ENTRANTS IN THE POLITICAL ARENA: NEW PARTY TRAJECTORIES DURING
THE THIRD WAVE OF DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA

Thomas J. Mustillo

A dissertation submitted to the faculty of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Political Science.

Chapel Hill
2007

Approved by:

Advisor: Jonathan Hartlyn

Reader: Evelyne Huber

Reader: Gary Marks

Reader: Marco Steenbergen

Reader: John D. Stephens

ABSTRACT

THOMAS J. MUSTILLO: Entrants in the Political Arena: New Party Trajectories
During the Third Wave of Democracy in Latin America
(Under the direction of Jonathan Hartlyn)

The frequency and impact of new parties in Latin America's new democracies has been profound, especially in comparison to their role in established democracies. From the relatively stable Chile and Uruguay to the highly volatile Ecuador and Bolivia, new entrants have altered national party systems.

The electoral fortunes of new parties have been diverse. Most studies of new parties dichotomously classify them into successes and failures. In the more stable party systems of the world, this approach may be sufficient. However, in unstable systems of the developing world where volatility is high, the quality of representation is low, and parties are weakly institutionalized, we are likely to find more than two distinctive categories of party performance. This project begins with an analysis of the legislative electoral performance of all new parties from Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador and Venezuela using latent trajectory models and finds that there are five distinctive performance profiles among the population. I call these groups the explosive, contender, flash, flat and flop trajectories and classify each party into one group. In the relative stability of Chile there are parties of two types while the other systems have more diversity.

Theories of new party success have largely focused on advanced party systems where party competition and linkages with voters are centered around issues and programs. Party

systems in Latin America don't often follow this logic. When they don't, these theories can't explain new party performance. In the second part of this project I use a nested research design—a small-N qualitative analysis of new parties in Ecuador nested in a large-N quantitative analysis of new parties in Ecuador, Venezuela and Bolivia—to build and test an alternative explanation of new party performance centered on organizational features of the parties, and specifically on their programmatic, machine, personalistic, or vote-buying strategic orientation.

I find that in unstable party systems, to be a contender a new party must build a national network of machine-based linkages with constituents that are geographically rather than economically or socially defined; have access to considerable discretionary resources; and be weakly constrained by organizationally articulated programmatic demands.

To Dad

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The journey to this dissertation began nearly two decades ago while I was an undergraduate at Notre Dame. Bonaventure Scully, Tim Scully, Michael Himes, Bill Leis, Angie Appleby, John Maxwell, Rosi Lozada and many other friends and mentors helped ignite in me a passion for peace and justice, especially in Latin America. This institution and these people had the earliest and most formative impact on the discernment of my vocation, and for that I am forever grateful.

This project required the careful guidance of more proximate mentors to translate the zeal I had as an undergraduate into intellectual discipline and scholarly skill suitable for the work I now do. Jonathan Hartlyn has been a patient and encouraging advisor, not only on this project, but in my larger formation as an academic. He carefully and critically reviewed this document in numerous drafts, and all the elements leading up to it. He offered me apprenticeship opportunities as a research assistant and coauthor. He opened many doors for me, and certainly more than I can mention here. His influence will continue, since many of the ideas I have for future directions of this work come directly from him. Evelyne Huber and John Stephens have been amazing mentors and supporters from the very start, and I am deeply grateful to them. They are first rate teachers who shaped my theoretical and methodological thinking on some of the most important topics in the field. It has been great fun working with them. I suspect that Jenny Pribble and I will always and frequently look back with amusement and satisfaction at the many sessions we had with them in their home-

I thank my parents for providing the initial opportunities through which I developed a love of learning. Since very shortly after my graduation from Notre Dame my father has been encouraging me to pursue a Ph.D. He passed away in February of this year, and it is to him in love that I dedicate this work.

Finally, I thank my wife and statistical secret weapon, Sarah. Her substantive and methodological contributions to this project are substantial, but her boundless love, patience and encouragement are the most fundamental contribution of all to this dissertation. She sustained me and our family through this time with gentleness and dignity. I feel like the most fortunate man alive to have her as a life-long companion

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

New Entrants in Latin America

The frequency of new party entry and the impact of new parties on the party systems and on representation in Latin America's third wave democracies has been profound, especially in comparison to the role of new parties in established democracies. New political parties have emerged to successfully challenge and sometimes win national legislative and executive elections: Chile's right-wing confessional Independent Democratic Union (UDI) was born in the 1989 transition to democracy and finished second in the 1999 presidential elections and won the highest vote share of any party in both the 2001 and 2005 lower house elections; Uruguay's leftist Broad Front (FA) emerged from within an institutionalized two-party system to capture the presidency and an absolute majority in congress in 2004; Venezuela's neo-populist Fifth Republic Movement (MVR) emerged in the mid 1990s and won the presidency by 1998; Bolivia's Movement Towards Socialism (MAS) organized as an indigenous and cocoa growers party in 1990's and won an unprecedented absolute majority in the 2006 presidential election. Not surprisingly, these success stories have drawn the attention of political scientists who study Latin America, but often in a particularistic manner—why the right in Chile, the left in Uruguay, the populist in Venezuela, and the indigenous in Bolivia?

Also striking, but less studied, are the number of new parties which have emerged with other performance profiles. In Venezuela in 2005, roughly 251 electoral groups competing under a new name emerged in the national legislative elections, with 171 of them competing in only one state. Between the striking successes and the hundreds of nearly invisible competitors are other distinctive performance trajectories. For example, in Ecuador, veteran politician Sixto Duran-Ballen formed the United Republican Party (PUR) to contest and win the 1992 presidential elections, but despite its ambitions for growth, by the 1994 mid-term elections the party was on the wane and in 1996 it disappeared entirely.

In the region as a whole, since the most recent transition to democracy, most countries have experienced a proliferation of new parties. Table 1.1 below lists the approximate number of new parties that have *gained representation* in the lower house of congress.[1] The number of parties *contesting* national legislative elections is frequently much larger, though comprehensive data on the subject is not available. In the four countries analyzed in this project, the frequencies are as follows: Bolivia from 1985 to 2005 had 37 new party entrants; Chile from 1989 to 2005 had 20 new entrants; Ecuador from 1979-2002 had 96 new entrants; and Venezuela from 1958-2005 had 797 new entrants.

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[1] The number is an approximation because not all parties were rigorously coded according to the definition of new party used in this analysis. Sources include Nohlen and Pachano (2005), Coppedge (1997), and various country specific sources. Independent congressional members are not counted if they are reported as running as "independents" with no party or movement name.

Table 1.1:

New Parties in Latin American Lower Houses During the Third Wave

Country	Parties	Years
Argentina	34	1983-2001
Bolivia	13	1985-2002
Brazil	14	1986-2002
Chile	8	1989-2001
Colombia	65	1958-2002
Costa Rica	16	1953-2002
Dominican Republic	5	1978-2002
Ecuador	15	1979-2002
El Salvador	11	1985-2002
Guatemala	12	1985-1999
Honduras	3	1981-2001
Nicaragua	18	1984-2001
Panama	9	1989-1999
Peru	22	1980-2001
Uruguay	2	1989-1999
Venezuela	40	1958-2000

In spite of anecdotal accounts of the impressive impact new parties have on the party systems of the region, they have received little attention as a group. We lack theories which describe, measure, and account for their activity and their impact. New party activity is a window into the performance of the young democracies of the Americas. First, it reveals how third wave democracies are consolidating, in the narrowly construed sense of the concept (Munck 2001, Schedler 1998). Party systems, under stress from economic and social changes, are generating newly mobilized demands and shifting political divisions. Most of the political systems have been in deep flux. The ways in which new parties assert themselves and the ways in which new voices are channeled by the existing powers tell us something about the means actors are willing to use to gain or maintain political power.

Second, new party activity is an indicator of how the larger party system and the parties which occupy it are performing their representative function. In systems where voters have strong and enduring linkages with parties, we would expect the impact of new parties to have a marginal effect on party systems and there is some indirect evidence in support of this suspicion. Of the four dimensions of party system institutionalization—regularity of inter-party competition, party roots in society, party legitimacy, and party organization—new party activity figures directly into the first three and indirectly into the last (Mainwaring and Scully 1995, Mainwaring and Torcal 2005). Furthermore, by finding a strong association between party system institutionalization and representation—measured as congruence between legislator issue opinions and voter issue opinions—Luna and Zechmeister (2005) suggest that new party challenges will be less intense and less frequent when the quality of party representation is strong.

On the contrary, where party institutionalization is weak, we would expect higher volatility in voting patterns and a more profound influence of new challengers to the system. Of course, party institutionalization need not be formalized (Levitsky 2003, Levitsky and Feidenberg 2006) and where it is informally institutionalized, the relevant question with respect to representation shifts from the strength of the presumed substantive content of representation—what Kitschelt calls programmatic party-voter exchange—to the possibility that parties and voters may be linked by clientelism or some other mode of exchange. In informally institutionalized party systems, if the basis of exchange is different such that parties do not compete on the basis of platforms and appeals to broad social constituencies, then we might ask what role new parties play in these systems, and in particular whether new principled parties are able to succeed. In sum, a general and comparative study of new parties

will tell us something about the variation in strategies and modes of linkage that are electorally viable in the countries of the region.

Third, new party activity reveals how social and economic structural conditions interact with national party systems. Transitions to democracy have been accompanied by the rise of multiple new political divisions. Political regime, economic liberalization, state form, and ethnic identity have all been the basis of recent political mobilizations. Though not all of them meet the rigorous conditions set out by Lipset and Rokkan (1967) to qualify as "political cleavages," all have been features of political contestation in multiple countries of the region. For example, economic liberalization has had differing consequences in the party systems of the region, with some systems incorporating the new divide and remaining stable while others have decomposed and reemerged under fundamentally different logics (Roberts forthcoming) and with important new political actors in the electoral arena. Yashar (2005) argues that neo-liberalizing reforms were the impetus for the emergence of indigenous social movements in the Andes. A study of new parties contributes to our understanding of when and how underlying social and economic divisions are transferred into the political arena.

Finally, new party activity is an indicator of the degree to which institutional design has achieved its intended outcomes. Practitioners have tried to engineer party system outcomes by crafting electoral and party laws designed to institutionalize and nationalize party competition, reduce fragmentation, and cull small parties in the most volatile of countries. A large scholarly literature exists on these efforts in the region (Mejia 2002, Hurtado 1990, Sievelis 2000, Van Cott 2005, Birnir 2004). A general study of new parties with a more fully developed concept of the early electoral life of the party can reveal the

strengths and limits of institutional explanations of certain features of a party system's dynamics.

This project is a comparative study of new political parties which brings all aspirants into the analysis—winners and losers—to investigate first whether those parties can be grouped into distinctive performance profiles and second whether extant theoretical predictive or a new model of electoral performance will account for the variation in a general analysis of Latin American parties.

<center>Party Competition in Latin American Party Systems</center>

Party systems in Latin America are extremely diverse, as I describe in Chapter 3. In this project I am particularly interested in party systems that have been sometimes described as fluid, inchoate, informally institutionalized, and non-programmatically structured. While there have been some attempts to import extant models of party competition—in particular cleavage, spatial and institutional approaches—into Latin America, these approaches do not always travel well. In particular, when party-voter linkages are formed over personalism or clientelism rather than party programs, then the party system is operating by a logic which is at odds to the assumptions of those approaches.

Instead, I argue that an organization-centered explanation will be necessary to understand electoral competition in general, and the performance of new parties in particular. Such an approach has been neglected until recently, and is a departure from the norm. For example, Gibson (1996) urges caution: "If our concern is to distinguish between parties in ways that are relevant to the broader conflicts of society, an organization-centered approach provides little to work with" (p 19). Yet, there is growing evidence of the fact that many party systems—though by no means all—in Latin America lack partisan divides that

articulate broad conflicts of society (Rosas 2005, Luna and Zechmeister 2005, Coppedge 1998, Dix 1989). Furthermore, case evidence is accumulating which emphasizes how parties typically thought of as programmatic are increasingly opting to invest in alternative linkage strategies.

In this project, then, I focus attention of party systems which are not programmatically structured. With this domain restriction, I ask first: What is the observed variation in new party performance? What would be a suitable way to model that variation? Second, I ask: Do extant theories of new party performance, developed primarily in programmatically structured party systems, explain the observed variation in the non-programmatically structured context? Third, I ask: What theoretically framework can I deploy, and if necessary alter, in order to adequately explain new party performance in this context? Lastly, I ask: How well does my model of new party performance explain party performance trajectories in Ecuador since the transition to democracy?

