OUTPOST OF FREEDOM: 
A GERMAN-AMERICAN NETWORK’S CAMPAIGN TO BRING 
COLD WAR DEMOCRACY TO WEST BERLIN, 1933-72

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ABSTRACT

Scott H. Krause: Outpost of Freedom: A German-American Network’s Campaign to bring Cold War Democracy to West Berlin, 1933-66
(under the direction of Konrad H. Jarausch)

This study explores Berlin’s sudden transformation from the capital of Nazi Germany to bastion of democracy in the Cold War. This project has unearthed how this remarkable development resulted from a transatlantic campaign by liberal American occupation officials, and returned émigrés, or remigrés, of the Marxist Social Democratic Party (SPD). This informal network derived from members of “Neu Beginnen” in American exile. Concentrated in wartime Manhattan, their identity as German socialists remained remarkably durable despite the Nazi persecution they faced and their often-Jewish background. Through their experiences in New Deal America, these self-professed “revolutionary socialists” came to emphasize “anti-totalitarianism,” making them suspicious of Stalinism. Serving in the OSS, leftists such as Hans Hirschfeld forged friendships with American left-wing liberals. These experiences connected a wider network of remigrés and occupiers by forming an epistemic community in postwar Berlin. They recast Berlin’s ruins as “Outpost of Freedom” in the Cold War. Popularizing this narrative through access to the vast resources of American foreign policy and control of the city’s dominant party and radio RIAS made Ernst Reuter and Willy Brandt especially effective Mayors. Archival research uncovered how personal experiences in exile prefigured this surprising alliance between reformers of the SPD and US occupation officials within OMGUS and HICOG. By connecting the network that redefined West Berlin with its roots in wartime Manhattan, this study provides a new, transnational explanation for the alignment of Germany’s principal left-
wing party with the Western camp in the Cold War. By unearthing substantial, yet covert American contributions, my research outlines how this network shaped an anti-Communist political left in postwar Germany. While standard accounts portray Berlin as a stage of Cold War dramatics, my research highlights how the city’s urban politics pioneered seminal developments in the Federal Republic of Germany, rendering it an alternative to the West German brand of democratization. For instance, the remigrés anticipated the national SPD’s 1959 turn that scrapped Marxist theory and endorsed NATO membership. Moreover, this network groomed Brandt for the Chancellorship, illustrating a route between the margins of exile and West Germany’s most prominent posts.
To my family.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Much like the subject of this study, this dissertation has been a transatlantic enterprise. Thus I am grateful for the support I have received from individuals and institutions on both sides of the Atlantic. I am grateful for their support that has shaped this project in numerous ways, which I can only acknowledge here.

Transnational research requires cost-intensive international research. I have had the good fortune of receiving generous support from a host of institutions to make archival research across two continents possible. The History Department of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill has enabled me to teach and conduct research simultaneously. Led by Mischa Honeck, the Bosch Foundation Archival Seminar served as an invaluable introduction to archival research in 2012. A DAAD Graduate Research Grant enabled yearlong immersion in German archives. A Doctoral Fellowship by the German Historical Institute, Washington, DC, (GHI) gave me the chance to consult American repositories for a semester. A Visiting Fellowship by the Bielefeld Graduate School in History and Sociology (BGHS) offered an engaging cross-disciplinary environment to jumpstart the writing process over the summer 2014. A Doris G. Quinn Foundation Fellowship allowed me to sustain this pace in Chapel Hill. Grants from Central European History Society (CEHS) and the Carolina Center for Jewish Studies (CCJS) made crucial follow-up research across Europe possible. The UNC Graduate School funded a Dissertation Completion Fellowship that allowed me to concentrate on completing the dissertation in its final phase.
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The UNC History Department brings together a unique array dedicated scholars, creative researchers, and patient educators that has shaped this dissertation. Konrad Jarausch’s interpretation of the advisor role serves as a model to be emulated. Discussions with him were crucial for conceiving the project and shaped it as it developed. With marvelous aplomb, he prodded me to question common wisdom at times, while encouraging me to move on in other instances. Through the entire process, he always took his time – often on short notice – to offer his perspicacious advice, while deliberately leaving all creative decisions to me. The committee members wrote countless letters of recommendation on my behalf, but also took a keen interest
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INTRODUCTION

The Soviet blockade of Berlin’s Western sectors in June 1948 rattled Berliners and their American occupiers alike. Governing Mayor Ernst Reuter rallied to sustain his constituents’ morale, while American authorities responded with instituting an airlift. As he addressed nearly 300,000 of his Berlin constituents at a protest on September 9, 1948, Reuter elevated their palpable struggle to epic proportions, exclaiming “in this city a bulwark, an outpost of freedom has been set up.” Moreover, he implored “the peoples of the world,” and those of North America in particular, to “look upon this city” as an example of democratic resistance to totalitarian ambition.¹

Only in 1948, Berlin was one of the most unlikely places to look for inspiration. The city Reuter addressed was a half-city under siege. The “bulwark” consisted of rubble, ruins of the 1,000 Year Reich’s capital that had collapsed in apocalyptic fashion only three years earlier. World War II, unleashed by orders signed in Berlin, consumed the city as its last European battlefield in April 1945. The victorious Soviet Union pledged to govern the former Nazi Reichshauptstadt cooperatively with its American, British, and French allies, who occupied their sectors in July. Despite the ubiquitous scars of war, 2.1 million people were crammed into the three Western sectors of Berlin alone, making it the largest city of Germany by a wide margin.

To support both the millions of Berliners and advance their interests, the Soviet authorities had immediately set up an administration upon liberation. The intensifying disagreements between the United States and the Soviet Union over the composition and policies of the municipal administration mirrored those on the architecture of the postwar world. The Cold War’s opening frontlines cut across the city and surrounded the Western Allied sectors that improvised to form its own municipal structure, West Berlin\textsuperscript{1} in June 1948 to preclude further Soviet intrusion. The Soviet reply was to seal off West Berlin from all supply routes out of the nascent Federal Republic, popularly known as West Germany, to test the resolve and viability of the makeshift polity. Simultaneously, West Berliners had to come to terms with defeat in a war that had shattered their city and moral legitimacy, anti-Soviet resentment, and two competing political visions for postwar reconstruction.

In this confusing situation, Reuter’s term \textit{Outpost of Freedom} signified a comprehensive narrative to reframe West Berlin’s political culture. The Outpost of Freedom called on West Berliners to reinvent their political identity as besieged defenders of liberal democracy in the Cold War. This narrative entailed tangible benefits for West Berliners: It offered them political relevance in negotiating the Cold War paradigm, orientation for constructing a new political framework, and for many the convenient opportunity to ignore the incriminating legacies of the Nazi era. Despite the narrative’s political utility for a broad range of West Berliners’ political

\textsuperscript{1} In a city formed by political strife, political statements extended to naming conventions. Federal German parlance preferred “Berlin (West)” before settling on the less clunky “West-Berlin” to stress the politically induced fragmentation of the larger city. GDR counterparts insisted on “Westberlin” to stress the separateness of the Western sectors. In this regard, writing in English offers the opportunity to refer to the Western sectors and their municipality simply as “West Berlin” without making a political statement. Conversely, “East Berlin” refers to the 1945 Soviet sector that Soviet authorities and German Communists named the “Democratic Sector,” before rebranding it as “Berlin, capital of the GDR.” In this dissertation, “Berlin” refers to contemporaries’ conception of entire Berlin in its boundaries set by the 1920 Groß-Berlin-Gesetz. These boundaries also outline those of the present-day state “Land Berlin” in a reunified Germany.
convictions, the conception of truncated West Berlin as the Outpost of Freedom could not find acceptance through a single airlift, but had to be culturally ingrained over time.

This transformation was not a logical consequence of the Cold War, but the political project of a transatlantic network shaped in wartime exile. During World War II, émigré German Social Democrats had met American left-liberals through their shared opposition to Hitler. Both sides reconnected in postwar Berlin determined to resist Communism and hoping for an electable left in the future. This remigrés network included key alumni of exile in West Berlin politics and media such as Reuter, his successor Willy Brandt, Marshall Plan funds distributor Paul Hertz, and municipal public relations director Hans E. Hirschfeld. On the American side, the network comprised John J. McCloy, United States High Commissioner of Germany (HICOG), and Shepard Stone, his Director of Public Affairs, among others. For their shared political goals, this unique network of remigré Social Democrats and liberal American occupation officials constructed and popularized the Outpost narrative.

The remigrés network collaborated quietly, but popularized the narrative intensely. Given the high profile of the network’s members, it deliberately enlisted the considerable resources within West Berlin’s municipal government, media outlets, and American occupation at their hands to promote the narrative. The remigrés network gained control over the dominant political party in West Berlin, the Social Democratic Party (SPD). It employed Berlin’s most popular

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radio station, the American-run Radio in the American Sector (RIAS) to promote the narrative. Citing the narrative of Berliners defending democracy against the Communist threat also elicited the open and covert financial support from the American government that culminated in President Kennedy’s triumphal 1963 visit to West Berlin after the erection of the Berlin Wall.

For the remigrés network, the Outpost of Freedom narrative had four distinct political benefits. First, it summarized both the American and West Berlin administrations’ stance against the Soviet Union and its East Berlin allies in the Cold War. Second, it shored up support among West Berliners, as it offered them moral credibility and ongoing anti-Communism under the single slogan of “Freedom.” Third, the narrative offered remigrés the chance to vindicate their return. And fourth, the narrative offered a blueprint for German democratization based on personal experience in exile, highlighting Social Democratic ideals of civil rights as much as inculcating anti-Communism.

This dissertation seeks to outline the Freedom narrative’s genesis, explore its political effects and uncover the German-American remigrés network that promoted it. Specifically, the dissertation asks how the narrative developed out of a benign interpretation of Berlin’s earlier twentieth century history. In addition, it analyzes reasons for its popularity, initially as a bold claim, then as an ambitious political agenda, and subsequently as shorthand for a staggering transformation. Thus, this study scrutinizes the narrative’s political utility for the network’s different members, most notably in undergirding American Cold War foreign policy and reinventing postwar Social Democracy in face of the Cold War. Finally, this dissertation illustrates the narrative’s results and network’s legacies.

Ultimately, the study of the transatlantic network’s promotion of the Outpost of Freedom narrative, 1933 to 1972, opens up fresh perspectives. It highlights the role of remigrés in postwar
German history. It reveals the political clout of informal German-American networks. Finally, it accentuates West Berlin as an alternative laboratory of German democratization. These interventions necessarily address larger issues in postwar German history. These include the extent of internalization of democratic principles among Germans, the legacy and sway of anti-Communist sentiments, and the exportability and sustainability of democratic political frameworks.

**Historiography**

This dissertation on West Berlin in the emerging Cold War brings together multiple chronologically and geographically compartmentalized historiographical debates. From the vantage point of international history, Berlin has long played a central role as symbol of the Cold War. But in a subject dominated by traditional political and diplomatic histories highlighting the symbolism necessarily neglects the agency of the city’s inhabitants, in effect marginalizing its rancorous urban politics.\(^4\) Since the Cold War’s conclusion, Volker Berghahn and Michael Hochgeschwender have brought the persistence of transnational Cold War networks to the light in their path breaking studies of Shepard Stone’s sprawling contacts and the Congress for Cultural Freedom, respectively.\(^5\) This study seeks to contribute to this literature by linking a transnational network to one of the Cold War’s focal points, Berlin. As study on the political


utility of popularized narratives, it is conceived as a contribution to the new research on the cultural dimension of the Cold War and its repercussions.⁶

The remigrés network operated in a unique urban space. At once, West Berlin was a flashpoint of global confrontations, capital of an abolished nation-state, and a vibrant metropolis in ruins. While each individual context has received considerable attention, such dynamic – and all too often tense – interplay between global, national, and local histories has long been underestimated in historiography. For example, urban histories on Berlin as a whole tend to portray the city’s Cold War division as a painful but temporary episode, in turn neglecting the volatility of the political situation for contemporaries.⁷ More specific research on the Western Allies’ presence or their effects on democratization has been conducted only before the collapse of the Wall and inevitably lacks the privilege of hindsight.⁸ Research on RIAS in particular has almost exclusively concentrated in its function as an anti-communist front-line station in the media theater of the Cold War, neglecting its outreach to the populace of West Berlin.⁹ From the vantage point of national history, overviews on postwar (West) German history tend to cover West Berlin selectively as another West German metropolis.¹⁰

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Moreover, a seeming contradiction invites renewed research on the nascent Federal Republic of Germany. For the last two decades, historians have increasingly qualified the interpretation of West Germany’s postwar years as a purely restorative Adenauer Era, while systematic research has unearthed the disconcerting persistence of NSDAP alumni networks in the Federal Republic’s bureaucracies in new detail. While studies such as most recently *Das Amt und die Vergangenheit* have found the deserved attention of the field and a wider public alike, the unique German-American remigrés network in Berlin serves as an important counter example.

The challenges refugees faced in exile have been documented since their flight from the Nazis. While a burgeoning literature explores the exile experience’s impact on the likes of Theodor Adorno, Bertolt Brecht, Fritz Lang, Thomas Mann, and Franz Werfel in high culture, some scholars have focused on the politics of exile instead. Notably, former émigrés themselves have written on the political divisions between the German-speaking exiles over the best strategies to oppose National Socialism and conceptions for Germany after Hitler. Since the

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1970s, a new generation of scholars, who came to age after the war, has conducted considerable research with the intent to raise awareness for émigrés as a group of Nazi victims. The return of émigrés to Germany and the remigrés’ challenging, often times acrimonious reintegration into postwar German society has found renewed interest only since the 1990s. In her succinct overview of remigré phenomenon in both German postwar states, Marita Krauss noted the “particular success” of remigrés within the SPD, as exemplified by Brandt. The reasons for Social Democratic remigrés’ comparative success have remained desiderata, however. In particular, the role of networks and their transatlantic composition have been largely neglected. Thus, West Berlin’s postwar history offers an important case study for the political clout of remigrés.

An Epistemic Community Crafting Political Narratives for Democratization

This dissertation examines the crafting and exploitation of the Outpost of Freedom narrative by the German-American remigrés network as a facet of the wider German democratization process. As such, it contributes to the discussion on the seemingly swift popular acceptance of liberal democratic frameworks across Western Europe in the postwar era. In the German context, it seeks to contribute to a better understanding of democratization through the application of epistemic communities and medialization.

\[\text{The Social Democratic Executive Committee in the Nazi Era. (Berkeley, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1956).}\]

\[15\] Krohn, “Vorwort.” xiii.


Interpreting West German postwar history as a case study of open-ended democratization has posed highly relevant questions. Ulrich Herbert and Konrad Jarausch have both qualified the term’s first incarnation as an objective of American occupation policy and characterized it instead as a societal learning process.18 Thus, Herbert and Jarausch underscored the cultural dimension of democratization, in which a host of shifting social norms – also known as westernization – buttressed the process.19 Understanding democratization as a societal transformation combines the analytical rigor to aptly describe empirical developments with the flexibility to cover the process’ many representations in politics, culture, and economy. Most notably, it offers a framework to examine how an elite network could influence this process.

These advantages privilege democratization in this dissertation over alternative concepts such as the narrower Americanization or the semantically nebulous modernization. Compared to democratization, Americanization accentuates seminal cultural developments in postwar West Germany. But Americanization can hardly explain important political characteristics of the Federal Republic or West Berlin, such as powerful parliaments and municipal bureaucracies.20 West Berlin’s need for modernization is debatable. The city was in ruins, but Berliners and Americans agreed that they were decidedly modern ruins.21 Modernization hinges on the

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21 Cf. the competing narratives on postwar Berlin in Chapter 1.
definition of ‘modernity’ which can be either descriptive of a historical era or prescriptive as a comprehensive program leading to prosperity and open societies. 22 Even more fundamentally, the prescriptive understanding of modernization in this case implies a one-way transfer of American knowhow to lead Germans back into the mainstream of Western democracies. The persistence of a network comprised of German and American members working together to foster their vision of an anti-communist left-liberal democracy in postwar Germany contradicts such sweeping assessments and suggests a much more volatile and open-ended development instead.

Political Scientists have studied rapidly converging cultural and economic norms across Western Europe for decades. Building upon Michel Foucault’s classic The Order of Things, John Ruggie in the 1970s first credited shared cultural dispositions of informal transnational networks for the rise of supranational institutions that steered European integration. 23 Ruggie accentuated the “shared symbols and references, mutual expectations, and mutual predictability of intention” of the epistemic communities formed by these networks. 24 Peter M. Haas defined epistemic communities by the “shared set of normative and principled beliefs, which provide a value-based rationale for the social action” and “common policy enterprise” of their members. 25 In Political

22 In a descriptive definition modernity can refer to the implications of societal changes wrought by industrialization sweeping across North America and Western Europe since the 1890, which Detlev Peukert had pioneered in the German context. Cf. Detlev J. K. Peukert, The Weimar Republic, The Crisis of Classical Modernity (New York: Hill and Wang, 1993), xiv. Other descriptive definitions refer to different timeframes, for instance, the entire discourse on post-modernism hinges on the assumption that modernity itself is an era passed – usually in the 1950s. Prescriptive definitions refer to modernization as a set of economic and social reforms which ensure broad prosperity. They refer back to the concept of modernization set forth by economist Walt W. Rostow, first published in Walt Whitman Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960). Its subtitle already implies the concept’s contemporary political agenda that complicates its analytical use in a dissertation engaged with Anti-Communism as a historical phenomenon.


Science, this concept has inspired indispensable work for understanding the emergence and governance of European institutions.  

In bringing this proven concept to postwar Berlin, epistemic communities provide a framework to examine the remigrés network at the center of this study. In particular, it helps to analyze underutilized personal papers most effectively, for instance through reuniting scattered correspondence. This study first traces the experiences of the fight against National Socialism, exile, and disillusionment with Soviet-style Communism that formed its members shared set of normative and principled beliefs despite their different backgrounds. Second, it examines their social actions and their rationales in postwar Berlin. Third, it recreates their common policy enterprise of making the Berlin’s Westside the showcase of Cold War democracy as the Outpost of Freedom. Hence, the concept of epistemic communities offer a path to analyze how the network first made sense of – and then thrived on – arguably the most confusing place in the bipolar postwar world, Berlin.

This dissertation examines the history of RIAS as a case study for popularization strategies of the Outpost narrative. Both its stature as the most popular radio station in the Berlin market at the time and its structure as a German language outlet under American control make RIAS particularly relevant for this issue. In order to analyze the influence of journalists on political culture, this dissertation will rely on the concept of medialization, which has been pioneered by the German-speaking scholarly community. This concept defines the expanding and intensifying use of mass communication as a transformative current in western societies.

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since the beginning of the 20th century. Proponents of medialization highlight the importance media has played in shaping daily lives as well as historical memory. For the purposes of this dissertation, the discussion on medialization will concentrate on its influence on shaping the political public.

In contrast to Jürgen Habermas’ fear of mass media having “shredded” the public by turning citizens into consumers, Knut Hickethier has advocated a nuanced understanding of its transformative qualities. Media can fragment publics as well as create new ones. Applied to the historical case of occupied Berlin, medialization structures this study’s research on popularization efforts of the Outpost narrative as a vehicle for democratization. Within the framework of medialization, Christina von Hodenberg has analyzed the social role and origins of broadcasters to grasp the direction and biases of their work in cultural transmission by drawing on Bourdieu’s concept of societal fields and generational differences. Hence, medialization allows not only to analyze the social role of journalists systematically and its political consequences, but also to illuminate a key function of modern mass media, the creation of a West Berlin political public with a distinct political identity.

With this structure, this dissertation seeks to make two historiographical interventions. First, it qualifies the conception of democratization as a consistent cultural transfer from a newly

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30 For the early years of the Federal Republic proper, medialization led to stimulating research, cf. Bernd Weisbrod and Thomas Mergel, Die Politik Der Öffentlichkeit - Die Öffentlichkeit Der Politik, Politische Medialisierung in Der Geschichte Der Bundesrepublik (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2003); Hodenberg, Konsens und Krise.
minted superpower to a shattered society,\textsuperscript{31} by stressing the cultural translation work done by intermediaries such as the remigrés. Secondly, it highlights the challenges the political left encountered in the postwar Germany and how much American officials contributed to the restructuring of an anti-Communist left in West Germany.

Sources

Outlining the composition and actions of the informal remigrés network requires research on both sides of the Atlantic. Hence this study relies on archival holdings across the United States, the Federal Republic and surrounding Europe. In particular, three types of sources have been consulted extensively: first, governmental files of the United States, West and East Berlin, and West and East Germany, second, personal papers, or \textit{Nachlässe}, of the remigrés network’s members, and, third, contemporary media coverage and internal media outlet files.

The files of the \textit{Senatskanzlei}, the municipal administration’s central office, which are held at the Landesarchiv Berlin, have been researched extensively for the city of West Berlin’s policies. Notably, these files remain often awkwardly silent on the protagonists, context, intentions, and competing alternatives to the policies, preferring instead to simply record the policies implemented. Still, these files offer insights to the policies increasingly formulated by the remigrés network as its members held key posts within West Berlin’s administration. These include memoranda from and to the Governing Mayors Reuter and Brandt. In particular, files of the municipal public relations directors Hirschfeld and Bahr have been especially revealing for the political exploitation of the Outpost narrative and how they planted it in different media outlets.

\textsuperscript{31} For proponents of a consistent transfer, cf. Doering-Manteuffel, \textit{Wie westlich sind die Deutschen?}, 4017:12–13, 34–47.
On the American side, this study consulted the files of United States’ authorities in West Berlin and media operations in postwar Germany that are both held at the National Archives in College Park. These files of the American occupation, in its various guises as the Office of Military Government (OMGUS) from 1945 to 1949, the High Commissioner for Germany (HICOG) from 1949 to 1955, and the State Department’s US Mission to Berlin after 1955, offer crucial documentation on how officials sought to reconcile Germans’ reorientation after National Socialism with waging the Cold War against the Soviet Union and its German Communist allies. For this delicate political balancing act, United States’ policy built up large-scale media operations in postwar Germany. Coordinated by the Public Affairs Section (PUB) of OMGUS and HICOG, its assets such as RIAS later transferred to the United States Information Agency (USIA), the global outlet of the American government in the cultural Cold War. PUB files accentuate the political significance of their work. During his tenure as HICOG Public Affairs director, 1949 to 1952, Shepard Stone turned his PUB section into a political actor of its own right. Stone established not only extensive backchannel communications with contacts across the nascent West German political elites, but also became one of the most trusted political advisors of his mentor, US High Commissioner John McCloy. Taken together, both the American occupation and media files highlight the surprising leverage of the remigrés network within the priorities of American Cold War foreign policy. The network’s German members shed their pariah image quickly through advancing the Outpost narrative that resonated deeply within their de-jure American supervisors.

Files from the former East German Democratic Republic (GDR) contrast the documentation from Western repositories. For this study, files from the Bundesarchiv Berlin’s Central Party Archive of the Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (SED), the GDR’s
The dominant Communist Party, East Berlin’s municipal administration at the Landesarchiv Berlin, and the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS), East Germany’s secret police colloquially referred to as the Stasi, at the BStU Berlin were examined. They have proven crucial in two regards. First, they offer insights to the GDR’s reaction to the Outpost narrative and the contrite recognition of its effectiveness in the Cold War. Second, East German intelligence memoranda confirm that West Berlin files’ silence on many key issues that complicate the historian’s task was intentional and merited. While the veracity of the Stasi files is often problematic, they are still vital to understand the political tensions in Berlin. Carefully crosschecked against West Berliner and American documentation and contextualized, they illuminate both the GDR’s counter-efforts and alarm over the remigrés network’s exploitation of the Outpost narrative.

Close examination of members’ personal papers has proven itself as an effective way to reconstruct the network’s composition and aims. Reuniting scattered correspondence helped to redress the intentional silence of many governmental files in particular. For instance, this strategy offered insights into the candid communication between the network’s members. Collectively, the papers of Hans Hirschfeld at the Landesarchiv Berlin, RIAS director Gordon Ewing at the George C. Marshall Library in Lexington, Virginia, and Shepard Stone at Dartmouth Special Collections illuminate for example the coordination of the counter-campaign against McCarthyism.

In order to assess the remigrés network’s popularization efforts of the Outpost narrative through mass media, this study relies on research in both RIAS broadcasts and files. Deutschlandradio Berlin maintains an extensive archive of RIAS audio files and programming. The Deutsches Rundfunkarchiv in Potsdam-Babelsberg holds the bulk of RIAS’ internal files. These contain for instance correspondence between network members and RIAS that illuminate
discussions on the political editing of RIAS. In conjunction, the four source sets illuminate the remigrés network’s cohesion and the political utility of the Outpost narrative for its goals in new detail.

**Organization**

After an introduction to postwar Berlin, this study is organized chronologically. It traces the remigrés network’s formation from Nazi-imposed exile from the 1930s onward and the development of the Outpost narrative until Quadripartite Agreement of 1971/72 that effectively froze the Cold War in Berlin as cornerstone of Chancellor Brandt’s détente Neue Ostpolitik. Each of the six chapters explores a transition in the narrative or the network advancing it in greater detail.

This dissertation begins with an overview of developments in Berlin and Europe from the 1945 Battle of Berlin to the administrative split of the city into West and East 1948. During this time, services to provide necessities of life had to be reestablished in the capital of ruins that had replaced the Reichshauptstadt. Joint quadripartite occupation of the victorious Allies fractured in this arduous process as the Soviet Union and the Western Allies led by the United States disagreed over the fundamentals of postwar reconstruction. Berlin’s postwar situation made the Outpost of Freedom in the starting Cold War one of the possible narratives to rebrand this unique urban space. This chapter also introduces competing narratives such as the city’s previous incarnations as capital for the Wilhelmine Empire, the Weimar Republic, and Third Reich. In addition, it outlines how a modicum of routine was established after the apocalyptic Battle of Berlin. This chapter asks for the repercussions of increasingly deteriorating inter-Allied relations and the conclusions Berliners took from this process.
The second chapter explores the formation of the German-American network that would come to define West Berlin’s political culture. It unearths its origins in Nazi-imposed exile during the Second World War. This chapter introduces the reader to Social Democratic exile politics and the gradual appreciation of liberal democracy. In addition, it traces the network’s reestablishment in Berlin until 1949, in which contacts made in wartime Manhattan prefigured the networks composition in postwar Berlin. Hence this chapter examines which experiences in exile made remigrés particularly adept to succeed politically in the escalating Cold War.

The Outpost narrative of heroic West Berlin defending democracy shored up support among both Americans and Berliners in the crisis of the 1948 to 1949 Airlift. The third chapter reassesses the emergence of this narrative. It explains its genesis and popular tropes it drew upon. It pays particular attention to the comprehensive efforts to popularize it. The remigrés network enlisted considerable resources from American Cold War foreign policy for this task. A host of prestige projects in Berlin, such as the Free University, festivities such the inauguration of the American cast Freedom Bell, and media outlets such as RIAS, or the high brow cultural magazine Der Monat, point to the magnitude of the effort to popularize the narrative. Hence this chapter seeks to outline the political benefits that the narrative entailed in Berlin, Germany, and the United States. Furthermore, it identifies the narrative’s boosters and the strategies they employed.

The fourth chapter explores how the remigrés network exploited the Outpost narrative to counter the crisis year of 1953. Within half a year, from April through September 1953, the remigrés network faced three distinct crises. The workers’ revolt against the GDR regime seemingly confirmed the narrative’s validity, but the uprising’s bloody suppression by Soviet tanks in East Berlin’s streets on June 17th starkly demonstrated the narrative’s limits.
Simultaneously, the leftwing leanings of the remigrés network brought its American members into the crosshairs of Senator Joseph McCarthy. On September 29th, the network experienced another blow when Mayor Reuter, its most visible member and public embodiment of Berlin’s defiance to Soviet demands, died suddenly. This chapter will thus trace the network’s reaction to these cascading crises. While the Soviet crackdown of June 17th dashed the network’s hopes for a quick implosion of the GDR, it propagandistically reframed the events as a moral victory of *Freedom* within the terms of the narrative. The network acted in concert against McCarthyism by brandishing the anti-Communist credentials of its actions in West Berlin. Bereaved of Reuter, the German Social Democratic members of the network rallied around remigré Willy Brandt to realize their vision of a *Volkspartei*, or big-tent party. In this vision, the SPD would break out of its prewar demographic confines of the working class and transform into a stridently anti-Communist, pro-American party left of the center to attract broader public support. Subsequently, this chapter examines reasons for the remigrés network’s resilience and the narrative’s political utility in reacting to these crises.

The fifth chapter highlights the ascent of the remigrés network’s members through their ownership of the narrative. Brandt’s 1957 election to West Berlin’s Governing Mayor exemplified the growing clout and resources of the network. Less prominent members who advanced into powerful positions were Egon Bahr at RIAS and Shepard Stone at the Ford Foundation. This chapter illuminates how the remigrés network propelled careers. It asks what resources and strategies it could employ against competitors in West and East Berlin alike. More broadly, it scrutinizes how this development did fit into the broader postwar economic miracle.

The sixth and final chapter demonstrates the narrative’s broad scale acceptance and concurrent loss of dynamism in the early 1960s. While President Kennedy’s triumphal Berlin
visit in 1963 underscored recognition of the Outpost narrative by the international public, the GDR’s construction of the Wall two years earlier increasingly questioned its suitability. While the Wall cut a dramatic wound across the city’s fiber, the petrification of political borders undercut the Outpost narrative’s component of a Communist threat. In addition, the physical isolation of West Berlin undermined its reputation as focal point of the Cold War. This chapter explores these factors that led to a loss of dynamism for the narrative despite its broad acceptance. The chapter also outlines competing strategies of the network’s members to counter this perceived loss of relevance. In particular, Brandt and Bahr, former RIAS journalist turned West Berlin public relations director, came to the conclusion that the situation after the Wall’s erection was so different that it required different strategies to overcome the city’s division. These included limited, but direct negotiations with the GDR’s SED leadership and renewed aspirations for national leadership in Bonn, the makeshift capital of the West German economic juggernaut. Hence a route existed from the margins of Nazi-imposed exile to the Federal Republic’s most eminent posts. And it ran through West Berlin. This study illuminates this route, the remigrés network’s tacking against the currents of the Cold War, and the American support it elicited.
CHAPTER 1

Berlin, Capital of Ruins, 1945-1948

On the morning of April 24, 1945, Franz Neumann found Red Army tanks in the streets of his Wittenau neighborhood. The 1000 Year Reich had crumbled overnight in this Northern Berlin borough. Relief trumped any uncertainty about the future for Neumann. Trained as a metal worker, Neumann was steeped in Berlin’s workers’ movement. Born in 1904, Neumann had become active in the SPD’s youth organization, the Sozialistische Arbeiter-Jugend (SAJ) in his Friedrichshain neighborhood in the wake of the 1918 Revolution, before moving across town to a co-op apartment association. His passions for grass-roots politics made Neumann a full-time community activist and head of the borough’s SPD ticket in the last open municipal elections in March 1933. The Nazis immediately targeted Neumann after gaining political control, sentencing him to two and a half years imprisonment, and tortured him at the infamous Columbia-Haus, a makeshift Concentration Camp at Tempelhof Airport. Released in 1935, Neumann ceased his political activism and made a living working in a metal factory.¹

Upon liberation, Neumann renewed his commitment to improve the living conditions of his community, despite the difficulties and destruction. Immediately, he reached out to old Social Democratic comrades to procure the necessities of life and establish relations with the Soviet soldiers. With the help of local Communists, Neumann convinced Soviet occupiers of his neighborhood’s Socialist credentials. He secured posted signs exclaiming in German and Russian that Neumann’s neighborhood was “Socialist Workers’ Housing” that effectively exempted it from Soviet reprisals.\(^1\) Through these determined steps, Neumann had revived both the once dominant SPD in Berlin and his own political career.

Wittenau’s surprisingly smooth transition was exceptional, however. The sincere cooperation between Soviets, German Communists, and Social Democrats in Wittenau in April 1945 gave no indication that Neumann would emerge as one of the Soviet Union’s most visible critics in Berlin within a year. Neumann would rise to prominence by defending the Berlin SPD’s independence against a Soviet-designed Communist takeover attempt. The American, British, and French forces that would allow West Berlin’s experiment as a liberal enclave would not arrive for another nine weeks. Most notably, the members of the Outpost network that would define West Berlin’s political culture had not come to the city yet. Still, as they arrived in Berlin individually, they had to deal with the consequences of spring 1945. Moreover, the developments in Berlin between 1945 and 1948 animated them to work together.

While Neumann and his comrades undertook first reconstruction efforts in late April 1945, the Third Reich had not even capitulated yet, despite the inevitability of its defeat. The Battle of Berlin had just opened in full intensity in the central district of Mitte.\(^2\) Adolf Hitler and his

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\(^1\) Hurwitz, *Die Anfänge des Widerstands*, 4:23–24.

\(^2\) The ferocity of the battle and its relevance as coda of the Nazi regime inspired numerous popular accounts, such as Antony Beevor, *The Fall of Berlin, 1945* (New York: Penguin, 2003); Peter Antill, *Berlin 1945: End of the*
personal staff entrenched themselves in the bunker underneath the Reich Chancellery, plotting
desperate battle schemes for positions already been overrun. Simultaneously, the Soviet First
Ukrainian Front and the First Belorussian Front converged to lock the siege around the perimeter
Ringbahn. The Wehrmacht hastily rounded up defenders and ordered them to fight “to the last
man and bullet.” Roving SS commandos enforced these orders by hanging suspected deserters
and “defeatists” from marquee Friedrichsstraße lampposts.³ Marshal Georgy Zhukov could
muster more than 2.5 million soldiers, 42,000 guns, 6,200 tanks, and 7,500 fighter planes, but
had to call for the largest known urban assault to finalize the defeat of the Third Reich.⁴

The ensuing house-to-house fighting in the streets of Berlin inflicted a staggering toll in
material damage and loss of lives. While Berlin had already been battered by years of aerial
bombardment by the Western Allies, the one-sided battle hit the residential neighborhoods
within the Ringbahn hard. Destruction was especially severe in the city center, where 70% of
houses were damaged beyond repair.⁵ In the three weeks of fighting in and around Berlin, from
April 16 to May 8, 1945, the Soviet Red Army listed 352,475 causalities. Analysis of
fragmentary Wehrmacht files confirmed at least 92,000 German military deaths, but other
estimates calculate “surely far more than 100,000 dead.”⁶

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³ Large, Berlin, 361.


⁶ Ibid., 673.
The Battle of Berlin effectively ended the war in Europe when Soviet commandos found the charred bodies of Hitler and Joseph Goebbels among the landscape of ruins. The apocalyptical end of the Third Reich marked an ambivalent liberation for the 4.43 million people crammed into Berlin. For the thousands of Fremdarbeiter, slave laborers kidnapped from across Europe, Soviet victory brought their labor for the Nazi war machinery to a close. After liberation, however, Soviet policies viewed the majority of these slave laborers that came from territories claimed by the Soviet Union as traitors. Peace had returned for established Berliners as the Nazi regime collapsed. But they found themselves subject to numerous reprisals as the Red Army had driven the Wehrmacht from the Volga to the Elbe River after years of German genocidal warfare in the Soviet Union.

On May 9, 1945, the date of Nazi Germany’s surrender at Berlin-Kralshorst, neither Berliners, nor Soviet victors, nor American observers found any indication of the city’s second career in contentious global politics. The then third largest city in the world had become the trophy of the Stalinist war effort against Nazi Germany. Destruction in the Reichshauptstadt was ubiquitous. The Soviets had confiscated remaining production facilities, such as those of industrial giants Siemens and AEG, and prepared their transfer as war reparations. The United States, who would craft an emotional bond to the city in the coming years, had no boots on the ground. The closest US Army positions were in Dessau on the left bank of the Elbe, roughly 130 kilometers to the southwest of Berlin.7 Staunchly democratic and vigorous leaders such as Franz Neumann were few and far between, giving little indication for the intensity of the battle over the

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meaning of democracy in postwar Germany that would be fought in the streets of Berlin in the coming years.

Hence this chapter will provide an overview of Berlin’s tumultuous immediate postwar years. During the three years between the Battle of Berlin in April 1945 and the Soviet Blockade of the city’s western sectors starting June 1948, the metropolis transformed from a Soviet symbol of victory over Nazism to a focal point of the rapidly escalating Cold War. This unique postwar context made the remigrés network’s rebranding of the capital of Hitler’s Empire as the Outpost of Freedom possible in the first place. To explain this development, this chapter outlines how a modicum of routine was reestablished in the city, what the repercussions of increasingly deteriorating inter-Allied relations were for Berlin, and how the opening of the Cold War created the conditions for the formation of the Outpost network in Berlin’s Western sectors.

I. Decisions Made and Deferred at Potsdam, July 1945

While the Soviet victory in Berlin had concluded the War in Europe, the terms of peace remained elusive. To this end, the leaders of the Big Three, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States met at Schloss Cecilienhof across the Havel river from Berlin to find common ground from July 17 to August 2, 1945. At this so-called Potsdam Conference, Joseph Stalin, Winston Churchill, succeeded by Clement Attlee, and Harry S. Truman faced the momentous tasks of ending the War by forcing the Japanese Empire to surrender, arranging a stable European postwar order despite their diverging interests and principles, and agreeing on the territorial and governmental composition of postwar Germany.8

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8 Given these stakes, the Potsdam Conference has attracted continuous attention, mostly from diplomatic and popular historians, cf. Herbert Feis, Between War and Peace; the Potsdam Conference. (Princeton University Press, 1960); Manfred Müller, Die USA in Potsdam 1945: die Deutschlandpolitik der USA auf der Potsdamer Konferenz der Grossen Drei. (Berlin: Fides, 1996). Wolfgang Benz has used the Conference as a pars pro toto for the transition to military occupation at large and provides a succinct overview of the Conference proceedings and goals, cf.
To end hostilities in the Pacific, President Truman, Prime Minister Churchill, and Chiang Kai-shek, “President of China by wire,” issued a stern warning to the Japanese government. In their Proclamation, the Allied leaders demanded the unconditional surrender from the Japanese Empire. Pointing to the German example, Truman and Churchill threatened that continued resistance would produce “inevitably the utter devastation of the Japanese homeland.”

Unknown to the Japanese government, Truman made two crucial steps to realize this threat. He reconfirmed with Stalin that the Soviet Union would enter the War against Japan in August with an invasion of Japanese occupied Manchuria. Most notably, Truman authorized the use of the Atomic Bomb from his confiscated Villa overlooking the Griebnitzsee.

The wartime anti-Fascist consensus still held enough sway that the heads of the anti-Hitler coalition substantiated earlier decisions outlined by the preceding Tehran and Yalta Conferences in regards to the postwar European order. In the final Protocol of Proceedings, commonly known as the Potsdam Agreement, the Soviet Union, United Kingdom, and the United States recognized France as a victorious ally of equal standing. The leaders confirmed the division of Germany in occupation zones according to the Yalta principles. After Truman and Churchill accommodated a French zone from their claims, the Potsdam Agreement assigned four occupation zones across Germany: the British in the northwest, the French in the southwest, the Americans in the South,


and the Soviets around Berlin. Anticipating joint rule over Germany from its established capital, the Allies pledged to control the city itself cooperatively under quadripartite control, in which each victorious power would exercise control over one sector.

These occupation zones did not comply with the final front lines of the war, however. In effect, this meant that the United Kingdom relinquished control over Mecklenburg and the United States over Thuringia and the Saxon economic hubs of Halle and Leipzig for stakes in Berlin, the traditional capital of the German nation-state. The newly formed occupation zones were to supply the reparations for its occupying power individually. The pragmatic origins of the zonal boundaries would not impede their quick reification as part of the Iron Curtain.

The United Kingdom and the United States acquiesced to Soviet demands for the political reorganization of Central Europe. For example, they accepted Moscow-dominated Polish Provisional Government of National Unity and explicitly withdrew recognition of the London-based Polish Government in exile, which they claimed “no longer existed.” Territorially, Stalin found support for “shifting” Poland westward. Under this agreement, the Soviet Union retained the bulk of the eastern Polish territories annexed after the 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. Poland was to be compensated with the eastern German territories beyond the Oder-Neisse line. The Potsdam Agreement envisioned expelled Poles to resettle in southern East Prussia, Berlin’s Baltic port of Stettin including its Pomeranian hinterland, Brandenburg’s Neumark, and Silesia.

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14 Ibid., 2:1490–1492.
The Agreement called for the “transfer” of those Germans living there “in an orderly and humane manner.”\textsuperscript{15}

The uprooting of millions presented a logistical and humanitarian challenge in the short term and a collective trauma for decades to come. The magnitude still is stridently debated. An estimated half to two million Germans perished in the process.\textsuperscript{16} The first German postwar census in 1946 – and last all-German census for more than four decades to come – indicated the presence of over 9.5 million expellees in the four occupation zones.\textsuperscript{17} Despite strict restrictions on establishing residency, 100,000 of them found themselves in destroyed Berlin.\textsuperscript{18} The experience of expulsion by Soviet policy seared the biography of millions of German voters, making anti-Soviet resentment deeply resonant among Germans. American foreign policy, successive West German governments, and the Outpost network in particular would consciously exploit this trope to foster their own political agenda.

The Potsdam Agreement laid out an ambitious agenda for changing the fiber of German political culture. The Allies agreed on both handing out punishment and offering the opportunity for rehabilitation.\textsuperscript{19} They abolished German sovereignty and replaced the central institutions of the Reich with the Allied Control Council (ACC) that was tasked to coordinate four separate

\textsuperscript{15} Ibid., 2:1495.


military occupations. Furthermore, the Allies dismantled the Nazi Party and its affiliated organizations. The Potsdam Agreement formed the legal basis for judicial prosecution of the innumerable Nazi crimes that resulted in the Nuremberg trials. In addition, the Potsdam Agreement disbanded any kind of German military units and called for the close supervision of heavy industries. The Big Three set a clear rehabilitating goal, however. The purpose of the Allied occupations just begun was “to prepare for the eventual reconstruction of German political life on a democratic basis and for eventual peaceful cooperation in international life by Germany.”

Despite its ambitious agenda, the Potsdam Agreement marked only the minimal consensus between the victorious Allies. The implementation of its terms soon became points of contention between the Allies. Unknown to them, Potsdam marked the last meeting of the Big Three before the fracture of the anti-Hitler coalition. Thus, the Potsdam Agreement drew the opening lines of the nascent Cold War, while its terms served as legal baseline for the German Question that occupied diplomats and politicians of both German states, the Western Allies, and the Soviet Union until 1990.

The United States and the Soviet Union in particular clashed heavily over the interpretation of the Potsdam Agreement calling for a “democratic basis” for Germany. Berlin soon came to symbolize the rift between a Stalinist people’s democracy and a representative liberal democracy in the following years. But this rift also offered Berliners the chance to develop their own interpretation of democracy. The Outpost network would later capitalize on this opportunity that the peculiar Cold War politics in Berlin offered.

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II. Berlin, Soviet Prize of War

Unlike in any other city on the Western side of the Iron Curtain, the Soviet Red Army had liberated Berlin’s western sectors. For seven weeks, Berlin remained under exclusive Soviet control until the arrival of the Western Allies in July 1945. Neumann had good reason to post his neighborhood’s Socialist credentials bilingually.22 Soviet soldiers plundered, engaged in gratuitous violence, and committed nearly countless rapes. Yet simultaneously, the Red Army undertook determined efforts to secure the food supply for the city. The Soviet policy set out to systematically confiscate Berlin’s industrial manufacturing assets, while the Soviet Military Administration in Germany (SVAG) made tentative first steps at the political participation of Germans. The ambivalent experience of Soviet occupation remained a trope that the Outpost network would exploit politically for decades to come. Unlike in the Federal Republic proper, anti-Communist rhetoric in Berlin could not only draw from an abstract threat, but from collective experience.

The endemic rapes committed by victorious Soviet soldiers have seared themselves into Berliners’ consciousness more than any other transgression, including plunder and gratuitous violence. While numbers are impossible to ascertain, rape was a mass phenomenon in the weeks immediately succeeding the Battle.23 Estimates range between 110,000 and 500,000 victims, which would have included every third woman in Berlin.24 Marta Hiller’s firsthand account of ordeal and survival has illustrated both the extent of her suffering and the societal trauma the


rapes wrought. First published in 1954, her diary of *A Women in Berlin* found widespread condemnation for openly discussing a hastily introduced taboo. In 2003 the text ignited a strident debate among the German public on the extent of rapes, when it was anonymously republished after Hiller’s death. The visceral reactions to the topic half a century later illustrate its political potency in Cold War Berlin. Mass rape formed a traumatic collective experience that prefigured Berliners’ postwar perceptions. Not only did the experience seemingly confirm Nazi propaganda tropes, but also created fertile ground for a narrative that not only acknowledged the Berliners’ ordeal, but also lent it a retroactive purpose as victims of Communism in the Cold War world.

The removal of Berlin’s industrial manufacturing assets formed not only a crucial rupture in the city’s economic history, but further added to Berliners’ resentment of Soviet occupation and the Stalinist policies they signified. Manufacturing had driven Berlin’s explosive population growth from the 1880s until the end of World War Two. Berlin enterprises such as Siemens & Halske, Allgemeine Elektricitäts-Gesellschaft (AEG), Actien-Gesellschaft für Anilin-Fabrication (AGFA), and Osram exemplified economic growth through technological innovation since the Wilhelmine Era. Products of Berlin’s electrical engineering sector such as the U-Bahn and street lighting had impressed international visitors, leading for instance Mark Twain to exclaim in 1890: “It is a new city; the newest I have ever seen. […] all of Berlin is stately, substantial, and

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27 Large, *Berlin*, 26,103.
[…] uniformly beautiful.” Twain’s enthusiastic assessment illustrated Berlin’s global reputation as hub for contemporary technical industries.

Berlin’s decline as a European manufacturing center started during World War Two. British and American aerial bombardment took its toll on Berlin’s production facilities. Moreover, the Nazi war effort transferred key facilities to other parts of the Reich in anticipation of these air raids. Still, Berlin’s manufacturing facilities remained impressive, with an estimated 65 percent surviving in May of 1945. Thus, they became highly sought after by the Soviets as prize of war – especially since their time of full control over these assets was limited. The reparations to aid in the monumental task of reconstructing the Soviet Unions left an indelible mark on Berlin’s industrial cityscape. Berlin’s vaunted electrical engineering sector had been decimated and the pace of Berlin’s economic recovery was hampered for decades to come.

Moreover, the heavy-handed extraction of reparations from all of Berlin undercut early Soviet efforts to influence Berlin’s reconstruction. The Interministerial Committee on Reparations’ systematic dismantling infuriated SVAG officials, as it disrupted their tasks of feeding the German population and reorganizing German political life. Already on May 5, 1945, City Commander Nikolai Berzarin proclaimed that the Red Army had made foodstuffs available to Berliners. SVAG quickly introduced its own set of ration cards that closely resembled the system Berliners grew accustomed to during the War. Despite the Soviets’

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31 Naimark, The Russians in Germany, 26.
considerable effort, the food supply of Berlin remained a staggering task given the size of its population. Those who could, started growing vegetables in Schrebergärten, small weekend garden-plots. Less fortunate – but often times nominally more affluent – Berliners resorted to Hamstern, foraging the surrounding Mark Brandenburg to barter their personal belongings for food. Thus, the responsibility of feeding their population fell to the Western Allies once they occupied their sectors in July 1945. This inter-Allied agreement not only sent grain trains from the Western Zones to Berlin’s Western sectors, but also created Berlin’s dependency on Western supplies that the Soviets and their German Communist Allies attempted to exploit during the Berlin Blockade 1948/1949.

Earlier than any other occupying power, SVAG opened up avenues for German political participation. On May 17, 1945, SVAG appointed a new Berlin Magistrate that included Communists and Democrats of all stripes – although the latter were given Communist deputies. On June 10, 1945, SVAG licensed the founding of four German parties, the SPD, the Communist Party (KPD), the center-right Christian Democratic Union (CDU), and the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). A mixture of pragmatism and Kremlin policy intentions motivated both of SVAG’s decisions. SVAG quickly came to the conclusion that restoring a modicum of routine in the city necessitated German participation. For instance, food rationing quickly passed to the control of the newly appointed Magistrat. Norman Naimark has noted that the sanctioning of German political parties “gave the Soviets the opportunity to monitor, check, and control all

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political activities in their zone of occupation.”36 In spite of the Soviet ulterior motives, Franz Neumann and his comrades seized the opportunity to shape the reconstruction of their city by reconstituting the SPD.37 The Berlin Social Democrats quickly clashed with another newly introduced political actor in the city, the Gruppe Ulbricht, a group of committed Communists around Walter Ulbricht that flew to Berlin from their Moscow exile in the slipstream of the Red Army.38 Ulbricht gained political power by quelling radical anti-fa groups that flourished after liberation, organizing the KPD, taking a hard line against the SPD, and making himself indispensable for SVAG.

Upon first entering Berlin on July 1, 1945, American advance detachments encountered not only the cityscape of destruction they expected. In addition, they also found themselves overseeing a provisional city administration already in place. Moreover, key decisions had been made under the sway of the Soviets and their German Communist allies. First Lieutenant Melvin J. Lasky, a combat historian of the US 7th Army, noted in his diary “the street-corner propaganda: everywhere the Stalinist billboards with messages from the master.”39 Only gradually would the American occupiers realize that their late arrival to the city did not put them at a comparative disadvantage as much as they feared, but rather gave Berliners an experience of Soviet occupation they could exploit politically in the opening of the Cold War.

36 Naimark, The Russians in Germany, 272.
37 For a detailed account on the reconstitution of the Berlin SPD in May and June of 1945, cf. Hurwitz, Die Anfänge des Widerstands, 4:73–110.
III. Competing Narratives in Interpreting Postwar Berlin

Though parts of Berlin resembled a tabula rasa in the summer of 1945, the American occupiers saw it as a city with multiple problematic pasts. Despite the passions of war, a New York Times editorial portrayed Berlin’s fate as a tragedy, when it noted “that the end of Western urban civilization is no longer an empty phrase but a terrible fact already in the grasp of mankind.” While the editorial made certain that “Berlin wrought its own destiny and its own destruction,” it asked American decision makers to “take solemn thought:” Berlin had been larger than any other American city save New York and “sturdy,” teeming with “vitality.”40 This significant amount of empathy for the enemy’s capital and the immense relevance ascribed to its fate for American metropolitan areas highlight the potency of popular narratives to describe Berlin. This example underscores the relevance of the most popular narratives used to describe Berlin before and during the War since these narratives shaped the horizons of political actors grappling with postwar Berlin.41

Berlin had captured the American imagination since the Wilhelmine Era at the close of the 19th century. For instance in 1912, Theodore Dreiser believed to have visited nothing less than the city of the future in Berlin due to its mercurial atmosphere: “Paris has had its day, and will no doubt have others; London is content with an endless, conservative day; Berlin’s is still to come and come brilliantly. The blood is there, and the hope, and the moody, lustful, Wagnerian temperament.”42 Moreover, Dreiser cited Berlin’s example to demand infrastructure improvements from his compatriots:

“I wish all Americans who at present suffer the indignities of the American street-railway and steam-railway suburban service could go to Berlin and see what that city has to teach them in this respect. Berlin is much larger than Chicago. […] The plans for handling this mass of people comfortably and courteously are already in operation.”

Dreiser’s intense criticism of contemporary American culture exemplified an enduring pattern of interpreting Berlin as a metropolis comparable to those in the United States. From 1890 on, a string of American journalists, writers, and activists visited to Berlin as a case study of a modern metropolis under an interventionist government.

The American perception of Berlin’s confidence in confronting rapid urbanization might have astonished its inhabitants. Following the foundation of the German Kaiserreich in 1871, the new capital’s transition into a mushrooming economic juggernaut unsettled many Germans, as it symbolized the dizzying pace of social, economic, and cultural changes sweeping the new nation-state. Established Berliners and hundreds of thousands of new arrivals alike grappled with the daily effects of rapid population growth. In spite of numerous detractors, a newly emerging mass culture with a strong sense of urbanity helped Berliners cope. Polymath Walther Rathenau, AEG industrialist, public intellectual, and liberal politician, likened Berlin’s transformation to the death of Spree-Athens and the rise of Spree-Chicago, in which an erudite and aristocratic polis gave way to a sprawling metropolis. Hence Berliners reciprocated the American perception by describing their city increasingly in categories of American cities.

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43 Ibid., 468.


45 Large, Berlin, 5–21.


In the aftermath of World War One, the conception of Berlin as a metropolis compatible with America became overtly politically charged. In a positive interpretation, Berlin as an American city meant embracing it as a cosmopolitan capital that heralded international and domestic acceptance of the Weimar Republic. Berlin’s increasing ability to attract cutting-edge artists and public intellectuals from across Germany and beyond highlighted the liberal promise of the Republic. In a less benign interpretation, the continuing growth and the increasing number of non-native inhabitants made American Berlin symbolize the ailments of German urban life.

The rise of the National Socialism and the dismantling of the Weimar Republic questioned Americans’ overwhelmingly positive associations with the city with increasing urgency. The letters of Associated Press (AP) Berlin correspondent Louis P. Lochner to his children in the United States outline not only an individual’s alienation from uniquely integrated to foreigner, but also an American perspective developing from sympathy to open hostility, over the course of nearly a decade, from 1932 to 1941. Lochner, a Lutheran Mid-Westerner from a German-speaking family, had played a major role in organizing Henry Ford’s 1915-1916 pacifist Peace Mission in Europe, before coming to Berlin as AP bureau chief in 1928. Quickly immersing himself in Berlin’s society, Lochner quickly built up a unique circle of friends and acquaintances. It boasted a number of high-profile liberals and conservative icons of the era, among them General Wilhelm Groener and Foreign Minister Julius Curtius, and Lochner stayed on friendly terms with Hitler’s flamboyant foreign press chief, Ernst Hanfstaengl.


Lochner’s initial reaction to Hitler’s seizure of power reflected the grave underestimation of National Socialism by his bourgeois Berlin acquaintances. Thus Lochner mockingly characterized the Nazi celebrations of introducing May Day as a public holiday as a spectacle: “I was also out at Tempelhof at that gigantic May 1st [1933] celebration. It was the biggest thing of its kind ever staged anywhere in the world, I believe. The Nazis are the world’s greatest showmen, and we really don’t miss Max Reinhardt, of whom we first thought he was indispensable.”

Lochner not only took a swipe at the eminent theater director’s emigration, but also entirely omitted the celebration’s context in the dismantling of independent trade unions the next day, May 2, 1933. While Lochner voiced his horror over the Nazi encroachment in the Lutheran Church and the staged burning of Magnus Hirschfeld’s Institut für Sexualwissenschaft’s library, the Nazis successfully convinced him of Hitler’s peaceful foreign policy intentions and “that no bodily harm was being done” to Concentration Camp prisoners. Despite being given a deceiving tour of the KZ Sonnenburg on the Oder’s east bank, Lochner empathized with the degrading internment of fellow pacifist Carl von Ossietzky, noting how “one of the greatest writers I have ever read […] must sing Nazi songs as they march around the prison yard.”

The Reich’s intensifying persecution of its Jewish citizens deeply disturbed Lochner in the following years. Lochner regularly lamented the persecution of “those highly cultured [assimilated] families which through centuries have helped to build up Germany.” In the wake of the November Pogroms 1938, also known as the infamous Kristallnacht, Lochner claimed that his Christian creed prompted him to open up his home for “haunted and hunted creatures

50 Ibid., 299.
51 Ibid., 299–301.
52 Ibid., 304.
pitifully begging for a night's lodging,” as did “hundreds of foreigners” in Berlin. Ominously, he added that “the heathens […] take upon themselves the odium of perpetrating crimes that will some day cost the country dearly.53

Germany’s aggressive armament drive and belligerent rhetoric ultimately convinced Lochner of the Nazi reign’s disastrous consequences. In a letter to his son Robert, Louis Lochner foresaw imminent war after witnessing the lavish military parade for Hitler’s 50th birthday, April 20, 1939. Moreover, after spotting one of Robert’s childhood friends as a Wehrmacht recruit, Louis Lochner gloomily anticipated the scenario in which “Bobby [stands] on the other side of a firing line and aiming at ‘Wowo’ […] and having to pull he trigger on him merely because the politicians on top say that Wowo and Bobby are enemies!”54 Fortunately for Robert H. Lochner, the University of Chicago student was spared of direct combat. Work as a radio journalist at NBC’s German language global services and training as an OSS recruit would keep the younger Lochner from the frontlines.55 Robert Lochner would, however, return to the city he grew up in as an OMGUS official. Holding various Public Affairs posts and relying on his dual German-American background, Robert Lochner became a crucial member of the Outpost network, most notably as director of its radio outlet RIAS during the 1950s.

Louis Lochner had frowned over the Nazis anti-American rhetoric in Berlin. In the spring of 1939, he had confided to Robert:

“I fear the Germans make one big mistake: they completely underestimate the potential forces arraigned against them. […] Queer that the top leaders in Germany should repeat that mistake of 1914-18! Remember how they used to scoff at the possibility that America could ship troops across

53 Ibid., 324.
54 Ibid., 325.
the ocean? Now they drill into the German people […] that the U.S.A. is a big bag of wind, etc., etc. A great pity.”

While Louis Lochner perspicaciously analyzed Nazi hubris, they had attempted to redefine Berlin’s cityscape according to their grandiose ambitions for more than five years. Since the 1920s, Nazi propaganda had carefully nurtured the perception of Berlin as a degraded metropolis foreign to the rest of the country to vindicate its “Fight for Berlin” that culminated in the street violence of the early 1930s. After the Nazi’s seizure of power, Berlin NSDAP Gauleiter Goebbels sought to transform the diverse metropolis into a Nazi stronghold – partly to improve his own standing among the party leadership. In order to evidently Nazify the city, Goebbels turned to architecture that met Hitler’s enthusiasm to hurriedly undertake major construction projects. The party imposed itself in Mitte’s cityscape with Hitler’s pompous Chancellery and underground bunker. To this day, Ernst Sagebiel’s Tempelhof Airport terminal and Reichsluftfahrministerium, or Ministry of Aviation, stand as witnesses for the attempt to spatially Nazify Berlin in their imposing dimensions and their allegedly “Germanic” style.

The Nazi propaganda machinery exploited the 1936 Berlin Olympics to present the international press the ostensive benefits of their rule. Notably, Louis Lochner added an irreverent subtext to his dispatches from Berlin. For instance, he reported how the Berlin government called for “a week of laughter” to make Berliners more welcoming of Olympics visitors and rewarded them with hoarded goods and that the German Soccer Team lost against

56 Lochner, “Round Robins from Berlin,” 324.


the Norwegian squad despite the allegedly decisive presence of the Führer. Encouraged by the Olympics, Hitler appointed the servile Albert Speer Generalbauinspektor für die Reichshauptstadt, or Supreme Construction Coordinator for the Capital (CBI), in 1937 to architecturally restructure Berlin into the future world capital Germania. Until the invasion of Poland in September 1939, the Nazis had created an alternative narrative of Berlin as embodiment of Nazi ambition that rivaled the older incarnation of a dizzying American metropolis, through their persecution policies, construction projects, and propaganda spectacles.

Louis Lochner remained one of the few Western reporters in Berlin until Germany declared war against the United States in December 1941. His dispatches from the Reichshauptstadt, however, exemplify the fraying American emotional bond to Berlin due to the Nazi regime and the World War it unleashed. Lochner dispassionately noted the toll British aerial bombardment started to take on Berliners, even as he sat among them in the shelter. Moreover, he contrasted their experience with that of Londoners. For example, he wrote drily that after a night of bombardment spent in air raid shelter “the next day, though, one isn’t fit for work. How much worse it must be in London!”

The hostilities between Nazi Germany and the United States and the concurrent genocide unleashed from Berlin’s premises fully ruptured Americans’ emotional bond to the city. The Nazi narrative of Berlin had supplanted more benign, older interpretations – even for contemporaries of its seething Weimar Era incarnation. In 1943, Shepard Stone, a US Army intelligence captain – and future superior of Robert Lochner in the Outpost network during the 1950s – commented on the news of another Allied air raid on the city laconically: “Berlin […]

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60 “‘Week Of Laughter’ To Prepare Berlin For Olympic ‘Strain,’” The Baltimore Sun, July 18, 1936; “Hitler Watches, Germans Lose; A Mystery Admits Nazi Press,” Washington Post, August 9, 1936.

received a terrible blow. The University is apparently no more. Well, they asked for it. *62

Germany’s *Zivilisationsbruch* under Nazism, or rupture of Civilization, seemingly rendered universities obsolete – even if they included Stone’s own alma mater, where he had completed his doctorate in 1933.

The Third Reich split American attitudes towards Berlin in two competing narratives. In a positive reading, Berlin figured as a cosmopolitan victim of Nazi aggression or, alternatively, as a totalitarian behemoth. Upon her return to the city of her youth in July 1945, American journalist Tania Long asserted scathingly, “scratch a Berliner and you will find a German.”63 In her bleak assessment, Nazism still ran unabated among Berliners under the veneer of pitifulness. This pessimistic interpretation that has highlighted the durability of its Nazi past convinced many American liberals. The Berlin Outpost network shrewdly responded to this impediment by referring American liberals to East Berlin for totalitarian continuities.64

Even in its 1945 incarnation as destroyed Reichshauptstadt of Hitler’s Empire, American occupiers found redemptive qualities in Berlin – which the outpost network would later consciously exploit. The sight of its ruins was as riveting as confusing for Lieutenant Lasky. Within the space of a single paragraph, Lasky wrote enthusiastically how Berlin was “unbelievable, magnificent even in destruction,” but also noted that the void caused by it could fit all “ruins of Darmstadt, Kassel, Nuremberg, Augsburg, [and] Munich“ combined, thus comparing Berlin to “a tortured giant […] its eyes poked and burned out.”65 Berliners themselves

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63 Cited in Eisenhuth and Krause, “Inventing the ‘Outpost of Freedom’ Transatlantic Narratives and Actors Crafting West Berlin’s Postwar Political Culture.”

64 For a detailed discussion of the spatial division for the two contradictory narratives on Berlin, cf. Chapter III.

confused the CUNY graduate just as much. The Trotskyist sympathizer described them as jaded, but beyond any Nazi sympathies. While he relished the attraction the US uniform lent him for Berlin ladies, Lasky noted how his local dates despised his Soviet Allies. Lasky tried to explain this conundrum by referring back to Berlin’s distinct history: “I should know that Berlin is far from being […] ‘Prussian;’ it was always a highly political center, a fortress of the working-class movements, an independent disaffected area under the Nazis.”

Lasky also enjoyed the stormy cultural revival in postwar Berlin. Wolfgang Shivelbusch has claimed that Berlin’s quadripartite occupation status created a uniquely creative hub as each occupation power attempted to implement its own cultural policy. Lasky, gifted with an acute political awareness and boasting his cultural refinement, made full use of Berlin’s unique cultural offerings. In August 1945, Lasky easily traversed the boundary into the Soviet Sector to attend a screening of Sergei Eisenstein’s Ivan, the Terrible. Lasky hailed the movie as “the climax of all progressive and retrograde tendencies of Soviet cinema,” but added more ominously “this too, was a triumph, an undeniable Stalinist triumph.” Numerous other entertainment venues reinforced the high culture offerings. By 1947, Berlin boasted 5,715 restaurants and bars, 488 hotels and pensions, 365 cafes, and 282 kiosks that employed 28,140 people. A year later, the local US liaison officer could report that five dancing venues had spread into the sedate Steglitz district – with the two most popular choices flaunting the required “public dancing license.”

