of the available publications from this era. The instability and violence that followed the secession of the wealthy mining district, Katanga, from the Congo, and widespread suspicion of U.S. responsibility into the death of the widely popular Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba, required policy that would regain the trust of African nations and prompted the Kennedy administration to be more explicit in its support of African unification and firm in its repudiation of Katanga’s rebellion.

Methodology

Conducting a preliminary search for relevant resources required having sufficient background information about African decolonization and U.S. foreign policy to be able to narrow down a reasonable geographic scope and time period. After consulting secondary sources and browsing the principal sources to assess the available materials, I determined that the period of 1955-1965 would be a fruitful and realistic period to examine closely. My initial expectation was that I would select individual countries, principally in West Africa, to focus on in my bibliography. However, I found that with the sheer number of countries involved in this amazing upheaval from colonial domination to liberation, they were often lumped together in official policy and discourse.

While it is an oversimplification to treat Africa as a single or uniform region, because these documents concern the decolonization campaign that swept across the majority continent, and reflect the U.S. perspective at that time, “Africa” remains a salient category for scrutiny of not only the events as they unfolded there, but also of the Western outlook on cultural and political difference in the world. Special attention was paid to particular countries but in general, the trend of decolonization was viewed in terms of the continent as a whole.

Because of the wealth of information available about African political changes in this decade, this bibliography is necessarily selective rather than comprehensive. One factor in making the bibliography a useful rather than overwhelming tool was the elimination of redundancy evident in many documents. My selections were based on the
criteria of relevance. I made an effort to choose documents for their ability to represent overriding themes and concerns in this era or if they were illustrative of interesting exceptions. In another example of deselecting, voluminous materials on the Congo could not be included in full, and the materials I incorporated emphasize the U.S. position on independence rather than operations or interventions during the political crisis. Additionally omitted were documents whose content was limited to South Africa because of the overabundance of information, complexity of the crisis, and long duration of U.S. involvement.

My search began with the series publication, *Foreign Relations of the United States*, which proved the most generous resource for this bibliography. Compiling significant foreign policy decisions and dialogues, including private papers and correspondence as well as official Departments of State and Defense and National Security Council documents, *Foreign Relations*, proved a useful introduction to all of the themes that would appear in additional sources. In a useful volume published by the Library of Congress, *The United States and Africa: 1785-1975*, I tracked down some other resources, predominantly hearings and publications prepared for the U.S. government that provide background information about Africa. Searching the *Declassified Documents Reference System* unearthed several Central Intelligence Agency memoranda and other Top Secret communiqués. *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents* provided me with speeches and correspondence, and the U.S. Superintendent of Documents Monthly Catalog led me to an array of Subcommittee hearings. The electronic database, *Digital National Security Archive*, turned up a small number of
additional pertinent papers and messages. Keyword searches for “Africa” and “independence” in LexisNexis Congressional yielded no documents.

On a final note, referring to this decade as “the era of independence” can be useful from a Western standpoint, but misleading as it defines African periodization on Europe’s terms and based on the West’s relationship with its territories. While national leaders felt united in the cause of Pan-African liberation, it is my hope that the bibliography attends to the complexity of not only the region, but of U.S. thought and language that has created an “Africa” in the popular imagination through diplomatic policies and political discourse.

The documents are presented chronologically under broad geographic scope. Because of the abundance of materials available covering a wide geographic area, this bibliography is not comprehensive but, rather, emphasizes sources that best represent American concerns about the region as a whole during this important geo-political moment.
Annotated Bibliography

In Chronological Order from Oldest to Most Recent

April 20, 1955


In this correspondence, the United States position on African moves towards self-governance is outlined. Emphasized herein is the necessity of finding a careful balance in establishing a rapport with Africans as they transition into independence, “but without alienating our Allies” (7).

July 28, 1955


This document warns against premature independence in African states and considers the right of colonial territories to self-determination. Likening African nations to a “child” this letter poses the questions, “Is self-determination a right that is axiomatic, automatic, and divinely bestowed? Or is it a right that one must earn? Does a child have an ‘inalienable right’ to self-determination” (9)? The implication of this deliberation is that African territories are ill-prepared to take on the responsibility of self-governance and “some form of foreign protection” will be required for an indefinite period. The letter’s author defends Africa’s continued dependency upon Europe, “It would be strange to call such protection a ‘denial of inalienable rights of man’” (10).
August 12, 1955


The purpose of this report is to evaluate present United States Policy towards Africa South of the Sahara and to recommend tactics for future engagement with impending independence struggles. This communication anticipates the “acute dilemma of colonialism” in Africa “within the next ten years” and encourages the development of an “independent policy” in preparation of mounting tensions between European powers and African territories (13). Elaborating on the American stake in the continent, economically, militarily, politically, and culturally, the document summarizes U.S. interest as “real but limited,” yet expects its growth. The memorandum foresees the formation of nationalist consciousness among African native population, and as a corollary, Communist activity aiming to exploit the “emotional, irresponsible, exaggerated, and xenophobic” tendencies of nationalism (18). Setting as a goal of U.S. policy in Africa that the development of “the Continent be in a manner friendly to United States,” the author proposes several diplomatic, foreign aid, educational, and other strategies toward policy independent of the U.K., France, Belgium, and Portugal (19).