Research Design and Case Selection

This project takes place in three phases. First, in Chapter 2 I develop a conceptual and empirical approach for studying the electoral fortunes of new political parties. I borrow a quantitative technique from the fields of developmental psychology and criminology called "Latent Trajectory Modeling" which is specifically designed to analyze repeated measures over time of some behavior or trait—in this case party vote percentage—when there is theoretical reason to believe that the many observed trajectories can be grouped into qualitatively distinct categories. I use this analysis to classify the hundreds of parties I study into one of five groups. These classifications, in turn, form the dependent variable for the remainder of the project.

Whenever one attempts to explain variation in a categorical variable, in which each value differs nominally rather than ordinally, discretely or continuously from all the other values, the scope of the task can be large because it may include explaining each possible pairing of the values. In my case, the dependent variable has five categories and the scope could include explaining differences between categories 1 and 2, 1 and 3, 1 and 4, 1 and 5, 2 and 3, 2 and 4, etc. Of the five categories in my dependent variable, one conforms most closely to conventional notions of electoral success: the "contender" parties. Three of the others are different variants of failure, and the fifth, what I call the "explosive" group, is rather rare and newly observed trajectory. Therefore, I will confine my explanation to distinguishing between the "contender" trajectory and the other four groups.

Beginning in Chapter 3, I adopt a "nested" research design to explain why new parties are contenders rather than one of the other four types (Lieberman 2005). Because I adopt a domain restriction which takes the analysis of new party performance into unfamiliar territory—that is, the territory of non-programmatic party competition—I will begin with a large-N analysis which tests the robustness of explanatory models from outside that domain and compares the results with a preliminary formulation of a theoretical model—an organization-based approach—which I expect will perform better under my restriction. I use a multinomial logit model to compare the models. I expect that the findings for the imported theories will in general not be robust. Furthermore, I hope to find sufficient preliminary support for the organization-based approach to justify a model-building small-N analysis, which by the end of Chapter 3 I do.

In Chapter 4 I develop a theoretical framework derived from insights taken from Adrich (1995), Kitschelt (2000) and others concerning party-voter linkages and parties as

solutions to voter collective action problems. I turn to the model-building small-N analysis in chapter 5, where I look closely at eight new parties, two from each of four types on my dependent variable, and test the theoretical model of chapter 5. I use data gathered during field research over six months between July 2005 and May 2006. My research in Ecuador was primarily interviews with party founders and early party leaders and national candidates about concerning strategic decisions from the founding years. Additionally, I gathered detailed electoral data, and primary and secondary sources on the early years of the new parties.

Ideally, from there one could take the findings of the small-N analysis to formulate concepts and measures which can be reapplied in the large-N setting to test for the robustness of the theory. That stage, however, is beyond the scope of this project, and in any case would rely upon data about parties in the Americas that has not been assembled.

Overview of the Argument and Dissertation Outline

In chapter 2 I analyze new parties in four countries since the most recent democratic transition: Bolivia since 1985, Chile since 1989, Ecuador since 1979 and Venezuela since 1958. These countries represent diversity in the degree to which party competition is programmatically oriented, with Chile being programmatic and the other three being non-programmatic. I argue that when the analysis of new parties moves beyond highly institutionalized and programmatic arenas, that the dichotomy of success and failure to describe new party performance is no longer adequate. Instead, I expect there to be a larger number of distinctive performance profiles. I use statistical and theoretically grounded criteria to compare models and select a model in which there are five qualitatively distinctive performance profiles in the sample: "flop" parties which enter with less than 1% of the vote

and always disappear quickly; "flat" parties which enter with about 6% of the vote and persist though without growing; "flash" parties which enter prominently with about 12% of the vote but soon disappear; "contender" parties which also enter prominently at about the same level, but go on to become dominant players in the party system through slow and steady growth; and finally "explosive" parties which enter powerfully with 33% of the vote and quickly become the dominant player. The main distinction between cases from the programmatic system and cases from the non-programmatic systems is that the former parties from a more limited menu of the full range: only of the "contender" and "flop" types. Chile, however, also has the most majoritarian electoral system, with a district magnitude of two. This approach contrasts sharply with the traditional approach in the study of new party performance where grouping criteria and case classifications are assumed but never tested.

In Chapter 3, I find no support for social-structural and programmatic theories of new party performance, but suggestive support for a linkage and organization based approach. I find that higher levels of district magnitude increase that probability that new parties will be flop rather than flat, flash or contender parties. This result is rather trivial, but consistent with the expectation in a sample where district magnitude is never very low. None of the predictors explain the distinction between contender parties and explosive parties. Given that the case for my small-N analysis doesn't contain any explosive parties, I set aside this null result as outside the scope of this analysis. Though the phenomena of explosive parties is clearly very important, it requires separate theoretical treatment which will likely involve the dynamics of party system collapse.

In Chapter 4 I use the "calculus of voting" model as a heuristic to derive expectations about the types of linkage strategies a party will build to solve the voter's collective action

problem. I relate the various terms of the model to four strategies—the machine strategy, the vote-buying strategy, the personalist strategy, and the programmatic strategy. I then link these strategies to the organizational features a party will incorporate to deploy them.

Finally, in Chapter 5 I look closely at eight parties in Ecuador—two contenders, two flash parties, two flat parties, and two flop parties—to examine the types of linkages the parties built with their voters and the degree to which these linkages contribute to the party's performance profile.

In sum, this paper introduces four innovations to the study of new party performance. First, it proposes looking at parties across party families and across national contexts to investigate whether there are general trends of new party performance. Second, it proposes adopting a quantitative technique to model these trends and classify the cases into groups. Third, taken together, this approach to modeling party performance has important theoretical implications for the study of new parties and party system change, and especially for the types of causal accounts we develop and test in the discipline. In particular, this approach raises the question of whether or not findings which privilege particularities of a given party family or a given party system—for example, that the strength and unity of the indigenous movement predicts indigenous party success or that permissive multi-party systems lead to easier success for new entrants—are truly explanatory, or instead should be incorporated into a broader explanatory framework, or weighted more or less when other predictors (which may vary outside but not within the comparison set) are incorporated. Lastly, because this project looks squarely at the party as the unit of analysis, it suggests that causal accounts should shift the focus to party-level attributes to explain electoral performance. I incorporate and measure of party-level predictors of trajectory groupings. This represents an important

evolution in the study of new parties, which generally privileges system-level variables, such as electoral rules and social structures.

CHAPTER II

A CONCEPTUAL AND METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH TO

NEW PARTY ENTRANTS

Introduction

"Just as all men bear all their lives the mark of their childhood, so parties are profoundly influenced by their origins" (Duverger, 1959, p. xxiii)

"Every organization bears the mark of its formation, of the crucial political-administrative decisions made by its founders, the decisions which 'molded' the organization" (Panebianco, 1988, p. 50).

If Duverger is correct—that the life-course of a political party is constrained by the circumstances surrounding its origins; and if Panebianco is correct—that at its origins, a party is encoded with a genetic imprint, then the early years of the life of a political party are distinctive and deserve careful study and nuanced theorizing. These and other scholars have constructed a valuable theoretical foundation upon which students of political parties can form and test new hypotheses about party formation and success. In this chapter I extend their human development metaphor by borrowing from the fields of developmental psychology to propose a conceptual and methodological approach for the study of new parties. I propose conceptualizing the early life of a party as a developmental trajectory and measuring development by using the vote percentage won by a party over its first five elections to the lower or only chamber of congress.

I begin this chapter by reviewing the dominant approach—dichotomizing new party performance into success and failure—found in the literature and by pointing out the problems in concept and measurement with this approach. Also, I outline an argument which finds this approach theoretically ill-suited for application in volatile party systems. In the second section I lay the groundwork for treating the early electoral life of a party as a qualitatively distinct phase of life. In the third and fourth sections, I first outline an alternative approach—called latent trajectory modeling (or semi parametric mixture modeling)—to measuring party performance and then test the propositions of the theoretical framework of section two on new political parties in four countries of Latin America in their most recent democratic episode. I find that in this geographical and temporal context, new political parties follow a small number of qualitatively distinctive developmental trajectories. Specifically, I have identified and named five trajectory groups: "explosive parties," "contender parties", "flash parties," "flat parties," and "flop parties." Rather than coarsely and by fiat dividing new parties into the categories of successes and failures, as is the convention of most treatments of new parties, we can test for the existence of distinctive groups and test for the classification of parties into one group or another.

Beyond the Dichotomy of Success and Failure

This section reviews the extant approaches to the study of new party performance and argues that in poorly institutionalized party systems the standard approach of using subjective and dichotomous measures of performance are insufficient because they fail to test assumptions implicit in the criteria and they fail to capture the theoretically relevant variation of the dependent variable.

In the larger context of studying party system change—whether it be realignment, dealignment, fragmentation, collapse or consolidation—it is extremely important to understand the role of new parties and their developmental patterns. The preliminary step to comprehensive and generally applicable theories, and hypotheses about party system change and the role of new parties in particular, requires an empirically and theoretically defensible scheme for measuring their performance. This project seeks to improve upon the methods generally used for identifying and grouping new political parties by adopting a testable modeling technique which is also theoretically sensible. In particular, it seeks to move beyond the overly simplistic dichotomy of "success" and "failure."

Approaches to concept and measurement of the initial performance of new parties has evolved over time. In the earliest published quantitative analysis of the subject, Harmel and Robertson (1985) measure new party success by sorting their cases into countries where any new party has gained at least one seat in the lower chamber and the cases where no new party had gained a seat in the lower chamber. This division allows them to code countries as cases of successful new party formation and cases of unsuccessful new party formation. With this setup, the party is not the unit of the analysis, and they therefore cannot explain party performance using predictors which are attributes of the party. Many studies since then have shifted from the country as the unit of analysis to the party as the unit of analysis.

Among the body of work where the party is the unit of analysis, the principle weakness is that the studies adopt relatively arbitrary cut points to groups their cases, usually into the categories of successful and failed new parties. For example, Kitschelt's (1989) study of ecological parties in Europe parses out cases of "significant" and "insignificant" entry by setting a cut point of 4% of the national legislative vote during at least one election

between the range of years he studies. Many studies of new parties have proceeded in this general manner to identify their subjects and classify their cases. There are sometimes defensible reasons for these approaches, especially in systems where electoral competition is stable. Under those circumstances, the subjective nature of the decision-making process does not necessarily affect the veracity of the findings. But in general, authors who adopt a dichotomous successful/failed classification of new political parties ignore the fact that subtypes may exist. The country case approach will sometimes yield conceptualizations that are more subtle, as, for example in Converse and Dupeux's discussion of "flash parties," a term coined with reference to a peculiar (in a European context) unstable phenomena found during the French 4th Republic, which lasted through 1958 (1962). They remark:

> "The turbulence of French politics has long fascinated observers, particularly when comparisons have been drawn with the stability or...the dull complacency of American political life. Profound ideological cleavages in France, the instability of governments and republics, and the rise and fall of "flash" parties...have all contributed to the impression of *peculiar intensity* in the tenor of French political life" [emphasis added] (page 1)

Flash parties start strong but soon die. In a dichotomous scheme, it is unclear whether these parties should be considered cases of success or failure. In the long run, they may properly be considered "failed" cases, but in the short run, they may properly be considered "success" cases. In sum, whether the particular research design and country context can theoretically justify a dichotomy or not, there are new modeling techniques available which allow us to make this determination with more precision and support.

Approaches that use cut points adopt an unnecessarily restrictive application of data theory. This occurs whenever analysts adopt a nominal level of measurement when they could instead adopt a higher level of measurement. The dependent variable—new party performance—is most commonly measured using vote share, but vote share is almost never

used directly. In the course of dichotomizing according to ad hoc rules, one discards important information concerning the variation of the dependent variable. While doing so is not technically problematic—and depending on the research question may be perfectly appropriate (Steenbergen, stats notes)—the literature on new party performance suggests that it is ill-advised because there is a theoretical foundation for expecting distinctive intermediate categories, as described with the case of "flash" parties.

Even when vote share has been used directly (Hug 2001), it is often only measured at one point in time—at the first election—and therefore performs poorly as a measure of new party performance. Party performance is a dynamic process which should instead be measured over several elections.

These flaws in concept and measurement call into question some of the important conclusions of the literature because the form of the dependent variable has explanatory implications. If there are theoretically relevant and qualitatively distinctive groups of performance profiles among new parties which are not identified, our explanations can be incomplete or flawed. The research design I adopt here and describe in section three below allows me to more rigorously specify the dependent variable.