66 Ibid., 202.
69 Eisenhuth and Krause, “Inventing the ‘Outpost of Freedom’ Transatlantic Narratives and Actors Crafting West Berlin’s Postwar Political Culture.”
70 Walter J. Pugh, “Memorandum ‘Night-Clubs and Establishments Featuring Entertainment in VBK Steglitz’” September 27, 1948, RG 260, Records of the Office of Military Government for Germany (OMGUS), Records of
Billy Wilder captured the surprisingly affirmative Zeitgeist among this landscape of rubble in a *Foreign Affair*.

The ruins of war not only impeded postwar reconstruction, but also served as contradictory catalysts for the postwar revival of Berlin’s urban culture. Examining the “ethnographic gaze” of British and American photography on postwar Berlin, Stefan-Ludwig Hoffmann has contended that the shifting portrayal of Berlin’s ruins constituted a “visual denazification.”71 Disgust over Nazi Germans quickly gave way to pity for Berliners’ plight. US General John J. Maginnis echoed these sentiments in December 1945, when he confided: “I could sit in my office and say with conviction that these Germans, who had caused so much harm and destruction in the world, had some suffering coming to them, but out here in the Grunewald, talking with people individually, I was saddened by their plight. It was the difference between generalizing on the faceless crowd and looking into one human face.”72

The visual denazification and the rehumanization of Berliners through witnessing their plight posed a challenge for American officials on how best to understand the sliver of the metropolis they occupied. Increasingly, they connected their contradictory experiences with earlier, more benign incarnations of Berlin, such as the seedy days of the Weimar Era. Lasky did this when he summarized his experience in the city with the title of the upbeat, yet defiant 1920s’ song *Berlin bleibt doch Berlin*, or Berlin still remains Berlin.73 The *New York Times* editorial did this by citing Weimar Era “modernist experiments” as witnesses to Berlin’s redeemable
qualities.\textsuperscript{74} By underlining the city’s democratic and liberal traditions – and by simultaneously marginalizing the years it had served as Nazi Germany’s capital –, American occupiers supported the quick establishment of a narrative that directly connected Weimar to postwar Berlin. This narrative of Weimar’s positive legacies contributed to an American investment into the city. But Berlin’s political structure was even more contested than in the Weimar days. Berlin’s politics suffered from two diverging visions for postwar reconstruction.

IV. Municipal Politics Torn over the Meaning of Democracy

The United States, the Soviet Union, Communist Berliners, and anti-Communist Berliners alike found themselves arguing over the meaning democracy, whether in its liberal parliamentary form or as a Soviet-style “people’s democracy.” From 1945 to 1948, municipal politics became increasingly acrimonious, as they reflected the contentious disagreements between the Western Allies, led by the United States, and the Soviet Union. The rancorous municipal politics animated the formation of the Outpost network, as it witnessed the hasty inception of West Berlin as a separate polity and allied key members politically, such as Ernst Reuter and Lucius D. Clay. The structure and personnel of Berlin’s bureaucracy, which played a crucial role in realizing Berlin’s reconstruction, ignited contentious debates between Communists and non-Communists, who increasingly vindicated their opposition as Cold War liberals.

SVAG and its KPD ally benefitted from the groundwork they had laid during the first days of sole authority in the spring of 1945. The Soviets had named both the non-aligned engineer Arthur Werner Lord Mayor and multiple non-Communists Borough Mayors. Temporarily, SVAG accepted multiple parties until it expected that elections would bring outright Communist

\textsuperscript{74} “The Punishment of Berlin,” 12.
control. Still, it pursued a strategy of indirect influence as Communist deputies controlled the
daily operations of the reemerging municipal bureaucracy. KPD head Ulbricht left no doubt that
SVAG and the KPD intended to systematically exploit this advantage when he informed his
subordinates that “It must look democratic, but we must remain in control of all.”75 Thus, the
KPD could bypass the multi-party, equally seated provisional magistrate in accordance with
SVAG’s interests before the elections slated for fall 1946.

The emphatic defeat of the Austrian Communist Party in the first postwar elections in
November 1945, however, raised questions about the electoral appeal of Communists in post-
Nazi societies. Hence SVAG changed its strategy towards the SPD. Instead of marginalizing the
Social Democrats, SVAG contended that the KPD could absorb the SPD through a new
Sozialistische Einheitspartei, or Socialist Unity Party (SED). This marked a reversal of KPD
policy. During the Weimar days, the KPD had rejected the Republic and had fought the SPD
with the same vengeance as the NSDAP.76 After the Nazi seizure of power, leftists from across
the political spectrum had identified the division of the worker’s movement as a prerequisite for
the Nazis’ success. In response, the Popular Front concept that envisioned an alliance between
Social Democrats and Communists had gained popularity.77 New groups, such as the
Sozialistische Arbeiterpartei Deutschlands, Socialist Workers’ Party of Germany (SAP), and
Neu Beginnen, had emerged to advocate Socialist unity. Most notably, these groups had included
Willy Brandt, Hans Hirschfeld, and Paul Hertz who would condition Social Democracy to the
Cold War from their base in postwar West Berlin as key members of the Outpost network.78 In

75 Wolfgang Leonhard, Die Revolution entläßt ihre Kinder (Köln: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 1955), 358.
76 Cf. Chapter 2.
78 For their political reversal in exile, cf. Chapter II.
their Moscow exile, the KPD members around Ulbricht had adopted the Comintern plank of a Popular Front only reluctantly. Upon their return to Germany, they quelled dissident Antifa groups of unorthodox Marxists to build up a cadre party during the summer of 1945.

As winter set in, Walter Ulbricht emerged as the unlikely champion of a united working class through a new unity party. SVAG heavily influenced the formation of local committees to prepare the SED founding. Ulbricht and SPD Soviet Zone Chairman Otto Grotewohl sought to drum up support for a unity party among their own ranks.79 The 1945/1946 Fusionskampf over the independence of the SPD proved to be a seminal development as it drew the fault lines across the German political left for decades to come. In light of these political implications, both the amount of Soviet coercion and degree of Social Democratic interest in the merger have been stridently debated. Social Democratic interpretations have consistently portrayed the partial merger as Zwangsvereinigung, or forced fusion.80 Scholars associated with the SED or its successors in reunified Germany have emphasized the broader appeal of the merger.81 Christoph Kleßmann has proposed to take the initial Social Democratic interest in the merger seriously, without losing sight of the merger’s grave implications for the postwar era: “Only the mixture of massive coercion and illusionary seduction, of pressure from above and […] sincere desire to heed the ‘lessons of history,’ signifies the explosive nature of the process.”82 The successful absorption of the SPD into the SED in the Soviet Zone and the reaffirmed independence of the


SPD in Berlin reinforced the divide between Communists and Social Democrats for the duration of the Cold War and beyond.

The 1945/46 question of a KPD-SPD merger into the SED anticipated not only German political fragmentation, but also the political passions of the Cold War. While SPD leader Grotewohl had come around to endorse the Soviet SED project, Hanover’s Kurt Schumacher emerged as the leader of the SPD in the Western Zones through strident opposition against it.\(^8^3\) Political campaigning centered in Berlin because of its status as capital, quadripartite Allied occupation, and traditional stronghold of workers’ parties. In a February 1946 interview with the British-licensed Berlin Tagesspiegel, Schumacher asserted that any new Socialist Unity Party “would be viewed as an extension of the Communist Party by the Western SPD.” This categorical refusal dashed any hopes for a SED in all occupation zones across Germany. Moreover, the merger question reinforced old divisions between Social Democrats and Communists rather than overcoming them. Schumacher explained his opposition as a matter of democratic principle incompatible with the KPD and Soviet policy: “Socialism and personal freedom of creed and criticism are inextricably linked for Social Democracy in the Western zones.”\(^8^4\) Schumacher’s anti-Communism and interpretation of Socialism as an economic tool for fostering personal freedom made him an uneasy, but legitimate potential partner for American policy in postwar Germany.


While SVAG could outlaw any referendum of SPD members on their party’s future in their area of control, they could not quell the opposition by the Berlin Social Democrats in the Western sectors. On March 1, 1946, Grotewohl abruptly scheduled a party meeting to rubber-stamp the city SPD’s approval of the merger in Berlin-Mitte’s Admiralspalast. What Grotewohl had staged as a formality became an acrimonious spectacle when the merger encountered a hostile reception. Franz Neumann and his Reinickendorf party delegation spearheaded the opposition and succeeded in scheduling a Urabstimmung, or referendum, that SVAG had denied them. The referendum on the SPD’s independence posed a conundrum not only for SVAG, but also for OMGUS, as it pitted two key aims, namely democratization and Allied unity against each other. US Military Governor Lucius D. Clay tried to reconcile competing priorities by sanctioning the referendum in the Western Sectors and hoping for a resolution through the quadripartite ACC. Clay’s evasive policy rankled the ranks of OMGUS. Privately, his advisor Edgar N. Johnson fumed:

“And where do we stand in this fight? Neutral! What does the liberal tradition of American democracy mean to these [Communists]? Nothing. Don’t we care whether the real democrats have a chance here or not? Why did we fight this war? […] I am sick of it. May[be] a democracy that is so spineless deserves to die.”

Neumann’s passionate campaigning for retaining an independent SPD quickly made him the face of the opposition and garnered his party sympathies within OMGUS.

The referendum confirmed his stance emphatically. 82.6 % voted against the merger, with 71.8% of Berlin SPD members participating. SVAG, KPD, and the Grotewohl wing of the Soviet

85 For the referendum and the Fusionskampf over the SPD’s future, cf. Hurwitz, Die Anfänge des Widerstands, 4:1009–1222.


Zone SPD refused to accept the results and celebrated the founding of the SED with a grandiose convention in the Admiralspalast on April 21 and 22, 1946.  

Less than a year after its reconstitution, the SPD was effectively barred again in the Soviet Zone that comprised its traditional strongholds such as Saxony. The following years confirmed the suspicion of the merger’s critics like Schumacher and Neumann. Former SPD members swelled the ranks of the SED and broadened its appeal. But Ulbricht and his Moscow-groomed cadres purged former SPD members from the higher ranks and transformed the SED into the Stalinist state party of the future GDR. In spite of these setbacks, the SPD had retained its independence in all of Berlin, as the Western Allies recognized the referendum. Led by Franz Neumann as its new chairman, the Berlin SPD had sent the Western allies a strong signal that Social Democrats resisted Communist encroachment more forcefully than OMGUS’ calculating response had allowed.

Campaigning for the October 20, 1946 municipal elections outlined the cleavages for future clashes. While the four occupation powers had pledged free and fair elections in the ACC, the campaigning for the elections demonstrated the Soviet preference for the SED. SVAG exploited its exclusive control of the established Berliner Rundfunk, or Radio Berlin to grant significant airtime to the SED. In similar fashion, the SED could rely on a steady supply of paper for newsprint, which was a tightly rationed commodity in postwar Berlin. Consequently, the election campaign further questioned conciliatory attitudes towards SVAG among the ranks of American officials in Berlin. OMGUS therefore pushed for holding the October 1946 election and negotiated a compromise that both SED and SPD could contest it.

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Feeling undermined by the Soviet support for the SED, OMGUS made first steps to build its own media outlets. Founding Radio RIAS exemplifies the reinvigorated American media policy in Berlin during 1946. Upon the arrival of the Western Allies in July 1945, Soviet authorities refused to relinquish full control of Radio Berlin, despite the British sector location of its studios in Charlottenburg, the former headquarters of German radio. In anticipation of the elections, American authorities decided to create an alternative station. RIAS took the Berlin airwaves on February 7, 1946 from makeshift studios in a war-damaged building in Schöneberg’s Winterfeldtstraße using a clunky Nazi era wire communications system that severely hampered its reach. Despite these humble beginnings, RIAS marked the start of a new kind of broadcasting journalism in Germany. It quickly employed 700 German employees under American management and broadcasted over Berlin’s undivided airwaves. A cast of young German journalists and their American superiors created a program that blended entertainment, highbrow culture, and current affairs. In its editorial stance, RIAS journalism strove to foster the American objective of reeducation, or teaching democracy. Thus RIAS extolled the democratic legitimacy of the election and provided considerable airtime for all four registered parties.

Despite SVAG’s efforts to cast the SED as the best choice for workers, the Berlin SPD’s defiant stance against Soviet policy and its local SED ally expanded its electoral appeal far beyond the large working class demographics. In a rousing success, the Social Democrats won 48.7% in the vote for the Stadtverordneten, the council members. Moreover, the two bourgeois parties LDP and CDU also garnered 9.3 and 22.2%, respectively. The SED, who had

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92 Schivelbusch, *In a Cold Crater*.
campaigned with high hopes, came in as a distant third with 19.8%.\textsuperscript{93} Ironically, the SPD benefitted from its dismemberment in the Soviet Zone in the Berlin elections. Since the creation of the SED had closed down all Social Democratic regional organizations in the Soviet Zone, the SPD could campaign freely against SVAG. CDU and LDP, on the other hand, still had to accommodate SVAG, if they wanted to retain a presence in the Soviet Zone.\textsuperscript{94} Thus, voters rewarded the SPD as the most open and credible voice against Soviet designs.

The SPD success in the October 20, 1946 elections brought the Weimar Era Mayor of working-class \textit{Prenzlauer Berg}, Otto Ostrowski, into the Lord Mayor’s office. He formed a Magistrate, or city government with representatives from all parties, including the SED, despite the SPD’s dominant position in the city council. Ostrowski’s intention was to govern by consensus for the two large pressing tasks, the coordination of Berlin’s reconstruction and the drafting of a new, democratically representative constitution.\textsuperscript{95} Ostrowski encountered the dilemma that consensus politics required common ground that was rapidly lost in postwar Berlin.

The ACC bypassed the politically gridlocked Magistrate to impose a provisional constitution until the next slated elections in 1948.\textsuperscript{96} This new constitution created just as many problems, however, as it devolved power to the individual boroughs. This undermined the political unity of Berlin, as the individual occupiers – and SVAG in particular – could exert their influence on a borough level. In addition, Soviet officials asserted the right for themselves to confirm all officials and liberally vetoed the Magistrate’s non-Communist nominees. This

\textsuperscript{93} Schlegelmilch, \textit{Hauptstadt im Zonendeutschland}, 4:363.

\textsuperscript{94} Ibid., 4:351.

\textsuperscript{95} Ibid., 4:110–112.

\textsuperscript{96} Benz, \textit{Auftrag Demokratie: Die Gründungsgeschichte der Bundesrepublik und die Entstehung der DDR 1945-1949}, 316.
virtually entrenched the SED members in key positions of the municipal bureaucracy who held office since being appointed in 1945.97

In light of these developments, support for Lord Mayor Ostrowski’s desired consensus eroded within his own SPD. The Berlin SPD party committee around Neumann, Otto Suhr, and Louise Schroeder had lost faith in any cooperation with the SED and turned to CDU and LDP for cooperation against the Communists.98 When news reached the SPD that Ostrowski had met privately with SED leaders to find ways to overcome the impasse, the SPD party committee forced Ostrowski to resign on June 11, 1947.99 The SPD nominated City Council for Transportation Ernst Reuter as successor. Reuter was a latecomer to the reconstituted Berlin SPD, but brought unique experience to the office.

Notably, Reuter was a former Communist, proven city administrator, and alumnus of exile. After witnessing the October Revolution as a German prisoner of war in Russia 1917, Reuter had enthusiastically joined the cause and risen to the rank of People’s Commissar. Upon his return to Germany, he joined the central committee of the KPD, but broke from it disillusioned in 1924. He rejoined the SPD and made a career as city administrator, implementing large-scale improvements to Berlin’s mass transit system during the 1920s. Extolling the virtues of liberal democracies, Reuter was elected Lord Mayor of Magdeburg in 1933, but was forced to flee after brief incarceration in a Nazi Concentration Camp. Reuter found refuge as an urban planning professor in Ankara, Turkey.100 While materially in a relatively comfortable position, Reuter


98 Ibid., 4:212–228.


100 For the political biography of Ernst Reuter, cf. David E. Barclay, *Schaut auf diese Stadt: Der unbekannte Ernst Reuter* (Berlin: Siedler, 2000).
lamented his political “loneliness” in exile to future Outpost network member Paul Hertz in the United States.\textsuperscript{101} Upon liberation, Reuter sought to implement his vision of reconciling socialism with civil rights in Germany. Strict American and British visa restrictions initially blocked his quick return, as occupation authorities regarded remigrés as potential liabilities. After a rejected application to the American State department, Reuter finally obtained a British visa in July 1946.\textsuperscript{102} Despite the ubiquitous destruction, Reuter showed remarkable enthusiasm upon his reinstatement as Berlin City Council for Transportation in Ostrowski’s Magistrate.

Despite the City Council’s election of Reuter by a wide margin on June 24, 1947, SVAG refused to certify him as Lord Mayor of Berlin. The former People’s Commissar’s ideological treason two decades earlier made him anathema to the Soviet occupation authority. Two years after its inception, the all-party reconstruction of Berlin under quadripartite Allied supervision had resulted in political gridlock.

**V. Escalation 1947-1948**

The dramatic breakdown of quadripartite Berlin governance in 1947 and 1948 made the city a symbol for the escalating Cold War. Soviet and SED actions in Berlin convinced their political opponents that they faced another totalitarian threat. The political split in East and West Berlin and the Soviet prompted the network’s narrative redefinition of West Berlin as the Outpost of Freedom with a unique urgency.

The Soviet Union and the United States’ failure to closely cooperate in Berlin as mandated by the Potsdam agreement mirrored their escalating disagreements on a global scale. On March


12, 1947, President Truman announced military and economic assistance to Greece and Turkey. Moreover he pledged American support for all “free people” in what became popularly known as the Truman Doctrine. His administration fleshed out this policy by unveiling the ambitious European Recovery Program (ERP), popularly known as the Marshall Plan, and invited all European states to apply for aid. Kremlin policy makers feared losing their grip on what they viewed as their sphere of influence in Central and Eastern Europe. Fearful of losing control over Central and Eastern Europe, Stalin’s veto against any aid to states under Soviet influence exposed the fault lines that ran through Europe.¹⁰³ The Communist putsch in Czechoslovakia in February 1948 sent shockwaves to Washington and Berlin alike, as it reinforced the perception of Communist encroachment.

Communist tactics in Berlin further fed this perception. The postwar history of Berlin’s Humboldt University exemplifies the increasingly Stalinist policies of SVAG and its SED ally.¹⁰⁴ For the May 1st celebrations in 1947, the Communist controlled university administration draped the buildings in red flags and put a banner carrying the SED logo at center stage. The administration intended to visually undergird the new political direction of the curriculum against the expressed wishes of the elected student representatives. In protest, Otto Stolz, and Georg Wradzidlo, a Social Democratic and Christian Democratic student leader, respectively, distributed the first issue of a critical periodical, called Colloquium. The student leaders had quietly secured a necessary publishing license from OMGUS, Berlin Sector (OMGBS). The makeshift editors Stolz and Wradzidlo wasted little time in voicing the grievances among the

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student body. Soon, Wradzidlo fell victim to the string of “disappearances” in Berlin and resurfaced in NKVD custody. Publishing under a pseudonym, Stolz directly assaulted the administration in the Colloquium’s March 1948 issue, accusing it of installing “a new totalitarianism”. He invoked the collective experience of his generation to vindicate his grave charge: “But we have experienced that a life under a dictatorship is no life, but an inhuman vegetative state.” The fear of again being denied opportunities as a Social Democrat may have fueled his bitterness, but it motivated his defiant stance. The reaction of the Rector was swift: he exmatriculated Stolz, which prompted nearly 2000 students to protest in the American Sector on the far side of the Potsdamer Platz on April 24th, 1948. Reitering his concerns in fiery language, Stolz called publically for the creation of a new university in the Western Sectors. OMGUS and faculty members untainted by National Socialism, such as the historian Friedrich Meinecke, shared the students’ concerns. Military Governor Clay initiated the founding of an alternative Free University that would serve variously as showcase of American culture in the Cold War, hotbed of student activism, and one of Germany’s most innovative postwar institutions.

Wradzidlo’s disappearance exemplified the fate of an estimated 250 Berliners per month whom the NKVD arrested in 1947. Neumann accused the Berlin Police of aiding in these secret arrests in the City Council. In November 1947, the SPD dominated chamber passed a vote

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107 Cited in Ibid., 223.

108 For the Free University’s role as American showcase in the cultural Cold War that undergirded the Outpost narrative, cf. Chapter III. For an overview of the Free University’s history cf. James Tent, The Free University of Berlin: A Political History (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988).

109 For the estimate, cf. Schlegelmilch, Hauptstadt im Zonendeutschland, 4:129.
of non-confidence against Police President Paul Markgraf, who had been appointed by SVAG in
1945. In March 1948, the caretaker Magistrate of Louise Schroeder, SPD, and Ferdinand
Friedensburg, CDU, voted to replace Markgraf with SPD candidate Johannes Stumm. Markgraf
refused to step down, however, and cited SVAG’s backing. Berlin found itself with two
competing Police Presidents, who threatened to arrest each other, each endorsed by separate
Allied powers.\textsuperscript{110} Hence by spring 1948, Berlin police’s example precipitated the imminent
division of the municipal bureaucracy between East and West.

Berlin’s contentious local politics symbolized the breakdown of political unity on a
national level. The Soviet Union’s representative had left the ACC in protest in April 1948. The
policies of the Soviet Union and the Western Allies led by the United States created two
diverging political entities. Whereas SVAG reconfigured the Soviet occupation zone into a
“People’s Democracy,” OMGUS succeeded in forming an economic union from the three
Western occupation zones. To revive the economic life in the Western Zones, OMGUS
clandestinely organized a currency reform.\textsuperscript{111} On June 18, 1948 Germans in the three Western
zones awoke to the news that a new \textit{Bank deutscher Länder} would issue a \textit{Deutsche Mark} in two
days. In response, SVAG barred all economic contacts between its zone and the Western zones,
as it feared the uncontrolled influx of old devalued Reichsmark.

The Deutschmark introduction posed a conundrum for SVAG, but also for Berliners.
Originally, OMGUS had excluded Berlin from the new currency. Put on the spot, however,
SVAG responded with a hurried currency reform of its own for its zone and all of Berlin. British
and American representatives in the ACC protested the inclusion of Berlin and extended the

\textsuperscript{110} Ibid., 4:125–131.

\textsuperscript{111} Benz, \textit{Auftrag Demokratie: Die Gründungsgeschichte der Bundesrepublik und die Entstehung der DDR 1945-
Deutschmark to Berlin’s Western Sectors on June 23, 1948. Suddenly, Berliners had to grapple with two competing currencies. Within hours, SVAG announced the blocking of crucial train supplies in coal and foodstuffs for Berlin’s western sectors.

Many historians characterize the Soviet Blockade of Berlin’s Western sectors as the first major crisis of the global Cold War. For Berlin contemporaries, however, the Berlin crisis also meant an insecure future and compounded economic and material hardship. OMGUS Military Governor Clay immediately ordered the supply of the Western sectors by air. Initially only resupplying Western troops, the feasibility of an airlift for over two million Berliners was an open question. In spite of the odds, Clay’s decision opened a path for the Truman administration to demonstrate determination in the Cold War without testing the Soviet Union’s willingness for combat. Moreover, the American Airlift placed the onus for an armed confrontation over Berlin on the Soviet Union. The Berlin Blockade opened up a competition for the hearts and minds of Berliners between the United States and the Soviet Union, and their respective local Allies. Despite the Airlift’s shortfall to supply West Berlin’s entire consumption and the crucial smaller supply from the Soviet Zone, the Blockade became a Soviet public


116 Lucius D. Clay, Entscheidung in Deutschland (Frankfurt am Main: Verlag der Frankfurter Hefte, 1950), 403–408.
relations disaster in the opening Cold War. The commitment of Western Allies, and the United States in particular, to supply West Berlin via Airlift presented a unique opportunity for the Outpost network to convince Berliners of the accuracy of their narrative.

The dramatic escalation of global tensions in Berlin precipitated the division of the city and Germany at large. On July 1, 1948, the Western Military Governors instructed German delegates to craft a provisional constitution for a new German state. These Frankfurter Dokumente would form the basis of the Grundgesetz, or Basic Law, for the nascent Federal Republic of Germany that would be founded in 1949. SVAG followed suit by reinvigorating efforts leading to a Socialist constitution for a German Democratic Republic that the Gruppe Ulbricht had already begun in 1946.

In Berlin, the political division of the city was completed on September 6, 1948. SED loyalists dispersed a City Council meeting in Berlin-Mitte’s town hall. The SED members contended that their colleagues had fled, failing in their constitutional duties and instituted a new “Democratic City Council,” Magistrate, and Lord Mayor under Communist control by acclamation. The elected members of Berlin’s city government from SPD, CDU, and LDP reconvened in British occupied Charlottenburg, forming their own government of West Berlin.

In protest against what they viewed as a putsch, the three non-Communist parties quickly scheduled a political demonstration adjacent to the sector boundary to Soviet controlled Mitte.

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118 For a more detailed assessment of the 1948/1949 Berlin Airlift’s ramifications for the narrative, cf. Chapter III.


120 Benz, Auftrag Demokratie: Die Gründungsgeschichte der Bundesrepublik und die Entstehung der DDR 1945-1949, 3030–305.

121 Schlegelmilch, Hauptstadt im Zonendeutschland, 4:139–141.
Fueled by indignation against the Communist takeover and blockade of the city, an estimated 300,000 Berliners rallied in front of the burnt shell of the Reichstag, a fitting symbol for the state of German democracy in 1948. The largest postwar political rally in Berlin demonstrated RIAS’ political clout as much as that of SPD, CDU, and LDP. The American-run station had heavily publicized the upcoming demonstration, broadcasted the speeches live across Berlin and Germany, and provided the rally’s sound system. Multiple speakers, such as Neumann, CDU Acting Lord Mayor Ferdinand Friedensburg, and banished SPD deputy from the Soviet Lichtenberg borough Joachim Lipschitz, denounced the Communist takeover of Berlin’s central institutions by drawing parallels to the Nazi regime recently abolished. In reference to the secretive internment of Berliners in NKVD special camps, Neumann exclaimed “the KZs are the same, only today, in 1948, Hammer and Sickle have replaced the Swastika.”

Lipschitz expressed both the determination and impotence of non-Communists when he vowed “we will return” to those “who inserted themselves in our offices and jobs.” In contrast, Lord Mayor-elect Reuter rose to the occasion by redefining a confusing situation into a clear moral choice.

Despite the bleak prospects of the blockaded Western half of the war-ravaged city, Reuter lent Berliners hope by framing their plight as the defining political question of their time. Reuter directly asked the publics of the Western occupying powers to “look upon this city” as an example of resilient democracy. Fighting for the survival of West Berlin as a political entity, the Lord Mayor-elect couched his concern in the language of Cold War by characterizing his half-


123 “Großkundgebung auf dem Platz der Republik.”
city as “a bulwark, an outpost of freedom.” Moreover, the thundering orator shrewdly connected rectification of Berliners’ perceived indignities with entry in the Cold War on the Western side:

“When this day arrives, the day of victory, the day of freedom, on which the world will recognize that the German people – become anew, newly changed, newly developed – has the right to voice its opinion among equal and free peoples, then our trains will not only again travel to Helmstedt [on the British-Soviet zonal border], they will also travel to Munich, to Frankfurt, Dresden, and Leipzig, they will travel to [newly Polish administered] Breslau and Stettin.”

Thus Reuter promised his battered constituents justice and international rehabilitation, if a democratically reoriented Germany were to prevail on the side of the Western Allies.

Reuter’s bold narrative construction of newly formed West Berlin as the Outpost of Freedom captivated his constituents and American occupiers alike. The next two chapters will address the origins of this narrative in exile and explore the reasons for its rapid acceptance in West Berlin.

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CHAPTER 2

Formation of the Network, 1933-1949

The German-American network that would define West Berlin as the Outpost of Freedom in the postwar era had its roots in wartime Manhattan. New York City brought together American liberals and leftists of all stripes with a diverse, but growing community of German-speaking exiles. For instance, Hans E. Hirschfeld and his family found refuge in the city in 1941 after an eight year-flight from the Nazis.1 Despite his distinguished curriculum vitae and his immense resilience, Hirschfeld grappled – as any refugee – with the challenging insecurity and marginalization of exile.

Moreover, Hirschfeld’s biography reflected the ruptures of German history in the first half of the twentieth century.2 The trained jurist and experienced journalist had volunteered for the Kaiserreich’s Army in World War One as a Social Democrat of Jewish descent. During the Weimar Republic, he coordinated Prussian press policy against the propagandistic onslaught by the Nazis and Communists. Yet the infamous 1932 *Preußenschlag*, or Prussian Coup, ended

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1 “Case Registration Hans Hirschfeld,” June 27, 1941, Accession Number: 2002.296 American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) Refugee Assistance Case Files, Case File 6999, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum Collections, Washington, DC.

Hirschfeld’s work for the Prussian government.¹ Through this measure Chancellor von Papen and his conservative allies unseated the elected center-left Prussian government of Otto Braun (SPD) with the backing of President Paul von Hindenburg, despite a dubious constitutional basis.² Most fundamentally for Hirschfeld, von Papen’s Coup brought his employment in the propagandistic defense of the Republic to a close.

Immediately following the Nazi seizure of power in 1933, Hirschfeld fled to Switzerland via Czechoslovakia accompanied by his wife Bella and their two daughters. The Nazis used his flight as a pretext to strip Hirschfeld and his family of their German citizenship.³ Stateless and denied Swiss residency, the Hirschfelds moved across the French border from Basel.⁴ In Alsatian St. Louis/St. Ludwig, separated from Germany only by the Rhine river, Hirschfeld continued to denounce the Nazi regime journalistically until the outbreak of hostilities in 1939.

Amidst the chaos following the French defeat, Hirschfeld fortunately secured an Emergency Visa for the United States at the American consulate in Marseille in August 1940.⁵ The Hirschfelds followed Varian Fry and the Emergency Rescue Committee’s established yet insecure route to Portuguese ports via Francoist Spain, before disembarking in New York’s

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² Since the 1950s, scholars have continuously identified the Prussian Coup as ushering in the final, authoritarian turn of the Weimar Republic and the fatal defeat of its democratic parties, cf. Karl Dietrich Bracher’s classic account: Karl Dietrich Bracher, Die Auflösung der Weimarer Republik (Stuttgart: Ring-Verlag, 1955). Even structural argumentations cite the importance of the Prussian Coup, cf. Detlev J. K. Peukert, Die Weimarer Republik: Krisenjahre der Klassischen Moderne (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1987), 258.


⁵ Hirschfeld, “Curriculum Vitae for AFSC.”
harbor nearly eight months later, on March 7, 1941. While the United States offered a safe haven from persecution, Hirschfeld and his family faced considerable doubts about the future. Like in their previous stations in Europe, the Hirschfelds found themselves again on the margins of a society with a different culture, language, and system of professional credentials.

This chapter seeks to outline the transformation of a group of leftist German-speaking refugees from the margins of society in exile to indispensable power brokers in postwar Berlin. Their political agenda evolved from their political radicalization in the face of the Nazis’ dismantling of the Weimar Republic to their gradual alienation from Soviet-style Communism and converse appreciation of liberal democracy in exile. In order to unearth this crucial link between wartime New York City and postwar Berlin, this chapter outlines the geographic and ideological scattering of left-wing German-speaking exiles, the unique opportunities and constraints of exiles in wartime Manhattan, the popularization of the term “freedom” in their political thought, and the foundation of the network through the movement of key members back to Germany in the late 1940s. Both anti-totalitarian convictions precipitated by the experience of exile and the contacts made during this time would serve a network of former revolutionary socialists particularly well in Berlin’s Cold War politics as staunch defenders of democracy.

I. Political Fragmentation, 1932-1941

The Outpost network’s success derived in no small part from its members’ durable anti-totalitarian convictions. This ideological cohesion is even more remarkable in light of the

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political fragmentation that had hamstrung the opposition to the Nazis in exile until the outbreak of World War II. For instance, the personal and political journeys of future network members Willy Brandt, Paul Hertz, Ernst Reuter, and Hans Hirschfeld exemplify fracturing of German Social Democracy over the defeat by the Nazis during the first years in exile.

Hans Hirschfeld’s biographical trajectory had exemplified the democratic promise of the Weimar Republic. Born in 1895 into an affluent, Social Democratic family of assimilated Jews, Hirschfeld joined the SPD in 1913.7 Excelling academically, Hirschfeld took courses on the theoretical underpinnings of Marxism with Rosa Luxemburg at the SPD Reichsparteischule in 1912.8 Nonetheless, Hirschfeld volunteered in 1914 to serve in the Kaiserreich’s Army for the entire duration of World War I. After the Armistice, the young veteran quickly completed his law degree in 1920.9

After attaining his degree, Hirschfeld eschewed the legal profession, however, and chose a career in journalism instead. As editor of the SPD news service in Berlin, Hirschfeld became immersed into the SPD party apparatus, its affiliated large-scale party press, as well as Berlin’s journalist milieu of the Weimar era. Carl Severing, Social Democratic Prussian Minister of the Interior, took an interest in Hirschfeld in his attempt to bring Republican loyalists into its notoriously conservative bureaucracy. Consequently, he appointed Hirschfeld as the youngest Prussian Ministerialrat to implement Prussian press policy in 1921.


In the Prussian Ministry of the Interior, Hirschfeld mounted a vigorous journalistic defense of the Weimar Republic in press and radio broadcasts against assaults from the radical Left and Right, respectively. As member of the Board of Directors of the *Drahtloser Dienst*, the German governmental radio news agency, and Vice President of the *Deutsche Welle*, the governmental broadcasting program for an international audience, Hirschfeld strove to “connect” Prussian press policy with “the labor unions and the democratic and republican parties in the Republic” in “support of their struggle against the forces of reaction and militarism.”\(^{10}\) This prominent position and his background made Hirschfeld a target for Nazis and reactionary conservatives alike.

Von Papen’s 1932 Prussian Coup not only ended Hirschfeld’s work for the Prussian government, it also razed one of the preeminent bulwarks of republicanism in Germany. Despite its popular reputation for reaction, Prussia had continuously elected SPD-led governments, due to the large working-class milieus in the population centers of the Ruhr, Berlin, and Upper Silesia.\(^{11}\) In a tense party executive meeting, the SPD leadership voted for Severing’s proposition to limit their opposition to the Coup to judicial means. A proposed general strike was called off.\(^{12}\)

The timid reaction of the senior Social Democratic leadership infuriated many younger party members. The urge to resist the Nazi challenge militantly prompted the rise of left-wing breakaways from the SPD, most notably the SAP, the Socialist Workers’ Party of Germany and

\(^{10}\) Hirschfeld, “Curriculum Vitae for AFSC.” Carl Severing has also highlighted the bipartisan nature of Hirschfeld’s journalistic work, cf. Carl Severing, *Mein Lebensweg*, vol. 2 (Köln: Greven, 1950), 318.


**Neu Beginnen** (NB).\(^{13}\) In the Baltic port city of Lübeck, the internal Social Democratic opposition counted nineteen-year-old apprentice Herbert Frahm, later known under his nom de guerre Willy Brandt. Gifted with both teenage passion and political prescience, Frahm concluded that the inability of the political Left to openly confront reactionaries and Nazis in unified fashion contributed to the imminent demise of the Republic. Instead, Communists and Social Democrats remained locked in an intense – and at times lethal – rivalry between each other.

Twenty-eight years later, the Prussian Coup remained a formative political event for the West Berlin Governing Mayor. In his first autobiography, in which he introduced himself as a steadfast defender of Western democracy to the American and West German publics alike, Brandt shared his lessons: “It is tragic to lose in open battle – but surrender without a fight turns tragedy into a farce. It robs the beaten of the last they own, their most precious: their self-respect.”\(^{14}\) This stark rhetoric won Brandt more voters as an eminent politician in the Cold War than as a junior party activist against the Nazis in 1932. Embittered, he broke with the SPD and his mentor Julius Leber and joined the radical breakaway SAP.\(^{15}\) Thus von Papen’s Coup did not only weaken the democratic parties decisively, it also exposed the fissures among Social Democrats on how to best oppose fascism that anticipated the acrimonious debate that would fracture the SPD in exile.


The 1933 victory of National Socialism in Germany prompted the geographical dispersion and political divisions of those Social Democrats who managed to flee. Like many other exiles, the Czechoslovak Republic (ČSR) became the initial destination for the Hirschfelds due to Prague’s proximity to Berlin, democratic structure, and urbane, German-speaking milieu. Due to this critical mass of the first wave of émigrés, Prague became host to a provisional SPD Party Executive in Exile that reconstituted itself as the Sopade.

After the Nazi confiscation of all SPD party assets in May 1933, ten Party Executive members hastily met in the French controlled Saar Territory. They included Chairman Otto Wels, future postwar Chairman Erich Ollenhauer, and future United States exiles Siegfried Aufhäuser, Marie Juchacz, Erich Rinner, Friedrich Wilhelm Sollmann, and Paul Hertz. Unanimously, they asserted that a provisional SPD Party Executive in exile in Prague represented the party and tasked it to develop “new forms of political activities.” Thus the newly reconstituted party organ Neuer Vorwärts thundered from Prague at the end of July:

“The Party Executive of the Social Democratic Party of Germany calls to arms. Against a world of slavery, it is now the only visible and effective center of resistance and attack for Germany! Germans across borders, Workers, Freedom-loving humans over the world, rise up! The decision between Kultur and barbarism may stand for centuries.”

The Sopade’s founding proclamation exhibits new militancy as well as thinly veiled political fragility. According to émigré historian Lewis J. Edinger, Hans Vogel, Siegmund Crummenerl, Friedrich Stampfer, Ollenhauer, and Hertz drove the work of the Sopade into a new

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political direction under the leadership of Wels. Together, they espoused stridently Marxist language that promised liberation from Hitler through a “revolutionary” Social Democratic Party.\(^{19}\) For this lofty goal, the Sopade placed particular emphasis on media. Thus veteran Social Democratic journalist Stampfer edited the *Neuer Vorwärts*, which was aimed at an émigré and international audience. Meanwhile Hertz became editor of the clandestinely circulated *Sozialistische Aktion* that was intended to inspire a German underground resistance.\(^{20}\) The Sopade’s new radical guise and its intention to create a domestic resistance within the Reich were partly a reaction to the torrent of criticism from the further Left.

A plethora of political groups took issue with the Sopade’s self-characterization as the “only visible and effective center of resistance,” most notably their old Communist rivals. Despite KPD leader Ernst Thälmann’s incarceration in Nazi concentration camps, the party could still count on underground cells within the Reich. Senior leaders of the party had regrouped in Moscow under the leadership of Wilhelm Pieck and Walter Ulbricht. Learning nothing from Weimar’s recent collapse, the KPD leadership continued to denounce and fight Social Democracy as *Social Fascism*.\(^{21}\) According to this example of Marxist dialectics, Social Democrats became indistinguishable from Fascists due to their support of liberal democracies that served the bourgeoisie and its Fascist proponents.\(^{22}\) Since its adoption in 1928, the Social Fascism thesis benefitted from Stalin’s vital support, rather than from any intrinsic logic. Hoping to attract Stalin’s support, KPD leaders started to brandish this accusation against intra-party


\(^{20}\) Ibid., 45–46.


rivals. The farcical infighting between Thälmann and Heinz Neumann during the final days of the Weimar Republic anticipated the reciprocal and often lethal accusations of “disloyalty” that would characterize – and decimate – the KPD during its Moscow exile years and the concurrent Great Purges.\textsuperscript{23}

Due to the sharp antagonism between the Sopade and KPD, Neu Beginnen gained in stature. Derived from a splinter group of Communist dissidents around Walter Loewenheim, Neu Beginnen emerged in September 1933 with an eponymous programmatic essay.\textsuperscript{24} Under the pseudonym “Miles,” Loewenheim argued that the political division of the German workers’ movement had been a precondition for the Nazis’ success. As a consequence, he called for a clean break “from the past that has been outlived” and the unification of the German Left through “revolutionary Socialism.”\textsuperscript{25} This bold proposal brought a small, clandestine group of hundred to a hundred-fifty cadres to the center of conversation in leftist exile circles.\textsuperscript{26} Moreover, Neu Beginnen could bolster its influence through its claim of possessing a tightly knit resistance network within the Reich. Under the new leadership of Karl B. Frank, Neu Beginnen bolstered its reputation of possessing resistance cells within Nazi Germany by scrupulously compiling inside reports from the Reich.\textsuperscript{27}


\textsuperscript{24} Foitzik, \textit{Zwischen den Fronten}, 26, 70.


\textsuperscript{27} These rare sources have since been republished in: Stöver, “Die Berichte der Gruppe Neu Beginnen aus dem Dritten Reich.”
Neu Beginnen presented a serious challenge to the Sopade by claiming to represent a *New Left* that transcended the schism between Communists and Social Democrats.\(^{28}\) Neu Beginnen’s demand for a Popular Front against the Nazis anticipated the divisive issue that would eventually fracture the Sopade Executive. Despite Chairman Wels’ refusal to recognize Neu Beginnen as a group of equal standing, Hertz and Frank began a programmatic conversation on the pages of the *Zeitschrift für Sozialismus*.\(^{29}\) These discussions marked the beginning of a close cooperation between Neu Beginnen’s Frank and Sopade Executive members Aufhäuser, Karl Böchel, and Hertz.\(^{30}\) Anticipating later cooperation within the network, future West Berlin Mayor Reuter followed this conversation from his Turkish exile “with great interest,” despite reprimanding its “slightly academic Marxist” jargon. Thus he made a donation to Neu Beginnen and asked his “friend” Hertz to put him contact with its leader Frank.\(^{31}\)

The debate whether the reaction to Fascism necessitated a Popular Front with the Communists divided the Sopade Executive. After the KPD had stridently dismissed any Popular Front for years, Stalin’s 1935 endorsement of the concept prompted the reversal of his German subordinates on the spot.\(^{32}\) Due to their long antagonism even this reversal, offering an anti-fascist Popular Front, could not overcome the ingrained anti-Communism of the Sopade’s

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32 Eley, *Forging Democracy*, 263–266.
majority that pointed to the violent street fights between both sides that accompanied the founding of the Weimar Republic.\textsuperscript{33}

Volatile political divisions were not the only challenges these émigrés faced, as Hirschfeld’s example attests. Hirschfeld also had to invest considerable resources in maintaining a network in exile and had to cope – together with his family – with social uprooting. Just as German-speaking émigrés scattered across Europe and beyond, the Hirschfelds did not stay in the ČSR, but tried to settle in Switzerland. Swiss authorities denied their petition for residency, however.\textsuperscript{34} Instead, they moved to Basle’s Alsatian suburb St. Louis/St. Ludwig, precisely one block across the border.\textsuperscript{35} This curious location was no coincidence. Hirschfeld became active in the Alsatian section of the Sopade’s clandestine network of \textit{Grenzbüros} that carried news and resources across borders.\textsuperscript{36} As such he remained in close contact with Social Democrats remaining in the Reich and his fellow \textit{Grenzsekretäre} Franz Bögler, Waldemar von Knoeringen, Paul Hertz, and Emil Kirschmann.\textsuperscript{37} Through his clandestine resistance work and closest collaborators, Hirschfeld increasingly gravitated towards the Neu Beginnen organization even while he still was a Sopade activist.\textsuperscript{38}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{33} Edinger, \textit{German Exile Politics: The Social Democratic Executive Committee in the Nazi Era.}, 113–146.
\item \textsuperscript{34} Hirschfeld, “Curriculum Vitae for AFSC.”
\item \textsuperscript{35} Hans E. Hirschfeld, “Brief an Paul Hertz,” August 4, 1938, Nachlass Paul Hertz, Film XXXI A-H, Archiv der sozialen Demokratie, Bonn.
\item \textsuperscript{36} Hartmut Mehringer, \textit{Waldemar von Knoeringen, eine politische Biographie: Der Weg vom revolutionären Sozialismus zur sozialen Demokratie} (München: Saur, 1989), 169.
\item \textsuperscript{37} Hirschfeld, “Brief an Paul Hertz,” August 4, 1938.
\end{itemize}
Life as a refugee took its toll on the former Ministerialrat which forced him and his family into a precarious existence with uncertain legal status and very limited financial resources. Hirschfeld’s ambiguous relationship with Swiss authorities illustrates the challenges wrought by both. On the one hand, Hirschfeld relied on anti-fascist activists based in Switzerland for maintaining political contacts and financial support. Simultaneously, intermittent Swiss entry bans hit Hirschfeld hard. He harshly criticized Swiss authorities as he bitterly noted that being labeled “a Jew, a Socialist, a political refugee, are plenty of ‘plague stains’ today.” Fatalistically, he remarked to his friend Hertz: “How to struggle through [life] remains to be seen.”

As the years wore on, Leftist émigrés like Hirschfeld felt increasingly desperate despite their activism. Their compatriots continued to show little indication of organized resistance against the Nazi regime. The Gestapo hunted down clandestine cells with increasing efficiency. Moreover the Nazis’ foreign policy revisionism found widespread public approval as perceived rectification of past injustices. The 1938 Austrian Anschluss and the Munich Agreement added a new quality to the Leftist exiles woes. France and the United Kingdom condoned the Nazi conquest of Austria and the dismantlement of ČSR through the occupation of the Sudetenland and the de-facto annexation of the “Protectorate.” Hirschfeld tersely called the Nazi invasion of the ČSR a “Trauerspiel,” or tragedy. Nazi rule from the Prague Castle also destroyed the main operational base for the exiled German opposition and the Sopade in particular.

Increasing Nazi pressure on the ČSR and the election of Socialist Léon Blum as French premier had prompted the Sopade Executive’s move from Prague to Paris in the summer of 1938.

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40 Ibid.

Despite the evacuation’s prescience, this shift hamstrung the party’s work. Moreover, Neu Beginnen openly questioned the Sopade’s sacrosanct claim to represent the German workers’ movement in exile. As an alternative, Neu Beginnen pushed for a “concentration” of all Socialist exile groups among equals. Controversially, this move would have not only eroded the Sopade’s authority, but also wedded the pragmatic Sopade to the stridently Marxist perspective of revolutionary Socialism.42

Thus tensions between Neu Beginnen sympathizer Hertz and his Social Democratic comrades within the Sopade Executive reached the boiling point. In an acrimonious meeting on August 10, 1938, Hertz concluded that “this circle did not support […] the party’s democratic renewal […] while it endures a process of disintegration.”43 Deploiring the controversy as “émigré klatch” while “the brutal abuses in the concentration camps” continued unabated, Friedrich Stampfer characterized Hertz’ support for Neu Beginnen as an “open declaration of war” against the Sopade.44 Hertz’ secret cooperation with Neu Beginnen infuriated Stampfer and the majority of the Executive in particular. Unbeknownst to them, Hertz and key Grenzbüro leaders such as Bögler and von Knoeringen had simultaneously worked for the Neu Beginnen activist network for years.45

All three denounced activists had also been among Hirschfeld’s closest political friends in exile. In addition, Neu Beginnen’s agenda appealed to Hirschfeld’s political priorities. Earlier in 1938, Hirschfeld had implored his Sopade comrades to realize that “the main goal is to support

42 Edinger, German Exile Politics: The Social Democratic Executive Committee in the Nazi Era., 175–177.
44 Ibid., 329–330.
45 Ibid., 331.
the work on the borders and inside [the Reich] by any means.” For Hirschfeld, the situation called for “overcoming the fragmentation, [making the] joining of forces desperately necessary, as disproportionately different and higher sacrifices [are made] over there [in Germany].”46 At this point Hirschfeld himself had become a Neu Beginnen sympathizer, if not an outright member. Notably, he criticized his Sopade companions through Neu Beginnen’s talking points of resistance within the Reich and the need for Socialist unity.

Not surprisingly, Hirschfeld broke from the Sopade after it had banished Paul Hertz for his perceived treason. Their correspondence indicates how much Hirschfeld identified with Hertz and Neu Beginnen’s goals at this point. Hirschfeld suggested to build up a “cartel” of Neu Beginnen and other small Marxist exile groups against the Sopade and acerbically accused the Sopade Executive of “sabotaging” leftist unity.47 Despite the professed need for political unity by all actors, the personal acrimonies illustrate how much German leftist émigré politics had fallen into disarray by the end of 1938.

The events of the following year would further compound the problems of Sopade and Neu Beginnen members by turning their political activism into a fight for their very survival. The immediate reaction of the French government to the outbreak of World War II in September 1939 entailed the evacuation of the population in municipalities near the German border to other regions of France. The Hirschfelds’ found themselves in rural Lectoure, in the southwestern Gers department, among their neighbors from St. Louis/St. Ludwig. The Hirschfelds must have found a significant degree of acceptance among the displaced Alsatians, since the Mayor of Mulhouse vouched for their “loyalty to France” when French authorities commenced the internment of


German refugees as indésirables. Despite their local supporters, the Hirschfelds shared the fate of many other prominent German-speaking émigrés such as Neu Beginnen’s eleventh hour Communist associate Willi Münzenberg. They were detained in the Catus Camp in the Lot department, about 100 kilometers north of Lectoure.

Strikingly, Hans Hirschfeld, aged forty-five, volunteered for the French Army from the internment camp in January 1940. Details of his service in the French Army alongside the British Expeditionary Force north of Paris remain elusive, but a letter to his wife Bella illustrates his motivation to serve. On June 10, 1940, when the French defensive lines already buckled precariously, Hirschfeld lamented the “awful events all around, the battle that has been raging in bright flames for days.” Simultaneously, he anticipated present-day terminology by characterizing the war as “becoming more and more a Vernichtungskrieg, or war of annihilation, by the Fascist states of violence, [bound to bring] Unfreiheit, or unfreedom, [fighting] against anything named Culture and Ideas.” Looking back at his wife’s years in exile and to the future of their daughters, Hirschfeld framed the war as a stark political choice:

“We have already endured much suffering and many sacrifices for freedom, for our ideas of humanity and justice. Now we have to commit to the last and highest effort to win – or lose everything!! This certitude must strengthen and ready us – right?”

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51 Hirschfeld, “Curriculum Vitae for AFSC”; Hervé, “Mémorandum.”

On the same day, the Wehrmacht offensive forced the French government to vacate Paris and declare it an open city, signaling the imminent collapse of the Third Republic and of Hirschfeld’s hopes. Still, service in the French Army proved beneficial in hindsight as it extracted Hirschfeld from the camps that would entrap many internees like Münzenberg. Yet the Fall of France put Hirschfeld in grave personal danger. The Wehrmacht, Abwehr, and Gestapo commandos that now combed through France considered him a Social Democratic traitor as well as a Jew, like other activists such as Stampfer and Hertz. Fortunately, the Hirschfelds evidently could rely on contacts made during their evacuation. The family successfully reunited in unoccupied Lectoure.

Staying in France would quickly become a deadly risk, however. Encouraged by Nazi Germany, the newly installed Vichy government moved quickly to pass anti-Semitic legislation. Among the first measures passed was the October 4, 1940, “Statute on Jews” that called for the detention of “foreign Jews.” Hans Hirschfeld noted how they lived in fear of “a repetition of the Catus policies [i.e. internment] on a larger scale.” Not surprisingly, the Hirschfelds set their sights on the United States. Earlier, Hans Hirschfeld’s brother had emigrated to New York. In addition, Hirschfeld could benefit from two close Neu Beginnen friends in the United States.


Both Frank and Hertz had emigrated to New York City in 1938 after the political schism of German-speaking émigrés in Paris. Both became active in founding the American Friends of German Freedom (AFGF) that became Neu Beginnen’s de-facto American branch. The AFGF became instrumental in setting up the Emergency Rescue Committee (ERC). Neither Hertz nor Frank had forgotten the Hirschfelds. Hertz had publically denounced the French government internment of anti-fascist refugees as “the right of asylum’s decay in France.” Privately, he had brought Hirschfeld’s detention to former Socialist Prime Minister Léon Blum’s attention. Frank stayed in contact with Hirschfeld to help him leave France after the Third Republic’s collapse. At the ERC, Karl Frank himself not only hired the indefatigable Varian Fry, who would subvert Vichy laws to organize American entry visas from a skeptical State Department with legendary determination. Frank also added names to the crucial list of refugees eligible for the ERC’s support. The ERC supplied Hans Hirschfeld with American visa application instructions.


59 “Dr. Hertz über das Asylrecht in Frankreich,” Aufbau, February 16, 1940.


61 Hirschfeld, “Brief an Kurt Hirschfeld.”

62 Varian Fry has become the public face for the ERC’s efforts to evacuate German-Jewish refugees from Vichy France. A autobiography has been published posthumously, cf. Varian Fry, Assignment - Rescue: An Autobiography (New York: Scholastic, 1992). In addition, his activism has attracted a plethora of popular biographies, e.g. Andy Marino, A Quiet American: The Secret War of Varian Fry, 1st ed (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999); Sheila Isenberg, A Hero of Our Own: The Story of Varian Fry, 1st ed (New York: Random House, 2001); Carla Killough McClafferty, In Defiance of Hitler: The Secret Mission of Varian Fry, 1st ed (New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 2008). Varian Fry has been recognized as a Righteous Among the Nations by Yad Vashem and the City of Berlin has named a street in his honor in the reconstructed Potsdamer Platz area after the fall of the Wall.


Through the determined work of the ERC’s staff around American activist Varian Fry, Hirschfeld secured an Emergency Visa from the American Consulate in Marseille. With such highly sought-after documents in hand, the Hirschfelds started the precarious route to the neutral Portuguese ports through Vichy France and Francoist Spain. Hirschfeld dispassionately noted later that he “succeeded, after overcoming many difficulties by the German Gestapo in getting Portuguese and Spanish transit visas.” Wisely, they nonetheless chose to cross the French-Spanish border “illegally” in December 1940, most likely to avoid detection by German, French, or Spanish authorities. Walter Benjamin’s fate three months earlier illustrates the dangers of this route. Detained upon registering with Spanish authorities, Benjamin committed suicide in fear of extradition to German authorities. It would take the Hirschfelds another three months to reach American soil in New York’s harbor on March 7, 1941. Eight years of leftist – often radical – activism against it had made seemingly little impact on the Third Reich. Instead, their struggle left these activists bitterly divided and politically marginalized. Upon arrival in the United States, Hirschfeld could count as his only victory that he secured the survival of his family and himself.

II. **Wartime Exile in New York City, 1941-1949**

The subsequent – and somewhat surprising – political de-radicalization of these émigrés and tentative steps at political unification derived from their experiences in wartime exiles in

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66 Hirschfeld, “Curriculum Vitae for AFSC.”


Stockholm and London, but also New York. On the Hudson river, these German-speaking 
émigrés came to appreciate the civil rights proclaimed in liberal democracies, became thoroughly disillusioned with Soviet-style Communism, and eventually contributed directly to the American war effort. How did they survive in exile, adapt to American politics and change their political views?

In the years prior to the American entry into World War II, New York had arguably emerged as the preeminent haven for German-speaking émigrés. The city’s distant location across the Atlantic and political stability promised security from the aggressive Nazi military juggernaut. Its vibrant immigrant communities offered both the cultural ties and air of cosmopolitanism that the Nazis’ pursuit of a racial utopia sought to eradicate. The United States’ notoriously high hurdles for any visa tragically kept many refugees from safety, yet simultaneously reinforced New York’s appeal as the most sought after destination. Still, no less than 70,000 German-speaking refugees like the Hirschfelds found their way to New York City from 1933 until 1941. These newly arrived formed a diverse group of refugees either outright stripped of their citizenship like Hirschfeld, or carrying German, superseded Austrian or invalidated Czech passports. In addition, personal reasons for fleeing Europe varied greatly, ranging from political convictions, to religious faith, or Nazi racial categories.

As a result, German-speaking émigrés quickly organized themselves along sectarian and political lines they encountered in New York rather than forming a single homogenous community. Moreover, political émigrés in particular recreated the divisions they had imported from Europe to the city. Among Socialist circles, the rift between Sopade and Neu Beginnen ran

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across the Atlantic. Sopade members around former Prussian Minister of the Interior Albert Grzesinski, former Hamburg Mayor Max Brauer, and Stampfer set up the *German Labor Delegation* (GLD).\(^{71}\) As its name already implied, the German Labor Delegation benefitted from links to American labor organizations. In particular, steady donations from the *American Federation of Labor* (AFL) and the *Jewish Labor Committee* formed the GLD’s main source of revenue.\(^{72}\) While small in numbers, these contributions marked the AFL’s first contact with German Labor activists. Most notably, this connection would form the nucleus for a burgeoning network that would prove instrumental in aligning West German trade unions to the Western side in the Cold War.\(^{73}\) Moreover, American unionists such the enigmatic Jay Lovestone, Victor G. Reuther, and Walther Reuther would also support the Outpost network at the center of this study in postwar Berlin.\(^{74}\)

Simultaneously, Frank and Hertz regrouped local Neu Beginnen members under the banner of the AFGF. Notably, the AFGF reconnected Frank and Hertz with Hirschfeld and Kirschmann, among others.\(^{75}\) Its initial objective had been to raise American donations for Neu Beginnen’s struggle in Europe. The industrious Frank quickly built up a network of his American donors, counting again on the AFL.\(^{76}\) The competition for funds from the limited pool of donors

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\(^{74}\) Cf. Chapter 3.

\(^{75}\) “Aufruf an die demokratischen Deutschen in Südamerika,” January 30, 1943, Nachlass Paul Hertz, Film XX Aktivitäten der American Friends of German Freedom, Archiv der sozialen Demokratie, Bonn.

intensified the rivalry between GLD and AFGF. The bitter split between Stampfer and Hertz in Paris intensified this rivalry and prompted a GLD campaign against Frank.\textsuperscript{77} The connections to the AFL illustrate how both the AFGF and the GLD could attract an amount of attention from left liberal segments of the American public that belied their marginal size and the personal animosity between them.

Both the AFGF and the GLD stood out from the broader émigrés’ experience of polite disinterest to their plight and causes that marked the overwhelming reaction of mainstream American society. American authorities treated these refugees as regular immigrants. Thus they expected rapid assimilation and had little inclination to offer any kind of assistance.\textsuperscript{78} The leftist émigrés tried to conform to these expectations as well as they could. For instance, Hertz acquired American citizenship.\textsuperscript{79} Although contemporaries could construe this as resignation in their struggle for an \textit{Other Germany}, this bureaucratic act entailed tangible benefits such as material security and a considerable degree of acceptance by mainstream American society.

Less fortunate individuals like Hirschfeld could benefit from a host of charities that had sprung up to fill the void of governmental assistance. Next to the aforementioned ERC, the Hirschfelds benefited from the refugee committee of the \textit{American Friends Service Committee} (AFSC).\textsuperscript{80} More established émigrés like Bryn Mawr Social Work Professor Hertha Kraus and


\textsuperscript{78} Winkler, “Metropole New York,” 180–181.


Robert Kempner, an emigré lawyer who would serve as an American prosecutor at the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, helped the newly arrived. Kraus could empathize with the Hirschfelds as a Social Democrat and convert to the Society of Friends with Jewish ancestry herself. She had emigrated to the United States in 1933.\footnote{For Kraus’ biography, cf: Gerd Schirrmacher, \textit{Hertha Kraus, zwischen den Welten: Biographie einer Sozialwissenschaftlerin und Quäkerin, 1897-1968} (Frankfurt am Main: Lang, 2002).} As their case worker, Kraus passionately helped the Hirschfeld’s two teenage daughters to adjust to the American educational system. Most notably, she secured their participation in an introductory summer camp in the summer of 1941, since the lack of extended social contacts in the United States otherwise left the family “little chance to get established in the near future.”\footnote{Hertha Kraus, “Memorandum to Lynn Daetsch,” May 9, 1941, Accession Number: 2002.296 American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) Refugee Assistance Case Files, Case File 6999, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum Collections, Washington, DC.} Robert Kempner’s plea for help on his friend’s behalf alludes to the strains resulting from their nearly decade long flight. To Kempner, Hirschfeld had become “fairly distraught,” over the uncertain educational prospects of his daughters.\footnote{Robert Kempner, “Brief an Hertha Kraus,” June 9, 1941, Accession Number: 2002.296 American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) Refugee Assistance Case Files, Case File 6999, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum Collections, Washington, DC.}

Hans and Bella Hirschfeld’s network of friends and supporters in New York also highlighted the durability of their identity as German socialists. The Hirschfelds primarily moved within the circles of exiled Social Democrats, Neu Beginnen members, and their American supporters. They did not become active within New York’s bourgeoning and diverse Jewish community, although the Nazi regime had also persecuted them because of their Jewish descent. For instance, the Hirschfelds made no advances to receive aid from New York’s extensive Jewish community support system for refugees, but relied on the ERC, AFSC, and émigré friends that tended to left-leaning secular refugees. Similar to his fellow New York Socialist
émigrés, Aufhäuser, Hertz, and Stampfer, Hirschfeld only mentioned his Jewish background in context of the Nazi persecution.\textsuperscript{84} This suggests a centrality of Socialist and humanist convictions for these émigrés’ self-conception that postwar scholarship emphasizing their Jewish backgrounds has neglected.\textsuperscript{85} Moreover, the degree of secularization arguably became a determining factor of their future postwar biographies, since all of these émigrés mentioned eventually returned to Germany, in contrast to the number of German-Jewish exiles who stayed in the United States.

Apart from reconstituted friendships dating back to their Berlin days, the Hirschfelds also found support in the space of Manhattan’s sizeable émigré community. Notably, Hans Hirschfeld continuously held addresses in the Washington Heights neighborhood throughout his years in the United States.\textsuperscript{86} Located on Manhattan’s northern tip, the neighborhood attracted around 25,000 German-speaking immigrants, enough to become informally known as the “Fourth Reich on the Hudson.”\textsuperscript{87} The Hirschfelds fell into the dominating demographics of this new center of German-speaking immigrants that hosted bourgeois families of Jewish descent who arrived between 1938 and 1941. This environment helped them to adjust to life in the United States. Their daughters went on to college, and received Green Cards.\textsuperscript{88} Hans Hirschfeld’s legal status, however, remained precarious. A Green Card as gateway to naturalization never superseded his emergency

\textsuperscript{84} Notably, Hertz’ and Hirschfeld’s Jewish background remains curiously absent in their archival collections in the holdings of the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, the Archiv der sozialen Demokratie and the Landesarchiv Berlin.


\textsuperscript{86} Kraus, “Memorandum to Lynn Daetsch”; Hirschfeld, “Curriculum Vitae for AFSC.”

\textsuperscript{87} Winkler, “Metropole New York,” 179.

 visa, keeping him stateless. Moreover, he had to renew his visa regularly. This impaired his chances on the job market as well. Through his émigré connections, Hirschfeld found some supplemental income as a research assistant for the Social Science Research Council (SSRC) and the émigré-derived New School for Social Research.