December 28, 1955


In response to the above report on U.S. policy in Sub-Saharan Africa, this memorandum calls for the urgent development of an informed and realistic policy. The letter articulates
the need for the U.S. to defend African self-determination as a means to prevent African leaders to seek Communist support. The threat of Soviet propaganda in building Communist sympathies is weighed, and is considered significant enough to require U.S. support of independence campaigns, lest the USSR fortify its claim that it is “the champion of democracy and freedom” (26). The paper advises the U.S. proactively spur economic development in Africa in order to preserve friendly relations with colonial powers and guide the future of the continent in line with the interests of the West: “an African policy devoted to raising living standards, education, economic development can lead to political inter-cooperation even among European colonial powers themselves” (28).

February, 15, 1956


This report explores possible obstacles to peaceful transition to independence in Africa, and focuses primarily on racial tensions in colonized territories. The document asserts that “white settlerism” poses most problems towards African self-governance in East and Central Africa, whereas West Africa is rapidly moving towards decolonization without resistance from white settlers. Independence in this region is predicted to inflame racial tensions in other African territories. The document addresses the dissonance between U.S. support of African independence and its own system of racial segregation and exclusion on American soil. The report recommends that the U.S. demonstrate inclusiveness and integration between whites and African Americans in order to reassure Africans of an American commitment to independence.
March 23, 1957


The discussion documented herein assesses the Communist presence in Africa, presuming a decade of turmoil on the continent as the Free World struggles to retain influence there. Expressed in the conversation was the hope “that in some cases these [African] countries would not want to become independent and would retain their relationships with the mother countries,” in order to avoid Communist takeover in the aftermath of decolonization (55).

August 23, 1957


In this “Statement of U.S. Policy toward Africa South of the Sahara” American strategic, economic, political, and social interests are outlined and political problems analyzed for the development of future policy. The paper remains consistent with previous declarations in support of self-determination, while stressing the importance of avoiding premature independence and Communist infiltration and the need to preserve “mutually-beneficial political and economic relationships between the emerging African peoples and the peoples of Western Europe” (78). The paper suggests American intervention in education, particularly in the work of “detribalization.” Characterizing the native population as “extremely primitive in their social outlooks,” one key policy guideline
issued is that Western labor and education institutions supplant tribes for “the African looking for a new source of allegiance” (84).

May 1, 1958


This address weighs the U.S. reaction and position on the recent Pan-African Conference held at Accra in April 1958. Holmes voices an overall favorable response to the call among Africans for their autonomy with some caveats about the pace and political development of the transition to independence. Referring to a statement that Secretary Dulles made to Prime Minister Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, the document defines the U.S. view that “the transition from current, progressively liberal colonialism to self-government and eventual self-determination should be completed in an orderly manner.” The speed of the shift, it was reasoned, should be dependent upon the ability of citizens “to assume and discharge the responsibilities of government” (1077). Dulles echoes a common theme among American diplomats that full independence and self-governance would be premature. Preferable would be a slow, deliberate training of administrators, establishing of economic stability, infrastructural and institutional development and societal and cultural modernization. Sovereignty is for those who are prepared to rule, U.S. politicians claimed, and conveniently deemed themselves the objective judges of which territories possessed that capacity. The speech urges, “moderate African leaders who recognize the benefit to their own people of following the evolutionary rather than the revolutionary approach to social, political, and economic progress” (1078). Holmes expresses preparedness on the part of the U.S. to work with other nations toward Africa’s
economic and social development and stresses that “the free world” take advantage of
Africa’s “friendly” relationship with the West to frustrate Communist attempts at
domination in the region (1082).

January 29, 1959

“Memorandum from the Representative at the Trusteeship Council to the
Representative at the United Nations,” pp. 40-42. In Foreign Relations of the United

Reasserting U.S. interest in Africa primarily as securing post-independence leadership
that aligns with the Free World, this paper insists that the U.S. must “build goodwill
among those who will be leading the independent Africa of tomorrow” (42). The
document outlines three specific recommendations in order to achieve a favorable
position in a continent moving towards decolonization.

March 5, 1959 and July 21, 1959

U.S. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Briefing on Africa: Hearings before the
Subcommittee on Africa. 86th Cong., 1st Sess. Washington; Government Printing
Office, 1959.

Topics related to African independence covered in this document include Communism,
Islamic, and Pan-African influences in the region. The complexity of the African
continent, according to Satterthwaite, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs,
poses a challenge to the U.S. in developing “a policy which can be clear cut” (9).
Countries discussed in detail are concentrated in West and Central Africa. Satterthwaite
acknowledges a potential for Communism in West Africa, but tells the subcommittee that
they might expect a distinctively African form of government that resembles neither the
West nor the Communist bloc. “I don’t think,” he explains, “we should be too
discouraged if these states don’t always follow the Western system. It doesn’t necessarily mean that they will be following the Soviet system, either” (19).