Electoral Performance in Volatile Country Contexts

The prominence of the dichotomizing approach is not surprising given the fact that the literature on new party performance was developed in the advanced industrial context. Cleavage theory, for example, traditionally posited a freezing of the systems with new party entrants arising at critical junctures (Lipset and Rokkan 1967, Scully 1992). Even with the updating of these frameworks by studies of party system realignment and dealignment (Dalton, Kitschelt, etc), it remains conceptually plausible if blunt to think of new parties as

making it or not because the systems remain relatively stable and institutionalized. But how shall we proceed when the "intensity" observed by Converse and Dupeux, rather than being "peculiar," is not so peculiar?

In Latin America, many parties and party systems are highly volatile and poorly institutionalized. In some cases, the implementation of liberalizing economic reforms has weakened the organizational basis of labor-based parties leading them to replace or complement programmatic and socially encapsulated organizational linkages with clientelisitic ones in order to remain competitive (Roberts forthcoming, Levitsty 2003 on Peronism, Luna forthcoming on FA in Uruguay and Luna manuscript on UDI in Chile, Samuels 2004 and Hunter APSA 2006 on PT, Freidenberg and Alcántara 2001 on ID). In other countries, some or all parties have always been at best weakly programmatically linked with voters. In countries of the region with historically "elitist" party systems, the logic of linkage is typically non-programmatic (Roberts forthcoming). Gibson argues that conservative parties, whose core constituency is the upper classes, must develop a non-programmatic mechanism of linkage with non-elite voters to compete successfully (Gibson 1996).

Under these circumstances, where we can expect wide diversity in the performance profiles of new parties, dichotomizing their performance into success and failure according to an arbitrary cut point is insufficient. The case-based literature underscores the degree of variation that exists in new party trajectories. To name just a few, Gamarra speaks of new parties during Bolivia's transition as having been dubbed "taxi" parties because their entire membership can fit in a taxi (Gamarra 1995) while Keck (1992), Buhn (1997) and Ellner (1988) trace the origins and early life three of leftist parties—Brazil's PT, Mexico's PRD and

Venezuela's MAS, respectively—which were electorally weak but enduring over their early years. Also, there is ample discussion in journalistic and academic press about performance profiles that resemble "flash" parties. The wider range of variation in performance profiles is theoretically relevant to our understanding of party systems in volatile contexts.

Scholars have developed many concepts and measures to capture the weak and unstable footing of many party systems in Latin America. Kitschelt and Zechmeister (2003) use the 1998 University of Salamanca surveys of legislators to develop a measure of "programmatic orientation" of politicians, which ranges from 0 to 100. They define programmatic orientation as a policy-based linkage of accountability and responsiveness between voters and politicians. Figure 2.1 below reveals the great variation in the region. In particular it reveals that politicians in Ecuador and Colombia are not at all programmatically oriented, and that politicians in Brazil, Bolivia, Venezuela, Uruguay and Peru are only weakly programmatically oriented.

Figure 2.1:

Programmatic Orientation of Politicians

(Kitschelt and Zechmeister 2003)

Similarly, Rosas (2005) uses the same data to construct an index of ideological orientation of the party systems of the region. See Figure 2.2 below. The party systems of Ecuador, Venezuela, Brazil, Peru and Bolivia stand out as having very low scores, even as Chile, Mexico and Uruguay score well. In contexts, where programmatic or ideological orientation is low, a dichotomous treatment of party performance may not be adequate because many politicians cohere into parties for alternative, non policy-based, reasons.

Figure 2.2:

Ideological Orientation (Rosas 2005)

Luna and Zechmeister (2005) use the University of Salamanca surveys of parliamentarians and Latinobarometer surveys of voters to develop a measure of congruence between elite and voter policy preferences. Their measure, which ranges theoretically from – 10 to 10, captures the degree of representation success (positive values) or failure (negative values). Scores of zero correspond to cases where there is no relationship between elite and voter preferences over bundles of issues. Figure 2.3 shows that while Chile and Uruguay are cases of representation success, the other cases are noticeably less representative, and Mexico, Bolivia, and Ecuador score near zero. In such contexts, a dichotomous treatment of new party performance might not be adequate because linkages between parties and voters are not policy-based.

Figure 2.3:

Elite-Mass Congruence (Luna and Zechmeister 2005)

Building upon Mainwaring's work on party and party system institutionalization, a large literature has evolved to measure this concept and its component parts, which are: 1) stability in patterns of inter-party competition; 2) party roots in society; 3) the legitimacy of parties and elections; and 4) party organization (Mainwaring and Scully 1995, Mainwaring 1999, Mainwaring and Torcal 2005, Jones 2005). Figure 2.4 below reports Jones' 2005 party system institutionalization calculations with the dark bar and Mainwaring and Scully's original 1995 calculations using the light bar.[2] The time points are not precisely comparable, mostly because the more recent attempt incorporates more precision and survey data not available in 1995. Nevertheless, they are conceptually equivalent. The variation between countries is more dramatic with the early measure. The compression that is evident between the high and low in the 2005 values over the 1995 values is likely to be a result of both improved precision in the measurements and substantial erosion of institutionalization in

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[2] Mainwaring and Scully's index has been rescaled from 0-12 to 0-100.

several national contexts, especially Colombia and Venezuela, but also in Chile and Costa Rica.

Figure 2.4:

Party System Institutionalization (Jones 2005, Mainwaring and Scully 1995)

Taken together, these indicators of diversity in party systems of the region justify skepticism of the sufficiency of using dichotomous measures of new party performance. Returning to Converse and Dupeux's reflection on politics during the French 4th Republic, they note: "…It seems likely that [the rise and fall of "flash" parties] represent spasms of political excitement in unusually hard times on the part of citizens whose year-in, year-out involvement in political affairs is abnormally weak" (1962, p 2). Hard times which in France may have been unusual, for Latin American third wave democracies has been usual; and a weakly involved citizenry which in France may have been abnormal in Latin America has been much closer to the norm. Below, I propose a method for measuring electoral

performance which is well-suited to the task of discerning patterns in the routine appearance of "spasms of political excitement."

New Parties as a Developmental Trajectory

In this section I will develop a theoretical basis for conceptualizing new party performance as a developmental trajectory. Much like childhood is a distinct developmental phase from adulthood and treated as such in medicine and psychology, I will argue that the first several electoral contests for a political party are fundamentally different than electoral competition by a mature party. This conceptualization rationalizes my choice to measure new party performance with a time-series of five observations for each party.

A central premise of this project is that new political parties are distinctive from mature parties. Whether one emerges seemingly from nowhere or arises out of long-standing social or economic groups transferred to the political arena, in so far as it is a new collective actor, it enters the electoral arena as a novice. Its electoral linkages with a base will be embryonic and its organizational infrastructure will be nascent and unconsolidated.

I assume that new parties are vote maximizers. Vote maximizing behavior fits intuitively with the extremely pragmatic vote seeking actions of the personalistic and ideologically diffuse parties of many party systems in the region, but a vote maximizing assumption is not necessarily inconsistent with a principled ideological strategy. In fact, a diversity of party strategies could be deployed which all satisfy the quest to win votes. In Laver (2005), the author models the behavior of four party strategies: stickers, aggregators, hunters and predators. The "hunter" behaves in a way consistent with what we think of as pure vote seekers, taking positions over time in a hunt for more votes without commitment to any particular position. The "sticker," on the contrary, is an ideological fixed party whose

position never changes. If we consider that a party's attractiveness to voters will be based upon their reputation and not just on their current policy position, an ideological strategy may in the medium and long term be vote maximizing. In sum, under conditions of uncertainty about voter preferences and in a fluid party system where other parties are coming and going and shifting changing position, it is not always clear for to a party what the best vote maximizing strategy might be. On this basis, I will assume they are all vote maximizers. For a discussion of other potential motivations for parties, see Muller and Strom (1999).

One way to justify treatment of the early years of a party as a distinct developmental phase is outlined by Panebianco (1988). Over the course of a party's life, it shifts from being an organization oriented towards some particular program (be it a broad or narrow one) to becoming one oriented towards its own survival. He builds upon Michels' theory of "substitution of ends" (1911; tr. 1959), which "illustrates precisely this passage of the organization from being an instrument for the realization of certain aims…, to a natural system in which the survival imperative and the actors' particular objectives predominate" (p 8). His approach is an organizationally-oriented treatment of the party, and he outlines features that one would expect to see during the founding years versus those of the mature years when the party is focused on survival.

Alternatively, one can distinguish an early phase because during this time ties to voters are weak and being formed. Of course, not all parties consolidate ties with voters, but for those that do and evolve into long-standing actors in the political arena, the initial phase takes place under conditions of vulnerability which are not as life-threatening after linkages are established and ties are strong. A party in its early years will not have accumulated reputational capital that mature parties can rely upon. To the extent that strong relationships

between parties and voters rely upon many repeated iterations of exchange of some public or club good for a vote, I expect to see vote winning patterns over time for new parties to be more volatile than for established parties, and the causes of their performance gains or losses to be at least in part distinct from those of established parties.

Also, new parties will not have a strongly established relationship with the state. In a professionalized state, it means that they may not have secured the credibility and formally institutionalized connections that an established party has. In a politicized state, it means that it will not have carved out points of access to resources and policy making that a mature party has secured.

In sum, the first electoral contests of a party as a distinct from those of an established party in so far as it forms and consolidates its organization, contests and then gains access to the state and other resources, forms and consolidates linkages with voters and organized interests, and effectively governs or opposes.

Parties Defined

One thorny problem in a study of new parties is to identify them. Careful observation of a wide range of new political organizations reveals that they arise from a bewildering range of circumstances. We must offer a succinct and theoretically-informed operational rule for identifying and classifying the objects of this study into new and pre-existing parties.

A preliminary task of most studies of new parties is to first define political parties. I use the definition adopted by Hug (2001), who in turn borrowed from Sjoblom (1968), which focuses upon a single criterion: a party "appoints candidates at general elections to the system's representative assembly" (Sjoblom 1968, p 21).

Implied, but not explicit, in this definition is that the system's representative assembly refers to the *national* representative system; therefore, parties that form and compete exclusively at sub-national levels are excluded. This constraint is sensible because the purpose of this study is to analyze how new national political parties are projected into the national arena. Some parties which eventually do so begin at the local level, so in a future extension of this project I will consider this circumstance as a predictor of performance at the national level.[3]

Also following from the definition is that I exclude parties which compete in presidential or senate races, but not lower house elections. Furthermore, the definition presumes that lower house elections are a more perfect measure of a party's performance in the national political arena than elections to the upper house or the presidency. Observation of political competition for the executive office is clouded by dynamics which include the personal attributes of candidates, sometimes to such an extreme that they overshadow the importance of attributes of the parties. Still, the personal attributes of a party's leadership may often have an important role in determining a party's trajectory in national political life; therefore, rather than considering these elected offices in the *measurement* of the trajectory of a party, I will incorporate them as *predictors* of that trajectory. Finally, I exclude from my analysis candidates who run as independents in a single district.

Party Birth and Death Defined

Having identified parties, I now turn to identifying new parties. If party formation conformed to Laver and Schilperoord's theoretical model of the citizen-candidate (2007),

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[3] Note that this exclusion means that the parties which Van Cott (2005) classifies as having "electoral viability"—the second level in her three category scheme of party success—will by design not be detected in this analysis. Her "electorally viable" parties include those which "may win local or regional elections, but rarely can compete at the national level" (p 18).

where parties form when citizens are dissatisfied with the system-wide programmatic offerings, then the identification of a new party would be a simple task: new parties would be of the type that Hug (2001) labels "genuinely new parties." While Laver and Schilperood's work represents a great advancement to the formal modeling of party birth and death, for this empirical project, new parties are almost never formed by a citizen-turned-candidate. Instead, party formation in Latin America is almost always the result of political entrepreneurship by veteran politicians.[4]

For this analysis, in general, new parties are marked by discontinuities in the organizational structure of a party and/or lack of experience in competitive elections at the national level. Specifically, they are defined according to any one of the following criteria:

After an extended non-democratic interruption, parties are new if they did not compete in the election immediately before the democratic breakdown or the founding election after the transition (ex: DP in Ecuador is new in 1984); or if the interruption caused a rupture in the organizational life of the party (ex: PSCH in Chile).[5] Non-democratic interruptions often introduce pressures into the party system which can disrupt party organizations. If an interruption is sufficiently long, it may be fair to consider all parties which participate in the founding election of the transition back to democracy as new parties.

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[4] With respect to the *predictors* of party formation and success, this fact implies that new party formation and success is not determined exclusively or mostly by features of the issue space (that is, by programmatic politics), but also by organizational features of the parties themselves, such as how they resolve conflict, recruit new leaders, and co-opt an organizational network, etc.

