VOTER BEHAVIOR IN ELECTIONS WITHOUT PARTY LABELS

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ABSRACT

John P. Lappie: Voter Behavior in Elections without Party Labels
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If there is consensus on anything in Political Science, it is that party matters to voters. Beyond this point there is considerable dispute. Scholars have focused most of their attention on high profile partisan elections, giving rather less attention to non-partisan elections and primaries. I refer to the latter as Elections without Party Labels (EWPLs). This is unfortunate, because EWPLs can be used to gain leverage on questions about the role of party for American voters, questions that are difficult to answer by examining only formally partisan elections. In this dissertation I examine voter behavior in EWPLs. In Chapter One, I argue that party identifiers might have a psychological or social attachment to parties, or they may use it as guide for government performance, ideology, or policy positions. I argue, and find evidence, that different types of partisans behave very differently when they are cross-pressured. This suggests that the common scholarly strategy of advancing a monocausal theory of party identity is flawed. In Chapter Two, I argue that more educated areas should participate more in EWPLs than less educated areas, especially when candidates run blatantly partisan campaigns. However I find the opposite; more educated areas are less likely to participate in EWPLs than less educated areas. Though counter-intuitive, this finding is not unique. In Chapter Three, I argue and find evidence that more educated areas should cast more preference-congruent votes than less educated areas. This suggests that EWPLs are essentially discriminatory against less educated voters.

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Walker (1966) noted that the most important aspect of the classical theory of democracy was the existence of "*…an active, informed, democratic citizenry…"* (p. 285). Many citizens, then and now, do not vote, and most are politically uninformed (see Campbell et al, 1960; Converse, 1964; Somin, 2004). Still, V.O. Key was right when in 1966 he declared that voters are not fools. Ignorance is not the same thing as foolishness. The standards set by classical democratic theorists were simply too high (see Dahl, 1949; Lippmann, 1922). Democracy still seems to function. Most Americans, at least in Presidential elections, even vote correctly (Lau and Redlawsk, 1997). How are voters able to cast ballots in a reasonable fashion? To many scholars, the answer to this puzzle is heuristics. So long as citizens utilize a reasonable decision rule, they do not need to be fully or even well informed on every candidate/issue (see Druckman, 2001; Gerber and Lupia, 1999; Lupia, 1994; Page and Shapiro, 1992; Popkin, 1991; Collier et al, 1989; McKelvey and Ordeshook, 1986). The most notable of these decisions rules, or heuristics, is the party heuristic. DeSart (1995) and Huckfeldt et al (1999) found that the party heuristic is easily understood by most voters, and thus has a major effect on candidate evaluation and vote choice. In short, party is the most important heuristic available to voters.

The massive amount of research done on partisan elections in the United States leads to at least one inexorable conclusion: party matters a lot to voters. Scholars certainly do not agree on *why* this is the case (see Carsey and Layman, 2006 for an overview), but it is nonetheless widely accepted that party is one of the biggest factors – perhaps the biggest – in predicting vote choice

in partisan elections (DeSart, 1995; Huckfeldt et al, 1999). It is also clear that party labels can act as informational shortcuts. Citizens do not need to be fully or even well informed on every candidate/issue so long as they utilize an informational shortcut that maps reasonably well with their likely preferences on those candidates and issues (see Druckman, 2001; Gerber and Lupia, 1999; Lupia, 1994; Page and Shapiro, 1992; Popkin, 1991; Collier et al, 1989; McKelvey and Ordeshook, 1986). This dissertation is concerned primarily with party, and how party influences the decisions made by voters. Perhaps paradoxically, answering these questions requires scholars to examine elections without party labels (EWPLs). By examining EWPLs, we gain leverage on questions about the role of party in American democracy. These questions are difficult if not impossible to answer if one examines only elections where there is a meaningful party label on the ballot.

By EWPL, I mean both formally non-partisan elections and elections where the party label is technically on the ballot, but provides no meaningful information to voters. Primaries are an example of the latter category; strictly speaking party labels are present on the ballot, but they convey no meaningful information to voters (Lau and Redlawsk, 2001; Key, 1949). The same can be said of run-off elections, if both candidates in the second round belong to the same party.

1.2 The Importance of EWPLs

EWPLs are important in their own right, and worthy of further study. As of 2001, 77% of American municipal and county governments are elected via non-partisan elections (MacManus and Bullock, 2003); in 2013, eight of the ten largest cities in the United States held non-partisan elections for municipal office. In thirty-two states Supreme Court justices (or equivalent) are elected via non-partisan elections. In twenty-two states trial court judges are also elected via non-

partisan elections.[1] These officials do vital work, running the services that people rely upon on a day-to-day basis, or interpreting the state constitution.

Party primaries are, perhaps counter-intuitively, essentially non-partisan elections (Key, 1949). Voters in a general election can reasonably infer that a Republican is more conservative than a Democrat. It is more difficult to tell which Republican hopeful in a primary field is more or less conservative than the rest. Thus, even in races for partisan offices, it is important to remember that the election is really a two-stage process, and that the first stage lacks meaningful party labels.

1.3 EWPLs as Leverage

The study has EWPLs has mostly been confined to scholars of urban politics and the judiciary. This is unfortunate because, in addition to being important in their own right, EWPLs give scholars leverage to answer questions we care about regarding the role of party. It is difficult to answer questions about the role of party if every observation you have comes from a partisan election. This dissertation examines EWPLs because they are important in and of themselves, and because doing so can help answer fundamental questions about the role of party in voter behavior.

Chapter one examines one such question. There is considerable debate over the meaning of party to American voters. Some scholars argue that party is a psychological and/or social tie to voters that is very difficult to change, and that party acts as a perceptual filter (see Bartels, 2002; Miller and Shanks, 1996; Campbell et al, 1960). Conversely, argue that party identity is formed through a Bayesian updating process and is relatively malleable (Achen, 1992; Fiorina, 1991). In this conception, party does not really serve as an identity, but rather as a running tally performance evaluation of the parties. Still others have argued that voters use party as a more-or-less reliable guide to the ideology and policy positions of candidates (Abramowitz and Saunders, 1998). I argue

[1]Source: American Judicature Society. http://www.judicialselection.com/

that in reality there are at least two kinds of party identifiers: those for whom party is a strong psychological attachment (psychological partisans), and those for whom it is not (objective partisans). To see the ways different types of partisans behave, it is necessary to have a baseline of comparison. I establish that baseline by analyzing how partisans behave in the absence of party labels. In this chapter, I examine the results of a unique survey experiment given to a large sample of American adults via Qualtrics. This survey experiment presents mock campaign material that described candidates running in a judicial election. Whether or not a party label is present is manipulated. Furthermore, the survey introduces cross-pressure, such that a partisan respondent will always be given a scenario in which their co-partisan is also the less qualified candidate. The results suggest that different types of partisans do behave differently in the presence of cross-pressure. Namely, psychological partisans are much less likely to defect in the presence of cross-pressure.

There has been much discussion over whether or not campaigns influence outcomes in elections. This debate has focused primarily on high-profile elections, particularly presidential elections. In chapters two and three I argue that in lower profile non-partisan elections, campaigns can have an effect. The information environment is very scarce in low-profile elections. This means that an individual piece of information can weigh more heavily with voters in a non-partisan judicial election as compared to a presidential election. Notably, voters are willing and even eager to cast a partisan ballot even in non-partisan elections (Bonneau and Cann, 2014; Squire and Smith, 1988). Citizens often lack partisan information in these contexts, preventing them from casting a partisan ballot in most circumstances (see Dubois, 1980). However, even in formally non-partisan elections candidates can and often do run blatantly ideological or partisan campaigns, which I term quasi-partisan campaigns.

A major question in the discipline is who benefits most from the use of the party heuristic, high sophisticates or low sophisticates? Some scholars have argued that since cognitive heuristics enable citizens to make decisions without having a great deal of information, they are most important for the uninformed (Popkin, 1991; Collier et al, 1989; McKelvey and Ordeshook, 1986). Others have argued that one has to be somewhat well informed *a priori* to understand what a heuristic means. Therefore it is the better informed, rather than the less informed, who benefit the most from heuristics (Lau and Redlawsk, 1997; Sniderman et al, 1991). To find out who benefits most from party however, one cannot look just at partisan elections. The best way to answer this question is to see what happens when the party label is taken away, and see how well different types of citizens perform.

In Chapter two, I examine the effects of education and candidate behavior on participation in EWPLs. I argue that the better educated should be better able to navigate the low-information environment of EWPLs, and thus should have higher rates of participation than the less educated. I also argue that when candidates in non-partisan elections run blatantly partisan campaigns (quasi-partisan campaigns) participation will increase across all levels of education, but particularly among the better educated. I test these hypotheses by examining ballot roll-off in a sample of precinct-level non-partisan judicial election returns and a sample non-gubernatorial executive branch primary election results from 2008. The results indicate that, contrary to expectations, participation in EWPLs decreases as education increases. This counter-intuitive result has been found elsewhere, however (Streb et al, 2009; Nichols and Strizek, 1994).

Chapter three examines the relationship between education, campaign effects, and vote choice in non-partisan elections. I argue that what I term preference-congruent voting (measured as partisan voting) should be low across all levels of education in the presence of truly non-partisan

campaigns (that is, a campaign devoid of ideological or partisan appeals). I argue that quasi-partisan campaigns should increase preference-congruent voting across levels of education, but especially high levels of education. In other words, the gap in preference-congruent voting between high and low levels of education should increase in the presence of quasi-partisan campaigns. I test these hypotheses on a sample of precinct-level results from formally non-partisan judicial elections. The results indicate that preference-congruent voting does indeed increase in the presence of quasi-partisan campaigns, especially in areas with higher levels of education. This suggests that better educated citizens are better able to participate effectively in non-partisan elections.

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Chapter Two: Basis of Party Identification and Voter Behavior in the Presence of Cross-Pressure

John P. Lappie[2]

Abstract The study of party identification has mostly focused on monocausal theories of behavior. In this study I argue that for some party identifiers party is a strong psychological or social attachment, while others use party as a guide, and lack a psychological attachment. I refer to the former as psychological partisans and the latter as objective partisans. I argue that in the presence of cross-pressure, objective partisans are likelier to defect and vote for the opposition party than psychological partisans. I examine this argument via a survey given to a large sample of American adults. The results suggest that objective partisans are likelier to defect in the presence of cross-pressure than psychological partisans.

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2.1 Introduction

If there is consensus on anything in Political Science, it is that partisanship matters in vote choice. Numerous scholars of partisan elections have identified partisanship as the most important factor in voter behavior (Huckfeldt et al., 1999; DeSart, 1992). Scholars have also found evidence that, to a lesser extent, partisanship shapes the behavior of voters in non-partisan elections (Bonneau and Cann, 2013; Lappie, N.D.). That party is important to voters is beyond dispute; why party is important to voters is not. Some scholars argue that party identification is a strong psychological (see Carsey and Layman, 2006; Campbell et al., 1960) and/or social identity (Greene, 2004; Green et al., 2002) for voters. Other scholars argue that party is not a psychological tie. To Fiorina (1981) and Achen (1992), party identification represents a running tally of citizen evaluations of events, performance, and policy positions. Somewhat differently, scholar such as Levendusky (2010) and Abramowitz and Saunders (1998) have argued that voters use party as a more-or-less reliable guide to ideology and issue positions.

While these scholars contest the meaning of party identification, they do share one thing in common – they all focus on fitting a single theoretical model to the population of voters. The implication is that determining which theory of party is most appropriate rests on evaluating which single theory best characterizes the average voter. The idea that some citizens may simply behave differently, or have different motivations, compared to others has gone unconsidered until recently. Kropko (2012) and Banda and Kropko (N.D.) both argue that the electorate is more heterogeneous than political science theories seem to suggest. Both argue that in the real-world there is a mixture of proximity and directional voters, though Banda and Kropko (N.D.) suggest there are more of the latter. For example, Kropko (2012) argues that previous studies on this topic have found mixed results precisely because the electorate has a mixture of both kinds of voters.

Similarly, in this paper I argue that there is not one kind of partisan, but at least two different types of partisans. To some citizens party is a psychological or social attachment, while for others party is a running tally or a policy/ideological guide. For simplicity's sake I refer to the former as psychological partisans, and the latter as objective partisans. I discuss these two types of partisans more thoroughly in a later section. In this study I develop a theory of how different types of partisans would respond to being cross-pressured regarding the partisanship of two candidates compared to their objective qualifications for holding office, using the example of judicial elections.

The findings of this study indicate that scholars should pay more attention to how different types of partisans behave. Scholars have by and large focused on what causes party affiliation on average, assuming that party identifiers are more or less homogenous. If this is not true then models which claim to explain behavior of all (or nearly all) identifiers in fact only explain the behavior of some identifiers. The more complicated reality of party identification has been missed.

2.2 Theory

2.2.1 Party as a Psychological or Social Attachment

The authors of *The American Voter* (Campbell et al., 1960), and other scholars following their Michigan school tradition (e.g. Carsey and Layman, 2006; Miller and Shanks, 1996) argue that party identification is key to voter behavior, serving as an unmoved mover, in the sense that party is generally a strong psychological attachment to voters (Carsey and Layman, 2006). Somewhat differently, Green et al. (2002) argue that party is a social identity to voters, comparing partisan identity to religious identity. Like the Michigan school however, social identity scholars consider party identification a deeply held attachment that is exceedingly difficult to change. This fits in well with theories of childhood socialization into political parties (Jennings et al., 2009;

Valentino and Sears, 1998, 1997). Just as children are socialized into certain religions by their parents and other close individuals, children are socialized into political parties. These childhood partisan attachments tend to be enduring (see Jennings et al., 2009; Valentino and Sears, 1998, 1997), just like other group attachments such as religious affiliation (Hunsberger and Brown, 1984). Most young adults who identify as members of a political party identify with the same party as their parents (Jennings and Niemi, 1991).

Most scholars following the Michigan school argue that, because party is a deep seated psychological attachment, it acts a perceptual filter for citizens, influencing how individuals perceive other political objects (Bartels, 2002; Miller and Shanks, 1996; Campbell et al., 1960). If an official at a sporting event were to make a questionable call, one can easily imagine fans of the penalized team calling foul while fans of the beneficiaries argue that the call was correct. The psychological attachment of these people to their teams colors their perception of reality. Similarly, to the Michigan school party identity colors how individuals perceive and relate to the political world. It shapes how they view political candidates, policy proposals, and even objective features of the political landscape such as the performance of the economy.

Scholars from the Michigan school and social identity traditions have found plenty of evidence in favor of their theory. Party attachment can be just as, if not more, enduring then the stances citizens have on even the most salient of issues (Green et al., 2002; Campbell et al., 1960). Zaller (1992) finds that party identifiers often shift their position on the issues when elite party leaders change their stance on that issue. Similarly, Carsey and Layman (2006) find that, generally, partisans are more likely to shift their issue positions to bring them more in line with their party attachment then to change their partisanship to bring it more in line with their views on issues (see also Lau and Redlawsk, 2001; Mondak, 1993). Relatively few individuals just accept being cross-

pressured partisans; for instance, to simply accept that they are a Democrat *and* are pro-life. To do so would be to live with cognitive dissonance, holding two contradictory identifications (see Festinger and Carlsmith, 1959), which very few individuals will accept.

2.2.2 Rational Theories of Party Identity

Other scholars have challenged the Michigan and social identity schools. Their theories do have serious disagreements, but do possess at least one commonality: that partisanship is not a strong psychological or social attachment to voters. Following in the tradition of Downs (1957) and Key (1966), these scholars argue that voters are on the whole rational (see Achen, 1992). Furthermore, unlike the Michigan school these scholars argue that party identity is in fact moveable.

Fiorina (1981) and Achen (1992) for instance argue that partisanship is a running-tally (Achen calls this Bayesian updating), influenced by citizens perceptions of events, policy positions, and other political objects. If for example the economy was bad at a time when the Democrats held the governorship, citizens would consider that a negative in their running-tally evaluation of the Democratic Party. As these evaluations build, rational citizens can end up changing their party identification. Other scholars argue that party is used by citizens as a more-or-less reliable guide to candidate ideology and policy positions (Levendusky, 2010; Abramowitz and Saunders, 1998). Abramowitz and Saunders (1998) argue that the public has become increasing ideological, and that citizens now identify with parties in order to achieve their ideological and policy goals.

This study examines how the behavior of psychological partisans differs from that of objective partisans. Specifically, I posit that psychological partisans will tend to reinterpret other political objects that voters care about in partisan terms in order to justify a partisan political

decision. Objective partisans will not reinterpret these political objects, lowering their likelihood of making a partisan political decision. I utilize the example of judicial elections and candidate quality to illustrate this.

2.2.3 Basis of Partisanship and Cross-Pressure

Most of the debate on party identification in the United States has revolved around whether party identity is a psychological attachment (Campbell et al, 1960), a social attachment (Green et al., 2002), or an information shortcut that is devoid of social .or psychological attachment (Achen, 1992; Fiorina, 1981). What these theories tend to have in common is monocausality. That is, they implicitly assume that a single theory applies on average across the entire population. Every scholar of course recognizes that no single theory applies equally well to every individual. The implication of these studies is that the best strategy moving forward is to find the single theory that best fits the entire population.

However I argue, similar to Brandenburg (2011), Kropko (2012), and Banda and Kropko (N.D.) that there are different kinds of partisans, and that each type of partisan occurs in sufficient numbers to make monocausal theories of party identification misleading. For some voters party is a deep-seated psychological attachment, as predicted by the Michigan School; or it is a deep-seated social identity, as Green et al. (2002) argue. For the sake of convenience, I refer to this group as psychological partisans. Conversely, there are other partisans who have no particular attachment to *being* a Republican or Democrat. To them, party is a useful cue, either evaluative (Fiorina, 1981) or as a guide to policy positions (Abramowitz and Saunders, 1998). I define all non-psychological partisans as Objective Partisans. Both of these groups are general, and there are likely important differences within each of these groups. However, my focus in this paper is on the general difference captured by this simple classification.

For objective partisans, party identity and presumably party-line voting are a means to an end. These voters want to elect candidates that will further their ideological agendas (Abramowitz and Saunders, 1998), or to reward/punish the party currently managing public affairs (Achen, 1992; Fiorina, 1981). This differs radically from psychological partisans, for whom electing members of their group to office *is* the end. The goal is to elect a member of their group to office. This should have major effects on the behavior of psychological partisans as opposed to objective partisans.