April 16, 1959


In these “First Tripartite Talks on Africa,” the discussants reiterate the desire to ease African transition to independence in a way that countries “remain politically stable and Western-oriented” (46). The conversation considers the wave of Pan-African conferences, Communist foothold in the region, and European preparedness to provide monetary and military assistance in order to maintain normalcy and a Western affinity.

May 25, 1959


This document summarizes and characterizes recent political developments in West Africa, and outlines U.S. policy. Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, Joseph Satterthwaite defends a U.S. policy that backs independence when its political orientation aligns with the West. As noted in the introduction to this bibliography, Satterthwaite articulates the U.S. position that seeks to guide post-independence Africa into alliance with the West:

We support African political aspirations where they are moderate, nonviolent, and constructive and take into account their obligations to and interdependence with the world community. We also support the principle of continued African ties to Western Europe. We see no reason why there should be a conflict between these two concepts (749).

June 9, 1959
Senator John F. Kennedy held a Subcommittee on African Affairs meeting that is documented herein. Senator Kennedy hears the account of a month-long trip that the Council on Foreign Relations made to Africa and gets updates on the various regions and their political orientation and status of relations with European colonizers. Senator Kennedy shows his alliance with the West African cause of self-determination when he poses the question on the topic of Guinean efforts for independence, “What sorts of things do you think we beneficially could do now even at the risk of antagonizing de Gaulle” (576)? One committee member declares an American disadvantage of being behind in its development of a clear policy in Africa, “I think we have lost a great deal,” he explained, “not having had some mobility of action when [French withdraw of administrators, arms, and finances in Guinea] first took place. The upshot has been that the Communists moved in hammer and tongs” (577). Also on display in this document are Orientalist representations of Africa and its people. Reference to Kipling and his characterization of aborigines in the diminutive, cartoonish language of “Fuzzy Wuzzies,” awe at Sekou Toure, “one of the few Africans” with the “capacity to make a decision and to carry it out,” and descriptions of “improvident” and “primitive” black Africa pepper the pages (588, 572). The council does make a distinction between Marxist and socialist leanings among the European educated-elite in Africa and their propensity to fall under Communist influence.

June 16, 1959

This document focuses on West Africa, and the “probable orientation of the independent states” there. Interestingly, the report critiques the Sino-Soviet Bloc for presenting their policy in West Africa as one of a “disinterested supporter of West African independence against the ‘imperialist’ powers,” even though American officials have similarly outlined their own goal to be viewed among Africans as “disinterested supporters” of self-determination against the Communist threat.

August 21, 1959


In this speech, Sattherthwaite recalls the major events in what a contemporary New York Times piece termed an “agonizing upheaval” towards independence and modernization, “after” the Times claims “countless centuries of primitiveness, subjection and isolation from the civilized world” (1084). Dividing the continent into three significant areas; one North, another West, and lumped together as the final category, East, Central and South Africa. Sattherthwaite then evaluates each of the “three Africas” in relation to its political and economic development and devotes considerable time to U.S. interests, objectives, and assistance in Africa. He expresses the desire that the continent design its post-independence government “in a manner consistent with free-world ideals” (1092). Attention is given to the discrepancy between U.S. official policy against racial discrimination and contemporary “domestic problems in the field of racial relations,” warranting U.S. reticence on the issue in Africa lest it draw attention to its contradictions.
September 3, 1959


This declassified top secret document is an account of a conversation between President Eisenhower and General de Gaulle of France on the topic of Africa. The leaders share concern over Communists taking advantage of African nations in transition and lament the direction toward the Bloc in which Guinea seemed to be going. A portion of their discussion that focuses Guinea’s leader Sekou Toure remains classified in the document. President Eisenhower raised the case of the Philippines as an example of possible challenges in emergent African nations, putting forth that “even after 40 years of U.S. help they were still unable to build the schools or operate the country effectively” (4). President Eisenhower raises concerns about premature independence and unrealistic expectations for the speed of economic growth given the level of technology, skill, and demand in developing nations. Eisenhower explains “Many of these peoples were attempting to make the leap from savagery to the degree of civilization of a country like France in perhaps ten years” (6). The leaders discuss the possible advantages of an international lending agency to offer assistance to African nations in order to compete collectively as the Free World against Soviet assistance to newly independent nations.

October 20, 1959


Primarily concerned with developments and prospects for independence in East and Central Africa, this report examines countries individually and then discusses the
situation and outlook broadly for decolonization. The view that the native inhabitants are ill-equipped to self-govern is supported with popularly held stereotypes of Africa, “Tribal loyalties and jealousies continue play a major political role,” and “Africans of this area…are less advanced culturally” (62). The report concludes that “disunity and backwardness” will be significant obstacles to successfully achieving a stable post-independence administration in East and Central Africa (66).