[5] The Socialist Party of Chile (PSCH) broke up into various pieces during the Pinochet dictatorship. In 1989, during the founding election of the transition back to democracy, two instrumental parties, the PPD and PAIS, competed (Scully and Valenzuela 1993). Furthermore, many former members completed in 1989 without party affiliation, as independent candidates within the center-left Concertacion alliance. It was not until 1993 that the PSCH solved its organizations dilemmas and reemerged as an organizational unit, though deeply changed. In fact, 8 of the 10 candidates that competed as members of PAIS in 1989 later joined the Communist Party rather than the Socialist Party and the PPD turned out not to be so instrumental—it continues to play a prominent role today. In this project, I treat the PSCH as new since 1993.

Regime type effects party organization by introducing alternative organizational forms and survival strategies which do not rely on electoral incentives, and so the founding election is truly a new challenge. Also, a regime transition can form a critical juncture which fundamentally alters the dimensions of political competition by introducing a new dimension of competition. For this reason, it is advisable to use a slightly lower standard of organizational disruption for identifying a new political party than one would use under regime continuity.

When a party splits, one piece will never be considered new and the other(s) will always be considered new (following Mainwaring, 1999, p 29). In the clear and common situation where a small group of dissidents leave the main party and complete under a new name, the coding decision is simple. In more complex situations I take into consideration continuities in name, the relative size of the two groups, the organizations inheritance of the two groups, and the source of the split.

A political party that has existed but never competed for a seat in the lower or only chamber of congress will be considered new. Such a party is effectively entering a new political arena subject to electoral pressures it has never encountered (Schlesinger 1984). Formerly banned leftist parties are an example of this type of party.

A party that arises from a fusion of two or more parties will not be counted as a new party. However, because I conceptualize a party's life as a trajectory, I must code party death. I will use the following decision-rule: at the time of a fusion, I will always consider one (or more) of the party's as having died and one and only one of the party's as having survived. As with the case of fissures, the decision regarding which party dies and which

survives will take into consideration the size of the merging parties, the continuities in leadership, and the continuities in name.

Parties that are hijacked by new leadership and essentially emerge as a new party will be counted as new. This often happens when there is a nearly defunct party which nevertheless has the benefit of having legal recognition by electoral authorities. This subjective decision will be guided by: a) the entry of a large cadre of new leadership; b) the simultaneous disaffiliation of large numbers of the previous leadership; c) the abruptness of the change; d) large changes in party platforms, organizational operations, party statues; and e) name changes (ex: MAS in Bolivia and PLN in Ecuador).[6]

The coding rules used here differ to some extent with other efforts. Mair (1990), for example, includes as new parties any resulting from a fusion or from a fission. Hug (2001) distinguishes "genuinely new parties" from fusions, fissions and alliances, as parties which "emerge without the help from members of existing parties" (p 13.) He concludes that in his analysis, the category of new parties will be reserved for "genuinely new parties" and fissions. This definition will not suffice in this project because it fails to provide guidance under a number of difficult circumstances, many of which are not often found in the sample of advanced industrial countries he studies.

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[6] Beginning in 1999, Evo Morales' IPSP party adopted the party registration of MAS. In Ecuador, the party that was born in 1989 as the Partido Liberacion Nacional (PLN) changed hands three times. It was founded as a progressive splinter from the communist FADI party during the identity and strategic crisis which followed the fall of the Berlin Wall. In 1995 it was occupied by Rosalía Arteaga and changed its name to Alianza Nacional (PAN) to serve as a platform for her 1996 VP bid with Abdala Bucaram. After Bucaram was removed from the presidency, it was abandoned by Arteaga and cooped by César Alarcón, changing its name to the Partido Libertad (PL). In spite of the continuity in party registration, the coincidence of name changes, rotation in party leadership, and shifting ideologies has led me to code this party as three cases of the emergence and death of a new party. Personal interviews PLN-1 (2006), PLN-2 (2006), PL-1 (2006).

Latent Trajectory Modeling as an Approach to Modeling Early Party Performance

This section develops the argument for applying Latent Trajectory Modeling to the study of new party performance by citing prior applications and explaining the technical elements of the approach.

Model Estimation

Vote share trajectories were determined by fitting a semiparametric mixture model (SPMM) to the data, using SAS's Proc Traj routine. SPMMs identify qualitatively distinct groups of trajectories within a population. This approach to modeling growth curves is different from traditional growth curve modeling in that the latter assumes the random parameters to be bivariate normal distributed. In other words, all individuals are assumed to belong to a single class of individuals who vary continuously on a latent trait. In contrast, the group-based method employed here assumes a number of discrete classes of parties, each having a specific intercept and slope (and sometimes a higher order polynomial in order to model curvilinear trajectory paths) and an estimated population prevalence.

SPMMs were first developed for application in the fields of criminology and psychology to analyze distinctive trajectories of human behavior, such as criminal recidivism and childhood delinquency. It has potential applications in political science, but has thus far has not penetrated deeply into the discipline.[7] The premise of the technique is that "patterns in the repeated measures reflect a finite number of trajectory types, each of which corresponds to an unobserved or latent class in the population" (Bauer and Curren 2003).

A latent trajectory model is particularly appropriate when the developmental trajectories found within the population are expected to have either different functional

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[7] See Plutzer 2002 for an exception.

forms—some zero-order constant trajectories, some first-order linear trajectories, some second-order quadratic trajectories, etc.—or the various individual trajectories do not vary regularly within the population—some are monotonically increasing while others are monotonically decreasing while still others are not monotonic (Nagin 1999). In the study of new political parties, theoretical expectations suggest that both circumstances apply.

As an illustration of the varying functional forms, consider the fact that the most successful new parties will not continuously grow, but will flatten out, usually near or before becoming a majoritarian party. In this situation, a second-order specification may be appropriate for that trajectory to capture the curvilinear shape. Similarly, a second-order specification may be necessary to model performance of a "flash" trajectory. See Figure 2.5 below. On the other hand, there may be a distinctive set of parties strongly rooted in an identity group—ethnic parties, extreme left parties—that enter with relatively few votes but are able to sustain that support over the long-run. This profile may best be modeled with a zero-order functional form: they enter with very a small percentage of the vote and continue on with no gain or loss. A single term—the intercept—may be sufficient to summarize their trajectory. Finally, there will likely be parties which enter and grow steadily or enter and decline steadily, best modeled with a first order polynomial.

Figure 2.5:

Variation in Functional Form of Trajectories

As an illustration of the expectation that party performance may not vary regularly, contrast the concept of "flash parties" with what one might expect from a conventionally successful party. The former are distinctive in that they enter with relatively high support and drop quickly. In the language of latent trajectory models, flash parties are defined by their relatively high intercept and their relatively high *negative* slope. The former enter and have *positive* slopes. See Figure 2.6 below.

Figure 2.6:

Irregularly Varying Trajectories

Taken together, these expectations are another way of saying that SPMM make differing assumptions than conventional growth curve models about the distribution of the random parameters: that is, they will be discretely rather than continuously distributed.

The modeling procedure takes place in four steps. First, the model estimates the "shape parameters" for alternative specifications on the number of groups and the order of the polynomials; then, it estimates the "population prevalence" for each of the groups in each of the models; next, the analyst compares models using both statistical and theoretical criteria and selects the best model; and finally, the analyst uses the estimates of the preferred model to compute group membership probabilities—also called posterior probabilities—for each of the parties in the dataset.

Estimating The Shape Parameters

The shape parameters are the set of estimates which describe each individual trajectory. They are estimated using:

$$Vote_{it} = \beta_0^j + \beta_1^j Age_{it} + \beta_2^j Age_{it}^2 + \varepsilon_{it}$$

where vote is the vote percentage of party i at age t, age is party age measured in national

lower house election cycles, and j is the trajectory group. Notice that β's are superscripted

with j, which means that each trajectory has its own intercept, slope, and quadratic term. β_0,

β_1, and β_2 are collectively the shape parameters for the polynomial because they define the

shape of each groups trajectory.

Estimating The Population Prevalence

The population prevalence is a parameter estimate of the prevalence of a given

trajectory in the population, given the sample. The model estimates one value for each

trajectory group. Its notation is π_j, and it is estimated using:

$$\pi_j = \frac{e^{\theta_j}}{\sum_{j=1}^{j} e^{\theta_j}}$$

where π_j is the probability of membership in group j, and $\sum_{j=1}^{J} \pi_j = 1$.

Model Comparison and Selection

Multiple SPMM models are estimated and compared. This process of comparison

helps answer questions such as: Does a 4-group model fit the data better than a 5-group

model or a 3-group model? Does a second-order polynomial on trajectory 5 fit the data better

than a first-order polynomial on that trajectory? Model selection is informed using a

combination of theory, domain knowledge and formal statistical criteria, normally the

Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC).

Computing Posterior Probabilities

Finally, once a model is selected, we use the model estimates and a party's actual vote share history to compute the posterior probability of party i's membership in group j, $\hat{P}(j|vote_{it})$ using:

$$\hat{P}(j|vote_{it}) = \frac{\hat{P}\left(vote_{it}\middle|j\right)\hat{\pi}_j}{\sum_{j}^{J}\hat{P}(vote_{it}|j)\hat{\pi}_j}$$

This value, which is calculated for each party, indicates the probability that a given party is a member of a given group. An indication of a good model is that it places most parties solidly in one group or another with a high probability.

Sometimes a party will be difficult to classify. In one circumstance, we might imagine that a party's history of electoral returns over five elections may make its membership status ambiguous between two trajectories. Keep in mind, however, that if it is truly a party "in a class by itself," the model selection stage of the analysis would have yielded a superior model with a group for this one party. Furthermore, the analysis does not serve the research question well if it yields many very similar trajectory groups. We're looking for a discrete set of qualitatively different groups. If the distributional assumptions about the random parameters are correct, therefore, we expect that truly ambiguous cases will be rare in a strong model.

In a second circumstance, where parties have entered the electoral arena so recently that we have only one or a few data points on them, it may be difficult to classify a party into a group. Imagine, for example, a scenario where there are two groups of parties. Both enter

strong—say, with 10% of the vote—but one group goes on to be the set of contenders and another group is of the "flash" type which soon dies. If we observe a party entering at the most recent election with 10% of the vote and no other observations, we might say that this party has a 50/50 chance of being in one group or the other, until another election comes and we receive more data and can make a stronger determination. This will be particularly the case if the best model contains two or more groups with similar intercepts.

An Empirically and Theoretically Based Typology of New Party Entrants

This section reports the results of the analysis. The result specifies my dependent variable for the rest of this project. The larger goal of this project is to predict why parties fall into one trajectory group rather than another. In the introductory chapter I explained that the predictive theories developed for application in programmatically structured political arenas do not travel well to the volatile and non-programmatically structured arenas. In chapter 3 I will develop a predictive model for application in non-programmatic arenas. However, in this chapter, where for the time being I am concerned only with the question of whether and which distinctive trajectory groups exists, I will not restrict my sample to non-programmatic country contexts. I will argue that the approach used here has general application cross-nationally and for party systems of all types, programmatic or not. I illustrate this point by including the programmatic case of Chile.

Sample and Measurement

The sample I use here is drawn from four countries, Bolivia, Ecuador, Venezuela and Chile. The sample is restricted to cases for which I was able to collect district-level electoral data over the entire period since the democratic transition. The analysis here uses only national-level vote returns, but I use the district-level data in the predictive model of Chapter

3. Theoretically, the analysis here could be conducted on a larger sample of countries, but these four cases contain a sufficiently large sample of new parties and they span party systems that are institutionalized and programmatic and those that are not.

I analyze all new political parties which compete in national elections to the lower or only legislative chamber since the most recent transition to democracy. In multi-tier electoral systems, I analyze results from the proportional component if it generally governs the overall seat distribution in the legislative body. See Table 2.1 below.

Table 2.1:

Summary of Election Results Analyzed

Country	Years	Election Results Analyzed
Chile	1989-2005	Lower Chamber; Single Tier
Bolivia I	1985-1994	Lower Chamber; Single Tier
Bolivia II	1994-2005	Lower Chamber; PR Tier
Ecuador I	1979-1998	Single Chamber; District Tier
Ecuador II	1998-2005	Single Chamber; Single Tier
Venezuela I	1958-pre1993	Lower Camber; District Tier
Venezuela II	1993-1999	Lower Chamber; PR Tier
Venezuela III	1999-2005	Single Chamber; Single Tier

Overall, during 32 elections, 950 new parties entered the electoral arena. The majority of them, however, are one-district parties from recent elections in Venezuela (about 200 each year in 1998, 2000 and 2005) and Ecuador (about 25 each year in 1996, 1998, and 2002). With respect to their national electoral performance, the 649 one-district parties comprise a homogeneous group together with several hundred other small parties which compete in multiple districts. All the one-district parties conform to the general profile of the "flop" parties I describe later. That is, they all enter with a very small vote share and none have lived beyond 4 election cycles. On only 5 occasions did any of these parties ever earn more than 1% of the vote, and they never earned more than 3.5%. The mean national vote

percentage of these parties is less than .05%. Because they severely skew the sample

distribution, they lead to estimation difficulties. Therefore, I have excluded them from the

analysis. See Appendix X for more details on the excluded one-district parties.