While voters, for any number of reasons, care about candidate partisanship (see Huckfeldt et al., 1999; DeSart, 1995), it is not the only factor that voters consider important. Voters care about the demographics of candidates (McDermott, 1997), the personality traits of candidates (see Glasgow and Alvarez, 2000), and the quality of the candidates (Carson et al., 2007; Dubois, 1984, 1980; Goldstein, 1979), among other factors. If citizens care about both party *and* other factors, then it is possible for an individual to be *cross-pressured*; one or more factors that they care about may be in conflict. In this study I focus on individuals being cross-pressured by candidate quality and candidate partisanship, and how these may influence voter decision making.

In order to see how psychological and objective partisans behave differently, it is necessary to introduce cross-pressure. If, for example, a Republican candidate were better qualified than her opponent, and held conventionally conservative views, then psychological Republicans would behave no differently than conservative voters who just use the Republican label as a shortcut for 'candidate with conservative policy positions.' Both kinds of voters would be expected to vote for the Republican. Differences can be seen only if cross-pressure is introduced. Cross-pressure in essence introduces cognitive dissonance; when an individual notices that two beliefs, or an action and belief, are contradictory (see Petty et al., 1997 for an overview; Festinger, 1957). For example,

if a citizen values both electing co-partisans and electing better qualified individuals, then an unqualified Republican running against a qualified Democrat would introduce cognitive dissonance for Republican Party identifiers.

Psychological partisans have an attachment to *being* Republicans or Democrats, either because it is a psychological attachment (Campbell et al., 1960) or a social attachment (Green et al., 2002). Whatever the basis of their attachment, for psychological partisans supporting a political party is not a means to an end but *the end itself.* Their goal is to elect other members of their group to office. Furthermore, for these citizens party acts as a perceptual filter, coloring how they perceive other political objects (Bartels, 2002; Miller and Shanks, 1996; Campbell et al., 1960). This means that in the presence of cross-pressure, or cognitive-dissonance, psychological partisans are particularly unlikely to just accept that there is a mismatch between different values, such as electing a Democrat *and* electing the better qualified candidate. Rather, since party acts as a perceptual filter, these partisans should in engage in motivated reasoning to overcome the dissonance. Motivated reasoning is the process by which individuals seek and process information in such a way as to support a preselected conclusion (Redlawsk, 2002). Motivated reasoners often discount, ignore, or counter-argue dissonant information (Redlawsk, 2002). For instance, imagine a psychological Democrat who also cares about electing more qualified candidates to public office. When faced with a less qualified Democrat running against a more qualified Republican, a psychological Democrat may counter-argue that in fact the *Democrat* is more qualified.

Partisanship does *not* act as a perceptual filter for objective partisans, because they have no particular emotional attachment to their political party. Since party is not a perceptual filter for these individuals, it will not color their perception of other political objects, including factors that

lead to cross-pressure. Objective Democrats for instance would not counter-argue that the objectively less qualified Democratic candidate is actually *more* qualified than the Republican.

This has several implications for the behavior of psychological and objective partisans when cross-pressured. Since psychological partisans will engage in motivated reasoning, they are effectively able to eliminate the cross-pressure. A Democratic voter who has decided that his or her party's nominee is also better qualified for office (say) has given his or herself no reason to defect and support the opposition party's candidate. However, objective partisans do not have this perceptual filter, and are unable to rationalize the cross-pressure away. Objective partisans must make a choice between supporting a co-partisan and some other factor that they care about, such as candidate quality. Objective partisans then have reasons that they *might* defect and support the opposition party's candidate.

2.2.4 Candidate Quality, Non-Partisan Elections, and Judicial Elections

In this study I examine cross-pressure between party identity and candidate quality. Voters do care about candidate quality in both the partisan and non-partisan context. A common phrase in American politics is "vote for the person, not the party." This value hearkens back to the days of the Progressive Era reformers who disliked political parties and felt that candidate quality should be the most important factor in vote choice (see Williams and Adrian, 1959; Adrian, 1952). Quality challengers are in fact far more successful than less qualified challengers in US House (see Carson et al., 2002) and US Senate (see Squire, 1992) elections.

This study uses the example of judicial elections to test the theory presented here. Thirty-nine American states use some form of election to either select or retain judges. Despite this, the judiciary is still seen by the public as an apolitical branch. After all, the Federal judiciary is

formally non-partisan, and only seven states have formally partisan judges.[3] Americans are taught that judges are fair, impartial figures who make decisions strictly on the basis of law, and who are above the fray of everyday politics (see Jaros and Roper, 1980). This is the so-called Cult of the Robe (see Frank, 1949), which save the courts from the unpopularity the more blatantly political branches must endure (see Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 1995). Therefore, candidate quality should have more resonance in the judicial context, since citizens tend to view the judiciary as apolitical.

Judicial elections however do *not* eliminate the desire of citizens to support their co-partisans. Scholars have consistently found that citizens will support their co-partisans when they are able to do so. Dubois (1980) found that if a former high-level partisan politician runs for a non-partisan judicial office, their co-partisans tend to support them while the opposition party's identifiers tend not to. Squire and Smith (1988), using a unique poll, found that Californians reported partisan voting intentions for a non-partisan judicial retention election *if* they were informed whether Jerry Brown or Ronald Reagan had appointed the judge in question. Republicans indicated that they would vote to retain Reagan's nominees and against retaining Brown's nominees, and vice versa. More recently Bonneau and Cann (2013) found that partisanship influences voter behavior even in non-partisan elections, with citizens sometimes able to infer party from seemingly apolitical statements by the candidates. Relatedly, Lappie (n.d.) found that voter behavior becomes predictably partisan, at least among better educated voters, if candidates run quasi-partisan campaigns. By quasi-partisan campaigns, Lappie means explicitly partisan and/or ideological campaigns in formally non-partisan elections.

[3]Three of these states (Pennsylvania, Illinois, and New Mexico) use partisan elections only to fill vacancies on the court. Judges win subsequent terms by winning non-partisan retention elections.

In both partisan and non-partisan judicial elections, voters care about candidate quality. Due to the public's belief that judges are, or at least should be, above politics, candidate quality is likely considered a more important factor than in the non-judicial context. Still, voters do care about party even in non-partisan judicial elections, and they would certainly care in the partisan context. This makes judicial elections a strong test of the theory and hypotheses developed in this paper.

2.2.5 Types of Partisanship, Candidate Quality, Judicial Elections, and Cross-Pressure

In a non-partisan judicial election, it does not matter whether or not a partisan individual is a psychological or objective partisan. The party label is not available to them, so even in a real election it would be very difficult to cast a partisan ballot, no matter how much the citizen wanted to do so. The experiment conducted as part of this survey does not include what Lappie termed quasi-partisan campaigns. That is to say, the candidates do not make explicitly partisan or ideological statements. By construction, then in this study it should not be possible to infer partisanship in a non-partisan election (see the data and methods section).

In the absence of a party label, both psychological and objective partisans should tend to support the more qualified candidate. If there is no party label, there is no cross-pressure because the individuals simply do not know the parties of the candidates. Therefore, in the non-partisan context both objective and psychological partisans should rely upon the most relevant cue still available to them, candidate quality.

Hypothesis 1: In the non-partisan context, voters of both parties should be more likely to vote for the more qualified candidate.

Hypothesis 2: The probability of a partisan respondent voting for the objectively more qualified candidate (Gordon) will decrease if that candidate is labelled as a member of the opposition party

However, in a partisan election a partisan individual can be cross-pressured if their party's candidate happens to be less qualified than the opposition party's candidate. The party cue is in conflict with the candidate quality cue. The question then is how different sorts of partisans resolve this cross-pressure.

For psychological partisans, party acts as a perceptual filter, coloring their perception of other political objects, such as candidate quality. Psychological partisans, then, would tend to reassess candidate quality in light of partisan information. They would engage in motivated reasoning, counter-arguing the idea that the opposition party candidate is really better qualified. In short, psychological partisans would rationalize that their party's candidate is actually better qualified, even if in the absence of party labels they would label that candidate as less qualified. Objective partisans would tend not to engage in motivated reasoning to resolve this cross-pressure. Their partisanship is caused *by* political objects, so it should not color their perception of candidate quality. If their co-partisan is in fact the less qualified candidate, objective partisans would recognize it and admit it. Note however that this study has no *a priori* measure of psychological versus objective attachments to political parties. Psychological partisanship is measured by whether or not a partisan respondent assessed the objectively less qualified candidate as being more experienced in a partisan election (see experimental design).

Hypothesis 3: The probability that a partisan individual will correctly identify the objectively more qualified candidate as more qualified will decrease if that candidate is labeled as a member of the opposition party.

If psychological partisans engage in motivated reasoning about candidate quality, they have relieved themselves of any cross-pressure. They have rationalized that their party's nominee is better qualified, even if this is objectively untrue. Therefore, they have given themselves no reason to vote for the opposition party's candidate. Objective partisans have not relieved the cross-pressure at all; they recognize the opposition party's candidate as more qualified. Objective partisans are faced with a choice between electing a less qualified co-partisan or a more qualified candidate from the other party. This should lead as least some objective partisans to defect from their party's candidate and cast a ballot for the more qualified opponent. Therefore, while support for more qualified candidates should decline across the board if that candidate is labeled as a member of the opposition party, this should be especially true of psychological partisans.

Hypothesis 4: The probability of voting for a less qualified co-partisan candidate will be greater for a psychological partisan than for an objective partisan

2.3 Data and Methods

2.3.1 Experimental Design

The hypotheses developed above are tested on a unique survey experiment developed for this study. It was distributed online to a nationwide sample of 1,044 adults in March of 2015, via Qualtrics. Every condition consisted of presenting respondents with pictures and descriptions of two candidates running for a seat on the Minnesota State Supreme Court. These candidates were fictitious, but respondents were not told this. In each treatment, one candidate (always surnamed Gordon) was highly qualified while the other (always surnamed Anderson) was less well qualified. Both Gordon and Anderson are older white men. Neither candidate was an incumbent; Gordon and Anderson differ in quality due to their varying professional experiences. Regardless of

treatment, Gordon is always described as having served as a judge for twenty-one years, including twelve years on the state's second highest court. Respondents were also told that Gordon "Has received a rating of 'Excellent' from the Minnesota State Bar Association every year he has served as a judge." Conversely, Anderson is described as having much less experience. For the sake of realism Anderson is described as a successful attorney, but the prompt always notes that Anderson "has never served as a Judge at any level."

Respondents were asked to give their party identification in the pre-test. Respondents were given the option of identifying themselves as Republicans, Democrats, independents, or "other" using the same wording as in the American National Election Survey. Respondents identifying themselves as Republicans or Democrats were then asked if they viewed themselves as strong or not so strong partisans. Respondents calling themselves independents were asked if they were closer to one party or the other. For purposes of treatment assignment and analysis, these leaners were treated as Republicans or Democrats. The partisanship of the respondent determined which treatment they were assigned to. Independent respondents could be assigned to any treatment, but were analyzed separately from the partisan respondents. The results for independents are not theoretically interesting, and are included in the appendix.

The survey had three treatment conditions relevant to this paper.[4] Respondents were only exposed to a single treatment condition. There is a non-partisan treatment, wherein neither Gordon nor Anderson is given a party label. Both Republicans and Democrats could be assigned to this condition. There were two variants of a partisan treatment. In one variant, Gordon is labeled as the Democratic candidate, while Anderson is labeled as a Republican. Republicans could be assigned

[4]There were four additional treatments given to respondents that are not relevant to this study. These four treatments manipulated the race and gender of Gordon and Anderson; one would always be a white male, and the other either a black male or a white female.

to this treatment, but not Democrats. In another variant of the partisan treatment, Gordon is identified as a Republican and Anderson as a Democrat. Democrats could be assigned to this treatment, but not Republicans. Therefore the partisan cue, where present, is always in conflict with the candidate quality cue.

In addition to candidate experience and the candidates' pictures, respondents were also given background on the personal life and education of the candidates, and told about their judicial philosophies. The personal life and educations of the candidates are designed to be very similar, but with enough differences to appear genuine. Each candidate is always born and raised in Minnesota (but different parts of the state), is married, and has multiple children. Gordon is described as having one son and one daughter, while Anderson is described as having one son and two daughters. Both candidates are described as having earned his Bachelors' degrees from private colleges in Minnesota that the vast majority of respondents have likely never heard of,[5] and each candidate received his law degree from the University of Minnesota. The philosophical statements of the candidates are designed to be similar without making respondents question their genuineness. In other words, respondents were not supposed to be able to infer anything about the candidates' partisanship from their philosophical statements.

Philosophy#1:

"[JUDGE GORDON/TOM] believes that judges must perform their duties in a fair and impartial fashion, and must uphold the rule of law, recognizing the limited but important role the people have assigned to our court system. [JUDGE GORDON/TOM], after visiting with Minnesotans of all walks of life, believes that these principles, which are the

[5]There is at least one exception: one respondent who supported Anderson said that his or her support was based on Anderson being a graduate of Hamline University, which is affiliated with the United Methodist Church.

foundational blocks for our democracy, are widely shared." -from [ELECTEDJUDGEGORDON.COM/ANDERSONFORJUSTICE.COM]

Philosophy#2:

"[JUDGE GORDON/TOM] believes that judges should faithfully interpret and apply the laws of our state, not follow their own political leanings or personal preferences. [JUDGE GORDON/TOM] also believes that judges should treat each other, and all participants in our legal system with dignity and respect. [JUDGE GORDON'S/TOM'S] philosophy will result in unbiased, even-handed justice for all." -from [ELECTJUDGEGORDON.COM/ANDERSONFORJUSTCE.COM]

Each treatment in the survey had two variants. In one variant, Gordon would use philosophy #1 while Anderson's would use philosophy #2. In the other variant of the condition, Gordon would use philosophy #2 while Anderson used philosophy #1. This helps to control for the potential independent effects of these philosophies on individual responses, in case these philosophies were more meaningful to respondents than intended.

2.3.2 Statistical Model

Since the outcome variables in all three models (see next section) are dichotomous, a logistic regression was appropriate. The results of logistic regressions are not easily interpretable, so only predicted probabilities are reported below. Full results are available in the Appendix. Note that the predicted probabilities reported below are based upon bivariate regressions or regressions with two independent variables. Other variables such as race, political knowledge, gender, and education seem to have little if any effect on the dependent variable. Models including these controls are included in the appendix. Note that many of the 1,044 respondents surveyed were

assigned to treatments that are not theoretically relevant to this study. Four-hundred and three partisan respondents were assigned to treatments whose results are reported in-text.

2.4 Models and Results

2.4.1 Support for Gordon Across Treatments

Model 1 tests hypotheses 1 and 2; that partisan respondents will tend to support Gordon in the non-partisan context, but be less likely to support Gordon in the partisan context. The dependent variable in this model is whether or not the respondent indicated that he or she would support Gordon: 1 if yes, 0 if no. At the bottom of the screen containing descriptions and pictures of both candidates, respondents were asked who they would vote for if they were Minnesota voters. Gordon and Anderson's names appeared in the same order in the question that they did on the page, which itself was randomized. After answering this question, respondents were also asked why they cast their vote for either Gordon or Anderson. This response was open-ended, and respondents were not required to answer. The key independent variable is the condition to which the respondent was assigned. The coefficient on these variables demonstrate whether respondents in the partisan treatment behaved differently than those in the non-partisan treatment. If respondents are less likely to vote for the qualified candidate (Gordon) when there is a partisan cue, it is evidence in favor of hypotheses 1 and 2.

Table 2.1: Model 1, Probability of Vote for Gordon among partisan respondents, by treatment

Condition	Pr(Vote for Gordon)	95% Confidence Interval	N
Non-Partisan Treatment	.727	.666 - .789	202
Partisan Treatment	.447	.379 - .516	201

Table 2.1 shows the predicted probabilities generated from model 1, among partisan respondents. The left hand column shows the treatment to which the respondent was assigned. The Pr(Vote for Gordon) column shows the predicted probability[6] of a vote for Gordon from respondents assigned to the treatment in the far left column. Thus, partisan respondents assigned to the non-partisan treatment have a .727 probability of voting for Gordon. The third column from the left shows the 95% confidence interval for the predicted probability reported in that row. The rightmost column shows the number of partisan respondents assigned to that treatment.

As predicted, in the non-partisan control condition partisan respondents are overwhelmingly likely to support Gordon, who by construction is the objectively more qualified candidate. Partisan respondents have .727 probability of voting for Gordon in the non-partisan treatment. However this probability falls to .447 in the partisan treatment, where Gordon is explicitly labeled as a member of the opposition party. These differences are both substantively and statistically significantly different from each other. This provides clear evidence in favor of hypotheses 1 and 2.[7]

2.4.2 Party and Assessment of Candidate Quality

Model 2 tests hypothesis 3, whether or not the probability of incorrectly identifying Anderson as the more qualified candidate increases in the partisan context. The dependent variable in this model is whether or not the respondent identified Gordon as the more experienced candidate, 1 if yes, and 0 if no. This question was asked of respondents immediately after they cast

[6]All predicted probabilities reported in this paper were generated using the Margins command in Stata. Dofile available upon request.

[7]A preliminary analysis of the open-ended responses suggests that most respondents in the non-partisan treatment who supported Anderson did so because they preferred the philosophy Anderson used to Gordon's. Note that whether Anderson was given philosophy #1 or philosophy #2 was randomized. Auxiliary regressions, reported in the appendix, do not show any statistically significant differences in the probability of voting for Gordon based upon what philosophy he used.

their vote, though on a separate webpage. The key independent variable is what condition the respondent was assigned to. If partisan respondents are less likely to identify Gordon as the more qualified candidate in the partisan than non-partisan treatment, it is evidence in favor of hypothesis 3.

Table 2.2: Model 2, probability of evaluating Gordon as more qualified, by treatment. Partisan respondents.

Treatment Condition	Pr(Gordon is Experienced)	95% Confidence Interval	N of Respondents
Non-Partisan Treatment	.846	.796 - .896	202
Partisan Treatment	.716	.654 - .778	201

Table 2.2 shows the predicted probabilities generated from model 2 among partisan respondents. The left hand column shows the treatment to which they were assigned. The column second from the left shows the predicted probability of the respondent assessing Gordon as the more experienced candidate. Thus, a partisan respondent assigned to the non-partisan treatment has a .846 probability of assessing Gordon as the more experienced candidate. The third column from the left indicates the 95% confidence interval around the predicted probability in that row. The far-right column indicates the number of partisan respondents assigned to that treatment.