Testimony in this hearing assesses the need for economic assistance in Sub-Saharan Africa and identifies which areas are most critical for the U.S. to support and fund. The document also explores how to improve the image and reputation of the U.S. in Africa, and compete with Communism. Officials advocate for training and education in vocational skills, public health information, and preparation of government personnel. According to statements, problems should be tackled on a regional basis, so as to not stir tensions or competition for aid by giving more attention to one country over another.

One committee member expresses worry over the U.S. focus on development and aid over ideology, warning members that

We can make people fatter and give them all kinds of libraries, better living conditions, and industrial production, but if we haven’t some kind of a challenge or cause that appeals to their emotions so they commit themselves to it, we will not win. In the end the Communists will outwork and out sacrifice us and out suffer and prevail (22).

The document details the extent and progress of foreign aid in several countries, and considers African perceptions of Americans in these various states. As a pro-Western,
anti-Communist state, great potential is seen in Nigeria as being “a very good influence on its neighbors and Africa as a whole” (34). In contrast, concern is voiced over the popularity of more radical leaders and the momentum of the Communist party in publicizing its cause to youth in West Africa. “Because the French has always opposed” Communist material, “it is a kind of act of anti-colonialism to read that literature” (96). Among many Africans, America is viewed as “a lot of talk,” whereas they can readily access “a good education” in bloc countries like Russia or Czechoslovakia (97). This volume contains 2 maps of Africa, memoranda, and an appendix by the Africa League entitled “A New Policy Toward Africa,” which recommends that the U.S. “help Africans lay the basis for the kind of social and economic system in which democracy might eventually take root” (132).

April 9, 1960


U.S. policy towards West Africa is examined at length in this report, which restates the American goal of preserving the Free World orientation of the region. At the time of this report’s publication, four West African nations had achieved independence and Togo, Nigeria, and Mali were moving in the same direction. The paper proposes control of sea and air communications, and aims to discourage an arms race in Africa. Trade, investment, and economic development are seen as essential to maintaining African and Free World relations.

May 2 1960
In this address, Satterthwaite sets U.S. advocacy of self-determination in African within a historic tradition and American spirit of independence rooted in its own struggles for freedom from Britain during the American Revolution. He provides examples of official policy and, especially, private missionary and philanthropic pursuits on the continent. Conveying the middle ground policy of the U.S., Satterthwaite complains of the popular view that the U.S. is guilty of “on the one hand interference, on the other irresponsible indifference” (687). Maintaining the delicate balance between supporter of both African and European parties, Satterthwaite describes the “proper role…of a friend contributing to orderly transition while hoping that new, strong, and voluntary ties will be established between the new countries and the former administering states” (688). Satterthwaite contends that despite its cautious policy, examples abound of American involvement through Foreign Service establishments, embassies, educational, development, and technical assistance. Warning against “aimless” assistance, the Secretary outlines the U.S. “objective…to strengthen the economies of underdeveloped states and enrich the lives of their people so that democracy will be satisfying and meaningful to them” (691). This speech defends the widespread African doctrine of neutralism, which had been under attack as soft or naïve regarding Communism. The speech concludes optimistically about working cooperatively in the United Nations to effectively meet the needs of new states.

December 26, 1960

Authored by Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, this provides a nice, clear overview of recent developments and sentiments in anticolonial Africa and a record of US presence and opinion to date. Laying bare the logic of Western support for African independence, Penfield articulates a pro-independence policy and gives its reasoning:

> It is to be hoped that the developed countries will rapidly give effect to their sincere desire to see the new African nationalism succeed both politically and economically. It is to their interest that the citizens of these countries rapidly be enabled to shoulder the responsibility and share the benefits of independence and contribute to the strength of the free world (953).

The author expresses disbelief that US foreign aid could be viewed with suspicion among African countries wary of neocolonialism. Author sees importance of twin revolutions in industry, technology, and economic stability, along with political sovereignty. Adopting the language of the Declaration of Independence and quoting Lincoln’s Gettysburg address, the report concludes triumphantly that post-independent Africa is following in the footsteps of the U.S. and its doctrines of “individual liberty and equality” (958).

December 26, 1960


Authored by the Geographer of the Department of State, G. Etzel Pearcy, this document aims to describe the revised map of Africa as new political entities emerge in the era of transition to independence. The piece discusses the proliferation of African states and details their former and current names and dates of independence. A map in this
publication delineates “Increasing Areas of Independence” before 1950, between 1950-1959, and 1960-1961. A discussion of regional differences, topography, and African nomenclature follows. The report concludes that the surge of seventeen new African states between 1960-1961 is unprecedented. Perhaps unintentionally strengthening popular stereotypes of Africa before European colonization, Pearcy proclaims “It is becoming evident that to keep in step with the fast-moving pace of events in the field of international relations one cannot dismiss Africa as a backward area of grass huts and desert tents” (967).