New York émigré scholars affiliated with the Frankfurt School also fascinated the young Jewish-American sociology graduate student Harold Hurwitz. Inspired by the works of émigré playwright Ernst Toller, Hurwitz had enrolled at Columbia University to write a dissertation on Toller’s main political project, the short-lived Bavarian Soviet Republic in the aftermath of World War One. At Columbia, Hurwitz took a formative seminar with Max Horkheimer in which he discussed the roots of German authoritarianism with fellow Frankfurt luminaries Franz Neumann, Otto Kirchheimer, Friedrich Pollack, and Leo Löwenthal. Fascinated by these German-speaking unorthodox Marxists, the self-professed “Norman Thomas socialist” began to question his pacifism. Thus the New Left’s search for a Third Way between capitalism and Soviet-style Communism became a cause that preoccupied Hurwitz’ life. For him, Germany seemed to be the principal battleground in the quest to reconcile personal liberties with economic justice. Thus Hurwitz entered the New York émigré circles to learn more about the political aspirations of “the Other Germany.” Hurwitz became politically active with fellow graduate student, and later eminent sociologist, Dennis Wrong. Together they founded the anti-Stalinist

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90 Hirschfeld, “Curriculum Vitae for AFSC.”


“Socialist Club at Columbia.” New York’s émigré scene inspired Hurwitz’ activism and intellectual interests that would eventually bring him to postwar Berlin.

Hurwitz’ shifting interpretation of Socialism reflects that of fellow Columbia graduate student Melvin J. Lasky as well. In college, the City University of New York (CUNY) history major had fervently tried to convert Communist fellow travelers to Trotskyist Marxism. Yet the Nazis’ war in Europe and the persecution of its Jewish communities shook Lasky’s worldview. He concluded that the defense of human rights necessitated American intervention and his contribution. Thus Lasky accepted a position at the Leftist, yet anti-Communist weekly New Leader “as something of a Social Democrat” in 1942 before induction into the US Army a year later. The young Jewish-American Socialists Hurwitz’ and Lasky’s fascination with German émigré Marxists as a source for new political paradigms pointed to the larger intellectual crisis of Socialism in Western democracies like the United States during the late 1930s and early 1940s.

III. Support for ‘Freedom’ and origin of the network

Experiences in their exile abodes and international political developments led German-speaking left radical groups like Neu Beginnen to gradually appreciate liberal democracy. The emergence of “freedom” as a central category in non-Communist leftist émigrés political writings exemplifies this development. For instance, Hirschfeld had already explained his military service on the Allied side as the defense of freedom. In the Battle of France during the summer of 1940, he remarked starkly: “Europe’s and the fate of us all depends on the [war’s] outcome. Millions now face each other in the struggle over Vernichtung, or annihilation, over

93 Ibid., 1.
destruction and over freedom.” Nazi Germany’s rampage across Europe endangered not only the right form of Socialism, but fundamental values of civilization. In addition, Germany’s unleashing of World War Two made clear that stemming the Nazi tide required mass conscription armies as much as secretive socialist cadre cells. Thus Hirschfeld and other Neu Beginnen members sought more inclusive terms to validate their fight against National Socialism.

Hirschfeld’s service in the French Army anticipated official Neu Beginnen policy, when Hertz publically professed “where given refuge, [Neu Beginnen activists] are ready to fulfill their duties. Freedom and democracy will be only restored, when Hitler has been destroyed militarily. German refugees want to contribute to this task.” Consequently, Neu Beginnen alumni in the United States would enter American service, most notably in the OSS. The initiative of Neu Beginnen’s self-identified revolutionary socialists to enter the war against Nazi Germany under a flag that stood for liberal democracy and market economy had been deliberate. Neu Beginnen members gained a new appreciation of liberal democracy from their experience in the United States at the height of the New Deal. In 1943, Neu Beginnen leader Frank identified the United States as the best hope for democracy in postwar Germany. He concluded that solution of “the problems in Central Europe […] by bourgeois democratic countries under American leadership” would enable “the free development of independent democratic propellants.” Notably, Frank cited “particular democratic rights of freedom” that the United States proclaimed as the main

95 Hirschfeld, “Brief an Bella Hirschfeld.”


97 Cf. next section.
advantage of American model in Germany.\textsuperscript{98} The former Communist’s espousal of civil rights was also a response to the non-Communist left’s gradual disillusionment from Soviet Communism.

Several Stalinist policies alienated the Neu Beginnen network from Soviet Communism. First was the sobering experience of the Spanish Civil War. Like many other international leftists, Neu Beginnen members had come to the aid of the Republic. In the summer of 1937, however, Frank travelled to Spain to investigate the disappearance of a young volunteer. He came to the conclusion that that person had fallen victim to the violent crackdown of the Stalinist PCE against non-orthodox Communist groups in Barcelona that spring.\textsuperscript{99} Combined with initial accounts of the Stalinist purges, these developments reinforced old suspicions of the Communists. But the 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact prompted a final break from the Soviet Union. Stalin’s rapprochement with Nazi Germany, in which they carved up Eastern Europe between them, came a week before Hitler started the war. Consequently, this cynical move equated Comintern with treason for Neu Beginnen. Von Knoeringen judged witheringly “that Russian politics have nothing in common with international socialism anymore.”\textsuperscript{100} Neu Beginnen’s political transformation mirrored that of other groups, most notably Willy Brandt’s SAP.\textsuperscript{101}

\textsuperscript{98} Quoted in Rainer Behring, \textit{Demokratische Außenpolitik für Deutschland: Die außenpolitischen Vorstellungen deutscher Sozialdemokraten im Exil 1933 - 1945} (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1999), 305.

\textsuperscript{99} Löwenthal, “Konflikte, Bündnisse und Resultate der deutschen politischen Emigration,” 631.


\textsuperscript{101} For the SAP’s and Brandt’s transformative exile experience, cf. Merseburger, \textit{Willy Brandt}, 126–171.
completed what Hartmut Mehringer described as the transformation of an initially anti-fascist consensus into an anti-totalitarian consensus. ¹⁰²

The emerging anti-totalitarian consensus would shape the politics of the non-Communist German Left for decades to come. During World War Two it helped to unite scattered leftist exiles and align them with Western Allied foreign policy. For instance, Ernst Reuter attempted to unite the non-Communist German opposition to National Socialism from his Turkish exile under the heading of “freedom.” Reuter contacted New Yorker GLD member Albert Grzesinski with the ambitious proposal for a Deutscher Freiheitsbund, or German Freedom Federation. Its ambitious program gave insights into Reuter’s conception of “freiheitlicher Sozialismus.” Reuter called his German compatriots to topple the Nazi regime and seek peace immediately, arguing “a quick mortal blow [for the regime] can save the lives of hundreds of thousands, can save mothers their sons, can save wives their husbands.” He warned against any illusions about the terms of peace hoping that “the unity of the Reich” could be preserved at best, but that “a new country must develop out of the rubble.”

The restoration of civil rights, the rule of law, and a liberal-democratic parliamentary system were pillars for this new Germany Reuter envisioned. Specifically, he reached out to conservative German democrats and Western democracies to realize this vision, noting

“As everywhere on earth, we will have different ideals among our people and consequently different parties will be necessary. Each healthy people needs conservative and progressive forces. Their peaceful competition is indicator of a healthy communal life. We must learn from the mistakes of the past, the ominous fragmentation, the abuse of freedom – as we must learn from the experience of all free people with whom we will cooperate.”¹⁰³


Thus Reuter laid out his political vision of a liberal democratic Germany that earned the acceptance of Western democracies. The implementation of this vision would animate his career in postwar Berlin. His biographer David Barclay has contended that the Freiheitsbund embodied Reuter’s hope for an anti-Hitler coalition between Social Democrats and bourgeois parties that anticipated the SPD’s gradual postwar development towards a big-tent party.  

Most notably, Communist forces were strikingly absent from Reuter’s manifesto for postwar Germany. While he dreamed of political openness, he noted that it predicated acceptance of the liberal democratic framework. Specifically, Reuter warned against “governing this New Germany with Nazi methods under the opposite direction.” In his letter to Grzesinski, Reuter billed the Freiheitsbund as an alternative to the Communist-dominated *Nationalkommittee Freies Deutschland* that had recently formed in Moscow including the nucleus of the *Gruppe Ulbricht*, whom he dismissed as “not really independent.”

Reuter instead hoped for Germany’s postwar future as a rehabilitated member of Western democracies. Gradual acceptance would follow only after earnest repentance, however:

> “Germany’s esteem in the world outside has sunk deeply. […] The bloody reprisals against the civilian population in occupied countries, the hostage shootings, the atrocity murder of Jews, the razing of entire localities, all these crimes committed in the name of the German people without precise knowledge in the homeland have stained us with ignominy. […] It will take the span of a human lifetime until our people are forgiven. A mountain of hate and mistrust will surround us. We will not overcome this mistrust through polite words, with the assurance of not having known anything, or that only the Nazis were at fault. Only sincere cooperation, a truly free regime, a radical break from all dreams of the past […] will gradually achieve change.”

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105 Reuter, “Programmatische Grundgedanken des Deutschen Freiheitsbundes.”


107 Reuter, “Programmatische Grundgedanken des Deutschen Freiheitsbundes.”
Germans’ best chance for international rehabilitation presumed its embrace of the concept of freedom. While the Freiheitsbund would find little recognition outside of its origins in the small Turkish exile circles, it had one immense benefit for Reuter: the manifesto put his name on American governmental records – inextricably linked with “freedom.” Unknown to Reuter, two of his Turkish exile acquaintances, Alexander Rüstow und Hans Wilbrandt, had become informants of the OSS. They would pass his manifesto on and foster loose contacts between Reuter and the agency.108 Reuter’s wartime writing would help him to establish political credibility for American officials in postwar Berlin. He could introduce himself as a principled democrat to his de-jure occupiers. The conviction of sharing fundamental political ideals of liberal democracy facilitated the formation of the Outpost network between returned Social Democrats and American officials. In addition, Reuter’s and Neu Beginnen’s cases also highlight how the anti-totalitarian turn and embrace of freedom made these committed leftists particularly adept to succeed under the Cold War paradigm.

Entering American service in the fight against National Socialism proved another component for postwar political success. For instance, Hans Hirschfeld joined the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in 1943, which became the turning point of his taxing émigré experience. Work at the Biographical Records Section in the Research and Analysis Division109 offered Hirschfeld a steady salary, a work environment among like-minded colleagues, and also the chance to make a direct contribution to the American war effort against Nazi Germany. Hirschfeld’s service in the United States’ first centralized intelligence agency would become a crucial biographical feature as it enabled him to forge contacts for the postwar era as well as to


109 Hirschfeld, “Governmental Curriculum Vitae”; Hirschfeld, “Curriculum Vitae for AFSC.”
modify his political outlook. Service in the OSS offered Neu Beginnen alumni the chance to
fight against National Socialism directly as Hertz had hoped. Already in 1942, Karl B. Frank had
offered Neu Beginnen’s assistance to the nascent OSS for daring operations behind enemy lines.
Frank’s controversial reputation among émigré circles cooled the agency’s enthusiasm. The OSS
eventually shelved Frank’s bold plans after soliciting assessments from various émigrés – among
them Swedish exile informant Willy Brandt. Instead, the OSS exploited the émigrés’ expertise
through an innovative Research and Analysis Division that Hirschfeld entered as part of a
considerable cohort of leftist émigré scholars.

The unorthodox William J. Donovan’s exploits to build up an American intelligence
infrastructure have been well documented. Starting in 1943, “Wild Bill” Donovan recruited
New York City émigrés for the nascent Research and Analysis Division to utilize their
knowledge in the war against Nazi Germany. Strikingly, the OSS heavily relied on Marxist
refugee scholars from the New School, formerly the Institut für Sozialforschung, or Frankfurt
School of global renown, such as Herbert Marcuse, Franz Leopold Neumann, and Otto
Kirchheim. Driven by Neumann, the Research and Analysis Division resorted to an informal

110 Christof Mauch, The Shadow War against Hitler: The Covert Operations of America’s Wartime Secret

111 For an influential biography on Donovan, cf. Anthony Cave Brown, The Last Hero: Wild Bill Donovan: The
Biography and Political Experience of Major General William J. Donovan, Founder of the OSS and “Father” of the
CIA, from His Personal and Secret Papers and the Diaries of Ruth Donovan (New York: Times Books, 1982). For
an overview of the OSS operations against Nazi Germany, cf. Mauch, The Shadow War against Hitler.

112 Jürgen Heideking and Christof Mauch, “Introduction,” in American Intelligence and the German Resistance to

113 Not to be confused with Berlin Social Democrat Franz Neumann.

114 For the Frankfurt School’s affiliation with the OSS, cf. Barry M. Katz, Foreign Intelligence: Research and
Analysis in the Office of Strategic Services, 1942-1945 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989); Raffael
Laudani, ed., Secret Reports on Nazi Germany: The Frankfurt School Contribution to the War Effort (Princeton, NJ:
hiring pattern of personal contacts between émigrés. This émigré network-hiring pattern is also likely to be the reason why Hirschfeld found employment at the OSS.

The Research and Analysis Division constituted an intelligence detachment as much as a sophisticated think-tank, given the academic luminaries among its ranks. In spite of the institutional pressures to produce innumerable memoranda and assessments, the Research and Analysis Division also carefully crafted memoranda inspired by the unorthodox Marxist Critical Theory. In particular, the Research and Analysis memoranda echoed Franz L. Neumann’s *Behemoth*. This monumental monograph offered a sophisticated academic analysis of National Socialism and illustrated his motivation to join the American war effort:

“A military defeat of Germany is necessary. […] I am certain: A military defeat will wipe [National Socialism] out. The military superiority of the democracies and Soviet Russia must be demonstrated to the German people. The philosophy of National Socialism stands and falls with its alleged ‘efficiency.’ This must be proved untrue. […] More and better planes, tanks, and guns and a complete military defeat will uproot National Socialism from the mind of the German people. But this is not enough. The war must be shortened by […] divorcing the large masses of the people from National Socialism. This is the task of psychological warfare […]. Psychological warfare is not propaganda. It is politics. It consists in demonstrating to the German people that military superiority can be achieved by a democracy which does not claim to be perfect but which rather admits its imperfections, and does not shun the long and arduous task of overcoming them.”

The *Behemoth* had established Neumann’s academic reputation in the United States as it offered, in the words of a contemporary reviewer, “one of the most thorough and judicious


accounts of National Socialism so far produced.” Neumann viewed the Nazi takeover of power in 1933 as an act of “anti-democratic” totalitarianism by “the traditional partisans of German reaction: university professors, bureaucrats, army officers, and big industrialists.”

Since then, the Nazi Party had succeeded in transforming Germany into a “New Society” that “can be united solely by emotions.” Neumann’s interpretation of National Socialism as a peculiar variant of totalitarianism and eloquent defense of liberal democracy dovetailed with the newly anti-totalitarian conviction of Neu Beginnen members such as the OSS profiler Hirschfeld.

Apart from offering an outlet to fight National Socialism, the OSS also gave Hirschfeld an opportunity to forge crucial contacts that would endure far beyond his tenure at the agency. For instance, Neumann and Hirschfeld collaborated closely in assessing the possibilities for the revival of trade unions in a postwar Germany. Hirschfeld supplied Neumann with detailed biographies of select trade unionists. In turn, Neumann commended Hirschfeld for his “excellent work” that “will prove extremely useful.” This episode also indicates the nature of Hirschfeld’s work at the OSS. At the offices of the Biographical Records Section, 610 5th Avenue in Midtown Manhattan’s Rockefeller Center, Hirschfeld collected biographical information on persons of interest. Hirschfeld concentrated on the assessment of political leanings of former colleagues, namely German Ministerialbeamte, or high-ranking civil servants,


121 Neumann, Behemoth, 50, 47–61.

122 Ibid., 365.


and their degree of collusion with the Nazi regime. These biographies were collected in the OSS’ gargantuan Central Information Division (CID) database that formed the basis for Allen Welsh Dulles’ “white lists” of potential partners in postwar Germany. While compiling these biographies, Hirschfeld met and worked together with a colleague with a similar background.

Charlotte Stone, née Hasenclever-Jaffé, was another Berliner who found herself in wartime Manhattan. Hailing from an affluent, liberal family of partly Jewish ancestry, Charlotte Stone had left her native city in 1933 to follow her American husband Shepard. The deteriorating domestic politics of Weimar compelled Shepard Stone to return to the United States after the completion of his doctorate at the University of Berlin under the direction of national-liberal historian Hermann Oncken. Through shared fond memories of Weimar Era Berlin, experience of uprooting, and struggle against National Socialism, Hirschfeld and the Stones became personal friends. Shepard Stone and Hans Hirschfeld shared the same background in journalism and a strong interest in politics. They would continue to correspond regularly for three decades, until Hirschfeld’s death. This friendship would form the most important and hitherto neglected link between the German and American members of the Outpost network in Cold War Berlin.


126 Mauch, The Shadow War against Hitler, 15, 205–207.

127 Hirschfeld, “Memorandum on Survey of Foreign Experts, Confidential”; Stone, “Memorandum to John C Hughes.”


129 Ibid., 12.

Shepard Stone’s wartime service would start an illustrious career in and outside of American government that continuously revolved around the fate of liberal democracy in Berlin. When Stone met Hirschfeld at the OSS, he had been inducted into the Army since June 1942 and prepared for deployment in Europe. Given his intimate knowledge of German culture and society, Stone was assigned to G-2, the Army General Staff’s intelligence section.\textsuperscript{131} The exact nature of his work remains elusive. Yet flights to recently liberated French Algeria and Italy from his Bristol base at the Headquarters of the US First Army in spring 1944 indicate that he held crucial responsibilities in coordinating the US Army’s campaigns across Europe.\textsuperscript{132} According to Volker Berghahn, General Omar Bradley commended Stone for his contingency plan for the First Army if the Nazi regime were to implode before D-Day.\textsuperscript{133} Despite his promotion to Major, a staff officer rank, Stone remarked to his wife “I’m still only a civilian in uniform. And that is a good thing.”\textsuperscript{134} Participation in the Normandy landings six days later only reinforced this conviction when he confided “some things I’ve seen I’ll never forget.” But he also added optimistically that “we are moving along well, we are on our way.”\textsuperscript{135}

\textsuperscript{131} Kenneth P. Lord, Brigadier General, “Extracts of Orders,” June 4, 1942, Shepard Stone Papers, ML-99, Series 2, WWII, 1941-1945, Box 2, Folder 37, Dartmouth College, Rauner Special Collections Library.


\textsuperscript{133} Berghahn, \textit{America and the Intellectual Cold Wars in Europe}, 28.

\textsuperscript{134} Shepard Stone, “Letter to Charlotte Stone,” June 1, 1944, Shepard Stone Papers, ML-99, Series 2, WWII, 1941-1945, Box 3, Folder 65, Dartmouth College, Rauner Special Collections Library.

Stone’s dispatches from the US Army’s campaign eastwards into Nazi Germany convey a sense of urgency. By April 1945, he had become impatient with the fanatical but futile Nazi resistance in the Reich:

“I wish that this damned war were over. The Germans, the Lord knows, are getting what they deserve. Their madmen are wrecking everything by continuing the fight. Most of beautiful Germany is gone. The people are facing a desperate future. They must be made to understand that they are suffering for their own follies, for their own indulgence in Hitler and things military.”

For him, his mission in Europe was simultaneously personal and political.

Stone was already concerned with the postwar era. Preventing a future European war preoccupied him. In spite of his experiences, he envisioned giving Germans the chance for rehabilitation as democrats when he noted: “[Military victory] is only the beginning. For if it was necessary that so many of our boys die[d] to smash Hitler and Germany, it’s an absolute necessity to start now to try to avoid bitterness towards us, leading to another war. If we are smart, we’ll avoid the pinpricks that create the real bitterness.” While Stone felt compelled to add “we’ll be damn severe and damn just,” he took the liberty to criticize American occupation policy as indecisive: “Right now we aren’t either.” Instead of another divisive diplomatic settlement like the Versailles Treaty, Stone called for a democratization of Germany from within. His assessment was colored by his personal experience of Weimar’s demise and research for his dissertation, which explored Polish-German conflicts over the borders drawn at Versailles.

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136 For a thorough account of the US Army’s campaign from France into Germany with particular emphasis on institutional constraints and political considerations, cf. Klaus-Dietmar Henke, Die amerikanische Besetzung Deutschlands (Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter, 2009).

137 Shepard Stone, “Letter to Charlotte Stone,” April 7, 1945, Shepard Stone Papers, ML-99, Series 2, WWII, 1941-1945, Box 3, Folder 64, Dartmouth College, Rauner Special Collections Library.

138 Ibid.

139 Shepard Stone, “Deutsch-Polnische Beziehungen 1918-1932, Inaugural-Dissertation zur Erlangung der Doktorwürde genehmigt von der Philosophischen Fakultät der Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität zu Berlin,” 1933, Shepard Stone Papers, ML-99, Series 1, Pre-War, 1928-1940, Box 1, Folder 38, Dartmouth College, Rauner Special Collections Library.
Stone’s comment upon V-E Day underscored his personal investment into the thorny issue of Germany’s political future:

“To me right now I feel a job is unfinished. For there is a tremendous problem over here in which we have a vital interest and I know that some of us should help to do it. If it is done well then there is great hope.”\textsuperscript{140}

Strikingly, Stone felt no accomplishment on May 8, 1945, but rather determined his agenda for the post-war decades. He viewed his task as one of those to help with the tremendous problem of rebuilding Germany in a liberal democratic framework.

Stone remained in Germany after the war’s conclusion to promote his ambitious agenda. As a trained journalist, he helped implement occupation press policy of the American Military Government (OMGUS).\textsuperscript{141} Stone also reached out to Hans Hirschfeld for assistance in his networking.\textsuperscript{142} Hirschfeld passed Stone a list of Social Democrats who “might be interesting to see.” Among those listed was “E. Reuter, now back in Germany,” whom Hirschfeld recommended as “a very able man. Returned just now from Turkey to Germany.”\textsuperscript{143} Thus Hirschfeld brought Reuter to Stone’s attention and helped form the Outpost network.

This informal list marked the beginning of the political relevance of the friendship between Stone and Hirschfeld. The network derived not from any grand design, but rather from the shared political passions for a democratic postwar Germany of a US Army Major and a low-level OSS profiler. Still, this network became one of Stone’s politically most effective circles of contacts and arguably in postwar Germany as well. To gain this stature, the network reconstituted itself in

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{140} Shepand Stone, “Letter to Charlotte Stone,” May 8, 1945, Shepard Stone Papers, ML-99, Series 2, WWII, 1941-1945, Box 3, Folder 66, Dartmouth College, Rauner Special Collections Library.
\item \textsuperscript{141} E.S. Biberfeld, “Memorandum to Shepard Stone,” November 21, 1945, Shepard Stone Papers, ML-99, Series 3, Military Government, 1945-1946, Box 5, Folder: 33, Dartmouth College, Rauner Special Collections Library.
\item \textsuperscript{142} For Stone’s reliance on informal networks, cf. Berghahn, \textit{America and the Intellectual Cold Wars in Europe}, 56.
\item \textsuperscript{143} Hirschfeld, “Letter to Shepard Stone.”
\end{itemize}
Berlin, where it incorporated new German and American members and successfully couched its political aspirations within the narrative of the Outpost of Freedom in the opening of the Cold War.

IV. Reconstitution of the Outpost Network in West Berlin

Nazi Germany’s demise in May 1945 suddenly turned hitherto abstract questions of the postwar order into urgent practical tasks. The resulting conundrums were especially grave for émigrés formerly aligned with the SPD. Any contribution to a democratic postwar reconstruction in Germany faced at least four obstacles. As German political representatives, they lacked recognition by the victorious Allies. Contacts with comrades surviving in Germany had to be reestablished. The bitter political fragmentation during the years in exile had to be overcome. And most personally, the émigrés had to decide whether to return to Germany in the first place.

Initial American occupation policy in Germany sought high ideals through stern measures. At Potsdam US foreign policy had committed itself to demilitarization, denazification and decartelization as prerequisites for later democratization. While most of these objectives found widespread approval among German-speaking émigrés in the United States, the implementation of punitive measures such as the abolishment of all central German institutions met immediate resistance. The politically fractured Council for a Democratic Germany (CDG), founded in 1944 as a Popular Front association claiming to represent a cross section of German exiles in response to the Soviet-dominated National Committee of a Free Germany, united to point out the suffering of Germans not tainted by National Socialism. Together with the CDG Chairman, eminent theologian Paul Tillich, executive board member Hirschfeld helped publish the pamphlet “They Fought Hitler First: A Report on the Treatment of German Anti-Nazis in Concentration Camps.
from 1933 to 1939” which highlighted the ordeal of the German resistance to Hitler. A cartoon headlined the pamphlet’s cover: A well-dressed American newspaper reader reacts to the news “Concentration Camp horrors” by exclaiming “The whole German people should be wiped out for this!” Four wretched camp survivors left standing among the dead respond by “Don’t forget some of us are German, too, my friend.”

Initially, the campaign of German émigrés for a less heavy-handed occupation policy showed little impact on American occupation policy, underscoring Rainer Behring’s assessment that German Leftist émigrés wielded no influence on American World War Two policy. It also suggested that utilizing contacts formed a more promising strategy than a public campaign for émigrés.

Reuter’s quest to return to Germany exemplified the obstacles potential Social Democratic remigrés faced immediately after German surrender. Reuter had eagerly awaited the chance to return home. Already in April 1945, Reuter asked the American embassy in Turkey to assist him in returning to Germany, explaining his motivation impassionedly as a matter of principle:

“I am deeply steeped in the conviction that it is the duty of all democratic and freedom-loving Germans to return to Germany and contribute to the task of not only rebuilding our country externally, but also heal it internally. I am conscious of the fact that the inclusion of Germany into the world of peaceful and civilized peoples will be a complicated and protracted task, which can only succeed in an arduous process and through long labor of reconstruction. I know that this requires the loyal and sincere cooperation with the Western democracies in all circumstances, and I am ready for such cooperative work.”

This letter written before Nazi Germany’s capitulation anticipated Reuter’s political agenda that would allow him to rally the Outpost network to Berlin. Striving for a liberal

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145 Behring, Demokratische Außenpolitik für Deutschland: Die außenpolitischen Vorstellungen deutscher Sozialdemokraten im Exil 1933 - 1945, 301.

democratic Germany, he highlighted the compatible political interests between him and American foreign policy. Shrewdly, Reuter emphasized the importance of “freedom” in his political outlook while glossing over its context of freiheitlicher Sozialismus. Most strikingly, Reuter omitted the Soviet Union from his profession of democratic loyalty. Friends in New York seconded this view. Paul Hertz tried to renew American interest in Reuter by sending the OSS an enthusiastic recommendation. Hertz praised Reuter as “having such outstanding qualities that he could become the future German Chancellor.”

Yet the hopeful Reuter received no positive response by the State Department. The victorious Allies did not recognize a right to return for German émigrés. Strict visa restrictions prevented the quick return to the former war zone of those émigrés not wearing an Allied uniform. In December 1945, a frustrated Reuter contacted the American Embassy in Ankara again, this time in English. He acknowledged that “without doubt there are many standpoints to regard the German question.” But he reminded the US State Department “it is impossible to handle the task without those Germans who had to leave their country under the pressure of Nazi persecution.” Reuter closed by “begging” American authorities “to revise your declining or better waiting attitude and to grant me the permission to return to Germany.” Nonetheless, the US State Department eventually rejected Reuter’s application, despite OMGUS Political Adviser Robert Murphy’s personal approval. It would take Reuter another six months to finally obtain a visa from British authorities in July 1946. Reuter’s difficulties highlight the degree of political

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147 Quoted in Barclay, Ernst Reuter, 186.


150 Barclay, Ernst Reuter, 189; Krauss, Heimkehr in ein fremdes Land, 68–69.
marginalization of even those émigrés who were most determined to return and friendly to American interests in 1945. The emergence of the Outpost network as a powerful faction that derived from these émigrés seems even more remarkable in this context.

Apart from his vigorous campaign for his own return to Germany, Reuter devoted his considerable energies to convince other political allies to return to Germany as well – starting well before the 1945 collapse of the Nazi regime. His 1943 Program of the abortive German Freedom Federation had included a call to return. Reuter envisioned “the arbitrarily removed civil servants, teachers, and judges will return to their positions, because we need everybody for reconstruction who has proven him- or herself a sincere adherent to a life of freedom.” But not all of Reuter’s comrades shared his enthusiasm for an eventual return.

Gerhart Seeger of the GLD exemplified the thousands of German-speaking refugees from National Socialism that saw their personal futures in their adopted home countries. In response to Reuter’s prodding, Seeger felt compelled to explain his choice in no uncertain terms: “I am not going back to Germany under any circumstances; I became an American, and I mean it.” The diametrically opposed conclusions of close political friends like Seeger and Reuter illuminate the momentousness of the decision for the émigrés and that depended on personal, professional, practical, and psychological circumstances.

Not surprisingly, many émigrés did not decide to return immediately, given the deep and conflicting emotions this question entailed. Like the prominent case of fellow CDG member Bertolt Brecht, Hans Hirschfeld stood on the fence for years. On the one hand, he followed the

151 Reuter, “Programmatische Grundgedanken des Deutschen Freiheitsbundes.”


153 Krauss, Heimkehr in ein fremdes Land, 42–49.
gradually resuming political life in Germany and particularly in Berlin closely. For instance, he clipped newspaper articles on the successful resistance of Berlin SPD rank and file members against Communist encroachment led by Franz Neumann.\textsuperscript{154} On the other hand, the Hirschfelds had to simultaneously cope with the grim confirmation that Bella’s mother Franziska Strauss had fallen victim to the Holocaust at the Theresienstadt concentration camp in September 1942.\textsuperscript{155} In similar fashion Paul Hertz published an obituary somberly noting that his mother, mother-in-law, and brother-in-law “had been sent to the Auschwitz extermination camp.”\textsuperscript{156} In light of these grave personal losses, the decision of this group of émigrés to return to the city in which the Holocaust had been engineered seems remarkable and suggests a singular political commitment to their causes.

In addition, Hans Hirschfeld’s professional prospects had taken a severe hit with the conclusion of the war. As part of its downsizing, the OSS terminated Hirschfeld at the end of July 1945, commending him in a form letter as “extremely useful to this agency’s accomplishments” and for contributing “a valuable share to the country’s war effort.”\textsuperscript{157} The OSS had deemed him expendable even before the end of hostilities in the Pacific. This timing underscored Hirschfeld’s low-level position at the agency. His superior’s optimism that “you will have no difficulty in locating a new position in the government or private industry” proved


bitter irony. Numerous applications for postings in occupied Germany failed – despite Charlotte Stone’s efforts on his “outstanding” behalf. The open question of Hirschfeld’s citizenship impaired his opportunities to find stable employment in the United States – and its government in particular. In a failed 1947 application to receive an immigration visa to the United States, Hirschfeld indicated “since the end of the war, I have earned my living by manual labor.” These trying times on the margins of New York City with limited interaction beyond his fellow leftist circles left Hirschfeld in limbo – and open to a potential return to Europe in contrast to those émigrés who had been more successful in their professional careers.

Hirschfeld contacted Stone to explore his options for return. Hirschfeld added a personal paragraph to his recommendation of Reuter for Stone after long deliberations on the most appropriate wording of his conflicting feelings in a foreign language:

> You know that I consider it my duty to try to help in the work of European reconstruction to my very modest part. How where and why remains the question! […] To repeat: I consider to return to Germany, to help in a construction of a new Germany and Europe. The situation in the different zones of Germany being unknown to me I can’t say what I would like to start with and where. Unfortunately it is impossible for me to go over to Germany and to look around, to observe, and then make my decision. […] It would be awfully nice of you if you could find the time during your trip through Germany to give me some hints and help.”

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Apart from illustrating his emotional conflicts, Hirschfeld’s letter stands out in two further regards. First, it hints at Stone and his beginning political collaboration. Second it references the rapid institutional reorganization of the SPD. Notably, Hirschfeld’s list of recommended Social Democrats in Germany included fellow former Sopade border secretaries and Neu Beginnen members Waldemar von Knoeringen and Erwin Schoettle as well as Gustav Klingelhöfer who – with Franz Neumann – spearheaded the Berlin SPD rank and file’s revolt against the Soviet instigated merger with the KPD.\textsuperscript{163} Almost certainly, Hirschfeld deliberately grouped recently returned remigrés like Reuter with Social Democrats who held out in Berlin during National Socialism like Klingelhöfer.

Berlin had become the battleground for both the independence and future personnel composition of postwar Social Democracy.\textsuperscript{164} The Soviet occupation authority SVAG had sanctioned the reconstitution of the SPD in June 1945, well before any Western Allied power. In response, a Zentralausschuss, or Central Commission, formed in Berlin-Kreuzberg under the leadership of Otto Grotewohl. Despite its ambition to reconstitute the SPD within the entire “Reich,” its influence was effectively limited to Berlin and the Soviet Zone surrounding it. Simultaneously, concentration camp survivor Kurt Schumacher set out to reorganize the SPD from British-occupied Hannover. The Social Democrats’ relationship to Communism immediately became the issue that set both camps apart. While Schumacher and his allies equated Social Democracy with strict anti-Communism, the Berlin Central Commission was divided on this question with its leader Grotewohl sympathetic to a renewed Popular Front strategy.\textsuperscript{165}

\textsuperscript{163} Ibid. Cf. Chapter 1.
\textsuperscript{164} Cf. Chapter 1, section III.
The pivotal Wennigsen Conference in October 1945 led to the recreation of a separate Social Democratic Party of Germany. In the rural outskirts of Hannover, Schumacher convened Social Democratic representatives from the three Western Zones, from the Berlin Central Commission and from the Union of German Socialist Organisations in Great Britain, a recent merger of the British-based members of Sopade, SAP, Neu Beginnen, and the Internationaler Sozialistische Kampfbund (ISK), or International Socialist Militant League. The delegates made no less than three fundamental decisions that set the course of postwar Social Democracy. They appointed Schumacher “Commissioner for the Western Zones,” entrusting him with reconstruction of the SPD’s party structure. Schumacher’s post would quickly turn into the first postwar party Chairmanship. They rejected any proposed merger with the KPD – even at the cost of a split from the Grotewohl wing of the Berlin Central Commission. And they voted to reintegrate the three aforementioned Socialist breakaways into the Western Zones’ SPD. A decade of contentious debates over the relationship between Social Democracy and Revolutionary Socialism culminated in renewed Social Democratic unity against Soviet-style Communism.

The New York émigrés closely followed the dramatic developments in Germany approvingly. After touring postwar Germany in early 1946, London-based Neu Beginnen alumnus von Knoeringen reported his dizzying impressions in Berlin to Hirschfeld’s Neu Beginnen friend Frank. The political situation in postwar Berlin simultaneously shook and invigorated von Knoeringen exclaiming:

“Today, Democratic Socialism fights a really crucial battle in Germany, a battle no less important than the military decision of the last war. […] One has to possess alert senses and Neu Beginnen’s political schooling as a Socialist to feel how much world history is made here now.

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166 For the emergence of the London Union of German Socialist Organisations in Great Britain, cf. Ibid., 156.
 […] It was an unforgettable experience for me to feel the peculiar tension, a kind of atmospheric pressure, in Berlin that I have not met anywhere else.”

Von Knoeringen’s correspondence with Frank illustrates how quickly the Neu Beginnen alumni had identified Berlin as a pivotal political battleground. His letter also exhibited both Neu Beginnen’s traditional sense of mission and wartime espousal of anti-totalitarianism:

“The elements of mental and moral resistance [against Communist pressure] are here, but they do not coalesce into a power because they lack political consciousness in its historical sense. The Berlin leadership did not grasp clearly that it acted as representatives of an intellectual notion that stretches far beyond the confines of the SPD. They think too narrowly, too much within categories of the party as a political organization and not as expression of a Geistesströmung, or intellectual conviction, that has to assert itself against a new kind of dictatorship today. They operate with a conception of class that has become unreal today […]”

Von Knoeringen’s fundamental criticism of the local SPD leadership anticipated the Outpost network’s motivation in its fight for control over the Berlin SPD starting three years later. More broadly, his impassioned argument for broadening the intellectual horizons and support base of the SPD preceded his advocacy for reforming the party platform that would culminate in the 1959 Bad Godesberg program. Notably, von Knoeringen utilized Marxist vocabulary of “political consciousness” to deplore “dictatorship” in its anti-totalitarian interpretation. This interpretation entailed two implications: It could attract émigrés who wanted to reappropriate socialism for liberal democracy in Berlin. And it elicited American support in the opening Cold War.

Reuter placed equal political importance on Berlin as the Neu Beginnen alumni still abroad. Convinced that old local Social Democratic comrades “banked on him,” Berlin ranked on

168 Ibid.
169 Cf. chapter 3.
170 For von Knoeringen’s contribution to the party program that redefined the SPD as a big-tent party, cf. Mehringer, Waldemar von Knoeringen, 375–384.
Reuter’s short list of possible destinations in Germany.171 After briefly checking in with Schumacher at Hannover, Reuter quickly set his sights on Berlin after his return to Germany in November 1946.172 Sending seasoned politicians to Berlin had a high priority for Schumacher. He strove to rebuild the leadership of the Berlin SPD with anti-Communist loyalists after the demise of the Zentralausschuss for the Soviet Zone following Grotewohl’s endorsement of and subsequent defection to the Communist-led SED. Upon his return to Berlin at the end of November 1946, Reuter immersed himself in work. The local SPD immediately offered Reuter the post of City Council for Transportation against the objections of SVAG.173 American radio RIAS interviewed the new appointee within 48 hours of his arrival in the city. Reuter reintroduced himself as an energetic administrator and vowed to revive Berlin’s vaunted mass transit system. Moreover, the return to his old domain Berlin deeply moved him. He assured his new and old constituents via radio: “In the last twelve years in which I have been gone, there has not been a single day without my thinking of Germany and Berlin. And being back again here today means something to me that nobody can appreciate who has not been away.”174 Yet privately, Reuter revealed his ambition for a high-profile career in postwar Germany. He lamented to his brother that he would have been elected Mayor of Berlin “without question” if he would have been allowed to return only two months earlier.175


172 Barclay, Ernst Reuter, 199–200.

173 Cf. chapter 1,III.


The American occupation also brought three young officials to Berlin who possessed an uncommon level of interest and cultural affinity to German politics, namely Hurwitz, Lasky, and Robert Lochner. On the recommendation of Frank, Hurwitz had accepted a position in OMGUS’ Information Control Division (ICD) in order to be able to conduct dissertation research in Munich. However, he was deployed to Berlin in 1946 where he was tasked with conducting surveys for OMGUS. Hurwitz could rely on state-of-the-art training with Robert K. Merton to bring this innovative tool to OMGUS’ disposal. His research on political trends in Berlin brought Hurwitz in contact with the local SPD. Witnessing local Social Democrats fighting Communist encroachment without Western Allied assistance became a seminal political event for Hurwitz. Through his research, he also came into contact with Neu Beginnen alumni that were deeply “impressive” to him in their courage, experience, and principles. Hurwitz immersion into Berlin Social Democratic circles became personal when he met Klingelhöfer. Toller’s former deputy commander of the Bavarian Red Army became a “mentor’ to Hurwitz. In addition, he met his eventual wife Margarete Klase through the party. Hurwitz would point to “my social democratic mishpoka (family)” when asked why he stayed in Berlin as an American Jew for decades. Hurwitz offered the Outpost network valuable contacts and expertise for decades, first as an OMGUS official, later as Willy Brandt’s first pollster and political consultant.

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180 Ibid., 1.
At the same time, Hurwitz forged a close personal and political friendship with Lasky. Both were in a similar situation. Lasky had also met a German wife, Brigitte Newiger. He had also stayed in Berlin after the conclusion of his Army service in 1946. Lasky worked as the Berlin correspondent of the New Leader and reveled in the unique cosmopolitan cultural life that the quadripartite city offered. Hurwitz remarked to Lasky’s biographer Roth how “he was in the center of attention here [in Berlin]. Where else would he have been in the center? And Berlin’s cultural life with Russians, French, all that was unique.” Lasky’s visibility as an impassioned anti-Communist intellectual in Berlin made him the first choice for OMGUS during Clay’s 1948 “Operation Talk-Back” that was intended to demonstrate to Germans the advantages of liberal democracy against Communist defamation through press and broadcasts. With the help of these American funds, Lasky launched his own magazine, Der Monat. This highbrow magazine aimed to target German academics and university students in both nascent states with an ambitious blend of politics, culture, and entertainment. It also provided members of the Outpost network with a formidable platform.

Next to American officials, Berlin attracted a steadily increasing string of remigrés. A few weeks after Reuter, in January 1947, the Norwegian Military Mission welcomed a new thirty-three year old press attaché, Willy Brandt. Quickly promoted to Major in the Norwegian Army for the post, Brandt saw Berlin as the best stage to advocate German and Scandinavian political interests simultaneously. In his first autobiography thirteen years later, Brandt – like many other

181 Quoted in Roth, “In einem Vorleben war ich Europäer,” 146–147.
184 Merseburger, Willy Brandt, 252–254.
remigrés – noted the cosmopolitan appeal of the city: “Berlin – this decided the issue. Without hesitation I accepted the offer.”\(^{185}\)

Return to Berlin conveniently deferred the question of permanent return to Germany. Brandt used his post at the Norwegian Military Mission to observe German postwar developments and explore his options for the future. These did not necessarily lay in Germany.

In the summer of 1947, Brandt cautiously asked an old friend, Gunnar Myrdal, now Executive Secretary of the incipient *United Nations Economic Commission for Europe* (ECE), about employment opportunities.\(^ {186}\) While corresponding with Myrdal, Brandt decided to forgo the offered career in an international organization for one in the stridently anti-Communist Berlin SPD instead. Privately, Brandt clarified that reclaiming his German citizenship was a deliberate political rather than personal choice. He assured Gunnar Myrdal that “no formal distinctions will keep me from doubting [my] true allegiance,” suggesting a singular identification with the ideals proclaimed by Scandinavian Social Democracy rather than any kind of German patriotism.\(^ {187}\) Enthralled by the stakes of Berlin’s political future, he left the Norwegian Military Mission and accepted an appointment as Berlin liaison of Schumacher’s Hannover bureau in the fall of


1947. Eventually, between 3,000 and 4,000 Social Democrats, or about half of those who had emigrated, would return to vastly different country than the one they had to leave.

The reemerging gulf between Social Democrats and Communists demanded a fateful choice of allegiance from any returnee, despite Reuter’s, Brandt’s, and the circle of Neu Beginnen alumni’s enthusiasm for the postwar reorganization of the SPD. While the majority chose the Western Zones, Jacob Walcher’s case provides an important counter example as the majority of the nearly 200 political remigrés in postwar Berlin aligned themselves with the SED. Willy Brandt’s former mentor at the SAP had returned to Berlin from New York at the same time as Brandt. In contrast to the Neu Beginnen group at the AFGF, fellow CDG member Walcher still viewed the Soviet Union as the “natural ally of revolutionary socialism.” Subsequently, he joined the SED and took up a position in the Communist union newspaper Tribüne. Despite personal sympathies, Brandt felt compelled to break from his friend and mentor over the question of personal rights and freedom that divided them.

Reuter’s return to Berlin paved the way for more remigrés. As Reuter reconstructed his political career in the city as the Social Democratic champion of anti-Communism, he strove to build up firm support in the party organization as well. Reuter forged close links with established

188 Merseburger, Willy Brandt, 265–269.

189 The number of remigrés varies because of a lack of systematic records and the shifting territorial definitions of Germany. For instance, many Sudeten German Social Democrats moved to the Western zones in the postwar era, even though they had never held German citizenship before. cf. Claus-Dieter Krohn, “Einleitung,” in Rückkehr und Aufbau nach 1945: Deutsche Remigranten im öffentlichen Leben Nachkriegsdeutschlands, ed. Claus-Dieter Krohn and Patrik von Zur Mühlen (Marburg: Metropolis, 1997), 9; Mehringer, “Impulse auf die Modernisierung der SPD,” 92.


leaders like Klingelhöfer and Louise Schroeder, developed into a new mentor for Brandt, but also searched for like-minded spirits outside of Berlin. Reuter consciously set out to recruit émigrés from their foreign exiles. His correspondence offers insights into how he reached out to émigrés and defended them against suspicions that spread even within the SPD’s Schumacher leadership. When Reuter as Mayor-elect suggested inviting Paul Hertz back in the rapidly escalating political confrontation in Berlin during April 1948, Schumacher’s bureau in Hannover balked. Fritz Heine, one of Schumacher’s principal enforcers of political loyalty, considered Hertz vulnerable for “approaches by the SEP [i.e. SED] in the special situation of Berlin […] to win him over.” Moreover, he accused Hertz of “never definitively declaring to break with these people.” The marginalia suggest that Reuter succeeded in dispelling doubts of Hertz’s loyalty. He added the brief annotation “Erl[edigt].” or “done” in response.

The Berlin Airlift and his rise to global prominence as Mayor personifying democratic resistance against Communist encroachment gave Reuter considerable political capital. He utilized it to recruit New York émigrés during his triumphal 1949 American tour. They offered him both political support for his vision that reconciled socialism with freedom and valuable contacts in the country that now guaranteed the viability of West Berlin’s makeshift polity in the Cold War. Frank, Hertz, and Hirschfeld responded to Reuter’s proposition. Reuter could send out

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195 Cf chapter 3.

official letters of invitation to Hertz and Hirschfeld that promised employment noting contently how “your multi-year stay in America has augmented your experience in particularly precious ways.”197 But similar plans for Frank failed.198 The proposed return of the former Communist Frank who frequently had crossed the Sopade between 1933 and 1945 was still unpalatable for powerful actors within the postwar SPD. Hertz remarked to Hirschfeld that Frank’s case proved “much more tedious and complicated” than his own.199 Thus Frank’s own nominal political comrades prevented the resumption of his political career in postwar Germany.

Hertz arrived in West Berlin in late September 1949, after the successful conclusion of the Airlift. Hertz’s dispatch to his family and friends in the United States suggests that frenzied political meetings filled his first days in the city. Reuter quickly appointed him European Recovery Program Coordinator at the Senator’s rank, comparable to minister in a German Bundesland, or constituent state in the Federal Republic. Hertz coordinated the disbursement of millions of US Dollars in Marshall Plan aid in this delicate post that he would hold until its reorganization in 1953. In a personal meeting, the Governing Mayor confided how he hoped that Hertz could act as his deputy maintaining his influence during his frequent trips outside of Berlin. On October 1, Hertz met Lucius D. Clay’s outgoing political advisor J. Anthony Panuch who “tried to make clear to me how much Reuter needed a man like me.”200 The same evening, Hertz attended a dinner of fellow Social Democrats. One newly introduced stood out for Hertz:


“A very substantial discussion started, mostly on party problems. Willy Brandt is one of the [newly constituted Bundestag] parliament members, knows all internals, has developed from a devout disciple of Schumacher to a sober critic and is generally considered a hopeful quantity. He himself has a quite confident presence and judgment, but still humble and winsome.”

Hertz counted among the many whom Brandt could win over. Their “substantial” conversation marked the beginning of a durable political friendship that formed a cornerstone of the Outpost network. Despite the 25 years of age difference between them, the experience of exile connected both men. Also, it shaped their political outlook. Hertz mentioned approvingly Brandt’s growing criticism of Schumacher. Their shared objection to Schumacher’s skepticism towards the Western Allies already anticipated one question that would haunt the Berlin SPD for the next eight years and would form one of the main battlegrounds of the Outpost network.

Paul Hertz also encouraged Hirschfeld to return to Berlin. Hirschfeld found Hertz’s impressions of Berlin “particularly interesting,” not least because they assuaged anxieties of return. Hirschfeld eventually agreed to return to Berlin on a trial basis to form his own conclusions. While he looked forward to “heedlessly throwing myself into battle lines and joining the ranks where it looks dangerous,” Hirschfeld was also concerned about West Berlin’s safety and his being “far away from Germany and Berlin for sixteen years.” His dilemma illustrated the anxieties that returnees had to confront, but also the decisive role remigrés like Reuter and Hertz played to convince fellow émigrés to follow suit in a reverse chain migration.

The network’s own members were the first successful converts of Reuter’s daring reconception of West Berlin as the Outpost of Freedom against totalitarianism. The narrative of West Berlin as the heroic defender of liberal democracy validated nothing less than the remigrés’ return. Late arrivals like Hertz and Hirschfeld exemplify the narrative’s success for this audience.

201 Ibid.

Hertz framed his intense and dizzying first impressions upon return to Berlin under the rubric of fighting for freedom:

“It is surprising how quickly one grows used to things that have been new and foreign. This applies to the destruction in particular. […] I live literally in rubble. Across the street and as far as I can see – rubble. Berliners have become proud Menschen. Proud, but not presumptuous. […] If somebody says that people in the West should experience two months of Russian occupation then one realizes what caused this natural defense of freedom. It is as if every Berliner knew that the border between freedom and slavery runs across Potsdamer Platz. Reuter has not boasted about this spirit in the United States. It is here and palpable everywhere […]”.203

Berliners’ seeming revulsion against totalitarian regimes resulted from their actual experience with them. A few days in politically torn 1949 Berlin seemingly sufficed to convince a principled émigré like Hertz that West Berlin deserved support against renewed totalitarian “slavery.” This flattering assessment of Berliners – or at least those living in the Western sectors – also dissipated Hirschfeld’s reservations. Shortly after his return to Berlin, Reuter appointed Hirschfeld West Berlin’s Public Relations Manager.204 Hirschfeld’s political allegiance, experience in journalism, and contacts in the United States fitted Reuter’s preferred profile for the post. Brief proposals of Willy Brandt filling the post two years earlier suggest that Reuter deliberately searched for a fellow remigré to best promote his politics to national and international publics alike.205 In this key capacity, Hirschfeld would popularize the West Berlin Senate’s policy through the Outpost narrative of defending freedom to Allied authorities, German journalists, and ordinary Berliners for more than ten years. Notably, the Outpost narrative captivated him, since he described his return as a religious awakening to skeptical émigré friends in the United States. Enthusiastically, Hirschfeld noted “after a few days in Berlin, Saul became Paul. […] I stayed here, because I am convinced that we in Berlin complete a

203 Hertz, “Als ich wiederkam…”


crucial political task—unlike anywhere else on earth.” The Outpost narrative that elevated West Berlin’s resistance against Communist designs to the struggle “between freedom and slavery” had given returned Social Democrats like Hertz and Hirschfeld a new political purpose and reconciled them with both their estranged party and hometown. Belief in this interpretation of Berlin’s rancorous postwar situation also united a network of liberal and leftist Germans and Americans who came to the city from differing geographical and political origins. And it animated them to employ this narrative as a political weapon in the following years with such success that “Free Berlin” would become the defining feature of West Berlin’s political culture.

CHAPTER 3

Rise of Outpost Narrative in the Wake of the Berlin Airlift, 1948-1953

On September 6, 1948, US Army Major Karl F. Mautner became embroiled in a physical confrontation in Soviet-controlled Mitte. SED instigated protestors stormed the *Neues Stadthaus* in the Parochialstraße that housed the *Stadtverordnetenversammlung*, Berlin’s City Council. These protestors dispersed a Council meeting while Markgraf’s Communist police officers and SVAG personnel idly looked on. American liaison officer to the Berlin City Government Mautner and his British colleague Guy Adams barricaded themselves in their office, sheltering those non-Communist Council members who were not able to flee the building immediately. Mautner managed to negotiate an end to the standoff only after a few hours: SVAG officers guaranteed the safety of Mautner, Adams, and the Council members they sheltered if they left the building.¹

Like the other American members of the Outpost network, Mautner’s intense commitment to bring an anti-totalitarian democracy to Berlin derived from his personal experiences with National Socialism. Born as Karl Friedrich Mautner in Vienna in 1915, he and his family fled to Hungary after the 1938 Nazi *Anschluß* of Austria. Fearing Nazi persecution because of his Jewish descent, Mautner immigrated to the United States, arriving in New York’s harbor

February 29, 1940, claiming to carry only eight US Dollars in possession. After living in New York for little more than a year, the US Army inducted Mautner in April 1941. Assigned to the All American 82nd Airborne Division, Mautner participated in combat jumps into Normandy during D-Day and Nijmegen during Operation Market Garden.\(^1\) Meanwhile, the Nazis killed Mautner’s parents Stephan and Else in the extermination camps after the eleventh hour deportation of Hungarian Jews coordinated by Adolf Eichmann.\(^2\)

Mautner stayed in Berlin after the war as part of the local G-2, military intelligence, because of his German language skills.\(^3\) Mautner credited the SPD’s 1946 struggle against the proposed SED merger for “gradually becoming attuned to the political developments in the city.” New York’s Neu Beginnen Alumni most likely awoke Mautner’s political interests, as he recalled how “former German citizens in the US Military Government who had political connections from the past began getting first-hand reports, especially from old friends in the Social Democratic Party, the party with the greatest support in Berlin.” Mautner appreciated the Social Democrats like the “remarkable Reuter […] for those dogged political personalities, often survivors of concentration camps or prisons, and for their iron determination to create a better Germany.”\(^4\) Thus the SPD found a decisive ally who became both nominal occupier and


\(^3\) Dunnigan, “Interview with Karl F. Mautner, May 12, 1993.”

\(^4\) Mautner, “The View from Germany,” 234–237.
confidant for secret backchannel communication as American liaison officer in January 1947. While holding this post for over ten years, Mautner interpreted his role as “being the oil in a very unwieldy machine, our ear in City Hall, interpreter of our (sometimes hard to explain) ideas with the Germans and explainer of the (sometimes equally hard to explain) German thinking behind certain of their actions.”

Mautner would draw from his bicultural background for a common political project between American authorities and local Social Democrats, namely promoting anti-totalitarian convictions to Berliners.

The dramatic events in the Neues Stadthaus exemplified the simultaneously escalating tensions in Berlin, Germany, and the global Cold War. The Communist Coup in Czechoslovakia in February had decisively hardened opposition to the Soviet Union in Washington. SVAG had blocked Berlin’s Western Sectors from the Western Zones’ vital supply line six weeks earlier, prompting an American-led Airlift to the besieged half-city. Concurrently, the American-led Western Allies took major steps to unite their occupation zones politically, most notably through the introduction of the Deutsche Mark that gave Berlin two competing currencies. On the same day that the SED stormed the City Council, Reuter hailed the beginning deliberations for a Grundgesetz, or Basic Law, of a separate Weststaat as “a new era in German history” to Berlin newspaper readers. Reuter thus backed the nascent Federal Republic enthusiastically, even at the price of economically divorcing Berlin’s Western sectors from its Eastern districts and their hinterland in surrounding Brandenburg. In this context, the SED’s assault on the last link that connected both sides of the city politically came as no surprise to the Outpost network’s


7 Cf. Chapter 1, Section IV.

members. Communist sympathizers had impeded access to City Hall for weeks. Via RIAS, Reuter had denounced the “peculiar tactics of a totalitarian occupation force,” noting “the populace suddenly seething in a notorious pattern.”

Reuter’s mocking of the SED’s theatrically staged rallies point to a public relations dimension often neglected in scholarship on postwar Berlin but that was part and parcel for its contemporary political partisans.

The SED ratcheted up tensions deliberately with the local, national, and international publics in mind. As all political actors in Berlin, it sought to advance its political agenda through narratives transmitted by press and increasingly broadcast media. While the Trümmerfrauen extracted bricks from the rubble of Berlin’s houses for reconstruction, political factions appropriated particular tropes, experiences, and developments in the city and strove to rearrange them into winning political narratives. Arguably the Outpost network proved most successful in enlisting popular support through its flattering narrative that reinvented Berlin’s Western sectors as “Free Berlin.” This narrative’s comparative inclusiveness stood in marked contrast to the contradictions within the increasingly Stalinist SED’s narrative offerings of national and political “unity” that the network’s media outlet RIAS relished to satirize.

Thus this chapter explores the Outpost narrative’s development from the network’s desperate plea for outside support in 1948 to the defining narrative shaping West Berlin’s nascent political culture in 1953. Subsequently, this chapter unearths the narrative’s origins as the most successful interpretation of the 1948/49 Berlin Blockade and Airlift, which lent these events immense symbolic meaning on an international scale. Moreover, this chapter highlights

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how the Outpost network shrewdly exploited this international attention to advance its agenda of remaking West Berlin into the showcase of *Cold War Democracy*, a fortified liberal democratic framework that could simultaneously deter Communist schemes and enthrall constituents tainted by a Nazi past. Accordingly, this chapter surveys the network’s strategists, their goals, its narrative’s target audiences, the American resources the network could elicit, and their campaigns to remake West Berlin’s political culture.

I. Appropriating the Berlin Airlift as Manifestation of the Outpost Narrative

The eleven-month-long Berlin Airlift was a hitherto unprecedented logistical feat. Under considerable strain and sacrifices, the US and Royal Air Forces conducted 277,682 flights to deliver 2,325,652 tons of freight to the city through September 1949.\(^{11}\) In addition, it provided the network the unique opportunity to validate their Outpost narrative and lend them moral urgency. Yet scholarship has given vastly unequal attention to these two dimensions. While the American-led relief effort into the city’s Western sectors has inspired a plethora of accounts for decades, this genre takes the Airlift’s second incarnation as a potent propagandistic argument in the escalating Cold War for granted.\(^{12}\) Moreover, this genre directly originates from this political exploitation, as the first accounts from Lucius D. Clay and Hans Hirschfeld attest.\(^{13}\) Scholars

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have started to scrutinize the Airlift’s political exploitation only after the end of the Cold War and Berlin’s reunification.\textsuperscript{14} Recent scholarship has stressed the relative permeability of the Blockade, noting that the Airlift supplied less than the total consumption in West Berlin, which fueled a gigantic shadow economy manifesting itself in the black markets.\textsuperscript{15} In light of the resulting hardships for everyday Berliners, Paul Steege has concluded that “the city’s symbolic resonance for an international Cold War” itself needs explanation. Moreover he asserted that such an explanation “can make sense (prove meaningful) only in connection (and in tension with) the particular conditions in the historical location of late 1940s Berlin.”\textsuperscript{16} Arguably, any explanation for West Berlin’s symbolic resonance is inextricably linked to its political culture and mediascape,\textsuperscript{17} given how political strife divided this mid-century metropolis. For instance, veteran West Berlin journalist Peter Bender reflected that the “technical, organizational, and humanitarian brilliance” of the Airlift had an even bigger effect in the public discourse: “If


\textsuperscript{17} To borrow the term from Arjun Appadurai, mediascapes denote the “large and complex repertoires of images, narratives and ethnoscapes to viewers throughout the world” by media, cf. Arjun Appadurai, “Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Cultural Economy,” \textit{Public Culture} 2, no. 2 (March 20, 1990): 6–9, doi:10.1215/08992363-2-2-1.
President Truman would have employed a public relations firm with staging the containment of Communism, it would have needed to invent the Airlift.”

Bender’s sarcastic remark offers a more accurate depiction of the Airlift than most literature on the topic commonly acknowledges. Neither Truman nor the Outpost network staged the Berlin crisis that precipitated the Airlift. Yet the network introduced the Airlift in the language of Cold War containment through deliberately crafting the Outpost narrative and promoting it in a fifteen-year-long public relations campaign. In particular, its members drew from their positions within the American occupation authorities, OMGUS, HICOG, and later US Mission to Berlin, in West Berlin’s government, and preeminent local news outlets such as RIAS. Thus the narrative that would define West Berlin’s makeshift polity for its constituents, West European and American publics alike originated from anti-totalitarian convictions of a local left-liberal network rather than from cynical Pentagon ploys as the GDR leadership insinuated. In fact, public relations indeed offer clues on the origins of the narrative. But it was Stone and Hirschfeld hiring a public relations firm on behalf of the West Berlin Senate to shore up popular support for the half-city within the United States. Through close cooperation and message control they elicited considerable financial support from American Cold War foreign policy.

This calculated offering to the anti-Communist zeitgeist that swept the West German and American publics derived from the former Communist Reuter’s desperate situation after the

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19 For the most recent and refined version of this argument, cf. Gerhard Keiderling, “Rosinenbomber” über Berlin (Berlin: Dietz, 1998).

1946 Fusionskampf. Despite SVAG vetoes and SED sabotage tactics that undermined his political work in Berlin and precluded him from becoming Mayor, Reuter cited a unique “will of resistance among Berliners” as motivation in April 1947. Moreover, Reuter already identified Berliners’ determination against Communist encroachment as an opening to assert relevance vis-à-vis their Western Allied occupiers, noting contently that their resistance “has gradually produced corresponding feelings among the Western Allies.”

Reuter positively rephrased resistance to Communism in Berlin as the fight for freedom. Faced with escalating political tensions over two competing currencies little over a year later, Reuter denounced Soviet policies as recurring totalitarianism at a SPD rally on June 24, 1948: “We will defend ourselves with all means [...] against the claim of a power that seeks to turn us into slaves, into Helots of a party. We have lived in such slavery in Adolf Hitler’s empire. We have enough of it! We want no return!” Speaking at a football stadium in Wedding’s Behmstraße with the Soviet Sector looming across a set of railroad tracks, Reuter advertised his strategy: “In this hour, dear comrades, we freedom-loving Berliners must raise our voice for the entire world to hear. We Social Democrats have taken the lead in this fight in Berlin […].”

In the precarious situation of the Social Democrats that led Berlin’s embattled elected government, Reuter called on his SPD comrades to internationally publicize their struggle. Reuter’s characterization of Berliners as “freedom-loving” Democrats who resisted totalitarian aggression deliberately appealed to American foreign policy. President Truman had used precisely these terms to...

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promise American aid to any “free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures” in formulating his eponymous Doctrine.\footnote{Harry Truman, “Address before a Joint Session of Congress” March 12, 1947, Avalon Project: Documents in Law, History, and Diplomacy, Yale Law School, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/trudoc.asp.}

SVAG instantly put Reuter’s strategy to the test when it blocked Western access routes to Berlin the same day. This dramatic escalation set off American foreign policy in high gear. Leading officials in the State Department, the nascent Department of Defense, and OMGUS hectically debated possible American responses. Military Governor Clay emerged as the crucial proponent of testing to supply Berlin’s Western sectors through an airlift. In a quickly scheduled meeting in Clay’s \textit{Harnack Haus} in upscale Dahlem, Reuter pledged Clay his constituents’ unconditional support for this untested measure.\footnote{Shlaim, \textit{The United States and the Berlin Blockade, 1948-1949}, 199–203; David E. Barclay, \textit{Schaut auf diese Stadt: Der unbekannte Ernst Reuter} (Berlin: Siedler, 2000), 241–242.} Attendee Willy Brandt recalled in his first autobiography that Reuter encouraged Clay to “do what you are able to do; we shall do what we feel to be our duty. Berlin will make all necessary sacrifices and offer resistance – come what may.”\footnote{Willy Brandt, \textit{My Road to Berlin}, 1st ed. (Doubleday, 1960), 193.}

Starting with Brandt, authors have continuously portrayed this meeting as the formative event of German-American bonding over Berlin’s divisive future.\footnote{Cf. most recently Rott, \textit{Die Insel}, 36–37.} While this hagiographic account of great men single-handedly changing the course of history needs to be approached critically as a constituent part of the Outpost narrative, the episode still offers one important insight: With the Mayor of Berlin suddenly counseling his top occupation officer, the network attracted the considerable resources bipartisan American Cold War foreign policy harnessed.