Model 2 tests hypothesis 3, that the probability of a respondent correctly assessing Gordon as the more qualified candidate will decline if Gordon is identified as a member of the opposition party. Among partisan respondents, the probability of assessing Gordon as the more qualified candidate drops from .846 to .716 as one moves from the non-partisan to the partisan treatment. This difference is both substantively and statistically significant. As one would expect, the probability of independent respondents assessing Gordon as more qualified does not change

substantively or significantly as one moves from the non-partisan to the partisan treatment. The results of this model therefore provide support for hypothesis 3. Partisans do seem to be less likely to assess Gordon as more qualified when he is identified as a member of the opposition party. The results also indicate that the survey successfully constructed Gordon as the objectively more qualified candidates. Partisans assigned to the non-partisan treatment were very likely to assess Gordon as more qualified.[8]

2.4.3 Basis of Partisanship and Support for Gordon

Model 3 tests hypothesis 4, that psychological partisans will be likelier than objective partisans to support a less qualified co-partisan candidate. The dependent variable in this model is whether or not the respondent voted for the objectively more qualified candidate, Gordon. This variable is labeled 1 if yes, 0 if no. The key independent variable in this model is the respondent's evaluation of candidate experience. This is coded 1 if the respondent believes Gordon is more experienced, 0 if they believe Anderson is more experienced. Conceptually, respondents in the partisan treatment who believe Anderson is more qualified are psychological partisans, while those who believe Gordon is more qualified are objective partisans.

This model is tested only on respondents assigned to the partisan treatment. Running this model on respondents assigned to the non-partisan treatment would yield no theoretically interesting information. Furthermore, the number of respondents assigned to the non-partisan treatment who believe Anderson is more qualified is so low that it would make interpreting the results hazardous.

[8]Independents assigned to the non-partisan and partisan treatment were equally likely to assess Gordon as the more qualified candidate. This provides further evidence that Gordon was successfully constructed as the more qualified candidate. See the Appendix.

Table 2.3: Probability of Voting for Gordon by Psychological and Objective Partisanship

Condition	Thinks Gordon more experienced?	Pr(Vote Gordon)	95% C.I.	N
Partisan Treatment	No (Psychological Partisan)	.035	-.023 - .082	57
Partisan Treatment	Yes (Objective Partisan)	.611	.531 - .690	130

Table 2.3 presents the results from model 3. Note that all respondents in this model were assigned to the partisan treatment. The second column from the left indicates whether the respondents are psychological or objective partisans. The middle column shows the predicted probability of that type of partisan voting for Gordon. Therefore, a psychological partisan has a .035 probability of voting for Gordon. The second column from the right shows the 95% confidence interval around the predicted probability in that row. The far-right column shows the number of psychological and objective partisans in the sample.

Objective partisans have a .611 probability of voting for Gordon. These are respondents who see Gordon as more qualified than Anderson but who share the same party identification as Anderson. These voters are cross-pressured as a result because they could justify supporting Gordon based on qualifications or supporting Anderson based on shared partisanship. In this case, a modest majority chose Gordon over Anderson, suggesting that qualification trumped partisanship for a majority of objective partisans.

Among psychological partisans the probability of a vote for Gordon is .035. Psychological partisans are not cross-pressured. Anderson shares their party identification, but they also believe

that Anderson is more qualified, despite objective information to the contrary. Because in their minds both partisanship and qualifications of the candidates point in the same direction, they vote overwhelmingly for Anderson. The difference between the behavior of psychological and objective partisans is statistically and substantively different. Objective partisans are still more likely than not to vote for Gordon, while psychological partisans have virtually no probability of voting for Gordon. This provides support for hypothesis 4: psychological partisans are much less likely to support the objectively more qualified candidate (Gordon) than are objective partisans. This is because objective partisans are cross-pressured while psychological partisans resolve that potential tension by simply concluding that the candidate who shares their partisanship is also the more qualified candidate.[9]

A potential objection to these findings is that the terminology "objective partisan" and "psychological partisan" may simply be proxies for "weak partisan/leaner" and "strong partisan." The logic of such a complaint is simple: psychological partisans should be more committed to their political affiliation since it is a deep-seated attachment. Objective partisans, for whom party is not a psychological attachment, would have weaker ties. After all, objective partisans would treat party as a standing decision, subject to change in light of events. If the identity of objective partisans is subject to change more easily than a psychological partisan, then their attachments must be weaker.

However, this would be an erroneous conclusion. It is true that an objective partisan would have little if any affect towards the terms "Democrat" or "Republican". It is also true that the partisanship of psychological partisans should be harder to change over time than that of an

[9]I also ran this model on separate samples utilizing only Republican, or only Democratic, voters. The results are substantively the same for both samples. In the Republican sample the difference in the probability of voting for Gordon between psychological and objective partisans is not quite statistically significant. This is most likely caused by there being fewer Republicans overall in the sample then Democrats. These tables are included in the appendix.

objective partisan. That does not mean, however, that objective partisans are, at any given point in time, less committed to the election of their party's candidates than a psychological partisan.

Imagine two hypothetical Democratic voters. One is a psychological partisan, who supports the Democrats because she was socialized into the party at a young age. Being a Democrat is important to this person's identity, and it will likely not change in the future regardless of events. Conversely, the other Democratic voter is an objective partisan. He has no psychological or social attachment to the term Democrat. He supports the party because he is very much pro-choice, pro-same-sex marriage, pro-gun control, for a more progressive tax structure, etc. It is true that *if* the Democrats and Republicans happened to switch positions on these issues in the future, he would likely switch parties. However, in the context of 2015, there is no reason to believe that this objective partisan would be any less committed to the election of Democratic officials than the psychological partisan.

Testing for the possibility that objective partisans are just weaker partisans than psychological partisans is simple enough. If it were true, then in the partisan treatments self-identified leaners should be more likely to assess Gordon as the more qualified candidate than weak partisans. Weak partisans in turn should be more likely to do so than self-identified strong partisans. I therefore ran a diagnostic logistic regression for both Republican and Democratic respondents, all of whom were assigned to the partisan treatment. The dependent variable is assessment of candidate experience (1 if they think Gordon is more qualified, 0 if not), and the key independent variables are treatment assignment and strength of party identification. The results are presented in table 2.4.

Table 2.4: Diagnostic Regression

PID Strength	Pr(Gordon is Experienced)	95% C.I.	N
Leaner	.755	.629 - .881	45
Weak	.779	.680 - .877	68
Strong	.647	.547 - .747	88

Strength of party identity does not seem to predict whether or not respondents in the partisan treatment assess Gordon as the more qualified candidate. While strong identifiers are less likely than weak identifiers and leaners to correctly identify Gordon as the more experienced candidate, the difference does not even approach statistical significance.[10] In short, there is no evidence that strength of party identification is related to an individual being an objective or psychological partisan.

2.5 Discussion and Conclusion

This study has identified two different types of partisans: psychological partisans and objective partisans. Psychological partisans are deeply attached to their party affiliation, while for objective partisans party is just a useful heuristic. For objective partisans, party is a means to an end, while for psychological partisans supporting their party *is* the end. Psychological partisans are not necessarily stronger partisans than objective partisans. In any given year there is little

[10]This is true both according to the 95% confidence intervals and to the regression results used to generate this predicted probability; see Appendix.

reason to believe that an objective Republican would be less committed to the election of Republican candidates than a psychological Republican.

Nonetheless, this study has identified an important way in which psychological partisans differ from objective partisans. Specifically, they differ in how they evaluate objective information about candidates and how they use that information to render their vote choice. For psychological partisans, party acts as a perceptual filter, causing them to reassess objective information about the political world in order to justify a partisan decision. This means that in the presence of cross-pressure they can eliminate the cognitive dissonance by rationalizing the cross-pressuring factor away. In this case, a cross-pressured psychological partisan would rationalize that the objectively less qualified co-partisan is actually *more* qualified.

Conversely, party does not act as a perceptual filter for objective partisans. Therefore, they do not reassess political objects in light of their party affiliation. When cross-pressured between party and some other factor, they do not rationalize the cross-pressuring factor away. They have to live with the dissonance and make a choice between two factors they care about – party and whatever else (candidate quality in this case). As expected, this study finds that objective partisans are therefore more likely to defect from their party on a given vote than a psychological partisan is. In effect, objective partisans can be persuaded by other factors to support the opposition party's candidate, unlike psychological partisans.

While finding the relative balance between psychological partisans and objective partisans among party identifiers is not the goal of this study, the results may be somewhat suggestive. The probability of erroneously assessing Anderson as the more qualified candidate nearly doubles as one moves from the non-partisan to partisan treatments, from .156 to .284. Therefore, the increase in the probability of saying Anderson is more qualified as one moves from the non-partisan to

partisan treatment is .128. This could be viewed as the lower-bound of the proportion of partisans who are psychological partisans. However, the results may be underestimating the presence of psychological partisans. For one, some proportion of partisans who think Anderson is more qualified in the non-partisan treatment are presumably psychological partisans. For another, the survey experiment used here is a hard test of the hypotheses presented earlier. There is a widespread notion in the United States that judges are apolitical figures (Jaros and Roper, 1980; Frank, 1949), giving candidate quality cues more resonance than in other types of elections. Candidate quality is in fact the most important predictor of vote choice in non-partisan judicial elections (Dubois, 1980; Goldstein, 1979).

The judiciary is also a hierarchical institution. As chief judge of the state's second highest court, Gordon would occupy a superior rank to anyone other than an incumbent running for state supreme court. Anderson is described as a successful attorney, plainly much lower down the judicial hierarchy; but if Anderson had been described as a county magistrate he would still have held an obviously inferior position to Gordon. In the non-judicial context it is not always so clear cut. In a gubernatorial election, for example, a mayor is not obviously better qualified than a state senator or even a business owner. The use of judicial elections in the experiment might have limited the effects of motivated reasoning, leading to an underestimation of the proportion of partisans who are psychological partisans.

Scholars have focused significant attention on what drives party identification, namely, whether it is mostly a psychological and social tie or a more rational standing decision on the part of voters. While this debate is certainly worthwhile, I argue that in reality there are two kinds of partisans, each sufficiently numerous that they should not be ignored. Rather, more attention needs to be paid to how different kinds of partisans make political decisions. Current models of how

partisanship influences voter behavior may be too simplified, assuming that all partisans behave the same. Doing so, however, means that there may be systematic overestimation or underestimation of the effects of partisanship. More attention needs to be paid to how different kinds of partisans make political decisions. For example, table 2.1 shows that in the partisan treatments, both Democrats and Republicans are slightly less likely to support Gordon than to support Anderson. However, to leave that as the conclusion would have been misleading. Objective partisans (see table 2.3) are more likely than not to support Gordon in the partisan treatment, while psychological partisans have essentially no probability of supporting Gordon.

The results of this study provides evidence that different kinds of partisans behave differently when cross-pressured, at least in the judicial context. It is likely that psychological partisans and objective partisans behave differently in terms of other political decisions as well. The discussion of party identification in the literature has focused on the debate between the Michigan school scholars, social identity scholars, and scholars who argue party identity comes from rational evaluations. This is an important question, but it is also important to realize that the types of partisans envisioned by both camps exist. The most fruitful path for researchers now is to see how differently these kinds of partisans behave.

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Chapter Three: Education, Quasi-Partisan Campaigns, and Ballot Roll-Off in Elections without Party Labels

John P. Lappie[11]

Abstract This study examines the effects of education and candidate campaigns on voter participation in non-partisan elections and primaries. I develop a theory of voter participation in these elections that argues that the better educated should tend to participate more than the less educated. This should be particularly true when candidates run blatantly partisan campaigns (which I refer to as quasi-partisan campaigning). I test this theory on a sample of non-partisan judicial elections held from 2000 to 2010, and a sample of non-gubernatorial executive branch primaries from 2008. The results show the opposite of what I predicted: that participation actually *decreases* slightly as education increases. This counter-intuitive result is not unique however, and I discuss some possible reasons for this odd finding.

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3.1 Introduction

In his classic work *An Economic Theory of Democracy*, Anthony Downs (1957) proposed a mathematical model for the decision to turn out to vote: PB-C+D, where P is the probability that a citizen's vote is decisive, B is the benefit that a citizen gets from their favored candidate winning, C is the accumulated costs associated with voting, and D is a sense of civic duty (Riker and Ordeshook, 1968; Downs, 1957). Since the probability of a decisive vote is essentially zero, this formula can be reduced to the costs of voting and the sense of civic duty. The costs of voting are not limited to the physical and opportunity costs of registering and voting. There are also informational costs to voting, and acquiring information can be expensive for voters. These informational costs are particularly high in the United States, as American voters are asked to cast ballots for more offices than almost any voters in the world (Wattenberg et al., 2000). The party heuristic greatly diminishes the informational costs of voting. The party cue is highly accessible in the minds of citizens, and is one of if not the most widely used heuristic in American elections (DeSart, 1995; Huckfeldt et al., 1999).[12]

Furthermore, the importance of the party cue increases, rather than decreases, as the salience of the contest decreases (Klein and Baum, 2001). In short, citizens who know little if anything about the candidates involved in an election believe that party labels alone give them enough information on which to cast a vote. Therefore, party labels greatly decrease the informational costs associated with voting, and, by doing so, increase participation in elections (Bonneau and Hall, 2009; Schaffner et al., 2001).

[12]What precisely party *means* to voters is a hotly debated question. This study does not seek to address that question; for the purposes of this paper, what party means to voters is less important than the fact that party is meaningful to most voters.

However, there are many elections where either the party label is not on the ballot (non-partisan elections), or where the label is technically present but conveys no meaningful information to voters (such as primaries; see Key, 1949). I refer to this class of elections as Elections without Party Labels (EWPLs). The costs of voting are higher for these elections, since there is no easy label available to guide the decisions of voters. It is for this reason that voter participation is higher in partisan than non-partisan judicial elections (Bonneau and Hall, 2009; Schaffner et al., 2001).

There is also a debate in the literature on for whom cognitive heuristics, such as the party cue, are most important: high or low sophisticates. Some have argued that, since cognitive heuristics are informational shortcuts, they must be more important to those who have less information (Popkin, 1991; Collier et al., 1989; McKelvey and Ordeshook, 1986). Others have argued that since a person must be somewhat well informed to understand what a heuristic (such as party) means, heuristics must be more beneficial for high sophisticates (Lau and Redlawsk, 1997; Sniderman et al., 1991). In this study, I examine the related question of whether party labels increase or decrease in importance as education increases. The best way to resolve this puzzle is to see how different kinds of citizens perform when party labels are taken away.

In this paper I examine whether more educated citizens are likelier to participate in EWPLs than less educated citizens. Furthermore, while party labels are never on the ballot in non-partisan elections, candidates can send out partisan and/or ideological signals via their campaigns. When these 'quasi-partisan' campaigns are run (see Lappie, N.D.), voter participation should increase due to the presence of partisan information in the electoral environment. However, this benefit should not be felt equally among citizens, but mostly among more attentive citizens; namely the more educated.

3.2 A Theory of Voter Participation in EWPLs

The progressive movement of the late 19th and early 20th century detested political parties. They believed normatively that candidate quality *should* be the most important factor in vote choice. In their view, partisanship was nothing but a hindrance, distracting voters from the candidate quality cue. Therefore the progressives introduced non-partisan elections to suppress partisan voting, and force voters to rely on the 'better' cue of candidate quality (Wright, 2008; Williams and Adrian, 1959; Adrian, 1952). However, voters in both the partisan and non-partisan context have the same goal, to vote in line with their preferences. For many if not most Americans, supporting a political party *is* their preference (Lappie, N.D.; Bonneau and Cann, 2013; DeSart, 1995; Huckfeldt et al., 1999). Citizens who feel they do not have enough information to cast a vote are much less likely to participate (Wattenberg et al., 2000). Indeed, ballot roll-off is higher in non-partisan than partisan judicial elections (Bonneau and Hall, 2009; Hall, 2007). However, I argue that the probability of a voter participating in EWPLs will vary based upon the information provided by campaigns, and the educational attainment of voters. Specifically, participation in EWPLs should increase if the candidates run blatantly partisan or ideological campaigns (hereafter quasi-partisan campaigns), particularly among the more educated. This raises important normative questions about the nature of EWPLs, and about representation in EWPLs. If different kinds of citizens are better able, or more willing, to participate in EWPLs, then than the victorious candidates will likely represent the interests and beliefs of those citizens who voted rather than the citizenry as a whole.

3.2.1 Information, Party, and Ballot Roll-Off

American voters are asked to cast ballots for more offices than voters in almost every other democracy. The result is that the informational costs of voting are higher in the United States than

almost anywhere else in the world (Wattenberg et al., 2000). These informational costs have a direct effect on ballot roll-off. By ballot roll-off, I mean individuals who *have* turned out to vote, but choose not to vote for one or more offices on the ballot. Focusing on ballot roll-off rather than simple turnout is an appropriate way to measure participation in EWPLs because EWPLs generally are not the contests that bring citizens out on Election Day.

Scholars have emphasized that the decision to roll-off the ballot is a rational one (see Wattenberg et al., 2000; Bowler et al., 1992; Pothier, 1997). If citizens do not know the answer to the question, be it for whom to vote for or how to vote on a ballot proposition, the rational decision is to not cast a ballot for that contest. The citizen is implicitly leaving the decision to those who have more information about the contest. In essence, voters are risk averse, and would rather not vote at all than risk voting for the 'wrong' person. Wattenberg et al. (2000) liken this to High School students taking the SAT: if the voter does not know the 'answer', then he or she skips that item and move on to a question that he or she can answer. Again, scholars argue that citizens are likelier to skip a particular contest if they are uninformed about the candidates.

This is because party labels provide a great deal of meaning to citizens. What party means to voters is a hotly debated question, but for the purposes of this paper what party means to voters is less important than the fact that party is *meaningful* to most voters (see Schaffner and Streb, 2002; Huckfeldt et al. 1999; Beck, 1997; DeSart, 1995). Partisan ballots greatly reduce the informational costs of voting (Bowler et al., 1992). This is the accepted reason that ballot roll-off is higher in non-partisan judicial elections than in partisan judicial elections (see Bonneau and Hall, 2009; Schaffner et al., 2001).

Party labels do not always convey meaning to voters. Primaries are essentially non-partisan elections (Key, 1949) because a party label cannot convey meaning if every candidate is a co-

partisan. Primary voters usually turn out to vote for presidential, gubernatorial, or senatorial nominations, but are often asked to make decisions about lower-ticket races about which they are uninformed. These voters are confronted with a list of candidate names, most of whom they know little if anything about. Naturally these names will convey little if any meaning to voters (but see King and Matland, 2003). Therefore, the informational costs to voting in a low-salience primary are akin to those of a non-partisan election.