      After excluding one-district parties, the resulting sample includes 297 parties with

558 party-year vote share observations. However, there is an additional alteration which I

make to the dataset. Vote percentage is not reported for parties which die because we only

observe their death when they cease to compete. If we analyze the data in this condition, the

general electoral profile of the parties which die would appear healthier than it actually is

since death is not observed in the data. I prefer to analyze a dataset that includes a defensible

value for party death. Fortunately, the vote share has a meaningful value for death. Following

Diehr and Patrick (2003), if a party is determined to have died, I add to its panel an entry of 0

vote percentage following the last election in which they compete in order to "account fully

for death." I do not do this when a party competes in the most recent election for each

country. Once accounting for death in this way, the final dataset of 297 parties includes 759

party-year observations. See Table 2.2 below.

Table 2.2:

Frequency of New Party Entrants

| Country | Years | Elections | New Parties | | | Party -Year N | |
			Total	Excluded One-District	Analyzed	w/o Accounting for Death	Accounting for Death
Bolivia	1985-2005	6	34	0	34	53	82
Chile	1989-2005	5	20	2	18	40	51
Ecuador	1979-2002	10	96	73	23	64	72
Venezuela	1958-2005	11	797	574	223	401	554
Total		**32**	**950**	**649**	**297**	**558**	**759**

Conceptually, this analysis is built upon a new party's life cycle between birth and its fifth election or death, whichever occurs first. Chronological time (for example, whether a party was born in 1989 or 2005) is not theoretically important for estimating the party's performance trajectory over its lifetime.[8] Therefore, rather than year, I will use a party's age to measure time in this analysis. However, electoral cycles in different countries (and sometimes in the same country over time) run on different increments. Therefore, rather than counting a party's age in years, I will count its age in election cycles. At the time of a party's first electoral run for national office it will be 1 cycle old; at the time of its second run, it will be 2 cycles old, etc. A party in Chile that was born in 1989 and ran also in the 1993 election will be 1 cycle old in 1989 and 2 cycles old in 1993 (ex: PPD). When a party is born in Ecuador for the 1984 election and then runs again in 1986, it will be 1 cycle old in 1984 and 2 cycles old in 1986 (ex: PRE). A party born in Venezuela for the 1998 election which goes

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[8] Of course, if there are period effects associated with a party's performance, chronological time may have a predictive effect on its performance trajectory. Therefore, chronological time will be incorporated into the analysis as a *predictor* in future research.

on to compete in 2000 and 2005 will be 1 cycle old in 1998, 2 cycles old in 2000 and 3 cycles old in 2005 (ex: MVR).

I limit my analysis to only the first five electoral cycles for each new party because, as I argue above, the early years of a party's life are developmentally distinctive from its mature years. The choice to use five elections is somewhat subjective, and based mostly upon the observed performance of the best performing parties across the four countries. Their level of support seems to level off after around five elections. I do not expect the results reported here to be greatly effected by this choice. The majority of new parties do not live to the age of 5 election cycles old, and the model produces parameter estimates based upon the available data. The impact of the number of election cycles I use mainly alters the results in that more cycles leads the model to begin discriminating between the most enduring parties based upon their electoral performance in elections rather far in time from their birth. They farther we go from birth, the more the result will be incorporating elements of a party's life that are unrelated to early developmental characteristics. An analysis that takes into consideration the entire life history of the most successful parties may be a worthwhile one to conduct, but it lies beyond the scope of this project and my ultimate concern with predicting a new party's early course. See Appendix 2 for a complete list of the new parties and their electoral history over its first five elections.

I estimate SPMMs that allowed for 1-8 groups of vote percentage over time using zero, first, and second order polynomials for each group. Improved fits were obtained for each new group through 5 groups; however, no improvement was obtained when 6 and subsequent groups were allowed. The Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) supported the 5-group model as the best fitting. The preferred model also had trajectories with differing orders in the polynomial. One trajectory was flat (an intercept, but neither a slope nor a quadratic term), two had a constant rate of change (an intercept and slope but not quadratic), and two had a variable rate of change (an intercept, a slope and a quadratic). Thus, the analyses presented here are based on the 5-group model, with individual parties being assigned to their most likely trajectory group using posterior probabilities, a value calculated post-estimation using the model's parameter estimates as described above.

Of the five trajectories, one consists of "flop" parties which are estimated to enter with a vote percentage of 0.1% and drop off at a rate of .36% of the vote per election. This groups is estimated to comprise 89.4% of the population. The second trajectory group, "flat" parties, enter with about 6% of the vote and neither grow nor die. They make up 2.5% of the population. The third class of parties, which I call "flash," enter with about 12.2% of the vote and lose 8% by the second election, and continue losing at a steadily declining rate. They are estimated to be 4.3% of the population. The fourth class of parties, which I call "contenders," enter with over 12% of the vote and grow at a rate of about 1% per election. They make up 3.0% of the population. Finally, the fifth class of parties are "explosive" parties, with an intercept of over 33% of the vote and a growth at an initially high rate that steadily declines. They are estimated to be 1% of the population. See Figure 2.7 and Table 2.3 below.

Figure 2.7:

New Party Trajectories

Table 2.3:

5-Group Model of New Party Electoral Performance

(Latent Trajectory Model; parties N=299; panel N=758)

Group	Population Prevalence	Share Parameters	
Flop	89.20%**	Intercept	0.11**
		Slope	-0.36**
Flat	3.00%**	Intercept	6.26**
Flash	4.32%**	Intercept	12.24**
		Slope	-8.44**
		Quadratic	0.85**
Contender	2.50%**	Intercept	12.38**
		Slope	1.15**
Explosive	1.00%*	Intercept	33.11**
		Slope	55.66**
		Quadratic	-9.93**

* significant at .1 level; ** significant at .05 level.
Intercepts are undefined at t=0 and have been adjusted to t=1

The figure truncates the trajectory of the explosive group to three points because it is estimated to be a group of only three parties, all of which are relatively new. Bolivia's Podemos has completed only in one national legislative election, Bolivia's MAS has completed in only two, and Venezuela's MVR has completed in only three.

Table 2.4:

Party Classifications using Posterior Probabilities

Explosive					Contender			
Bolivia	**Chile**	**Ecuador**	**Venezuela**		**Bolivia**	**Chile**	**Ecuador**	**Venezeula**
MAS	None	none	MVR		MIR	PPD	ID	none
PODEMOS						RN	PRE	
						UDI	PRIAN	
						PSCH		

Flash					Flat			
Bolivia	**Chile**	**Ecuador**	**Venezuela**		**Bolivia**	**Chile**	**Ecuador**	**Venezuela**
NFR	None	PD	CCN1		MIP	none	FRA	LCR
Condepa		PUR	Conver.		UN		MPD	MAS
UCS			FDP1				MUPP	PPT
			FND1				DP	
			MEP					
			PODEMOS					
			PRVZL					

Flop			
Bolivia	**Chile**	**Ecuador**	**Venezuela**
...All Others...			

The case classifications in Table 2.4 are based upon the posterior probability calculations reported in Appendix X. In all but seven of the cases, we can predict with at least 97% certainty that the parties are properly classified. The smaller level of certainly for the remaining seven parties is not surprising, and I will discuss them each in turn.

In Ecuador, PRIAN and PSP have both only competed in one national election for the purposes of this analysis. Both competed again in the 2006 election, which lies outside the scope of this analysis. PSP is the party of Lucio Gutierrez, who was removed from the presidency about two years after being elected in 2002. His party began as an electoral vehicle and performed very poorly in congress that year. However, it performed very well in

2006. The new data point would likely lead PSP to be reclassified as a "contender" with a fairly high probability. PRIAN is the electoral vehicle for Ecuador's wealthiest man, Alvaro Noboa. It evolved out of several regional electoral movements and registered as a national party for the 2002 elections. PRIAN has built a substantial clientelistic network and in 2006 did extremely well. Its status as a "contender" would be more probable, and probably nearly 100%, with the new data. Pachakutik, the indigenous party, arose as the electoral arm of the national indigenous social movement, CONAIE to contest the 1996 elections. It has been hailed in the popular and scholarly press as a potent and well-organized political force, but it is likely to remain a small though enduring player in the national political arena. Additional data points, including its 2006 performance of 5.6% of the vote, will further consolidate its classification as a "flat" party.

In Bolivia, both the parties with low posterior probabilities are new comers. MIP, the party of the radical and marginal indigenous leader Felipe Quispe, has only contested two elections. UN, the party started by Samuel Doria Medina, one of Bolivia's wealthiest men and a defector from the traditional MIR party, was formed to contest the 2005 elections.

Finally, in Venezuela, the ambiguity of Podemos and PPT arises because both are newcomers to the political scene, with Podemos competing once in the 2005 elections and PPT contesting three elections since 1998. Podemos originates as the pro-alliance faction of MAS which stayed with Chavez' governing alliance in 2000 after the rest of the party left the alliance. PPT formed when the more radical of two factions peeled off from the moderating LCR in the mid-1990s and, from the 1998 election through today, has allied with Chavez' governing MVR party. As their electoral history grows, and if they remain members of the governing coalition, they will likely settle in with a low but enduring percentage of the vote.

Table 2.5:

Posterior Probabilities*

Country	Party	Max Post. Prob.	Alt 2	Alt 3
Ecuador	PRIAN	56% Contender	44% Flash	
Venezuela	Podemos	57% Flash	37% Flat	
Bolivia	UN	52% Flat	43% Flash	
Ecuador	MUPP	88% Flat	8% Flop	4% Flash
Venezuela	PPT	60% Flat	40% Flop	
Bolivia	MIP	61% Flop	39% Flat	
Ecuador	PSP	87% Flop	12% Flat	

*All other parties classified with >97% probability

This model is based upon a sample derived from my definition of new political parties. In the course of coding parties as new or pre-existing (which I will call "legacy parties"), I omit 24 legacy parties from this analysis. Earlier in this chapter I conceptualize a party's life-cycle using a developmental metaphor and argue that the early years of a new political party constitute a distinctive phase and are subject to a different explanation than one would use to account for the performance of legacy parties. Democratic transitions, however, introduce some ambiguity into the coding decisions. For the transitional elections, one may wonder whether I should have coded all parties as effectively new. Alternatively, one may wonder whether the results of the trajectory models are sensitive to my analysis of the continuities and discontinuities in the life of a party over the democratic interruption and the resulting coding decisions I made. For example, would the result have changed if I counted Chile's Socialist Party (PSCH) as a legacy party rather than a new party? Or if I had counted Ecuador's Social Christian Party (PSC) as new rather than a legacy party? In order to test the sensitivity of the results to these issues, I estimated models on two alternative samples. First, I estimated a model using just legacy parties. Second, I estimated a model

which included all cases, legacy and new. The results, which appear in Appendix X, sustain the approach I adopt in this chapter.

Discussion and Conclusion

This result offers a compelling alternative to the approach most comparativists have used to group new parties for the purpose of explaining their performance. First, it suggests that we move away from the dichotomous classification scheme of successful parties and failed parties separated by an arbitrary cut-point (Kitschelt 1988, Van Cott 2005, Harmel and Robertson 1985, Hug 2001). The result here is supported by a number of studies which have theorized, often one by one or on a small subset, on different sorts of party performance profiles. The novelty here is that the analysis takes place in a cross national time series context.

Second, this chapter illustrates how we can use a much richer set of data in studying electoral performance, even when conducting a quantitative analysis. Some early studies have used the country as the unit of analysis—in some countries successful new parties arise while in others they don't (Harmel and Robertson 1985). Not surprisingly, these studies find system-level variables such as the electoral system to predict success and failure. Other studies have observed parties at only the first election in determining success or failure (Hug 2001). A single point of observation misses several important distinctions, especially if two or more sets of parties enter with the same vote share, but go on in different directions. The implication of looking at more detailed data of a party's performance, rather than at a country or a party's single time point, is that it places the analytic lens more squarely on the party as the unit of analysis and implies that party-level variables may take on greater explanatory power.