Concurrent changes in both American occupation and German institutional structures brought a new quality of cooperation and clout for the network. After Clay had stepped down as
planned after the successful conclusion of the Airlift, OMGUS welcomed its new Military Governor in early July 1949, John J. McCloy. Following the recommendation by Secretary of State Dean Acheson, President Truman had appointed the World Bank President as the first civilian OMGUS commander for two momentous tasks. First, McCloy sought to supervise the formation of the Federal Republic on the territory of the three Western Allied Zones that had adopted a democratic constitution, the Basic Law, in May. Second, McCloy was tasked to transform the sprawling Military Government into a smaller, civilian High Commission (HICOG). 27

For these tasks in Germany, McCloy could rely on the experience and contacts from a distinguished career propelled by World War Two. After studying law that had been interrupted by service in the Army on the Western Front during World War One, McCloy established himself as a successful lawyer on Wall Street, until Secretary of War Henry Stimson appointed him Assistant Secretary in 1940. In this position, McCloy emerged as one of Stimson’s most busy managers. Working in countless committees, McCloy played a decisive role in coordinating supplies for the gargantuan American war effort. This task also led the liberal Republican to relish bipartisan foreign policy and to reluctantly appreciate governmental intervention in “certain important social fields” that he had opposed in form of the New Deal while in private practice. 28 In his critical position, McCloy also made decisions that later ignited controversy, such as him coordinating the internment of Japanese-Americans and shelving explorations to bomb Nazi extermination camps in occupied Poland. 29 In debates on postwar Germany, McCloy


28 Quoted in Ibid., 10.

29 Ibid., 15–18.
stridently argued against proposals for a Carthaginian peace, such as Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau’s eponymous plan for dismantling German industrial capacities. He urged President Roosevelt to focus rather on reconstruction already in September 1944:

“I still feel that the course proposed by the Treasury would in the long run certainly defeat what we hope to attain by a complete military victory, that is, the peace of the world, and the assurance of social, economic and political stability in the world. [...] Is this not simply doing to Germany what the Nazis were accused of doing to their neighbors? Will it not simply perpetuate hate and prevent the reconciliation out of which peace would come?“\(^{30}\)

After the war McCloy was given the opportunity to implement his vision of “social, economic and political stability in the world” as formative President of the World Bank, focusing on the economic reconstruction of Europe. This eminent post gave McCloy a strong bargaining positioning when the Truman administration offered him control of the American occupation in Germany. Shrewdly, McCloy only accepted his nomination after securing full control over the disbursement of Marshall Plan funds in Germany and direct access to the President for the High Commissioner’s portfolio. Having once derided the office of Military Governor as “Roman proconsulship,” McCloy instead interpreted his role as High Commissioner as a chief executive officer, giving extensive responsibilities to trusted directors of individual divisions.\(^{31}\) McCloy appointed then New York Times journalist Shepard Stone as his Director of HICOG’s Public Affairs Division (PUB) in September 1949, after sensing a similar background of cracking into New York’s most refined circles from modest origins.\(^{32}\)

Stone and McCloy would form a congenial working relationship for decades to come.

McCloy became a powerful mentor for Stone, while Stone provided “invaluable” expertise and

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\(^{30}\) John J. McCloy, “Memorandum to Franklin D. Roosevelt” September 15, 1944, John J. McCloy Papers, Series 8: War Department, Box WD3, Folder 1, Amherst College Library, Archives and Special Collections.

\(^{31}\) Schwartz, America’s Germany, 41–43; John J. McCloy, “Diary July-December” 1949, John J. McCloy Papers, Series 2: Diaries, Box DY13, Amherst College Library, Archives and Special Collections.

contacts to Germany’s political scene through his “almost unique background” in McCloy’s own words. Stone’s arrival in Germany provided the Outpost network with access to the considerable resources of the American occupation, while he would find a congenial counterpart in West Berlin’s administration when Hans Hirschfeld arrived in the city later that fall. Together both sides of the network could exploit the glare of the American public and administration and by rapidly expanding institutions, media and public relations campaigns from their Berlin base. And their work as Propagandists of Freedom met such success that it shaped the landscape of nascent West Berlin’s political culture.

II. Berlin Activities of Shepard Stone’s Public Affairs Division

As incoming director of HICOG’s Public Affairs Division, Shepard Stone could count on McCloy’s vital political and material support. Notably, McCloy increased expenditures for Public Affairs activities in Germany, while effectively slashing all other items in the transition from OMGUS to HICOG. For the fiscal year 1952, the last year of Stone’s tenure, PUB budget consisted of 29,360,554 US Dollars. In addition, Stone had control over 7.5 million Deutschmarks in ERP promotion funds “to play with.” Recalling his commitment made on V-E-Day, Stone described his “mad” mission as “making Germany a country upon which you can


34 Schwartz, America’s Germany, 330n29.


rly to be peaceful and anti-totalitarian." Stone chose Berlin as stage for most of his ideas that numbered “as many as a dog has fleas,” in McCloy’s words. As a self-described “leftist,” Stone saw a “necessity of helping the good and positive forces against the more traditional chaps in power [whose] leader is Adenauer.” He thus placed great hopes on the “remarkable Reuter” to whom he was well connected through the Mayor’s new press manager Hirschfeld. In particular, Stone sought to bring the public relations success of the Airlift on permanent footing through the Outpost narrative. Thus his PUB Division founded or greatly expanded a host of institutions and initiatives in close collaboration with Hirschfeld’s press section of West Berlin’s newly renamed Senate, such as hosting a distinct West Berliner polite society and the inauguration of the Freedom Bell.

As an outstanding networker, Stone brought West Berlin’s emerging political scene to the attention of powerful brokers within American foreign policy. Deriving from his wartime service in military intelligence and through his directorship of PUB, Stone held excellent connections with American intelligence agencies. For instance, personal friend Thomas Braden, the CIA liaison to the Congress for Cultural Freedom, lauded a meeting with Stone as the “most pleasant thing […] in Europe.” In addition, Stone cultivated a close friendship with then deputy CIA Director Allen Welsh Dulles, who would lead the agency after 1952. As OSS chief in Europe, Dulles had been among the first members of the American occupation in Berlin, from July

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38 McCloy, “Letter to Senator Herbert H. Lehman.”


through October 1945.\textsuperscript{41} Notably, Stone brought Dulles in contact with persons in Germany, passed on information on the SPD, recommended potential recruits for the CIA, and stayed at his private home during a business trip to New York City.\textsuperscript{42} Thus Stone played an important role in keeping High Commissioner McCloy informed on American intelligence activities in Berlin.\textsuperscript{43} The link between Stone and Allen W. Dulles would later ensure bipartisan support for the Outpost network within the upper echelons of American foreign policy, when the latter’s brother, John Foster Dulles, would take over the State Department in 1953 with the incoming Republican Eisenhower administration.

Stone also deliberately reached out to the elite of the nascent Federal Republic. HICO requisitioned a stately villa in Falkenstein in the Taunus Hills overlooking Frankfurt for Stone’s purposes. He relished that his occupancy kept Deutsche Bank Chairman Hermann Josef Abs from moving in.\textsuperscript{44} Stone noted that the house’s upkeep required “a gardener, a cook, a butler, and a maid.” He described his housing to his family as “incredible, but keep in mind that I wouldn’t have the house were it not for the fact that it was given to me for a purpose. I entertain Germans,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{43} Shepard Stone, “Secret Memorandum for John McCloy” March 17, 1951, Shepard Stone Papers, ML-99, Series 4: High Commission For Germany (HICOG), 1949-1953, Box 12, Folder 37, Dartmouth College, Rauner Special Collections Library.
\item \textsuperscript{44} F. Faudi, “Brief an Shepard Stone,” February 20, 1952, Shepard Stone Papers, ML-99, Series 4: High Commission For Germany (HICOG), 1949-1953, Box 13, Folder 1, Dartmouth College, Rauner Special Collections Library.
\end{itemize}
and bring Germans and Americans together. Moreover, in this house away from [HICOG headquarters in] Frankfurt, political and other discussions take place that are not without significance.” In particular, these discussions offered the opportunity to entertain the Outpost network members Hans Hirschfeld and Ernst Reuter for repeated informal talks.

Expense vouchers name the illustrious figures of the early Federal Republic hosted by the Stones multiple times per week. Waldemar von Knoeringen, former Neu Beginnen leader turned SPD Bundestag delegate, Eugen Gerstenmaier, CDU delegate and Chairman of the Bundestag foreign committee, Gerd Bucerius, publisher of broadsheet weekly Die Zeit, and Rector of Frankfurt University, returned faculty member and OSS veteran Max Horkheimer were among the many regular guests in Falkenstein. Most notably, Stone cultivated a personal and intellectual friendship with his Taunus neighbor, Eugen Kogon, a Catholic Socialist Camp survivor who had published the first scholarly account on the German Concentration Camp system. Stone frequently asked for Kogon’s advice and at times requested his suggestions for public speeches in German.

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Stone’s salon also opened a franchise in West Berlin in which he put particular emphasis on opening up informal channels to the heads of the West Berlin mediascape. This strategy sought to keep West Berlin’s media outlets on message for the Outpost narrative. For instance, Stone enlisted the help of Ralph A. Brown, or Braun, another remigré in PUB who would later stay in Berlin to maintain a constant channel of communications between Willy Brandt and the CIA for decades to come.50 Braun organized an informal “buffet dinner” at Stone’s Berlin home in October 1950 with key media leaders in West Berlin, such as Arno Scholz, editor of the Social Democratic Telegraf, Hirschfeld, and PUB officials Braun, Theodore Kaghan and Charles S. Lewis.51 Stone became a friend and crucial financier of Melvin Lasky and his Monat magazine.52 Both men’s backgrounds exhibited parallels: Both hailed from secular Jewish lower middle-class families and shared the ambition to establish themselves in Manhattan’s elite circles. Stone would hail Berlin-based Lasky as an “invaluable member of our staff.”53 As the collaboration between both networkers suggest, Stone’s mission in Berlin exhibited a strong social component, blurring private and professional. For instance, Stone organized a “RIAS-Stone Party” to celebrate 1952 New Year’s. Having invited “125 guests, the leading people in the political, cultural, social, and economic life of Berlin,” PUB brought together McCloy, Reuter, Hirschfeld


together with RIAS leading journalists.\textsuperscript{54} Round the clock commitment to establish West Berlin as the Outpost of Freedom in the Cold War had become a constituent part of the personal identity of the members of the Outpost network.

But crucially, the PUB’s strident public relations efforts to popularize West Berlin’s conception as the Outpost of Freedom also appealed internally within the American occupation. They stoked American personnel’s enthusiasm for the city they occupied following the Berlin Airlift. The Outpost narrative captivated the US High Commission’s own propagandists before they advanced it through radio broadcasts, newspaper campaigns, and pamphlets. Strikingly, PUB couched the Outpost narrative in a comprehensive interpretation of Berlin’s history. For instance, Shepard Stone’s Public Affairs Division briefed US Commandant Maxwell Taylor thusly:

“Berlin before the war was the greatest commercial, industrial and communications center on the continent. […] But it was more than that. For my generations, prior to the creation of the modern German state, Berlin was the cultural and spiritual capital of the German-speaking people. […] It is a cosmopolitan city. Its people have the quality sound in great cosmopolitan centers. They are quick intelligent, possessed of a sense of humor, and contrary to most prevailing ideas in the world, have a long tradition of independence and liberalism. […] Very few know that Berlin resisted the Nazi regime more strongly than any other major city in Germany. Berlin was the safest city in Germany throughout the Nazi regime for hunted liberals.”\textsuperscript{55}

For US authorities in Berlin, the seemingly heroic pre-Nazi past determined the present. The constructed continuity between the liberal potential of the Weimar Republic and West Berlin’s conception as the Outpost of Freedom reconciled American occupation officials such as Stone with the city they had known intimately – like the German Social Democratic remigrés. In the aftermath of the Airlift, PUB and US authorities in Berlin picked up on Reuter’s narrative of


\textsuperscript{55} Clark Denney, “Briefing for General Taylor Enclosed in Letter to Fred Shaw” September 18, 1950, 1–2, RG 466, US High Commissioner for Germany (HICOG), Public Affairs Division, Berlin Element, Classified Subject Files, E-176, Box 3, Folder German-American relations, National Archives, College Park.
West Berlin as the Outpost of Freedom by routinely referring to the half city as an “outpost of freedom in the middle of the Communist area of influence.” Within four years, this term became eponymous with American commitment to West Berlin, as American officials vigorously debated the best defense of “this exposed and key outpost of freedom behind the iron curtain.” In 1953, Republican Secretary of State John Foster Dulles adopted this terminology, describing “Berlin’s role as a key and influential democratic outpost.” This signaled bipartisan support for the Outpost narrative and the network that controlled it from the highest echelons of American foreign policy makers.

This linguistic reinterpretation of West Berlin shifted the vindication of the American presence in Berlin from stamping out vestiges of fascism to combating totalitarianism in any guise. Thus, usage of the Outpost narrative transformed Americans’ perception of Berliners and informed American policy in West Berlin. For instance, Schöneberg City Hall liaison officer Mautner viewed remigré SPD leaders not only as political allies, but as kindred spirits, boasting “the leaders of Berlin's political scene are the best ally any occupation can ever hope to get.” Mautner pointed to the experience of uprooting, wartime exile, and return to Europe that he shared with these SPD remigrés and offered the bonding experience of the Airlift as proof:

“There was not a trace of antagonism on the particular group I am speaking of two of three years ago. They considered us as double liberators. Some of this group had spent the war years in exile. (REUTER, KRESSMANN, Willi BRANDT, Dr. HERTZ, Dr. HIRSCHFELD). They were not a group of cringing Germans, they were as free as we are. They had the same goal we had and I dare


57 Smith, “Memorandum” September 18, 1953, RG 466, US High Commissioner for Germany (HICOG), Berlin Element, Office of the Director, Classified General Records, 1949-55, E-162, Box 21, Folder Pol BE (Mayor Reuter), National Archives, College Park.

say that this is still true. It is simply our common minimum strategic goal, the consolidation of what we've got and prevention of any further Eastern encroachment. The blockade had forged an iron alliance between us and the Berliners.”

Mautner’s report suggests that experience of exile vouched for these Social Democrats democratic credentials even to American officials who did not share his Central European émigré background. Their remigré background elevated them from “cringing Germans” to “free men” of equal standing. In practical terms, American subscription to the Outpost narrative dispersed patronizing attitudes towards these remigrés and acknowledged their political relevance. The gifted politicians Reuter and Brandt would shrewdly leverage this stature to advance their agenda through the narrative. Given the narrative’s crucial role in personally bonding PUB officials with German remigrés members of the network, PUB sought to connect the broader American and Berlin publics through their work.

The 1950 dedication of the Berlin Freedom Bell deliberately infused imagery deeply connected with American political culture into West Berlin. In an attempt to expand the prominence of the Outpost narrative also geographically, PUB coordinated the installation of a replica of Philadelphia’s iconic Liberty Bell. After his return to the United States, former OMGUS head Clay chaired a Free Europe Committee (FEC) that initiated a Crusade for Freedom. Derived from an extensive private-state network, this Crusade sought to “strengthen our own peoples’ basic understanding and appreciation of the freedoms we enjoy” in the context


60 Cf. Sections III and IV.

of the Cold and Korean Wars by pointing to Berlin’s example. In an elaborately staged pageant that was secretly underwritten by the CIA, the Berlin bound Bell toured around the United States recalling the national exhibition of its Philadelphia role model. This national tour served as a fundraiser for the Bell and the incipient Radio Free Europe, modeled after RIAS.

Both the festivities surrounding its arrival in West Berlin and the Bell itself highlight the crafted ritualized memorialization – and Americanization – of the narrative by the network. Stone’s PUB and Hirschfeld’s West Berlin Press Office collaborated closely to stage a grandiose reception of the Bell and its patron, Lucius D. Clay. They convened the heads of HICOG and the recently founded Federal Republic, including Chancellor Adenauer and the Minister Presidents of all West German states. The Berlin delegation conspicuously included the remigrés Reuter and Hirschfeld as guests of honor.

In an era of mass demonstrations in Berlin, the dedication ceremony drew 400,000 Berliners, equaling the number of protestors at the Reichstag ruin in 1948. Returned American Berliner Robert Lochner directed and translated the ceremony. Strikingly, the Outpost network

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66 PUB, “Guest List Freedom Bell Dedication Luncheon” October 1950, John J. McCloy Papers, Series 13: HICOG, Box HC2, Folder 10, Amherst College Library, Archives and Special Collections.

enlisted RIAS to produce a live broadcast of the dedication ceremony that was carried across Germany and via 1500 affiliates across the United States and the world to create an even larger audience. The four speakers, US City Commander Taylor, Clay, McCloy, and Reuter expounded on the Outpost narrative using the terms “free” and “freedom” seventy times, contending that West Berlin’s resistance to Communism had garnered the admiration of the American public. Taylor introduced a “Vow of Freedom” to accompany the Bell:

“I believe in the sacredness and dignity of the individual. I believe that all men derive the right to freedom equally from god. I pledge to resist oppression and tyranny wherever they appear on earth.”

In conjunction with the medium of a bell, this vow that RIAS broadcasted each Sunday at noon highlighted the sacral character of the ceremony and the cult of freedom propagated by the Outpost network. Clay pointed to the Freedom Bell’s inscription: “That this world under God shall have a new birth of freedom.” The inscription deliberately echoed Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address, simply supplanting “nation” with “world.” Thus the Truman administration sought to justify the United States’ commitment in the global Cold War through the most compelling vindication for the sacrifices made in the bloodiest conflict of American history.

McCloy’s speech connected the city’s unsavory past with its present role as democratic model: “This city has known tyranny and was destroyed by tyranny. But this is also a city from whose ruins a new spirit has arisen, with a new courage to resist oppression and all its shackling consequences.” In particular, he warned the Soviet Union and its newly founded East German client state, the GDR: “Those who apply totalitarian techniques will fail today and tomorrow just

68 For the original RIAS broadcast, see “Festakt auf dem Rudolf-Wilde-Platz vor dem Rathaus Schöneberg der Freiheitsglocke” (RIAS, October 24, 1950), DZ079993, Deutschlandradio Archiv, Berlin.

69 Geppert, “Die Freiheitsglocke,” 239.

70 “Festakt auf dem Rudolf-Wilde-Platz vor dem Rathaus Schöneberg der Freiheitsglocke.”

71 Ibid.
like the Nazis failed five years ago.” Reuter took the opportunity to press his constituents to fully identify themselves as proponents of resilient democracy: “It was on September 9, 1948 [at the Reichstag ruin] when we called upon the world not to abandon in grave danger. This call has been answered! […] This gift is more than recognition of our achievement. We all know that this bell is reminder and obligation for us all. We must muster the courage to engage in the large contest even more determined than before.” In characteristic fashion, Reuter alluded to the traumatic experiences of his constituents in hope to channel their passions to not only construct West Berlin as a liberal democratic entity, but as showcase of a resilient, vigorously anti-totalitarian Cold War Democracy. The Freedom Bell pageant exemplifies how PUB and the West Berlin Press Office succeeded where Social Democrats had struggled during the interwar era: The network exploited its stage in West Berlin to channel passions in the age of mass politics through broadcasting media.

III. RIAS, the Principal Media Outlet of the Network

The Radio in the American Sector (RIAS) proved to be the network’s preeminent and most versatile media outlet at their disposal. Its slogan ‘A free voice of the free world’ exemplifies the duality of RIAS’ competing goals. As a unique hybrid institution under the tutelage of PUB’s sprawling media operations led by Stone, RIAS had to reconcile upholding the ideals of independent journalism with furthering a Cold War political agenda. American RIAS

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72 Ibid.
73 Ibid.
management addressed this tension on an ad-hoc basis; with its journalists pushing to expand journalistic freedom while the network sought political loyalty.

Despite these constraints, RIAS’ institutional status as a unique German-American hybrid institution offered liberties as well. Unlike public broadcasting stations in the Federal Republic proper, RIAS did not possess any broadcasting council that guaranteed institutional party representation and control.\textsuperscript{75} Under American management, young German broadcasters created a program that combined news, highbrow culture, and entertainment. Eminent figures of the Federal Republic’s public sphere emerged as RIAS journalists. Among them rank Brandt’s later Ostpolitik confidante Egon Bahr, his speechwriter Klaus Harpprecht, political journalist Gerhard Löwenthal, and popular TV host Hans Rosenthal. Through its pioneering programming, RIAS stood out to an audience conditioned to twelve years of Goebbels’ broadcast indoctrination.

While its role as a Cold War attack station has been well documented, its role in shaping West Berlin’s new identity for its core audience has attracted less attention.\textsuperscript{76} American authorities repeatedly ranked RIAS as “our most effective weapon here is in Berlin.”\textsuperscript{77} As the most popular station in the Berlin market, no other institution had such framing power for the


network’s creation of a canonical repertoire of ‘freedom’ in Berlin. Moreover the Outpost narrative and the network’s leadership guided RIAS to attain this stature of one of West Berlin’s preeminent ambassadors of Cold War Democracy. As testament to the enduring success of the network’s channeling of the Outpost narrative through RIAS, present-day Berliners cite the station nostalgically as a constituent part of West Berlin’s cultural identity – more than two decades after it went off the air in 1994.

RIAS’ afterlife in Berliner’s popular memory in fact concentrates on the station’s final of three incarnations. The station first begun in a makeshift manner in 1946 and endured bitter infighting that reflected the shifting political priorities of the American occupation in general. RIAS started its broadcasts in February of 1946, after OMGUS Information Control officer (ICD) Charles S. Lewis lobbied for an independent American reorientation policy in Berlin. The situation OMGUS faced in Berlin during the first months of its occupation quickly dashed hopes for quadripartite rule. For instance, the Western Allies encountered a Berliner Rundfunk that was already running again, when they entered Berlin in July 1945. The former Berliner Reichsrundfunk had dropped its “Reichs-“ prefix and retook the airwaves under Soviet auspices despite the station physical location in British-occupied Charlottenburg. Unwilling to share the facilities, Radio Berlin came under increasingly Communist influence in the following months,

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prompting American designs to build up theirs fashioned as a non-partisan station.\textsuperscript{81} Originally directed by Viennese-born Edmund Schechter, fellow émigré Ruth Norden assumed directorship of RIAS in April 1946.\textsuperscript{82} She retained an American management team for the station that derived from German-speaking émigrés, comprising Harry Frohman of the Weimar-era Comedian Harmonists fame and Gustave Mathieu.\textsuperscript{83} Norden’s tenure at RIAS from April 1946 to December 1947 proved even more controversial than what could have been expected in Berlin’s tumultuous context. Identified and derided as Leftists, Norden and political editor Mathieu faced repeated accusations by fellow occupation officers, local RIAS journalists, and Reuter of aiding the Communist cause.\textsuperscript{84} Whatever the true extent of their Leftist sympathies, both had attracted the ire of Social Democrats of differing stripes such as Neumann and Reuter, when Norden and Mathieu clung to an editorial line of neutrality in covering the KPD-SPD Fusionskampf 1946.\textsuperscript{85} Mirroring their divisive tenure, OMGUS’ lapse to extend Norden and Mathieu’s contracts at the end of 1947 has found competing interpretations. While Wolfgang Schivelbusch in his sympathetic account has suggested that Norden and Mathieu as “New Dealers” fell victim to the

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{81}{Rott, \textit{Die Insel}, 96–97.}
\footnote{85}{Schivelbusch, \textit{In a Cold Crater}, 112–113.}
\end{footnotes}
rapidly intensifying anti-Communist hysteria taking hold in OMGUS, Heribert Kundler as a RIAS veteran has accused Norden of failing to pay RIAS’ most elementary bills.  

The succeeding RIAS director William Heimlich would expand the station and give its political programs a distinctive anti-Communist edge. As another veteran of G-2 military intelligence, Heimlich had been one of the first American soldiers to enter Berlin in July 1945. He continuously stayed in the city, rising to Deputy Chief of Branch, Civil Administration. Heimlich brought two qualities to the RIAS Director’s post: First, he possessed broadcasting experience as a trained radio journalist before the war. Second, his ardent anti-Communist convictions attracted General Clay’s attention. The high priority placed on RIAS and the escalating political tensions in Berlin during 1948 led to a large expansion of the station in scope and reach. Heimlich claimed as his success the introduction of political satire into the program. Günter Neumann and his Insulaner comedy troupe, or the Islanders, bitingly lampooned Stalinist rhetorical contortions and gave West Berliners’ emerging distinct political identity an outlet. The duality between political satire and high brow news exemplified RIAS innovative duality that would become a trademark of its programming.

The 1948/1949 Berlin Crisis made RIAS a household name. According to a state of the art survey by the American occupation conducted by Harold Hurwitz, RIAS’ market share reached

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86 Kundler and Kroening, RIAS Berlin: Eine Radio-Station in einer geteilten Stadt: Programme und Menschen - Texte, Bilder, Dokumente, 49; Schivelbusch, In a Cold Crater, 121.


89 Information Control Division, “RIAS,” Military Government Information Bulletin, 10-19, University of Wisconsin Digital Collections, Madison, WI.

up to 80% in West Berlin.\textsuperscript{91} RIAS rise to West Berlin’s preeminent media outlet derived from a coordinated strategy to channel popular outrage against the Soviet blockade with the Outpost narrative. RIAS journalists took credit for the resounding success of the September 1948 political demonstration in front of the Reichstag in which Reuter pitched the Outpost narrative both to his own constituents and the American public.\textsuperscript{92} RIAS not only provided the public address system and extensive live coverage of the demonstration. Moreover RIAS journalists claimed partial ownership of the “Freedom rally” as RIAS had called on its listeners to converge upon the Reichstag ruin.\textsuperscript{93} Privately, RIAS journalists boasted “on a few hours notice, RIAS was able to mobilize this mass demonstration of democratic strength.”\textsuperscript{94} The ramifications of the blockade further propelled RIAS rise. French combat engineers demolished the Communist-dominated \textit{Berliner Rundfunk}’s transmitter as it obstructed air supplies into Tegel Airport, briefly impeding reception of RIAS’s main competitor. Shrewdly, OMGUS circumvented the electrical blackouts that embroiled West Berlin by mounting loudspeakers on US Army trucks that carried the RIAS program to its audience.\textsuperscript{95}

The hardships wrought by the Blockade on West Berliners led to popular identification with RIAS. In the survey conducted by Hurwitz, an overwhelming majority of West Berliners agreed with the statement that RIAS served “its purpose as radio station of western Berlin.”\textsuperscript{96} In

\textsuperscript{91} Research Analysis Branch, “Report No 4. Series No 2: RIAS and Its Listeners in Western Berlin.”

\textsuperscript{92} Cf. Introduction, Chapter 1, IV.

\textsuperscript{93} For a tape of the extensive RIAS coverage from that demonstration, cf. “Großkundgebung auf dem Platz der Republik” (RIAS, September 9, 1948), DZ079323, Deutschlandradio Archiv, Berlin.

\textsuperscript{94} “RIAS Scrapbook” 1955, Gordon Ewing Collection, Box 2, George C. Marshall Library, Lexington, VA.


\textsuperscript{96} Research Analysis Branch, “Report No 4. Series No 2: RIAS and Its Listeners in Western Berlin.”
similar fashion, over 90% of RIAS listeners gave it highest marks in coverage accuracy – locally and internationally. RIAS’ equal credibility in both dimensions hints at the Outpost narrative’s effectiveness: The narrative refigured both the confusing situation Berliners faced and the plight they endured into a struggle for the future of democracy in Europe. Thus RIAS news casting gained credibility by association. While West Berliners identified with RIAS’ interpretation of Berlin’s high stake drama through their own experience, they had to rely on RIAS’ coverage of international developments while the city was sealed off. Their overwhelming trust in RIAS’ credibility gave its newscasters tremendous influence to frame political debate within West Berlin.

Yet just after the successful conclusion of the Airlift that RIAS had exploited so effectively, HICOG PUB abruptly dismissed RIAS Director William Heimlich in September 1949. While on the surface a management decision, this episode illustrates the US occupation’s susceptibility to nepotism, the network’s growing clout, and the personal acrimony that would later invite McCarthyist persecutions. Head of HICOG radio operations Charles S. Lewis and new PUB Director Shepard Stone terminated Heimlich for profligate spending. In a scathing memorandum, Lewis accused Heimlich of deliberately overpaying personal favorites that included “Mr. Heimlich’s very close friend Christina Ohlsen,” a local singer.97 RIAS internal files confirm that Heimlich had explicitly ordered the skeptical RIAS wages department to “fully pay” the future Mrs. Heimlich.98 Heimlich’s subsequent dismissal created bitter personal animosities between

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him and the network members at PUB such as Stone and Lewis that prefigured the 1953 witch-hunt at RIAS, but also opened the door for even closer cooperation with the SPD remigrés within the network. Characteristically, incoming RIAS Director Fred G. Taylor visited Governing Mayor Reuter on his first day in Berlin.\textsuperscript{99} Taylor eagerly introduced himself as a network member, reaching out to the SPD remigrés and immediately discussing the “shared work” between them.\textsuperscript{100} Lewis noted with surprise at this meeting how Reuter “apparently had been well informed about the maladministration of the station.”\textsuperscript{101}

Inside knowledge of RIAS internals proved crucial for the SPD remigrés to secure preferential RIAS coverage. The remigrés resorted to informal contacts through the network since RIAS did not possess any broadcasting council that gave any party institutional influence, unlike any other radio station in West Germany at the time. Again the network proved particularly useful for implementing this strategy. Reuter and Hirschfeld in Schöneberg City Hall and Taylor and his deputy Gordon Ewing across the Rudolph-Wilde-Park firmly connected RIAS to the network. HICOG officials noted contently that Taylor and Ewing quickly reduced RIAS running costs by a quarter to 900,000 DM per month.\textsuperscript{102} Stone commended RIAS for its “phenomenal job” under its new leadership.\textsuperscript{103} In 1950, Taylor asked Reuter to “rest assured that

\begin{itemize}
\item [Lewis, “Memorandum ‘Supplemental Report on Regularization of RIAS.’”]
\item [Fred G. Taylor, “Brief an Ernst Reuter,” October 1, 1949, B Rep 002, 8640 Akten der Senatskanzlei, Der Regierende Bürgermeister, RIAS Berlin, Landesarchiv Berlin.]
\item [Lewis, “Memorandum ‘Supplemental Report on Regularization of RIAS.’”]
\item [Ralph Nicholson, “Letter to Henry Kellermann,” October 20, 1949, RG 260, Records of the Office of Military Government for Germany (OMGUS), Records of the Information Control Division, Records of the Director and Deputy Director, 1945-50, E-242 (A1), Box 37, National Archives, College Park.]
\item [Stone, “Letter to the Stones of Nashua, NH,” May 31, 1950.]
\end{itemize}
RIAS will always strive to support your work in every regard.”104 Hirschfeld suggested to his ‘dear friend’ Taylor that the creation of West Berlin was a Social Democratic and American co-production when he called the city “our Berlin.”105 Conveniently, the network could employ the Outpost narrative against Communist enemies and intraparty rivals alike.

RIAS’ coverage of the SPD remigrés confirms that its pledged unconditional support extended beyond the Cold War into domestic political wrangling. Analysis of RIAS programming between 1948 and 1958 confirms that Reuter as Mayor and other prominent remigrés received most airtime. Most notably, RIAS introduced the format “Wo uns der Schuh drückt” or “Where the Shoe Pinches Us” on November 18, 1951, which it would carry until 1978. Every second Sunday, Mayor Ernst Reuter had the opportunity to field questions from Berliners for fifteen to twenty minutes in a tone emulating President Roosevelt’s fireside chats.106 Billed as an example of RIAS’ innovative programming and civic control, the radio program also enabled Reuter to speak exclusively to thousands of Berliners.

The intense cooperation between SPD remigrés, RIAS, and US authorities enraged their political rivals on the either side of the Brandenburg Gate. East Berlin’s SED regularly denounced RIAS journalists as mercenaries serving the United States. But behind closed doors, the SED party bureaucracy begrudgingly admitted that “the hate and slandering campaign of the West press and RIAS succeeds in confusing many West Berlin workers who hence still disapprove the Workers’ and Peasants’ Might to the benefit of the remigrés faction in the


Apart from the political vitriol, CDU leader Ferdinand Friedensburg seemed to agree with the assessment of RIAS’ political leanings when he lamented to Reuter: “It may be that [American RIAS official] Shub has displayed particular courtesy to you. But in general he has promoted one-sidedly the interests of the SPD as part of his duties. […] Particularly the CDU had good reason […] to be unsatisfied with RIAS.” The network’s influence over RIAS and the station’s commitment to the Outpost narrative made it particularly well-suited for campaigning for Cold War Democracy in Berlin – against political rivals of all stripes.

IV. Campaigns to Install Cold War Democracy in West Berlin

In the months after lifting of the Berlin Blockade, the network made full use of the institutions that came into full fruition through the Airlift and the narrative it seemingly affirmed. Casting West Berlin as the model city of Cold War Democracy helped the network to promote its points among American policy makers concerning Germany, marginalize its primary competitor, the CDU, and attacking its Communist enemies on the other side of the Brandenburg Gate.

The network reverted back to its roots in wartime Manhattan to implement this ambitious agenda of comprehensively restructuring Berlin’s political culture. The SPD remigrés relied on Hans Hirschfeld for high-level informal communication with sympathetic de-jure occupiers such as Shepard Stone. The relationship between these journalists-turned-politicians suggests a characteristic connection between public relations and sensitive backchannel communication in Cold War Berlin not fully acknowledged until now. Reuter construed Hirschfeld’s portfolio as

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West Berlin’s Public Relations Director broadly to act as a conduit between American authorities and the West Berlin administration.

Hirschfeld drew on his émigré experience and network of OSS contacts for this task. For instance, Hirschfeld regularly informed the Viennese-born American liaison officer in West Berlin’s City Hall about the Reuter administration’s PR activities. Karl F. Mautner’s summaries of these conversations also appeared on Shepard Stone’s desk.\textsuperscript{109}\ Stone and Hirschfeld also communicated directly, coordinating personal meetings in Berlin, HICOG’s Frankfurt Headquarters, and Stone’s private Taunus home.\textsuperscript{110}\ While written records on these informal meetings are intentionally sparse, official memoranda summarizing them have survived in Hirschfeld’s personal papers. These rich and underutilized sources indicate the presence at select meetings of Mayor Ernst Reuter, HICOG Commissioner John McCloy, and then-journalist Willy Brandt.

In these meetings, the remigrés found direct access to American decision-makers such as High Commissioner John J. McCloy, as the example of the negotiations on West Berlin’s relationship with the nascent Federal Republic illustrate. During the formative phase of the Republic and the Airlift 1949, Reuter sought West Berlin’s full integration into the Federal Republic as its twelfth constituent state. This proposal met the resistance of French and British occupation authorities and of the Rhenish Adenauer CDU. Moreover, local Schumacher allies around Franz Neumann joined the opposition against Reuter’s key initiative, much to his outrage.


The French High Commissioner François-Poncet feared that West Berlin’s simple accession to the Federal Republic would undercut Allied prerogatives upon which Berlin’s independence from the Soviet Zone rested.\(^{111}\) In an informal discussion with American liaison officer Mautner, Reuter fumed: “This is impossible. I cannot stand for it that we here, who have done so much for the freedom of Berlin [...] are constantly stabbed in the back by people who squabble about formulations and fail to recognize the big picture, which we pursue since 1946.”\(^{112}\) Reuter’s conversation exemplifies how the remigrés attempted to extract political concessions from their de-jure American occupiers through conscious use of the Outpost narrative. Reuter succeeded in convincing Stone of West Berlin’s full integration into the Federal Republic, but his superior McCloy encountered surprising support for the French position from Chancellor Adenauer.\(^{113}\) While Adenauer’s neglect of Berlin interests has often been portrayed as ingrained Rhenish antipathy against the unloved former Prussian capital, practical political calculations favored his strategy: West Berlin would have sent a SPD dominated caucus to the Bundestag in Bonn, endangering Adenauer’s parliamentary majority.

The state of West Berlin’s CDU made Adenauer’s maneuvering smart politics. The network exploited the Outpost narrative to neutralize the Berlin CDU. While the network highlighted the SPD remigrés’ steadfast fight for civil rights and opposition to Communist designs, it concurrently exposed the structural dilemmas of the local CDU. A history of susceptibility to Soviet pressure and a competing political conception of Berlin hamstrung the


City CDU. The formation of the CDU in Berlin is closely connected with founding of the party in the Soviet Zone. After surviving the last years of the Nazi regime in hiding, Christian trade unionist and resistance leader Jakob Kaiser took a central role in forming a Christian Democratic Union with essential blessing of SVAG. While the SPD lost its Soviet Zone wing within months after the 1946 forced merger into the SED, the CDU survived in the future GDR. For elections in Berlin, the effective dismantling of the SPD in the Soviet Zone allowed the Social Democrats to denounce SVAG and SED policies vigorously and with moral authority. In contrast, Kaiser and in particular then Berlin Mayor Ferdinand Friedensburg could not afford to alienate SVAG outright and were forced to resist Communist political encroachment through the GDR’s National Front list in a piecemeal manner.\textsuperscript{114}

In addition, politicians like Kaiser and Friedensburg long advocated a political conception of postwar Berlin that stood in opposition to the Outpost of Freedom narrative. While Reuter had returned to zealously transform Berlin to a non-Communist model city, these CDU leaders hoped that Germany and its capital Berlin could act as a “Brücke,” or bridge, connecting both geopolitical camps. While the political tensions in the city rapidly escalated around him, Kaiser still saw this concept as a chance for “our Germany that today is distraughtly jammed in the deplorable dichotomy between East and West.”\textsuperscript{115} The spiral of escalation that culminated in the Soviet Berlin Blockade prompted Kaiser to move to West Berlin, shattered the political unity of Berlin and Soviet Zone CDU, and dealt the Berlin bridge concept a blow.\textsuperscript{116} Even after the start

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{114} Arthur Schlegelmilch, \textit{Hauptstadt im Zonendeutschland}, vol. 4, Die Entstehung der Berliner Nachkriegsdemokratie 1945 - 1949 (Berlin: Haude & Spener, 1993), 351.
\item \textsuperscript{115} Jakob Kaiser, “Rede ‘Um Demokratie und Freiheit’” January 10, 1948, 01-171 Nachlass Emil Dovifat, 003/3 Materialsammlung 1945-1965, Archiv Christlich-Demokratischer Politik, St. Augustin.
\item \textsuperscript{116} Jakob Kaiser, “Brief an Ernst Lemmer,” April 28, 1948, 01-280 Nachlass Ernst Lemmer, 057/3 Korrespondenz, Archiv Christlich-Demokratischer Politik, St. Augustin.
\end{itemize}
of the blockade, Friedensburg set the term “unity” against Reuter’s “freedom.” The personal authority of Kaiser and Friedensburg secured a robust share of votes for the CDU, making her a SPD junior coalition partner with nearly 25% of the 1950 vote. But the Berlin CDU lacked the direct access to US occupation authorities granted to the SPD remigrés in the pursuit of a common political project. Instead, Schöneberg City Hall liaison officer Mautner dismissed the Berlin CDU leadership as “naïve.”

As the 1948 demonstration in front of the Reichstag and the 1950 inauguration festivities for the Freedom Bell suggest, the network routinely staged mass rallies to promote its narrative. Just like the competing rallies in the Soviet Sector, these events deliberately harked back to Weimar-era mass politics. Since the 1948 strike of the American-backed UGO union against the Soviet Zone run S-Bahn rapid transit service, driving a wedge between Berlin’s traditionally large working-class milieu and the Communist SED formed a principal aim for these campaigns.

Thus the network pooled the resources of the SPD, West Berlin’s municipal government, RIAS, and HICOG PUB to appropriate May Day for West Berlin. Consciously staged as an alternative to the pompous Stalinist rally at the Lustgarten off Unter den Linden, Hirschfeld organized the Western rally in front of the Reichstag in close proximity to the still open

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118 Karl F. Mautner, “Memorandum ‘Article by Dr Friedensburg Concerning Problems of Western Berlin’” September 7, 1951, RG 466, US High Commissioner for Germany (HICOG), Berlin Element, Office of the Director, Classified General Records, 1949-55, E-162, Box 21, Folder Political Germany (Berlin), National Archives, College Park.


Brandenburg Gate in conjunction with the non-Communist UGO union.121 RIAS repeatedly called upon its listeners to attend the rally in different pitches appealing to different target groups.122 Under the motto “Peace in Freedom,” keynote speaker Reuter claimed the traditions of the German worker’s movement for the Cold War democracy he spearheaded in the old Socialist stronghold Berlin.123 This rally claimed to have attracted 500,000 Berliners from all Sectors. Among the dignitaries whom Reuter impressed was also Shepard Stone.124 In a high-level meeting the next day, American officials highlighted the importance of the Outpost narrative and its supporting institutions to General Taylor, US Army commander in Berlin: “the vital target in Berlin is the Berlin population. Our position here rests squarely on the support of this population. If we should ever lose its confidence, our position would become untenable.” This frank assessment of the American position in the city not only implied a stunning acknowledgment of occupied Berliners’ political power, but was offered a rationale for the open American support of the remigrés’ political mass rallies: PUB sought to “maintain morale and confidence in West Berlin,” which had proven itself as “remarkably steadfast and courageous.”125

Just four weeks later, the competition of mass rallies escalated during the 1950 Deutschlandtreffen of the GDR state youth organization FDJ on Pentecost, May 27 to 30. FDJ Chairman Erich Honecker planned to gather 500,000 FDJ youths uniformed in their iconic blue


122 RIAS Berlin, “Programmfahnen 7.2.46 bis 28.10.50” n.d., J104-00-06/0001 F0115, Deutsches Rundfunkarchiv, Potsdam-Babelsberg.


125 HICOG Berlin, “Briefing on Current Berlin Problems.”
shirts to demonstrate for German unity.\textsuperscript{126} The future General Secretary of the SED’s plan to also converge in the Western Sectors from five sides in a “March on Berlin” sent shockwaves into Schöneberg City Hall and HICOG. While HICOG allowed “FDJ personnel […] to enter the Western Sectors individually or in small groups, no organized marching in or through the Western Sectors will be permitted.”\textsuperscript{127} This set up both sides for a grave confrontation in the streets of West Berlin. HICOG Berlin considered the likelihood an open FDJ coup-attempt in West Berlin low, but nonetheless compiled a secret contingency plan to quell a potential insurrection.\textsuperscript{128} While this plan emphasized that “the West German Berlin Police shall be the first line in maintaining order,” it grimly asserted that “all measures necessary to maintain order, including the use of fire arms, will be taken both by Allies and Germans.”\textsuperscript{129} Yet HICOG invested most of its resources to build a massive propaganda campaign of its own for Berliners in both Western and Eastern Sectors. A year after the unsung failure of the Berlin Blockade, the Soviet leadership in Moscow did not share Honecker’s enthusiasm for another conflict over Berlin with incalculable consequences. On orders from Stalin’s Kremlin, the GDR leadership changed to a less confrontational program, dropping the March to West Berlin and now characterizing the FDJ rally as celebrating “zest for life.”\textsuperscript{130}

\textsuperscript{126} Lemke, \textit{Vor der Mauer}, 141–143.


\textsuperscript{129} Ramsey, “Secret Memorandum ‘Planning for Deutschlandtreffen.’”

\textsuperscript{130} Lemke, \textit{Vor der Mauer}, 143.
The shift in Communist tactics turned Pentecost 1950 into a West-East competition over the hearts and minds of Berliners and its youth in particular. HICOG and West Berlin propagandists now welcomed young visitors from the East to demonstrate the superiority of liberal democracy. In a detailed “propaganda program,” HICOG Berlin sought to “develop attitudes” that “West Berlin takes pride in being able to defend itself; it knows that Allies stand ready to help with all means” and ‘West Berliners have confidence in the future of their city.”¹³¹ This emphasis on Berlin’s heroic resistance to Communism within the Outpost narrative echoed Reuter’s insistence to his American network members that “politically it must be ‘The Berliner’ who does the calm stubborn holding out.”¹³² HICOG’s ICD polling service conducted surveys to identify particularly effective slogans against the FDJ.¹³³ PUB Berlin commissioned the printing of 460,000 leaflets, 2,000 placards and 10,000 balloons for 33,000 DM.¹³⁴ PUB tasked its “Berlin city liaison” Hans Hirschfeld with the distribution of these leaflets in characteristic fashion.¹³⁵ In anticipation of the month of mass rallies in May 1950, RIAS gave daily airtime during the evening prime time “to accentuate the radio propaganda.”¹³⁶ HICOG’s strategy shared


with Reuter and Hirschfeld to call upon FDJ to visit West Berlin proved a resounding success. Thousands of East German youths took advantage of West Berlin’s vaunted entertainment venues. 15,000 curious East German youths visited RIAS station for example.\textsuperscript{137} RIAS Director Taylor congratulated his “wonderful team” enthusiastically “for the outstanding work you have done in the past week for the shared cause that we all hold dear.”\textsuperscript{138}

The perceived stakes in the May 1950 Berlin mass rallies prompted formation of the clandestine “Political and Economic Projects Committee,” or PEPCO, that would institutionalize American responses in the future. Since the opening of the files after the conclusion of the Cold War, scholars have underscored PEPCO’s significance in formulating American policy vis-à-vis the GDR and coordinating propagandistic efforts against the East Berlin regime.\textsuperscript{139} Its origins, composition, and policies, however, point to considerable ramifications for West Berlin that have been neglected until now. High Commissioner McCloy founded PEPCO in February 1950 with the stated priority of “the strengthening of the Western position in Berlin and the improvement of the political, economical, and psychological viability of the western sectors thereof” in anticipation of the city’s busy rally schedule in May.\textsuperscript{140} It recommended “erecting in West Germany some Western-oriented mass movement […] which might promote German integration

\textsuperscript{137} Lemke, \textit{Vor der Mauer}, 144.


with Western Europe as the surest guarantee against Soviet penetration.” PEPCO comprised representatives from HICOG Political Affairs, a newly formed Eastern Section devoted to the GDR, US intelligence, and Shepard Stone for HICOG PUB. Stone emerged as a key member of PEPCO, chairing meetings at times. The high profile of its members lent PEPCO for implementing key initiatives. For instance, PEPCO supported the founding of the Congress for Cultural Freedom in West Berlin. In addition to Stone’s membership in the committee, PEPCO consulted directly with Mayor Reuter on “direct American aid to the Berlin problem,” giving the network privileged access to PEPCO. Most importantly, the perceived success of the cooperation with the remigrés in West Berlin’s municipal government made the close cooperation PEPCO’s template for future clashes with East Berlin. For 1951, PEPCO proposed to “counter Soviet-East German threats in manner developed in respect to the May Day Rally and the Deutschlandtreffen.” The formative power of the May 1950 rallies for the network’s policies warrants closer examination of the tropes its publicity exploited.

Under the rubric of ‘freedom,’ the network promoted a vision of Cold War Democracy that reconciled anti-Communism with a variant of Social Democracy committed to the defense of civil rights. The network consciously attempted to attract Berliners by capitalizing on lingering anti-Communist resentments. One of the leaflets Hirschfeld distributed depicted battered camp

141 Ibid., 29.
142 E.g. HC Ramsey, “Secret Memorandum ‘Sixth and Seventh Meetings of PEP Committee’” March 1, 1950, RG 466, US High Commissioner for Germany (HICOG), Berlin Element, Office of the Director, Classified General Records, 1949-55, E-162, Box 6, Folder PEPCO Minutes, National Archives, College Park.
internees and read “500,000 German P.O.W. want to be in Berlin on Pentecost, too!” This tapped into pervasive popular grievances and anguish over the fate of the thousands of former Wehrmacht soldiers the Soviet Union still held in captivity. Another of the leaflets in response to the FDJ Deutschlandtreffen visualized the sheer number of the 500,000 attendees of West Berlin’s May Day Demonstration through a foldout photo with the intention to confirm emphatically: “Berlin is free and will remain free!” The network attempted to counter GDR’s distinctive logos by branding the capitalized letter “F” as “Freiheit,” or Freedom. For instance a pamphlet titled with a Berlin Bear tearing down the “DJ” of “FDJ” to expose “F” for “Freiheit,” or Freedom. In this pamphlet, the Western propagandists denounced the nascent GDR regime as totalitarian, drawing continuities between FDJ blue shirts and SA brown shirts a decade earlier through both organizations’ shared penchant for uniformed parades.

Denouncing the Stalinist campaigns in East Berlin as totalitarian complemented the plausibility of Outpost of Freedom narrative. Just as the network could consciously appropriate positively construed tropes of Berlin’s Weimar days for the narrative, it unloaded tropes of Berlin’s troublesome past onto the Soviet sector in the name of totalitarian continuity. The network shrewdly assigned one narrative each to postwar Berlin’s two competing polities. Thus

146 “Leaflet ‘500,000 Kriegsgefangene’” April 1950, RG 466, US High Commissioner for Germany (HICOG), Berlin Element, Office of the Director, Classified General Records, 1949-55, E-162, Box 13, Folder Deutschlandtreffen, National Archives, College Park.


150 For the Weimar tropes and the marginalization of Berlin’s Nazi incarnation, cf. Chapter 1, II.
East Berlin would come to exhibit the totalitarian revenants of the past, while West Berlin claimed to represent the heir of 1920s cosmopolitan Berlin.

V. Campaigns to Remake Postwar Social Democracy

Aside from its numerous activities against totalitarianism, the Outpost network also campaigned within West Berlin’s dominant SPD party. The Outpost network made West Berlin the prime battleground in its hitherto neglected battle to condition Social Democracy to the Cold War. The network sought to make West Berlin the model city in its quest to redefine the postwar SPD as a left-center big tent party committed to West European integration and closely aligned to United States foreign policy. The network’s vision of a Cold War democracy that it extolled through the narrative stood in marked contrast to the agenda of SPD national Chairman Schumacher and his close ally, Berlin SPD chairman Franz Neumann. Committed anti-Communists in their own right, Neumann supported SPD national Chairman Kurt Schumacher’s priority of German unity over a clear commitment to the West in the Cold War.

This disagreement provoked one of postwar Germany’s most bitter intra-party feuds that divided the Berlin SPD for nearly a decade, from the Berlin Airlift until Brandt’s succession of Neumann as West Berlin SPD Chairman in 1958. The remigrés faction led first by Reuter and later by Brandt confronted traditionalists like Franz Neumann and his political allies, the so-called Keulenriege, or clubs’ squad. In tragic fashion, this feud pitted the experiences of remigrés against those who endured within the Nazi Empire – and often times in its concentration camps. Remigrés such as Reuter and Brandt who had retooled their perspective in exile to envision them as members of a broader postwar European Left clashed with Camp survivors like Neumann and
Schumacher who wanted to pick up where Weimar’s most progressive policies had left off.\textsuperscript{151} Thus the network wielded the narrative also against political rivals within the SPD of Berlin and the Federal Republic – with the subtle, but direct support of American occupation officials.

Early in the postwar era, SPD remigrés and American occupation officials found another area of agreement in their increasingly scathing assessment of the course directed by Chairman Schumacher and his ally Neumann in Berlin. As one of the first returnees, von Knoeringen relished the reconstituted SPD’s rank and file insurrection against Communist encroachment, but remained skeptical of the strategic acumen of its leadership around Neumann, claiming “they think too narrowly […] to assert themselves against a new kind of dictatorship today. They operate with a conception of class that has become unreal today.”\textsuperscript{152} For these remigrés, West Berlin’s best chance lay in attracting Western Allied support as a model city of resilient democracy, rather than in recreating the Weimar Era Social Democratic milieu.

This differing assessment of Berlin’s role within postwar German politics engendered the rivalry between a remigrés-dominated faction around Reuter and Schumacher’s loyalists. Reuter grew disillusioned by Schumacher’s perceived ideological intransigence.\textsuperscript{153} In private conversations with American network members, Hertz reprimanded Schumacher for his

\textsuperscript{151} American officials noted the sharp contrast between Brandt and Schumacher over European integration, cf. HICOG Berlin, “Memorandum to HICOG Frankfurt” May 29, 1950, RG 466, US High Commissioner for Germany (HICOG), Berlin Element, Office of the Director, Classified General Records, 1949-55, E-162, Box 3, Folder Berlin Weekly Reports, National Archives, College Park. For the obfuscated exile roots of Brandt’s European agenda and their centrality, see Scott H. Krause and Daniel Stinsky, “For Europe, Democracy and Peace: Social Democratic Blueprints for Postwar Europe in Willy Brandt and Gunnar Myrdal’s Correspondence, 1947,” \textit{Themenportal Europäische Geschichte}, forthcoming 2016.


\textsuperscript{153} Barclay, \textit{Ernst Reuter}, 226–227.
opposition to the budding West European integration.\textsuperscript{154} Brandt, whom Schumacher had brought back into the fold of the German Social Democrats as liaison to the West Berlin SPD, increasingly gravitated to Reuter, alienated by the Chairman’s rigid policy proposals.\textsuperscript{155} Conversely, the disciplinarian Schumacher grew suspicious of the remigrés Reuter and Brandt who he had sent to Berlin just a few years earlier. In particular, he resented Reuter’s perceived insubordination in foreign policy and his international stature gained during the Airlift. Schumacher bypassed Brandt as official party liaison to Berlin and held close contacts with Neumann and Scholz.\textsuperscript{156}

In similar fashion to the Berlin remigrés, American officials grew critical of Schumacher despite his impeccable anti-Communist and anti-Nazi credentials. In a 1949 letter to Stone, Allen W. Dulles accused Schumacher of publically “placing the blame on us” for the hardships Germans endured.\textsuperscript{157} In 1950, High Commissioner McCloy characterized the personal animosity between Adenauer and Schumacher as a major challenge for his work in Germany to President Truman.\textsuperscript{158} By 1951, HICOG had become deeply suspicious of Neumann undermining Reuter and made Schumacher eponymous with the “negative side of the SPD.” Schumacher, Neumann,


\textsuperscript{157} Allen W. Dulles, “Letter to Shepard Stone,” July 26, 1949, Allen W. Dulles Papers, Box 53, Folder 17, Princeton University Library, Department of Rare Books and Special Collections.

\textsuperscript{158} John J. McCloy, “Top Secret Memorandum to President Truman: The Situation in Germany” September 10, 1950, John J. McCloy Papers, Series 13: HICOG, Box HC6, Folder 18A, Amherst College Library, Archives and Special Collections.
and Social Democratic Berlin newspaper editor Arno Scholz took issue with the planned, American backed European Defense Community (EDC) that would have rearmed the Federal Republic without autonomous control over its military. When Scholz criticized the EDC backed by Reuter and Brandt, HICOG Berlin lambasted his speech as “a good example of the negative, resentful and suspicious (i.e. pro-Schumacher ) wing of the Berlin SPD.”¹⁵⁹

The successful conclusion of the Airlift exacerbated tensions within both SPD wings, as it made management of Germany’s political division urgent. The political wrangling between the Adenauer CDU in Bonn and the Berlin SPD remigrés around Reuter over West Berlin’s relationship with the Federal Republic led to a compromise that suited Adenauer, but infuriated Neumann’s Keulenriege. West Berlin were to adopt the Federal Republic’s laws, but defer to potential Western Allied vetoes. It would send non-voting delegates to the Bundestag, nominated by the Berliner Abgeordnetenhaus rather than through a direct election. Neumann viewed this compromise as conservative rollback against the principal recent achievement in social welfare legislation, Berlin’s postwar single-payer health care system, which the Federal Republic lacked. The remigrés pointed to economic pressures to adopt Federal German law, effectively abandoning the single-payer system. The introduction of two competing currencies, the city’s costly fight against the Blockade’s effects, and the continuing rupture of the city’s regional markets and supply chains had upended West Berlin’s economy. While American economic aid programs such as GARIOA and the ERP temporarily helped West Berlin to stay in funds, the city’s fiscal prospects remained dire without outside assistance for the foreseeable future.¹⁶⁰ Thus

¹⁵⁹ Jones, “Memorandum to HICOG Frankfurt” August 16, 1951, RG 466, US High Commissioner for Germany (HICOG), Berlin Element, Office of the Director, Classified General Records, 1949-55, E-162, Box 21, Folder Berlin Weekly Reports, National Archives, College Park.

the remigrés were willing to trade in Berlin’s single-payer health for adoption of the Bonn Grundgesetz and the federal subsidies it guaranteed.

Thus two urgent questions splintered the local SPD in the aftermath of the successful Airlift and the recently drawn lines of the Cold War. For close to a decade, until 1958, West Berlin’s relationship with the Federal Republic and the party’s relationship to the Western alliance pitted the remigrés of the network against traditionalists in one of postwar Germany’s most bitter intra-party feuds. To promote their vision of West Berlin as the heroic city of Cold War Democracy and to gain full control over the SPD, remigrés such as Reuter, Brandt, and Hirschfeld utilized the network to orchestrate a media campaign and attract direct, but clandestine financial contributions by the US Federal Government on their behalf.161

This campaign helps to explain Brandt’s tenure as editor of the short-lived tabloid Berliner Stadtblatt, 1949-1951. Brandt’s most prominent journalistic endeavor puzzles his biographers, as it appears disjointed from Brandt’s life in politics. Peter Merseburger attributed it to the necessity of feeding his young family.162 In the context of the remigrés-Keulenriege clash, however, Brandt’s stint as Berliner Stadtblatt editor emerges as a crucial stepping-stone. As Stadtblatt editor, Brandt was introduced to American attention that he continued to exploit as Reuter’s heir apparent after Reuter’s sudden death in September 1953. Most notably, the Berliner Stadtblatt served as a vehicle for a direct but covert American intervention in the Berlin SPD feud. In a board meeting of the SPD on May 15, 1950, tensions came to a head when Neumann and Brandt


clashed over the SPD’s relationship to the Western Allies.163 Two weeks later, Hans Hirschfeld contacted Stone in “urgent need.” Hirschfeld’s acknowledgment that he typed the letter himself indicated its confidentiality, while his offer to “fly in to Frankfurt if there is a possibility of getting the demanded support” underscored its urgency.164

After a telephone conversation with Stone, Hirschfeld asked him for American subsidies the following day, on May 31, 1950. Noting the “severe financial distress” of the Berliner Stadtblatt, Hirschfeld argued that “intra-party differences” necessitated American financial support. Hirschfeld reminded Stone of his own assessment that “the Berliner Stadtblatt is the organ of the Reuter SPD. The Telegraf led by Arno Scholz follows Schumacher unconditionally.” Hirschfeld pleaded, “But we need in Berlin a newspaper that follows, maintains, and explains our political agenda in the mass party SPD.”165 In addition, American support for the Berliner Stadtblatt would enable it to assert its financial independence from Scholz’s Telegraf, which it had earlier owed 20,000 Deutschmarks (DM).166

Hirschfeld’s correspondence with Stone emerges as a crucial source outlining the remigrés’ American support and ambitions. Hirschfeld mentioned numerous undercover flights of Reuter and himself to HICOG headquarters in Frankfurt for “political talks.” Reuter’s vocal embrace of German integration into the Western Alliance challenged SPD Chairman Kurt Schumacher. Reuter’s stature in party and press had grown immensely as heroic organizer of the Berlin Airlift,


flaunting his defiance of Soviet demands. Mindful of the political magnitude, Hirschfeld bound Stone to conspiratorial silence, asking him “to view and act on this strictly in private. Except Reuter and Willi Brandt […] nobody knows that I write you. [Schumacher in] Hannover and Scholz would resist, if they would learn of this matter – let alone others,” All three Social Democrats informed were alumni of exile, which highlights the formative qualities of exile. The inclusion of Brandt in this select circle signified his rapid rise within the party as a Reuter loyalist. Hirschfeld also introduced Brandt to Shepard Stone on this occasion. In effect, Hirschfeld wrote a letter of recommendation for the young remigré:

“The Stadtblatt will always be Social Democratic with its current journalists, but without being too close to the party. Willi Brandt, its current editor, is a guarantee for that. […] Brandt is not 37 yet and is Berlin representative in the Bundestag. He fled from Lübeck to Norway in 1933, where he studied history and worked as a journalist. […] He returned to Germany after the 1945 collapse as correspondent of Scandinavian newspapers. Later he became Press Attaché at the Norwegian Military Mission in Berlin. He relinquished this post and his Norwegian citizenship in 1948 to actively participate in the political life of Germany. He is an excellent man and in no way dogmatic or limited to the party line. His entire background guarantees in my opinion sensible political views.”

While political opponents like Franz Neumann, Konrad Adenauer, and Franz-Josef Strauß would later use Brandt’s past in exile to question his integrity, Hirschfeld highlighted it ironically as a badge of honor. Its implications are two-fold: First, SPD remigrés in Berlin consciously felt connected by exile as a formative experience. Second, for American authorities in 1950, an émigré background vouched for democratic and anti-Communist convictions.


169 Merseburger, Willy Brandt, 408–414.
American funds started flowing swiftly in July 1950, after Hirschfeld reminded Stone again of the tenuous finances of the SPD remigré wing. On July 19, 1950, Hirschfeld met Walter Ridder, the HICOG official managing the European Recovery Program, popularly known as the Marshall Plan. Shepard Stone had pulled strings to finance the remigré wing by infusing the Stadtblatt with ERP money. Stone suggested that the Stadtblatt could publish two supplements extolling ERP’s benefits for West Berlin to the tune of 100,000.-- DM each. The remigrés’ network sprang into action quickly. The next afternoon, Brandt had already sent one of his journalists to discuss the concept of the first supplement, titled “Berlin and ERP.” On the same afternoon, Ridder called Hirschfeld, informing him that a contractual agreement had been drafted and only needed the remigrés’ signatures.

On July 27, 1950, Hirschfeld and Brandt met Ridder at the HICOG headquarters in Frankfurt. Hirschfeld noted in a memorandum that both sides found each other “in total agreement” on the contractual obligations, which stipulated that HICOG ordered from the

_**Berliner Stadtblatt**_

“Two supplements for the months of August and September, or October [1950], respectively, on ‘Berlin and the Marshall Help.’ […] HICOG, section cultural affairs, and ERP publications pay the _Berliner Stadtblatt_ 100, 000.-- DM each after publication of the supplement concerned.”

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According to Hirschfeld, HICOG legal advisers had designated him as legal witness for the contract, which was then signed by Ridder for HICOG and “the representative of the BS, Mr. Willy Brandt, in my presence.”

As open American financial donations to Berlin remigrés would have enraged SED Communists, political competitors in West Berlin, and the SPD national and Berlin Chairmen alike, both sides pledged strict secrecy. Hirschfeld wryly wrote “representatives [of John McCloy] pointed out again that the High Commissioner placed great value on strict confidentiality of this contract, its implementation, etc.” Hirschfeld assured Americans that “our side also had great interest to only inform the truly necessary circle.” The great secrecy surrounding the contract has been a main reason for its late emergence. According to Hirschfeld, Brandt held on to the remigrés’ copy of the contract, which never resurfaced, while the intended reader of Hirschfeld’s memoranda, Mayor Ernst Reuter, died unexpectedly in 1953 without making arrangements for the preservation of his papers. Reuter’s surviving papers, housed in the Landesarchiv Berlin, are silent on any direct American support, but the bulk of the material was donated to the Landesarchiv in the 1970s by Brandt himself, who led the effort to compile the material to write the first biography of Ernst Reuter, partly to claim Reuter’s mantle.

In spite of the lack of documentation on the clandestine American contributions in well-known archival collections, three pieces of archival evidence corroborate the veracity of Hirschfeld’s account. First is Hirschfeld’s position in 1950’s West Berlin. US State Department files confirm that Hirschfeld was indeed a conduit for transferring funds from HICOG to the

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175 Ibid.
176 Ibid.
West Berlin administration on different occasions. Between June 12, 1952, and November 30, 1953, alone, Hirschfeld acknowledged receipt of an additional 106,500 DM in cash for nebulous “services to be rendered”, presumably to fund other PR work for Reuter’s policies.178 Second is the record of clandestine financial transactions between Stone and Hirschfeld. They would use the newly founded Bürgermeister Reuter Foundation as front to funnel $150,000 from the Ford Foundation to Melvin Lasky’s Der Monat in 1954.179 Third is Brandt’s correspondence in conjunction with the publication record of the Berliner Stadtblatt. On August 19, 1950, Brandt sent Ridder two copies of a completed six-page supplement, “Berlin im ERP,” and asked him “to arrange the agreed upon transfer in the most expedited fashion.”180 The next day, the Stadtblatt ran the supplement, followed by another in late October, in keeping with the stipulations of the Frankfurt contract.