3.2.2 Education and Participation in EWPLs; or for whom is party important?

EWPLs are an information scarce environment, but there is some information available to citizens that could help guide their decisions. However, these elections are generally very low profile, and thus not the elections that bring citizens out on Election Day. Furthermore, campaign spending in EWPLs is generally low. Citizens will be exposed to campaign messages a handful of times, if at all. To a large extent citizens must inform themselves about these contests. The question is which citizens are likeliest to inform themselves and therefore participate in EWPLs.[13]

I posit that more educated citizens are likeliest to participate in EWPLs. There are several reasons that this is likely.[14] First, education may increase citizens' interest in and knowledge of politics (Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996). More educated citizens are in fact likelier to seek out political information than their less educated counterparts (Hall, 2007; Milligan et al., 2004). Second, the likelihood that one's social network contains at least one politically involved person increases as one's education increases (Sondheimer and Green, 2010; Rolfe, 2004). A person who

[13]Naturally campaign spending should influence whether or not citizens are exposed to campaign messages. The data in this study is at the precinct level; campaign spending is controlled for by a contest dummy. See data and methods section.

[14]Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980) argue that education gives those citizens a greater ability to navigate the bureaucracy associated with registering to vote in the United States. Since this study examines ballot roll-off, this argument is not relevant to this paper.

has politically involved associates is likelier to learn about politics than someone whose social network lacks those persons. Third, political campaigns are more likely to reach out to voters as their education level increases (Sondheimer and Green, 2010; Rolfe, 2004). Finally, more educated voters tend to be better able to comprehend complex political information than less educated persons (Matsusaka, 1995; Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980).

For all of the above mentioned reasons, the more educated are likelier than the less educated to be exposed to information about EWPLs. Given that the more educated are also better able to comprehend the complex political world (Matsusaka, 1995; Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980) they are also more likely to find partisan information even in non-partisan elections. Non-partisan elections are ineffective at suppressing the willingness and even eagerness of citizens to cast a partisan ballot (see Lappie, N.D.; Bonneau and Cann, 2013; Squire and Smith, 1988). Bonneau and Cann (2013) note that savvy voters can infer candidate partisanship from seemingly innocuous campaign statements. The candidates themselves might also send out blatantly partisan or ideological signals (see section 2.2.3). Even if there is no partisan information in the environment, the more educated are still likelier to be aware of the existence of EWPLs and make an effort to inform themselves on the candidates. There is at least a chance that inquisitive citizens will find something that leads them to support one candidate over the other, and thus cast a vote for that office.

> *Hypothesis 1: Voter participation in EWPLs should increase as educational attainment increases*

3.2.3 Candidate Decisions and Voter Participation in EWPLs

Candidates in all elections have *some* ability to choose what to emphasize in their campaigns (Banda and Carsey, 2015; Simon, 2002; Carsey, 2000; Riker, 1990). Candidates in

partisan elections are heavily constrained by their party affiliation. A partisan candidate may well *want* to distance themselves from their party. For example, during her ill-fated 2012 campaign for U.S. Senate in Connecticut, Republican nominee Linda McMahon paid for advertisements encouraging citizens to vote for her and Barack Obama. However, the presence of the party label on the ballot limits the ability of candidates to distance themselves from their party. Candidates in EWPLs are comparatively unconstrained. Note that campaigns should influence voter behavior in primaries as well, since these are also (with some exceptions) lower profile contests with a relatively scarce information environment. However the campaign strategies available to candidates are different in primaries than in non-partisan elections. There is for example little to gain from running a truly non-partisan campaign in a party primary. Therefore, while campaigns should matter in primaries as well as non-partisan elections, this study addresses campaign effects solely in the context of non-partisan elections.[15]

In non-partisan elections, candidates can choose to keep silent about their party affiliation, or they can run blatantly partisan or ideological campaigns (Lappie, N.D.). I refer to the former as truly non-partisan campaigning, and the latter as quasi-partisan campaigning. If the candidates in a non-partisan election run truly non-partisan campaigns there will be very little, if any, partisan information in the political environment for citizens to discover and learn. However, if one or more candidates run a quasi-partisan campaign, then there is partisan information in the environment for voters to consume.

Quasi-partisan campaigns provide partisan information to voters, which should increase voter participation in these contests. This should be true over all levels of education. However, the

[15]Hypothesis 1, which relates solely to the direct effects of education on participation regardless of campaign strategy, is however tested on a sample of primary election results. See data and methods section.

gap in participation between more educated and less educated citizens should increase. Non-partisan elections are usually low profile, so it is likely that more passive citizens will never be exposed to the campaigns. In other words, low profile elections require citizens to seek out information on their own. Because more educated citizens are more interested in politics (Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996) they are more likely to make that effort. If the candidates send out partisan signals, the more educated should be more apt to learn candidate partisanship and thus participate. The less educated are less apt to make that effort, so the participation gap between levels of education should increase.

Hypothesis 2: Voter participation in non-partisan elections should increase in the presence of a quasi-partisan campaign.

Hypothesis 3: *The gap in participation between levels of education should increase in the presence of quasi-partisan campaign.*

3.3 Data and Methods

3.3.1 Samples, Models, and Data

The hypotheses developed above are tested in two models: one on a sample of cases from non-partisan judicial elections, the other on a sample of cases from non-gubernatorial executive branch primaries. I refer to the former as the judicial elections model and the latter as the primary elections model. Hypothesis 1 (that participation in EWPLs will increase as education increases) is tested in both models. Hypotheses 2 and 3 (regarding the effects of quasi-partisan campaigns) are tested only in the judicial elections model.

Non-partisan judicial elections provide a particularly tough test of my theory. Citizens tend to perceive judges as fair and impartial figures who make decisions upon the basis of law rather than petty politics (Jaros and Roper, 1980; Frank, 1949). This is part of the reason that the judiciary

tends to be more popular than the legislative and executive branches (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 1995). Thus, the judiciary is an area in which theoretically voters might not believe party is important.

The judicial elections model contains precinct level returns from nine contests across three states from 2000 to 2010. Four of the contests were truly non-partisan, five were quasi-partisan. I discuss how contests were coded as truly non-partisan or quasi-partisan in the independent variables section (section 2.3.4).

The primaries model consists of Democratic primaries for non-gubernatorial executive branch offices in 2008 in Montana and North Carolina.[16] In both places the state and local primaries were held concurrently with the presidential primary. In 2008 in each of these states the Democratic presidential primary was hotly contested by Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton.[17] This provides a case of a primary where the highest of all possible contests is on the ballot, while voters are still asked to make decisions for very low profile contests. It is important to note that I only examine *contested* primaries for these low profile elections. If a primary only has one candidate, voters are not really being asked to make a decision.

The data is measured at the precinct level.[18] Precincts are more homogenous than counties, which are the most viable alternative. Using data from the 2010 GEOCORR project at the

[16]These contests are: Attorney General and Superintendent of Public Instruction in Montana, and Lieutenant Governor and Commissioner of Labor in North Carolina. Each of these contests was heavily contested.

[17]In North Carolina, the Republican primary was held the same day. However, John McCain had no serious challengers left by this point. The Montana Democratic primary was held on the same day as the state Republican primaries, but the Republicans held a caucus to determine presidential delegates several months earlier. Any effects these factors might have on ballot roll-off are controlled for by the contest dummies.

[18]Twenty-five states report their election results at the precinct level; nine of these states use non-partisan judicial elections.

University of Missouri, it is possible to match precincts[19] with census blocks, and use that to estimate the demographics of the precinct.[20]

3.3.2 Dependent Variable

In all models, the dependent variable is ballot roll-off at the precinct level. Ballot roll-off is defined as the percentage of voters who cast a ballot for the top race on the ballot, but not for the contest being examined. In the primaries model, the top race is the 2008 Democratic presidential primary between Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama. In the non-partisan judicial elections sample the top race may be the Presidential contest, or a gubernatorial or senatorial contest. Contest dummies (see subsection on controls, 2.3.5) control for the effects of the top-race on the ballot, and other state-level factors.

3.3.3 Key Independent Variables

A key independent variable in both models is educational attainment. In this study educational attainment is measured as the percentage of persons over age twenty-five who have a Bachelor's Degree or higher. This data is available from the US Census Bureau. Some studies use the percentage over age twenty-five with at least High School diploma as their measure of education (see for example Hall, 2007). However, in 2009 eighty-five percent of Americans over age twenty-five had at least a High School diploma.[21] I chose to use percentage with a bachelor's

[19]The census refers to precincts as Voter Tabulation Districts, or VTDs. It is possible for a precinct's boundaries to change at some point between censuses, or to be abolished, or split in two, etc. Federal law requires that VTD boundaries not change for a two year period before the census (so between 2008 and 2010).

[20]Specifically, it is necessary to assume that each precinct (VTD) within a census block has the same demographics as the census block. There will probably be some difference; however it is better than assuming that that the precinct has the same demographics as the county.

[21]US Census Bureau, Educational Attainment 2009 (published 2012).

degree or higher, since this has more variance. For examples of this measure in published work, see Streb et al. (2009), and Nichols and Strizek (1995).

In the judicial elections model there is a second key independent variable: an interaction term between educational attainment and quasi-partisan campaigning. The coefficient on educational attainment shows the effect of education on ballot roll-off when there is a truly non-partisan campaign. The coefficient on the interaction term shows the additional effect of education in the presence of a quasi-partisan campaign. I am unable to include a quasi-partisan dummy variable in the model, since this would correlate perfectly with the contest-level dummy variables (see the subsection on controls, 2.3.5). However, these contest dummies do capture the unique effect of quasi-partisan campaigning.

3.3.4 Identifying Campaigns as Quasi-Partisan or Truly Non-Partisan

Identifying campaigns as quasi-partisan is relatively easy. Did the candidate make explicitly partisan or ideological appeals in the course of their campaigns? This could be demonstrated through a candidate's advertisements, statements at campaign events, or by mentioning party affiliation or ideology on the official campaign website.[22] Furthermore, the news media and judicial election watchdog groups such as the Brennan Center will often comment when quasi-partisan campaigns are run. It should be noted that it is only necessary for *one* candidate to run a quasi-partisan campaign in order for the contest to be identified as quasi-partisan. This is because if candidate X says that he is a Republican, voters will probably infer that candidate Y is a Democrat, even if she stays silent on the subject.

[22]Campaign websites are usually taken down shortly after the election; however through archive.org these old websites can sometimes be accessed.

A good example of a quasi-partisan campaign is the campaign run by Barbara Jackson of North Carolina during her 2010 bid for State Supreme Court. Justice Jackson's television advertisements referred to her as the conservative choice for State Supreme Court. These advertisements also showed viewers that she had been endorsed by U.S. Senator Richard Burr, at that time the state's leading Republican politician.[23] In addition, Jackson went to Republican campaign events and openly called herself the Republican candidate for State Supreme Court.[24]

Truly non-partisan campaigns were harder to identify, as I require positive evidence from a third-party source that the campaign was truly non-partisan.[25] Truly non-partisan campaigns are very lightly covered by the news media. After all, the lack of partisanship in a non-partisan election is not generally considered newsworthy. Furthermore, advertisements and speeches from the candidates that were devoid of partisanship does not mean the campaign was truly non-partisan; only that those particular speeches and advertisements were not. Though not likely, it is possible that I could just miss evidence of a quasi-partisan campaign. As a result, I required positive evidence from a third-party source that the campaign was truly non-partisan. For example, in 2008 Minnesota Supreme Court election featuring incumbent Lorie Gildea against Deborah Hedlund news outlets and legal associations in Minnesota noted how both campaigns were devoid of partisanship, juxtaposing them with quasi-partisan campaigns occurring in Wisconsin at that time (see Soule, 2008). This strategy provides a high degree of confidence that the four truly non-

[23]"Judge Barbara Jackson: True Conservative for Supreme Court." Paid for by Citizens for Judge Barbara Jackson.

[24]Barbara Jackson, speech to the Franklin County (NC) Republicans, Oct. 2, 2010. In this speech, Justice Jackson also mentioned the logistical support given to her campaign by U.S. Senator Burr (R), who was in the midst of his own successful re-election bid

[25]With the exception of the 2000 Minnesota Supreme Court election where Kathleen Blatz was the nominal Republican candidate. This election was held before the US Supreme Court case of Republican Party of Minnesota vs. White (2002), which struck down regulations preventing candidates from discussing their political views. If Justice Blatz or her opponent, Burton Hanson, had made blatantly partisan or ideological appeals they would have been disciplined.

partisan contests are distinct from the five quasi-partisan contests. If however I erroneously coded a quasi-partisan campaign as truly non-partisan, it would tend to lead to null results and thus against finding support for my hypotheses.

Table 3.1: Case Selection, Truly Non-Partisan Contests

Year	Republican Candidate	State
2000	Kathleen Blatz	MN
2004	Ed McLean	MT
2008	Tim Tingelstad	MN
2008	Lorie Gildea	MN

Table 3.2: Case Selection, Quasi-Partisan Contests

Year	Republican Candidate	State
2004	Cindy Younkin	MT
2008	Bob Edmunds	NC
2010	Barbara Jackson	NC
2010	Nels Swandal	MT
2010	Greg Wersal	MN

3.3.5 Controls

In each model I include a dummy variable for each contest. These dummy variables control for the idiosyncratic factors associated with each contest, state, and year. In short, the contest dummies capture all average differences between the nine contests. I am not able to report on the unique effects of these factors, but they are controlled for.

There is also a control variable for precinct population (measured in thousands to ease interpretation of the coefficients). As population increases, campaigns may focus more attention on that area, decreasing ballot roll-off. Conversely, increased population may make it more difficult to disseminate campaign information, so perhaps voters in less populous precincts are more informed. If so, ballot roll-off may increase as population increases.

3.3.6 Statistical Models

In both models I utilize an OLS multi-level random effects model. This is necessary to control for unit effects, since each sampled precinct appears at least twice in each dataset. The contest dummies provide fixed effects for state, contest, and year level effects. For example, the fact that Barbara Jackson is a woman presumably had some direct effect on her fortunes in the 2010 North Carolina Supreme Court election. I cannot report the independent effects of gender on the dependent variable, but that effect is controlled for. The coefficients on variables are interpreted the same as in the basic OLS model.

3.4 Results

Table 3.3: Abridged Results[26]

Y = Ballot Roll-Off	**Judicial Elections Model**	**Primary Elections Model**
Variable	Coefficient (P-Value)	Coefficient (P-Value)
Education	0.001* (.000)	0.002* (.000)
Education : Quasi-Partisan Campaign	-0.0005* (.001)	NA
Population (in thousands)	0.004* (.002)	0.003 (.168)
N =	1,931 (676 precincts)	832 (416 precincts)
Overall R-squared	.447	.216

*All p-values are two-tailed. * indicates significance at the .05 level*

The judicial elections model tests all hypotheses presented in this paper. Educational attainment exerts a positive and statistically significant impact on ballot roll-off. This means that in a truly non-partisan context, ballot roll-off increases as precinct-level educational attainment increases. For a one percent increase in education there is on average a .001% increase in ballot roll-off, *ceteris paribus.* So while this coefficient is statistically significant, it is not of substantive importance.

The interaction of education and quasi-partisan campaigning is negative and statistically significant, though again the coefficient is not substantively important. It should be noted that the coefficient of the interaction is smaller (-.0005) than the coefficient on education (.001). Thus, the

[26]The contest dummies are not of theoretical interest, therefore they are not reported in-text.

coefficient on the interaction does not mean that in the quasi-partisan context ballot roll-off *decreases* (i.e. participation increases) as education increases. Rather, ballot roll-off still increases as education increases, but at a smaller rate, in the quasi-partisan context. Precinct population exerts a positive and significant effect on ballot roll-off, meaning that participation in that contest as precinct population increases. However, the effect is not substantively important.

The primaries model tests only hypothesis 1 (that increased educational attainment should increase participation, i.e. decrease ballot roll-off, in EWPLs). The coefficient on education here is positive and statistically significant, meaning that as education increases, ballot roll-off increases as well. As in the judicial elections model, this coefficient is not substantively important. Unlike in the judicial elections model, the coefficient on population is negative, though not statistically significant.

These results provide no support for any of the hypotheses presented in this paper. Ballot roll-off does not decrease as education increases, but the exact opposite. The effect is not strong, but it appears to be real. Quasi-partisan campaigning does not seem to have any substantial impact on that relationship.

3.5 Discussion and Conclusion

I posited that in EWPLs, the more educated would tend to roll-off the ballot less than the less educated. I also posited that in the presence of quasi-partisan campaigns, ballot-roll off would decline, but that the participation gap between the educated and uneducated would decrease. The results of this study indicate the exact opposite of what I predicted. Citizens in less educated areas participate more in these EWPLs than citizens in more educated areas. Furthermore, quasi-partisan campaigns do not increase the participation gap between the educated and less educated. Rather, the gap decreases because the more educated start to participate more.

This result is entirely counter-intuitive; scholars will no doubt be tempted to set the results aside as anomalous. However, it turns out that these results are not unique. Streb et al. (2009) found that when they measured educational attainment by percentage of population with a bachelor's degree or higher, it had a statistically significant *positive* effect on ballot roll-off. Streb et al., like myself, find that increased education actually *decreases* participation. When they ran the model with percentage of the population with a High School diploma as their measure of education, the result was in the same direction but was not quite statistically significant. Similarly, Nichols and Strizek (1996) also found that educational attainment, measured as percentage with a bachelor's or higher, increased ballot roll-off. Conversely, Hall (2007), while using High School diplomas as her measure of educational attainment, found what one would expect: increased educational attainment decreases ballot roll-off.

Streb et al. relegate their odd findings to a footnote, while Nichols and Strizek mention it only briefly in-text. Educational attainment was a control in their models, not the key independent variable. Those scholars could afford to set the odd findings aside. This study lacks that luxury, so I will briefly consider: why would educational attainment *increase* ballot roll-off?

One possibility is theoretical: more educated citizens may be more risk averse. The more educated are also likelier to be wealthy, and thus bigger stakeholders in government policy. This may make them warier of making the "wrong" decision when voting. Relatedly, the more educated may simply take politics more seriously than the less educated. If so, they may be concerned about the possibility of making the "wrong choice" and thus be likelier to abstain.

If so however, why does Hall (2007) find that ballot roll-off decreases as educational attainment increases? She measures this concept as percentage with a high school diploma or higher rather than a bachelor's or higher, but it is difficult to imagine why this should make a

difference. Another possibility is that there is something methodological that Streb et al., Nichols and Strizek, and I are missing. Whether the problem is methodological or theoretical, there is a puzzle to be resolved. Hall finds that ballot roll-off decreases as education increases, while others find the opposite, and highly counter-intuitive, result. This puzzle could perhaps be resolved by looking at the individual level rather than the aggregate level. Conversely, perhaps new methods or new theories are needed. In any case, this is a puzzle that requires more research to resolve. The answer, however, is one worth finding.