January 10, 1961


This document outlines the contemporary political crisis in newly independent Congo. Its assessment of the situation and the country’s capacity for civic progress is cynical and informed by popular stereotypes of the continent. The report summarizes “There is no indication that the Congo is developing a national leader, a national party, or a national consciousness,” and characterizes “the Congolese people” as “largely illiterate and primitive” (3-4). While deemed civically unevolved for its lack of “national consciousness,” the Congolese are also criticized for a Pan-African “radical nationalist spirit” that is shared among Ghanaians, Guineans, and people of the United Arab Republic (UAR). The report blames political instability and mounting violence on the premature process of decolonization, stating “The country was grossly unprepared for independence” (4). A recurring theme in this document is the potential for Soviet exploitation of unrest in the Congo.
January 26, 1961


This document offers an account of a conversation among upwards of twenty participants among United States representatives and the Ambassador of Morocco. The discussion identifies Patrice Lumumba as a danger, whose “rabble-rousing tactics” could push the Congolese parliament towards a radical, anti-U.S. policy (27). The conversation does acknowledge, however, the African view that the U.S. unfairly backed Kasavubu while “Lumumba represented the only legitimate government” (26). Discussants condemn African naivety towards Communism and emphasize the “minimum goal” of the U.S. is to keep “the Cold War out’ of the Congo (28).

February 1, 1961


In this communiqué, Secretary Rusk evaluates United States policy on the Congo and recommends new goals and future strategies to secure American interests in the region as it transitions into a post-independence government. Rusk urges that the U.S. aims to neutralize radicalism and quell unrest among balkanizing factions in the country, both of which in his view, makes the Congo vulnerable to Communist influence. The document stresses the importance of securing “a middle-of-the-road” government in the Congo. Advocating a policy of tolerance toward Patrice Lumumba in the Congolese government, Rusk warns against a Lumumba takeover in leadership, asserting that the more moderate Ileo would be a more favorable prime minister for U.S. interests and make the Congo less
susceptible to Soviet infiltration. Rusk sees the United Nations as having an integral role in a successful shift in Congolese post-independence governance and stability. This report is pessimistic about the preparedness of self-sovereignty among the Congolese. Rusk envisioned a United Nations transitional administration in the Congo, led by “a strong, reliable, reasonable African,” who can foster the “conditions in the Congo which would permit the Congolese to govern themselves” (45).

February 17, 1961


This document evaluates prospects of a Communist influence in the Congo after the assassination of Lumumba. The memorandum urges against reactionary strategies against the Communist currents in the Congo for fear it could alienate the populace and foment anti-U.S. sentiment. In language typical of popular notions of African underdevelopment and backwardness, the file concludes with the claim that “Africa is much more emotional and unsophisticated than Europe and Asia” and maintains that this supposedly African impulsiveness demands that the U.S. fortify moderate presence and intervention rather than resist Communist presence (69).

April 11, 1961


In this brief a prognosis of decolonization is offered for the remaining British and Belgian territories in Africa. The report criticizes the intransigence of Salazar in light of mounting African independence movements in Portuguese regions, and foresees violent
struggle so long as Salazar remains unwilling to negotiate even limited independence in Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea. While this document casts African independence as inevitable, it also predicts continued economic dependence and foreign political aid. The report describes tribal rivalries, inexperienced administrators, and a fledgling economic system as obstacles to “growth of effective and stable governments” in independent Africa (285). In the predicament of unstable and novice African governance, this report argues, newly independent nations will be open to assistance from Communist USSR and the U.S. must be prepared for attempts by the Bloc to exploit dependent areas in Africa to the detriment of the West.

May 13, 1961


This memorandum highlights the pressing concern of mitigating the “painful process of disengagement from colonialism” and ensuring a collective effort in the West to “fend off Communist efforts to trap areas in Africa” that would be most vulnerable to its influences (291). The document points to Mali and the Horn of Africa region (Sudan, Somalia, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Djibouti) as those nations most at risk for Soviet opportunism and sees greatest potential for anti-Communist alliance in Africa in Tunisia, Nigeria and Cote D’Ivoire.

May 31, 1961

The issues of independence movements in Africa and suppression of Communist-inspired insurgency were the focus of this discussion between President Kennedy and General de Gaulle of France. President Kennedy raised concerns about independence movements led astray towards Communism in Ghana, Guinea, and Angola. De Gaulle voiced reservations about United Nations intervention and placed blame on the U.N. for increasing instability and violence in the Congo.

**June 20, 1961**


In this transmission, Secretary Rusk delineates objectives and priorities for the U.S. in the Congo. The telegram promotes the creation of a moderate government that avoids Lumumba-sympathizing leadership. Rusk expresses this goal of conditional independence erstwhile emphasizing the need to build public relations and garner support among “Afro-Asians” for an American policy “to create a viable independent nation” (149).

**July 24, 1961**


This document is concerned with popular perceptions of American foreign policy in Africa, among Africans. Critical of its own defensive involvement in Africa, it argues for a more positive policy of American aid to make the link between political democracy and economic development in the Western paradigm compelling. The paper emphasizes the “need to demonstrate to Africans that the United States is truly a disinterested friend and
that we genuinely and fully support their aspirations to run their own affairs” (295). Yet at the same time, the article concludes that presenting a public face of neutrality can help secure an independent Africa that is aligned with the West, and therefore stave off Communist elements of governance.