Sunday edition’s supplement “Berlin im ERP” opened with the lead “Focal Point of World Politics,” penned by Hirschfeld for Reuter. The article again advanced the successful Airlift narrative of heroic Berliners defending “freedom” side by side with Americans “against the obstructionist policies of the Soviet Union.”181 The complete cast of prominent Reuter loyalists continued to emphasize this point in their articles. Brandt, for example, attempted to shore up support for the Marshall Plan among the ranks of Berlin workers while anticipating SED talking

178 E.g. US Embassy Bonn, “Receipt 50,000 DM for Hans Hirschfeld” June 12, 1952, RG 84, Records of the Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, Top Secret Subject Files, 1953-1958, Bonn Embassy, Germany, Lot No. 61, F23, Box 1, Folder 128 Admin w/other Agencies, National Archives, College Park; US Embassy Bonn, “Receipt 25,000 DM for Hans Hirschfeld” February 26, 1953, RG 84, Records of the Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, Top Secret Subject Files, 1953-1958, Bonn Embassy, Germany, Lot No. 61, F23, Box 1, Folder 128 Admin w/other Agencies, National Archives, College Park.

179 Cf. Chapter 4,III.


points: “Sure, Americans want their business to thrive. But many of them have understood brilliantly that they need solid partners for that.” Not only did these supplements differ from other contemporary West German newspapers in their open praise of the virtues of American foreign policy, but also Franz Neumann and his Keulenriege comrades remained conspicuously absent from the list of contributors.

These personal papers also illuminate the American rationale for covert funding of the Berlin SPD remigrés. Stone could easily make such a startling alliance between the United States and a nominally Marxist party plausible. American Cold War foreign policy banked on the Berlin remigrés to bring the national SPD on the same page in foreign policy as the Adenauer CDU. Less than two weeks after both sides signed the contract, Stone informed Hirschfeld “one would appreciate if Mayor Reuter could increase his influence on Federal government policies.” Bypassing diplomatic subtleties, Hirschfeld recalled how “Mr. Stone asked me directly, if and what kind of opportunities I saw for that.” Hirschfeld’s answer was noncommittal, noting that while Reuter’s priority lay in Berlin, “future opportunities were left to future developments.”

This conversation anticipated a meeting between High Commissioner John McCloy and Mayor Ernst Reuter the following day that marked the most overt American prodding of Reuter to consider his national ambitions. After all, a Reuter move to Bonn would have entailed evident benefits for American Cold War foreign policy. Reuter as SPD chairman would have made a close alliance with the United States a party plank, creating a foreign policy consensus between the SPD and the Adenauer’s CDU. As a possible successor of Adenauer as Federal German


Chancellor, Reuter would have been at least as close to American policy makers as the incumbent.

Whatever Reuter’s answer to the American proposition might have been, HICOG’s interest in him continued. Using him as a shining example for successful American Cold War foreign policy, Stone enlisted Reuter to record a voiceover for the international Voice of America radio broadcasts\(^\text{184}\) and he coordinated the itinerary of Reuter’s tour across the United States in March 1953 to drum up American popular support for West Berlin and to increase Reuter’s visibility in Germany.\(^\text{185}\) The collaboration between Reuter and HICOG was so close that Hirschfeld could again ask Stone whether he could “count on” further electoral campaign funding.\(^\text{186}\)

American support for the Berliner Stadtblatt also stood out in its intensity from HICOG’s broader, simultaneous campaign for a democratic press.\(^\text{187}\) Stone secured a way for Hirschfeld and Brandt to bypass a competitive, bureaucratic two-stage application procedure for a loan from ERP funds that would have included an examination of the creditworthiness of the applicant paper.\(^\text{188}\) The Stadtblatt’s prospects of passing such an examination would have been doubtful, as it recorded hefty monthly losses of over 50,000 DM in March and April 1950.\(^\text{189}\)


\(^{187}\) Berghahn, America and the Intellectual Cold Wars in Europe, 68–76.

\(^{188}\) For details of the legal stipulations of HICOG loans to the West German press, cf. Ibid., 69.

support for the Stadtblatt stood out even further in the type of financial assistance proffered. Instead of receiving a loan that carried an interest rate of about five-and-a-half percent, the Berliner Stadtblatt was permitted to directly charge HICOG 200,000 DM. This amount for twelve newspaper pages in total was rather generous. Taking a vastly increased circulation number of 100,000, as stipulated by the contract with HICOG, the sales price for an entire edition of supplements would have been 15,000 DM at 15 Pfennig per issue.\(^{190}\) Conservatively calculated, this constituted a net profit of at least 170,000 DM – or the present-day equivalent of $392,000 – for the SPD remigrés. Whether Brandt invested the money into the ailing Stadtblatt or whether the remigrés cross-financed a slush fund remains unclear.

The network polished and popularized the Outpost of Freedom narrative in the wake of the Airlift. In one stroke, the narrative that Reuter had pioneered in the desperation of summer 1948 combined at least three benefits for the network’s members during the early 1950s: First it belatedly vindicated their anti-fascist fight against National Socialism. Moreover, this narrative construction carried over the same urgency from anti-fascist activism to this renewed battle against Communism under the banner of anti-totalitarianism. The reverse chain migration in which Reuter could convince fellow émigrés like Willy Brandt, Paul Hertz, and Hans Hirschfeld to place their personal and political stakes again in Berlin underscores the attraction of this proposition. Second, the narrative connected American and German members of the network, opening up access to considerable resources provided by the American government to wage the Cold War. For instance its members controlled Berlin’s most popular station RIAS and PUB’s sprawling public relation empire that staged the Freedom Bell installation in Berlin. Third, the Outpost of Freedom narrative as the blueprint for a Cold War Democracy that appealed to both

Berlin’s working-class and urbane milieus gave the network a strong weapon against Communist, Christian Democratic, and Social Democratic intra-party rivals alike.

The Outpost network’s campaign for a westernized SPD closely aligned to American Cold War foreign policy illustrates the immense clout it had accumulated after the Airlift in the early 1950s. It sought nothing less than to remake the agenda of postwar German Social Democracy from its West Berlin base. By early 1953 little suggested that key members of the network had been marginalized in exile. But the year 1953 would bring at least three challenges that fundamentally challenged the network and its narrative.
CHAPTER 4

Triple Crisis, 1953

In March 1953, Governing Mayor Reuter made another triumphal visit to the United States. Hailed by President Eisenhower as a man of “great qualities” prepared to meet any future crisis, Reuter enjoyed a reception befitting the state leader of a crucial ally, dining with the President and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles.¹ Reuter secured a further $600,000 of American aid for his half-city. The continuing commitment to West Berlin indicated the broad bipartisan support that carried over to the new Republican administration. It seemed to confirm Stone’s assessment who, based on his wartime experience in the Allied Staff, had quipped on the prospects of a President Eisenhower: “the people are okay, but they don’t speak so good.”²

Stone’s optimism was grounded in the institutionalization of a Berlin Lobby in Washington, D.C. Notably, John McCloy and Stone himself had transferred to prominent positions within the Ford Foundation – the largest philanthropic organization in the world – and would use these posts to direct funds and attention to West Berlin.³


In spite of the inroads the network made to gain the goodwill of a Republican administration, a crisis that Eisenhower had warned of struck West Berlin a week after Reuter’s return, but from an unexpected direction. On April 7, 1953, two staffers of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the US Senate’s Government Operations Committee landed at Tempelhof Airport to gain “a full and fair picture of [US] Government activities here.” Roy Cohn and G. David Shine, two of Senator Joseph McCarthy’s most notorious henchmen immediately targeted American members of the network, such as Stone’s former PUB deputy Theodore Kaghan.1 The “investigation” of these two men directly assailed the surprising political alliance between the United States Federal Government and a nominally Marxist party at the focal point of the Cold War. McCarthyism had arrived in West Berlin.

The contrast between international public celebrations of Reuter as anti-Communist hero and McCarthy’s witch-hunts in West Berlin exemplify the potential fates for the network. Whether these reformed Socialists could control the political passions it had stoked or would be consumed by them became an open question. On the flipside, the specter of McCarthyism gave the network a chance to prove its resilience. Moreover, two additional challenges tested the network’s resilience between April and October 1953. While McCarthy’s staff targeted US officials in Berlin, the GDR and East Berlin in particular erupted in a popular uprising against the Communist regime on June, 17, 1953. Moreover, the network’s most visible remigré Ernst Reuter died suddenly on September 29, triggering a leadership crisis that led to a brief loss of power for the SPD in West Berlin. Thus this chapter charts the network’s resilience and the narrative’s political utility in reacting to these three overlapping crises. Subsequently, this chapter explores the impact of the uprising for the narrative. In addition, it outlines the network’s

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recurring exploitation of its narrative to shield itself from McCarthy’s crosshairs. Accordingly, it assesses the ramifications of Reuter’s death that temporarily stalled the network’s political agenda to remake West Berlin into a model city that reconfigured the West German political Left.

I. June 17th Uprising in East Berlin

The challenges for the network partly stemmed from the growing prominence of its members. Initially, the network seemed to cope remarkably well with changing positions of its members. John McCloy and Shepard Stone’s organization of a Berlin Lobby within the United States exemplified their continuing commitment to the network. After the end of their tenures in the semi-sovereign Federal Republic during the summer of 1952, they took up prominent positions at the Ford Foundation. Volker Berghahn has meticulously established how both men altered the scope of the world’s largest philanthropic organization in assets to fund American initiatives in the Cultural Cold War, as board member and coordinator of European activities, respectively. But this recruitment of private organizations to buttress American foreign policy also possessed a geographic pivot, West Berlin. Curiously, McCloy visited Reuter in Berlin in his last days as American High Commissioner, not to say farewell, but rather to “to renew old friendships.” Der Monat editor and network dandy-in-residence Melvin Lasky lamented over a


3 Berghahn, *America and the Intellectual Cold Wars in Europe*, 143–212. Most recently, scholarship has identified the cultural realm as a Cold War front in its own right. For an introduction to this ongoing debate, cf. Thomas Lindenberger, Marcus M. Payk, and Annette Vowinckel, eds., *Cold War Cultures: Perspectives on Eastern and Western European Societies* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2012).

“boring bureaucratic conference, Public Affairs,” but highlighted the “good-bye party for Shep Stone.” According to established himself at the Foundation headquarters in New York City, Stone assured Hirschfeld that “in the course of our work [for the Ford Foundation], we [McCloy and I] often think of Berlin and what can be done to help Berlin. As [McCloy] said in the days before he left Germany, he will continue to do everything possible.”

Refugees from Communism became the first issue to attract the support of the newly expanded network. The rapidly increasing stream of refugees from the GDR into open West Berlin prompted Governing Mayor Reuter’s March 1953 plea for aid in the United States. That month, the number of refugees dramatically spiked to a new record of 57,000, which threatened to overwhelm the infrastructure that tended to them. Stone organized Reuter’s itinerary in cooperation with the International Rescue Committee (IRC).

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9 For Reuter’s connections to the IRC dating back to his years in exile and Leo Cherne’s introduction to the network, see Andrew Smith, Rescuing the World: The Life and Times of Leo Cherne (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002), 43–49.
camp on the edge of town synonymous with flight across the Iron Curtain and its increasingly entrenched German-German border.

Mayor Reuter founded an eponymous foundation to disburse this aid from American private and philanthropic sources. The Bürgermeister Reuter Stiftung became another case study of the network’s penchant for dual-purpose institutions. It combined administering humanitarian relief programs with masking financial funds to fight the cultural Cold War. Notably, board members included the IRC’s Leo Cherne, Hans Hirschfeld, and Paul Hertz as board director. These network members oversaw 1,000,000 DM raised “through the International Rescue Committee, New York, from donations by the American people during a lecture tour by Ernst Reuter.” In addition, the Stiftung had collected over 1,260,000 DM in other assets, of which 1.1 million came from foreign sources.10 The Foundation’s constitution gave the board broad powers and considerable flexibility in disbursing the Stiftung’s immense funds. While the bylaws defined the purpose of the institution as “additional support of needy refugees and other persons in need,” they also tasked the Stiftung’s leadership with “support of every action beneficial to this aim.”11 These actions included acting as a financial clearinghouse for waging the cultural Cold War. In 1954, the network exploited the Stiftung to cloak a large donation by Ford Foundation to Melvin Lasky’s Der Monat.12 Volker Berghahn has documented how the Bürgermeister Reuter Foundation acted as a front for Stone’s transfer of $150,000 from the Ford Foundation.

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12 Cf. Chapter, 3, IV.
Foundation to Lasky’s financially struggling magazine in May 1954.\textsuperscript{13} But the Bürgermeister Reuter Foundation listed merely 23,517.97 DM as foreign donations in its annual report, implying that board members such as Hertz and Hirschfeld were able to conduct business off the books.\textsuperscript{14} These covert political transactions within a philanthropic foundation indicate how anti-totalitarian activism had become synonymous with humanitarian aid for the network’s members.

The manifest humanitarian crisis of refugees in West Berlin, however, was a direct consequence of the mounting political problems within the GDR. The 1950 FDJ Deutschlandtreffen had stressed the topic of German unity, a topic that the Soviet and GDR leadership hoped to exploit politically. In the March 1952 Stalin Note, the Kremlin leadership surprisingly offered “free elections” across Germany to the Western Allies and the Federal Republic, if the reunified Germany would remain politically neutral in the Cold War.\textsuperscript{15} While Stalin’s proposal to suspend the Cold War in Central Europe instantly became a controversial topic for contemporaries, scholars still debate its sincerity to this day.\textsuperscript{16} The Soviet leadership hoped to expose the fissures within the Federal Republic between the Adenauer CDU and the Berlin SPD remigrés’ course of Western integration and the Schumacher SPD’s priority of German unity. But this plan from Moscow also unsettled the GDR leadership. Key circles around Walter Ulbricht in the \textit{Haus der Ministerien} possessed traumatic memories of Stalinist volte-faces from their exile years in Moscow. When the Federal Republic’s insistence on UN

\textsuperscript{13} Berghahn, \textit{America and the Intellectual Cold Wars in Europe}, 215–218.


monitors for all-German elections became the sticking point that doomed Stalin’s initiative, the Ulbricht regime sensed an opportunity to make itself indispensable by tightening its grip over its portion of Germany.

At the SED’s Second Party Congress in July 1952, Walter Ulbricht announced the “accelerated construction of socialism.” This characteristically grandiose but diffuse phrase became the byword for the party’s intensified implementation of Stalinist policies in the GDR. The concurrent expropriation of private businesses, quickened collectivization of agriculture, and prioritized development of heavy industries in conjunction with the strain of continuing reparations to the Soviet Union further disrupted the East German economy. Politically, the SED intensified its stranglehold on power by replacing the Länder, constituent states that highlighted Germany’s federal tradition, with fourteen smaller Bezirke, centralized districts; persecuting the members of the Junge Gemeinden, church affiliated youth groups whose presence belied the assertions of youth unity by the FDJ; and rapidly expanding the repressive apparatus of the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS), infamously known as the Stasi. Starting in the spring of 1952, the GDR leadership around Ulbricht sealed the border between the GDR and Federal Republic proper with barbed wire and armed guards, in effect redirecting the steadily growing stream of disillusioned GDR citizens to West Berlin. In May 1953, as a counter-measure to the self-inflicted economic disruptions, the party announced an increase of job norms, productivity target numbers, by 10 percent across all economic branches in celebration of Walter Ulbricht’s sixtieth birthday. These increased numbers effectively cut wages between 20 and 40 percent for


The self-proclaimed Workers and Peasants State had opened “total social war” against its own workforce.\(^{19}\)

The results of the SED nomenklatura’s Stalinist turn were so disastrous that they prompted the Kremlin’s direct intervention. After Stalin’s death in March 1953, his successors in the Central Committee critically scrutinized the state of affairs in the Soviet Union’s satellite states. Dismayed at the rapidly deteriorating economic numbers of the GDR, they issued an ultimatum demanding a political reversal to a quickly summoned SED delegation in Moscow. A week later, on June 9, 1953, the SED duly complied by announcing a “new course:” it admitted errors in the “construction of socialism” and pledged amnesty to all refugees who had fled to the West, to reopen closed private businesses, to reverse of collectivized agriculture, to rehabilitate activists of the Junge Gemeinde, and to review incarcerations based on the recent political campaigns.\(^{21}\)

The humbled SED made no mention, however, of the increased job norms in its communiqué.

The forced SED retreat invited further demands from the suffering populace. Throughout the self-proclaimed Democratic Republic, citizens vented their grievances to local municipalities. Notably, these demands echoed Radio RIAS’ talking points even in rural villages such as Brandenburg’s Schmergow.\(^{22}\) The most consequential of these local protests started innocuously on Eastern Berlin’s idyllic Müggelsee lake. On Saturday, June 13, 1953, many of the workers who reconstructed East Berlin’s Frankfurter Allee as the Stalinallee in eponymous architectural


\(^{21}\) Hoffmann, *Die DDR unter Ulbricht*, 51–53.

style enjoyed a work outing. In conversations, a strike was proposed for the next Monday, June 15, if the GDR government would not reverse the increase in job norms. That day, the discontent convinced the vast majority of workers to sign a petition demanding a “satisfactory statement by Minister President [Grotewohl] until noon, tomorrow, at the latest.” The workers on one of the GDR’s principal prestige projects threatened to strike against their Communist leadership. Moreover, RIAS evening news briefly covered these protests, adding national visibility to their demands.

On the morning of Tuesday, June 16, 1953, the workers arrived at their construction sites without having received any anxiously awaited reply from Grotewohl. Instead, they found their demands derisively dismissed in the headlines of the party-run newspapers. Frustrated workers at the construction site of the Friedrichshain Hospital decided to voice their grievances to the heads of the GDR regime in person. As the protestors marched down Stalinallee towards the Haus der Ministerien, seat of the hated regime, more and more workers, residents, and passersby joined them. After the march of demonstrators passed the East Berlin thoroughfares of Alexanderplatz, Unter den Linden, and Friedrichstraße, their ranks had swelled to over 10,000. The stunned SED nomenklatura hastily retracted the job norms’ increase at 2:30pm, but remained curiously absent from the public eye. By the time the regime complied with the protestors’ main demand, their demands had extended to fundamental political rights. The crowd’s slogans coalesced around open and free elections with secret ballots. Unsatisfied, the

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23 Schöne, *Volksaufstand*, 40–43.


25 Schöne, *Volksaufstand*, 44–47.
protestors called for a general strike on June 17, the next day that directly challenged the regime’s future.

The spontaneous uprising in East Berlin surprised US authorities and local politicians in West Berlin as much as the SED leadership. On the afternoon of June 16, HICOG Eastern Division officers “mingled” with demonstrators to get a better picture of the protests. They did not have to go far for their investigation. The GDR Haus der Ministerien, Göring’s former Aviation Ministry, stood directly along the boundary between the American and Soviet sectors as ironic testament to the arbitrariness of Berlin’s political division. Noting how the protestors lamented “a general lack of freedom,” HICOG’s Eastern Division hastily reported the incredulous events to the US State Department. Similarly, David Murphy, CIA Director of BOB, the joint Berlin Operating Basis of US Intelligence agencies, acknowledged after the Cold War that he first became aware of the crumbling of the Communist regime’s authority while listening to the radio that day. The tangible surprise of US authorities belies any accusations of an American-led putsch attempt that the GDR regime would later spread.

The escalation of events caught the network’s members by surprise as well. Tirelessly traveling to publicize Berlin’s plight, Mayor Ernst Reuter found himself in Vienna as the crisis intensified. Nonetheless, the network immediately sprang into action upon hearing the news that seemingly confirmed their narrative of Berlin as an Outpost of Freedom against

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28 Cf. following section on the GDR’s obsession with RIAS.

29 David E. Barclay, Schaut auf diese Stadt: Der unbekannte Ernst Reuter (Berlin: Siedler, 2000).
Communism in the most striking fashion imaginable. Melvin Lasky had been dining with wartime Neu Beginnen leader turned political scientist Richard Löwenthal now based in London when they heard “the electrifying news of a ‘General Strike’” and headed to the Potsdamer Platz across which the sectorial boundary ran.³⁰

As East Berlin erupted in anti-Communist protests, RIAS reporting received special attention. True to its mission of upholding the standards of journalism, RIAS covered the protests in East Berlin as they unfolded. RIAS coverage of the dramatic developments proved crucial to listeners in East and West. CIA agent Murphy’s best source for up-to-date news from the Soviet sector was RIAS.³¹ Emboldened by the success of its open door policy during the 1950 FDJ Deutschlandtreffen crisis, the station consciously made itself available for crosstown visitors to elicit unvarnished information from the GDR.³² RIAS staff scrupulously collected and analyzed listener mail, maintaining rotating cover addresses for submissions from East Berlin and the GDR.³³ In addition, RIAS boasted “interrogating” a “daily average of 100 visitors from Soviet dominated territory [who] risk imprisonment to provide information.”³⁴ These sources gave RIAS unique insights into the situation on the ground. While reporting on these protestors

³⁰ Lasky, “Calendar, 1951-1955.”
³³ RIAS Berlin, “Hörerpost, Manuskripte, Pressemeldungen” 1955 1949, 102-00-00, Deutsches Rundfunkarchiv, Potsdam-Babelsberg.
in a factual manner, RIAS disseminated their demands that inspired the overnight spread of the Stalinallee strike across the GDR in a full-fledged uprising.\textsuperscript{35}

By 8 am on June 17\textsuperscript{th}, already 15,000 protestors had converged onto the Haus der Ministerien demanding the resignation of the ruling SED government and free elections. Thousands more were still on their way. As a poignant reminder of Berlin’s political division that the protestors sought to overcome, protesting steelworkers from the Henningsdorf suburb northwest of Berlin took the direct route into Mitte through West Berlin. Locals voiced their sympathy, while West Berlin policemen escorted them without incident, as they confidently walked through the Wedding district along Chausseestraße. By midday, an estimated 150,000 protestors had swarmed in Mitte with no immediate reaction by the regime. Some protestors vandalized the police station at Alexanderplatz and set police cars alight.\textsuperscript{36} Moreover, the GDR regime buckled in villages and other cities.\textsuperscript{37} In Leipzig, protestors attacked SED buildings. In Görlitz on the Oder-Neisse-Line, protestors drove local SED officials and police authorities from the city. However, Ulbricht and his closest circle of associates had no intention of caving after having retreated to the shelter of the Soviet military the day before. Unknown to the protestors, the GDR leadership had found Moscow’s backing for suppressing these demonstrations at all


\textsuperscript{37} Schöne, \textit{Volksaufstand}, 84–115.
costs on the evening of June 16th. Subsequently, the Soviet Army had ammassed troops and tanks around Berlin overnight.\(^{38}\)

In this volatile situation, RIAS felt enormous pressure, especially its political editor Egon Bahr and deputy director Gordon Ewing. HICOG High Commissioner James B. Conant personally called Ewing to remind him of his responsibility to keep the peace and refrain from any incendiary reporting.\(^{39}\) Meanwhile, a delegation of adamant strikers approached Bahr at his RIAS office asking to broadcast a call for a general strike.\(^{40}\) While being pulled into opposing directions, both journalists had compatible political outlooks and shared links to the Outpost network that contributed to their close working relationship.\(^{41}\) Like his friend Shepard Stone, Gordon Ewing had served as a major in G-2 military intelligence during the war, graduating from the same training camp at Fort Ritchie, Maryland.\(^{42}\) After the war, he stayed in Germany working for PUB’s subsidiary ISD, the Information Services Division that conducted the surveys monitoring US occupation initiatives.\(^{43}\) In this capacity he could connect with Stone and Hurwitz.

Egon Bahr came to the Outpost network from a different direction. Today, Bahr enjoys recognition as Chancellor Brandt’s political confidante and architect of his signature Neue

\(^{38}\) Ibid., 49.


\(^{41}\) Bahr, Conversation in Willy-Brandt-Haus Berlin.

\(^{42}\) J.B. Schaab, “Certificate of Service” September 2, 1945, Gordon Ewing Collection, Box 1, Folder 2: Gordon Ewing Military & Civil Service Records, George C. Marshall Library, Lexington, VA.

Ostpolitik, the 1970s West German counterpart to détente.\textsuperscript{44} In postwar Berlin, however, Bahr emerged as an energetic political journalist preoccupied in bringing democracy to all of Germany, including his native Thuringia which lay behind the Iron Curtain. In appreciation of the SPD’s insistence on German unity, Bahr joined its Berlin chapter.\textsuperscript{45} Nonetheless, Bahr reluctantly declined the striking workers request on June 17\textsuperscript{th}, noting, “nobody could answer for this.”\textsuperscript{46}

While the Outpost network’s propagandists of freedom changed their pitch to prevent further escalation, the GDR regime and its Soviet overlords rushed to violently reassert control. At 1pm, the SED government declared martial law in East Berlin while Soviet tanks and armored personnel carriers descended upon the half-city. Shots rang out against the unarmed crowds who could only try to retaliate by throwing stones. Many demonstrators fled to the safety of the western sectors, while West Berlin hospitals tended the wounded.\textsuperscript{47} The self-proclaimed Workers and Peasants State’s violent crackdown on its own workers had claimed the lives of at least fourteen Berliners – protestors and bystanders alike.

\section*{II. The GDR’s obsession with RIAS as response}

This dramatic turn of events demanded proper interpretation. Given their seismic character at the flashpoint of German political division and the Cold War, competing interpretations of the June 17\textsuperscript{th} Uprising make it a case study for contested memory in the Cold War par excellence.

\begin{flushleft} \textsuperscript{44} Cf. Egon Bahr, “Das Musst Du Erzählen:” Erinnerungen an Willy Brandt (Berlin: Propyläen, 2013).  
\textsuperscript{45} Bahr, Zu meiner Zeit, 85–88.  
\textsuperscript{47} Schöne, Volksaufstand, 54–59. \end{flushleft}
To this day, historians debate the uprising’s significance. While scholars such as Dierk Hoffmann point to the regime’s “paradoxical” stabilization in the wake of the deadly silence that the Soviet tanks imposed, veterans of the GDR dissident movement emphasize the uprising’s significance as a “suppressed revolution” not only regarding its political aims, but also regarding its historical recognition. The GDR’s harshest academic critics maintain that the regime only survived through “Soviet bayonets,” shredding any hope of legitimacy only four years after its founding. Despite the regime’s bankruptcy as a credible political new beginning for the postwar era, it remained a social reality for 17 million Germans in the GDR and 1.1 million Berliners in the Soviet sector for decades to come.

The violent Communist suppression of the uprising put the Outpost network of propagandists of freedom in a quandary. One the hand, the uprising seemingly confirmed the narrative the network championed: the disenfranchised masses rose against the SED with workers whom the regime idolized as the protest’s ironic vanguard. The East German protestors signaled to the global public that the majority of Germans sought to live in a single reformed democracy, as the network had claimed. Moreover, the protestors’ appropriation of the network’s slogans via RIAS underscored its political influence. However, June 17th made clear in stark terms that this clout was not strong enough to change the Cold War logic of spheres of influence. Despite the demonstrators’ enthusiasm for the ideals that the network proclaimed, HICOG’s orders to its subsidies in Berlin illustrated how the fear of an escalating Cold War constrained the network – while East Berlin potentates violently quelled the protests.


The unenviable task of formulating a response to this conundrum fell to Egon Bahr in his capacity as German political editor at RIAS. In a political comment the next evening, June 18, 1953, Bahr tried to reconcile the popular manifestation for free elections with the regime’s survival:

“What hardly anybody in the West thought possible: the workers and citizens joining them from all walks of life have demonstrated of their own free will. [They] demonstrated not only against the [job] norms and the high cost of living, but for something, for their unity with the rest of Germany, for freedom. […] The population measured its strength with the regime. The workers and population have realized their strength. They have inflicted the greatest defeat for the SED since inception.”

Highlighting the protestors’ success in creating a PR disaster for the Eastern Bloc, Bahr urged calm to prevent further bloodshed: “These demonstrations have declassed the regime in a way that cannot be outdone […] As understandable as a fiery determination would be now, it would be misplaced to expend powers which could matter at one point.” Pointing to the global Cold War confrontation that left its imprint on Berlin’s cityscape, Bahr attempted to comfort his listeners by congratulating them for their contribution to hasten future German reunification – albeit at an undetermined date in the future:

“It is impossible to overthrow the regime in unorganized fashion against the will of the occupation, impossible to take over power unorganized; but it is possible to discredit the strongmen that nobody can sustain them permanently. And this has happened. […] This is the way to accelerate German unity […] All Germans have to thank East Berlin’s population and the population of the – yet – Soviet occupied zone.”

Despite the professed hopes for German unity, both parts of the city diverged economically and politically at an accelerated pace. CIA officer Murphy, who reported on the uprising, took a coffee break in the comfort of the iconic Café Kranzler on Ku’damm, recently

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rebuilt in mid-century modern architecture, while contemplating the personnel shortfall afflicting BOB’s clerical staff by the concurrent visit of Gary Cooper to West Berlin’s new film festival. Three days after Soviet troops crushed the uprising in East Berlin, Melvin Lasky hosted the Hollywood star and select RIAS journalists at his informal salon in the well-heeled Dahlem district across town. Unlike in the wake of the May 1950 rallies, RIAS American management made no official reaction to the incredulous events in Berlin-Mitte toward its own employees. The day following the clashes between Soviet tanks and protestors, RIAS director Taylor issued another circular to his staff. Avoiding any mention of the uprising, he proudly announced the introduction of a shuttle service to an off-site parking lot to accommodate their growing penchant for motorized vehicular traffic. The onset of the West German Wirtschaftswunder, the unprecedented economic miracle of postwar prosperity, had made the rapidly intensifying lack of available parking space at RIAS studios a pressing concern for the station.

The events and commemoration of the June 17th Uprising indicate the reach and limits of the Outpost narrative. Ewing and Bahr’s political journalism team at RIAS quickly published a booklet that documented RIAS’ coverage of the events and further promoted its interpretation of the uprising as a heroic act bound to succeed in the future. The SPD in the West German Bundestag rushed to declare June 17th a federal holiday as “German Unity Day.” This kind of

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52 Murphy, “Der 17. Juni 1953 und die CIA Operationsbasis Berlin,” 49.
celebration of the protestors’ courage disgruntled parts of the American occupation in Berlin. A diplomat on post quipped on the first occasion of the holiday how “June 17 is a strange holiday in any case for West Germans to be celebrating. They did nothing on June 17th, 1953 but stand on the sidelines watching Soviet tanks round up the people of the Soviet Zone.”57 Taking aim at the absence of West German support for the uprising, this local U.S. official acerbically pointed to the discrepancy between the network’s soaring rhetoric and the political constraints imposed by the Cold War paradigm that the uprising had exposed.

Disinterested in such subtleties, the shaken GDR regime immediately accused the United States and its West Berlin allies of instigating a “fascist coup attempt.”58 Willfully ignoring the popular vote of non-confidence in reaction to their own rule, the SED nomenklatura circled the wagons and sought to externalize the blame. Despite serious misgivings, the Politburo united around Walter Ulbricht and excluded his harshest critics. For the populace, the party tactically announced reliefs by lowering the prices on certain consumer goods.59 This cynical reaction led remigré playwright Bertolt Brecht to acerbically ask “whether it would not be easier for the government to dissolve the people and elect a different one”60 – albeit from the safety of his lakeside villa provided to him by the regime as reward for the international cultural recognition he had brought to the GDR.

As part of the governmentally mandated conspiracy theory of an American instigated coup attempt, the SED put RIAS in its crosshairs. Blaming the radio station complemented the


58 Lemke, Vor der Mauer, 199.

59 Hoffmann, Die DDR unter Ulbricht, 54–57.

60 Bertolt Brecht, Buckower Elegien, ed. Jan Knopf (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1986), 11.
Communist obsession with espionage and hidden enemies undermining public life that historians have highlighted as a defining characteristic of Ulbricht’s GDR. But this tactic only magnified the contrast to the relative inclusivity of the network’s “Outpost of Freedom” narrative. The SED leadership continuously accused RIAS of directly “issuing orders to the provocateurs” during the “fascist coup attempt.” The MfS apparatus immediately started transcribing every single RIAS political broadcast for its files and passed them to the desks of Stasi director Ernst Wollweber and his notorious then deputy Erich Mielke. The Stasi’s targeting of RIAS in the wake of the uprising, however, contradicts its present-day reputation for insidious professionalism popularized by Markus Wolf’s 1970s spy network in the Federal Republic and recent movies, such as The Lives of Others.

Internal MfS files from the mid-1950s indicate that the self-professed Shield and Sword of the Party interpreted intelligence gathered on RIAS through the blinding lens of ideology rather than that of basic plausibility. Convinced it had found an American “agents’ center,” the MfS tried to acquire sources from within RIAS, only to grow increasingly frustrated when they could not deliver evidence that the MfS craved, but did not exist. For example, the MfS became interested in the American son-in-law of an “invalid, unemployed black marketeer” it had arrested “while drinking beer.” Under coercion, the MfS enlisted the petty trader as an

A little over a month later, his operator noted how the informant did “not have anything to report that was remarkable or new.” Frustrated, his handler concluded: “It seems futile to keep a connection with him,” noting contritely the MfS’ “outlays of 15DM” worth of beer for this operation.\(^{67}\) The MfS painstakingly catalogued photographs of the RIAS studios’ premises, but the internals of the “agents’ center and thugs’ den RIAS” remained out of reach.\(^{68}\) The use of propagandistic language in internal files suggests that the MfS genuinely subscribed to the GDR propaganda’s outlandish characterization of the station. Moreover, in misidentifying the station, and thus raising unrealistic expectations on its sources, the MfS undercut the effectiveness of its own operations.

Despite the Stasi’s comically limited effectiveness thanks to Stalinist ideology, the MfS’ campaign against RIAS still had the potential to destroy careers. In November 1953, the MfS believed it had scored a lucky break when it arrested two men for violating §175 of the criminal code in both German states, which outlawed homosexual acts between males. The MfS held the RIAS cultural editor in its custody who had crisscrossed sectorial boundaries with a Brandenburg escort.\(^{69}\) In all likelihood, Berlin’s vaunted, yet criminalized gay community\(^{70}\) had been exploiting the niches that the political division of the city had created in order to escape attention. The MfS gloatingly noted the marital status of the cultural editor.\(^{71}\) The MfS leveraged his closeted homosexuality to extract information on the personnel structure of RIAS. Moreover,
it blackmailed him into being an informant. Some factual errors in the conflicted cultural editor’s testimony suggest that he sought to compromise its usefulness. For instance, he misspelled the names of RIAS personnel, identifying Egon Bahr repeatedly as “Hans Bahr.”

Most notably, the MfS did not recognize this inaccuracy for years. This involuntary MfS informant at RIAS most likely passed on internal RIAS circulars to East Berlin. While GDR pamphlets selectively published them—albeit misconstrued as orders for a spy network within East Germany—the MfS must have grown impatient with its source. After placing high hopes in him and attaining approval for the operation from the KGB, its source at RIAS did not deliver.

Calculating that the cultural editor had expended his usefulness as an informant, the GDR government cynically viewed him as a better propagandistic asset to slander RIAS. Less than two years after enlisting him, the MfS passed on information to publically expose him as a homosexual. The pamphlet “Thugs at the Microphone” reprinted passages of his confession under the caption “RIAS has found the right one to teach Germans American ‘culture.’” Self-servingly, the East German propagandists declared, “decency forbids disclosing further passages from this testimony”—which would have had included his coerced declaration of obligation. The cultural editor has since disappeared from record.

72 Oberstleutnant Schröder, “Memorandum ‘Mündliche Absprache vom 27.11.1953’” November 18, 1953, MfS ZAIG Nr. 9961, BStU, Berlin.

73 MfS, “Vernehmungsprotokoll.”


75 “Pamphlet ‘Ein Mann kam nach Berlin’” 1957, 107, MfS ZAIG Nr. 9961, BStU, Berlin.

76 Oberstleutnant Schröder, “Memorandum ‘Mündliche Absprache vom 27.11.1953.’”

The MfS had betrayed its informant as part of large-scale propaganda campaign against RIAS. Terrified of communication between the West Berlin station and East German audiences, Erich Mielke started “Operation Enten”, or [Press] Canards. The SED leadership tried to discourage tuning into RIAS, both by accusing the station of “agitation and subversion” and staging Stalinist show trials. In the crude slandering that lasted years, the GDR’s propagandists sought to exploit racist stereotypes among the local population. For instance, caricatures depicted African American control officers with grotesquely enlarged lips, making RIAS an acronym for “revanchism, intervention, anti-bolchevism, and sabotage.” In another example, the GDR propaganda denounced German RIAS journalists as “creatures that have sold themselves to the Dulles and Rockefellers for Judas’ thirty pieces of silver.” In the summer of 1955, the GDR staged a show trial against persons suspected of having contact with RIAS. In Stalinist fashion, the party executives could voice their expectations before the trial’s start. Walter Ulbricht’s personal “sentence recommendation” of capital punishment resulted in the execution of 27-year-old Joachim Wiebach for “military espionage” in Dresden.

The GDR’s drastic measures highlight the significance both East and West Berlin authorities ascribed to RIAS’ contact with East Germans. HICOG’s PUB asked RIAS to systematically interview refugees into open West Berlin from the steadily increasing stream.

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79 ZAIG des Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS), “Pamphlet ‘Die Wühl- und Zersetzungstätigkeit des “RIAS.”’”


81 “Pamphlet ‘Ein Mann kam nach Berlin,’” 108.

viewing them as a unique source for assessing mood and daily life within “Real Socialism.”

Behind closed doors, the MfS not only agreed on RIAS’ relevance as “the most important resource of psychological warfare.” Moreover, it begrudgingly admitted the appeal of the term “freedom” that the network channeled:

“Under the pretense of objectivity, the stations strive to prove to the people under which inhumane conditions the citizens of the [Eastern] countries of Peace and Democracy have to subsist, and how pleasant and ‘in Freedom’ people live in the ‘free World’ in contrast. This is fundamental. Their occasionally positive assessment of their opponents and reporting on negative occurrences in their own camp prompts a significant psychological reaction, i.e. the perception of an objective and credible coverage. […] This nuanced stance between social system on the one hand and the people on the other is the most striking characteristic of their method. Their impact relies on this.”

This appraisal of the network’s strategy stands out in its candor. It complements the assessment of PUB to a remarkable extent, which billed RIAS to its superiors as “pre-eminent throughout the free world (as well as the slave world) as a beacon of freedom. This powerful radio station is actually the only free broadcasting station behind the Iron Curtain sponsored by the United States Government.” In a booklet designed to introductory occupation officials, diplomats and politicians to U.S. institutions and activities in Berlin, PUB highlighted RIAS’ significance in the context of the uprising: “An indication of the influence developed by RIAS in the Soviet Zone [...] was given during the troubled days of the June 16-17 uprising when hundreds of Germans from the Soviet Sector and Zone streamed into the radio studios to report facts about the uprising.” For a high-ranking American audience, HICOG portrayed RIAS’ role during the uprising as a badge of honor. This stands in stark contrast to the lack of any

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83 PUB Berlin, “Memorandum for Gordon Ewing, RIAS” March 21, 1953, RG 466, US High Commissioner for Germany (HICOG), Public Affairs Division, Classified Subject Files, 1949-55, E-176, Box 10, Folder West Information Media - RIAS, National Archives, College Park.


traces of internal discussions on this matter within HICOG’s Berlin element in the archival holdings.\textsuperscript{86} This mute response was intentional and can be traced back to seminal developments only indirectly connected to Communism. While the SED accused RIAS of being an anti-Communist hate station, Senator McCarthy suspected RIAS of being secretly Communist.

III. McCarthyism in West Berlin

Four days after the uprising, a serious threat to RIAS and the entire network emerged from an unlikely direction, namely in Washington, D.C., far in the West. On June 21, 1953, the junior Senator of Wisconsin, Joseph McCarthy, announced his intention to summon RIAS deputy director Ewing for testimony in front of his notorious Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations.\textsuperscript{87} The network had entered the crosshairs of McCarthy’s witch-hunts, which thrived on the anti-Communist hysteria that had gripped the United States. The Outpost network immediately rushed to shield its members from these allegations that signaled a new quality of political persecution from the self-professed guarantor of freedom.

Since the outbreak of the Cold War, US authorities had occasionally removed Berlin-based American officials for political reasons – to the direct benefit of the network’s members. Back in 1947, the question of RIAS’ editorial stance had triggered the first high-profile incident of political removal of US personnel in Berlin from which the Outpost network had benefitted immensely. In spite of the growing political rift that cut across Berlin, RIAS’ founding US leadership continued to promote the wartime principle of inter-allied harmony. Autobiographical components contributed to the reluctance of RIAS director Ruth Norden, and her control officers

\textsuperscript{86} Cf. RG 466, US High Commissioner for Germany (HICOG), Berlin Element, Office of the Director, Classified General Records, 1949-55, E-162, Box 44, Folder USIA, National Archives, College Park.

Harry Frohman and Gus Mathieu, to intervene in the Cold War on the airwaves. All three were firmly situated on the left side of the political spectrum. Moreover, all three OMGUS officials had intimate experience with Berlin and German culture. London-born Norden had spent her formative years in Berlin’s cultural circuit during the Weimar era, while Mathieu and Frohman were German-born before having fled the Nazis. Most notably, Frohman had received immense popular success in Germany and beyond as a member of the Comedian Harmonists combo during the late Weimar days.\(^{88}\)

These convictions chafed Berlin SPD politicians who perceived themselves as victims of Soviet policies. Ironically, in light of their own later targeting by McCarthy, the network called for Norden’s dismissal on political grounds. In November 1947, Reuter lambasted RIAS as “the second Communist station in Berlin” and threatened: “We have been gathering evidence in this direction now for quite some time in order to present it to the American Military Government.”\(^{89}\) These SPD remigrés found a receptive audience at OMGUS ICD division. ICD member Harold Hurwitz recalled how their “resistance against Stalinist Gleichschaltung impressed” him so much that “I soon became part of a group of like-minded members within the American and British military government that since early 1946 supported those Social Democrats.”\(^{90}\) Most notably, future ICD/ISD acting chief Ralph Brown – another remigré – marginalized the RIAS leadership trio after it had broadcasted SED campaign ads.\(^{91}\) Brown, or Braun, became an

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\(^{89}\) Quoted in Ibid., 117.


important informal conduit between the Berlin SPD and local US authorities during the early 1950s. While his paper trail vanishes after this point, Egon Bahr later disclosed that Brown served as the CIA contact person for Willy Brandt’s inner circle until well after its 1966 move to Bonn. Brown’s first political success, however, was the removal of Norden and Frohman in December 1947. OMGUS simply let their contracts lapse.

Personal animosities from this era fueled the political McCarthyist witch-hunts years later. These controversies within US occupation personnel coalesced around William F. Heimlich. Like many of his peers such as Stone and Ewing, Heimlich had served in G-2, military intelligence during the war, and arrived in Berlin in 1945 in that outfit, before OMGUS military governor Lucius D. Clay selected him to replace Norden as RIAS Director. These leadership changes at RIAS coincided with a larger shift in the objectives of US media operations in Germany. In late October 1947, OMGUS encouraged its broadcasting outlets to initiate “attacks […] on Communism as a system of government and its lack of protection of the rights of the individual.” As part of “Operation Talk Back,” Heimlich brought RIAS onto a stridently anti-

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94 Schivelbusch, In a Cold Crater, 121.


totalitarian line. While Heimlich introduced RIAS’ trademark blend of incisive commentary, high-brow culture, and popular entertainment, his leadership style and exaggeration of his own role have attracted the ire of contemporaries and scholars since. In the course of RIAS’ expansion during the Airlift, the running costs for the station spun out of control. Heimlich contributed to this issue by ordering RIAS accounting to disburse extra funds to entertainer Christina Ohlsen, the future Mrs. Heimlich. These instances of nepotism proved Heimlich’s undoing as RIAS Director. Shortly after the Airlift, HICOG PUB replaced Heimlich with Taylor to end “many irregularities in the management of this station.”

Heimlich’s acrimonious 1949 exit had repercussions as soon as US Public Affairs activities in Berlin came to the attention of domestic zealots. In 1952, rightwing columnist Westbrook Pegler toured HICOG operations, only to conclude “something strange and imprudent and worthy of public investigation is going on in Germany.” These accusations concerned HICOG PUB Director Stone to such a degree that he started collecting Pegler’s columns. In light of these conservative accusations, the US Senate started to doubt that large-


98 Schivelbusch, *In a Cold Crater*, 121–122.


102 Shepard Stone Papers, ML-99, Series 4: High Commission For Germany (HICOG), 1949-1953, Box 12, Folder 7, Clippings: Westbrook Pegler columns, Fair Enough, and As Pegler Sees It, 1952, Dartmouth College, Rauner Special Collections Library
scale American PR ventures in Germany effectively waged the Cold War. A “Subcommittee to investigate US overseas information programs” appointed no one else than Heimlich to evaluate HICOG PUB operations in March 1953.\textsuperscript{103} The State Department countered by enlisting broadcasting legend and McCarthy critic Edgar Murrow to clarify “news in the international arena can be recognized and measured. It is not advertising, it is not psychological warfare.” The CBS host and future USIA Director cautioned against overt politicization of USIA stations such as RIAS: “An adequate and effective news service operated on behalf of a government must be staffed by competent newsmen, adequately paid. It cannot be the plaything of advertising men or ‘psychological warriors.’”\textsuperscript{104} Ultimately, the Senate recommended to the Eisenhower administration to streamline US foreign broadcasting under the umbrella of a United States Information Agency (USIA) and praised RIAS as a model.\textsuperscript{105}

The arrival of Senator McCarthy’s two most notorious henchmen, Roy Cohn and G. David Shine, a few weeks later signaled a new stage of escalation in this conservative cabal. They descended upon West Berlin, accusing American operations of “wasting millions worth of dollars on waste and mismanagement” and keeping Communists on its payroll.\textsuperscript{106} US authorities in Berlin were now subjected to a coordinated campaign of political witch-hunts. These investigations marked a sea change from Stone and McCloy’s optimism upon which they ended their tenures just a year earlier. PUB’s efforts to highlight its frugality and crucial work for


\textsuperscript{104} Edward R. Murrow, “Protocol Murrow’s Senate Testimonial from 3/26” April 2, 1953, Edward R. Murrow, papers, 1927-65, MS025/004.002, General Correspondence, Box 032, Special Events, Murrow, Tufts Digital Collection and Archives, Medford, MA.


domestic audience stood in sharp contrast to Stone’s ability to disburse significant funds at will only a few years earlier. \(^{107}\)

If possible, Senator McCarthy and his staff focused on the émigré background of these propagandists of freedom to question their loyalty. In early 1953, McCarthy singled out Edmund Schechter, chief of PUB’s radio section and early founder of RIAS, claiming that Schechter had been denied a security clearance during the war. \(^{108}\) While Schechter strenuously denied these allegations, \(^{109}\) McCarthy mischaracterized Schechter’s background. Viennese-born Schechter found himself in Paris as a refugee at the outbreak of the war. Like Hirschfeld, Schechter entered the French Army, only to escape via the ERC’s route to New York City. When he applied for a security clearance during his work for the Voice of America’s radio broadcast, he was yet not an American citizen and stateless, which impaired his chances of ever receiving such a clearance. \(^{110}\)

Still, Schechter’s background in German language and customs proved valuable assets for American occupation authorities. Schechter recalled OMGUS/HICOG’s diverse composition of American professionals with prior German experience and “the vast variety of Central European refugees who […] were, like by a sponge, soaked up into military government.” In spite of McCarthy’s exploitation of this unique set-up, Schechter maintained adamantly: “My greatest compliments go to the Army, which demonstrated a wonderful flexibility and a willingness to

\(^{107}\) E.g. Public Information Office, Berlin Command and HICOG Berlin, “Booklet ‘Berlin.’”


skirt restricting regulations in the interest of letting the new information media be effective in those unusual times in Germany.”

In light of the threat these witch-hunts posed to this unique Erfahrungsgemeinschaft, or community formed by experience, US personnel in Berlin struggled to restrain their hostility toward insinuations about their loyalty. Acting PUB Director and former Stone deputy Theodore Kaghan publically dismissed Cohn and Shine as “Senator McCarthy’s two junketeering gumshoes.” Such criticism provoked McCarthy to summon Kaghan to the Senate floor. Accused of having written theater plays that “followed the Communist line” during the pink decade of the 1930s, Kaghan pointed out his Berlin anti-Communist credentials to Joseph McCarthy. Behind the scenes of the public spectacle, the Outpost network rushed to Kaghan’s defense. In spite of their efforts, the State Department asked Kaghan to resign, even though he would be cleared of any wrongdoing. Kaghan confided to Hirschfeld the details of his “ordeal” in Washington, DC. Fuming at the “wimps in the State Department” for failing to back up Kaghan, Hirschfeld drafted a letter of support signed by Ernst Reuter. Shepard Stone wrote a letter to the editor of the New York Times defending both his former deputy and American intervention in German politics. He warned “it would be dangerous to the security of the American people to permit the destruction of a program in Germany that has done so much


112 “Aide of McCarthy Scored on Charge: Kaghan, US Official Serving in Germany, Replies to Cohn on Red Tendency Accusation.”


While the Outpost network employed its freedom narrative to combat McCarthyism in the United States, the bitter irony was not lost on Hirschfeld who informed Stone: “Now the time has actually come in which we in Germany must rise to defend the idea and cause of democracy in the USA.”

However, in characteristic fashion, McCarthy and his staff chose to expand their “investigations,” rather than to retreat. After Kaghan’s forced departure, McCarthy and Cohn targeted RIAS deputy director Ewing. This development prompted the American management’s mute internal response to the uprising as it scrambled to defend itself. The station’s highest-ranking German employees, however, took unprecedented steps to protect their superior Ewing. The nine section heads, among them Egon Bahr, sent out an explosive press release:

“In these days, the popular uprising in East Berlin and the Soviet Zone has shown for the entire world to see which spirit RIAS has imparted on its audience. Suspicions that Communist tendencies exist in the German-American team that is responsible for the successes of RIAS would strike us not only as absurd, but moreover as an insulting vilification of the successful work we have performed. We could not longer take for granted the basis for German-American cooperation within RIAS, should such suspicions […] trigger infringements on the personnel structure of the German-American RIAS team. […] Forcing us to take the consequences […] would be triumph for the Communists, which everybody who is serious about combatting Communism should strive to prevent.”

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118 “Won’t Comment on Statement.”

119 Cf. section 4, II.

The New York Times immediately picked up the story, guaranteeing circulation among the American public.\textsuperscript{121} By pointing at the station’s anti-communist credentials and using the uprising as the prime exhibit, RIAS’ German management raised the stakes in the dispute. Moreover by linking the station’s future with that of Ewing, the band of German journalist whom the US occupation had deemed worthy of assisting in democratization directly confronted Senator McCarthy. The senior American management, however, kept a much lower profile. RIAS Director Fred Taylor instituted a policy that any interview of RIAS employees would have to be cleared by Gerard Gert, another German-born American official at RIAS who had fled Berlin as seventeen year old in 1937.\textsuperscript{122}

Privately however, the American network members debated the most effective defense against McCarthy’s assault on RIAS. Stone assured Ewing of crucial support, informing the fellow G-2 veteran that “ever since your name appeared in the paper, Mr. McCloy and others have gone to work.” Under the Ford Foundation’s letterhead, Stone advised Ewing on how to contribute to McCloy and Stone’s campaign against McCarthy most effectively: “For the sake of our country, I hope you will be spared coming back here to testify. All of us have done everything possible to make sure that you stay where you ought to stay [in Berlin].”\textsuperscript{123} In these deliberations, the persona of Heimlich remained an anathema to American members of the

\textsuperscript{121} “Germans Threaten to Quit RIAS Staff,” \textit{New York Times}, June 22, 1953.


\textsuperscript{123} Shepard Stone, “Note to Gordon Ewing,” July 14, 1953, Gordon Ewing Collection, Box 1, Folder 3 RIAS, George C. Marshall Library, Lexington, VA.
network. In his response to Stone, Ewing bitterly accused the “abominable little man Bill Heimlich” of having betrayed PUB personnel to McCarthy.124

Stone and McCloy’s inclusion in the ever-growing list of suspects made blunting of the witch-hunts an increasing priority in the highest echelons of American foreign policy. Together, the duo stepped in to coordinate a shadow campaign against McCarthy from which the Berlin-based Outpost of Freedom network benefitted tremendously.125 Ominously, Stone had found his name on one of Roy Cohn’s publicized lists and the FBI subjected McCloy to a loyalty check in July 1953.126 At the same time, Henry Ford II had personally authorized the Ford Foundation to spend $15 million to stem McCarthyism between 1951 and 1953 in a campaign that Volker Berghahn has characterized as the “self-defense of leading Ford Foundation people.”127 McCloy collected acerbic accounts of Cohn and Shine’s notorious tour of American installations in Germany, indicating his growing concern.128 By the end of July, Stone reported encouraging developments for Ewing: “Immediately after McCarthy mentioned your name for the first time, Mr. McCloy and I got together and he immediately got in touch with [John] Foster Dulles. They had quite an exchange […] and under considerable pressure by McCloy, people in the State


125 Berghahn, America and the Intellectual Cold Wars in Europe, 74–75.


127 Berghahn, America and the Intellectual Cold Wars in Europe, 154.

128 “Press Compendium” April 9, 1953, John J. McCloy Papers, Series 15: Jenner-McCarthy, Box JE1, Folder 17, Amherst College Library, Archives and Special Collections.
Department did go to work. As of this writing, it seemed to me that McCarthy had decided to pull back in your case [...].”

John Foster Dulles’ State Department stalled proceedings, just as Stone had promised Ewing. Claiming to have run out of travel funds for the year, the State Department dragged its heels on flying Ewing to Washington, DC. Stone’s account raises the question how McCloy could convince an ardent cold warrior such as John Foster Dulles, who had cast his opposition to Communism in religious terms. Earlier, the Secretary of State, who dreamed of “roll-back” against Soviet expansion, had caved to McCarthy’s agenda by ordering the purges of titles from the libraries in the Amerikahäuser, United States funded cultural centers across Germany.

Dulles’ long-standing respect for West Berlin provided a lever. During the Berlin Airlift, he had visited West Berlin on behalf of 1948 Republican Presidential nominee Thomas E. Dewey. As his chief foreign policy advisor, Dulles had marveled at the “morale of West Berliners.” In a meeting with Reuter during his March 1953 American visit, Dulles had encouraged the Mayor “that Berlin was a place where American aid could be justified.” These instances of convincing conservatives like Dulles suggest that the network could use their Outpost of Freedom narrative to elicit support far beyond its origins within the wartime anti-fascist Left.

132 John Foster Dulles, “Text of ‘Statement Made in Berlin’” October 17, 1948, John Foster Dulles Papers, Box 35, Folder 10, Princeton University Library, Department of Rare Books and Special Collections.
In light of McCarthy’s 1954 censure by his fellow Senators, the State Department’s subversive, yet secret stalling of the witch-hunt proved successful. Ewing never had to appear in front of the Senate. It was the German RIAS employees’ act of defiance for the ideals they proclaimed and the joint McCloy-Stone shadow campaign against McCarthy that prodded the State Department into action, however. In addition, the network’s victory over McCarthyism was far from complete as it continued to scrutiny and congressional budget cuts.

For instance as late as 1955, the Senate’s Eastland committee accused erstwhile RIAS founder Charles S. Lewis of having briefly been in Communist circles in 1937. He testified that he felt pressured to step down from his post overseeing all US radio operations in Germany in 1952 when he learned that “loyalty charges” were being pressed against him.133 Privately, Lewis recounted his experience to Hans Hirschfeld: “I need not tell you, Hans, that being turned inside out by a Senate committee is far from pleasant […]. There must be an easier way to be purged, I hope it will be found for others in a similar situation.”134 Lewis’ case demonstrates how allegations of leftist sympathies still affected careers of people associated RIAS and HICOG PUB even after Senator McCarthy’s colleagues had censured him a year earlier.

The network felt even more keenly the effects of congressional cuts to expenditures in Germany. Most notably these entailed the closing of the Neue Zeitung, HICOG’s flagship daily broadsheet.135 While Congress slashed HICOG’s budget in reaction to the astonishing economic growth of the Federal Republic and its seeming democratic stabilization under Konrad


Adenauer’s tenure, McCarthy’s charge of wasteful spending contributed to this decision. After Adenauer’s emphatic election victory in September 1953, McCloy warned John Foster Dulles of complacency concerning the semi-sovereign Federal Republic: “We cannot, in my judgment, lift our hand and influence from internal German developments. The roots of sound parliamentary behavior are not deeply enough embedded in German soil for us to take a different position.”

As McCloy sought to maintain the US High Commissioner’s active engagement in German politics that he had championed, he touted the need for a strong, democratic opposition party, offering a rare insight into his motivation for supporting the Berlin SPD remigrés. McCloy deplored the United States’ funding cutbacks, but closed hopefully: “We can still assert influence on Germany internally and we must if we are to have the constructive force in that part of Europe that our policy will require.”

Slashed American funds rankled the Berlin SPD remigrés as well. A day before McCloy’s informal advice to Dulles, Hirschfeld had vented his frustrations to Stone:

“What currently takes place in the [US Embassy Bonn-]Mehlem is anything but pretty. […] In the last months all has been brought to naught that you and your colleagues have built up over years. I do not understand this policy at all […] because if one stops in the thick of it, it means that all expended strength, effort, and resources were futile.”

While Hirschfeld never expanded on the nature of the policy that infuriated him, his letter coincided with his last receipt of American funds, thus placing it in the context of the budget cuts and McCarthy’s targeting of American operations in Germany. In light of the State


137 John J. McCloy, “Letter to John Foster Dulles,” September 23, 1953, John Foster Dulles Papers, Box 72, Folder 27, Princeton University Library, Department of Rare Books and Special Collections.

Department’s timid response to McCarthyism, it seems not unlikely that HICOG had cut off all direct funding of a nominally still Marxist party such as the SPD in the summer of 1953. Having escaped the crosshairs of American conservatives, the German-American network faced an unclear funding situation and uncertain future.

IV. Reuter’s Death and Resilience of the Network

A week after expressing his dismay over the fallout of McCarthyism within US occupation authorities, Hirschfeld and his fellow network members had to endure yet another setback. On September 29, 1953, Governing Mayor and Outpost network figurehead Ernst Reuter suffered a lethal heart attack.¹³⁹ In his correspondence with émigré friends in New York, Hirschfeld mourned Reuter “who was both friend and boss to me. His death was not only a serious blow to me for political […] reasons, but also most personally. Since then it has become lonely and colder around me and work has become harder and less enjoyable. The four years that I have worked here with Reuter have been unison in thoughts […].”¹⁴⁰ The somber picture Hirschfeld painted point to Reuter’s centrality for both Hirschfeld’s work and identification with postwar Berlin.

More generally, Reuter’s death dealt a serious blow to the remigrés’ fight for control over the Berlin SPD and American hopes for a westernized SPD. Less than two weeks before Reuter’s passing, HICOG had regarded Reuter’s control of West Berlin’s mayor office as critical for the US position in the Cold War. In light of the rising tensions between the Berlin SPD’s two wings, HICOG officials feared “polarization of two democratic political camps in West Berlin

¹³⁹ Barclay, Ernst Reuter, 341.
with SPD personalities not of the moderate type coming to the fore on SPD side.” In particular, this confidential HICOG memorandum warned that Reuter losing office “could only be detrimental to the maintenance [of] this exposed and key outpost of freedom behind the iron curtain.”

Subscription to the Outpost narrative had again determined American sympathies for Reuter and his faction of remigrés.

Yet the death of HICOG’s trusted most Berlin politician left the course of the SPD in limbo, making HICOG’s worst-case scenario a distinct possibility. Subsequently, HICOG Berlin reported to the State Department under the title “Crisis:”

“With Reuter’s passing, the SPD lost one of its great assets. The political skill and qualities of the late Governing Mayor, whose influence reached far beyond his own party, helped to make Berlin symbol of freedom and of German unity and enabled Berlin to conjure with that symbolism to obtain the material and moral assistance without which it would not long survive. […] After Reuter’s death, the SPD could furnish no leader to fill his role.”

When Reuter died, the connection between West Berlin and the “Freedom” that he had personified with moral credibility faced severe doubts not only within the American occupation. Hirschfeld wrote gloomily to Stone that Reuter’s “death had provoked a feeling of abandonment among Berliners.” On the occasion of John McCloy’s and Shepard Stone’s visit to offer their condolences, Stone tried to encourage his friend, noting that “we sensed the same courageous Berlin spirit, and it was a deep experience to be with all of you again.”

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The death of the network’s most visible exponent stalled its political agenda. Among the most palpable short-term effects of Reuter’s death for the SPD was its lost hold on power. West Berlin’s all-party coalition frayed, prompting the conservative CDU and liberal FDP to form a governing coalition against the SPD. This sudden development concerned Stone, who consoled Hirschfeld that this “is not a healthy situation and everybody who knows something about Berlin deplores what has happened.”

Despite the SPD loss of power in West Berlin, the incoming Mayor Schreiber’s retention of Hirschfeld and Hertz illustrates the entrenched position of the network in West Berlin by the mid-1950s. Hirschfeld described himself as “listless to continue my work here, but Dr. Schreiber has asked me just again today [to continue].” In a similar fashion, Hertz remained coordinator of American ERP funds in West Berlin. Karl Mautner has suggested that Hirschfeld and Hertz’ exile experience in the United States offered unique conduits for cooperation with American authorities: “Dr. Hertz did not become a cabinet member but in effect remained in control of the ERP and Marshall Plan affairs. That was terribly important.” Moreover, Mautner claimed that “the Americans persuaded Mayor Schreiber to alter the planned chart of responsibilities within his new cabinet, carve out the Marshall Plan slot and put SPD man Dr. Hertz in charge of it, reporting directly to him.”