Third, this project illustrates some benefits of adding to the literature—which to date looks primarily as single case studies (in Latin American Keck 1992, Bruhn 1997, Ellner 1988), single country studies (Scully 1992), or single party family studies (Hawkins 2003, Kitschelt 1989)—by looking generally across countries and party systems. Cases that seem idiosyncratic in a limited sample may be part of a bigger class in a generalized approach. Or, cases that appear similar in one sample may in fact be different. For example, in Van Cott's (2005) analysis of indigenous parties in the Americas, she identifies Ecuador's Pachakutik and Bolivia's MAS as two cases of party success and sets out to explain why they are distinctive. My analysis indicates that the electoral performance of these two parties are qualitatively distinctive.[9] The implication is that, rather than explaining why they both succeed, we must explain why one is "explosive" and the other is languishing as a "flat" party. Furthermore, given that there are other explosive parties in the region—including one in Bolivia which arose at about the same time as MAS—the explanation for why MAS' entry is so stunning may have less to do with factors related to its roots in an indigenous movement, and more to do with other organizational or system factors which it shares with its current main rival Podemos and the MVR in Venezuela.

There are three important implications of these results for the larger literature on new party performance. First, the results alter the explanatory goal. It suggests that large-N comparative studies come to terms with what small-N studies of party performance have long accomplished: there are more distinctive performance profiles which will require more nuance in our explanatory models, at least in the contexts where these distinctive types are observed.

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[9] Of course, it may be too soon to conclude that they are successful or whether they are "flash," "explosive," or "flat" parties given that both have a relatively short historical record.

Second and related, the fact that certain party systems are able to generate multiple types of parties suggests that features of the parties themselves have a large and independent influence on performance, over and above system-level variables. In many instances, the system has been relatively fixed, yet parties of two or more different types have emerged.

Finally, the results of this chapter seem to confirm that system-level variables have an influence on party performance. Two observations are worth making because they may be relevant to the larger literature on party system change. First, Chile is a system which generates only two of the five types: contenders and flops. Something about the system makes it inhospitable to flash, flat, and explosive types. The cause may involve Chile's rather restrictive binomial electoral system. Alternatively, it may involve the relatively more institutionalized and programmatic nature of competition. Second, parties of the "explosive" type are only found in two of the four party systems: Bolivia and Venezuela. Furthermore, the three explosive parties all emerged following party system collapses. This suggests that not only is the explosive trajectory distinctive from the conventional type of success we observe among new parties, but that it only arises under very particular circumstances that may have to do with representation failures and the openness of party systems to outsider candidates.

CHAPTER III

PREDICTING NEW PARTY PERFORMANCE IN NON-PROGRAMMATIC PARTY

SYSTEMS: A LARGE-N ANALYSIS

Introduction

In the stage of this project, I analyze predictors of new party performance.

Explanations of new party performance in democratic systems are often based upon the

assumption that party competition is programmatic. From this starting point, models of

successful new entry either involve the strategic interaction of new and existing parties in a

one or low dimensional issue space or they involve a demand-side model predicated on a

new and distinctive social structural constituency. The former comprise the spatial and

directional models of party competition and the later the work on political cleavages.

However, in many developing countries—as well as in several advanced industrial

contexts—party competition is not highly programmatic. Instead, parties secure votes by

alternative linkages, such as clientelism or personalism (Kitschelt and Wilkenson 2007,

Kitschelt 2000, Mainwaring in The Handbook of Party Politics). In such systems,

explanations rooted in a spatial or cleavage model will not function well. Strategic interaction

may still takes place, but advantage is derived from a separate bundle of strategic

characteristics which may have nothing to do with a party's ideology, with its attainment of

programmatic goals while in government, or with the underlying social structure of society.

Instead, winning votes may instead be derived from other capacities, such as the ability to

build or co-opt clientelistic networks. The purpose of this chapter is to test explanations of new party performance derived from the assumptions of programmatic party competition in non-programmatic contexts, and compare them with measures derived from non-programmatic models of party competition. What distinguishes the five trajectory groups identified above from each other in systems dominated by non-programmatic—personalistic or clientelistic—linkages between themselves and the voter?

This chapter progresses through five sections. First, I review the literature on new party performance as it has developed in the context of programmatic party competition. I include in this review expectations derived from cleavage and spatial theory as well as from the literature on electoral systems. Then, I recommend a research design that goes beyond the traditional focus on individual country contexts and individual party families and looks generally across countries and families at all new political parties. I develop preliminary hypotheses, derived from the literature, of alternative and organizationally-based predictors of new party performance. Finally, in sections three and four, I use multinomial logic models to test competing explanations of new party success. In particular, I argue that the results of this project encourage theoretical development of a heretofore neglected explanatory approach which places the nature of the party as an organization in a prominent role of the analysis. In volatile political systems where linkages between voters and parties are based upon personalistic or clientelistic exchange, rather than programmatic exchange, strategic advantage for success in the long-run requires access to resources, the construction or cooptation of many dense local clientelistic networks, and at most weak organizational and ideological ties with mass social groups such as labor unions or ethnic-based organizations.

Explanations of New Party Performance in Programmatic Party Systems

A large body of work has evolved from Lipset and Rokkan's influential article on political cleavages (1967). In their approach, the party systems are formed as societies are reshaped by changes to their fundamental orientation and those social divides are transferred to the political arena. New party entry and performance will depend upon the particular domestic configuration of social forces.

In the Latin American context, Collier and Collier (1991) and Scully (1992) are perhaps the two accounts of party system change most self-consciously shaped by cleavage theory. Collier and Collier look across countries at how labor movements grew during industrialization, and they trace variation in the party systems of the region to the differing ways in which labor was incorporated politically into the regime. Scully looks at Chile over time and identifies three distinct episodes of social cleavage formation, each of which was orthogonal to the main axis of cleavage at the time it arose, and shows how entrepreneurial politicians transferred this cleavage into the political arena for electoral advantage. Explanations in the tradition of cleavage theory work in contexts where political competition is fundamentally programmatically structured.

Testing these effects in a cross-national time-series research design is difficult because the sources of new cleavages are particular to domestic social structures and political configurations. The convention in large-N studies has been to use very imperfect proxies of the underlying social structure. For example, Harmel and Robertson (1985) use measures of pluralism, inequality, post-materialism, and population, while Hug (2001) uses measures of population, ethnic fractionalization, linguistic and religious homogeneity, unemployment and economic growth, and Kitschelt (1988), who is studying left-libertarian party success, uses

per capita income, employment and the size of the student population. I don't expect these theoretical frameworks to have potency in the inchoate party systems of this project. Nevertheless, I will test for effects of the per capita income, urbanization, informalization and the presence of indigenous minorities.

Another body of work on new party entry and performance has arisen from Downs' spatial model of party competition (1957). The direct descendents of this approach, as well as the many innovators on it—such as directional theory (Rabinowitz and Macdonald 1989) agent-based modeling (Kollman, Miller, and Page 1992, Laver 2005)—all depart from the assumption that party competition is programmatic. New party performance in this context is derived from the ability by an entrant to successfully stake out new territory in a one or low dimensional political space (Sundquist 1973, Dalton, Flanagan, and Beck 1984).

More recently, a literature has developed which looks at the strategic interaction of parties in a competitive environment to account for the electoral performance of new parties (Kitschelt 1988 and 1994, Hug 2001, etc). In this context, attributes of the parties themselves, rather than just attributes of the system and electorate, have become prominent and potent elements of the explanation. Two works are illustrative. In a relatively simple formulation, Van Cott (2005) argues that the formation and success of new indigenous parties in the Andes took place following a period of decline on the left. More nuanced explanations have tied successful new entry to factors that influence the ability of existing competitors to adjust to the threat of new entrants, as when Kitschelt argues that left libertarian parties of Western Europe were able to emerge and succeed where opposition to nuclear power was strong and salient and where traditional social democratic parties were unable to adjust (1988).

Measurement of these concepts, which have been broadly classified as "the demand side" of political contestation, have also been imperfect. Harmel and Robertson (1985) use the effective number of political parties, while Hug (2001) uses taxation level, the number of parties in government, the presence of referenda, and government instability and Kitschelt (1988) finds strike level, the presence of the left in government, social security expenditure and the presence of a nuclear power controversy to be important. Again, the latter's precision is possible because he confines his project to a single party family. I will adopt a measure of the existence of organized social mobilizations and a measure of the electoral strength of other parties in the same ideological block as the new entrant, as described below.

In one of the most recent developments from within the spatial tradition, Laver and Schilperoord's (2007) "agent-based modeling" approach to party birth and death is based upon the idea of a citizen candidate. In his theoretical model, a two dimensional political space is randomly filled with 1000 citizens. Any one of these citizens can transform him or herself into a political party leader who then follows a strategy (defined by a set of parameters and based upon the policy positions of the other parties in the system and the size of their support) to compete in the political space with other citizens-turned-candidate. The transformation from candidate to party leader occurs when a citizen's accumulated dissatisfaction with the policy positions of other parties in the system surpasses a certain threshold. Does this conceptualization reasonably approach the empirical reality of new party formation? As a model in the spatial tradition, where one assumes voter preference distributions over a certain issue, it may approximate the voting behavior and party formation behavior in programmatic party systems. However, the assumption that new party formation will be executed by any average citizen based exclusively upon Euclidean distances between

ideal policy positions seems to deviate significantly from the behavior of citizens and parties in elitist and non-programmatic party systems. In fact, new party formation almost never occurs at the initiative of a citizen that is not already a political activist or professional. This fact implies that new party formation is not determined by issues, but instead is highly influenced by organizations and non-policy related elements, an issue to which I will return later.

The next set of variables I consider relate to the institutional environment. Several large bodies of work have arisen which link the electoral system and other system-level institutional rules to patterns of stability or instability in system-wide party support and party entry (Roberts and Wibbles 1999, Tavits 2005, Van Cott 2005) and to the electoral performance of new parties (Hug 2001, Birnir 2004). Baring in mind that this analysis of is party *performance* and not party *entry*, I will consider the effect of decentralization, party entry rules, survival rules, and the threshold of representation.

Institutional rules operate in three general theoretical ways on new parties. First, there exist a set of rules which either individually or in combination can either stifle or encourage new party *entry*. In particular, I refer to decentralization and party entry rules. These rules have a large effect on what happens to parties with respect to entry, but little effect with respect to performance, except indirectly to the extent that they encourage or discourage the fragmentation of parties. Second, there is a set of rules which, given entry, specify whether a party can continue to survive as an officially recognized organization, free to compete in future elections. These rules operate on the smallest parties by determining whether they must disband or can continue contesting (and losing) elections. Third, there is a set of rules which impact directly on the ability of new party entrants to harvest votes. In particular, I

refer to rules which individually or in combination determine the threshold of representation. I hypothesize that these rules will have an effect on which type of party, from among the full set of five trajectories, will occur across systems. Of the three types, the first are not germane to this project, the second have a small effect on only a subset of very small new entrants, but I expect the third to have an effect on entire systems, following a large body of literature. I will address each of the three types in turn.

The rules which effect entry operate primarily on the low or potentially low vote-getters through the decision calculus of party leaders. These rules include party registration requirements, such as signature collections and geographic distribution, and decentralization of the political system. Registration requirements function by setting the cost of entry. Decentralization functions by opening up venues for electoral competition to potential sub-national entrants which might then launch a national electoral campaign in alliance with others, or independently. Both types of institutions influence the entry decision; therefore, they are *not* relevant to the research question I address, which predicts performance given entry, not entry itself.[10] To include these variables here would be to misspecify the model.[11] In order to perform a test of these rules on entry, one might perform an event count model of

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[10] Brandler (2001) argues that Venezuelan decentralizing reforms beginning in 1979 opened up many opportunities for new party entry, but that electoral rules prevented these new entrants from winning seats at the national level thereby accelerating the decline in legitimacy of the system and, ultimately, its collapse.

[11] In addition to the permissive effect decentralization has on entry, it has also been theorized to operate directly on party performance by providing a venue for new parties to learn and gain credibility. An aspiring new party can work up to national competition rather than entering with a political organization that has national reach. By competing locally before doing so nationally, a new party can gain experience by tackling smaller issues and grooming local leaders; it can construct an organization built around a local constituency; and it make more credible claims when it comes time to compete nationally. Case studies of the Brazilian PT, the Ecuadorian Pachakutik, and the Bolivian MAS all point to the importance of having made local inroads before launching a national organization. It is important to note that according to this approach, decentralization is an organization-based theory where sub-national electoral venues act as new party incubators.

the number of flop parties per election using the entry rules as predictors. In effect, the election is the unit of analysis (Hug 2001).