**August 31, 1961**


Exploring and evaluating the relationships among independent African nations and their susceptibility to external ideologies, this document scrutinizes pan-African consciousness and concludes that though “a mystical concept” it is at risk of “gain[ing] support” (300). The predicted impact of Pan-Africanism across the sub-Sahara is a rise in militancy and anti-colonialism that will shift moderate African leaders to radicalize and disentangle from European and Western assistance as a move against neo-colonialism.

**September 25, 1961**


This brief account of a visit that Michigan Governor Mennen Williams made to Africa suggests that the cause for strife in the transition to independence in the Congo was “nationalism gone wild” and declares the need for models of stable self-government in Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and Nyasaland (Malawi). Belk also warns of Communist presence in Basutoland (Lesotho) and Malagasy Republic (Madagascar). A U.S.-led program of education is advocated in order to “inculcate a desire for a better standard of living.” The creation of interest in material wealth and progress can be interpreted as a move that
would help align Africa with the Western system of economic development and reduce the allure of Communism (303).

October 22-26, 1961


The papers included in this publication were prepared for UNESCO by specialists in a variety of topics and regions in Africa. Overall, the tone in the essays is sympathetic to the desire among Africans for self-determination and of African nationalism as a move towards cultural and political unity across the continent. The articles encourage Western observers to not hold the formation of incipient states to the same standards as British or United States democracy, arguing that one-party rule may be a necessary stage towards stability and is not incompatible with democracy. The authors stress that the polity and economy in newly independent Africa will be comprised of modern and traditional, European and African elements and may adopt a form of socialism that may be ideologically dissimilar and politically unconnected from Communism. The themes explored in depth in the articles include education, science, art, music, and the status of women. One article subverts the once widespread negative misconception of Africa as the “Dark Continent” by drawing attention to the dearth of knowledge and scholarship about its history and diversity: “The darkest thing about Africa remains our ignorance of it” (111). Also examined is the development of news media in post-independent Africa. Describing the financial and technical obstacles and limitations to the creation of indigenous-based print, radio, television sources, the writer notes the use of film as a
didactic and consciousness-raising tool for political change: “The role of the cinema is to be not only documentary and educational but also ‘revolutionary,’” (201).

October 23, 1961


This correspondence recommends that U.S. officials help stimulate a desire among Africans to restrain arms build-up in the continent. Claiming that an interest in weapons accumulation and military power “as a symbol of…newly won independence” poses a threat to security in Africa, this paper calls upon the U.S., with the cooperation of France and the U.K., in educating African leaders on arms control (305).

November 16, 1961


The aim of this document is to evaluate current political conditions in Ghana and future “prospects for political stability and foreign policy orientation” (1). The focus of this report is on Kwame Nkrumah and his relationship with the Bloc. Relations between Nkrumah and the West are described as tenuous, and could be compromised if the West is disinclined to finance the Volta River project. Nkrumah is characterized as an arrogant leader who is manipulating the West’s fears of Communist influence to maintain Western aid in education and technical assistance in the country while developing political and economic ties with the Bloc. The document predicts “severe strains” in the relationship between the U.S. and Ghana due to Nkrumah’s tendency to interfere “in the affairs of
other African states,” his “unpredictable behavior,” and “willingness to support the Communist Bloc” (19).

January 5, 1962


This report documents a discussion of political developments in newly independent Mali, Guinea, and Ghana. As young countries, the concern was voiced, “they were feeling their way into the world’ and could be ensnared into Communist machinations “unwittingly” (309). Included in this account is a brief analysis of the political status of each nation. Foreign aid and the Peace Corps programs are highlighted as opportunities to demonstrate U.S. goodwill and securing U.S. presence in Africa. Pan-Africanism is looked upon favorably as an antidote to ties with the Communist East.

January 18, 1962


In this statement Rusk reasserts U.S. support of Congolese independence and reviews United Nations operations in the country acting in alleged accordance with that goal of self-governance. This document includes a chronology of political events in the Congo and the stance that the U.S. took at each point. Given the turmoil, violence, and instability that ensued after the ousting and murder of Patrice Lumumba, Rusk predicts long-term “administrative, economic, and social” assistance in the Congo.

February 7, 1962
Consisting of several statements from Edward Murrow, director of the U.S. Information Agency, this document focuses on the status of information, media, and education in Africa, with special attention to how U.S. dissemination fares in competition with Communist efforts in Africa. The content includes updates on Communist and American controlled radio broadcasts, the teaching of English, and the accessibility of key publications in French. The urgent need for radio, libraries, pamphlets and inexpensive reading materials are emphasized as tools that can help to shape incipient states in a manner friendly to the U.S. The demand for copies of the Federalist Papers in Nigeria is celebrated. Murrow expresses a commitment of the U.S.I.A. “to make U.S. policy everywhere intelligible and, wherever possible, palatable” (9). According to the report, forty titles have been chosen for publication in French, among the ten listed here are, *The Key to Economic Progress* by Dimitrios Kousoulas, *Profiles in Courage* by John F. Kennedy, *Famous American Negroes* by Langston Hughes, and *A Brief History of the United States* by Frank Escher (16). In order to compete with Communism, a suggestion that such books are distributed for free “to kids throughout the various countries...and then let them sell them exactly the same way the Russians are doing it” (16). The view that State Department architecture in Africa should reflect U.S. values and culture, rather than the native African aesthetic or style is asserted. African Americans are identified as “one of the greatest assets” as ambassadors to Africa, “presenting the advantages that they have had” in the U.S. (20). A documentary film chronicling the progress of Blacks
in the U.S. and the use of African-American celebrities to promote a positive image of
the U.S. are mentioned.