145 Ibid.
148 Ibid.
remigré administrators underscores their indispensable position in West Berlin’s makeshift polity.

While Hirschfeld and Hertz’ retention guaranteed the remigrés’ continuing influence on West Berlin’s bureaucracy, the loss of their leader questioned their clout within their party in light of the ongoing feud with the Neumann wing. A year earlier, in 1952, Reuter had enticed the young Willy Brandt to challenge Neumann for the Berlin SPD chairmanship, only to lose emphatically despite the blessing of the SPD’s most popular politician.¹⁵⁰ In this feud, Neumann pioneered what would become the tactic of choice against Brandt for decades to come: exploiting popular resentments against remigrés. As early as February 1948, Neumann had made inquires in Stockholm about Brandt’s conduct in exile.¹⁵¹ During the intraparty campaign, Neumann spread insinuations about Brandt’s past. Brandt bitterly denounced the “emigration complex” of his nominal comrades and doggedly defended himself against “mud-slinging” accusations of “detachment” and “cowardice” in exile.¹⁵² A year later, Brandt eulogized Reuter at his funeral, but the continuation of his policies that Brandt demanded had become uncertain.¹⁵³

Strikingly, Brandt laid out his strategy for the network’s future in his eulogy for Reuter. He glossed over Reuter’s decade in exile while stressing Reuter’s unwavering anti-Communism in the Cold War. In addition, Brandt characterized Reuter as “simultaneously mentor,


admonisher, and good friend.” 154 Scholars have periodically questioned the intensity of the protégé-mentor relationship between Reuter and Brandt that Brandt publically celebrated. Despite Brandt’s interest in portraying himself as Reuter’s political heir, both politicians’ common background of adolescent leftwing radicalism, Nazi-imposed exile, and shared preoccupation to bring democracy to postwar Germany suggest that Brandt was genuine. Moreover, Brandt’s processing of clandestine American donations for Reuter illustrates their close working relationship within the network. Such a close relationship helps to explain how quickly Brandt “acted as Reuter’s unquestioned heir on Berlin’s political stage” with an authority that has astounded Brandt’s biographer.155 Born in 1913, Willy Brandt counted among the youngest remigrés. Thus he combined the experience of exile with the allure of being a man for the future. In West Berlin’s abrasive political landscape, Brandt consciously chose to stress the anti-Communism that he shared with his electorate, rather than exile heroism that set him apart from the vast majority of his constituents.

Yet Brandt seemed initially hesitant to confront Neumann openly again. Former Berlin Senator and Reuter loyalist Günter Klein implored the Americans to intervene, suggesting to American liaison officer Mautner that “a bit of pushing, possibly even carefully and tactfully by the American side, could help” to convince Brandt to run against Neumann. To add urgency to his request, Klein asserted that “without W[illy] Brandt, no struggle could hope for much success at this juncture.”156 Eventually, Brandt did challenge Neumann at the party convention

154 Ibid.

155 Merseburger, Willy Brandt, 309.

June 12, 1954, falling two votes short of dislodging Neumann as Chairman of the Berlin SPD.¹⁵⁷

To add insult to injury, Brandt’s support for West German inclusion in NATO doomed his bid for a spot on the SPD national executive board at the national convention in Berlin a month later.¹⁵⁸ Frustrated but determined, Brandt wrote to Reuter’s widow and Hirschfeld from his summer retreat on a Norwegian island: “Few people are here and hence no reason for chagrin. The triumph of mediocrity and leaderlessness that we experienced at the convention naturally crosses my mind over and over. We have no choice but to buckle our helmets tighter.”¹⁵⁹ Brandt’s martial phrasing exemplified a resolve despite setbacks by the network’s Social Democrats for future fights for control over the Berlin SPD.

The triple crisis of 1953 proved that realization of the network’s lofty ambitions would not come overnight, but was at best an arduous process that included painful setbacks. Despite the network’s success in disseminating their interpretation of German division and the GDR regime via RIAS, the Soviet crushing of the June 17 Uprising brutally dictated the limits of the network’s political clout. East Berlin’s striking workers reiterated slogans espousing “freedom” that the network had disseminated for yours. But RIAS journalists such as Egon Bahr had to confess to them that fear of Cold War escalation forbade a Western intervention on their behalf.

Often overlooked, concurrent McCarthyism posed an existential threat to the network, despite the persecution’s farcical fashion. McCarthy and his staff took aim at two constituent characteristics of the network that the Cold War paradigm had rendered suspicious: Its members


¹⁵⁸ Merseburger, Willy Brandt, 312.

possessed a cosmopolitan background and their political activism had its roots in leftist anti-
fascism – both of which could now be misconstrued as collusion with international Communism.

McCarthy and Cohn’s hubris to single out RIAS in West Berlin proved ill advised, however. American RIAS management and German RIAS journalists rebuffed these allegations by pointing to RIAS’ work as an anti-Communist frontline station. The Outpost narrative and the network’s high-ranking contacts proved particularly useful in its shadow campaign to evade McCarthy’s crosshairs.

The emergence of Willy Brandt as the network’s new standard-bearer in Berlin politics suggests its resilience in the face of adversity. Reuter’s death signaled a break of personnel continuity for the network’s most visible figurehead, but the public presentation of Brandt as his political heir offered the opportunity for a generational change. While Reuter’s passing led to the Berlin SPD’s fall from power and undercut the remigrés’ campaign to promote German integration into the Western Alliance within the party, Reuter loyalists quickly rallied behind Brandt, setting the stage for future conflict with the Neumann wing. In this intra-party confrontation, Brandt first faced a bruising character assassination campaign that questioned his past in exile. While the campaign against Brandt was particularly vicious, his case illustrates the cynical resentments remigrés more generally encountered in postwar Germany. Brandt pioneered a strategy to shield himself from accusations that built upon the Outpost of Freedom narrative. Instead of highlighting their principled opposition to Nazism in exile, the network now publically glossed over its exile roots and emphasized their anti-Communist credentials earned at the frontline of the Cold War in Berlin.

and Cold War anti-totalitarian campaigning still influences scholarly inquiry to this day. Despite the cynical public ostracism that these remigrés faced, their exile-derived network remained in place and would propel careers over the 1950s.
CHAPTER 5

Ascent to Leadership, 1954-1961

On October 3, 1957, the West Berliner Abgeordnetenhaus, or House of Representatives, elected Willy Brandt Governing Mayor.¹ The ambitious forty-three-year-old Social Democrat’s election was remarkable for at least three reasons. First, a remigré who had returned ten years earlier from his exiles in Norway and Sweden now governed two thirds of the former Reichshauptstadt’s inhabitants. Second, this former Press Attaché of the Norwegian Military Mission succeeded against a party machine that revered Franz Neumann, who had defended the SPD’s independence against Soviet encroachment in the immediate postwar era. Third, Brandt’s election signaled the network’s success after it had faced three existential crises only four years earlier.

In the context of the network and the Cold War narrative it wielded in Berlin, these three factors, in fact, helped to explain Brandt’s unlikely political rise. Brandt advanced as new political figurehead of a reconfigured network. Consciously claiming Reuter’s legacy, Brandt’s emergence as a politician of national and international stature reflected the expansion and resilience of the exile-derived network that exerted newly claimed influence. Thus this chapter outlines the network’s ascent to leadership from Reuter’s death in late 1953 to Willy Brandt’s first national campaign for Chancellorship in the summer of 1961, at the eve of the GDR’s

construction of the Berlin Wall. By contrasting the network’s political moves with the evolving situation in Cold War Berlin, this chapter critically retraces the network’s newfound success. In particular, this chapter reads Brandt and his PR staff’s writings against the grain – not to distinguish between fact and fiction, but to analyze how the exile-derived network used the Cold War to reinterpret its international background. Subsequently, this chapter assesses how the network prevailed over Franz Neumann, expanded the clientele of the SPD, exploited the opportunities the broadcasting media age offered by fashioning Brandt’s political image as a cosmopolitan Cold Warrior, and staged West Berlin as a show case of Cold War Democracy.

I. The Emergence of Willy Brandt as new Figurehead of the Network

HICOG blamed Franz Neumann’s intransigence for the collapse of West Berlin’s governing coalition following Reuter’s death in 1954. Since Neumann was not bound to any municipal office, the Berlin SPD chairman ironically benefitted from the party’s loss of power in the ongoing feud over the meaning of postwar Social Democracy. In contrast, the remigrés could count themselves fortunate that ramifications of the Cold War secured them a modicum of influence. In extraordinary move, HICOG Berlin enticed newly elected CDU Mayor Walther Schreiber to retain Hertz and Hirschfeld. The remigré candidate Willy Brandt, however, fell just short of replacing Neumann as SPD Chairman on Reuter’s coattails at a party convention in May 1954.

Still, Brandt’s convention speech foreshadowed the talking points the candidate and his support network would employ in their effort to realign the SPD. Brandt balanced his support for

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full Western integration with professions in support of democratic socialism to the audience of party veterans. For instance, Brandt combatively exclaimed: “The attacks of those […] who call us an American faction cannot bother us.” But he added in the following sentence: “But we distance ourselves from such degenerations of the Western world as they are associated with the name McCarthy in America.” Moreover Brandt used the political capital his network had built in combatting local McCarthyism to exhort the party delegates: “sober assessment of our situation – regardless of the feud over foreign and domestic policy – forces us to the conclusion that Berlin would be lost if it would not longer be the Outpost of Freedom.”

Most notably, Brandt referenced his own immediate postwar hopes for a Third Way between capitalism and Stalinism to close the ranks with the Western liberal democracies. While Brandt had hoped in 1947 to participate in constructing “the third power that is needed to avoid the biggest catastrophe of all times,” he reinterpreted his postwar blueprint seven years later in his bid for Berlin SPD chairman:

“It is certainly true, that anti-Communist politics not necessarily equal democratic politics. But all-German politics means anti-Communist politics in any case. A third power in accordance with democratic-Socialist politics does not exist through even the smallest support from the Soviets, but only exists through support from the non-Soviet world.”

The experience of Cold War Berlin with the SED’s Stalinist policies and fellowship with a network of international Leftists had convinced Brandt to pursue a hard line against Communism.

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Despite Brandt’s failure to succeed Neumann as Chairman, his candidacy increased his recognition as the remigrés’ standard-bearer exhibiting a carefully sculpted youthful image and gritty determination against Neumann’s Keulenriege.\footnote{5}

The remigrés’ near victory at the summer 1954 convention alarmed their Communist opponents on the other side of the Brandenburg Gate. GDR intelligence informed the Central Committee of the SED in a confidential document: “Berlin offers a bad example of the Yankee faction’s exertion of influence. Here the Yankee faction has been able to pick up almost half of the delegates’ votes for their candidate, Willi Brandt [sic].”\footnote{6} Moreover, Brandt’s challenge to Neumann seemed to confirm the influence of what the SED termed an “American legion within the SPD.” The SED also highlighted the experience of exile when it noted: “no small number of former Social Democratic émigrés who had stayed in the United States for years are among the US State Department’s missionaries within the SPD.”\footnote{7} For these Communist apparatchiks, the remigrés past in exile determined their support for West German rearmament in NATO, when it warned: “the United States’ fifth column wants to turn the SPD into an instrument of warmongering.”\footnote{8}

Despite the SED’s comical reduction of the remigrés to American puppets, these extensive GDR intelligence assessments illustrate the importance Ulbricht’s inner circle placed on the Berlin SPD’s internal wrangling. It had continuously monitored the Berlin SPD closely, hoping

\footnote{5}{cf. Chapter 4, IV}
\footnote{6}{A. B., “Memorandum ‘Weitere Enthüllungen über die ungeheuerliche Tätigkeit der amerikanischen Fraktion in der SPD’” June 12, 1954, Zentrales Parteiarchiv der SED, SAPMO DY/30/IV 2/10.02/98, ZK, Westabteilung, Bundesarchiv Berlin.}
\footnote{7}{Westabteilung des ZK der SED, “Memorandum ‘Die Amerikanische Legion in Der SPD’” November 23, 1953, Zentrales Parteiarchiv der SED, SAPMO DY/30/IV 2/10.02/98, ZK, Westabteilung, Bundesarchiv Berlin.}
\footnote{8}{Westabteilung des ZK der SED, “Memorandum ‘Sozialdemokraten Fordern Neuorientierung Der SPD’” 1954, Zentrales Parteiarchiv der SED, SAPMO DY/30/IV 2/10.02/98, ZK, Westabteilung, Bundesarchiv Berlin.}
to find the most receptive audience of all Western parties, in spite of grievances dating back to
the founding conflicts of the Weimar Republic. While the Communist functionaries fumed at the
Social Democrats like Brandt who called for integration in the Western Alliance, their passion
befitted those of estranged siblings who still saw the SPD as potentially redeemable. Instead of
any overtures from the Social Democrats, East Berlin’s sources reported how Brandt personified
a disquieting trend to prioritize full Western integration over German unity.

Ironically, Brandt privately seemed less bullish about his chances of success than the SED
feared. In October 1954, Mautner wired his superiors at HICOG and the State Department
statements of anxiety from Brandt that “an informed observeress” had extracted from him. She
noted that Brandt “required more than the usual amount of prodding, badgering, pushing and at
least one martini to get started. What finally emerged was totally gloomy.”9 While Mautner’s
informal data collection operations seemingly confirm present-day notions of a liquor-infused,
male-dominated workplace during the 1950s reminiscent of Mad Men, they also illustrate the
continuing interest US authorities in Berlin held in the machinations within Schöneberg City
Hall’s corridors.

A political calculation undergirded the easy rapport between Mautner and Brandt. Not
unlike the Communists behind the Brandenburg Gate, HICOG followed Brandt closely for his
support of a “German defense contribution” or rearmament that would boost NATO’s strength
against a powerful party faction rooted in parts of the Federal Republic proper.10 In the lead-up
to the national party-convention, HICOG Berlin tabulated a detailed breakdown of SPD

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9 Karl F. Mautner, “Memorandum ‘Willy Brandt Blows the Blues (an Informed Observeress Prodded This out of

10 Thomas D. McKiernan, “Classified Memorandum ‘Berlin and the SPD National Parteitag’” August 6, 1954, RG
466, US High Commissioner for Germany (HICOG), Berlin Element, Office of the Director, Classified General
Records, 1949-55, E-162, Box 49, Folder Political Parties (SPD), National Archives, College Park.
delegates in a “Neumann faction” and a “Brandt faction.”"\textsuperscript{11} These groupings might have been simplistic, but they demonstrate how the split had become institutionalized by 1954.

Thus HICOG anxiously anticipated the December 1954 city elections, as it hoped clarification over the course of Berlin’s largest party:

“The elections will not merely decide the relative strength of the Berlin parties. Real success or failure at the polls will assist the SPD to cut through its ‘web of contradictions’ and resolve some of its local problems on policy, leadership and tactics. […] Regardless of the outcome, it will be a crucial election for the SPD.”\textsuperscript{12}

The near parity between the Neumann and Brandt wings of the party prompted elaborate compromises in drawing up the SPD ballot. The leaders of both wings agreed on House President and former political science professor Otto Suhr’s nomination as candidate for the Abgeordnetenhaus election.\textsuperscript{13}

City elections on December 5, 1954, gave the SPD the absolute majority of seats in the Abgeordnetenhaus. The results surpassed the expectations of the remigré wing that had anticipated losses in votes from what it perceived as the party’s wobbly stance on rearmament, fearing that voters could construe it as softness on Communism. In an instance illustrating the close working relationship between the network’s members, SPD remigrés passed on an opinion survey to Viennese-American Mautner. Conducted by German-American joint venture DIVO, whose Berlin pollster was Harold Hurwitz, the remigrés credited the survey for attacking CDU Mayor Schreiber as an Adenauer ally disinterested in Berlin’s plight and avoiding “appreciable


\textsuperscript{12} HICOG Berlin and McKiernan, “Classified Memorandum ‘Developments in the Berlin SPD.’”

\textsuperscript{13} Heimann, “Einleitung,” 29–32.
losses that [national SPD Chairman] Ollenhauer’s foreign policy would cause.”\textsuperscript{14} In addition, the network’s budding reliance on opinion polling exemplifies its pioneering role in adopting this technique in Germany.\textsuperscript{15}

The new majority of seats in the Abgeordnetenhaus thus assured the SPD a role in the government, even if it invited the CDU to join as a junior coalition partner. The allocation of offices between the local SPD politicians proved more controversial. With Suhr now Governing Mayor elect, Brandt prevailed comfortably against a Neumann protégé to clinch the SPD nomination to replace Suhr as President of the Abgeordnetenhaus.\textsuperscript{16} A pleased Hans Hirschfeld immediately informed Mautner, who cabled his superiors with the news that Willy Brandt was a shoo-in for the House presidency.\textsuperscript{17}

The newly elected president of the Abgeordnetenhaus strove to reconcile his bipartisan office’s decorum with an ambitious political agenda in his inaugural speech:

“We have to do everything to achieve Berlin’s reunification through free elections and German unity in freedom. […] As much as we are willing to act as ‘trial run’ for a preliminary step towards an all-German solution – if international developments allow--. we do not aspire to become an international guinea pig. […]. Berlin wants to be free, and Berlin wants to become the rejoined capital of a Germany serving global peace and European prosperity.”\textsuperscript{18}


\textsuperscript{15} Cf. section III.

\textsuperscript{16} Merseburger, \textit{Willy Brandt}, 329.


By linking the West German formula of “German unity in freedom” with willingness for international negotiations – albeit on his own terms, Brandt signaled his intentions to enter the national and international political stage as West Berlin’s representative.

The network expanded the clout of Brandt’s largely ceremonial post through adroit use of broadcasting media. Through the network’s informal links to the station, RIAS fashioned Brandt as Reuter’s political heir, matching the late Mayor in accessibility, cosmopolitanism, and anti-Communism. Not surprisingly, analysis of RIAS programming between 1948 and 1958 confirms that Brandt received generous airtime like Reuter before him, thus extending support for SPD remigrés beyond the Cold War into domestic political wrangling.¹⁹ Immediately upon being elected president of the Berliner Abgeordnetenhaus, Brandt’s presence on RIAS increased even further. One program modification gave Brandt the chance to address listeners “on the eve of every session of the Berliner Abgeordnetenhaus.”²⁰ In turn, Brandt offered US authorities his suggestions for possible programming improvements.²¹ Exclusive access to constituents through West Berlin’s most popular radio station prior to any parliamentary debate gave Brandt enormous power to frame the political debate in West Berlin.

In practical terms, claiming Reuter’s mantle reinvigorated the triangle between SPD remigrés, RIAS, and US authorities. Not surprising in a city divided by political strife, this cooperation infuriated other political actors in the city. The East Berlin SED publically branded RIAS journalists as American mercenaries who had sold their souls “for blood money like

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Internally however, the SED contritely acknowledged RIAS’ effectiveness. Lacking this political vitriol, CDU Mayor Walther Schreiber nonetheless seemed to agree with the communist assessment of RIAS’ closeness to the SPD, when, during his brief tenure between 1953 and 1954, he pushed behind the scenes for the creation of a second West Berlin station “in which we [conservatives] can speak our own language”.

By fashioning themselves as best custodians of Berlin’s freedom, the remigrés could cast their fight for control over the Berlin SPD as conducive for RIAS’ political objectives. In a “Statement of USIA objectives in Germany”, US High Commissioner James B. Conant’s office had instructed Public Affairs outlets “with respect to Berlin, to illustrate and support by public affairs techniques the right, ability, and determination of the Allies and West Berliners to hold their position in, and access to, the city, and the intention of the free world to continue to promote Berlin’s economic health and maintain it as a political democratic community.” RIAS’ dominant market share in West Berlin made favorable coverage particularly important for the remigrés. Harold Hurwitz’ DIVO survey for the SPD only fortified this conviction, when it concluded that “for seventy-five percent of radio listeners, RIAS was the most popular station.”

Brandt could use RIAS’ journalistic support as he faced renewed insinuations about his exile past in the press. Despite the shared administrative responsibilities between Willy Brandt as

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22 “Pamphlet ‘Ein Mann kam nach Berlin’” 1957, MfS ZAIG Nr. 9961, BStU, Berlin. For the GDR’s campaign against RIAS cf. Chapter 4, Section II.
23 Cf. Chapter 3, section II.
26 Mautner and McKiernan, “Classified Memorandum ‘SPD-Sponsored Public Opinion Survey in Berlin.’”

The confrontation between remigrés and the Keulenriege over control of West Berlin’s dominant political party was fought in newspaper columns and broadcasts as much as at party meetings. But Brandt’s journalistic allies countered with media tactics of their own. Leading up to the decisive mayoral election of 1957, for example, U.S.-controlled Radio in the American Sector (RIAS) aired a guest commentary contending that Brandt “had been attacked by Franz Neumann […] just like Ernst Reuter and Otto Suhr [had been]. Franz Neumann has to search his soul and consider how much he has contributed to these men’s decline.” Stopping just short of implicating Neumann for the sudden deaths of Mayor Reuter and Mayor Suhr while still in office, the commentator described the Keulenriege using Nazi jargon: “It is about time to break through
the phalanx of *Alte Kämpfer,*” the commentator advised, making reference to the earliest members of the Nazi Party (NSDAP): “Berlin needs new men indeed, but no Neumänner.”

By 1956, both Suhr’s cancer and Brandt’s ambition were open secrets in West Berlin’s Schöneberg City Hall. Brandt’s informal German-American network, which derived from wartime exile circles, did its best to groom him as Suhr’s potential successor. To that end, Hirschfeld and Stone started planning a 1957 U.S. tour for Brandt. At the same time, Karl Mautner felt compelled to write his superiors a long dossier on Brandt’s character and supposedly bright future in politics:

> W.B. is a somewhat ponderous and slow but hearty man from the Baltic Sea. He carries himself with dignity and inspires confidence. In the last years, he has grown to the stature of a young statesman to be watched, a coming man. He is an excellent, sober speaker, compelling in his careful formulation and dignified presentation, which does not exclude a warm sense of humor.

As this suggests, Mautner and Brandt continued their trustful relationship. For instance, Brandt – contrary to his public position – had confided to Mautner that although “the Oder-Neisse line may have to be accepted eventually,” the issue remained useful as a diplomatic bargaining chip. Brandt also stayed in close contact with Shepard Stone, relaying through Hirschfeld his hope for a repetition “of our last *gemütlich* get-together in Bonn.”

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Otto Suhr’s death in office on August 30, 1957, sparked a heated internal party battle for
his succession. Searching for a suitable candidate among the ranks of the SPD faction in the
Bonn Bundestag, Franz Neumann frantically tried to prevent Brandt from assuming office. By
this time, however, Brandt’s power base had expanded to such a degree that no Bundestag
member was willing to run against him.34 Hans Hirschfeld was thus able to invite Shepard Stone
to West Berlin four days later: “I want Shep to meet a few people this time, and also Willy
Brandt in particular, who will probably be governing mayor by the time of your arrival.” In wry
understatement, Hirschfeld added: “So no stranger to Shep.”35 At the same time, Neumann faced
intense criticism from the executive board of the Berlin SPD for publicly undermining Brandt as
the SPD candidate.36 On October 3, 1957, Brandt was sworn in as governing mayor of Berlin.
Brandt retained Hirschfeld as PR Director and immediately appointed him interim Chef der
Senatskanzlei, coordinating all activities of the Mayor’s staff.37 Brandt’s forces then moved
quickly, and Mautner noted a few weeks later “the palace revolt against Franz Neumann is
picking up force.”38 In a hastily scheduled party convention on January 12, 1958, Brandt
succeeded Neumann as Berlin SPD chairman by a margin of 163 to 124 votes.39

34 See Adolf Arndt, “Brief an Franz Neumann,” September 19, 1957, E Rep 300-90, 195 Nachlass Franz Neumann,
Tätigkeit in der SPD, Landesarchiv Berlin.
Korrespondenz mit Stone, Folder 1, Landesarchiv Berlin.
Ausscheiden Hirschfelds” December 8, 1959, A3 1/WBA-PUB-0097 Publikationen 1959, Nov-Dec., Willy-Brandt-
Archiv im Archiv der sozialen Demokratie, Bonn.
Karl F. Mautner, SPD, Landesarchiv Berlin.
39 Merseburger, Willy Brandt, 342.
II. Brandt as new SPD Candidate for a new West Berlin

Mayor and Chairman Brandt took the Berlin SPD to soaring heights of popularity. In the 1958 municipal elections – the first under Brandt’s unequivocal leadership –, the SPD won an unprecedented 52.6% of the vote. Brandt succeeded in late 1950s West Berlin as candidate of a changed party in a changing city. After a decade of division, the Cold War left an imprint on the city’s demographic composition. Both official GDR and American observers noted Brandt’s success as a vigorous advocate of the Western cause in the global confrontation, with HICOG commending “the population of West Berlin [as] probably the most determinedly anti-Communist population in the world.” In contrast, the Mayor and his remigré-derived network’s appeal to a shifting demographic have received less attention by contemporaries and scholars alike.

By 1958, the city’s demographics hardly resembled those of ten years prior. Berlin’s destruction in 1945 triggered the loss of the capital status and of many industrial assets. The political division that followed disrupted longstanding regional trade networks. In 1950, the unemployment rate in West Berlin peaked at 32.7%. As a result of these processes, Berlin in its 1920 borders lost nearly every fourth citizen, from its wartime peak of 4.4 million to 3.3 million sixteen years later, in 1958. Both politicians and historians have characterized this fundamental

40 Cf. Section IV.


43 Cf. chapter 2.
socio-economic transformation as a narrative of loss. Willy Brandt named “confronting the increasing tendency of isolation and provincializing in Berlin” as one of his main priorities.\textsuperscript{44} Wolfgang Ribbe characterized Berlin’s postwar economic development in his expansive survey of the city’s history as “broad-based industrial decentralization.”\textsuperscript{45}

While the painful facets of this transformation are evident, the relative postwar prosperity and rise of the tertiary sector in West Berlin’s workforce point to important, yet often overlooked counter developments. West Berliners suffered from two contradictory frames of references in assessing their own economic situation. While gap in affluence between the city’s Western and Eastern sectors grew with ever increasing speed, West Berlin’s economic recovery paled in comparison to the unprecedented boom in the industrial centers of Western Germany. Already in 1949, Egon Bahr encapsulated the degradation Berliner urbanites felt in the Federal Republic proper: “Hamburg was a small culture shock. I saw a brightly lit city and realized how dark it was in blockaded Berlin. The eyes gazed over the elegant shop windows at the Alster; on the Spree we had missed the effects of the [Deutschmark] currency reform.”\textsuperscript{46} The West Berlin Senate, Federal Republic, and the Western Allies led by the United States spent considerable resources to counter this politically delicate wealth gap between the West Germany and the showcase of freedom behind the Iron Curtain. For instance, Paul Hertz coordinated the investment of 3.765 billion Deutschmarks worth of American ERP funds in West Berlin until 1960. While these initiatives had initially focused on providing industrial jobs to the local workforce’s traditional strengths, a burgeoning number of administrative positions eventually


\textsuperscript{46} Egon Bahr, \textit{Zu meiner Zeit} (München: Blessing, 1996), 49.
curbed the endemic unemployment.\textsuperscript{47} An American memorandum succinctly summarized West Berlin’s relative economic recovery: “West Berlin’s economic situation also improved over this period [yet] hardly comparable to the Federal Republic”\textsuperscript{48}

These shifting demographics gave the SPD – and its remigré wing in particular – the lever to breach into the white-collar segment of the voting public. Berlin’s administrative division into two competing entities created many vacancies largely filled by employees from the working-class milieu. In practical terms, this rapid expansion triggered the unprecedented influx of SPD voters into West Berlin’s bureaucracies. This process marked a departure from the Weimar era in which the party had struggled with a bureaucracy whose political loyalty was in doubt. Moreover, stable income and guaranteed pensions meant social advancement for the vast majority of newly employed \textit{Beamte} and \textit{Angestellte des öffentlichen Dienstes}. Not surprisingly, these changed economic circumstances altered their political outlook. For instance, a 1954 HICOG memorandum wryly noted how Neumann’s supported eroded since “a quarter of all West Berlin SPD due-paying party members are on the government payroll, and lately even the ‘left’ wing of the party has shown concern for patronage losses that might result from continued opposition.”\textsuperscript{49}

The erosion of Berlin’s bourgeois milieu conversely opened up new opportunities for the SPD as a firmly anti-Communist, yet staunchly pro-Western party as well. The Nazis’ persecution policies decimated Berlin’s vaunted liberal bourgeoisie of often-Jewish background that Shepard Stone had married into and Walter Benjamin had mourned.\textsuperscript{50} In the last weeks of

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\textsuperscript{47} Lemke, \textit{Vor der Mauer}, 282n65, 284–286.
\textsuperscript{48} HICOG USIS Bonn, “Confidential Semi-Annual USIS Report,” 2.
\textsuperscript{49} HICOG Berlin and McKiernan, “Classified Memorandum ‘Developments in the Berlin SPD.’”
\textsuperscript{50} Cf. Walter Benjamin, \textit{Berliner Kindheit um neunzehnhundert: Fassung letzter Hand und Fragmente aus früheren Fassungen}, Bibliothek Suhrkamp, Bd. 966 (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2004).
the war, top echelons of the Nazi elite fled the city or were forcibly removed from it. In the meantime, remaining bourgeois circles were particularly hit by the gargantuan destruction of wealth that the Nazis’ reign had inflicted. Moreover, the loss of West Berlin’s function as capital and the reconstitution of national bureaucracies in Bonn prevented a recovery on the same scale.

In this bleak situation, the SPD capitalized on its reputation as the most anti-Communist party it had earned in the 1946 Fusionskampf. Moreover, Adenauer’s strong Rhenish identity that undergirded the Federal Republic’s policy of Western integration put his fellow party members in Berlin in a quandary. While Adenauer reinvented West Germany as a culturally Catholic, West European nation, potential voters in West Berlin perceived this as disinterest. The SPD effectively blamed the CDU for West Berlin’s lagging economic recovery with the simple term “Berlin is not Bonn.” This evocative term expressed both the discontent with Adenauer’s policies in West Berlin and Berliners’ injured pride against Rhenish upstarts in Bonn.

The influx of white-collar voters in the Berlin SPD pioneered the federal party’s turn towards a left-of-the-center, big tent party at Bad Godesberg in 1959. While Neumann denounced “Social Democrats that abandon Socialist principles to gain the bourgeois’ goodwill,” the remigré wing of the party intensified its outreach to new blocs of voters. Prominent remigrés such as Paul Hertz and Richard Löwenthal compiled the Ernst Reuter Briefe, a newsletter “for the programmatic renewal of the SPD.” HICOG noted how these Neu Beginnen alumni’s desire to expand the SPD’s reach dated back to “Weimar for that matter.” Moreover, a

\[\text{\footnotesize\textsuperscript{51} Cf. Chapter 3.}\]

\[\text{\footnotesize\textsuperscript{52} HICOG Berlin and McKiernan, “Classified Memorandum ‘Developments in the Berlin SPD.’”}\]

\[\text{\footnotesize\textsuperscript{53} Cf. section IV.}\]

\[\text{\footnotesize\textsuperscript{54} Quoted in Tobias Kühne, “Das Netzwerk „Neu Beginnen“ und die Berliner SPD nach 1945” (TU Berlin, 2014), 357.}\]

\[\text{\footnotesize\textsuperscript{55} HICOG Berlin and McKiernan, “Classified Memorandum ‘Developments in the Berlin SPD.’”}\]
classic campaign at the party’s base buttressed this programmatic discussion. Neu Beginnen veterans Hertz and Eberhard Hesse engineered a concerted effort to win over functionaries from Neumann to Brandt, district by district, ward by ward.\textsuperscript{56}

Thus Brandt’s winning bid to succeed Neumann as Chairman in January 1958 offered an opportunity for the SPD to breach its interwar era ceiling, but also to present a new alternative to Adenauer and Schumacher. After “protesting” against Neumann’s accusation of “abandoning Socialist tenants,” Brandt contended: “Instead we need to substantiate Socialist goals for a majority of the people as expression of their interests and aspirations.” In addition, the new Berlin SPD Chairman exhorted his comrades to fully campaign on the successes in West Berlin since 1945: “First of all, we Berlin Social Democrats have indeed all reason to cite the achievements here in Berlin within the last years with pride. Sure, there are endless issues left to be resolved […], but Berlin needs the SPD as the defining political power for precisely this reason.”\textsuperscript{57} By claiming full ownership for West Berlin’s reconstruction, Brandt touted Berlin as a model for democratization. Over the next years, the Outpost network strove to cast West Berlin as model for postwar Germany.

\textbf{III. Coordinated Activities of the Network}

This backdrop of freezing Cold War frontlines across city thoroughfares and the onset of relative postwar prosperity affected the network’s composition, both in institutions and personnel. Shepard Stone’s 1953 move to the Ford Foundation, then world’s most affluent philanthropic


organization, heralded the intervention of a new and powerful institution in the fight to bring Cold War Democracy to Berlin.\textsuperscript{58} As coordinator of the Ford Foundation’s international affairs, Stone greatly expanded the scope and resources of the Foundation’s international activities, requesting $50,000,000 over one decade. West Berlin became the lynchpin for an agenda that Stone defined as “a. strengthening the ties of the European-Atlantic Community, b. strengthening the free institutions in Europe, c. widening European perspectives to counteract nationalism.”\textsuperscript{59} Notably, Stone nominated the “young SPD leader Brandt of Berlin” for a potential advisory board overseeing the effective execution of the Foundation’s European program.\textsuperscript{60} These activities undergirded Willy Brandt’s meteoric rise from Reuter protégé to “alternative German foreign minister and anti-king to Adenauer” within two years’ span.\textsuperscript{61} In terms of personnel, Brandt’s development into an international politician also prompted career advancement for a younger generation, like Brandt’s personal pollster Harold Hurwitz, and Hirschfeld’s eventual successor as West Berlin PR Director Egon Bahr.

Stone’s new position at the Ford Foundation proved particularly beneficial to the Outpost network as it opened up a new source of American aid for West Berlin’s shaky finances. Notably, McCarthyist purges at US installations in Berlin and concurrent Congressional budget cuts had left the future of US financial aid to West Berlin in doubt. The 1954 Paris Accords in which the Western Allies had granted the Federal Republic sovereignty in return NATO membership

\textsuperscript{58} For an overview of Stone’s career at the Ford Foundation, see Volker Berghahn, \textit{America and the Intellectual Cold Wars in Europe: Shepard Stone between Philanthropy, Academy, and Diplomacy} (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), 143–177.


\textsuperscript{60} Shepard Stone, “Memorandum ‘European Program’” September 17, 1954, Ford Foundation Records, Cataloged Reports (FA621), Box 429, Folder: Report 10640, The Rockefeller Archive Center, Sleepy Hollow, NY.

\textsuperscript{61} Merseburger, \textit{Willy Brandt}, 343.
numbered the days of the HICOG occupation apparatus and only compounded fears in West Berlin over the future of indispensible Western financial contributions. In this grave uncertainty, one of Stone’s USIA acquaintances, the successor of HICOG entrusted with RIAS, privately called on the Ford Foundation to step in where the federal government had left in controversy, noting that the 1953 cuts left “a vacuum which must be filled by private funds.”

Fearful “that we can no longer take Europe for granted,” Stone convinced the Ford Foundation to intervene in West Berlin as semi-official financier in the wake of the US government. While rapidly expanding subsidies from the increasingly prosperous Federal Republic eventually offset official US funds until the end of the Cold War and beyond, the Ford Foundation spent considerable sums to accentuate West Berlin’s cultural and political importance in the Cold War. Melvin Lasky’s Der Monat became the Ford Foundation’s first Berlin venture in 1954. Founded in 1948 by OMGUS during Clay’s “Operation Talk-Back,” the highbrow magazine aimed to reorient more refined German circles through a debate format. Monat editor and network social hub Lasky assembled an impressive cast of public intellectuals and politicians associated with the Congress of Cultural Freedom (CCF) such as John Dewey, Arthur Koestler, Irving Kristol, Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. internationally, Theodor W. Adorno, Karl Jaspers, Richard Löwenthal, domestically, and Reuter and Brandt from the Berlin SPD remigrés faction. While these celebrities showcased the virtues of vigorous democratic debate, Michael Hochgeschwender has noted how the Monat’s contributors drew from the “ideologically relatively homogenous milieu of left-liberal, anti-Communist intellectuals.”

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63 Stone, “Memorandum ‘European Program.’”

Lasky’s placed higher priority on publishing and hosting intellectual luminaries than on generating revenue. The Monat’s acceptance of CIA funds after 1958 has tarnished the reputation of the magazine. Before the Agency intervened as part of its campaign to assist the CCF, however, the financially struggling magazine received crucial contributions from the Ford Foundation for four years.\textsuperscript{65} The Outpost network proved instrumental in procuring these funds, as Stone and the Ford Foundation became synonymous for Lasky.\textsuperscript{66} For instance, Stone’s secretary transferred $90,000 from the Ford Foundation to the Monat in October 1954.\textsuperscript{67} Moreover, Stone used institutions that the network had built up in the previous years to cloak the Ford Foundation’s considerable assistance for the Monat. Notably, the newly founded Bürgermeister Reuter Foundation acted as front to funnel an additional $150,000 from the Ford Foundation to the magazine in 1954.\textsuperscript{68} As already noted, Foundation President Paul Hertz or board member Hans Hirschfeld cloaked these contributions.\textsuperscript{69}

The political edge of the Ford Foundation’s activities in Berlin constituted a major motivation to conceal the scope of its commitment. Stone portrayed his activities as fighting the Cold War in the cultural arena on America and liberal democracy’s behalf. Privately, Stone compiled a sophisticated analysis of European anti-Americanism which he characterized as a pervasive resentment Communist propagandists could exploit effectively. In his conclusions, Stone portrayed the Berlin-centered PR efforts as a model to emulate: “one of the most important

\textsuperscript{65} Ibid., 159–170.


\textsuperscript{67} Ford Foundation, “Bank Check for Melvin Lasky Enclosed in Letter from Moselle Kimbler” October 7, 1954, Nachlass Melvin Lasky, Box Berlin/Monat, Folder 8, Lasky Center for Transatlantic Studies, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München.

\textsuperscript{68} Berghahn, America and the Intellectual Cold Wars in Europe, 215–218.

\textsuperscript{69} Cf. Chapter 3.
causes of misunderstanding [American politics and culture] is jealousy of us; but also our inability to communicate in most countries as we did in Germany.”  

Evidently, American diplomats shared Stone’s assessment as some cultivated a close working relationship with him after Stone had left government service. Notably, the Deputy Assistant Director of USIA for Europe shared internal files with Stone and asked for his personnel recommendations. A letter from Mayor Suhr dated 1955, in which the Mayor curiously thanked Stone “for the trust that you have placed in me” hints at Stone’s informal clout in 1950s West Berlin.

Stone’s organization of Willy Brandt’s high-profile 1958 visit to the United States exemplified the growing resources of the network and its sculpting of Brandt’s image as statesman. Upon the suggestion of Hans Hirschfeld in 1956, both Hirschfeld and Stone strategically planned a transatlantic trip of Brandt as Suhr’s replacement in waiting. Upon Brandt’s inauguration as West Berlin Mayor in October 1957, Hirschfeld and Stone expanded the scope of the proposed visit for the newly elected Mayor to a scale that rivaled Reuter’s triumphal American tours in 1949 and 1953. In January 1958, Stone procured a meeting with President Eisenhower as capstone for Brandt’s American tour. In addition, the Ford Foundation

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agreed to cover the costs of Brandt’s twelve-day tour across the United States during February 1958.\textsuperscript{74}

Notably, Stone was able to secure many high-profile speaking engagements and private meetings for Brandt by highlighting his decades-long activism for German democracy in Berlin and abroad that was inopportune for the German electorate. Stone billed Brandt to American audiences in this way: “Persecuted and exiled by the Nazis, he is now one of the leading political personalities of his native land and its restored democratic institutions.” During his time in the United States, Brandt met with the President at the White House, spoke at Harvard University, appeared on television on CBS’s “Face the Nation,” and dined with the editorial staff of the\textit{New York Times}, Senator Jacob Javits of New York, as well as CIA director Allan Dulles; he also took the time to meet with old friends, former RIAS director Gordon Ewing and Shepard Stone among them—the latter on three separate occasions.\textsuperscript{75} Throughout this hectic tour, Brandt and his press staff kept constituents in Berlin informed of his exploits through RIAS broadcasts as well as a diary published in the\textit{Bild-Zeitung}.\textsuperscript{76}

Brandt’s first major publication venture offers a second compelling case how Brandt relied on his exile-derived network to influence his public personae well before he became Mayor. Shortly after Reuter’s death, Brandt joined forces with Richard “Rix” Löwenthal to write a biography of the late Mayor. Like Brandt, Löwenthal had spent the Nazi era in exile and returned to Germany as a press correspondent for his host country. Moreover, Löwenthal had emerged as


Neu Beginnen’s chief theoretician under the nom de guerre Paul Sering in British exile. In this position, Löwenthal had pioneered Neu Beginnen’s reconciliation with Social Democracy and hard line against Soviet-style Communism. While coauthoring Reuter’s biography with Brandt, Löwenthal broke to the fore as one of German academia’s most eminent exegetes of anti-totalitarianism. In addition, Brandt enlisted Frankfurt School in exile student Hurwitz as researcher to procure material. Karl Mautner helped these authors to open doors within the US State Department for interviews and literature.

Not surprisingly titled *A Life for Freedom*, this authorized biography served both to protect Reuter’s political legacy and claim his mantle for Brandt. The authors used their account on the last months of Reuter’s life to intervene in contemporary debates within the SPD on its political priorities. They channeled the late Mayor’s piercing analysis of Adenauer’s 1953 federal election victory over Ollenhauer: “He tore the smug phrases […] to shreds; the main problem lay in Social Democracy’s inability ‘to escape the tower’ […] – to overrun the limits of its traditional share of a rough third of West German voters.”

Brandt and Löwenthal closed determinedly:


The “question that concerns the future of [Reuter’s] achievements cannot be answered in words: it rests in the hands of the survivors.”\textsuperscript{82} As such, the biography’s intention was not limited to preserving Reuter’s memory, but also to enlist it in the Outpost network’s renewed attempt to redefine the SPD as a big-tent party that appealed beyond its working-class demographics.

Moreover, the book’s publication in fall 1957 coincided with Brandt’s squabble with Franz Neumann over the succession of Suhr in office. Thus, \textit{A Life for Freedom}’s contemporary reception is of particular interest. It received a glowing review on RIAS for its depiction of Reuter and his handling “of the great task [of saving West Berlin] that certainly would have not been his last if he had lived longer.” The reviewer notably highlighted “three emphases” in Brandt and Löwenthal’s narrative: Reuter’s break with his conservative family in his youth, his break with Communism in the Weimar Republic, and “his third struggle in the postwar era.”\textsuperscript{83}

While this structure covered salient points of Reuter’s biography, it also crafted an anti-communist continuity from the mid 1920s to his death in 1953 at the expense of the anti-fascist roots of Reuter’s postwar political program in exile.\textsuperscript{84}

\textit{A Life for Freedom} capped of a sustained campaign by the surviving remigrés to appropriate Reuter’s legacy. Immediately after Reuter’s death, the network started a newsletter aimed to facilitate the SPD’s “programmatic renewal” and a public lecture series bearing his name. For instance, Richard Löwenthal reprised his wartime pseudonym to expound on Berlin’s importance for “socialist renewal,” contending “nowhere in the last few years has the ideal of

\textsuperscript{82} Ibid., 718.

\textsuperscript{83} “Eine neue Biografie über Ernst Reuter” (RIAS, September 28, 1957), DZ099326, Deutschlandradio Archiv, Berlin.

\textsuperscript{84} Cf. Chapter 2.
freedom as principle of socialism […] become more dramatically visible than in Berlin.”

The remigrés’ appropriation of democratic freedoms for socialism within the SPD after Reuter rankled the SED competitors, as the East Berlin Communists’ collection of these newsletters attest.

The Reuter Memorial Lectures organized jointly by the recently founded Free University and the Congress for Cultural Freedom sought to popularize this interpretation of Reuter’s legacy for a broader audience. To this end, the lectures drew an impressive line-up: French sociologist and public intellectual Raymond Aron, former British Labour Prime Minister Clement Attlee, former Communist activist turned anti-Communist essayist Arthur Koestler, former British Labour Deputy Prime Minister Herbert Morrison, British celebrity historian Arnold J. Toynbee, and former Neu Beginnen leader Richard Löwenthal. The latter’s association with the fledging Free University proved particularly consequential for the Outpost network. In 1961, the Free University offered Löwenthal a full professorship for international politics, finally securing his long-term return to Germany. From this post, Löwenthal shaped his party and the field of political science in Germany: he informally advised his close friend Brandt, served on the SPD’s program committee, delineated the potential and limits of the anti-totalitarianism concept, and acerbically criticized the 1968 student generation’s fascination with Marxism. Concerning the initial lectures, Mautner contently reported, “the organizers may take credit for having achieved” the “intensification of the intellectual life in Berlin.” Mautner also noted how the lectures offered

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an opportunity for Brandt to display his leadership qualities and public visibility: “Excellent was [Herbert] Morrison whose lecture also provided a good background for Willy Brandt as after speaker, a task which he solved noticeably well.”88 Thus the CCF contributed to Brandt’s cosmopolitan appeal.

These PR efforts corroborate Martin Sabrow’s conclusion that Brandt exhibited an “contemporarily unusual readiness to self-enact his own image.”89 In particular, the network’s strategy to groom Brandt for leadership in the minds of voters predates his ascent as “first modern media Chancellor” that still captivates present-day historians.90 Brandt’s close relationship with Harold Hurwitz during these years in Berlin exemplify both the expansion of the network to include a younger generation and the incorporation of new techniques such as scientific polling for successful governance in the postwar era. Hurwitz and Brandt could look back on a long friendship that had developed since meeting as Social Democratic sympathizers within the Allied occupation apparatus in 1947.91 After Hurwitz’ discharge from OMGUS, graduate student Hurwitz stayed in Berlin as a freelance contributor to Lasky’s Der Monat, the Congress for Cultural Freedom, Brandt and Löwenthal’s biography of Reuter, and pollster.92

88 Mautner, “Ernst Reuter Memorial Lectures.”
90 Daniela Münkel, Willy Brandt und die “Vierte Gewalt”: Politik und Massenmedien in den 50er bis 70er Jahren, Campus Historische Studien 41 (Frankfurt/Main: Campus-Verl, 2005), 10.
Hurwitz became a close advisor of the candidate Brandt through his work experience on the book project, social scientific training at Columbia, and American background. A 1955 letter illustrates their close rapport, when Hurwitz advised Brandt candidly:

“Concluding all this, I think it is time to address yourself differently [underlined by Brandt] to the broad public and to Berlin intellectuals and opinion makers publically and to representative, somewhat intimate meetings with the theme: what has happened to Berlin, to us, what we have that is distinctive, how to prize it, use it again to emphasize again the necessity of realizing what is possible and not seeking the 'impossible' with illusions or strategies that betray us.

Incidentally, it is entirely wrong in such to scorn [...] the fact that we are all nourishing ourselves on our past, on a heroic tradition [of rebuffing Communism in 1946]. [...] Conclusion: The party should put out a book recording dramatically what it did in the heroic period. [...] And it should be done in terms of 'honoring Franz [Neumann]', 'giving him his due.' Frankly I think this would be a fitting way to bury him alive (with all honors to him).”

While contemporaries ironically noted how “brevity was not Harold’s thing,” Hurwitz’ remarks highlight two striking developments. First, it suggests how the remigrés consciously attempted to fashion Brandt as their standard-bearer to different audiences. In particular, Brandt’s personal underlining of “differently addressing yourself” implies his endorsement for a strategy that sculpted him into a standout face of Social Democracy in West Berlin. Second, this exchange exposes the remigrés’ strategy against Neumann in rare candor. Hurwitz encouraged Brandt to portray the local opposition in the party as men with past accolades that also belonged to the past. Combined, these two developments give insights how closely Brandt and his team of exile-derived advisors attempted to control his public personae.

The string of surveys Hurwitz conducted on the remigrés behalf further illustrate his clout and the importance Brandt assigned to them. The newly refined technique that promised to keep the pulse of the electorate with scientific precision appealed to network members that planned

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their careers strategically. Viewed as the vanguard of a purported rationalization of politics in postwar Germany, polling profited both from the expertise of American social science and its desirability as the eponym of American modernity. Thus the popularization of polling in postwar Germany was a genuinely transatlantic enterprise. Recent scholarship has revealed how polling agencies quickly asserted themselves in the Federal Republic along partisan lines. Regardless of political leanings, however, these agencies stressed the importance of the technique to measure the acceptance of democratic principles and inculcate the fledgling Federal Republic against totalitarian threats. Thus these pollsters exhibited a curious alliance between the leftist Frankfurt School that included remigré scholars like Max Horkheimer and the conservative Allensbach institute led by eleventh hour converted democrat Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann. Earlier, American sociologists had compiled German public opinion estimates in the war against Nazi Germany. In occupied Germany, surveys continuously tracked and informed OMGUS and HICOG’s efforts. The wartime memoranda of OSS R&A Branch and postwar ICD polls indicate that these surveys constituted more than simple intelligence collection on a war enemy. Instead, the public opinion within a modern society that bore responsibility for genocide and needed recivilizing raised these scholars’ intellectual curiosity from an early stage on.

In Berlin, Harold Hurwitz’ career personified the growing popularity of polling. Having initially come to Germany in 1946 for dissertation research, Hurwitz’ personal commitment to West Berlin meant prolonged years of economic insecurity. Return to the polling that he had

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96 Anja Kruke, Demoskopie in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Meinungsforschung, Parteien und Medien 1949 - 1990, Beiträge zur Geschichte des Parlamentarismus und der politischen Parteien 149 (Düsseldorf: Droste, 2007).

conducted for OMGUS on behalf of the Outpost network would jumpstart a career as trusted policy advisor of Mayor Brandt and culminated in a tenured professorship at the Free University. Thus Hurwitz’ career exemplified the emergence of a second generation in leadership positions that was recruited from the junior ranks of the network. Strong convictions, rather than opportunism motivated Hurwitz to pursue a career in Cold War Berlin with his “social democratic mishpoka.” Like prior network members, Hurwitz exhibited a singular commitment to the cause of bringing democracy to Berlin as example of the possible reconciliation between freedom and socialism.

The 1954 election that brought the SPD back into West Berlin’s government presented a watershed moment for the political exploitation of surveys. As noted, cutting-edge polls informed US occupation policies from the start. In Berlin, RIAS for instance had tailored its program and messages in consultation with constant polls. In 1951, HICOG’s Opinion Survey Section transformed into the privately held “Deutsche Institut für Volksumfragen” (DIVO) that continued to compile polls for the US government and commissioned Hurwitz has its lead researcher in Berlin. Crucially, this new structure opened up the established polling apparatus to German clients, among which counted the Berlin SPD after the remigrés’ suggestion.

Remigrés like Brandt and Hirschfeld remained convinced of the DIVO survey’s effectiveness. Compiled during the run-up of the election, they credited the survey with getting insights into the electorate that prompted them to “avoid [federal SPD Chairman] Ollenhauer’s

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policies.” 101 Apparently Ollenhauer’s perceived wavering between his predecessor Schuhmacher’s priority of German unity and integration into Western bloc had become eponymous with campaigning blunders for the remigrés after the 1953 federal election convincingly confirmed Adenauer’s mandate for Westbindung at the expense of the SPD.

Hurwitz’ association with crucial Herrschaftswissen, or knowledge to rule, made him particularly interesting to the candidate Brandt. In the lead-up for the 1958 West Berlin election, the SPD under the leadership of the newly elected Mayor Brandt again enlisted the services of Hurwitz’ DIVO for polling “similarly to 1954.” 102 In addition, Hurwitz became Willy Brandt’s informal conduit for maintaining the Mayor’s contacts in the United States. For instance, Hurwitz penned a 1959 English language pamphlet “A Message from Berlin,” in which Brandt called upon American “public opinion leaders” not to forsake the Outpost of Freedom behind the Iron Curtain. 103 At this time, Brandt succinctly characterized his pollster: “Harold Hurwitz is a Berliner with American citizenship.” The mayor next highlighted the close bond that had developed between both men: “He works with us since the early postwar years and belongs to my good friends and advisors – also in campaigning issues.” 104

The Hurwitz’ career as Brandt’s pollster dovetails what comrades in Bonn derisively labeled the “Berlin kitchen cabinet,” a close-knit circle of advisors that gradually changed the composition of the Outpost network. During the late 1950s, Brandt grouped an inner circle of

101 Mautner and McKiernan, “Classified Memorandum ‘SPD-Sponsored Public Opinion Survey in Berlin.’”


individuals that devoted their considerable energies to the Mayor. While retaining veteran remigrés like Hertz and Hirschfeld in their positions, Brandt for instance named the relatively young Klaus Schütz his Senator for Federal Affairs. As West Berlin liaison to the federal bureaucracy in Bonn, Brandt entrusted Schütz to procure the vital federal subsidies for Berlin on the Rhine. In addition, Brandt promoted Heinrich Albertz to head the Senate Chancellery, effectively acting as his chief of staff, replacing interim chief of staff Hirschfeld. The arrival of the Lutheran pastor turned Silesian refugee advocate signaled Brandt’s larger ambitions. Albertz had accrued extensive administrative experience leading the resort for “Social, Health, and Refugee Affairs” in Niedersachsen. By keeping his routine Mayoral duties in trusted hands, Brandt had more time to weigh in on federal and international debates while tracking public opinion. Notably, new arrivals like Albertz quarreled with veterans like Hirschfeld over administrative details. Frustrated, Hirschfeld filed for retirement upon reaching pension age in March 1960. As parting advice, Hirschfeld conveyed to Brandt his “absolute” support for Hertz’ project to place full page ads promoting investments in West Berlin in the New York Herald Tribune, New York Times, and Time-Life International on the same day he submitted his retirement request.

However, Mayor Brandt as one of the youngest remigrés also recruited from within the Outpost network, effectively forming a second generation in the network. Next to Hurwitz, the transfer of RIAS journalist Egon Bahr best exemplifies this second generation. Born in 1922,

105 Merseburger, Willy Brandt, 383–384.
Bahr was nearly a decade Brandt’s junior, but made a name for himself as a self-trained journalist in postwar Berlin. Bahr’s journalistic career began when an old school friend who had returned in the US Army picked him up in the wreckage of Berlin to work in the Allgemeine Zeitung in summer of 1945. After having covered the politician Brandt as a RIAS journalist, Bahr entered the SPD out of conviction in 1956. In 1960, Brandt tapped Bahr as Hirschfeld’s successor. As Brandt’s Public Relations manager, Bahr cultivated a close friendship and decades-long working relationship that culminated in Chancellor Brandt’s Nobel-winning détente Neue Ostpolitik paved by Bahr as his foreign policy envoy. Before both men scaled these heights, Bahr continued Hurwitz’ PR policies of casting Brandt as custodian of West Berlin’s freedom to the national and international publics.

Bahr further accentuated the polling operations of the Brandt administration. This brought him in close contact to Hurwitz with whom he coordinated and discussed the polls’ intent and results. Bahr described his impression of Hurwitz to Brandt in characteristically offhand fashion: “He is a curious blend between a realist and an out of touch individual, brutally sincere, selfless, and exhausting.” Despite Bahr’s reservations about Hurwitz’ policy recommendations, both men formed a close working relationship. Bahr particularly appreciated Hurwitz’ survey data “as highly recommendable” in the same letter. Brandt had assembled a team that

109 Bahr, Zu meiner Zeit, 29.

110 Merseburger, Willy Brandt, 383–384.


continued to promote West Berlin as the Outpost of Freedom for the next decade of the Cold War, until the dramatic construction of the Berlin Wall intervened.

IV. Fashioning West Berlin as the Cold War Democracy

In a 1954 Washington DC press conference, Secretary of State Dulles faced the question whether “the Western world [had] completely forgotten that there is a Western Berlin.” Dulles emphatically denied the suggestion and presented West Berlin’s falling unemployment rate as result of “the United States and the other Western powers taking a keen interest in the situation in Berlin and its economic vitality.”¹¹⁴ This episode encapsulated the American public’s preoccupation with West Berlin that lent the network political clout in both the United States and Germany. Even one of the Eisenhower administration’s most ardent Cold Warriors felt compelled to confirm his commitment to West Berlin’s survival in hope of underscoring his toughness on Communism. American journalists demanding economic help for Berliners thus illustrate the success of the Outpost narrative in the United States. This priority the American public had placed on West Berlin’s survival provided a lever for the network to pursue its goal of refashioning Berlin’s western sectors as an exemplary Cold War Democracy.

Realizing this lofty ambition prompted a brick and mortar campaign to transform the makeshift housing carved out of the ruins stretching from the Wannsee to the Reichstag. American assistance gave Mayor Brandt the opportunity to rebuild the city according to a vision he had laid out in the 1950 American-funded newspaper supplements. Brandt envisioned West

¹¹⁴ Cecil Lyon, “Memorandum ‘Secretary [Dulles]’s Press Conference’” June 8, 1954, Eleanor L. Dulles Papers, Box 2, Folder 1, Berlin 1954-1985, Princeton University Library, Department of Rare Books and Special Collections.
Berlin as an “Athens on the Spree,” a city-state that embodied democracy, but that was admired equally for its prowess and culture. The West Berlin administration and its financiers hoped underline this ambition in modernist architecture. For instance, the Ford Foundation, led by Shepard Stone, took a particular interest in the viability of the Free University. In 1954, it had donated and inaugurated the Henry-Ford-Bau as the centerpiece of the Western alternative to the established Humboldt University that had fallen under Communist control in Mitte.

In June 1958, the Ford Foundation brought its commitment to Mayor Brandt’s vision of an Athens on the Spree to a new level, when it gave West Berlin’s Free University a million-dollar grant. In a cable to Stone, Brandt stated, “I look forward to thanking you in person for your efforts.” Later that month, Stone traveled to West Berlin to award the grant. Hans Hirschfeld’s toast at the banquet in Stone’s honor lives on: “In Berlin, [Stone] is no stranger. Only a few people know what Berlin owes this man who hates public visibility.”

Eleanor Lansing Dulles proved to be a second important American booster for prestige projects in West Berlin; less because she was sister of Secretary of State Dulles, more because she headed the Berlin desk at the US State Department in the second half of the 1950s. Moreover she enjoyed an easy rapport with Mayor Brandt, whom she flattered: “These are times that call
for strength and clear vision. I am glad to be convinced you have both.”

In concrete terms, she coordinated the Benjamin Franklin Foundation that built a state of the art research hospital in West Berlin.

In late 1958, Mayor Brandt responded to a Cold War crisis that seemingly confirmed these efforts to groom West Berlin as exponent of Cold War democracy. Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev intervened in an episode that exemplified the unique link between a political confrontation on a global scale and local ramifications. Moreover, Brandt’s behavior during the so-called Second Berlin Crisis of 1958/59 precipitated his emergence as an international politician. Khrushchev announced his intention to sign a separate peace treaty with its GDR satellite state if the Western would not affirm West Berlin’s status as a “demilitarized free city.”

West Berlin’s status as a democratic entity within the GDR secured by American, British, and French forces created at least three issues for the Soviets’ East German satellite: it served as popular escape hatch through the Iron Curtain for the increasing stream of refugees, continuing economic links between East and West Berlin strained the GDR’s economy with West Berliners buying heavily subsidized Eastern staples while approximately 50,000 East Berliners worked in West Berlin, and West Berlin presented a formidable espionage center. Despite Ulbricht’s strengthened hold to power in the wake of the June 17, 1953 Uprising, the GDR’s shaky economic basis preoccupied local Communist apparatchiks who squarely blamed West Berlin’s

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presence. Hope M. Harrison who conducted research in formerly East German and Soviet archives concluded that despite “aggressive” Soviet tactics, “Khrushchev’s number-one priority in […] sending the 27 November ultimatum was to shore up the East German regime.”

The First Secretary of the CPSU’s defensive motivation, however, was hidden for Western contemporaries. His ultimatum consequently set the foreign policy corridors of the Western Allies and West Berlin’s Schöneberg town hall in high gear. The Soviet Union’s threat had potentially grave repercussions because unilateral withdraw from the Potsdam Four Power Agreements would have put the basis for Western Allied presence in Berlin in legal limbo and left access to the transit routes across the GDR at Ulbricht’s whims. Brandt responded defiantly in an instance:

“The intention of the plan to turn West Berlin into a ‘demilitarized free city’ is clear: It boils down to West Berlin being vacated by Allied troops while remaining surrounded by Soviet divisions. Moreover, it would mean that that West Berlin’s legal, financial, and economic belonging to the Federal Republic would be cut. That is unacceptable.”

The flurry of action within Brandt’s inner circle belied the Mayor’s simple dismissal in public. For instance, Hurwitz crafted a lengthy memorandum that gauged intentions and likely strategies of the Western responses in hope of securing the most strongly worded security guarantee for West Berlin possible. Besides the Brandt administration’s preoccupation with

123 Lemke, Vor der Mauer, 225–232.
Western support, these deliberations demonstrate how members of the network served as security advisors to Brandt. The Mayor’s initial response to Khruchev notably closed with:

“The Berliners will not let themselves be confused. They will continue to contribute to […] the preservation of the liberal-democratic order. The people of Berlin trust its friends in whole world now in particular. The fate not only of Berlin, but of the German people is at stake in the coming weeks. That is why we confidently expect that our friendly [Allied] powers will use the time.”

By having redefined the Western occupying powers into protecting powers, Brandt could exhort American foreign policy makers to remain committed to West Berlin’s viability.

The Kremlin placed his announcement in the midst of Brandt’s first municipal election campaign as Mayor. The SED had surprisingly chosen to contest these elections. By reversing the boycott policy it had pursued in 1950, the SED hoped to confront “Brandt [and] the [antagonistic] frontline-city politicians who try everything […] to enforce the NATO concept.” Moreover, the Central Committee feared how “the [SPD’s] right leadership asserts itself more and more. It has set course on even closer bonds with Bonn and NATO. […] It subordinates itself to the CDU policy unconditionally.” The prospects of the federal SPD backing Adenauer’s course of Western integration like Brandt and the remigrés disturbed the party functionaries. To reverse these developments, the Communists hoped to benefit from the frictions that the SPD quarrelling over West German NATO membership produced: “We must expose how [West Berlin’s SPD leadership] has allied itself with the class enemy.”

Khrushchev’s ultimatum undercut the SED’s soaring plans, however. Issued less than two weeks before the polls opened, the Soviet initiative instantly turned the election into a

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128 Lemke, Vor der Mauer, 138–141.

referendum over West Berlin’s status. The SPD and Mayor Brandt benefitted most from the electorate’s unequivocal endorsement of West Berlin’s conception as Outpost of Freedom in the Cold War. The SPD won 52.6% of the vote, the CDU 37.7%, while the SED fell far short of the 5% threshold to be seated.\footnote{Merseburger, \textit{Willy Brandt}, 357.} To add insult to injury, the SED’s share of the vote dropped from 2.7% to 2.0%. Observers of the election found themselves in rare agreement in their analysis.

Stone was briefed how the election became a “plebicite regarding Khrushchev’s plan” that delivered “a crushing defeat of the Communists.”\footnote{Walter Stahl, “Memorandum for Shepard Stone: ‘Re: Berlin,’” December 13, 1958, Shepard Stone Papers, ML-99, Series 6: Ford Foundation, 1952-1967, Box 36, Folder 32, Dartmouth College, Rauner Special Collections Library.} In its analysis to the Central Committee, the SED sulked “the campaign demonstrates the growing influence of the SPD in West Berlin and the strong support of the American occupiers for the Brandt gang.”\footnote{SED Bezirksleitung von Groß-Berlin, “Vorlage an das Zentralkomitee: Vorläufige Einschätzung der Wahlen in Westberlin und der ergriffenen Massnahemen.”} Brandt returned the choice words by noting contently “how the citizens of my city inflicted a devastating drubbing on the Communist mercenaries in secret elections.”\footnote{Willy Brandt, \textit{Mein Weg nach Berlin} (München: Kindler, 1960), 12.} Most importantly for Brandt, his resounding electoral victory gave him the mandate to assertively negotiate as West Berlin’s exponent.