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Chapter Four: Education, Quasi-Partisan Campaigns, and Preference Congruent Voting in Non-Partisan Elections

John P. Lappie[27]

Abstract This study examines the interaction of voter education, non-partisan elections, and candidate behavior on what I call preference-congruent voting. I address the theoretical tension that: (1) voters want to vote in line with their preferences, which for many means partisan voting. (2)Non-partisan elections were designed to suppress the party cue. The ability to ascertain the partisanship of candidates, and vote accordingly, should vary based upon (3) the education of voters and (4) the messages sent by the campaigns. This generates three predictions. First, that party should be a factor in voting even though the party label is not on the ballot. Second, more educated citizens can more easily cast a partisan vote. Third, partisan voting should increase when candidates run blatantly partisan or ideological campaigns. Testing these predictions on two samples of precinct level results from nonpartisan judicial elections, I find that more educated citizens are better able to cast preference-congruent ballots, but only when the campaigns are blatantly partisan or ideological. Whether the result of campaign strategy or individual-level education, creating differences among voters in the ability to cast ballots in line with their preferences raises important normative questions.

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4.1 Introduction

Walker (1966) states that the most important aspect of the classical theory of democracy was the existence of a "…*active, informed, democratic citizenry…"* (p. 285). However, we know that many citizens do not vote, that most are politically uninformed (Somin, 2004; Converse, 1964; Campbell et al., 1960), and that rational citizens do not have much incentive to participate in electoral politics (e.g. Downs, 1957). Nonetheless democracy still seems to function, and most voters, at least in presidential elections, even vote 'correctly'[28] (Lau and Redlawsk, 1997). How is an ignorant electorate able to cast ballots in a fairly reasonable fashion? For many scholars, the answer to this puzzle is heuristics. So long as citizens utilize a reasonable decision rule, they do not need to be fully or even well informed on every candidate/issue (see Druckman, 2001; Gerber and Lupia, 1999; Lupia, 1994; Page and Shapiro, 1992; Popkin, 1991; Collier et al., 1989; McKelvey and Ordeshook, 1986). The most notable and powerful of these decision rules is the party heuristic. However, the party heuristic is not always *easily* available to voters. Partisan elections have the party label on the ballot, making the choice easy for party-minded citizens. In contrast, non-partisan elections lack this easy label.

Non-partisan elections are important in their own right. Seventy-seven percent of all local governments in the United States are elected via non-partisan elections (MacManus and Bullock, 2003), including twenty of the nation's thirty largest cities (National League of Cities, 2014). Thirteen states currently utilize direct non-partisan elections for their state supreme courts, and in eighteen states for circuit, district, or superior courts. Even one state legislature, Nebraska, is elected via non-partisan elections.

[28]Lau and Redlawsk say a citizen voted correctly if, when given full information, he or she would have cast the same vote they did in reality. The authors do this by the simple procedure of providing subjects' fuller information, and asking if they changed their minds. There is a lengthy discussion of the term correct voting in the theory section.

Non-partisan elections are also important for theoretical reasons. The absence of party labels gives scholars leverage to answer important questions about the role of party in American politics. For example, Wright and Schaffner (2002) have compared the formally partisan Kansas Legislature to the formally non-partisan Nebraska Legislature to see how the lack of party caucuses influences legislative behavior. In the field of electoral studies, non-partisan elections can be used to help determine what party means to voters, how important party is to voters, and how citizens use party when making their decisions. Importantly, in non-partisan elections the strength of the partisan signal can vary from almost non-existent to quite strong, depending on the decisions made by the campaigns. This paper uses this fact to see how citizens respond to variation in the strength of partisan signals in formally non-partisan campaigns.

This paper seeks to resolve the tension that emerges from three fundamental propositions. First, non-partisan elections were designed to suppress the party cue. The progressive movement believed that non-partisan ballots would lead to voters relying on candidate quality, a cue the progressives deemed normatively superior (Wright, 2008; Williams and Adrian, 1959; Adrian, 1952). Second, voters in both partisan and non-partisan elections have the same goal: to vote in line with their preferences. For many voters, their preferences would include support for a particular political party. Third, that the ability to ascertain the partisanship of candidates in formally non-partisan elections will vary across voters and across campaigns. This final point raises important normative questions about representation in non-partisan elections that I will address in the concluding section of this paper.

In this paper, I develop a theory of voter behavior in non-partisan elections that addresses these three propositions. The theory rests on the contention that voters in non-partisan elections still wish to cast ballots in line with their preferences, and that for many Americans supporting one

political party or the other is their preference. The absence of party labels on the ballot makes it harder for voters to do this, but it does not change their motivations. In the absence of party labels, whether voters are able to use the party heuristic will depend on: (a) whether the campaign presents voters with sufficient information to determine the party leanings of the candidates involved, and (b) the capacity of voters to acquire and correctly interpret such information. I test this theory on two different samples of formally non-partisan elections. One sample includes five contests from three states where the campaigns made explicit partisan appeals to the electorate. The second sample utilizes four contests from two states where the candidates ran campaigns that did not emphasize party.

4.2 A Theory of Preference-Congruent Voting in Non-Partisan Elections

4.2.1 Heuristics

Cognitive heuristics serve as decision-making shortcuts. Tversky and Kahneman (1974) noted that human beings are cognitively limited. Simon (1985) refers to this as humans being cognitive misers. In the course of their lives individuals are constantly being asked to make decisions. However, the probability of a particular choice leading to a desired outcome is almost always unknown to the individual (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). A thorough examination of all possible alternatives (fully rational behavior) is simply too taxing on an individual's time, patience, and cognitive ability (Jones, 2001; Simon, 1985). Humans therefore utilize decision rules, i.e. heuristics, as informational shortcuts. These heuristics rely upon what information the individual does have, as well as the efficacy of that heuristic's prior use (Jones, 2001; Simon, 1985; Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). While the success rate of decisions based on heuristics will be lower than decisions based on fully rational behavior, the use of heuristics generally leads to satisfactory results (Simon, 1985; Tversky and Kahneman, 1974).

Individuals use heuristics to help them make decisions almost constantly in everyday life. As Dahl (1961) and Lippmann (1922) remind us, people are generally more concerned with their everyday lives than with politics. At an intellectual level, the common citizen might not consider his or her personal life more important than politics. However, the average individual has no political power except for his or her vote,[29] and an individual voter essentially cannot influence the outcome of an election (see Downs, 1957). As a result, individuals really have very little incentive to thoroughly research politics. This makes the use of heuristics for political decision-making particularly appealing to citizens. The evidence suggests that voting is generally based upon cues in both partisan (Lau and Redlawsk, 2001, 1997) and non-partisan (Bonneau and Hall, 2009; Dubois, 1980; Goldstein, 1979) contexts. Voting in non-partisan elections, like virtually all individual-level behavior, will still be cue-based.

4.2.2 Party and Preference-Congruent Voting

The study of partisan and non-partisan elections has diverged considerably. Scholars of partisan elections have focused much of their attention on how voters utilize the party cue (see Lau and Redlawsk, 2001, 1997; Gerber and Lupia, 1999; Lupia, 1994; Page and Shapiro, 1992; Popkin, 1991; Collier et al., 1989: McKelvey and Ordeshook, 1986). By contrast, scholars of non-partisan elections have focused on how alternative cues – most notably candidate quality – affect voter behavior (see Hall, 2001; Dubois, 1980; Goldstein, 1979; Adrian, 1959). Scholars were aware that the candidates in non-partisan elections are often members of political parties. However, it was

[29]They can also volunteer for campaigns, talk to others, or donate funds to candidates. For the average individual however, those activities are no more likely than his or her vote to sway the outcome of the election.

also believed that voters were unable to vote based on the party of candidates running in non-partisan elections except in a few, exceedingly uncommon situations (see Dubois, 1980).[30]

Removing the party label from the ballot does not change the goal of voters. The goal of voters is to cast a ballot in line with their preferences. A citizen who does so has cast a *preference-congruent* ballot. Stated more formally, a citizen has cast a preference-congruent vote if he or she cast the same vote in reality that he or she would have if that citizen had more information about the candidates. Lau and Redlawsk (2001, 1997) refer to this concept as correct voting.[31] However, the term "correct voting" can be misinterpreted to mean that citizens have voted in line with their policy positions (which they may not: see Ellis and Stimson, 2012), or for implying that citizens vote in line with their economic interests (see Bartels, 2005). This leads into a normative argument over how citizens *should* cast their votes, and whether or not researchers should substitute their judgment for the voter's (see Lupia et al., 2007). As such, I propose that preference-congruent voting is a more precise term for what Lau and Redlawsk call correct voting. If citizens behave in line with their preferences, then they are engaging in preference-congruent voting. I make no judgment here as to whether or not citizens *should* hold those preferences.

In this study, I measure preference-congruent voting as partisan voting. Partisan voting is not the only possible form of preference-congruent voting. However, party is very important to many Americans (as discussed below), and thus, should represent the largest slice of preference-congruent voting. On the practical level, partisan preferences are also easier to measure than are

[30]Dubois (1980) cites instances where former high-ranking partisan officeholders, such as a State Attorney General, ran for formally non-partisan seats on the State Supreme Court. In this event, the electorate voted in a predictably partisan fashion. Such occasions are rare however.

[31]Lau and Redlawsk (2001, 1997) measured this concept at the individual level by the simple means of providing a realistic level of information about the candidates to subjects. Subjects were then given a mock ballot, and after voting were provided with fuller information on the candidates. If the subjects, even with the new information, would still have voted the same, than they voted correctly.

preferences on other dimensions. Still, because partisan voting in non-partisan elections is not the only form of preference-congruent voting, the results of this study should be viewed as establishing the floor of preference-congruent voting, not its ceiling.

For many if not most Americans, their preferences include support for a particular political party. The party cue is highly accessible in the minds of voters, and therefore the most commonly used heuristic in partisan elections (see Schaffner and Streb, 2002; Huckfeldt et al., 1999; Beck, 1997; DeSart, 1995). However, what party means to voters is a hotly debated question. Party may be used as a guide to candidate ideology, issue positions in general, or to a specific issue position (Levendusky, 2010; Abramowitz and Saunders, 2006). Conversely, some argue that party identification is a strong social and psychological association for voters (Carsey and Layman, 2006; Greene, 2004; Campbell et al., 1960). If so, voters may support candidates not because they share like-preferences, but because they belong to the same group. Finally, voters may use party as an evaluative measure. This is typically conceived of as voters rewarding or punishing the incumbent party based on the condition of the national (or sometimes state) economy (see Fiorina, 1978).[32] The specific meaning of party identification is an important debate, but for this study, what party means is less important than the fact that party is meaningful to most voters.

The judiciary is the one branch of government where one could argue voters would not consider party affiliation important.[33] However, voters tend to support co-partisans when they are made aware of the party affiliation of judicial candidates (Bonneau and Cann, 2013; Squire and Smith, 1988; Dubois, 1980). Bonneau and Cann (2013) even find that voters can infer the

[32]Citizens can evaluate the incumbent party based on non-economic factors. The military/foreign policy situation, natural disasters, or scandals can also help or hurt the incumbent party.

[33]This is due to the so-called "Cult of the Robe," the idea that citizens should view judges as impartial experts whose political opinions are irrelevant when they make legal decisions. See Squire and Smith, 1988

partisanship of candidates based on non-issue related phrases used by candidates. The point is that many citizens want to cast a partisan ballot, and this should not change just because the ballot is non-partisan.

> *Hypothesis 1: Even in non-partisan elections, voters will attempt to vote for their co-partisan. Thus, an area with more Republicans should provide more votes to the nominally Republican candidate, and vice-versa.*

4.2.3 Education and Voter Behavior in Non-partisan elections.

There is some debate whether cognitive heuristics are more beneficial to high sophisticates or low sophisticates. Some scholars argue that since heuristics are information shortcuts, they are naturally more beneficial to those who *lack* information (Popkin, 1991; Collier et al., 1989; McKelvey and Ordeshook, 1986). Conversely, other scholars have argued that party is more beneficial to high sophisticates. They argue that an individual must have some knowledge in order to effectively use a heuristic (see Lau and Redlawsk, 1997; Sniderman et al., 1991). For instance, a citizen who uses party labels to infer candidate issue positions must know what the typical positions of Republicans and Democrats are. Therefore, heuristics would be most beneficial to high sophisticates. I examine a related question: are party labels most beneficial to the more educated or the less educated?

I argue that more educated citizens should be better able to navigate the information-scarce environment of non-partisan elections than their less sophisticated counterparts. More educated citizens are more likely to turn out to vote (Hogan, 1999; Jackson, 1995; Sigelman et al., 1985; Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980) and less likely to roll-off the ballot (Hall, 2007). I argue that the same factors that make educated citizens likelier to vote will also increase their propensity for preference-congruent voting. More educated citizens are likelier to seek out political information

*(*see Hall, 2007; Milligan et al., 2004), and are better equipped to understand political information than their less educated counterparts (Matsusaka, 1995*;* Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980).

Since more educated citizens are likelier to seek out political information, and better able to understand what information they are exposed to, they ought to be better able to ascertain the partisan leanings of candidates running in non-partisan elections. Generally, this comes from paying more attention to the campaigns. They could possibly infer candidate partisanship from such sources as platforms and candidate statements (Bonneau and Cann, 2013), but voters do not need to be even that attentive. They may read about the contest in the news, talk with their friends or co-workers about the contest, or be more likely to notice a political advertisement. It is probable also that educated citizens are more aware of the existence of formally non-partisan elections, and thus likelier to get a voter guide from their political party on Election Day.[34]

Hypothesis 2: Preference-Congruent voting should be higher among more educated citizens.

4.2.4 Candidate Behavior: Does it affect voters?

Candidates in all elections can to some extent choose what they *emphasize* in their campaigns (Carsey and Banda, 2014; Simon, 2002; Carsey, 2000; Riker, 1990). However, candidates in non-partisan elections are less constrained than their counterparts in formally partisan elections. Candidates running in a partisan election's have a very limited ability to distance themselves from their party. Conversely, candidates in non-partisan elections can choose whether or not to run explicitly partisan or ideological campaigns, hereafter referred to as quasi-partisan

[34]While these elections are non-partisan, it merely means the candidates have not been formally nominated. It does not prohibit parties from *endorsing* candidates, which they commonly do.

campaigns.[35] Candidates could also choose to run campaigns devoid of explicit partisan or ideological appeals, which I refer to as truly non-partisan campaigning.[36]

When one or more candidates run quasi-partisan campaigns, there should be more preference-congruent voting because it will be easier for citizens to ascertain the partisanship of the candidates. It is probably only necessary for one candidate to run a quasi-partisan campaign to generate this effect. If one candidate openly states that he or she is a Republican, voters will probably infer that the opponent is a Democrat, even if that opponent remains silent on the subject. Quasi-partisan campaigning should lead to higher levels of preference-congruent voting across all levels of educational attainment. However, the increase should be greatest among the highly educated, increasing the preference-congruent voting *gap* between the well and less educated. Non-partisan elections are usually low-profile elections where citizens are not exposed to much campaign information. Often citizens will be required to seek information on their own. The more educated are likelier to make that effort in both the truly non-partisan and quasi-partisan context. However, in the quasi-partisan context there is partisan information for the educated to learn and act upon. In the truly non-partisan context this partisan information is harder if not impossible to find; individuals may make the effort, but they are less likely to actually find information to support a preference-congruent vote.

Hypothesis 3a: Preference-congruent voting should increase at all levels of educational attainment in the presence of a quasi-partisan campaign.

[35]In truth, this is simply partisan campaigning within a non-partisan election. I call these quasi-partisan campaigns to avoid confusion with partisan elections.

[36]Candidates have personal partisanships and ideologies that may influence what they say in their campaigns, even if they do not openly identify themselves as a Republican or conservative (for instance). In the truly non-partisan contests sampled here, the campaigns were devoid of at least blatant partisan or ideological appeals.

Hypothesis 3b: *The preference-congruent voting gap between highly educated and lowly educated citizens should expand in the presence of a quasi-partisan campaign.*

To summarize the theory: citizens want to vote in line with their preferences, the most notable preference being support for a particular political party. However, the non-partisan ballot makes it far more difficult for voters to ascertain the partisanship of the candidates. The ability of voters to cast partisan ballots should increase when the candidates run quasi-partisan campaigns, because that information is now more readily available. Furthermore, preference congruent voting should be more prevalent among those better able to acquire and understand that information (i.e. preference-congruent voting should increase as education increases).

4.3 Data and Methods

4.3.1 Samples, Case Selection, and Data

The hypotheses are tested on two samples, both from non-partisan judicial elections. Judicial elections are a notable example of non-partisan elections. Non-partisan elections are used to elect State Supreme Court justices in thirteen states. Judicial elections also provide a relatively tough test of the theory presented here (see footnote 7). One of the samples includes only contests that were quasi-partisan; that is, where one or more candidates in the election made explicitly partisan or ideological appeals. The quasi-partisan sample consists of precinct-level election results from five State Supreme Court elections. Two cases are from North Carolina, two from Montana, and one from Minnesota.

The quasi-partisan contests were easy to identify: did one or more of the candidates involved in the contest make obviously partisan appeals to the electorate? There were numerous ways a candidate could demonstrate they were running a quasi-partisan campaign: via advertisements to the public, their language at public speaking engagements, or simply through

giving their party label a prominent place on their website. Furthermore, the news media and watchdog groups such as the Brennan Center often comment when quasi-partisan campaigns occur. An example of a quasi-partisan campaigning is Barbara Jackson's successful 2010 bid for the North Carolina Supreme Court. Jackson ran television advertisements which referred to her as the conservative choice for Supreme Court.[37] Jackson also spoke frequently at Republican gatherings, and referred to herself in her speeches as the only Republican nominee for Supreme Court.[38]

The other sample consists of four truly non-partisan contests; three from Minnesota and one from Montana.[39] These contests were harder to identify. As a rule, non-partisan candidates running non-partisan campaigns is not considered newsworthy, and finding a non-partisan advertisement (or speech, etc.) from that candidate does not prove there was no quasi-partisan campaigning. All the contests in this sample happened years ago, some as far back as 2000. A scholar looking for evidence of a quasi-partisan campaign could just miss it. To guard against this, I required positive evidence from a neutral party that the campaign was non-partisan for the case to be selected.[40]

[37]"Judge Barbara Jackson: True Conservative for Supreme Court." Paid for by Citizens for Judge Barbara Jackson.

[38]Barbara Jackson, speech to the Franklin County (NC) Republicans, Oct. 2, 2010. In this speech, Justice Jackson also mentioned the logistical support given to her campaign by U.S. Senator Burr (R), who was in the midst of his own successful re-election bid.