The rules which effect party survival, on the other hand, will help explain party performance to the extent that it specifies what is possible in election at time t+1, given the result of election at time t. These survival rules come in various forms. In Bolivia, for example, a party not attaining a given threshold is required to reimburse the electoral authorities of its share of the costs of printing the ballot.[12] In Ecuador, there have been rules which specify the conditions under which a party will be declared extinct. These rules have varied over time and have been inconsistently enforced. Whatever the details, these rules are designed to operate on the very poor performers. As such, if the trajectory model had distinguished multiple groups at the very low level, one might theorize that survival rules would predict group placement, and in particular that it would distinguish between membership in one or another of the very low groups. Given, however, that the trajectory model only distinguishes one group—the "flop" trajectory"—at low levels, I do not expect this variable to predict group membership; theory does not hold that it will distinguish between flop parties and the other groups of parties. Consequently, I do not include it in the model.

The last set of rules, those which designate thresholds of representation, are theorized to predict party performance; in terms of the modeling used here, they will predict group membership.[13] These rules consist of features of the electoral system such as district magnitude and vote thresholds for representation. In its earliest formulation—Duverger's

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[12] This threshold has varied over time, equal to 50,000 votes from transition to 1997 and equal to 2% of the vote since then.

[13] Kitschelt , for example, states that these electoral rules will effect party success, but not party formation (1989, fn 26, p 224).

Law—single-member district plurality rules will generate two large parties at the district level (Duverger 1959). As the seats per district rise, smaller parties can gain representation. In very large districts, very small parties can gain representation unless the electoral law also specifies a minimum threshold for acquiring seats. Whether directly through thresholds or indirectly through district magnitude, and whether through the mechanical or psychological effects of these mechanisms (Coppedge 1997, Taagepera and Shugart 1989), these laws influence performance.[14]

The effect of a threshold of representation on party performance will be strongest at the highest threshold and become weak at an increasing rate as the threshold drops. For example, in a single member district plurality setting a party would need 37.5% of the vote to capture the seat, following Lijphart's (1994) formulation of the "effective threshold of representation":

Effective threshold=75%/(m+1), where m is the district magnitude

Similarly, in a two-seat district the threshold is 25%, in a three-seat district 18.75%, etc. According to this formulation, the relationship between district magnitude and the effective thresholds is as follows in Figure 3.1.

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[14] Additionally, other features have an impact, such as the electoral formula—d'Hondt, Sainte-Lague, etc. (Taagepera and Shugart 1989)

Figure 3.1:

District Magnitude v. Effective Threshold of Representation

This figure reveals the declining rate of the influence of district magnitude on winning a seat in a proportional representation environment. This relationship has a direct effect on party performance to those parties and voters for whom winning matters . We would not generally expect to see members of a trajectory group if its intercept is much lower than the effective threshold. So, for example, "flat" parties, which the model predicts will enter at 6% and stay there, will not be observed unless the district magnitude reaches 12, at which point the effective threshold drops below 6%. However, this is a rather abstract and strict application of the formula and two qualifications are in order.

First, a party modeled as winning 6% of the vote might reasonable expect to win slightly more in an information environment of uncertainty. Say, for example, that 8.3% of the vote would fit within their expected range. At 8.3% of the vote, district magnitude could be as low as 8 and the party would still compete. The empirical existence of a class of parties

will be a function of the district magnitude, their ability to accurately predict their performance, and their risk aversion.

Second, since this effect operates at the level of the district, average district magnitude across a country will obscure whether or not there exists variation in district magnitude within a country. In the contexts where population concentrations are very high in one or a few main cities and districts are overlaid on state (or its equivalent), average district magnitude may be low on average, even when the states with principle cities have very high district magnitude. In Ecuador, for example, district magnitude in 2002 ranged from 2 to 18, as shown in Table 3.1 below. In the two districts which contain the two principle cities, district magnitude was 14 and 18, even though on average district magnitude was 4.5. In the two principle districts, therefore, a party will compete if it reasonable expects to win around 5% of the vote in that district and we might expect to see greater diversity of electoral performance trajectories.[15] On the other hand, in Chile, where all districts contain 2 seats, the minimum effective threshold of representation is 25%. The largest district magnitude serves as a floor on the trajectory groups we will observe in a country. Rather than average district magnitude then, the largest district magnitude will be a better predictor of the trajectory a party will have. In the countries of this sample, unfortunately, district size for all districts is not always easily available and so I will measure this effect with average district magnitude.

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[15] This example is illustrative and ignores for the moment the fact that during early elections in the series, electoral rules required that a party compete in multiple districts in the country.

Table 3.1:

District Magnitude in Ecuador, 1979-2002

Province	Seats									
	2002	1998	1996	1994	1992	1990	1988	1986	1984	1979
Azuay	5	5	missing	4	4	3	3	3	3	3
Bolivar	3	3	missing	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Canar	3	3	missing	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Carchi	3	3	missing	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Chimborazo	4	4	missing	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
Cotopaxi	4	3	missing	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
El Oro	4	5	missing	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
Esmeraldas	4	4	missing	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
Galapagos	2	2	missing	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Guayas	18	18	missing	10	10	9	9	9	9	8
Imbabura	3	3	missing	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
Loja	4	4	missing	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
Los Rios	5	5	missing	4	4	3	3	3	3	3
Manabi	8	8	missing	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
Morona Santiago	2	3	missing	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Napo	2	3	missing	2	2	2	2	2	2	1
Orellana	2	0	missing	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Pastaza	2	2	missing	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Pichincha	14	14	missing	8	8	6	6	6	6	6
Sucumbios	2	2	missing	1	1	1	0	0	0	0
Tungurahua	4	4	missing	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
Zamora Chinchipe	2	2	missing	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Average	**4.5**	**4.5**		**3.0**	**3.0**	**2.7**	**2.7**	**2.7**	**2.7**	**2.6**

In terms of predicting group membership of a party, the threshold of representation will not distinguish between all possible combinations, but only between those trajectories that fall below the threshold and those that fall above the threshold. Conveniently, in the multinomial model I use here, the statistical test in conducted on each pair of possible categories of the dependent variable in turn.

A General Approach: Beyond Party Family and Country Cases

The conclusions of most published studies of new party performance have been sustained to some degree by a flaw in the typical research design. Specifically, most studies are plagued by selection bias. Selection bias occurs because almost all studies— the only apparent exceptions are Harmel and Robertson (1985) and Hug (2001)—restrict their case selection to a single party family, a single national context, or a single party. It is unclear whether propositions which arise in these studies would withstand empirical testing in more generalized samples.

The flaw may sometimes be self-conscious. When there is reason to believe that party systems are programmatically structured, a research design which draws a sample in these restricted ways has advantages. Most importantly, the outcome is always a contingent one. When one asks: Why a Green party in Germany but not Italy? (Kitschelt 1988, 1989); Why an indigenous party in Ecuador but not Guatemala? (Van Cott 2005); Why a labor party in Argentina but not Brazil (Collier and Collier 1991); Why a Christian Democratic Party in Chile but not Venezuela (Hawkins 2003) and in Italy but not the UK (Lipset and Rokkan 1967); or Why a Christian Democratic Party in Chile in the 1950s but not earlier (Scully 1992), there is great merit in being able to isolate and measure explanatory variables directly associated the particular mobilization. In fact, in

generalized studies like this one, it is nearly impossible to adequately incorporate the contextualized elements of those new contenders.

Nevertheless, this approach leaves open the possibility that other causal variables which are constant within party family or within the country are left untested. A particular set of variables which may be overlooked are ones pertaining to the party as an organization. If members of a party family have similar values and their base is similarly constituted, then the organizational attributes—mechanisms of candidate selection, openness of the party organization, linkage mechanisms with constituents, etc.—may be similar as well. Likewise, to the extent that party systems constrain the possible organizational forms that its member parties may have, country studies may be ill-suited to uncover the influence of organizational variation.

To be sure, not all party, country or family studies omit consideration of party organization. This misspecification of the causal structure has tended to grow more pronounced as the number of parties analyzed grows larger. Single case studies or small samples have tended to take into consideration the party as an organization, while larger comparative projects have tended to take more cursory approaches to organization. Ellner (1988) shows how MAS in Venezuela distinguished itself from other parties on the left by building a democratic and open political party. Similarly, Kitschelt (1989) argues that successful new left libertarian parties in Europe built democratic party organizations as a way to appeal to new constituencies which, unlike the traditional left, valued openness and participation in party life. In both of these studies, party organizational functions not in so far as it mechanically secures and delivers votes, but rather because it appeals programmatically to its target voters. Van Cott (2005) argues that successful new

indigenous parties arose only where a preexisting and nationally united social movement had grown up.

Outside the narrow question of party performance, a great deal of the work on Latin American parties has been extremely interested in the party as an organization. Alcántara and his colleagues at the University of Salamanca have given the relationship between party organization and party origins the most careful treatment (Alcántara 2004, Alcántara and Freidenberg 2001). Case studies of party system change in general have also treated the topic (Ellner 1988, Bruhn 1997, Coppedge 1994, Mainwaring 1999, McGuire 1997, Roberts 1998, Levitsky 2003). But as Levitsky (2001) points out, there are immense areas in which we have little comparative data on parties as organizations. "We know virtually nothing about many parties' membership levels and organizational densities, and we have little data on party members" (p. 106). Data about informal party organizations are in even worse condition, though Freidenberg and Levistky (forthcoming) make some modest proposals with respect to concept and measurement. Levitsky (2001) continues:

> "Recent conceptual and theoretical innovations by scholars such as Angelo Panebianco (1988), Herbert Kitschelt (1994), and Richard Katz and Peter Mair (1994, 1995) would have been impossible were not it for the existence of a substantial amount of secondary material on those parties. No such pool of knowledge and data exists for Latin American parties."

Data scarcity is not the only reason for neglect of the party as organization. Some scholars have a normative objection. Gibson (1996) urges caution with respect to Panebianco's organizational approach. He argues, "If our concern is to distinguish between parties in ways that are relevant to the broader conflicts of society, an organization-centered approach provides little to work with." (p 19.) Yet, it is in precisely the political arenas I study here where I expect the influence of party organization to be

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most profound. In contexts where broader conflicts of society are weakly articulated and growing weaker, especially with respect to conflict in the political domain, and in light of the evidence that parties across the ideological spectrum are increasingly adopting non-programmatic modes of linkage to win votes, an organization-centered approach may become a more fruitful avenue of inquiry.

In a poorly structured programmatic electoral environment, what critically distinguishes the electoral fortunes of parties may not be their programmatic content and ties with organized sectoral or social interests, but the availability of resources and the access to or ownership of the organized distribution network of local political machines. Political entrepreneurs must grapple with securing the vote where parties are not trusted or expected to deliver broad public goods (Stokes 2005, Kitschelt and Wilkinson, forthcoming).

An important premise of this project is that a research design which includes a relatively large sample of cases that cut across party families and national contexts will provide a fruitful and unbiased context to compare the impact of institutional, social-structural, programmatic, and organizational explanations. Of course, my theoretical expectation is context specific, and leaves untreated the relative importance of a party's organizational features in programmatic party systems.

The theoretical expectations concerning the influence of party organization on new party performance is not well developed, and in Chapter Four I will take up this issue. At this stage, where I conduct an initial analysis to determine if the conventional explanations hold up in a non-programmatic party system, I seek some preliminary and blunt indicators of the effect of organization on party performance. There are hints in the

literature are party adaptation in the neo-liberal era, and in the literature on clientelism and informal party institutionalization.

As the strength of unions decline and urbanization and informalization has grown, parties across the spectrum have shifted towards more clientelistic linkages with non-core constituencies. Levitsky (2007) argues that labor-based parties which survived the neo-liberalizing reforms of the 1980s and 1990s were those which were only loosely tied to unions, had access to a politicized state, and where the labor-based parties faced strong electoral challenges. For other work on party adaptation: on the Brazilian PT see Samuels 2004 and Hunter 2006; on the Uruguayan Frente Amplio see Luna forthcoming; on the Chilean UDI see Luna manuscript; on the Argentine Peronists see Levitsky 2003). Stokes' (2005) analysis of clientelistic party behavior shows that successful clientelistic linkage requires that parties be deeply embedded in local communities so that they can accurately infer voter choices and circumvent the secret ballot.