A disquieting assessment fueled Brandt’s initial exhortation of the Western Allies in response to the ultimatum that the Mayor shared with political opposite Adenauer. Secretary of State Dulles’ initial reaction of dismissing Soviet demands while offering negotiations with the GDR as “Soviet agents” alarmed both politicians. The West German Chancellor and the West Berlin Mayor feared the United States wavering in its commitment to Berlin and proposed a hard
line against the Soviet overture.\textsuperscript{134} Ironically, the aging Chancellor introduced his later rival to a global stage as West German representative. Adenauer sent Brandt onto a month-long tour around the world as representative of West Berlin and the Federal Republic, visiting North America and Asia, meeting with UN General Secretary Dag Hammarskjöld, US President Eisenhower, and Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru.\textsuperscript{135} Stone again coordinated Brandt’s itinerary across the United States that brought him from New York to California.\textsuperscript{136} In the meantime, an old friend from HICOG Berlin and victim of McCarthyism, Charles W. Thayer, lionized Brandt in \textit{Harper’s Magazine}.\textsuperscript{137} Thayer introduced Brandt as a “amiable-looking young man with the build of a Notre Dame tackle” and as the “future Chancellor of Germany.” Moreover, the writer stressed Brandt’s importance for American readers: “For the main pressure of the Russian campaign to force the Allied troops out of Berlin […] rests on him. If he should waver, Berlin might be lost. If he should panic, a single rash move might touch off a shooting war.” Yet the journalist concluded: Fortunately for us – and all of Europe – Brandt is not a man likely either to waver or panic.”\textsuperscript{138}

Khrushchev’s ultimatum succeeded in convening a foreign ministers’ conference in the spring of 1959. At the Geneva Summit, the four wartime Allies met with representatives of both German states as observers to discuss the future of Berlin and Germany. The conference


\textsuperscript{135} Merseburger, \textit{Willy Brandt}, 357–360.


proceedings exposed fissures between the Soviet Union and its East German client state. While Ulbricht had hoped to revise Berlin’s status, symbolic Western concessions such as the admittance of GDR delegates as observers and an American invitation for a state visit pleased Khrushchev. Ultimately, when the ultimatum lapsed, the delegates adjourned without making any decisions that altered the status quo in Berlin. Brandt quipped laconically to Adenauer on Geneva’s failure to produce any tangible results: “No solution is better than a bad solution.”

The Geneva Conference succeeded, however, in cementing Brandt’s status as personification of West Berlin’s resolve to remain part of the Western camp. This applied to the German as well as the American public. For instance, Time Magazine covered West Berlin’s “Islanders” as the title story. The article casted Brandt as the epitome of the courageous Berliner:

“Beneath Berliners’ skepticism and grumbling lies a profound conviction, born of intimate acquaintance with tyranny, that liberty is a highly tangible good that is worth a considerable price. In pursuit of that good, postwar Berliners have demonstrated their political maturity by choosing leaders of rare sophistication, ability and high principle. […] And when Nikita Khrushchev touched off the second Berlin crisis last November, the city was in the hands of a man who may one day loom even larger in German history than Reuter – magnetic, hard-driving Willy Brandt.”

Notably, the magazine’s front page depicted “Berlin’s Willy Brandt” standing in front of Reuter’s bust, underscoring his presentation as Reuter’s heir to the American public.

The American journalists also picked up on the ongoing battle within the SPD over the best course in postwar Germany. Juxtaposing federal Chairman Ollenhauer with the West Berlin Mayor, Time Magazine presented Brandt as the man of the future:

“The conflict between Willy and Ollenhauer is also an ideological conflict between two generations of Socialists. Many of the party’s senior bureaucrats cling to the gospel according to Karl Marx, still talk wistfully of a ‘state-guided economy.’ They have lost the last three national elections.

139 Harrison, Driving the Soviets up the Wall, 121–125.
140 Merseburger, Willy Brandt, 365.
Willy argues that ‘the magic word nationalization is no longer justified. The problem is how . . . private and public capital are to be harmonized.’ If German Socialism is to get more than its immovable 30% of the votes, he insists, ‘it must have a wider base than a single class,’ must become less doctrinaire to win middle-class appeal. ‘Let's not start making any new red banners,’ he says. ‘It's not the fashion nowadays.’”

Moreover, the journalists highlighted Brandt’s time in exile as politically formative. The popular American magazine closed its remarks on the intra-party rift in the SPD by noting how Brandt’s had the potential for a national career, “if Willy can ever realize his dream of modernizing the Socialist Party’s policies.”

Gradual shifts within the party’s highest echelons presented a new opportunity to realize these ambitions. In anticipation of the 1958 SPD national convention in Stuttgart, Berlin Bundestag member and Brandt loyalist Gustav Klingelhöfer published an article with the provocative title “Kapitalismus ohne Schrecken,” or capitalism without horror. At the convention, party delegates forced to Kurt Schumacher loyalist Fritz Heine relinquish control of the party apparatus, initiating a process to rewrite the party planks – the same Heine who had viewed the return of Neu Beginnen activists to the party with great suspicion a decade earlier. Conversely, Willy Brandt was elected to the federal Parteivorstand, or party executive, a post that had eluded him in 1954.

The network’s PR strategy laid the groundwork for Brandt’s breakthrough within the SPD on a federal level. Most notably, the image of Brandt as the Outpost of Freedom’s personification secured the support of visceral anti-Communist Axel Cäsar Springer, West Germany’s most influential press magnate. Brandt biographer Peter Merseburger noted how

143 Time Magazine, “The Islanders.”


145 For Heine’s suspicion against Neu Beginnen remigrés cf. Chapter 2, IV. For the Stuttgart convention, see Merseburger, *Willy Brandt*, 353.
“steadily growing celebrity, political clout, and unprecedented popularity that compensated for
the Governing [Mayor]’s lack of concrete power eventually made Brandt’s rise in party on a
federal level possible, which had shunned the outsider for years.”

Brandt’s reputation as candidate who commanded an absolute majority in a federal
German state through his pro-Western foreign policy made him attractive in a party that searched
a winning strategy after losing three consecutive elections to Adenauer. This soul-searching
culminated at the 1959 party convention when the delegates agreed on a new party program. In
the watershed Godesberg Program, the party scrapped vestiges of Marxist theory and endorsed
West German NATO membership. While Brandt remained detached from the deliberations
over the program, it bore the handwriting of remigrés Willi Eichler and Waldemar von
Knoeringen. A decade later, a contemporary political scientist summarized the new party
program as a “great peace celebrations between the Berlin SPD and the federal leadership.”
After ten years of rancorous debates and bruising personal attacks, the federal SPD followed the
lead of the Berlin remigrés whom Brandt spearheaded to redefine the party as a left-of-center,
big-tent party committed to social justice in a market economy and firm attachment to the
Western alliance in the Cold War.

The federal elections in 1961 gave the SPD the first opportunity to test the appeal of their
new program. Only the question remained who would provide the public face for this campaign.

146 Ibid., 344.
147 Leftwing, non-Communist continuously characterized the 1959 program as the SPD’s betrayal of its historic
roots in Marxism, cf. Theo Pirker, Die SPD nach Hitler: die Geschichte der Sozialdemokratischen Partei
Deutschlands, 1945-1964 (München: Rütten & Loening, 1965). Beyond dispute, however, is the interpretation that
the program exemplified the SPD’s gradually changing moorings. For a recent assessment of the program’s
relevance in the party history, see Dieter Dowe, “Das Bad Godesberger Program in der sozialdemokratischen
148 Abraham Ashkenasi, Reformpartei und Aussenpolitik: Die Aussenpolitik der SPD Berlin-Bonn (Opladen:
Westdeutscher Verlag, 1968), 174.
Brandt’s attaché in Bonn Schütz started to sound out support for a Brandt candidacy among SPD functionaries across the Federal Republic since the beginning of 1960. The Berlin team quickly picked up the endorsement of another potential contender for the party nomination for Chancellor, Fritz Erler, SPD deputy whip in the Bundestag and Neu Beginnen alumnus. Brandt convened a national meeting of younger party functionaries that called for a strategy with candidate who could credibly symbolize youthfulness and dynamism against Adenauer in the upcoming campaign.

An important endorsement from the party’s leftwing paved the way for Brandt clinching the nomination. On June 30, 1960, Herbert Wehner, chairman of the Bundestag committee for “all-German and Berlin issues” surprised friend and foe alike on the floor by reiterating Brandt’s foreign policy agenda of commitment to NATO and calling for a bipartisan CDU-SPD policy of Western integration. This stunning public reversal marked the beginning of an alliance of convenience between both remigrés. Unlike Brandt however, Wehner had started his exile years in Moscow as a Communist in close proximity of Ulbricht. Fearing execution in the Stalinist purges that ravaged through the Hotel Lux, Wehner fled to Sweden in 1941 where he broke from the KPD. Unelectable through his past in national general elections, Wehner hoped that a candidate busy in Berlin like Brandt would open up avenues for him to gain control over the SPD Bundestag faction. Wehner submitted Brandt’s nomination for Chancellorship, which the party delegates confirmed in November 1960. Three years after Brandt’s inauguration as West Berlin Mayor, the party that had often viewed the Berlin remigrés with suspicion chose Brandt to personify the slogan “different times require different men” in the next campaign against Adenauer.149

149 Merseburger, Willy Brandt, 378–382, 386.
Brandt’s 1960 publication of his autobiography *My Road to Berlin* underscored both his ambition for higher offices and his unusual willingness to campaign on his biography.\(^{150}\) Brandt’s prodigious output of two autobiographies and two memoirs may partially account why the literature on Willy Brandt has marginalized his first autobiography.\(^{151}\) While his biographer Peter Merseburger for instance frequently cited the 1960 autobiography as a source for Brandt’s early life before exile, he omitted its writing process and publication intent from his account.\(^{152}\) Even if less important in content, *My Road to Berlin* remains highly relevant as a source of Brandt’s self-presentation as a political candidate. While authoring autobiographies has become an established tactic for present-day politicians attempting to redefine an extraordinary past into political sincerity, it was unusual for contemporaries.\(^{153}\) Autobiographies constituted, however, a popular genre of exiles who felt compelled to explain their physical and intellectual journeys.\(^{154}\)

Moreover, Brandt chose a remarkable set-up for this book project. He enlisted New York-based émigré Lazar Herman as his ghostwriter. Under the penname Leo Lania, the veteran of the eminent pro-democracy Weimar era magazine *Weltbühne* came to the fore to an American audience by publishing his own dramatic flight from Nazi-occupied Europe.\(^{155}\) Consequently, *My Road to Berlin* was published simultaneously in Germany and the United States. This


unusual practice at the time exemplifies the importance Brandt and the exile-derived network placed also on the American public in their transnational campaign to popularize West Berlin as the Outpost of Freedom in the Cold War.

From the very start, Lania and Brandt’s narrative set out to establish Brandt as an American politician:

“It was noon, February 10, 1959, slowly I drove along Broadway toward City Hall. I stood in the open car [...], my eyes focused on some patches of color: [...] the red-white-blue of the star-spangled banner, the black-red-gold of the German Federal Republic, the red-white of the city of Berlin. The applause of the crowd was like the surf of the ocean. Some shouts rose above the noise: ‘Hi, Willy!’ ‘Good luck, Willy’”156

By beginning with the iconic ticker tape parade he received during his 1959 New York visit in the wake of the Second Berlin crisis, Brandt presented himself both as personification of international recognition West German voters craved as well as a warrior for American values lauded by a recognition befitting the nation’s heroes.157 Moreover, Brandt explicitly drew the connection between the flight of persecuted émigrés in the Nazi eras and the plight of West Berliners in the Cold War:

“Once more I glanced at the man on the steps of Trinity Church. He did not look at all ‘American’; from his looks and attire one might have taken him for a European, perhaps an emigrant – he might have also been Jewish. How many among these men and women [...] had come to America but a few years ago, victims of Hitler’s madness, Jews and Christians alike? For thousands of them Germany had once been their home – later it became their hell. Now Broadway was their special domain.

This ticker-tape parade [...] was an impulsive demonstration by which the people of this unique city [...] wanted to show their sympathy with the men and women of Berlin – with the Berlin which although conquered by the brown dictatorship had never been converted to the new creed, had to pay the heaviest penalty for the crimes of the Nazis, and which now, still bleeding from many wounds, was holding the front of freedom and human dignity against the red dictatorship. [...] Because they had not forgotten the past, could never forget it – these New Yorkers and my Berliners had the same claim on the future.”158

156 Brandt, My Road to Berlin, 12.


158 Brandt, My Road to Berlin, 12–13.
Highlighting the hardships émigrés had suffered and the contributions they made, Brandt portrayed this group – and by extension himself – as redeeming more benign German traditions that the Nazis sought to destroy. Moreover, Brandt casted the émigrés as crucial cultural links for Berliners successfully resisting dictatorial ambitions past and present.

Brandt extended this inferred anti-totalitarian continuity also to his youthful activism against the Nazis. In this narrative, Brandt’s last encounter with his SPD mentor in Lübeck and anti-Nazi resistance hero Julius Leber formed a pivotal experience:

“The first of February [1933], two days after Hitler had been appointed Chancellor, Julius Leber was arrested. […] Then on the nineteenth of February, Lübeck saw one of the most powerful demonstrations in the history of the city. Fifteen thousand people gathered on the Burgfeld. The threats of the new rulers could not frighten them, the icy cold could not scare them away. […] As [Leber] appeared on the platform with a bandaged head, unbroken, unbent, he shouted only a single word: ‘Freedom!’ […] Actually this was the last free demonstration in Lübeck. It was also the last time I saw Leber.”

In this dramatic tale, Brandt subsumed Leber’s legacy under an evocative single-word term “freedom” that continued to animate his readers. Brandt’s legitimizing strategy also claimed Reuter’s mantle in a similar vein. Notably, he asserted to “have learned much for my own work” by writing Reuter’s biography. Brandt argued that Berlin offered a model to emulate that included in the German version an unsolicited defense of “the role of perspicacious minorities” such as returned émigrés. Brandt closed confidently “Berlin, in my opinion, exemplifies this struggle for a liberal order and a social democracy in an impressive and convincing manner.”

This contention of West Berlin as role model of Cold War Democracy in Germany became a staple in Brandt’s following campaign for Chancellor.

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159 Ibid., 56–57.
160 Ibid., 247.
161 Brandt, Mein Weg nach Berlin, 376.
162 Brandt, My Road to Berlin, 286.
Brandt and the exile-derived network’s keen eye for American developments also extended to Brandt’s campaign techniques. While Brandt still ran unannounced, the Outpost network sent Klaus Schütz to the United States to observe the 1960 Kennedy campaign from the inside. This Bildungsreise inspired Schütz to import the term *Kanzlerkandidat*, or nominee for Chancellor, for Brandt. This term has become the most well known result of Schütz’ American travels as it has entered the German political vernacular.\(^{163}\) Moreover, Schütz submitted detailed campaigning suggestions to Brandt on the basis of his observations of Kennedy. For instance, Brandt disseminated copies of the following suggestion “that might be crucial in coming campaigns” among his closest staff: “Why should it always be like under Ollenhauer? I am pretty sure that we can turn members and functionaries more into ‘Propagandizers’ [American English term original] than before.”\(^{164}\)

This great interest in the Kennedy Presidential campaign informed Brandt’s own 1961 Federal German campaign. For instance Kennedy received Brandt at the White House as the West German opposition leader at yet another American tour, signaling American recognition of the Social Democrats’ political viability. In the first meeting of both men, President Kennedy sounded out Brandt over foreign policy. Brandt assured the President that “currently no grave disagreements exist between government and opposition.”\(^{165}\) Moreover, Brandt and his staff engineered a campaign that boasted its innovative character.\(^{166}\)

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\(^{163}\) Merseburger, *Willy Brandt*, 385–386.


Notably, Brandt spent most of summer on a barnstorming tour across the rural parts of the Federal Republic in a Mercedes coupe convertible that promised openness and prosperity. On the surface Brandt hoped to replicate the grass roots outreach strategy that brought him to the fore in West Berlin. While Hurwitz, whom Brandt had asked “to keep some of his American friends in touch on campaign developments,” complained to Stone about the “back-country voters” targeted, he also laid out a different motivation: “I do not know what the outcome will be, but I do feel Brandt is building a bridge to the German people to identify with him, to approve someone with a very different-appearing ‘past.’” Hurwitz’ conclusion that “the effect of this seems to be a wave of confidence in him” illustrates the curious mixture between the soaring optimism of his Berlin-based staff on the extensive campaign trail and the perception of Brandt’s past in exile as a liability.

New York based émigrés followed Brandt’s candidacy with great interest. A Social Democrat who had left the country for his political convictions being a legitimate candidate for Chancellor raised the hopes for a belated victory of the Other Germany. Brandt echoed these hopes in May by assuring his friends across the Atlantic: “I think there is a real chance to achieve a decisive breakthrough.” Brandt’s conservative rivals also highlighted his remigré background, only with insidious interests. Adopting the strategy of Neumann and his Keulenriege, Minister of Defense Strauß asked rhetorically on the campaign trail what Brandt

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had done “outside” for a dozen years, only to add contently “yet we know what we did here on the inside.” In 1961 West German politics, an anti-fascist activist had to defend his past against a Wehrmacht veteran.

The conservative CDU/CSU Union’s whispering campaign alarmed the candidate and his network as it targeted its formative experience of anti-fascist activism in exile. Letters of interlocutors Harold Hurwitz and Günter Klein to American network members illustrate Brandt and his campaign’s furor over the twisted accusations. Given the Mayor’s immensely grown prominence and time commitments, Brandt had chosen Hurwitz “to keep some American friends in touch with campaign developments in Germany.”¹⁷² In these dispatches, Hurwitz seethed: “The defamation campaign of Willy Brandt for his ‘past’ as an anti-Nazi German émigré has reached a point beyond provincial bigotry […].” Hurwitz angrily asserted that “the accompanying memorandum documents the truth. There was a defamation campaign, it was never called off.” Moreover, he ominously warned Stone how these accusations “may damage or even destroy progress made so far toward developing common democratic values in Germany.”¹⁷³

The CDU/CSU Union’s insinuations intended to alienate those new voting blocs that the Brandt campaign reached out to in order to break through the SPD’s demographic ceiling. While this only added to the network’s frustrations, Stone all but conceded the election in early August 1961, with polling day still five weeks away: “All the information we are getting indicates that Adenauer is likely to win a substantial victory. I hope that Willy will increase the SPD vote so

¹⁷² Hurwitz, “Letter of Willy Brandt’s Office to Shepard Stone.”
that he remains an important figure in the future of Germany.” Characteristically, Stone already thought in longer time horizons before the vote was cast.

Five days later, however, the GDR directly challenged Brandt in his function as West Berlin’s mayor. In the early hours of August 13, 1961, GDR soldiers, reserves, and border guards started to seal off all access between East and West Berlin while keeping the transit routes open. Soon, construction workers laid down brick stones behind barbed wire across once busy streets. Ulbricht had finally received Khrushchev’s blessing for constructing an “anti-fascist protection barrier.” For the time being, this new barrier physically divided the city and its inhabitants under the less cynical, but more blunt name of the Wall. Brandt immediately suspended campaigning in the Federal Republic and rushed back to West Berlin to respond to these dramatic developments. Hurwitz explained this choice to Stone by warning “the Communists provoked a German national emergency in Berlin and created conditions that could threaten world peace.” Beyond the election, the construction of the Wall fundamentally altered Berlin’s position in the Cold War and thus signaled a new challenge for the network.


175 Merseburger, Willy Brandt, 395.

CHAPTER 6

Public Acceptance and Reinterpretation, 1961-1972

The GDR’s construction of the Wall that started in the early hours of August 13, 1961 marked a turning point for the network and its narrative as it redefined West Berlin. Overnight, bricks and barbed wire transformed an open city in East Germany’s center into a peculiarly urban backwater physically divorced from its surroundings. The Communist SED’s reckless policy cut countless economic, private, and familial relationships across the city, affecting the everyday lives of millions of Berliners. Through his American diplomatic status, RIAS Director Bob Lochner reported from East Berlin how “mass transit has been disrupted totally” at the Friedrichstraße hub to his listeners.¹ Like Reuter in 1953, The GDR’s scheme caught Brandt outside of Berlin. The Mayor immediately suspended campaigning for Chancellor and rushed back to West Berlin where he faced an angry and desperate electorate.²

The GDR had not only placed a death strip across busy thoroughfares in August 1961, but also altered Berlin’s political landscape fundamentally. Its ramifications challenged the network directly. On the one hand, the Wall ironically signaled Ulbricht’s recognition of the half-city’s persistence, by physically separating West Berlin from its surroundings. But on the other hand, the barrier simultaneously undercut the narrative’s

¹ “Interview mit Mr. Lochner” (RIAS, August 13, 1961), DZ171196, Deutschlandradio Archiv, Berlin.
appeal by putting West Berlin out of reach of ordinary East Germans. Most notably, this division cast in concrete belied any redemptive aspirations attached to the Outpost of Freedom narrative. The East German construction of the Wall thus also had contradictory repercussions on the network’s narrative. As the frontlines of the conflict froze along the Wall, the narrative became canonized, while it increasingly lost its dynamism as West Berlin’s founding myth.

Not surprisingly, this contradictory situation provoked conflicting reactions from the network. While Hurwitz urged Brandt to intensify his fiery rhetoric against the GDR regime,¹ a dissenting camp emerged within the network, led by Bahr and Brandt. Both politicians had concluded that the status quo in Berlin could not be changed from within Berlin as the Outpost narrative implied and searched for a recalibration of their agenda. Consequently, the Mayor and his foreign policy confidante set their sights onto a larger stage, the politics of the Federal Republic in Bonn on the Rhine. In order to secure electability for suspicious West German voters, Brandt felt forced to systematically obfuscate the exile-derived roots of his success on the Spree.

Besides geographic dispersion and diverging political assessments, aging undercut the network’s activities. Time gradually took its toll on the first generation of the network twenty years after first contacts in wartime New York City and fifteen years after fully developing in postwar Berlin. Hans Hirschfeld had retired in 1960, while Hertz passed away a year later. Moreover, the emergence of new issues such as unacknowledged legacies of Nazism in Germany or the American participation in the Vietnam War triggered protests by a new generation of West Berlin leftists who fundamentally questioned the city’s conception as an Outpost of Freedom in 1967/1968 with renewed interest in Marxism.

Thus this chapter examines the network’s evolution from the Wall’s construction and Brandt’s concurrent first campaign for Chancellor in the summer of 1961 to the Nobel Laureate’s landmark achievement, the 1972 détente Basic Treaty between both German states that paved the way for de-facto mutual recognition that underpinned West Berlin’s status as a liberal democratic enclave within the GDR. Subsequently, this chapter highlights the narrative’s ritualization as the network lost cohesion. Moreover, this chapter sketches the campaign of the eminent politician Brandt to obscure his exile-derived support network in Berlin in response to ad-hominem attacks, but also how the reinterpretation of West Berlin’s role guided Brandt’s path-breaking détente Neue Ostpolitik. Accordingly, this chapter surveys how the network’s members responded to the newly transformed politics of the 1960s.

I. Construction of the Wall as a Turning Point for Network and Narrative

The political fallout from the Wall’s construction constituted a traumatic experience for the politician that that triggered a search for reinterpretations of the Outpost narrative, eventually culminating in the Neue Ostpolitik. But on the evening of August 13, Brandt denounced the Wall as an “injustice” that “not only [placed] an international boundary in the midst of Berlin, but also the barrier wall of a concentration camp.”\(^2\) This harsh rhetoric could however hardly conceal the West Berlin government’s impotence to reverse these measures. The Western side still felt compelled to follow the quadripartite occupation statute despite the GDR’s action with Soviet backing. In the eyes of the Western Allies, the guarantees for West Berlin’s survival proscribed in the occupation statute forbade taking any risks that could undercut it. The initial silence of the

Western Allies and of the Kennedy administration in particular exacerbated a feeling of abandonment among West Berliners that reached into the highest echelons of Schöneberg City Hall. Egon Bahr recalled that Brandt bitterly characterizing the Western Allies as “cowardly clowns who at least [should] send patrols to the sectorial boundaries lest the Berliners do not think that they are left alone already.”

The Brandt administration’s initial reaction to the Wall was driven by understandable local consideration, but neglected the global context that the network had exploited so skillfully for more than a decade. Since the fall of the Wall and the contiguous opening of the archives, scholars have expounded that the GDR cynically built the Wall to stem the flow of refugees into West Berlin that had brought the self-professed Workers and Peasants State to the brink of “economic collapse.” The Ulbricht regime had to lobby hard in Moscow before receiving the Soviets’ blessing for the construction scheme in July 1961. Khrushchev viewed building a Wall around West Berlin as a defensive measure in lieu of the grand bargain with which he had sought to defuse the constant Cold War crisis over Berlin.

While surprised at the measure, the Kennedy administration agreed with the Kremlin’s assessment to an astonishing degree. Less than a month before the construction of the Wall, senior diplomats had warned the White House that the situation in Berlin was unsustainable as “East Germany is bleeding to death” leading to another “imminent crisis.” To alleviate tensions,

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6 Harrison, Driving the Soviets up the Wall, 182–192.
National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy informally debated de-facto recognition of the GDR with his Harvard confidante Henry Kissinger, while East German police and border guards made final preparations for lying barbed wire across Berlin streets.\(^8\) Taken aback by both the Ulbricht regime’s construction scheme and the visceral reactions in West Berlin, Bundy advised President Kennedy to underscore the “freedom of the people of West Berlin” in his response, thus explicitly referencing the Outpost narrative in hope to find common ground.\(^9\)

The West Berlin government also tried to harness the Outpost narrative for its purposes. To regain control of the volatile situation, Brandt and Bahr decided to call for a protest in front of West Berlin’s City Hall on August 16, 1961. Like the Outpost narrative itself, Brandt’s speech was intended for two audiences, West Berlin voters and the American government.\(^10\) As the Mayor stepped out onto the balcony to give a speech hastily prepared by Bahr, he faced banners in the crowd exclaiming, “Betrayed by the West” and “Where Are the Protective Powers?”\(^11\)

Amidst a rousing reception, Brandt thundered: “We are not afraid. Today, I have expressed our opinion very openly to the President of the United States, John Kennedy. Berlin expects more than words. Berlin expects political action.”\(^12\) In dramatic fashion, Brandt announced that he had sent a sharp letter to the White House.

To defuse the combustible situation, Brandt had rhetorically challenged the occupier-occupied relationship. Bahr later explained “the letter by the small Brandt to the big Kennedy

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\(^11\) David Clay Large, \textit{Berlin} (London: Allen Lane, 2001), 452.

\(^12\) Quoted in Merseburger, \textit{Willy Brandt}, 398–401.
had to arouse, be self-confident, constructive, and under no circumstances arrogant or unrealistic."\[^{13}\] In this escalating crisis of trust between West Berlin and Washington, Brandt exhorted President Kennedy that the East German measure “has not changed the resistance of West Berlin’s population, but raised doubts in the responsiveness and determination of the three [Western] powers.”\[^{14}\] Casting diplomatic subtleties aside, Brandt and Bahr openly leveraged the status West Berliners enjoyed through the perspective of the Outpost narrative in which the United States’ position in Berlin depended on the will of average Berliners to resist Communism. The network influenced Kennedy’s reaction informally as well. The President’s appointee to oversee USIA, legendary broadcaster Edward R. Murrow was in Berlin to visit RIAS during these days. Deeply impressed by West Berliners’ reactions shown to him by RIAS Director Bob Lochner, he placed a phone call into the White House calling for a visible American response.\[^{15}\]

Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson was hastily dispatched to West Berlin to bring Kennedy’s reply to Brandt. While expressing his “revulsion” over East German and Soviet behavior, Kennedy advised the Mayor that he saw “no steps available to us which can force a significant material change in this present situation.” Focusing on the larger context, Kennedy argued that the Berlin Wall “represents a resounding confession of failure and of political weakness” by the GDR and the Soviet Union.\[^{16}\] Initially “disappointed” by the reaction, both Brandt and Bahr would eventually endorse Kennedy’s assessment in their own memoirs decades


later.\textsuperscript{17} Moreover, Brandt cited Kennedy’s response as inspiration for his own détente Neue Ostpolitik: “But when a young President had determined to use both firmness and flexibility to ease the rigidity of the front lines, it could be seen as a sign of the times in Berlin and Germany.”\textsuperscript{18} In less flowery words, the experience of powerlessness in Berlin in the aftermath of the Wall’s construction had reinforced the SPD nominee for Chancellor’s conviction that any change to West Berlin’s status would be decided outside of the Outpost of Freedom.

This conclusion strengthened Brandt’s resolve to seek offices beyond Berlin. While the national SPD had selected Brandt as their nominee for Chancellor in the 1961 Bundestag elections in hope of a fresh face heading a ticket of veteran operators, Brandt now latched on ameliorating the effects of German division as the central issue in his campaign for Chancellor. His “Berlin kitchen cabinet” of closest advisors that included Klaus Schütz, Heinrich Albertz, and Bahr, but lacked alumni of exile, prodded Brandt to move to Bonn.\textsuperscript{19} Bahr portrayed their rationale decades later, after German reunification: “If we did not want to resign ourselves to the reality [of German division], we had to begin changing it. Nobody would, could, or wanted to do this, if not a handful of people in [West Berlin’s] Schöneberg City Hall would start it.”\textsuperscript{20} Yet Brandt’s innermost circle would have found little indications for such certainty in 1961. Rather, this self-assured characterization forms the triumphalist final word in an argument amongst the network’s members.


\textsuperscript{18} Brandt, \textit{My Life in Politics}, 55.

\textsuperscript{19} Cf. Chapter 5.

\textsuperscript{20} Bahr, \textit{Zu meiner Zeit}, 141.
Diverging opinions on how to best react to the Wall amongst the network put Brandt in a quandary, despite his soaring ambitions. Hurwitz emerged as a dissenting voice, being deeply pessimistic about West Berlin’s prospects. In a memorandum to Shepard Stone, Hurwitz pointed to the city’s accelerating loss of young professionals, noting “August 13 [1961] did bring a definite change; the desire to leave did become more intensive, more real.” More ominously, Hurwitz held Brandt’s administration responsible:

> “Unfortunately, in this situation, although it is almost universally adhered to the ideology of resistance in Berlin is longer equipped to put a firm break on such considerations. […] Again, leadership has not exercised its moral authority in this connection; it has confined itself to denying that it constitutes a serious problem.”

Hurwitz blamed the “state of local leadership” for a manifest, yet unacknowledged “crisis of confidence” he identified in polling West Berlin’s electorate. Hurwitz could sense how the Outpost narrative that the network had successfully fashioned as “the ideology of resistance” had reached its limits in 1961. Yet the West Berlin government failed to reassure the public, in Hurwitz’ point of view. In this perspective, Brandt jeopardized his carefully nurtured reputation by not attacking the GDR more harshly.

Despite Hurwitz’ scathing criticism of West Berlin “leadership,” he never named Brandt directly in the memorandum. Hurwitz might have feared Brandt slipping from the Outpost network after the Mayor appointed Heinrich Albertz and Karl Schiller to his Senate, two Breslau refugees who joined the Social Democrats only after the war. Brandt’s appointment of two of the SPD’s most talented administrators signaled his intention to assemble a SPD brain trust for the Federal Republic in Berlin, but both men had no prior links to the Berlin SPD.

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The 1961 Bundestag elections, held on September 17, roughly a month after the construction of the Wall delayed Brandt’s hopes to succeed Adenauer as West German Chancellor. As Stone had guessed earlier, the task to unseat “den Alten,” or the old geezer, was too tall for Brandt given the circumstances. Brandt expanded the SPD’s share of the vote by 4.4 percent to 36.2 percent – the SPD’s best showing since the first Weimar era elections in 1919. But he found no coalition partner for a parliamentary majority after the Free Democrats chose to throw their lot in with Adenauer again. After ruling out such a possibility during campaigning, they reneged on their commitment after Adenauer promised to step down after two years.  

Brandt thus played an instrumental role in bringing Adenauer’s fourteen-year tenure as Chancellor to a close, but could not reap the benefits of that for the moment.

Despite this respectable electoral showing, Brandt felt bruised by the campaign. Brandt reacted with dismay to the CDU’s insinuations of disloyalty due to his past in exile. On the other hand, the candidate and his staff noted the discrepancy in trustworthiness between himself as the firm Mayor of staunchly anti-Communist West Berlin and his party whose Marxist past many voters still regarded with suspicion. This created a strong incentive for stressing Brandt’s dependability in future campaigns. Part and parcel of this new PR tack was deemphasizing the role Brandt’s exile experience played for his political personae, thus challenging the formative bond between the network’s members.

Time became another factor that challenged the network’s cohesion as its first generation aged. Two months after the construction of the Wall, on October 23, 1961, Paul Hertz succumbed to a long illness. Until his end, Hertz strove to bolster West Berlin’s economy and

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22 Merseburger, Willy Brandt, 427.
23 Cf. Chapter 5.
24 Merseburger, Willy Brandt, 426.
Mayor Brandt’s administration as Senator of Commerce and Finance. Hans Hirschfeld organized the funeral of his closest political friend in American exile days. At the funeral Brandt eulogized his “fatherly friend” by retracing their shared journey. Brandt recalled how he had first met Hertz in Paris in 1938. Glossing over their careers in the left-wing breakaways of the SPD, Neu Beginnen and SAP, respectively, Brandt spoke diplomatically of Hertz’ “initial doubts” upon returning to postwar Berlin on Reuter’s invitation, effectively omitting the decimation of Hertz’ family in the Holocaust. Brandt instead highlighted how Hertz had indicated that “the twelve years in Berlin became the happiest of his life.”

Notably, Hertz’ widow soon relocated back to the United States where her son had emigrated permanently, illustrating a classic generational pattern in migration. In the context of the network, Hertz’ 1961 death underscores aging as a driving factor for the network’s shifting composition. Over two decades after first meeting in exile, the network’s first generation increasingly ended its work life, such as Hirschfeld, who had retired a year earlier.

II. Broad Acceptance of the Narrative and Creeping Disillusionment of the Network

The GDR’s construction of the Wall only increased Western financial aid to West Berlin as a stopgap measure. For instance, sealing off West Berlin from its surroundings accelerated the inflow of Federal German economic aid. Less known are the increased efforts by the network to bolster West Berlin’s standing by carving out a new economic role for the city. At the first


opportunity, Shepard Stone pushed for more funding by the board of the Ford Foundation to recreate West Berlin as a cultural hub. While it is difficult to ascertain the exact amount of funds Stone was able to procure at the Ford Foundation, the projects he funded give a clearer picture of his interpretation of Berlin aid.

Stone spent Ford funds to help the West Berlin administration led by Mayor Willy Brandt, who at this point had become an eminent politician of West Germany. Stone offered Hurwitz employment as Brandt’s personal pollster on “the most agreeable terms.” Hurwitz enthusiastically wrote Brandt how he hoped that “I can be of some use for you.” The social scientist understood his position as a “consultant,” polling the West Berlin electorate and organizing the English-language PR of the Brandt administration. Hurwitz kept the pulse on Brandt’s primary electorate by gauging the public’s reaction to policy initiatives or developments. In addition, Hurwitz edited the Berlin Briefing, an English-language newsletter, to “chosen” addressees that included political friends in Scandinavia and the United Kingdom, but in particular senior figures in the Kennedy administration such as Robert F. Kennedy, Walter Rostow, and Henry Paul Nitze and American members of the network such as Melvin J. Lasky, Roy Blumenthal, and Shepard Stone, in hope of finding international understanding for his agenda.

The Ford Foundation’s funding of Hurwitz’ services coincided with the SPD campaign for West Berlin’s Abgeordnetenhaus elections on February 17, 1963. The Mayor and his inner circle of advisors hoped that victory at the polls would reinvigorate Brandt’s career after his failed Chancellorship bid. Less than three weeks before election day Bahr approached Brandt with “necessary decisions” to be made after presumed victory:

“1. Do you want to enter federal politics? […] If so, you need the apparatus to spend more time in Bonn. You need an oiled machine with the best people [marginalization W.B. ‘1.’]. We haven’t got such one. In fact a political planning group is needed that does not get hung up on Berlin issues, but enables you […] to weigh in on different topics and set goals.”

This memorandum illuminates at least three points. Bahr not only outlined Brandt administration’s post-election strategy candidly, but the memorandum also illustrates Bahr’s entrance into Brandt’s closest circle and the openness of both men for a career in national politics – with West Berlin as their platform.

West Berlin’s February 1963 municipal elections provided a resounding vote of confidence for Brandt’s reaction to the crisis precipitated by the Wall’s construction. In his first election after the painful 1961 Bundestag loss, the Mayor triumphed by garnering an astounding 61.9% of the vote – an unrivalled feat before and ever since. Brandt hailed this victory as one that “will have important consequences for Berlin, and perhaps Germany.” Brandt confidently interpreted this success as a mandate to “exercise a stronger influence on molding of the Federal Republic’s foreign policy.”

This private communication reflects Brandt’s thoughts at the cusp of him branching out beyond Berlin. Brandt hinted at foreign policy initiatives to ameliorate the German problem that were based in Berlin, but possessed a much wider scope.


Brandt saw this election as a springboard for a renewed diplomatic offensive utilizing the Outpost network, but with an altered message. Already before the elections Bahr had called for “a policy [that] must be initiated which will be perceptible to Washington. […] A point has been reached on which the credibility of German politics will be decided.”

Brandt discussed the idea of reaching out to President Kennedy with Bahr and Hurwitz. Brandt strove to assure the President of “Berlin’s position” in the “most severe crisis of the Western community.”

Immediately after winning the elections, Brandt invited President Kennedy to Berlin. Brandt again relied on the Outpost narrative to lure the President, noting how “your visit to the outpost of freedom would become demonstration of unity of Western community that could not be overlooked anywhere in world.” The Mayor left nothing to chance in his quest to start his new policy initiative in the presence of the sitting US President in West Berlin. For example, he reached out to Stone, informing the Ford Foundation official how “It would be good if you, together with other close friends of Berlin, favor this by word in Washington.”

A little over a week later, President Kennedy accepted the invitation to Berlin.

Bahr and his public relations team meticulously planned the President’s upcoming visit. Again, they relied on the established Outpost narrative to introduce Berlin dignitaries to an international audience. Bahr’s staff noted how short biographies of local dignitaries for the

35 Bahr, “Schreiben an Willy Brandt.”


American press corps should “indicate emigration or resistance during the Nazi era – where possible.” In contrast to communication with skeptical West German voters, Brandt’s staff sought to assert antifascist legacies that undergirded the Outpost narrative for an American audience. The Brandt administration tried to leave a favorable impression with painstaking detail. For instance, Brandt’ bureaucracy informed the “Café Kranzler girls assigned to tend [to the American press corps]” how “American journalists cherish whisky.” It instructed the personnel to keep “whisky, brandy, and tobacco products” in reserve and “pay particular attention to keep as many ashtrays present as possible.”

President Kennedy spent only less than a full day in West Berlin. Yet his visit has set the benchmark for American Presidential visits in Germany to this day. Andreas Daum has interpreted Kennedy’s visit as a theatrically staged symbolic act that defined “America’s Berlin.” While the Kennedy visit formed the height of the Outpost narrative in popular acceptance as it signaled continued defiance to the reviled East German regime, it drew on a much longer tradition. In effect, the President’s visit validated two decades of personal experience for the network. Yet the Kennedy visit also demonstrated first inklings of the narrative’s diminishing persuasive power.

West Berlin Press Director Egon Bahr’s busy 1963 summer revolved around two public speeches. Hans Hirschfeld’s successor first played an instrumental role in making President


Kennedy’s June 26 visit to the city a rousing spectacle. Hundreds of thousands of West Berliners lined the streets along the route that his office had carefully chosen for the President’s motorcade. In the meantime, Bahr tended to the German and American Press corps in a bus that directly followed the open car that carried the President, Chancellor Adenauer, and Mayor Brandt.44

While Kennedy stayed less than eight hours in West Berlin, his visit had a lasting impression in defining “America’s Berlin.”45 Moved by the triumphal reception, Kennedy addressed an enthusiastic crowd in the overflowing Rudolf-Wilde-Platz facing Schöneberg City Hall in a speech that has retained its place in the political lore of both the United States and Germany:46 “Two thousand years ago the proudest boast was ‘civis Romanus sum.’ Today, in the world of freedom, the proudest boast is ‘Ich bin ein Berliner.’”47 In front of a legion of international journalists directed by Bahr, the President had elevated the inhabitants of the former Reichshauptstadt to global role models of freedom.

Despite the public success of the network and its narrative as exemplified by Brandt’s resounding electoral victory and Kennedy’s triumphal visit, the existence of the Wall prompted a creeping disillusionment within the network over how to best react to this unexpected as bitter stabilization of the conflict. President Kennedy’s assassination in November 1963 only exacerbated this concern. Despite President Lyndon B. Johnson’s commitment to West Berlin, which he had personally visited in 1961 as Vice President, members of the network became


45 Cf. Daum, Kennedy in Berlin.


increasingly concerned over Berlin losing priority in United States foreign policy that became increasingly preoccupied with Vietnam.\footnote{For Johnson’s 1961 visit to West Berlin, cf. Daum, \textit{Kennedy in Berlin}, 50–61.}

Brandt and Bahr employed the services of a New York based PR consultancy to professionalize the Berlin lobby in the United States. They hoped to bolster the standing of both West Berlin and its Mayor in the eyes of the American public and administration. The West Berlin administration enlisted both Roy Blumenthal and his employee and network veteran Theodore Kaghan in a contract worth $500,000. Kaghan boasted connections to Stone and the US State Department, while Blumenthal himself became “a devoted friend” of Brandt.\footnote{Bahr, \textit{Zu meiner Zeit}, 144–145.}

For instance, Blumenthal privately sent a scathing memorandum on the presumptive 1964 Republican Presidential nominee Barry Goldwater that must have astonished his client Brandt in its bleakness. Characterizing Goldwater as showing a “record [that] is without meaning, direction, serious intention or social responsibility,” Blumenthal warned Brandt to take the Senator from Arizona seriously “because it does reflect a mood and climate of a great section of the American opinion.” In spite of his scathing critique, Blumenthal aptly predicted the Goldwater campaign’s transformative qualities for national American politics: “This defeat of the liberal forces is the prologue to a violent turn right […]. Goldwater will lose in 1964, but his campaign will accelerate forces of divisiveness in America. Principally, these forces are, in the order mentioned, anti-foreign, anti-Negro, anti-Semitic, anti-labor, and most important of all, anti-intellectual.”\footnote{Roy Blumenthal, “Memorandum on American Elections 1964” July 23, 1964, A6 1/WBA-BER-0046 Allgemeine Korrespondenz A-F, 1964, Willy-Brandt-Archiv im Archiv der sozialen Demokratie, Bonn.}

Blumenthal warned how the Johnson administration’s campaign for civil rights and against state-sanctioned racism undercut its electoral appeal: “Kennedy was steering a
foundering ship at the time of his death. Racism was beginning to erode the most traditional Democratic party constituencies, not only in southern states, but in the Southwest and Far West, not to mention several larger Northern states which believed in civil rights for the Negro in the South but reacted strangely to the integration of their own public school system.”  

While Brandt did not face a domestic problem of this magnitude, the now national politician was no stranger to the phenomenon of new issues coming to the fore in elections during the 1960s. After spending a decade of polishing his image of being both a Social Democrat and a dependable anti-Communist, new issues such as management of the hitherto unprecedented economic prosperity now concerned West German voters more than Cold War rhetoric.

These broad underlying developments influenced Brandt’s view on the German problem which solution the Berlin Wall seemed to defer indefinitely. Less than three weeks after the sitting US President had canonized the Outpost of Freedom in its best-known description, Bahr departed from his background role to question this very narrative in a speech of his own.

Brandt and his staff, in particular his PR director Egon Bahr, increasingly searched for a reinterpretation of the Outpost of Freedom narrative. In the wake of the Wall’s construction, Bahr and Brandt had come to the conclusion that the Outpost narrative that had been instrumental in their success now painted them in a corner. Thus Bahr presented his first tentative thoughts for a new strategy in a small circle in Bavarian Tutzing. Under the headline “change through rapprochement,” Bahr’s presentation was explosive. While Bahr couched his speech in Kennedy’s affirmative response to Khrushchev’s diplomatic overtures of “peaceful coexistence,” he proposed a departure from Hallstein Doctrine that enshrined West German non-

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51 Ibid.
recognition of the GDR. After coming to the “inconvenient, yet logical” conclusion that “any policy geared towards the direct downfall of the regime over there is hopeless,” Bahr questioned the founding principle of West German foreign policy. Instead, Bahr touted direct negotiations with the GDR to ameliorate the ramifications of division for citizens’ on both sides of the Iron Curtain as part of a confident, autonomous Federal German policy towards their Eastern neighbors.

The presentation’s small venue belied its bombshell public reaction. Both political allies and foes aptly interpreted Bahr’s remarks as signaling a shifting strategy by one of the SPD’s most visible – and trusted – foreign policy heads, Brandt. While Bahr has vocally claimed his surprise at his speech’s reception that founded his reputation as engineer of Brandt’s foreign policy agenda, its timing and substance suggest that Brandt had called in Bahr to deliberately test the waters on his behalf. The concept of change through rapprochement found a controversial reception. The CDU predictably reviled the speech as “a heavy blow against the German people’s vital interests.” In this context, the GDR’s initial reaction of branding the initiative as “aggression on slippers” even helped. To blunt American criticism, Bahr deliberately couched his call for such a fundamental shift in West German foreign policy in the terms of Kennedy’s relaxation of relations with the Soviet Union in the wake of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis.

Arguably, the split reaction within the network constituted the biggest political danger for Brandt in the short-term. Ironically, Harold Hurwitz as editor of the Berlin Briefing newsletter

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53 Merseburger, Willy Brandt, 441–446.
55 quoted in Merseburger, Willy Brandt, 443–444.
that Brandt had set up to candidly explain his policies to an elite international circle voiced serious reservations. Seemingly oblivious to Brandt’s role in the matter, Hurwitz “imagined that Egon’s speech confronts you with sets of problems” and sent Brandt an unsolicited, fourteen page long memorandum with his objections to the Tutzing speech.  

While Brandt diplomatically invited Hurwitz to “talk in private,” this disagreement highlighted an existential challenge to the network. Brandt needed to win over his own forces for his shift before hoping to convince the recipients of his newsletter such as Robert F Kennedy, Walter Rostow, and Henry Kissinger. Moreover, the Outpost of Freedom narrative was never a purely political ploy for the network, but its raison d’être rooted in the scars and experiences of its members’ biographies. Reuter’s daring conception of Berlin as not only redeemable for democracy, but the embodiment of democracy united this diverse network. Doubts in this narrative coming from its most visible exponent could, in turn, easily be construed as questioning the network.

Brandt found confirmation for exploring the hitherto unthinkable in an episode over Christmas 1963. Bahr broke the taboo of maintaining no contact to the GDR regime for a humanitarian gesture. The Brandt administration agreed with East Berlin that West Berliners could visit family members across the Wall over Christmas, which had been impossible for sixteen months. East German border guards sent delegations to West Berlin processing visa applications, which were named “passing slips,” or Passierscheine, as the legal nature of the border was in dispute. Despite these cumbersome constraints, Berliners made use of this opportunity beyond all expectations. This very limited success encouraged Brandt’s to invest

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further political capital in détente, as he had anxiously kept the pulse of his electorate through polling while he stretched the limits of his powers in West Berlin.\textsuperscript{57}

Thus the diverging reactions to the Wall marked the onset of the network’s geographical dispersion. Bahr conceived the Tutzing speech as a trial balloon for Brandt’s foreign policy program in a potential second run for Chancellorship in 1965.\textsuperscript{58} Underpinning such aspirations was the conclusion that the situation in Berlin could not be changed from West Berlin’s premises. Consequently, Brandt and Bahr were willing to move the center of their political operations to the national stage in Bonn on the Rhine, effectively leaving the Outpost of Freedom that they had polished so successfully behind.

\textbf{III. Marginalization of the Past in Exile for National Leadership in Bonn}

While the dramatically altered geopolitical situation in Berlin prompted Brandt to consider a move to Bonn, continuing suspicions against him and his support network over their leftwing activist past compelled the network to deliberately obscure its roots in exile. Despite the Communists’ and Christian Democrats’ best efforts, these ominous allegations were not an exclusively German affair, but a genuinely transatlantic enterprise. Hans Hirschfeld’s years-long judicial prosecution in the United States exemplifies the continued suspicions these remigrés faced long after Senator McCarthy’s downfall.

On July 7, 1961, the New York Times broke the news that recently-retired Hans Hirschfeld had been accused of serving as a Soviet double agent in a American federal espionage trial.\textsuperscript{59} At the trial of former Trotskyist turned convicted Soviet spy Robert Soblen, a fellow

\textsuperscript{57} Merseburger, \textit{Willy Brandt}, 449–459.

\textsuperscript{58} Egon Bahr, “\textit{Das Musst Du Erzählen: Erinnerungen an Willy Brandt}” (Berlin: Propyläen, 2013), 45.

former German émigré named Hirschfeld as the source passing on information to the Soviet
NKVD while working for the OSS during World War Two. This unverifiable accusation added
another chapter to a convoluted legal saga: Soblen would eventually commit suicide in a London
deportation cell by the way of Tel Aviv,60 and Hirschfeld would desperately fight for his
reputation, all the while the network intervened in the highest echelons of American foreign
policy to shield Brandt’s West Berlin administration from the political fallout of this astonishing
accusation.

Hirschfeld’s legal troubles in the United States came as no surprise to him. According to
court documents, American officials visited Hirschfeld in his West Berlin office on September
27, 1957 to “confront” him with witness Johanna Koenen Beker and her accusation. Hirschfeld
“flatly denied ever having seen, met, spoken to or worked with Mrs. Beker [and] insisted on his
complete innocence of the inculpatory acts attributed to him by Mrs. Beker.” Curiously,
Hirschfeld indicated to the court that he had since then “discussed with Mr. Stone the whole
affair long before I came to the States [in 1961], and with others, too.”61

The affair escalated quickly in light of its potential political implications in Cold War
Berlin. As early as February 1958, Brandt had warned Hirschfeld of impending litigation in
United States. While visiting the United States on the Ford Foundation’s invitation as West
Berlin’s newly elected Mayor, Brandt informed his PR director how Eleanor Dulles had
“touched upon the ‘case H.’ and had signaled to now avoid an inept tapping of the press.” Brandt
assured Hirschfeld that the network had already scrambled to his defense: “Shep [Stone] was

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shocked and has immediately […] talked with [CIA Director] Allen Dulles with whom I met yesterday evening. He did not know any details, wanted to inform himself quickly, and strive for the quickest resolution.” Perceiving their shared past in exile as an open flank, the mayor advised his top aide to cooperate in any investigation as the best defense: “They will probably invite you to put a testimony on record.” Knowing from personal experience how accusations of disloyalty in exile could be wounding, Brandt “hoped that this matter has not grieved you deeply.”

Aside from this note by Brandt, Hirschfeld’s entrapment in this web of legal proceedings remains curiously absent from his personal papers, indicating the risk Hirschfeld faced or the wounds it opened. Court documents and contemporary press coverage, however, allowed reconstruction of the investigation’s proceedings. Hirschfeld followed the network’s advice and made himself available for interrogation multiple times. For instance, a prosecutor from the United States Department of Justice interviewed Hirschfeld for a total of six days in the fall of 1959, while the FBI conducted additional interviews over four days in the spring of 1960. Concurrently, Hirschfeld filed for retirement. In how far these American legal proceedings contributed to Hirschfeld’s decision to retire cannot be ascertained.

In November 1960, a Grand Jury indicted Lithuanian immigrant Robert Soblen at the US District Court for the Southern District of New York for transmitting OSS internals to the Soviet Union during World War Two. Born Ruvelis Sobolevicius, Soblen had studied in Weimar era Germany and become active in the German KPD, before fleeing to the Soviet Union. The NKVD

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then sent him to the United States in 1941 to gather intelligence on dissident Trotskyists. Yet the prosecution also strove to convict Soblen of spying on the United States government. Hirschfeld’s work as OSS profiler nearly two decades earlier suddenly had the potential of becoming the key link in an international espionage case. Thus Hirschfeld travelled to New York in February 1961 to appear in front of the Grand Jury for another two days. In his deposition, he maintained that he had never met Beker in New York exile and labeled her a “liar.” Instead he suggested that Communist turned anti-Communist activist Ruth Fischer had singled him out in an exile milieu cabal.

In the ensuing heated encounter in the courtroom, Hirschfeld and Beker clashed over the meaning of their own actions “trapped in exile” rather than the defendant Soblen’s. Beker coaxed Hirschfeld by contending that his alleged help for the NKVD “was almost understandable in view of the wartime situation in which they found themselves as German refugees in New York City.” Moreover, she encouraged him to come forward, if he “wanted to help the cause of free Berlin.” Hirschfeld retorted how “his loyalty and devotion to the city of Berlin was a matter of public record.” Hirschfeld categorically denied the allegations, joking bitterly how he “would certainly be able to recall if he had given away any OSS ‘secrets.’” Hirschfeld’s questioning only resumed after Beker “was escorted from the interview room” on his request. Despite the abrasive, yet inconclusive nature of Hirschfeld’s interview, the prosecution used Hirschfeld’s alleged actions to underscore the military significance of Soblen’s dispatches to the Soviet Union.

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Judge Herlands sentenced Soblen in August 1961 to life imprisonment “for conspiracy to obtain and transmit American national defense secrets,” yet kept him free on bail pending legal appeals and treatment of his cancer.\textsuperscript{68} The case continued with Hirschfeld’s role at the center when Soblen demanded a second trial arguing that the prosecution had withheld information on Hirschfeld postwar career in West Berlin from him.\textsuperscript{69} Given Brandt’s candid note on the network’s intervention on Hirschfeld’s behalf, it seems not unlikely that the prosecutor had been persuaded to deemphasize Hirschfeld’s postwar service as West Berlin’s PR Director in the interest of American Cold War foreign policy.

At this point, the now retired Hirschfeld changed his legal strategy, having become convinced that the drawn out litigation constituted an attempted intrigue by former left-wing émigrés against the Berlin remigrés. The accused fumed at Soblen’s legal counsel:

“We are in the middle of an election campaign. Willy B. is the candidate of the SPD against Adenauer. How simple to claim that the SPD is not 100 percent pure against Communist infiltration. Just look at Willy B: One of his closest co-workers has been named a Soviet agent and a spy!”\textsuperscript{70}

Hirschfeld refused to cooperate further, feeling that a “witch-hunt” targeted him. According to his counsel, Hirschfeld felt “so victimized and brutalized by the Federal Bureau of Investigation” that he refused to reappear in court.\textsuperscript{71} Instead, Hirschfeld’s attorney published a letter in the New York Times explaining his refusal to testify again.\textsuperscript{72}


\textsuperscript{69} David Ander\textsuperscript{son}, “Figure in Spy Trial of Soblen Linked to Brandt of West Berlin: Retrial Motion Emphasizes Man Hirschfeld’s Denial of Aid to Defendant,” \textit{New York Times}, October 6, 1961.

\textsuperscript{70} Ibid.


In November 1961, Judge Herlands blocked Soblen’s motion for a new trial. While Soblen stayed in the headlines with his desperate flight from the United States to Israel and later the United Kingdom, Hirschfeld dropped from the public’s glare. Judge Herlands’ ruling effectively ended Hirschfeld’s legal scrutiny of his conduct in exile, as no charges were ever filed against Hirschfeld directly.

The veracity of Beker’s allegations remains elusive. While American intercepts declassified after the end of the Cold War corroborate Soblen’s involvement with Soviet intelligence, the Venona project files cannot conclusively establish the facts of Hirschfeld’s possible involvement with the NKVD during his time at the OSS. Even scholars who believe in a wide reach of the Soviet spy rings in the United States such as Haynes and Klehr admit, “the Venona messages shed little light on this portion of Soblen’s ring.”

Neither can any other archival trace found support Beker’s allegations, for instance within the files of the East German Ministerium für Staatssicherheit in Berlin’s BStU. This archival silence renders Beker’s account to the court questionable for at least three reasons: First, like other members of the network, Hirschfeld had become increasingly skeptical of the Communists as early as 1938. For instance, Hirschfeld reached out to contribute in Willi Münzenberg’s Paris-based anti-Stalinist Die Zukunft newspaper during his time in France. Second, it seems highly unlikely that committed anti-Communists such as Reuter and Brandt would have employed a former NKVD spy for decades. Third, it seems at least as unlikely that


the GDR’s MfS would have remained idle with a Communist espionage veteran in West Berlin’s innermost political circle. Brandt meanwhile had publically professed his “complete confidence in Hirschfeld’s integrity.” 76 Poignantly, his Chancellorship would be derailed a decade later during the Guillaume Affaire by not heeding warnings of an Eastern spy among his closest staff. 77

But what Brandt took away from this episode was the perception that his exile past was a liability for his career, which was about to take off to new heights. For instance, the national SPD elected the former outsider Chairman in 1964. Consequently, Brandt started a decades-long campaign to obscure the exile-derived roots of his political success in Berlin. Brandt’s bitter experience of the 1965 Chancellorship campaign only intensified his resolve. While Brandt as the Social Democratic nominee again increased the SPD’s share of the vote by 3.1 percent to 39.1 percent, he fell short of dislodging Adenauer’s CDU successor Ludwig Erhard. The Christian Democrats again assailed Brandt’s credibility through an intensified whispering campaign over his past in exile, much to the dismay of Brandt who believed that it changed the election’s outcome. 78 Bahr later argued that Brandt “felt persecuted and would never again forget this. Even the big successes only let the wounds struck scar superficially, but not heal.” 79

In contrast to his 1961 eulogy for Hertz, in which he had outlined their shared personal and political journey during the Nazi era, Brandt now accentuated his belief in German democracy in exile. While stressing his impeccable anti-Communist credentials as West Berlin

76 Anderson, “Figure in Spy Trial of Soblen Linked to Brandt of West Berlin: Retrial Motion Emphasizes Mans Hirschfeld’s Denial of Aid to Defendant.”

77 Merseburger, Willy Brandt, 720–738.


79 Bahr, Zu meiner Zeit, 178.
Mayor, Brandt commissioned the publication of his writings in exile to showcase his commitment to German democracy in Nazi-imposed exile. Picking up on Strauß’ accusation, the “deliberately” titled *Draußen*, or “Outside,” followed Brandt’s bruising 1965 federal election campaign. 80

*Draußen* compiled the abundant evidence for Brandt’s wartime preoccupation for German democratization. Among the extensive selection of pamphlets and letters, the book published the correspondence between Brandt and Myrdal as proof for Brandt’s patriotic belief in Germany’s democratic potential. However, comparison with the original letters in Myrdal’s personal papers has revealed that either Brandt or his editor Günter Struve tactically redacted passages that could illuminate Brandt’s complex motivation to return. Most notably, *Outside* skipped any mention of exile era experiences as Brandt’s “true allegiance.” Instead, Brandt’s November 8, 1947, letter now simply read: “It has not been the case that I simply choose Germany instead of Norway. But it is clear for me that I can and must do something more actively for the ideas that I avow, and that this [German] country needs a strong engagement most urgently.” The book omitted the following paragraph in which Brandt regretted renouncing his Norwegian citizenship: “It is painful to give up the immediate bonds to a society one feels a part of […]. Political work in Germany on the other hand means fellowship with many people one has little in common with.” 81 Brandt’s opponents could have easily misconstrued his understandable reluctance to reclaim his German citizenship in 1947 after his emergence in West

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81 Brandt, *Draußen: Schriften während der Emigration*, 358.
German politics ten years later. Until now, this simple omission tactic has shaped scholarship as Brandt biographers have relied on the redacted published version of the letter exchange.  

Brandt’s *Vergangenheitspolitik* concerning his own past is unsurprising in the context of the vicious ad hominem attacks he faced. Nearly fifty years after redacted publication, asking for the rationale for Brandt’s disavowal of a constituent part of his political identity poses a more productive question. Apparently, a former anti-fascist activist felt compelled to downplay his principled opposition to Nazism in order to stay electable in federal German elections. While the self-deceptive to cynical relationship with the most recent past in the first two decades of the Federal Republic has been well documented, Brandt’s self-censorship highlights the intensity of the hostility remigrés faced. Moreover, Brandt’s campaign to downplay the importance of his exile-derived contacts has been a main reason for late scrutiny of these networks.

Even at the height of his power as newly minted Nobel Peace Prize laureate, the then Chancellor Brandt exhibited a peculiar blend of triumphalism and defensiveness when he wrote about his years in exile. To an English-language audience, Brandt asserted again unprompted “that during my time ‘outside’ I did not for one moment cease to regard myself as German, despite my Norwegian passport.” He asked rhetorically “Why else would I have chosen Berlin, a city skipping into the clutches of another totalitarian power? The Germans understood my reasons. My election as Chancellor was an act of mutual confidence. It gave me the right to assert that the defeat of Hitler was now finally complete.” In this view, West Berlin’s resistance to Communist ambition paved the way for rebuilding “confidence” with his fellow Germans. While the narrative’s political relevance in Berlin waned during the 1970s, this passage thus

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underscores the enduring autobiographical bent of the Outpost of Freedom narrative. It still helped the network’s remigrés to make sense of their days in anti-fascist exile while pursuing political careers in the Federal Republic.

In 1966, Brandt persistence in federal German politics paid off – at least in parts. After two soaring campaigns for Chancellorship that ended in perceived humiliation, the seemingly impregnable coalition government between Christian and Free Democrats fractured. A desperate CDU invited the SPD to join the government in a grand coalition. After internal debates, Brandt relented to trade in his post in Berlin for a seat in the cabinet of the Federal Republic. Sworn in as West Germany’s Foreign Minister, Brandt spearheaded the first SPD representation in a German government since 1930 as Vice Chancellor. Tendering his resignation as Mayor of West Berlin, Brandt sought to assure his Berlin comrades: “This is no farewell to Berlin. For me this is the beginning of a new chapter in the work for Berlin, Germany, and the goals of our great political community, our Social Democratic Party.”

Bonn’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs posed a foreign working environment for Brandt. While his office in Berlin had made Brandt one of West Germany’s most respected voices in foreign policy, he now faced a bureaucratic apparatus led by CDU appointees and infiltrated by Nazi-era old boys networks. In this context, Brandt’s addressed his new staff confidently: “Who has a sense of history cannot easily ignore that a man of my origin and convictions has

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become the German Foreign Minister.”\textsuperscript{87} Couched in this autobiographical reflection, Brandt expressed his willingness to restructure his ministry, if it failed to back him.

This consciousness of his unique career trajectory in exile and Cold War Berlin also helped Brandt in cementing the Neue Westpolitik that he had advocated in West Berlin. While the Federal Republic’s inclusion in the NATO alliance and its reconciliation with France rank as Adenauer’s two most important foreign policy legacies, they became seemingly mutually exclusive during the late 1960s by severely strained relations between the United States and France. In this dilemma, Brandt adroitly maneuvered between the Johnson administration and the De Gaulle, using his personal authority gained in exile and Berlin deliberately. Based on his longstanding ties formed in Berlin, Brandt could tactfully reject West German contributions to the American quagmire in Vietnam, while retaining close ties to the United States against the wishes of the ageing General and fellow resistant, who had taken France out of NATO.\textsuperscript{88}

Brandt’s contribution to the governing coalition demonstrated even to the most skeptical West German voters that voting for the SPD would not mean the end of the Federal Republic as the CDU had so often claimed. Brandt’s nuanced tenure as Foreign Minister exemplified how the Social Democrats supported the westernization policy established by Adenauer, while Karl Schiller as Minister of the Economy underscored that the SPD had made its peace with tempered capitalism. This administrative experience put the party in a competitive position for the 1969 Bundestag elections. New issues came to the fore, as an increasingly introspective electorate asked how to retain the heady economic growth rates, how to equitably allocate the wealth accumulated, and how to engage with incriminating legacies of National Socialism that were left

\textsuperscript{87} Merseburger, Willy Brandt, 493.