[39]Called Truly Non-Partisan as a matter of convenience, to distinguish from the quasi-partisan cases. Some amount of partisanship may still seep in, but at the very least these contests are *substantially* less partisan than the quasi-partisan contests.

[40]With the exception of the 2000 Minnesota Supreme Court election where Kathleen Blatz was the nominal Republican candidate. This election was held before the US Supreme Court case of *Republican Party of Minnesota vs. White* (2002), which struck down regulations preventing candidates from discussing their political views. If Justice Blatz or her opponent, Burton Hanson, had made blatantly partisan or ideological appeals they would likely have been disciplined.

For instance, Justice Lori Gildea of Minnesota's 2008 re-election campaign was labeled truly non-partisan by both local press and legal associations that juxtaposed her truly non-partisan campaigning with quasi-partisan campaigns in nearby Wisconsin (see Soule, 2008). This strategy provides a high degree of confidence that the four truly non-partisan contests in this analysis are distinct from the five quasi-partisan contests that are included. However, if a case that was really quasi-partisan was erroneously labelled as truly non-partisan, it would tend to skew the analysis in favor of null results and against finding support for my hypotheses.

Table 4.1: Contest Selection

Truly Non-Partisan Contests		
Year	Republican Candidate	State
2000	Kathleen Blatz	MN
2004	Ed McLean	MT
2008	Tim Tingelstad	MN
2008	Lorie Gildea	MN
Quasi-Partisan Contests		
Year	Republican Candidate	State
2004	Cindy Younkin	MT
2008	Bob Edmunds	NC
2010	Barbara Jackson	NC
2010	Nels Swandal	MT
2010	Greg Wersal	MN

4.3.2 Dependent Variable

The dependent variable in both the quasi-partisan and truly non-partisan samples is the percentage of the vote for the nominally Republican judicial candidate at the precinct level.[41] This data comes from the respective Secretaries of States offices, Divisions of Elections, or equivalent offices from each state. Precinct-level data was chosen due to a key advantage over county-level data. Counties can be very heterogeneous on several levels (political, racial, class, etc.) while precincts tend to be more homogenous. Every precinct in the state is not included; rather, a random sample of precincts was coded in each state.

4.3.3 Key Independent Variables

The key independent variables are precinct-level Republican partisanship, educational attainment, and an interaction of those two variables. The ideal measure of precinct-level Republican partisanship would be party registration or self-reported party identification rather than voting. However many states (including Minnesota) do not have party registration, and even states that do have party registration rarely report it at the precinct level. Thus, I measure precinct-level partisanship as the percentage of the population who voted for the Republican presidential

[41]I say nominally Republican, since while these candidates were Republicans, they were not official party candidates.

candidate in the most proximate presidential election.[42] This is the same measure used by Schaffner et al. (2007),[43] Ansolabehere et al. (2001), and Erikson and Wright (1980).[44]

Educational attainment is measured as the percentage of persons over age 25 who have a Bachelor's Degree or higher. This data is available from the U.S. Census Bureau. The precinct educational attainment rates are estimated using the values of the census tracts to which they belong. Precincts were matched to census tracts using GeoCorr from the University of Missouri at Columbia. If there is error in this measure it would tend to lead to null results.

Finally, there is a multiplicative interaction term between precinct-level partisanship and education. This interaction term is necessary to test whether or not preference congruent voting increases as the level of educational attainment increases. As such it is the key independent variable in this study.[45]

4.3.4 Controls

Both models include dummy variables for each contest. These dummy variables account for the idiosyncratic factors associated with that particular contest, that particular state, and that particular year. Thus, these variables capture all average differences between the nine contests.

[42]In the case of mid-term years, I used the figures of the *next* Presidential election. This may seem somewhat arbitrary. My reasoning is that 2006, a bad year for the Republicans, was more similar to 2008 than it was to 2004. Similarly, while the Republicans did lose in 2012, they did not lose nearly as badly as in 2008. Thus, 2010 more closely resembled 2012 than 2008.

[43]With one exception: Schaffner et al. measured precinct partisanship as the percentage who voted for the Democratic candidate. I use percentage of the population who voted for the Republican candidate. However, the choice between Republican or Democratic partisanship is completely arbitrary.

[44]It should be noted that whether this measure exactly reflects Republican partisanship is not important. The measure is valid if it can distinguish very Republican precincts from less Republican precincts and Democratic precincts. If the measure fails to make this distinction, it would tend to lead to null results.

[45]This paper uses aggregate level data to test an individual-level theory. I have reason to believe that the ecological inference problem is not leading to faulty inference in this case. See table 3 in the appendix.

While I am unable to report the unique effect of these various idiosyncratic factors, they are controlled for.[46]

4.3.5 Method

The model used here is a multi-level random effects model, with random intercepts estimated for each precinct. The random effects model is necessary because the same precincts are included multiple times in these two datasets.[47] The contest dummies provide fixed-effects for contest, state, and year level unit effects. The coefficients for each variable are interpreted the same as in a standard OLS model.

4.4 Results

The results of this analysis are presented in Table 4.2. Because each model includes an interaction term, I have displayed the results graphically in figure 1 in order to provide a complete evaluation of each hypothesis.

[46]For example: campaign spending presumably matters in terms of preference-congruent voting. However such data is unavailable at the precinct-level or even the county level. The contest dummies at least control for campaign spending at the contest level, along with any other contest-level factors.

[47]Contest level unit effects are already fully captured by the contest specific dummy variables included in the model.

Table 4.2: Determinants of Republican Judicial Vote, abridged

Y = Republican Judicial Vote	**Quasi-Partisan Model**	**Truly Non-Partisan Model**
Independent Variable:	**Coefficient (P-value)**	**Coefficient (P-value)**
Republican Partisanship	0.214* (.000)	0.075 (0.056)
Education	-0.326* (.009)	0.077 (.154)
Education : Partisanship	0.006* (.000)	0.0002 (.809)
N =	1,039 (673 precincts)	883 (407 precincts)
Within R-squared	.011	.787
Between R-squared	.589	.411
Overall R-squared	.495	.720

To demonstrate these results more clearly, I present a figure below showing the change in the marginal effect of Republican partisanship at varying levels of education. Figure 4.1: Marginal Effect of Republican Partisanship on Republican Judicial Vote at varying levels of Education

Figure 1: Effect of GOP Partisanship on GOP Judicial Vote, by Education and Campaign Type



Along the y-axis of Figure 4.1 are varying levels of the education variable, ranging from very low to very high levels of the population over age 25 with a Bachelor's degree or higher. The x-axis shows the marginal effect of precinct-level Republican partisanship on Republican judicial vote; conceptually, this demonstrates preference-congruent voting. The light-gray bars indicate the marginal effect of Republican partisanship on Republican judicial vote at that particular level of education *in the truly-non-partisan context.* The dark-gray bars indicate the marginal effect of Republican partisanship on Republican judicial vote at that particular level of education *in the quasi-partisan context.*

Hypothesis 1 predicted that there would be preference-congruent voting even in formally non-partisan elections. Thus, it should be the case that Republican partisanship predicts Republican judicial vote. This effect appears to be vary by context. In the quasi-partisan context Republican partisanship produces a substantive and significant effect on Republican judicial vote (this is regardless of level of educational attainment). In the non-partisan context however,

Republican partisanship does not produce a substantive or significant effect on Republican judicial vote.

Hypothesis 2 predicts that preference-congruent voting should rise as educational attainment rises. The results presented in Table 4.2 and Figure 4.1 provide evidence in favor of Hypothesis 2 in the quasi-partisan context, but not in the truly non-partisan context. In the quasi-partisan context the marginal effect of Republican partisanship on Republican judicial vote share plainly increases as education increases; i.e. there is more preference-congruent voting. When 1.9% of the precinct population over age 25 have a B.A. or higher, the marginal effect of Republican partisanship on Republican judicial vote share is .225. In other words, at that level of education we would expect that for a 1% increase in Republican partisanship there will on average be a 0.22% increase in Republican judicial vote, *ceteris paribus.* However as the percentage of the population with a B.A. or higher increases to 41.94% (one standard deviation above the mean), the marginal effect of Republican partisanship increases to .465. That is, for a 1% increase in Republican partisanship we would expect there to be, on average, a 0.46 % increase in Republican judicial vote, *ceteris paribus.* In short not only does the marginal effect of Republican partisanship increase as educational attainment increases, but it substantially increases. Thus, in quasi-partisan cases there is strong evidence in favor of Hypothesis 2: as educational attainment increases, so does preference-congruent voting. In the truly non-partisan sample the marginal effect of Republican partisanship increases from .075 at the minimum of education (1.9% with B.A. or higher) to .091 at the maximum of education (80.8% with a B.A. or higher). This increase in preference-congruent voting is not substantial or significant. So in the truly non-partisan context there is no support for Hypothesis 2.

Hypothesis 3a predicts that preference-congruent voting would be more prevalent in quasi-partisan contests than in truly non-partisan contests. The results provide support for this hypothesis. The maximum of the education variable is 80.8, meaning 80.8% of the population over age 25 have a B.A. or higher. At this level of education in the truly non-partisan context, the marginal effect of Republican partisanship on Republican judicial vote is .091 for a 1% increase in Republican partisanship we would expect an increase in Republican judicial vote of about one-tenth of one percent. The minimum of the education variable is 1.9% with a B.A. or higher. At that level of education in the quasi-partisan context, the marginal effect of Republican partisanship on Republican judicial vote is .225. In other words, the marginal effect of Republican partisanship is over twice as large at the minimum of education in the quasi-partisan context than at the maximum of education in the truly non-partisan context.

Hypothesis 3b predicts that the gap in preference-congruent voting would be larger in the quasi-partisan context than the truly non-partisan context. In the truly non-partisan context the effect of Republican partisanship on Republican judicial vote increases from .075 at the minimum of education to .091 at the maximum. This increase is neither substantial nor significant. In the quasi-partisan context the marginal effect of Republican partisanship increases from .225 at the minimum of education to .698 at the maximum of education. In other words, the marginal effect is around three times larger. This provides evidence that in the quasi-partisan context preference-congruent voting is more prevalent among the well educated than the less educated.

4.5 Discussion and Conclusion: Are Non-Partisan Elections Discriminatory?

The results of this study provide evidence that preference-congruent voting, measured as partisan voting, increases dramatically in the presence of a quasi-partisan campaign. In truly non-partisan campaigns preference-congruent voting appears to be negligible. Furthermore, the well-

educated cast more preference-congruent ballots than the less educated, but only in the quasi-partisan context. In the truly non-partisan context the increase in preference-congruent voting as educational attainment increases is neither substantial nor significant. In terms of whether the party heuristic is more important at higher or lower levels of education, the results of this study suggest the answer is lower levels. In the absence of party labels it is the least educated who are unable to identify and support their co-partisans.

The results of this study provide further evidence that scholars of non-partisan elections need to consider the role partisanship plays in voter behavior, building further on the work done by Bonneau and Cann (2013) and Rock and Baum (2010). Furthermore, this study has found evidence that the type of campaigns run by the candidates has a profound impact on voter behavior. Scholars need to pay further attention to campaign effects in non-partisan elections. In these (usually) low-profile elections what little information citizens do encounter can have a profound impact on their vote choice. A worthy area of future study is whether or not strategies in non-partisan elections influence voter participation, particularly whether or not quasi-partisan campaigning leads to a more or less representative electorate.

Who decides the outcome of an election matters a great deal. Per Griffin and Newman (2005), elected officials are most responsive to those citizens who decide the election; i.e. voters. Previous studies have already found that the electorate is disproportionately more educated than non-voters in partisan elections. Put more succinctly by Lijphart (1997), there is a distinct class bias in turnout. I have posited, and found some evidence, that the more educated are also better able to engage in preference-congruent voting, at least in the quasi-partisan context. Quasi-partisans campaigns lead to more preference-congruent voting at other levels of education as well, but the least educated precincts cast many fewer preference-congruent votes than the best educated

precincts. Some of the least educated may be basing their votes on factors less relevant to that voter,[48] on utterly irrelevant factors, or even just randomly. If the well-educated are voting in line with their preferences and the least educated mostly are not, it is reasonable to expect that candidates more amenable to the well-educated will win. Given the correlation of such factors as education and income, the interests and beliefs of the best educated are probably not the same as the interests and beliefs of the least educated. Even if the elected official *cares* about the interests of the less educated, electoral pressures will make that politician more responsive to the *decisive* portion of the electorate.

Note that the above discussion only applies when there is quasi-partisan campaigning. In the truly non-partisan context, there is no evidence that education has any real effect on preference-congruent voting. This may imply that quasi-partisan campaigning is the problem, not non-partisan elections. Even if true, there are two issues in trying to fix the problem. First, in the presence of truly non-partisan campaigning, all levels of educational attainment engage in equally *low* levels of preference-congruent voting. Second, efforts to restrict quasi-partisan campaigning in judicial elections have failed in the U.S. Supreme Court.[49] Furthermore, these restrictions never existed in non-judicial non-partisan elections, and quasi-partisan campaigning has always been possible. How prevalent quasi-partisan campaigning is, in both the judicial and non-judicial context, is a question worthy of future study. For the foreseeable future however, quasi-partisan campaigning will continue in formally non-partisan elections.[50]

[48]In other words, they may still be voting systematically on factors that *are* important to that voter, but factors that are not *as* important to the voter as party.

[49]For instance, see the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in *Republican Party of Minnesota vs. White (2002)*

[50]Replication data available upon request

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Chapter Five: Voter Behavior in Elections without Party Labels, a Conclusion

The statement that "party matters to voters in U.S. politics" would engender no controversy in political science. I have posited, and found evidence, that party matters even in electoral circumstances that are specifically designed to suppress the party cue (see Williams and Adrian, 1959). Together this finding, along with indications that preference-congruent voting in EWPLs is unequal (see Chapter three) raise serious normative concerns about the usage of non-partisan ballots.

While EWPLs are important in their own right, they are also useful for gaining leverage over questions that political scientists care about. Questions about the nature of party identity, whether party is more important for the highly educated or the less educated, are questions that can only be fully answered by seeing what happens when the party label is taken away. I believe the results of this dissertation have demonstrated the usefulness of EWPLs as leverage, and hope that scholars will use these elections to answer other important questions in our field.

5.2 Summary of Results

In chapter one, I posited that there are at least two different kinds of party identifiers: psychological partisans and objective partisans. The results of this chapter found that psychological and objective partisans do behave very differently when they receive conflicting information regarding which candidate is more qualified compared to which candidate is from the respondent's more preferred party. Specifically, psychological partisans would engage in motivated reasoning and rationalize that their party's nominee, by construction always less

experienced, was in fact the more experienced candidate. Objective partisans did not engage in this sort of motivated reasoning. Instead, they had to deal with the cross-pressure and make a choice in spite of it. As a result, objective partisans were more likely than psychological partisans to defect from their party and vote for the opposition party's candidate.

In chapter two, I examine the interaction between education, ballot roll-off, and candidate behavior in EWPLs. I predicted that the more educated should participate in EWPLs at a higher rate than the less educated. I also predicted that while ballot roll-off would decrease across all levels of education in the presence of a quasi-partisan campaign, this effect would be larger for the more educated than the least educated. The results showed the opposite of what I expected: ballot roll-off is actually lower in less educated areas than more educated areas. This counter-intuitive finding is not unique however (see Streb et al., 2007; Nichols and Kritzer, 1994). This suggests that there is something methodological and/or theoretical that scholars are missing.

Finally, in the third chapter I examined the relationship between education, candidate behavior, and vote choice in non-partisan judicial elections. I posited that preference-congruent voting, measured as partisan voting, should be higher among the better educated than the less educated, but only in the presence of a quasi-partisan campaign. The results provided strong support for the hypotheses presented in this chapter. Partisanship does indeed become a stronger predictor of vote choice in non-partisan judicial elections in the presence of a quasi-partisan campaign, but this is particularly true in precincts with higher levels of educational attainment.

5.3 Different Types of Partisans

Much of the scholarly debate regarding partisanship at the mass level has revolved around whether it is best thought of as a psychological attachment (e.g. Campbell et. al) or group identity (Green et al., 2002) on the one hand or merely an information short-cut based largely on a running

tally of performance evaluations (e.g. Fiorina). While the debate has explored many nuanced views of partisanship, one thing nearly all of this work shares in common is an effort to fit a single theoretical model of the average voter across the entire population. In other words, the various competing theories of partisanship all tend to be monocausal – resting on the implicit assumption that a single theory applies on average across the entire population. Everyone recognizes that no single theory fits all citizens equally well – there are residuals in every regression model. However, the implication is that the best strategy moving forward is to find the single theory that best fits the entire population.

However, I argue, similarly to Brandenburg (2011), Kropko (2014), and Banda and Kropko (n.d.), that reality is more complex and nuanced. A key finding of this dissertation is the existence of at least two distinct types of partisans: psychological partisans and objective partisans. For psychological partisans, party is a strong psychological tie that acts as a perceptual filter. Objective partisans however have no particular affect towards the terms Republican or Democrat, but rather use party as a guide. In the presence of cross-pressure, psychological partisans reassess political objects in order to rationalize a partisan decision. Objective partisans do not engage in this rationalization, and thus are likelier to defect and vote for the opposition party than are psychological partisans

All of the approaches to partisanship discussed thus far help to explain party identification. Each is potentially *right* in some sense, or for some subset of people. However it may not be best, as they implicitly suppose, to estimate the average fit of each theory to the entire population of people. Party identifiers are probably more heterogeneous than previous research has supposed, with psychological and objective partisans existing in sufficient numbers to make monocausal

theories of behavior hazardous. A more productive avenue for scholars is to produce more nuanced theories that recognize the heterogeneity of voters.

Note that in order to identify the differences between psychological and objective partisans, it was necessary to examine their behavior in a EWPL, namely a non-partisan election. By looking at the non-partisan election and comparing it with a partisan election, I was able to see how individual responses to candidate quality varied across treatments. This allowed me to get a minimal estimate of the proportion of the sample who were psychological partisans. This question could not be addressed effectively without comparing behavior in partisan elections to those in EWPLs. I needed a baseline where both psychological and objective partisans were provided with a pair of candidates without any party labels who were both plausible in terms of their qualifications, but where one was better qualified than the other. Comparing responses among those who received the same information about candidate quality but were also told that the less qualified candidate was from their party allowed me to distinguish the two types of partisans.

5.3 For whom is party important?

There has been considerable debate over whether cognitive heuristics are more beneficial for high sophisticates (Lau and Redlawsk, 1997; Sniderman et al., 1991) or low sophisticates (Popkin, 1991; Collier et al., 1989; McKelvey and Ordeshook, 1986). I examine a related question that flows naturally from this debate: is the most common of all electoral heuristics, party, more important for the well-educated or the less educated? There were two ways in which I examined this question: participation in EWPLs (chapter two) and vote choice in EWPLs (chapter three). The results of chapter two are intriguing, albeit counter-intuitive. More effort needs to be made to explain the results of that chapter and of other works on this topic (see Streb et al., 2009; Nichols and Kritzer, 1994).