**February 12, 1962**

“Paper Prepared in the Office of West Coast and Malian Affairs,” pp. 373-374. In

This paper identifies Ghana as “one of the foremost practitioners of subversion of Africa”
for its efforts to spread nationalism across the continent, primarily in Togo and the
Congo. Captured in this document are American fears of radicalization of African
nations as they gain independence from their European colonizers, making them more
receptive to the USSR.

**July 3, 1962**

U.S. Department of Commerce. *Nigeria in the Struggle for Independence*. Joint
Microprint, 1963.

This document is an English translation of a book of the above title published in Moscow
in 1961 by L.N. Pribytovskiy detailing and interpreting the nation’s geography, history,
economy, the position of its working class, and the European colonial presence. The
content is both informative in its own right, and illuminating for its insight into the Soviet
or Communist perspective of Africa and decolonization. “British imperialist colonial
policy,” Pribytovskiy rails against the West, “has always been based on the principle of
plundering the colonies to whose peoples it has brought poverty and hunger” (132).

**July 6, 1962**

U.S. Department of State. *Planning Group Meeting, July 10, 1962* with attachment,
This document is a paper about growing racial tensions in Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Malawi, and South Africa that was disseminated among Defense Department members and individuals in the CIA for an upcoming meeting. The report, entitled “The White Redoubt,” gives a brief history of the demographics in each country and the roots of the present conflict, and offers possible courses of action and recommendations for the U.S. government, including “an early visit to Africa by President Kennedy” in anticipation of Khrushchev touring West Africa. Having a weakened position in the United Nations because of admittance of many African and Asian countries necessitates a course of action that is sympathetic to this new membership and true to America’s “historic political principles” for “the right of self-determination” (27). The Kennedy administration expresses worry that treaties with Portugal may harm its reputation among African nations as an advocate for self-determination.

December 3, 1962


This document includes testimony from a Ghanaian exile, a sociologist named Kofi A. Busia, who furnishes the U.S. government with materials and evidence to accuse Ghana’s Kwame Nkrumah of pro-Communist inclinations. The bulk of this document is comprised of appendices with articles, photographs, and memos that support Busia’s accusation that “Accra has become the centre of Soviet activities on the African continent” and that U.S. aid to support development and infrastructure such as funding the Volta River project is tantamount to “aid to the totalitarian, pro-Soviet Government of
Ghana” (25). Of the attached papers, many are authored by Shirley Graham, wife of African-American scholar and activist, W.E.B. Du Bois. Graham wrote often during her time living in Ghana. Also included are Ghanaian Times articles about Nkrumah and photographs “showing Nkrumah being welcomed by various Communist leaders” (68).

February 27, 1963


A substantial portion of the hearing documented here is an account of observations and encounters by Governor Mennen Williams of his trip to Algeria, Nigeria, the Congo, Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), and Nyasaland (Malawi). One of his principle concerns was to assess the need and use of foreign economic aid and to evaluate the political situation in each country. Williams distinguishes between “self-determination” and “independence,” which would allow colonizing Portugal “a different association” with Angola than that of complete severance and independence (7). Williams also explains the emergence of one-party government in Africa under a nationalist umbrella, “In the transition period the two-party system might be too sophisticated for the Africans at this time” (8). Comparing the African move to independence with America’s own experience as an early republic, he continues, “We ourselves had no political elections, that is, two-party elections, until after George Washington, which was a period of 8 years” (8). Williams stresses that one-party politics in Africa cannot be equated with “the monolithic type” of Communism or Nazism. Williams also reports to the committee on the efforts of bloc countries to indoctrinate “young Africans.” Some sent to host countries for “brainwashing in Communism, on how to run a revolution,” others, he insinuated are trained in African
countries but submits a classified statement of whose content is not elaborated. Tables included consist of imports, exports, commodities, food distribution, U.S. aid.