\textsuperscript{88} Ibid., 501–524.
lingering when material reconstruction was the most pressing task. The elections resulted seemingly inconclusively, with the CDU at 46.1%, the SPD at 42.7%, and the FDP at 5.8%. Despite garnering fewer votes than the CDU, the SPD had achieved its best result on record. 89

These results sufficed for Brandt to act decisively. Against skeptical voices in own party, Brandt reached out to the FDP to form a governing coalition with a slim majority of only three seats against. In October 1969, this Bundestag majority elected Brandt Chancellor, making him the first Social Democrat since Hermann Müller in 1930. In his inaugural address, the new Chancellor vowed to maintain the foreign policies of his predecessors, while promising a new beginning domestically. Brandt touted the successes of the democratically reconstructed Germany and confidently counted the election that brought him into office among them:

“Twenty years after its founding, our parliamentary democracy has proven its ability to change with the times and thus has withstood its test. This has also been noted beyond our borders and has helped to bring our state new trust from throughout the world.” In light of the 1968 student movement, however, Brandt exhorted his fellow West German politicians: “such a democratic order needs extraordinary patience in listening, and it needs to exert extraordinary effort on behalf of mutual understanding. We want to dare more democracy.” 90

IV. Holdouts in Berlin facing a new Generation of Leftwing Activists

Brandt’s 1966 characterization of his move to Bonn as the continuation of politics for Berlin by other means could hardly sugarcoat the fact that he and Bahr left the majority of network members behind in West Berlin. Already in the fall of 1963, when Brandt launched his détente initiative that would catapult him to Bonn, Hurwitz encouraged Brandt to publically

89 Ibid., 575–576.

recall the “arduous path of struggles of the Berlin party’s old friends.” Hurwitz who was personally deeply rooted in West Berlin, having married a local Social Democrat, quite possibly feared Brandt’s evident ambition to enter the larger national stage.

Brandt’s career in Bonn politics created the need for a new Mayor among the SPD’s ranks. Unlike in prior instances, the Berlin SPD quickly agreed on the efficient administrator Albertz to succeed Brandt as Governing Mayor. Heinrich Albertz would face challenges by new generation of leftists embodied by the student movement with particular intensity, however. Structural reasons such West Berlin’s urban nature and peculiar position within the Federal Republic prefigured this clash, while administrative shortcomings exacerbated the tensions between the new student milieu and the established West Berlin residents.

Two decades of militarizing West Berlin’s police had left the force with a stockpile of weaponry, but ill-prepared for confronting protestors. Barred by occupation statute to garrison German troops within Berlin, the then Senator Albertz had groomed his police as an Ersatz army. Egon Bahr later recalled self-critically and acerbically: “When [the riot police] marched into the Olympic Stadium and the short dull sound of coordinated grasps to the barrel resonated through the bowl, a groan came from the stands. The hearts of men hardened, those of women melted. Democratic Prussia.” Led by ardent anti-Communist Social Democrats Stumm and Duensing, these units engaged the East German border patrols in numerous incidents at the Wall. These incidents contributed to the perception of Communism as threat that framed the officers’ perception when they encountered university students jauntily shouting Marxist slogans.

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92 Bahr, Zu meiner Zeit, 124.
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the Shah of Iran, was among those who witnessed West Berlin’s newly antagonistic political culture in 1967. Traditionally, the West Berlin Senate and its constituents alike enthusiastically greeted any foreign dignitary as endorsement of the half-city’s global prominence and viability. This time, however, young demonstrators, mostly students of the Free University, vocally confronted the monarch with his transgressions in Iran and denounced him as a stooge of American imperialism. The Shah’s entourage gave orders to counter-protestors recruited by the notorious SAVAK to attack with clubs. In the ensuing melee, a police bullet killed the student Benno Ohnesorg. This shocking escalation became a cause célèbre for the nascent student movement and shook West Berlin’s politics. The courts acquitted the perpetrating officer Karl Heinz Kurras for lack of evidence for killing the subdued theology student deliberately. Silence among Kurras’ colleagues obstructed judicial proceedings. Ironically, an MfS mole such as Kurras, who was exposed only recently, benefitted from such misplaced esprit de corps in the self-styled militant vanguard of anti-Communism in Berlin.

The lethal shortcomings of the West Berlin police during the Shah’s visit had ramifications across the city’s political sphere. In the Senate, Brandt’s chosen successor Heinrich Albertz resigned under a cloud, while the SPD replaced him with another former member of the kitchen cabinet, Klaus Schütz. The personnel restructuring also compelled police chief Duensing to resign. In private, the Social Democrat bitterly expressed his lack of understanding to Hans

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93 Large, *Berlin*, 484.

Hirschfeld: “May others do better. Police chiefs were also replaced sporadically during Weimar times. But never in this way.”

Ohnesorg’s killing became the lightening rod for the radicalizing student movement centered on the Free University. The political science department named after Otto Suhr gained national prominence as one of the principal battlegrounds of the student movement. Self-professed vanguards of a New Left like Rudi Dutschke acerbically indicted the capitalist economic system and unaddressed legacies of the Nazi era. Moreover, their activism touted radical tactics of public protests, proudly embracing the acronym APO, Außerparlamentarische Opposition or outer-parliamentary opposition. The perceived lack of other activism avenues contributed to this choice. For instance, Neu Beginnen veterans such as Eberhard Hesse had enforced draconian discipline within the Berlin SPD’s ranks since Brandt’s takeover in 1958, expelling open Marxists.

On the Free University’s Dahlem campus, former Neu Beginnen intellectual leader Löwenthal somewhat ironically emerged as the leftist student activists’ most vocal opponent. The Free University had become a refuge for Richard Löventhal and Harold Hurwitz, capitalizing on its rapid expansion, keeping in line with Brandt’s 1950 vision of West Berlin as Athens on the Spree, and benefitting from the Ford Foundation’s ongoing support for the institution as flagship for the walled-in city’s alternative economy. In 1961, The Otto-Suhr-Institut (OSI) offered Löwenthal a full professorship for international politics, finally securing

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his long-term return to Germany. From this post, Löwenthal shaped his party and the field of political science in Germany: he informally advised his close friend Brandt, served on the SPD’s program committee, delineated the potential and limits of the anti-totalitarianism concept, and acerbically criticized the 1968 student generation’s fascination with Marxism.99

Löwenthal had initially welcomed the political activism of his students, however. Poignantly, his former student Dutschke confronted him with his critiques of capitalism during his time in exile as a model to emulate. But the increasing militancy of some exponents of the student movement alienated Löwenthal. He denounced attempts to undermine seminars by singled-out professors as reminiscent of brownshirt tactics of National Socialist German Students’ League during the 1930s. In response, he joined the board of a mostly conservative Bund Freiheit der Wissenschaft (BFW), or Academic Freedom Association of professors.100

In this volatile situation, Löwenthal carved out a tenured position for Harold Hurwitz at the Free University. While Hurwitz relished the material safety of his professorship, he faced a bruising whispering campaign at the institute. Hurwitz characterized the atmosphere as an “ordeal” of a dozen years in which students slandered him as “a CIA agent” while colleagues tried to “kill” his research repeatedly.101 Despite these formidable obstacles, Hurwitz tackled his research agenda through persistence and outside grants. For decades, he chronicled the milieu that had attracted him to Berlin in meticulous detail. His opus magnum “Demokratie und Antikommunismus” sought to explain the reconstruction of the Berlin SPD against Stalinist

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100 Wehrs, Protest der Professoren, 81, 114–116.

designs during the second half of the 1940s in six installments. Hurwitz published four hefty volumes – including one double volume – before retiring.\textsuperscript{102} After the fall of the Wall, Hurwitz focused with the biography of Robert Havemann, a Neu Beginnen leader who chose the GDR after the war, only to become one of its most prominent dissidents. Thus scholarly research on the network that had brought him to postwar Berlin preoccupied Hurwitz for the rest of his life.\textsuperscript{103}

Despite West Berlin’s creeping provincialization as a relict of a increasingly frozen conflict after the 1971 Quadripartite Agreement, the walled-in half-city remained a \textit{Sehnsuchtsort} – not only for students of the New Left and countless GDR citizens, but also American members of the network. West Berlin became the refuge not only for Harold Hurwitz, but also Robert Lochner and Shepard Stone, as well. Lochner characterized stations in West Berlin as the most gratifying in his career in the USIA and the American Foreign Service. After a tour of duty as Public Affairs Officer at the US Embassy in Saigon in which he did not feel “qualified, nor helpful” and a rotation in Washington, DC, Lochner eagerly accepted the RIAS directorship in early 1961.\textsuperscript{104} Lochner quickly reconnected with friends and associates from the network. For instance, he tried to explain the Kennedy administration’s ill-advised support for Diệm’s slipping control in South Vietnam to the West Berlin public in a talk jointly organized by RIAS and SPD in the \textit{Amerikahaus}.\textsuperscript{105}

Unsatisfied by the USIA’s direction during the Nixon administration, Lochner left the Foreign

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{103}Hurwitz passed away shortly after publishing Harold Hurwitz, \textit{Robert Havemann: eine persönlich-politische Biographie} (Berlin: Entenfuss Verlag, 2012).
\item \textsuperscript{104}Lochner, \textit{Ein Berliner unter dem Sternenbanner}, 113–120.
\item \textsuperscript{105}Robert H. Lochner, “Summary of Speech on Vietnam” October 10, 1962, Robert H. Lochner Collection, Box 4, Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford, CA.
\end{itemize}
Service and moved back to West Berlin. Lochner then assumed directorship of the *International Institute for Journalism* through a connection with Bahr’s successor and former RIAS journalist Hanns-Peter Herz.\textsuperscript{106} His choice to retire in reunited Berlin indicates that Lochner considered himself an American Berliner.

Stone used West Berlin and his local contacts to reinvigorate his career. Stone had left his position at the Ford Foundation in 1967 to take over the presidency of the International Association for Cultural Freedom (IACF). After the British press had exposed CIA funding to the CCF via the Ford Foundation, Stone had been called in to restructure the floundering anti-Communist bullhorn.\textsuperscript{107} From the IACF headquarters in Paris, Stone retained a keen interest in German politics visiting the Federal Republic multiple times per year. In 1974, Stone transferred back to West Berlin to a position created by himself. Stone had established a local franchise of the Aspen Institute by bringing his connections in both the United States and the Federal Republic together. In Berlin, Stone profited from the help of Mayor Klaus Schütz, his chief of staff and RIAS alumni Hanns-Peter Herz, and particularly Chancellor Brandt.\textsuperscript{108}

The think-tank opened its doors in 1974 in vintage Stone fashion. Drawing on his HICOG tactic, the Aspen Institute Berlin director invited distinguished guests to a majestic villa once impropriated by Joseph Goebbels for an off-the-record conversation. Aspen Berlin’s honorary board member Brandt served as the main attraction for a short list of guests that included the network alumni Stone, Schütz, and Löwenthal.\textsuperscript{109} Aspen Berlin gave Stone the

\textsuperscript{106} Lochner, *Ein Berliner unter dem Sternenbanner*, 141–142.


\textsuperscript{108} Ibid., 278–280.

opportunity to follow his passion of connecting politicians, academics, and professionals. The Institute’s first conference explored a source of lifelong fascination for Stone, namely the relationship between media and social change. Under the title “The Communications Revolution,” distinguished guests discussed television’s impact, but also the prospect of “computer communication.”

V. Berlin as Laboratory of Chancellor Brandt’s Neue Ostpolitik

Notably, Shepard Stone was among the invited guests for Chancellor Brandt’s soaring inaugural address in 1969. Moreover, Stone met old friends and political companions Bahr and Brandt privately, further underscoring the continuity of the network. In an informal meeting the newly elected Chancellor outlined his foreign policy as “immediately after [forming the] new government [start] détente.” Brandt sensed an opportunity for realizing these lofty ambitions by reaching out to multiple powers. For instance, Brandt quickly negotiated treaties with the USSR and the People’s Republic of Poland in which both sides pledged their commitment to European peace and the 1945 borders. Effectively dropping claims to the territories east of the Oder-Neisse-Line created considerable resistance for the SPD-FDP coalition domestically.

But Brandt’s ambitious outreach to the Soviet Union and Poland increased the pressure on the GDR to enter negotiations, like its “sister states” had before. While the obstinate Ulbricht had rejected Brandt’s initiatives in 1967, Brandt travelled to Erfurt to meet GDR Prime Minister Willi Stoph three years later. Despite the inconclusive nature of the meeting, its symbolism could hardly been exaggerated for contemporaries. For the first time, a West German Chancellor


crossed the Iron Curtain to meet high-ranking SED functionaries. Thousands of East Germans broke through police barriers to catch a glimpse of Brandt. This rousing reception poignantly illustrated the hopes citizens on both sides of the Iron Curtain placed on the new Chancellor.

An intrigue within the SED changed the GDR’s response to the West German overtures. In May 1971, the Politburo replaced Ulbricht with Erich Honecker, who had previously shown his loyalty to the regime by leading the FDJ party youth and coordinating the construction of the Wall. Despite being political enemies with Brandt in postwar Berlin, both men were from the same generation, with Honecker being born one year earlier than Brandt in 1912. Honecker tried to implement a reform agenda of his own by readjusting the party’s course “from the utopian promise of redemption towards pragmatic problem solving.”

Less than a month after deposing Ulbricht, Honecker proclaimed the “unity of economic and social politics” at the VIII. Party Congress. This technocratic slogan encapsulated Honecker’s gambit for the East German population that marked a departure from the ill-fated attempts of Stalinism that marked the Ulbricht era. The new General Secretary of the SED initiated an ambitious effort to improve the living standard within the GDR by pledging to build millions of new apartments, raising wages, and improving availability of consumer goods. In return, the SED leadership expected unquestioned continuity of its monopoly on political power.

This course change signaled the regime’s development into a “welfare dictatorship,” which characterizes the regime’s perplexing combination of concern for improving the daily lives of its citizen with an increasingly refined repressive apparatus embodied by the MfS.

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These internal reforms left the new General Secretary of the SED eager to prove himself and gain international recognition for the GDR’s languishing experiment in “real-existing Socialism,” thus increasing the likelihood that the GDR would enter negotiations with the Federal Republic in hope of a bargain, rather than scoring propagandistic points.\(^\text{115}\)

The first major achievement for the Neue Ostpolitik in cooperation with the GDR concerned the situation in Berlin. Negotiations between the wartime Allies and both German states resulted in the 1971-72 Quadripartite Agreement which marked a turning point for West Berlin’s safety and internal politics. On September 3, 1971, the four wartime Allies legalized the status quo in Berlin, in which the GDR had incorporated the Soviet Sector as its capital and divided the city though the Wall. In return, the GDR and USSR pledged unhindered access to West Berlin from the Federal Republic, and accepted West Berlin’s economic integration into West Germany.\(^\text{116}\) Locally, the Agreement created a “contrived normality” in Berlin marked by serene every-day life and intense contacts across the Iron Curtain, all while navigating the constraints imposed by the Cold War.\(^\text{117}\) In the global perspective, this new predictability of the absurd froze the conflict along the sectorial boundaries that made Berlin vanish as a flashpoint of the Cold War.

The Quadripartite Agreement furthermore constituted a pivotal development of the Neue Ostpolitik, as it paved the way for the more comprehensive Basic Treaty between East and West


In the 1972 Basic Treaty, the German Democratic Republic and Federal Republic of Germany pledged “normal, good-neighbourly relations with each other on the basis of equal rights.” However, the treaty documented the ongoing dispute over the question of German citizenship that illustrated the divergent goals of both sides. While Honecker’s diplomats expected that “the Treaty will facilitate a regulation of questions of national citizenship,” West German negotiator Bahr underscored that “questions of national citizenship are not regulated by the Treaty.”

Despite granting the de-facto recognition of the GDR that the SED craved, the Brandt administration insisted that only a single, shared German nationality existed. In practical terms, this meant that any GDR citizen who successfully crossed into West Berlin or the Federal Republic could collect West German papers immediately. In contrast to the restrictive ethnic dimension of West German citizenship laws embodied by the classification of migrants from the Mediterranean rim that heavily contributed to the economic miracle as “guest workers,” this ethnic definition of citizenship underpinned the Federal Republic’s openness for East German refugees. The underlying interpretation of one German nation in two states thus illustrated the Brandt administration’s policy of ameliorating the ramifications of German division in hope of eventually overcoming it.

Brandt received the 1971 Nobel Peace Prize in recognition for his efforts to reduce tensions of the Cold War in Europe. This honor underscores Brandt’s enduring achievement for reaching out across the entrenched lines of a global conflict. But his years in Berlin advocating

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West Berlin’s viability as the Outpost of Freedom preceded and informed his later policies as Chancellor. By contextualizing his Neue Ostpolitik with its local roots in Berlin, his détente agenda emerges as a creative reinterpretation of the Outpost of Freedom narrative. By adjusting its tactics, the most prominent exponent of the network found lasting success in firmly embedding the postwar German democracy in the Western Alliance, while keeping the question of national unity on the table.
CONCLUSION

Excavating the Outpost of Freedom on the Spree

Present-day Berlin constitutes a *Sehnsuchtsort*, a place of desire, for scores of young Germans, Americans, and beyond. Between 2011 and 2014, the city attracted 175,000 new inhabitants from across Germany, Europe and the world.¹ Berlin draws these newly arrived by the hope of finding freedom – albeit differently accentuated than during the early Cold War. The city promises affordable housing, diversity, and thriving art scene to a global audience. This myth rests both on nostalgia for West Berlin’s bohemian counter culture of the 1970s and 1980s and the creative explosion in the former East Berlin during the 1990s, making it a genuine site of West-East coproduction.

Thus this characterization of Berlin as “poor, but sexy” has become the latest master narrative to grasp a confounding city, dominating earlier layers. Moreover, these reverberations of David Bowie’s West Berlin of the 1970s marked by experimentation make Ernst Reuter’s West Berlin of the 1940s and 1950s marked by grim determination look increasingly foreign.² This perception is buttressed by fading West Berlin landmarks: ICE trains no longer stop at the iconic Zoo Station, while a clothing retail chain took over the venerable Café Kranzler.


But the perception of a vanished metropolis has most recently renewed popular interest in West Berlin’s history. In 2012, Ulrike Sterblich’s youth memoir on “a half-city that is no more” found a remarkable reception.¹ In 2014, an exhibition on “WEST BERLIN: An Island in Search of the Mainland” in the Ephraim Palais City Museum surpassed expectations in the number of visitors.² In 2015, the feature film documentary “B-Movie: Lust & Sound in West-Berlin” found critical and commercial success by introducing West Berlin’s art scene to a new generation. British Berliner Mark Reeder took stock of his “wild West Berlin” that “will never be same again – it no longer exists,”³ raising the question of West Berlin’s peculiarities lost in time, but also of its enduring legacies.

In effect, present-day Berlin as the reemerging metropolis in Europe’s center – geographically, but also in cultural and political prominence – directly derived from the Outpost narrative and the network that popularized it for decades. These propagandists of freedom played not only an instrumental role in securing West Berlin’s viability in the Cold War, but also in overcoming it by securing the German government’s return to Berlin. In 1991, the future seat of government in newly reunified Germany divided politicians across party lines. Despite decades of ritualized professions by the West German Federal Republic’s Bundestag affirming Berlin’s status as the desired capital of a reunified Germany, the delegates hesitated to relocate to the Spree when given the opportunity. Instead, a powerful faction centered around the large North Rhine-Westphalia caucus favored retaining the federal government in Bonn on the Rhine. This group contended that Bonn, in its quaint Western environment, signified forty years of

economic affluence, international peace, and democratic stability. More ominously, some Western proponents remarked that Bonn thus contrasted positively to Germans’ experiences with authoritarian governments based in Berlin. Leading up to the vote, journalists and politicians alike declined projections, especially since delegates were allowed to vote without being bound by party ties.

The decisive 1991 Bundestag debate witnessed one of Willy Brandt’s last public appearances. The cancer-stricken Bundestag President by seniority returned to the floor to prevent “Berlin, Outpost of Freedom in difficult years” from being “fobbed off with a meaningless honorific title.” Brandt briefly cast off his elder statesman persona to reprise the role of impassioned West Berlin Mayor during the Cold War. Suggestions that Berlin’s past during the horrific Nazi Era precluded its reemergence as German capital infuriated Brandt. He denounced the “unsavory” attempts to “brand Berlin as more of a stronghold of criminal Nazism […] than other German cities or to blame the city and its population for the SED leadership in its Eastern boroughs.”

Brandt attacked proponents of continued Rhenish Gemütlichkeit with the same passion as he did against Stalinist lackeys in postwar Berlin. Moreover, he polemically turned historical analogies against Bonn, when he thundered, “in France nobody would have thought about staying in the relatively idyllic Vichy, after foreign powers did no longer prevent a return to the capital on the Seine.” He lauded “Bonn’s accomplishments” that “have historic significance” yet quickly added: “But West Berlin’s self-assertion of freedom predated them. The cradle of German-Western friendship stood on the Spree. The June 1953 Uprising […] stood not at the end, but at the beginning of the prison revolt that has now given all of Europe the chance for
unity.” As during his tenure as Governing Mayor of West Berlin, Brandt embedded the Outpost narrative within his own biography. Brandt resorted to this fiery rhetoric in order to convince wavering delegates of Berlin, the pivot of his lifelong vision for a Germany that was progressive, but not provincial.

Under the influence of Willy Brandt’s appearance and with the help of Wolfgang Schäuble, the Bundestag voted narrowly, 338 to 320, to relocate to Berlin. The final bill adopted contains a rare direct quote, by sponsor Brandt, to explain the government’s move across the country: “We would not be gathered here [in a democratically reunified Germany], if Berlin (West) would not have stood firm between 1946 and 1962.” Thus Brandt employed the Outpost narrative one last time to shift the foundations of the Federal Republic to an enlarged Berlin Republic, which ramifications contemporaries explore to this day.

I. The City

This enduring legacy of the Outpost narrative illustrates how Berlin’s urban history exemplifies seminal developments in German history, while also exhibiting important peculiarities. Despite of the city’s perception as the embodiment of divided Germany’s fate, West Berlin held a peculiar position within the Federal Republic until 1990. While federal German laws applied to West Berlin, these deferred to Allied occupation prerogatives. This legal patchwork created a unique insider-outsider perspective for the municipality and its inhabitants, who could not vote in Bundestag elections, and were exempted from conscription in the West

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German Bundeswehr. West Berliners carried West German passports, but not ID cards. The city’s singular legal situation caused confusion just as it created opportunities. A group of left-wing émigrés first realized the opportunities in confusion by moving to Berlin in hope to revive their political careers and introduce a more stable democracy during the late 1940s.

These remigrés came to postwar Berlin gradually, but in a deliberate reverse chain migration. These former anti-fascist activists returned to Berlin convinced that “the border between freedom and slavery runs across Potsdamer Platz.” Moreover, remigrés such as Paul Hertz, Hans Hirschfeld, and Willy Brandt highlighted Berlin’s cosmopolitan appeal that “tipped the scales” to risk returning to the capital of their deeply alienating birth country. The career of these politicians in Cold War Berlin illustrates how this peculiar urban environment offered them unique chances because of their transnational background and international experiences.

The presence of a robust and ambitious cast of remigrés as well as the subtle but direct intervention of American authorities in West Berlin’s political process underscore the city’s significance in the context of German history. These former anti-fascist activists’ conscious choice of Berlin as a location unique distinct from the rest of Germany, but also having tremendous clout over the country as a whole, challenges the historical scholarship on postwar Germany. While the network skillfully exploited West Berlin’s special insider-outsider relationship with the Federal Republic proper, the established literature discusses West Berlin’s history eclectically. Voluminous grand narratives of German history such as Hans-Ulrich Wehler’s Gesellschaftsgeschichte or Ulrich Herbert’s recent Geschichte Deutschlands im 20.

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Jahrhundert cover postwar Berlin only intermittently as just another metropolis. These accounts concentrate on indispensable developments such as the Berlin Airlift and the 1967/68 Student Revolt, but effectively decontextualize the half-city’s own inner workings. Such a selective perspective of West Berlin can conveniently concentrate on the argument that West Germany’s explosive economic revival preceded gradual acceptance of the Federal Republic’s democratic framework, sidestepping West Berlin’s case study of increasingly stymied economic growth and militant defense of democratic values against “totalitarian threats.”

In contrast, this study charts West Berlin’s rancorous urban politics as it pioneered seminal developments in the Federal Republic of Germany, rendering it an alternative to the West German brand of democratization. First, the Berlin SPD remigrés anticipated the national SPD’s 1959 Bad Godesberg Program, which scrapped Marxist theory and endorsed West German NATO membership. Second, it was in West Berlin that this network groomed the ambitious remigré Brandt for a career in national and international politics. Third, West Berliners styled their fashions, customs, and political views after the American model with particular enthusiasm. For Berliners, Stalinist dictatorship was a traumatic experience, rather than forming an abstract threat on the Rhine, which propelled these landmark developments to a considerable extent.

Thus postwar Berlin presented a unique confluence between the local and global during the opening stages of the Cold War, highlighting both the global reach of the paradigm, but simultaneously the agency of locals in navigating the divide. Crucially, Social Democratic leadership around Mayor-elect Reuter first convinced their American occupiers that Berlin was not only redeemable for democracy, but actually the embodiment of democracy in the Cold War.

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This Outpost of Freedom narrative came not only to define Berlin’s Western sectors, but also gave its political leadership considerable political clout in Washington, DC, as it responded to the Truman Doctrine. These Berlin SPD remigrés subverted the occupier-occupied power relationship with American authorities by shrewdly leveraging their location as the focal point of the Cold War paired with the moral authority and personal contacts they had gained during their time in exile.

Berlin’s many and malleable faces preceded this unlikely public relations success. Propagandists of Freedom such as Shepard Stone and Hans Hirschfeld could only convince the highest echelons of American foreign policy and broad swaths of the American public by connecting their political agenda with competing narratives employed by earlier American visitors to describe Berlin. Since the late 19th century, scores of American writers and journalists had described Berlin as Europe’s laboratory of modernity that could elucidate America’s future.10 This reputation of cosmopolitanism fueled the Nazis’ attempts to brand Berlin as the brown metropolis, epitomized by the 1936 Olympics. Due to the Nazis’ reign of terror across Europe, this spatial Nazification of the cityscape severed American emotional bonds to Berlin during World War II. However, the network drew on these earlier benign incarnations of Berlin by fashioning the city’s western sectors as the legitimate heir of Weimar era cosmopolitan Berlin. In parallel fashion, the network unloaded problematic legacies of Berlin’s most recent history onto the Soviet sector under the assertion of a totalitarian continuity.

Conversely, the Manichean paradigm of the global Cold War affected not only the city’s deepening political division, but also Berliners’ personal political inclinations. While standard

accounts portray Berlin as a stage of Cold War dramatics, it also led to a pioneering political realignment of the city’s politics. For instance, the competing rallies to celebrate May Day 1950 illustrate how Eastern and Western municipal administrations fought over the meaning of left-wing politics in postwar Germany in close combat in the streets of Berlin. While the SED held a pompous Stalinist parade at the Lustgarten, Hans Hirschfeld organized a mass rally in front of the Reichstag with American funding and publicized by RIAS. Both sides appropriated the past for their own purposes. The West Berlin SPD and the East Berlin SED each tried to claim the legacy of the German workers movement to lend their own new polity popular legitimacy in a largely working-class city. This emotional rivalry reinforced the schism between Communists and Social Democrats that many émigrés had sought to overcome in prewar exile. Notably, the West Berlin rally made a supra-party appeal by including speakers from the CDU hinting at the reconciliation between bourgeois parties and the Social Democrats against Communism that underpinned the stability of postwar West German democracy. This unique connection between global and local in postwar Berlin has repercussions on the course of German history not fully acknowledged by scholarship until now.

The literature’s emphasis on the Federal Republic’s history as a success narrative\textsuperscript{11} has marginalized the Berlin Social Democrats’ pivotal contribution to the Republic’s founding consensus. Outlining this network and its Outpost narrative balances the largely Rhenish focus in our understanding of postwar West German democratic reconstruction. Without doubt, the CDU under Adenauer’s leadership recast the former Reich’s Western regions in a conservative, culturally Catholic mold that became Western Europe’s most dynamic economy closely allied to

\textsuperscript{11} E.g. Edgar Wolfrum, \textit{Die geglückte Demokratie: Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland von ihren Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart}, 1st ed. (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 2006).
France. But this German-American network that came to define postwar Berlin in the eyes of the German, American, and global publics alike complements our understanding of the Federal Republic’s early years. In this perspective, postwar Berlin exemplifies the new polity’s endorsement by returned émigrés, transatlantic powerbrokers, and Social Democrats of Jewish and Lutheran descent that underscores another dimension of the nascent Federal Republic’s broad acceptance.

These diverse backgrounds highlight a higher capacity of the Federal Republic to appeal beyond its core Rhenish demographics than is routinely acknowledged. Now, fifteen years after the federal government relocated to Berlin, the limitations of this Bonn-centered perspective become more acute. Conversely, Berlin’s history merits close scrutiny as it exemplifies experience in integrating thousands of diverse backgrounds, which has become a defining issue for the present Berlin Republic.

II. The Narrative

The conception of West Berlin as the Outpost of Freedom shaped the horizons of actors that determined political outcomes, reinforcing the relevance of ideas in the historical process. Even voices in American foreign policy that prided themselves in their dispassionate calculations concluded that a 481 square kilometers small enclave behind the Iron Curtain could determine a global chess game with nuclear missiles. Berlin lacked intrinsic military relevance, but possessed special symbolic value for Soviets, Americans, and Germans of all political stripes, even if filled with vastly different meanings.


For the remigrés, in particular, the Outpost of Freedom narrative encapsulated an understanding of anti-totalitarianism that had expanded the definition of anti-fascism during Nazi-imposed exile. Both the 1936-1939 Spanish Civil War and the 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact fractured the tentative anti-fascist consensus between Communist and non-Communist German-speaking émigrés. Breakaway from the majority SPD after the party’s 1932 decision to oppose the Nazis legally, not militantly.

-> joining the SAP

-> flight to Norway at the age of 19. Freshman year as a refugee

-> Hope for a popular Front

In similar fashion, Neu Beginnen leaders like Paul Hertz sought to fight for Democracy in the ranks of the Western Allies after Stalin’s reconciliation with Nazi Germany had alienated them from Soviet-style Communism. By the time the Nazi leadership unleashed World War II in September 1939, renewed suspicion of the Communists replaced hopes of an anti-fascist Popular Front for these formerly Social Democratic émigrés, exposing the fissures within Germany’s political left that would become a wide gulf in postwar Berlin.

While the Nazi Wehrmacht conducted its rampage across Europe, the discourse among Neu Beginnen members coalesced around the term “freedom.” For instance, Hans Hirschfeld framed his motivation to enlist in the French Army from an internment camp in 1940 as the defense of “freedom” against “the fascist states of violence.”\(^\text{14}\) Three years later, as the Allies had stemmed the Nazi tide militarily, Ernst Reuter used “freedom” to outline his manifesto for a democratic postwar Germany. Often overlooked, Reuter’s manifesto for a “German Freedom

Federation” reached out to the democratic bourgeois parties to rebuild Germany without the Communists.\(^{15}\) Since Reuter had deliberately fashioned the Freedom Federation as an alternative to the Kremlin-backed “Nationalkommitee Freies Deutschland” of Walter Ulbricht, this 1943 manifesto marked the first use of “freedom” as shorthand for anti-Communism before the Cold War opened. Already in exile, Reuter sought to capitalize on both the term’s positive connotations and semantic ambiguity, which he would employ successfully against the Stalinist KPD and its GDR era SED successor in postwar Berlin.

The success and composition of this network derived from the ability of the term “freedom” to resonate across diverse demographics. First, it convinced the future Propagandists of Freedom themselves. Not only did the term vindicate the struggles of German émigrés, but it also made them relatable to American associates by invoking a staple item of the United States’ political culture. Defending “freedom” as the principal dividend from the American war effort animated American leftists like Hurwitz and liberals such as Stone on their “mad mission” to make Germany “peaceful and anti-totalitarian.”\(^{16}\) After the quadripartite Allied rule in Berlin had broken down in the summer of 1948, Mayor-elect Reuter greatly expanded the audiences of this terminology by exhorting Berliners, but also the German and American publics to “look upon this city” as an “Outpost of Freedom.”\(^{17}\)

\(^{15}\) David E. Barclay, *Schaut auf diese Stadt: Der unbekannte Ernst Reuter* (Berlin: Siedler, 2000), 179–180.


Recasting Berlin not only as redeemable for, but as a paragon of Freedom enabled Reuter and his exile-derived transatlantic support network to gain the attention and esteem of American foreign policy makers. Reuter redefined Berlin to receive American assistance President Truman had promised in his eponymous Doctrine. American aid to Berlin’s Western sectors took their most dramatic form in supplying the city with necessities during the Berlin Airlift, but also kept its disrupted economy afloat through subsidies. Crucially, American occupation authorities, OMGUS and its successor HICOG, adopted this narrative as their own in explaining their efforts. Their Public Affairs Branch popularized this narrative by building RIAS, Berlin’s most popular radio station, hosting elaborate pageants, such as the installation of the Freedom Bell, and funding the infrastructure to stage mass rallies, such as West Berlin’s May Day Demonstrations. These costly popular projects illustrate how this transatlantic network gained access to the deep coffers of American Cold War foreign policy after convincing the American executive and large parts of the public of Berlin’s vital importance in the global conflict.

Ironically, the semantic flexibility of “freedom” directly contributed to its success among several distinct audiences. The evocative term roused individuals to shared “anti-totalitarian” activism despite differing conceptions of what it meant. For instance, the close working relationship between US Secretary of State Dulles and West Berlin Mayor Reuter in hope that Berlin “could radiate Western influence” seems strange even by the standards of Cold War alliances, but was remarkably smooth.18 The conviction of Berlin’s relevance for Europe’s political future brought together American conservatives, such as Dulles, who cast his opposition to Communism in religious terms with self-professed “Freiheitliche Sozialisten,” and

18 Department of State, “Memorandum Dulles - Reuter” March 20, 1953, RG 466, US High Commissioner for Germany (HICOG), Berlin Element, Office of the Director, Classified General Records, 1949-55, E-162, Box 38, Folder Pol Berlin, National Archives, College Park.
Reuter who had first entered politics as a public speaker promoting atheism. Accepting West Berlin as the Outpost of Freedom and the underpinning view of the Soviet Union as a totalitarian threat in the Cold War outweighed such fundamental distinctions.

Moreover, this narrative construction gave politicians such as Reuter and Brandt leverage to gain considerable political concessions from their American occupiers. These remigrés’ deliberate and shrewd strategy deserves wider recognition in the scholarship on the Cold War, as it can improve our understanding of the global confrontation by expanding the horizons beyond Washington, DC, and Moscow. Understandably, much of the literature focuses on these dominating powers, controlling the nuclear arsenals that left the world in limbo. But the agency of West Berlin’s leadership demonstrates how select ostracized Germans influenced American foreign policy by shifting the perceptions of its leaders. Notably, the network propagating this sea change relied on a narrative that was compatible to the Manichean Cold War logic, but derived from the margins of leftist German-speaking exile.

Reuter’s daring rebranding of Berlin’s ruins as the Outpost of Freedom in the Cold War offered orientation for many of his Berliner and American contemporaries in making sense of the confusing situation in 1948. Berlin’s dominant narrative of postwar reconstruction appealed uniquely to the collective memories of both local Germans and American occupiers. For Berliners, this narrative simultaneously offered them political relevance, recognition as victims of Communism that increasingly displaced unsettling questions of culpability for the Nazis’ crimes, but also offered a vision to rebuild their city in democratic fashion. American officials reveled in the role of benevolent occupiers, as it offered affirmation at a critical juncture. Former

inhabitants of the Nazi enemy capital yearning for American-style liberal democracy not only pointed to the political potency of their ideals, but also affirmed American Cold War foreign policy in the eyes of the United States public.

In light of its broad appeal, the network pushing the narrative redefined West Berlin as the showcase of Cold War democracy. Scarred by the dislocating experiences of National Socialism, the network’s members fashioned postwar Berlin as the proving ground of a “wehrhafte Demokratie,” or “militant democracy,” ostensibly against all forms of totalitarianism. Through the narrative, the network exploited visceral anti-communism prevalent in Berlin after years of Nazi “anti-bolshevist” indoctrination and its seeming confirmation through Soviet warfare and heavy-handed occupation policies productively to broaden the support for a liberal democracy in Berlin’s Western sectors. The closing of the ranks between the SPD and its non-Communist CDU and FDP competitors in defense against Stalinism, made many divisive questions of the Weimar Republic moot. This anti-totalitarian consensus stood in marked contrast to the disintegration of Weimar’s last popularly elected government in 1930, when SPD Chancellor Herrmann Müller governing coalition with the bourgeois parties fractured over details in funding the Republic’s strained social security system.

The Outpost of Freedom narrative cast West Berlin as the site of a selective, yet comprehensive reinterpretation of the German past to underpin this emerging anti-Communist consensus. As exemplified through the elaborate May Day mass rallies, the Social Democrats sought to appropriate the legacies of the German workers movement in order to lend legitimacy to their polity in a largely working-class city. The narrative’s flexibility allowed members of the network to simultaneously fashion West Berlin as heir of cosmopolitan Weimar Berlin – without
the political street fights of the Nazi SA and the Communist Rotfrontkämpferbund – to a more educated and international audience.

Thus the Outpost of Freedom narrative contributed to the comprehensive political realignment that undergirded West German democratization in the guise of anti-Communism. Before the Cold War paradigm fully developed in the calculations of Soviet and American foreign policy, postwar Berlin’s urban politics had mended the rift between the bourgeois parties and the Social Democrats, while widening it between the Social Democrats and the Communists to levels reminiscent of Weimar’s final days in exemplary fashion. Thus such an integrative anti-Communism that emerged in the streets of Berlin played a pivotal role in German postwar democratization. Granted, the term “anti-Communism” is loaded with a checkered past that led to its decline in scholarly popularity. Notably, politicians of the transformed SED successor party bucked this trend focusing exclusively on anti-Communism’s repressive aspects.20 In contrast, the discussion of anti-Communism as a constitutive element of the early Federal Republic has begun only recently.21 This case study illustrates how German and American, non-Communist leftists reframed anti-Communist continuities productively for democratization. Rather than being the Federal Republic’s original sin, the success of this narrative highlights anti-Communism’s integrative qualities that have either been overlooked or taken for granted, but determined West Berlin’s political stability against the odds.


III. The Network

Securing West Berlin’s viability united a diverse cast of actors as Propagandists of Freedom. Their insistence on the redeemable qualities of “freedom” derived from autobiographical experience. Fighting for a liberal democracy and against Stalinism in postwar Germany vindicated personal and intellectual journeys during up to 16 years of exile for key German members of the network such as Hirschfeld, Hertz, and Brandt. The emergence of these politicians as the SPD’s most passionate proponents of fighting the Cold War within the American-led Western Alliance constituted a surprising development, as they all started as left-wing activists. The Berlin SPD remigrés who pushed for a hard line against the Communists since the opening of World War II, ironically, had broken the SPD’s party discipline to reach out to them in hope of anti-fascist solidarity in exile. However, these former left-wing breakaways from the SPD realized the dangers of Stalinism quicker than many others, making them adept for the postwar political landscape redrawn by the Cold War’s repercussions. The group biographical component inherent in the network perspective connects exile and postwar eras, thus transcending artificially compartmentalized eras. Understanding the caesura of 1945 not only as a divider, but also as a transformative period opens the opportunity to reconstruct the emergence of an anti-Communist, pro-Western SPD in hitherto unknown detail.

The experiences and contacts these remigrés made in exile enabled them to pioneer a new kind of political left for Germany in West Berlin. Hans Hirschfeld’s transatlantic career illustrates how direct contribution to the American war effort made the remigrés particularly adept to succeed in the Cold War. Reuter as a skilled politician reached out to fellow émigrés, bringing figures such as Hertz, Hirschfeld, and Brandt into his inner circle. While most of these remigrés arrived only after the 1946 Fusionskampf had reinforced the enmity between
Communists and Social Democrats, these latecomers inserted themselves into Berlin’s urban politics through a clear sense of mission and united as a community of experience of exile. Unlike many of their Berlin SPD comrades, appreciation of liberal democracy embodied by New Deal America through often-personal experience rivaled their contempt for Soviet-style Communism.

Whether or not close combat with the rival GDR regime necessitated a broad programmatic renewal of the SPD became a contentious question that divided the Berlin SPD for nearly a decade, from 1949 to 1958. The remigré faction became embroiled in one of postwar Germany’s most bitter internal party feuds with local Chairman Franz Neumann and his supporters of the “Keulenriege.” The name’s double entendre, meaning both a “buddy collection” in the Berliner dialect and a “clubbing squad” already hinted at the group’s roots in the party’s working-class milieu, as well as its experience in Berlin’s combative urban politics. Fundamental disagreements over the party’s priorities stemming from different experiences in exile or inside the Nazi’s Third Reich fueled this rivalry as much as personal ambition. In contrast to Kurt Schumacher the remigrés prioritized West Berlin’s full integration into the Western alliance, if necessary over German unity. To them, the defense of civil rights against Communism trumped Weimar era party aspirations such as selective nationalization of industries. Decades later, Brandt still highlighted the experience of exile as a point of distinction: “What counted was how you had coped with your experience of emigration, of party history, of the Weimar Republic, […] and whether your sense of reality had been sharpened.”

extreme case, this internal party rivalry tragically pitted concentration camp survivors like Neumann against remigrés such as Reuter and Brandt.

The remigré faction relied on media tactics as much as party meetings in this clash over the control and priorities of West Berlin’s dominant political party. Through their network contacts, these Berlin SPD politicians attracted direct, yet covert support of from American occupation authorities. Reuter, Brandt, and Hirschfeld in particular had gained the backing of key U.S. personnel such as Public Affairs Director Shepard Stone, who also controlled RIAS. Through these contacts dating back to wartime Manhattan, they secured favorable coverage on Berlin’s most trusted news source and direct financial transfer of at least 306,500 Deutschmarks.

This politically delicate operation also was first trace of then journalist Brandt’s inclusion in Reuter’s innermost circle and brought him in contact with American authorities. Stone rationalized American support for a nominally Marxist party by Berlin SPD remigrés’ acceptance of West German inclusion in NATO. Despite Neumann and Schumacher’s long history of fervent anti-Communism, the former leftwing radicals Reuter and Brandt promised the westernization of the national SPD that they advocated in Berlin. While Willy Brandt would later put the Federal Republic’s relationship with its Eastern neighbors on a new footing, the best-known alumnus of this network pioneered a Neue Westpolitik first. Before the Nobel Peace Prize laureate could initiate his détente foreign policy as Chancellor, he only accrued the necessary political capital in West Berlin by introducing himself as dependable anti-Communist to West German voters and steadfast ally to American diplomats.

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The network’s shadow campaign for a pro-Western political left shines a new light on the United States’ occupation in postwar Germany as well. While the literature traditionally underscores the discrepancy between the sweeping goals of reeducation and the naively bureaucratic attempt of its implementation, John McCloy’s PUB division intervened in German politics informally and shrewdly. These American backchannel politics built upon the intimate personal experience with German culture and politics among second row occupation officials such as Stone, Karl Mautner, Charles Lewis, Gordon Ewing, Robert Lochner, Gerard Gert, and others. Like their remigrés allies, these officials leveraged their unique outsider-insider perspective with great effect. Their expertise helped American policies in West Berlin stay clear of the ideological straitjackets that led to disastrous results in other contemporary United States interventions in Guatemala and Iran. The counterintuitive support for former left-wing radicals, however, stemmed not from decisions made in Washington, but from the creative interpretation of these directives by prescient managers such as McCloy and the convictions of left-liberals such as Stone. Moreover, Senator McCarthy’s witch-hunts that ravaged through Washington almost derailed the network’s ambitious projects in West Berlin. Drawing on personal feuds within HICOG, Roy Cohn and G. David Schine deliberately targeted the network’s members for their cosmopolitanism. McCarthyism in West Berlin thus adds yet another example on how domestic anti-Communist hysteria undercut American efforts on waging the Cold War effectively.

The ensuing joint German-American campaign against McCarthyism highlights the resiliency of the network in the face of adversity. Together with the Soviet suppression of the East German Uprising and Reuter’s sudden death, these witch-hunts culminated in the crisis year of 1953. The June 17th Uprising confirmed the broad appeal of the narrative, but also revealed its
inability to topple the GDR regime. Reuter’s sudden death robbed the network of its most visible figurehead. In characteristic fashion, the network responded to these cascading crises by shielding itself in the heroic narrative, while coordinating to use all transatlantic resources at its disposal.

This remarkable cohesion paved the way for mainstream success with Willy Brandt as its new public figurehead from 1954 to 1961. Informal assets proved instrumental in Brandt’s emergence as new standard-bearer as he possessed emigration credentials and had shown his political reliability in 1950 by processing clandestine American donations to Reuter. In line with the network’s public relations bent, it groomed Brandt for higher offices by polishing a youthful and upbeat public persona. Stone at the Ford Foundation coordinated high-profile tours across the United States, old contacts ensured friendly and persistent coverage on RIAS, and Brandt’s first autobiography, ghostwritten by a New York émigré, introduced him as a stanch defender of freedom to both the American and German publics.

Brandt’s carefully crafted image proved particularly successful in broadcasting media that increasingly defined political campaigns. For instance, Brandt’s visibility as President of the Abgeordnetenhaus allowed him to succeed Otto Suhr as Governing Mayor of West Berlin through popular demand and against an initially Neumann-dominated party machine. Moreover, the network presented Brandt as the new face of a new party that embodied the larger social shifts propelled by the economic miracle. In contrast to Neumann’s party machine anchored in the Berlin’s traditional working-class boroughs, the network recast the SPD as a center of the left big-tent party that opened itself for white-collar middle-class voters such as the public servants that increasingly defined West Berlin’s electorate. By fashioning West Berlin as the model Cold War city – heroic against Communism, economically successful under SPD tenure,
and retaining its cosmopolitan flair – the Berlin SPD remigrés found rapid acceptance in the
party that had long eluded them. In 1959, the national party adopted their combination of anti-
Communism and support for NATO in the Bad Godesberg Program. Two years later, the SPD
threw its lot behind Brandt as nominee for Chancellor, desperate to unseat the aging Adenauer.

The conscious obfuscation of the network’s roots in exile constituted the flipside of this
successful adaption to new demands posed by the implications of postwar prosperity. The
network’s members experienced enmity on both sides of the Atlantic precisely because of the
unique experience that had brought them together. For instance, McCarthy targeted Edmund
Schechter for his émigré background. Neumann and his allies pioneered what would become the
tactic of choice against Brandt for decades to come: dropping veiled accusations to media outlets
accusing Brandt of alleged leftwing radicalism during his years in exile. Conservative rivals
such as Adenauer and Strauß later adopted this strategy to assail Brandt’s impeccable credentials
of fighting the Communists on the frontline of the Cold War by insidiously equating wartime
exile with treason.

Brandt’s response illustrates the network’s two-prong strategy of stressing their track
record in the Cold War while obscuring their journey to these convictions during the Nazi era. In
revising his published writings in exile, Brandt disavowed a constituent part of his political
identity. A former anti-fascist activist felt compelled to downplay his principled opposition to
Nazism in order to stay electable in federal German elections. In 1961 and 1965, Brandt
continuously increased the SPD’s share of votes, but a direct move to the Federal Republic’s
executive in Bonn eluded him. While the generally self-serving if not cynical relationship with

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the most recent past in the first two decades of the Federal Republic has been well documented, Brandt’s self-censorship highlights the intensity of the hostility these remigrés faced.

The GDR’s construction of the Berlin Wall on August 13, 1961 changed the political fundamentals that engendered challenging debates within the network. The SED’s brutal measure had paradoxical political effects on West Berlin. The Wall’s construction signaled the SED’s begrudging recognition of West Berlin’s viability, while the city’s inhabitants mourned the severed economic, social, and familial ties. Popular manifestations of despair prompted Mayor Brandt to exhort President Kennedy to action. Only gradually would the network adopt Kennedy’s view of the Wall as an Eastern declaration of bankruptcy. Internally, the network stridently debated whether to intensify their rhetoric or search for alternative solutions.

Kennedy’s triumphant 1963 visit to West Berlin has retained its place as one of the most popular manifestations of the Outpost narrative. During his stay, Brandt and his PR Director Egon Bahr already deliberated on how to best couch their new initiative in Kennedy’s overtures for the relaxation of Cold War tensions. Their new motto of “change through rapprochement” with the Eastern bloc reconfigured the Outpost narrative. Devoid of Rollback fantasies against Communism that the Wall had shattered, it proposed direct negotiations with the GDR to ameliorate the impact of the Wall, while retaining West Berlin as a liberal-democratic enclave in the center of the GDR. Within the network this different tactic met a controversial reaction, but it maintained the long-term goals by broadening acceptance for the Federal Republic’s Westbindung in Bonn, while keeping the German question open in Berlin. These internal debates deserve larger scholarly attention. While Chancellor Brandt’s famed Neue Ostpolitik is now universally lauded as step to eventually overcome Europe’s Cold War division, its origins lie in Berlin’s uniquely global and local politics. The GDR’s construction of the Wall inspired a
creative reaction by Brandt and Bahr as a different interpretation of the Outpost of Freedom narrative. These parts of the network pluralized détente with a Berlin variant while still calculating on West Berlin’s long term destabilizing effects on the surrounding GDR.

IV. The Legacies

One of the Outpost of Freedom’s most visible legacies lies just behind the former Wall in the form of Berlin’s present embarrassment. The new Berlin Brandenburg Airport Willy Brandt has suffered from billions of Euros in cost overruns and remains years behind schedule. But the name of this stymied construction site serves well as an indicator for the official recognition of the network’s most visible member. The Berlin Republic’s pride in Brandt as ambassador of the “other Germany” that had resisted Nazism, icon of the political left, and transformative Chancellor marks a stunning reversal from the perfidious character assassination campaigns he faced. More broadly, it demonstrates how dramatically the esteem of German exile in public discourse and historiography has changed since the 1960s. This esteem adds another incentive to review the contributions of remigrés to postwar Germany. The cosmopolitanism that defined their biographies and once subjected them to suspicions now seems pioneering for present-day Berlin.

The German-American network’s concurrent rebranding of Nazi Germany’s former capital into a symbol of freedom in the Cold War still resonates today in popular conceptions of Berlin as an open-minded world city. This enduring imprint of the network points to the malleability of narratives to grasp a diverse metropolis with a checkered past. The conception of West Berlin as an “Outpost of Freedom” popularized an interpretation of Berlin’s history that drew from its
explosive growth in the Wilhelmine era and its role as Europe’s creative hub during the Weimar Republic’s best years. Stressing Berlin’s past as a cosmopolitan city that was in many ways politically and culturally distinct from Germany at large allowed its propagandists to counter competing, less flattering associations, such as Berlin’s role as the Nazi Reichshauptstadt. But unique to Berlin, the dominant narrative of postwar reconstruction appealed to the collective memories of both local Germans and American occupiers.

Moreover, the “Outpost of Freedom” narrative created an imagined community based on a shared memory that spanned the Atlantic. The durability and cohesion of the narrative are further metrics for its extraordinary success. Berlin’s sustained significance on the mental maps of Americans still points to the narrative’s transatlantic origins. More than twenty years after the last soldier of the US Berlin Brigade has left the city, the renewed German capital remains a preeminent American lieu de mémoire. If anything, the 1989 collapse of the Wall renewed the popularity of this narrative. An increasing stream of American tourists and steady string of dignitaries reinforces its significance each year. For instance President Barack Obama exclaimed in 2013 that “here […] Berliners carved out an island of democracy against the greatest of odds […] supported by an airlift of hope,” to enlist the Outpost narrative for his foreign policy vision of global “peace with justice.” In a wry understatement, Obama noted that he was “not the first American President to come to this [Brandenburg] gate.” Since President Kennedy, all but three sitting US Presidents visited Berlin. Each one has sought to bolster the appeal of his foreign policy by embedding it within the narrative of the Outpost of Freedom.

Yet this narrative cannot frame present-day Berlin exclusively. Just like the unique crosscurrents between global and local had defined politics in Cold War Berlin, the 1990 reunification between West and East Berlin created a fractured urban memoryscape in which the fault lines run not only chronologically, but also geographically.\textsuperscript{26} For instance, two museums, namely the Alliiertenmuseum and the German-Russian Museum, on two opposite ends of the metropolis illustrate the gulf between the divided memory cultures on the Cold War alone. After reunification, the Alliiertenmuseum opened in suburban Zehlendorf in the former US garrison’s cinema, ironically named “The Outpost.” Its exhibition seeks to celebrate the cultural bonding between West Berliners and Allied forces in the face of the communist enemy. Less than twenty years after its inauguration, the Alliiertenmuseum carries the air of a victory lap for the Cold War. The other Allied force in Berlin, the Soviet Union and its successor states, were consoled with their own, smaller capitulation museum across town in Karlshorst, whose exhibition highlights the victory of the Red Army and the sacrifices of the Soviet population and Army during World War II, while sidestepping the controversial policies the USSR pursued during German reconstruction and the Cold War.

Recently, politicians and academics have proposed to fill this void measuring the city’s extent with a new Cold War Museum. The location in Mitte would prevent the former Checkpoint Charlie border crossing’s irrevocable transformation into a “Snackpoint Charlie.”\textsuperscript{27} A diverse cast ranging from Czech dissident and later President Václav Havel, former West


Berlin Mayor Hans-Jochen Vogel, to former US Secretary of State Lawrence S. Eagleburger sought to offer a state of the art educational opportunity to the masses of visitors interested in the Cold War. However, self-appointed custodians of West Berlin’s Cold War heroics attacked the new museum project as if it had been concocted by Communist apparatchiks determined to distort history. Former West Berlin’s tabloid *B.Z.* could hardly control its anger at such a scholarly sound methodology: “At Checkpoint Charlie, one has to point out who was the aggressor after 1945: […] The Soviets [and] the SED under Walter Ulbricht. It is as simple and brutal as that. […] Who wants us to sweep the Communist atrocities under the carpet?”

Yet contextualization is not marginalization. Nearly seventy years after grassroots resistance to the Soviet brokered KPD-SPD merger anticipated the fault lines of the global conflict and 25 years after its remarkably peaceful conclusion, Berlin has the potential to elucidate its citizens and visitors on the Cold War through historicizing an integrated perspective. Any plausible history of the Cold War needs to portray the two belligerent camps as such. This does not mean moral equation of both sides, but dispassionate analysis of internal developments and conflicts within the blocs. For instance, West Berliners did not topple the Wall, but pressure from popular opposition movements centered in Leipzig and East Berlin. Conversely, Berlin served not only as focal point of the Cold War, but also of German postwar rehabilitation.

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momentous developments were not insulated, but rather depended on each other, as Anti-Communist passions galvanized West Berliners productively towards a stable democracy.

In this unique and volatile postwar situation, individuals with a bicultural background such as the Berlin SPD remigrés and American Germany specialists within HICOG’s PUB could play a particularly important role as cultural mediators. Through personal history and contacts, they understood quicker than most that the Communists’ takeover attempt of the nation’s traditional capital opened up an opportunity to broaden the appeal of democratization through an anti-totalitarian consensus. Hence the study of West Berlin’s political culture and its formative personnel offers us fresh perspectives on West Berlin as an alternative laboratory of German democratization.

The half-city West Berlin offers a unique but highly relevant case study of German postwar democratization - one that involved a differing dynamic from that of the Federal Republic. Despite its economic dependency on the Federal Republic proper, West Berlin pioneered seminal political developments of the postwar era. Moreover, Berlin’s cosmopolitan reputation attracted remigrés in higher than average numbers, who found congenial allies within the American occupation to popularize West Berlin as the “Outpost of Freedom.” Shared anti-totalitarian convictions ensured surprisingly quiet and smooth cooperation between Germans and Americans despite the immense coordination required by the large scale of their effort. Both sides shared the experience of Nazism in the past, disdain for the Soviet policies in the present, and hopes for a liberal democratic Europe in the future. In addition, the personal experiences of many coordinating figures bridged cultural divides. As Brandt’s career suggests, the Outpost of Freedom served as gateway between the margins of exile and the Federal Republic’s most eminent posts, between inheriting a besieged field of rubble and an affluent metropolis in the
center of unifying Europe. Moreover, this gateway stood in West Berlin for a reason, a peculiar place marked by the Cold War that offered often-ostracized remigrés the chance to make crucial contributions to German postwar democratization in a genuinely transatlantic enterprise.
GLOSSARY

AFGF: American Friends of German Freedom. Liberal organization closely aligned with Neu Beginnen network members. Used to raise funds and advocate their vision for a postwar Germany.

AFSC: American Friends Service Committee. Quaker aid organization that ameliorated the plight of refugees in North Africa, France, and the United States prior and during World War II.


APO: Außerparlamentarische Opposition, or outer-parliamentary opposition. Label espoused by the radical wing of the West Berlin student movement led by Rudi Dutschke in 1967/68.


BOB: Berlin Operating Basis. Joint branch of all US intelligence agencies in Berlin.

CCF: Congress for Cultural Freedom. Founded in West Berlin in 1950, this association of predominantly left-liberal public intellectuals strove to fight Communism in the cultural arena of the Cold War. Renamed after CIA funding became public.

CDG: Council for a Democratic Germany. Founded in 1944 in response to the Soviet-dominated National Committee of a Free Germany as a popular Front association claiming to represent a cross section of German exiles.

CDU: Christlich Demokratische Union, Christian Democratic Union. Founded in 1945 as a united party for Catholic and Lutheran constituents to supplant the Weimar Era confessional parties. Dominant political party in the Bundestag in the postwar era. Political home of Konrad Adenauer.

CIA: Central Intelligence Agency

ČSR: Československá Republika, Czechoslovak Republic. Formerly the industrial heartland of the Hapsburg Empire, this southeastern neighbor of Germany gained independence in the aftermath of World War I as a multiethnic state. Through its democratic framework, eminent destination for German exiles until its partial and then full absorption into the Third Reich in the wake of the Munich Agreement 1938.

DIVO: Deutsches Institut für Volksumfragen, German Institute for Public Surveys, privately held spin-off of HICOG’s Opinion Survey Section and pioneer of polling in postwar Germany.
**ECE**: United Nations Economic Commission for Europe. Pioneering international organization to promote postwar regional European reconstruction across national borders – and Cold War blocks.

**EDC**: European Defense Community. Abortive proposal to pool the militaries of continental Western Europe, including the Federal Republic. Blocked by the French National Assembly in 1952.

**ERC**: Emergency Rescue Committee. American philanthropy devoted to bring persecuted refugees from Vichy France to the United States.

**FDJ**: Freie Deutsche Jugend, Free German Youth. Formed originally as an anti-Fascist organization in 1936 in exile, the organization was resurrected after the war under SED auspices by Erich Honecker and became the official youth organization of the GDR tasked to promote the SED interpretation of State Socialism among adolescents.

**FDP**: Freie Demokratische Partei, Free Democratic Party. Classical liberal party founded in the Western Zones. Closely aligned with the LDP in the Soviet Zone and Berlin until the division. The LDP’s West Berlin section reconstituted itself as the FDP Berlin in 1950.

**FRG**: Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Federal Republic of Germany, formerly known as West Germany until absorption of the GDR in 1990. Parliamentary democracy formed out of the British, French, and American occupation zone in 1949 with CDU, FDP, and SPD being the dominant parties. Civil control over West Berlin.

**GDR**: Deutsche Demokratische Republik, German Democratic Republic, popularly known as East Germany. Formed out of the Soviet occupation zone in 1949 under the dominance of the SED.

**HICOG**: US High Commissioner for Germany. Successor of OMGUS, guardian of United States’ prerogatives in the Federal Republic of Germany and Berlin, 1949-1955

**IACF**: International Association for Cultural Freedom. Successor of the Congress for Cultural Freedom led by Shepard Stone.

**ICD**: OMGUS Information Control Division, section of Public Affairs conducting state of the art surveys across the American occupation zone and Berlin.

**ISK**: Internationaler Sozialistische Kampfbund, International Socialist Militant League, late Weimar and Exile era Socialist breakaway from the SPD like the SAP and Neu Beginnen.

**IRC**: International Rescue Committee, successor of the wartime ERC, large donor to West Berlin assistance efforts for refugees from the GDR during the 1950s.
KPD: Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands, *Communist Party of Germany*. Supported by Soviet Authorities, it took over the SPD in 1946 in the Soviet occupation zone, forming the SED

LDP: Liberal-Demokratische Partei, *Liberal Democratic Party*. Classical liberal party founded in the Soviet Zone and Berlin. Closely aligned with the FDP in the Western Zones until the German division. The LDP’s West Berlin section reconstituted itself as the FDP Berlin in 1950.

MfS: Ministerium für Staatssicherheit, *Ministry for State Security*, colloquially known as the *Stasi*, East Germany’s expansive secret police and intelligence agency.

Neu Beginnen: Literally New Beginning, NB, formed in 1929 by disillusioned KPD members to overcome the schism between SPD and KPD. Organized as a clandestine cadre group, Neu Beginnen strove to organize militant opposition to Hitler.


OSS: *Office of Strategic Services*. First centralized intelligence agency of the United States. World War II predecessor of the CIA.

OWI: *Office of War Information*. World War II era global news service of the American government, institutional predecessor of USIS and USIA.

PEPCO: *Political and Economic Projects Committee*. HICOG Working group coordinating American efforts against the nascent GDR in the early 1950s from PUB, Political Affairs, Economic Affairs, and US intelligence.

PUB: *HICOG Public Affairs Division*. Coordinating body of all public relations efforts by the American High Commission in Germany, 1949-1955, such as RIAS. Key institution of the Outpost network during Shepard Stone’s tenure, 1949-1952.


SAJ: Sozialistische Arbeiter-Jugend, *Socialist Workers’ Youth*. Weimar Era youth organization of the SPD. Most SAP members recruited, among them Willy Brandt, recruited from their ranks.
SAP: Sozialistische Arbeiterpartei Deutschlands, *Socialist Workers’ Party of Germany*. 1931 Left-wing break-away from the SPD. Called for unity among Social Democrats and Communists in opposition to the Nazis. Political Home of Willy Brandt until the outbreak of World War II.


SSRC: *Social Science Research Council*. National research foundation to coordinate and fund research in the Social Sciences.

SVAG: Sovetskaia Voennaia Administratsia v Germanii, *Sovietische Militäradministration Deutschlands (SMAD), Soviet Military Administration of Germany*. Founded June 6, 1945 as the Soviet occupation agency for its zone and counterpart of OMGUS.

UGO: Unabhängige Gewerkschaftsorganisation, *Independent Union*. Western breakaway union in Berlin from the immediate postwar Freie Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund that fell under Communist sway. Later merged with the West German Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund (DGB).

USIA: *United States Information Agency*. Sobordinated to the State Department, its mission was to broadcast an American view in foreign countries. Ran radio stations such as the Voice of America or RIAS.


ZK: *Zentralkommittee der SED*. Central Committee of the SED.
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