In chapter three, I found that preference-congruent voting, measured as partisan voting, was low in both well-educated and poorly educated precincts. In the presence of quasi-partisan campaigning, preference-congruent voting increased across all levels of education. However, the gap in preference-congruent voting between highly and less educated precincts increased dramatically in the quasi-partisan case. This indicates that the party cue is ultimately more important for the less educated. In the absence of party labels on the ballot, the less educated are not as well equipped to cast a preference-congruent vote as the well-educated, even if there is an explicitly partisan campaign ongoing.

This question could not be answered without looking at non-partisan elections. To examine whether party is more important for the highly or less educated, one has to vary the strength of the party signal. The strength of the party signal however does not vary much if party labels are present on the ballot. In contrast, the strength of the party signal can vary in non-partisan contests between non-existent to relatively strong.

5.4 EWPLs: Normative Implications

Chapters two and three deal directly with voter behavior in EWPLs. The results of chapter two entirely contradict the hypotheses stated there, while the results of chapter three provide strong evidence for the idea that preference-congruent voting is more likely in places with higher average levels of educational attainment, but only in the presence of quasi-partisan campaigns. Taking both chapters together, the results could be described as mixed, yet encouraging. They point for a need to further inquiry into the role between education and participation in EWPLs.

The results of chapter three show that non-partisan ballots are ineffective at removing partisanship as a factor in elections. There is nothing to prevent candidates from running blatantly partisan campaigns, and when they do, partisanship does become a major factor in vote choice. So

EWPLs, far from removing partisanship, merely have made party-line voting more difficult and more dependent on the behavior of the candidates involved. The finding that areas where more of the population has received a college education show higher levels of preference-congruent voting (partisan voting) compare to areas where less of the population has received a college education suggests that those with higher levels of education are more able to cast preference-congruent ballots. This is problematic; in many states and localities important officials are chosen via non-partisan elections, and in many parts of the nation winning a party primary is tantamount to election. Since the more educated participate more effectively in these contests, in all likelihood those elected to office via EWPLs will reflect the interests and beliefs of only the more educated portion of the electorate. If elected officials realize that only the more educated participate effectively, they may be more responsive to their interests than those of the broader public. The relationship between EWPLs and the behavior of public officials is a fruitful topic for future research.

Citizens are plainly willing to cast partisan votes, even when the ballot design is supposed to suggest that party does not matter. If party is so important to voters, the rightness of removing that label from the ballot is questionable. Furthermore, non-partisan elections not only fail at their stated purpose, but discriminate against the less educated. Taken together, these points raise the normative question of whether or not we should have these kinds of elections at all.

5.5 Conclusion

The goal of this dissertation was two-fold; first, to examine how voters behave in EWPLs. Ultimately, party matters to voters even in EWPLs, but not all voters are equally well equipped to navigate the complex world of EWPLs. EWPLs are, in effect, discriminatory against less educated voters. Since EWPLs are important in their own right, this alone would justify this project.

However, the second goal of this dissertation was to use EWPLs to gain leverage more generally on how party matters for voters and whether it matters in the same way for all voters. I found evidence for at least two kinds of partisans. If this dissertation has a moral, it is this: to truly see the role that party plays, in-government (Wright and Schaffner, 2005) or out, one must examine what happens when that easy to understand label is taken out of the equation.

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APPENDIX A

Appendix to Chapter Two

Models broken down by party of respondent

The models presented in-text combine Republican and Democratic respondents into one sample of partisan respondents. There is no theoretical reason to believe that Democrats should behave differently than Republicans on the questions asked of them in this survey. Below I present predicted probabilities broken down by the party of the respondent.

Table 2.5: Model 1, Broken down by party of respondent

Democratic Respondents			
Condition	Pr(Vote for Gordon)	95% Confidence Interval	N
Non-Partisan Treatment	.721	.639 - .803	115
Partisan Treatment	.432	.340 - .524	111
Republican Respondents			
Condition	Pr(Vote for Gordon)	95% Confidence Interval	N
Non-Partisan Treatment	.735	.642 - .828	87
Partisan Treatment	.477	.363 - .569	90

Table 2.5 shows predicted probabilities for model 1, broken down by the party of the respondent. The dependent variable is the probability of the respondent voting for Gordon. Both

Democratic and Republican respondents are substantively and statistically significantly less likely to support Gordon in the partisan treatment than in the non-partisan treatment.

Table 2.6: Model 2, broken down by party of respondent

Republican Respondents			
Control or Treatment Condition	Pr(Thinks Gordon is Experienced)	95% Confidence Interval	N of Respondents
Non-Partisan Control	.816	.734 - .897	87
Gordon is a Democrat	.722	.629 - .814	90
Democratic Respondents			
Control or Treatment Condition	Pr(Thinks Gordon more experienced)	95% Confidence Interval	N
Non-Partisan Control	.869	.808 - .931	115
Gordon is a Republican	.711	.627 - .795	111

Table 2.6 shows the predicted probabilities for model 2, broken down by the party of the respondent. The dependent variable is the probability that the respondent believes Gordon is more qualified. Both Democratic and Republican respondents are substantially less likely to think that Gordon is more experienced in the partisan than non-partisan treatment. This difference is statistically significant for Democrats, but not quite statistically significant at the .05 level for Republicans. This is likely caused by there being fewer Republican than Democratic respondents.

Table 2.7: Model 3, broken down by party of respondent

Democratic Respondents				
Condition	Thinks Gordon more experienced?	Pr(Vote Gordon)	95% C.I.	N
Partisan Treatment	No (Psychological Partisan)	.062	-.021 - .146	32
Partisan Treatment	Yes (Objective Partisan)	.582	.473 - .691	65
Republican Respondents				
Condition	Thinks Gordon more experienced?	Pr(Vote Gordon)	95% C.I.	N
Partisan Treatment	No (Psychological Partisan)	.053	.010 - .097	25
Partisan Treatment	Yes (Objective Partisan)	.625	.511 - .739	65

Table 2.7 shows the predicted probabilities for model 3, broken down by the party of the respondent. The results for Republicans and Democrats alone is substantively the same as the results of all partisans presented in table 2.3. Psychological partisans of both parties are substantively and statistically significantly less likely to vote for Gordon than objective partisans.

Table 2.8: Diagnostic regression, broken down by party of respondent

Democratic Respondents			
PID Strength	Pr(Gordon is Experienced)	95% C.I.	N
Leaner	.750	.560 - .939	20
Weak	.769	.636 - .901	39
Strong	.653	.524 - .783	52
Republican Respondents			
PID Strength	Pr(Gordon is Experienced)	95% C.I.	N
Leaner	.760	.592 - .927	25
Weak	.793	.645 - .940	29
Strong	.638	.481 - .795	36

Table 2.8 shows the predicted probabilities for the diagnostic regression presented in table 2.4. While among both parties respondents strong identifiers are less likely to assess Gordon as more qualified (in the partisan treatment), the difference is not statistically significant. These results then are substantially the same as those presented in table 2.4 among all partisans.

Table 2.9: Model 1, Probability of vote for Gordon from Independent respondents, by treatment

Independent Respondents			
Condition	Pr(Vote for Gordon)	95% Confidence Interval	N
Non-Partisan Treatment	.588	.422 - .753	34
Partisan Treatment	.688	.584 - .791	77

Table 2.9 shows the predicted probabilities from Model 1 for independent respondents.

Table 2.10: Model 2, probability of assessing Gordon as more qualified, independents only

Independent Respondents			
Treatment Condition	Pr(Gordon is Experienced)	95% Confidence Interval	N
Non-Partisan Treatment	.764	.622 - .907	34
Partisan Treatment	.714	.613 - .815	77

Table 2.10 shows the predicted probabilities from Model 2 for independent respondents.

Logistic Regression Tables

Only predicted probabilities are reported in-text. Below are the results of the regressions that were used to generate these predicted probabilities. I note beneath each table which model and tables in-text that this regression supports.

Table 2.11: Model 1, Partisan Respondents

Variable	Coefficient (P-Value)
Anderson a white female	.416 (.174)
Anderson a black male	.064 (.833)
Gordon a white female	-0.135 (.603)
Gordon a black male	-0.800* (.001)
Partisan Treatment	-1.192* (.000)
N = 791	Pseudo R-squared: .056

Table 2.11 shows the results of the logistic regression used to report the predicted probability of *partisan* respondents voting for Gordon (Model 1), presented in Table 2.1. The non-partisan treatment is the baseline category. The regression also includes various conditions not reported in-text because they are not theoretically relevant to this paper. The full results will likely be reported in a later study. The number of partisan respondents assigned to the non-partisan treatment or the partisan treatment is 201. Note that in treatments where one candidate is described as something other than a white male, their opponent is always a white male. In the non-partisan and partisan treatment both candidates are white males.

Table 2.12: Model 1, Independent respondents

Variable	Coefficient (P-Value)
Anderson a white female	.416 (.174)
Anderson a black male	.064 (.833)
Gordon a white female	-0.135 (.603)
Gordon a black male	-0.800* (.001)
Partisan Treatment	-1.192* (.000)
N = 253	Pseudo R-squared: .056

Table 2.12 shows the results of the logistic regression used to generate the predicted probability of independent respondents voting for Gordon (Model 1), presented in Table 2.2. The non-partisan treatment is the baseline category. The number of independent respondents assigned to the non-partisan treatment or the partisan treatment is 107.

Table 2.13: Model 2, Partisan Respondents

Variable	Coefficient (P-Value)
Anderson a white female	.176 (.629)
Anderson a black male	-0.369 (.280)
Gordon a white female	-0.141 (.658)
Gordon a black male	-0.483 (.106)
Partisan Treatment	-0.780* (.002)
N = 791	Pseudo R-squared: .018

Table 2.13 shows the results of the logistic regression used to generate the predicted probability of *partisan* respondents believing that Gordon is the more qualified candidate, presented in table 2.2. The non-partisan treatment is the baseline category. The number of partisan respondents assigned to the non-partisan and partisan treatments is 201.

Table 2.14: Model 2, Independent respondents

Variable	Coefficient (P-Value)
Anderson a white female	.767 (.220)
Anderson a black male	1.278 (.078)
Gordon a white female	0.053 (.928)
Gordon a black male	-0.039 (.945)
Partisan Treatment	-0.262 (.582)
N = 253	Pseudo R-squared: .037

Table 2.14 shows the results of the logistic regression used to generate the predicted probability of *independent* respondents believing that Gordon is the more qualified candidate, presented in table 2.2. The non-partisan treatment is the baseline category. The number of independent respondents assigned to the non-partisan and partisan treatments is 107.

Table 2.15: Model 3

Variable	Coefficient (P-Value)
Evaluation of candidate experience (indexed)	3.766* (.000)
N = 201	Pseudo R-squared: .241

Table 2.15 shows the results of the logistic regression used to generate the predicted probabilities presented in table 2.3 (model 3). This model is limited to partisan respondents

assigned to the partisan treatment. It shows that respondents who assessed Gordon as more qualified were more likely to vote for Gordon than partisan respondents who assessed Gordon as less qualified.

Table 2.16: Diagnostic Regression

Variable	Coefficient (P-Value)
Weak Partisan	.133 (.768)
Strong Partisan	-0.519 (.208)
N = 201	Pseudo R-squared: .015

Table 2.16 shows the results of the logistic regression used to generate the predicted probabilities presented in table 2.4, a diagnostic regression. The dependent variable is whether or not the respondent assessed Gordon as the more qualified candidate. Respondents who lean Democratic or Republican are the baseline category.

Predicted Probabilities, Alternative Factors

Below I report predicted probabilities for Models 1 and 2 by partisan and non-partisan respondents, accounting for factors such as the respondent's race, gender, age, political knowledge, and what philosophies Gordon and Anderson used in the treatment to which the respondent was assigned. These predicted probabilities are built on logistic regressions with two independent variables: the condition to which the respondent was assigned and some other factor.

Table 2.17: Model 1, with Race variable. Partisans only

Condition Assigned	White or Nonwhite?	Pr(Vote for Gordon)	95% Conf. Interval	N
Non-Partisan	White	.720	.649 - .791	154
Non-Partisan	Non-White	.750	.627 - .872	48
Partisan	White	.430	.356 - .513	154
Partisan	Non-White	.489	.346 - .632	47

Table 2.17 shows the predicted probability of a vote for Gordon given the race of the respondent and the condition to which they were assigned. All respondents were partisans. The probability of a vote for Gordon between whites and nonwhites is neither substantively nor statistically significant in either treatment condition.

Table 2.18: Model 2, with Race variable. Partisans only

Condition Assigned	White or Nonwhite?	Pr(Thinks Gordon is more experienced)	95% Conf. Interval	N
Non-Partisan	White	.857	.801 - .912	154
Non-Partisan	Non-White	.812	.702 - .922	48
Partisan	White	.740	.671 - .809	154
Partisan	Non-White	.638	.500 - .775	47

Table 2.18 shows the predicted probability that a respondent assesses Gordon as the more experienced candidate, given the race of the respondent and the condition to which they were assigned. All respondents were partisans. Non-white respondents assigned to the partisan treatment are slightly less likely than white respondents in the same treatment to think Gordon is more experienced. However, this difference is not statistically significantly different.

Table 2.19: Model 1, by Gender. Partisans only

Condition Assigned	Gender?	Pr(Vote for Gordon)	95% Conf. Interval	N
Non-Partisan	Male	.770	.687 - .852	100
Non-Partisan	Female	.686	.596 - .776	102
Partisan	Male	.520	.420 - .620	96
Partisan	Female	.380	.288 - .473	105

Table 2.19 shows the predict probability that a respondent voted for Gordon, given the gender of the respondent and the condition to which they were assigned. In both treatments females are less likely than males to vote for Gordon, but in neither case is the difference statistically significant.

Table 2.20: Model 2, with Gender variable. Partisans only.

Condition Assigned	Gender?	Pr(Thinks Gordon is more experienced)	95% Conf. Interval	N
Non-Partisan	Male	.850	.780 - .919	100
Non-Partisan	Female	.843	.772 - .913	102
Partisan	Male	.739	.651 - .827	96
Partisan	Female	.695	.607 - .783	105

Table 2.20 shows the predicted probability of Gordon being assessed as the more experienced candidate, accounting for gender and the treatment assignment. In neither treatment is there a statistically or substantively significant difference between the behavior of men and women.

Table 2.21: Model 1, with Philosophy of Candidates. Partisans Only

Condition Assigned	Philosophy of Gordon	Pr(Vote for Gordon)	95% Conf. Interval	N
Non-Partisan	Philosophy #1	.685	.612 - .758	106
Non-Partisan	Philosophy #2	.774	.711 - .836	96
Partisan	Philosophy #1	.389	.311 - .466	95
Partisan	Philosophy #2	.500	.422 - .578	106

Table 2.21 shows the predicted probability of a vote for Gordon, depending on the philosophical statement used by Gordon in the treatment to which the respondent was assigned. In all cases whatever philosophy Gordon uses, Anderson uses the other variant. In both treatments the probability of a vote for Gordon is higher if he uses philosophy #1. However the difference is not statistically significant in either treatment.

Table 2.22: Model 2, with Philosophy of Candidates. Partisans Only

Condition Assigned	Philosophy of Gordon?	Pr(Thinks Gordon is more experienced)	95% Conf. Interval	N
Non-Partisan	Philosophy #1	.838	.782 - .894	106
Non-Partisan	Philosophy #2	.855	.802 - .908	96
Partisan	Philosophy #1	.702	.627 - .776	95
Partisan	Philosophy #2	.729	.659 - .798	106

Table 2.22 shows the predicted probability of Gordon being assessed as the more experienced candidate, given the philosophy used by Gordon. However the philosophy used by Gordon does not have a statistically or substantively significant effect on the probability of Gordon being assessed as the more experienced candidate.

Table 2.23: Model 1, with Political Knowledge Variable. Partisans only.

Condition Assigned	Knowledge Score (# correct out of 10 questions)	Pr(Vote for Gordon)	95% Conf. Interval	N
Non-Partisan	0-2	.564	.440 - .688	10
Non-Partisan	3-4	.669	.584 - .755	30
Non-Partisan	5-6	.725	.651 - .799	56
Non-Partisan	7-8	.748	.680 - .815	60
Non-Partisan	9-10	.715	.639 - .792	46
Partisan	0-2	.361	.249 - .472	11
Partisan	3-4	.469	.379 - .559	31
Partisan	5-6	.535	.450 - .621	45
Partisan	7-8	.564	.486 - .643	58
Partisan	9-10	.523	.440 - .607	56

Table 2.23 shows the predicted probability of a vote for Gordon, accounting for the treatment to which the respondent was assigned and the political knowledge of the respondent. In neither treatment does varying political knowledge have a statistically significant influence on the probability of voting for Gordon. The probability of a vote for Gordon does increase as political knowledge increases; however at the extreme end (those answering 0-2 questions correctly) there is a very low number of respondents, so the results should be treated with caution.

Table 2.24: Model 2, with Political Knowledge Variable. Partisans only.

Condition Assigned	Knowledge Score (# correct out of 10 questions)	Pr(Thinks Gordon is more experienced)	95% Conf. Interval	N
Non-Partisan	0-2	.666	.508 - .824	10
Non-Partisan	3-4	.791	.705 - .878	30
Non-Partisan	5-6	.849	.786 - .912	56
Non-Partisan	7-8	.879	.826 - .931	60
Non-Partisan	9-10	.875	.818 - .932	46
Partisan	0-2	.473	.303 - .643	11
Partisan	3-4	.630	.520 - .741	31
Partisan	5-6	.716	.625 - .807	45
Partisan	7-8	.765	.688 - .843	58
Partisan	9-10	.760	.678 - .841	56

Table 2.24 shows the predicted probability of assessing Gordon as the more experienced candidate, accounting for the treatment to which the respondent was assigned and the political knowledge of the respondent. In the non-partisan treatment political knowledge has no statistically significant influence on the probability of assessing Gordon as more experienced. In the partisan treatment there is a substantive and statistically significant difference in the behavior of knowledgeable respondents (7-8 or 9-10 questions correct) and those with very low levels of knowledge (0-2 questions correct). However the number of respondents who answered only 0-2 questions correctly is quite low (11 in the partisan treatments), so the results should be treated with caution.