March 5, 1963


The focus of this document concerns the control of the content and dissemination of information in Africa in order to promote understanding and sympathy of the United States politically, economically, and culturally. Having the goals of presenting a positive international image that assures “that the United States favors self-determination,” and to counteract negative impressions concerning the status of African Americans in the U.S., hearing members report on progress and implementation of various strategies of information policies. Production of newsreel films and radio broadcasts, providing libraries with texts in French on U.S. history and government, the distribution of sports equipment, and sponsorship of visits and tours by prominent African Americans such as James Baldwin and Roy Wilkins are all listed as constructive steps to aligning emergent African nations to American interests. Accessibility—whether in the medium of film given low literacy rates or the availability of readable, non-academic materials about the U.S. in colonial languages—is also addressed. As evidenced here, official discourse in this era comfortably juxtaposed rhetoric of disinterested support of self-determination with an anxious need to dominate the production of knowledge and create a multifarious strategy of indoctrination into the Free World paradigm. Not allowing native Africans to tell their own histories or define their own post-independence aspirations, the document announces the launching of a radio program that will
cross-report Africa to itself, telling it of its lore, its history, its geography, its progress and its plans, its hopes and its dreams, and perhaps the way in which this Government wishes for Africa the choice in freedom of its own destiny (11).

April 30, 1963


This report analyzes the nationalist situation in Mozambique, where a disorganized and underfunded group of dissidents had made recent headway and were inciting and advocating guerilla tactics against the Portuguese presence. Citing this country as an unlikely place for organized rebellion, given the high illiteracy, poverty, and severe repression of “even the most innocuous African organizations” (3). The document determines that the nationalist movement in Mozambique is highly compromised. Internal rivalries, tribal disputes, linguistic differences, inadequate funds, lack of arms and the clandestine nature of organizing all pose problems for the Mozambique Liberation Front (MLF). Despite recent gains, this report suggests that without considerable financial and arms assistance from neighboring African states that are unlikely to reliably and consistently offer it, the prospects for an MLF led campaign for independence are unlikely: “The tempo of nationalist activities inside sleepy Mozambique is unlikely to accelerate very much over the next six to nine months at least” (11). However, the report warns, MLF access to “guerrilla warfare schools” may pose a threat of “a few sabotage forays” and “small-scale incidents” (12). Overall, this document reasons that in response to Salazar’s “determination to hang on to Mozambique” guerrilla warfare tactics are likely but perhaps as a strategy to gain
international attention and U.N. intervention rather than produce a viable and sustainable independence movement (14). Yet it also recognizes that Portugal cannot “suppress widespread or protracted violence” (16).

**July 18, 1963**


This communication outlines the U.S. goal to secure good relations between Europe and Africa, in part, indeed, for the prevention of Communist infiltration. The document does make note of a “domestic racial crisis,” of which President Kennedy’s “honest recognition” has helped keep “Africa’s respect” (617). The speech goes on to address the opportunity that racial violence poses for Soviet propaganda against the United States. Fredericks mentions American support of independence in Angola but against its “immediate” realization, emphasizing a lack of prepared and educated civic leaders. The Secretary lauds private philanthropy and Peace Corps contributions to development in the continent.

**August 29, 1963 and January 11, 1964**


This document compiles 2 sessions of testimony heard from natives of Ghana educated in the United States, who like Kofi Busia before them (December 3, 1962) oppose U.S. assistance to what they claim is “the first Soviet satellite in Africa” (iii). In addition to the students’ statements are articles, book excerpts, photographs, and pamphlets
promoting Castro, Cuba, and Marxist Socialism as a Pan-African philosophy against “colonialism, racialism and imperialism” (96).

November 23, 1963


Concerned with maintaining positive relations with Africa in order to discourage Communist influence, this document focuses on presidential diplomacy and the political climate in several regions of Africa. The report is optimistic about the future of U.S. involvement in Africa because of efforts President Kennedy made to nurture relationships with even militant African leaders. Of particular interest in this memorandum is American progress towards racial integration. Of the civil rights legislation that became the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the paper predicts that its passage “would be a major triumph in United States relations with Africa” (338). Also discussed is the mounting movement towards independence in Portuguese Africa, and the uncomfortable role of the U.S. in maintaining their alliance with both Portugal’s colonialist government and African nationalists. More agreeable developments in Guinea show “a retreat from extreme socialism” toward a “healthy liberal economic trend” (340).

September 10, 1964


This document compiles translations from selected foreign language sources either offering specialized or local knowledge about particular regions or issues in Africa or providing insight to foreign perspectives on African independence. Some featured
articles and authors include a Senegalese ambassador to France, a Senegalese sociologist, Portuguese view of decolonization, scholarship on “Quioco” culture in Angola, and Malagasy folklore, all to better inform the U.S. of the broad range of experience and culture on the continent.

October 28, 1964


On the occasion of Zambian independence, this document is somewhat of a retrospective that favorably evaluates U.S. policy and political developments related to African decolonization movements. Summarizing the widespread move to independence, the report states “Thirty-two new African nations have been establish in less than 13 years,” and “not a single new African nation has succumbed to Communist domination” (285). The paper concludes with future economic and educational American diplomatic strategies in now independent African states.

December 18, 1964


This update on the status of nationalist incursions in Mozambique describes the most prominent organizations in the country and details recent violent events perpetrated by each group. Like its assessment of Mozambique nationalist movements a year ago, the CIA’s conclusion is again that mounting efforts have led to recent violence, but do not yet pose a significant threat to the Portuguese. However, their “long-range potential is
being enhanced…by greatly increased training, arms, and funds supplied by radical African and Communist forces” (1).
References