Table 2.25: Model 1, with Race variable. Nonpartisans only

Condition Assigned	White or Nonwhite?	Pr(Vote for Gordon)	95% Conf. Interval	N
Non-Partisan	White	.566	.383 - .743	30
Non-Partisan	Non-White	.750	.325 – 1.174	4
Partisan	White	.654	.528 - .780	55
Partisan	Non-White	.772	.597 - .947	22

Table 2.25 shows the predicted probability of voting for Gordon by the race of the respondent and the treatment to which they were assigned. In neither treatment is there a statistically significant difference in the behavior of either white or nonwhite respondents. Note the low N on non-white independents, especially in the non-partisan treatment.

Table 2.26: Model 2, with Race variable. Nonpartisans only

Condition Assigned	White or Nonwhite?	Pr(Thinks Gordon is more experienced)	95% Conf. Interval	N
Non-Partisan	White	.766	.615 - .918	30
Non-Partisan	Non-White	.750	.325 – 1.174	4
Partisan	White	.690	.568 - .813	55
Partisan	Non-White	.772	.597 - .947	22

Table 2.26 shows the predicted probability of assessing Gordon as more experienced, by the race of the respondent and the treatment to which they were assigned. In neither treatment is there a statistically or substantively significant difference between the behavior of whites and non-whites.

Table 2.27: Model 1, with Gender variable. Nonpartisans only

Condition Assigned	Gender?	Pr(Vote for Gordon)	95% Conf. Interval	N
Non-Partisan	Males	.571	.359 - .783	21
Non-Partisan	Females	.615	.350 – .879	13
Partisan	Males	.738	.605 - .871	42
Partisan	Females	.628	.468 - .788	35

2.27 shows the predicted probability of voting for Gordon, by the gender of the respondent and the treatment to which they were assigned. In neither treatment is there a statistically significant or substantively important difference between the behavior of men and women.

Table 2.28: Model 2, with Gender variable. Nonpartisans only

Condition Assigned	Gender?	Pr(Thinks Gordon is more experienced)	95% Conf. Interval	N
Non-Partisan	Man	.851	.707 – 1.006	21
Non-Partisan	Woman	.615	.350 - .879	13
Partisan	Man	.833	.720 - .946	42
Partisan	Woman	.571	.407 - .735	35

Table 2.28 shows the predicted probability of assessing Gordon as more experienced, by the gender of the respondent and the treatment to which they were assigned. Male independents in each treatment are likelier than female independents to assess Gordon as more experienced. In neither case however is the difference statistically significant (though it approaches statistical significance in the partisan treatment).

Table 2.29: Model 1, by philosophy of Gordon. Nonpartisans only

Condition Assigned	Philosophy of Gordon?	Pr(Vote for Gordon)	95% Conf. Interval	N
Non-Partisan	Philosophy #1	.549	.366 - .727	18
Non-Partisan	Philosophy #2	.634	.460 - .808	16
Partisan	Philosophy #1	.645	.517 - .773	35
Partisan	Philosophy #2	.723	.613 - .834	42

Table 2.29 shows the probability of voting for Gordon, by the philosophical statement used by Gordon. In each case, Anderson uses the other philosophical variant. In neither treatment does Gordon's philosophy have a statistically or substantively significant difference in the probability of voting for Gordon.

Table 2.30: Model 2, by philosophy of Gordon. Nonpartisans only

Condition Assigned	Philosophy of Gordon?	Pr(Thinks Gordon is more experienced)	95% Conf. Interval	N
Non-Partisan	Philosophy #1	.782	.637 - .927	18
Non-Partisan	Philosophy #2	.744	.582 - .906	16
Partisan	Philosophy #1	.737	.619 - .855	35
Partisan	Philosophy #2	.694	.575 - .814	42

Table 2.30 shows the predicted probability of assessing Gordon as more experienced, by the philosophical statement used by Gordon. In each case, Anderson uses the other philosophy. In neither treatment does Gordon's philosophy have a statistically or substantively significant difference in the probability of assessing Gordon as more experienced.

Descriptive Statistics

Below I report the descriptive statistics of partisan and independent respondents assigned to the partisan and non-partisan treatments in the survey run for Chapter One,

Respondents by Gender:

Table 2.31: Respondent Gender

Gender	N
Men	259
Women	255

Table 2.32: Respondent Party Identity

Respondent Party	N
Independent	68
“Other party”	43
Lean Republican	42
Weak Republican	66
Strong Republican	69
Lean Democrat	41
Weak Democrat	87
Strong Democrat	98

Table 2.33: Respondent Age

Respondent Age	N
18-25	88
26-35	133
36-45	109
46-54	84
55-65	65
Over 65	35

Table 2.34: Respondents by Education

Respondent Education	N
No High School	2
Some High School	25
High School graduate	143
Some College	108
Associate's Degree	63
Bachelor's Degree	117
Master's Degree	39
Professional Degree (ex: J.D., M.D., D.D.D.)	8
Doctorate Degree (Ph.D., Ed.D., etc.)	9

Table 2.35: Respondent Race/Ethnicity

Respondent Race/Ethnicity	N
White (non-Hispanic)	393
African-American	49
Hispanic	33
Asian	15
Native American	4
Mixed	14
Other	6

Table 2.36: Knowledge and Ideology

Variable	Mean	1 Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Political Knowledge	6.29	2.53	0	10
7-point ideology scale	3.94	1.46	1	7

APPENDIX B

Appendix to Chapter Three

Table 3.4: Full Results, Judicial Elections Model

Variable	Coefficient (P-Value)
Educational Attainment	0.001* (.000)
Education : Quasi-Partisan	-0.0005* (.001)
Population (thousands)	0. 004* (.001)
Edmunds, NC 2008	0.020* (.000)
Gildea, MN 2008	-0.005 (.472)
Tingelstad, MN 2008	0.024* (.000)
Wersal, MN 2010	-0.030* (.000)
Blatz, MN 2000	-0.067* (.000)
Swandal, MT 2010	-0.122* (.000)
McLean, MT 2004	-0.074* (.000)
Younkin, MT 2004	-0.156* (.000)
N = 1,931 observations (676 precincts)	
Within R-Squared = .470	
Between R-Squared = .452	
Overall R-Squared = .447	

Table 3.4 shows the full results of the regression run on a sample of precincts from judicial elections.

Table 3.5 Full Results, Primaries Model

Variable	Coefficient (P-Value)
Educational Attainment	0.001* (.000)
Population (thousands)	0.003 (.144)
MT Superintendent	0.037* (.000)
NC Lt. Governor	-0.025* (.010)
NC Labor Commissioner	0.058* (.000)
N = 832 observations (416 precincts)	
Within R-Squared = .450	
Between R-Squared = .125	
Overall R-Squared = .216	

Table 3.5 shows the full results of the regression run on a sample of precincts from primaries in 2008. Partial results were presented in table 2.3.

Table 3.6: Diagnostic Regression, Judicial Elections Sample

Variable	Coefficient (P-Value)
Educational Attainment	0.001* (.000)
Education : Quasi-Partisan	-0.0007* (.006)
Population (thousands)	0.002 (.228)
N = 535 observations (202 precincts)	
Within R-Squared = .450	
Between R-Squared = .517	
Overall R-Squared = .516	

Table 3.6 shows the results of the regression run on the sample of precincts from judicial elections, including only relatively homogenous precincts. That is, precincts where less than 9% of the population or more than 35% have a bachelor's degree or higher. The results are substantively the same as in the model run on all sampled precincts (see Tables 3.2 and 3.4). The probability of the ecological inference problem actually causing faulty inference declines as the heterogeneity of the sample decreases. Therefore, the results shown in Table 3.6 indicate that it is unlikely that the ecological inference problem is causing the results presented in tables 3.3 and 3.4.

Table 3.7: Diagnostic Regression, Primaries Model

Variable	Coefficient (P-Value)
Educational Attainment	0.002* (.000)
Population (thousands)	0.001 (.642)
N = 219 (110 precincts)	
Within R-Squared = .738	
Between R-Squared = .361	
Overall R-Squared = .446	

Table 3.7 shows the results of the regression run on the sample of precincts from primaries, including only relatively homogenous precincts. The results are substantively the same as in the model run on all sampled precincts (see Tables 3.3 and 3.5). The probability of the ecological inference problem actually causing faulty inference declines as the heterogeneity of the sample decreases. Therefore, the results shown in Table 3.7 indicate that it is unlikely that the ecological inference problem is causing the results presented in Tables 3.3 and 3.5.

Table 3.8: Judicial Model, Quasi-Partisan Cases Only

Variable	Coefficient (P-Value)
Educational Attainment	0.0007* (.000)
Population (thousands)	0.007 (.162)
N = 1,043 observations (676)	
Within R-Squared = .136	
Between R-Squared = .521	
Overall R-Squared = .500	

Table 3.8 shows the results of the judicial elections model when it is ran solely on a sample of precincts from quasi-partisan elections.

Table 3.9: Judicial Elections model, truly non-partisan cases only

Variable	Coefficient (P-Value)
Educational Attainment	0.001* (.000)
Population (thousands)	0.001* (.000)
N = 888 observations (411 precincts)	
Within R-Squared = .591	
Between R-Squared = .318	
Overall R-Squared = .423	

Table 3.9 shows the results of the judicial elections model when it is run solely on a sample of precincts from truly non-partisan campaigns.

Table 3.10: Judicial Elections Sample, dropping one

Dropped Contest	Coef. on Education (P-Value)	Coef. on Education : Quasi-Partisan (P-Value)
Jackson, NC 2010	0.001* (.000)	-0.0003* (.047)
Edmunds, NC 2008	.001* (.000)	-0.0004* (.007)
Gildea, MN 2008	0.001* (.000)	-0.0004* (.015)
Tingelstad, MN 2008	0.001* (.000)	-0.0004* (.022)
Wersal, MN 2010	0.001* (.000)	-0.002* (.000)
Blatz, MN 2000	0.001* (.000)	-0.0006* (.000)
Swandal, MT 2010	0.001* (.000)	-0.0004* (.013)
McLean, MT 2004	0.001* (.000)	-0.0007* (.000)
Younkin, MT 2004	0.020* (.000)	-0.0004* (.010)

Table 3.10 shows the coefficients of education, and the interaction of education with the quasi-partisan dummy variable, when a single case is dropped. Thus, the coefficients on the "Jackson, NC 2010" row show those coefficients when the model is run without observations from the 2010 North Carolina Supreme Court election in which Barbara Jackson was a candidate. The

results are substantially the same no matter what contest is dropped. This indicates that no contest is exerting a major influence on the overall outcome.

Table 3.11: Primaries sample, dropping one contest per regression

Dropped Contest	Coef. on Education (P-Value)
MT Attorney General	0.001* (.000)
MT Superintendent	0.002* (.000)
NC Lt. Governor	0.001* (.000)
NC Commissioner of Labor	0.001* (.000)

Table 3.11 shows the coefficient on education when a single case is dropped. Thus, the coefficient on the "MT Attorney General" row represents the marginal effect of education on ballot roll-off when the model is run without observations from the Montana Attorney General Democratic primary. The results are substantially the same no matter what contest is dropped. This indicates that no contest is exerting a major influence on the overall outcome.

Table 3.12: Single Contest Regressions, Judicial Contests

Contest =	Coef. on Education (P-Value)
Jackson, NC 2010	-0.0006* (.008)
Edmunds, NC 2008	0.001 (.671)
Gildea, MN 2008	0.002* (.000)
Tingelstad, MN 2008	0.002* (.000)
Wersal, MN 2010	0.002* (.000)
Blatz, MN 2000	0.001* (.000)
Swandal, MT 2010	-0.0007 (.129)
McLean, MT 2004	0.00003 (.935)
Younkin, MT 2004	-0.0003 (.222)

Table 3.12 shows the coefficient on the educational attainment variable when it is run in a model that includes observations form only a single contest. Thus, the coefficient in the "Jackson, NC 2010" row indicates the marginal effect of educational attainment on ballot roll-off when the model is run only on observations from the 2010 North Carolina Supreme Court election in which Barbara Jackson was a candidate. There is some pattern to the results; education seems to have a positive effect on ballot roll-off (meaning that participation decreases as educational attainment increases) only in Minnesota. There is no clear pattern in the non-Minnesota cases.

Table 3.13: Single Contest Regressions, Primaries Model

Contest =	Coef. on Education (P-Value)
MT Attorney General	0.0004 (.944)
MT Superintendent	-0.0004 (.641)
NC Lt. Governor	0.002* (.000)
NC Commissioner of Labor	0.003* (.000)

Table 3.13 shows the coefficient on the educational attainment variable when it is run in a model that includes observations from only a single contest. Thus, the coefficient in the "MT Attorney General" row indicates the marginal effect of educational attainment on ballot roll-off when the model is run only on observations from the 2008 Democratic Attorney General primary in Montana. The coefficient on education is positive and significant in the two North Carolina primaries, but non-significant in the Montana cases. Taken with the results presented in table 2.12, there is no clear pattern to the effects of education on ballot roll-off by state.

Table 3.14: Descriptive Statistics, Judicial Model

Variable	Mean	1 SD	Min	Max
Roll-Off	.222	.095	.000	.681
Education	26.6	15.5	1.9	80.5
Population	2.0	1.6	.03	15.2

Table 3.14 shows the descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent variables used in the judicial elections model.

Table 3.15: Descriptive Statistics, Primaries Model

Variable	Mean	1 SD	Min	Max
Roll-Off	.207	.096	.012	.913
Education	24.0	15.0	1.9	79.7
Population	2.5	1.9	.05	15.2

Table 3.15 shows the descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent variables used in the primaries elections model.

APPENDIX C

Appendix to Chapter Four

Table 4.3: Quasi-Partisan Model, Homogenous Precincts

Variable	**Coefficient (P-Value)**
Republican Partisanship	0.252* (0.000)
Education	-0.345* (.000)
Republican Partisanship : Education	0.005* (.000)
N = 577 (407 precincts)	
Within R-Squared	.005
Between R-Squared	.716
Overall R-Squared	.645

*All p-values two-tailed. * indicates significance at the .05 level.*

Table 4.3 shows the results of the quasi-partisan model using relatively homogenous precincts. The risk of the ecological inference problem leading to faulty inference decreases as the units included in the sample become more homogenous. In table 4.3 I run the quasi-partisan model using on a sample of homogenous precincts, defined here as having a Republican partisanship of more than 65% or less than 35%. The results of this regression are not substantially different from the regression presented in text (see table 4.2). Therefore, though the possibility cannot be entirely excluded, it seems unlikely that the ecological inference problem is leading to false inference here.

Table 4.4: Full Results, Quasi-Partisan Contests

Variable	**Coefficient (P-Value)**
Republican Partisanship	0.214* (.000)
Education	-0.326* (.000)
Republican Partisanship : Education	0.006* (.000)
Edmunds (NC, 2008)	0.775 (.195)
Wersal (MN, 2010)	-5.814* (.000)
Swandal (MT, 2010)	-2.597* (.001)
Cindy Younkin (MT, 2010)	-2.597* (.001)
N = 1,039 (673 precincts)	
Within R-squared	.011
Between R-squared	.589
Overall R-squared	.495

*All p-values two-tailed. * indicates significance at the .05 level.*

Table 4.4 shows the full results from the quasi-partisan model, i.e. including the contest dummies. The contest dummies are named after the nominally Republican candidate in that particular contest. Barbara Jackson's 2010 campaign for North Carolina Supreme Court is the baseline contest dummy.

Table 4.5: Full Results, Truly Non-Partisan Contests

Variable	**Coefficient (P-Value)**
Republican Partisanship	0.075 (0.056)
Education	0.077 (.154)
Republican Partisanship : Education	0.0002 (.809)
Tingelstad (MN, 2008)	-15.060* (.000)
Blatz (MN, 2000)	17.245* (.000)
McLean (MT, 2004)	-11.077* (.000)
N = 883 (407 precincts)	
Within R-Squared	.786
Between R-Squared	.411
Overall R-Squared	.720

*All p-values two-tailed. * indicates significance at the .05 level.*

Table 4.5 shows the full results from the truly non-partisan model, i.e. including the contest dummies. The contest dummies are named after the nominally Republican candidate in that particular contest. Lorie Gildea's 2008 campaign for Minnesota Supreme Court is the baseline contest dummy.

Table 4.6: One-Contest Regressions, Quasi-Partisan Contests

D.V. = Republican Judicial Vote	Republican Partisanship	Education	Partisanship : Education
If Keep:	Coefficient (p-value)	Coefficient (p-value)	Coefficient (p-value)
Jackson (NC, 2010)	.011* (.006)	-0.247* (.004)	0.007* (.000)
Edmunds (NC, 2008)	0.241* (.000)	-0.243* (.000)	.003* (.005)
Wersal (MN, 2010)	.325* (.000)	-0.274* (.000)	0.003* (.009)
Swandal (MT, 2010)	0.512* (.000)	-0.271 (.109)	.003 (.273)

*All p-values two-tailed. * indicates significance at the .05 level.*

Table 4.6 shows a series of diagnostic regressions, where the model is run solely on observations from one contest (shown in the first column). I report the effect of Republican partisanship, education, and the interaction term for each model. It should be noted that, with the exception of Swandal (MT, 2010), the results are approximately the same in the one-contest regressions as in the full model.

Table 4.7: One-Contest Regressions, Truly Non-Partisan Contests

D.V. = Republican Judicial Vote	Republican Partisanship	Education	Partisanship : Education
If Keep:	Coefficient (p-value)	Coefficient (p-value)	Coefficient (p-value)
Blatz (MN, 2000)	-0.164* (.001)	0.213* (.002)	.001 (.486)
Gildea (MN, 2008)	0.139* (.013)	0.302* (.000)	-0.003* (.023)
Tingelstad (MN, 2008)	0.055 (.410)	-0.240* (.004)	0.002 (.297)
McLean (MT, 2004)	0.242 (.055)	-0.032 (.904)	0.002 (.626)
Younkin (MT, 2004)	0.191 (.079)	-0.624* (.007)	0.010* (.011)

*All p-values two-tailed. * indicates significance at the .05 level.*

Table 4.7 shows a series of diagnostic regressions, where the model is run solely on observations from one-contest (shown in the first column). I report the effect of Republican partisanship, education, and the interaction for each model. Note that the three contests from Minnesota do not behave systematically; i.e. they do not behave the same way. This suggests that, though most of the sample is from Minnesota, it is not a Minnesota-specific factor that is driving the results.

Table 4.8: Descriptive Statistics

Variable	*Min*	*Max*	*Mean*	*Std. Dev.*
Republican Judicial Vote	*11.9*	*96.0*	*52.47*	*13.9*
Republican Partisanship	*0.6*	*93.2*	*50.1*	*17.4*
Education	*1.9*	*80.8*	*25.2*	*16.75*