I argue that in a non-programmatic competitive environment, electorally successful parties as we normally think of them—that is, parties that enter the electoral arena and grow to a point were they are among the principle party players over the medium to long term—will be those that a) attain access to a significant resource base; b) establish clientelistic networks over a critical mass of the territory; and c) are programmatically weakly constrained by social structural organizational ties and ideology. These requirements are not qualified by institutional configurations at the time of a founding elections, but during regular electoral competition they are contingent upon a threshold of representation that is minimally permissive. Parties that form around the status of an individual or with mass media strategies will have an initial level of electoral

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success commensurate with the candidate's reputation, but success will be fleeting unless that party invests in a distribution network characteristic of clientelistic exchange so that they can secure reliable and defensible electoral bailiwicks. Parties that invest in an organization compatible with formal programmatic party-voter linkages may not be electoral contenders, though they may eek out a modest electoral existence at the margins of political competition. The reasons for this are twofold. First, a robust clientelistic political machine is incompatible with a robust programmatic linkage strategy (Kitschelt 2000). Second, a programmatic linkage strategy is electorally vulnerable when the system as a whole is dominated by non-programmatic ties to voters.

Methods and Data

This analysis functions as a the quantitative part of a larger nested research design as described in Chapter 1 (Lieberman 2005). That is, this analysis is designed to compare competing explanations of new party entry on a relatively large sample and with a quantitative approach. The concepts and measures of the explanatory variables are relatively coarse and highly aggregated and will offer at best suggestive evidence. A statistical model with additive terms on the right hand side is not well suited for persuasively establishing causal mechanisms or conditional effects, at least not in samples constrained to tens or hundreds of cases. If the results suggest that explanations derived from a programmatic model of party competition don't function or that they function incompletely, and that measures based upon a non-programmatic model of competition are a preferable or complementary alternative, we can conclude that the proposed theoretical gaps in the knowledge are plausible and therefore justify a

qualitative approach, nested within the quantitative approach, which is more suitable to building and testing hypotheses of a causally complex and conditional nature.

I have constructed a dataset that includes all the parties from Chapter 2 except those from Chile. Because my argument is contextually circumscribed to non-programmatic party systems, I exclude Chile. In order to properly incorporate parties in Chile or any other programmatic party system into a statistical analysis, I would need to test interaction effects because my argument is that one set of variables will have one effect in programmatic contexts but a different effect in non-programmatic contexts. This technique is beyond what is possible in the small dataset of this project. Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela all scored low on the scales of programmatic orientation of politicians (Kitschelt and Zechmeister 2003), representation (Luna and Zechmeister 2005), and ideological orientation (Rosas 2005). These indicators all measured the systems in the late 1990s and early 2000s. There may be some question as to the programmatic status of Venezuela from its transition in 1958 until the breakdown of the two-party system in the 1990s. While Venezuela's party system may have been very institutionalized during that time, it is not clear that it was programmatic. The very foundation of the two party system emerged out of a pact between the main parties, and there is ample evidence that this collusion led not only to stability, but also to pervasive corruption and clientelism (Coppedge 1994, Martz 1966).

The first set of variables I test pertain to the organizational features of the new entrants. First, I code a dichotomy if the new party entered at the first or second election following a transition to democracy. I expect early entrants following a regime change to have an early mover advantage over later aspirants. This advantage is likely to be derived

from their ability to secure voter loyalties early before they are hardened. These loyalties may, of course, be secured with programmatic linkages; however, in the party settings I study it is more likely that the loyalties are based upon the incorporation of voters into a clientelistic network. Second, I am interested in a parties access to resources. In reality those resources can come from different places. For example, one of the "contender" parties in Ecuador, PRIAN, has used the personal fortune of the countries richest man and his network of businesses to build a powerful clientelistic network. Most commonly, however, they come from a position in government. In highly fragmented party systems that are presidential, parties may also secure access to resources by supporting the presidents legislative agenda from outside the government (Mejía 2004). Data on party participation in the executive is available, but comprehensive data on legislative coalitions and on the personal private fortunes of party founders is not available. Thus, I code each party dichotomously on whether or not they held a cabinet post at the time of or preceding their first lower house electoral bid. Lastly, I measure the nationalization of each party using district level data according to approach of Jones and Mainwaring (2003). I expect more nationalized parties to have a high initial level of success, enduring success, or both.

Finally, quite in contrast to the expectation in the programmatic literature, it is possible that the most highly successful parties will be on the ones which are ideologically diffuse and flexible. Levitsky (2003, 2007), for example, argues that the labor-based parties most likely to successfully adapt to a post-reform competitive environment will be ones with weak ties to organized labor. Of course, organizational linkages and ideological content are different concepts, but they will often covary.

Furthermore, I expect that programmatic strategies will be a weak and vulnerable in systems that are poorly structured and clientelistic or personalistic. I will test to see if weak programmatic content is advantageous by using Coppedge's (1997) expert survey of party left-right identity. I will code a dichotomy which distinguishes parties that are either "centrist" or "personalist" from those that are coded on the left-right scale.[16]

The next set of variables is designed to measure programmatic party competition. If programmatic forces structure party performance even in the sample of cases analyzed here, I would expect a new party's gains to be at the expense of existing parties in their general programmatic vicinity. This is difficult to measure without detailed information on parties and their programmatic profile. Comparable data exists primarily for the large parties, and only very rarely over time. One partial exception is Coppedge's analysis of parties in the region (1997). For this project, I derive a measure from Coppedge's codings of Latin American parties. Parties are classified as left, center, right, personalist, other, and unknown according to his criteria. I updated his coding for the most recent elections. The measure I derive takes the gain or loss in the block from the last election but excluding the vote share of the new entrant. No value is computed for "unknown" parties. "Other" parties are predominantly ethnic-based parties, though it includes a tiny Chilean green party. If contender parties are observed when we see large losses from its ideological block, we have tentative evidence that programmatic forces are in play. Voters are shifting their allegiances within the block, but not outside of it.

Alternatively, programmatic demands may arise from newly mobilized dimensions of competition which might not be picked up by this left-right scale. In order

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[16] Coppedge's definition of "center" consists of parties that have no "salient social or economic agenda" or those that are so divide between left and right that "no orientation…is discernable."

to test whether contenders more commonly arise in the face of organized demonstrations of public discontent, I incorporate protest data. I use Banks (2001) Cross National Time Series. Despite important shortcoming with these data (Nam 2006), they remain the only cross-nationally comparable source for this region. Specifically, I use a count of the strikes, riots, revolutions and demonstrations that take place in the year of and the year before the election.

The third set of variables I test concern social structure. Successful new parties are presumed to emerge following demographic shifts or at the time that existing latent divides become politicized. Two such variables are relevant to the period under analysis in this chapter. First, I test whether ethnic fractionalization advantages one or another sort of party performance profile and measure it using Alesina et al (2003). This variable is time invariant. Second, I test whether the trends towards urbanization and economic informalization lead to successful new party entry of any particular sort. I expect that the growth of the urban and/or informal masses, disorganized and unanchored from trade unions, ideology, social movements, and existing networks of encapsulation or clientelism, will lead to a higher frequency of flash or explosive entry. I measure informal and urban growth as a percent change since the last legislative election. Informal employment does not include agricultural employment.

The third set of variables I test relate to the institutional environment. Specifically, I test the effect of average district magnitude. Where district magnitude is lower, I expect that parties with a high intercept and positive slope—contenders and explosive parties—will be more likely than the others.

Finally, I include two controls which test whether parties that are at least initially electorally successful are more likely to arise following or in the midst of economic crisis. I measure economic decline using a dummy variable for high inflation, where inflationary elections are considered those with an average of 20% per year in the year of and the year before the election. I also use a measure of per capita economic growth over the year before and the year of the election. Summary statistics of the independent variables appears in Table 3.2 below.

Table 3.2:

Summary Statistics of Independent Variables

	N	Min	Max	Mean
Organization				
-Party Nationalization	266	0.04	0.84	0.34
-Entry at Transition	279	0	1	0.12
-Cabinet Participation	279	0	1	0.06
-Ideologically Diffuse	89	0	1	0.20
Programmatic Competition				
-Block Loss	74	-32.6	23.3	-6.3
-Protest	224	0	14	4.9
Social Structure				
-Urbanization	279	4.9	50.9	18.2
-Informalization	276	-17.6	40.8	19.1
-Fractionalization	279	0.50	0.74	0.54
Institutions				
-District Magnitude	279	2.9	14.4	7.1
Control				
-High Inflation	279	0	1	0.53
-Economic Growth	276	-10.0	8.4	1.08

I use multinomial logit to test the effect of these variables on a party's status as a flop, flat, flash, contender or explosive party. Multinomial logit estimates the model one pair at a time—it estimates a model for each category of the dependent variable relative to the omitted category. I will omit the "contender" group, thereby making it the reference category. Since the dependent variable is categorical, any given pair of outcomes might be of interest. I will limit the scope of the analysis to comparisons between the contender trajectory and each of the others because it is the most theoretically important category. Despite my arguments in Chapter 2 about the wider diversity in party performance profiles that arise in the inchoate and non-programmatic party systems of the region, the "contender" group conforms most closely to conventional understandings of party success.

The number of parties, 279, is relatively small and even smaller when including some of the variables with missing data. Furthermore, because multinomial logit generates estimates one pair at a time, some estimates are generated on small samples. For example, since I will use "contenders" as the reference group, the estimates which are derived from a comparison of the outcome "explosive" where n=3 and "contenders" where n=8 are off an effective sample of 11. Not surprisingly, it was most difficult to achieve model convergence for this pair, and ultimately no variables were significant, as described later in the results.

I tested alternative specifications seeking robust effects and seeking to trim insignificant variables. The results in Table 3.3 below are of the trimmed model. To interpret the results, each trajectory group is compared with the contender group. A negative coefficient means that the independent variable makes the "contender" group more probably than the group for which it is estimated, and a positive coefficient means that the independent variable makes the trajectory group for which it is estimated more probable than the contender group. Comparisons between other groups are sometimes theoretically relevant and can be tested with a Wald test and I report significant results in the text when they are relevant.

Quantitative Results and Discussion

The results of the model are reported in Table 3.3 below. None of the variables I used as measures of programmatic party competition or social structure were significant. Of the controls, only the measure of high inflation was significant, and so I retained it in the model. The negative coefficient implies that on the heels of high inflation, new parties are more likely to be contenders than flat or flash parties. This result is consistent with

Burklin's (1984) "breakdown" theory of green party success, as described by Kitschelt (1988). Voters may be more likely during an economic crisis to turn more seriously and durably to new entrants than when the economy is relatively stable.

Table 3.3:

Predictors of Trajectory Group Membership

(Multinomial Logistic Regression, "Condender" as the omitted comparison group)

Predictor	Trajectory Group			
	Flop	Flat	Flash	Explosive
1st Mover	-5.12**	-3.97**	-3.06*	-43.51
In Gov't	1.01	4.03**	5.36**	3.11
Party Nationalization	-10.18**	5.65	-6.89	8.15
District Magnitude	0.58**	-0.40	0.29	-2.04
Inflationary	-2.00	-4.98**	-4.89**	-9.09
Constant	8.28**	9.75**	5.82	11.32
N	266			
Pseudo R^2	0.40			

* significant at .1 level; ** significant at .05 level.

With respect to the variables I used to measure the concepts associated with non-programmatic party competition, the results are mixed. First, I expected that contenders would have a more diffuse or less identifiable ideology, but my measure of the concept was not significant and was dropped from the model because it severely restricted the sample size. It may be that the crucial ingredient of success is that the party be weakly constrained by formal ties to an organized constituency. Organized constituencies such as labor or business unions or social movements, more so than a shallower ideological predisposition, may be the mechanism by which attempts by parties to establish alternative linkages are challenged. I will make this argument with respect to ID in Ecuador later in chapter 5.

Second, I expected that parties which gain access to the executive during their first electoral competition would use that position to secure resources to build a strong and enduring clientelistic party. However, the results indicate that when a party's entry corresponds with a cabinet portfolio at or before their first legislative election, they are more likely to be flash or flat than contender parties. Perhaps the result is a consequence of the fact that a position in the executive is a poor and incomplete proxy for measuring whether or not a party has access to party-building resources. Alternative sources include private sources or executive office at lower levels of governance, as for example the mayoral office of a capital city. In fact, since clientelistic machines are by design rooted in direct exchange between principle and agent, it would not be surprising to find that a successful clientelistic party arises out of participation in a local government post, such as the mayors office of a major city.

Additionally, the executive office may be a bad platform for launching a political party because the executive will often be held responsible for social, economic and political failures which have been so common in the three countries of this study. Parties that arrive in the executive from the start may be punished in subsequent elections, either languishing as "flat" parties or dying as "flash" parties. Membership in the opposition may be a more promising initial position for long-term durability.

Yet another interpretation to account for the significant coefficient for the flash party is that participation in government may be capturing the existence of a personalist or outside politician who runs for the presidency and wins. With only a weak party behind him, the party disappears soon after he leaves office. Many of the flash parties either won office directly—PUR in Ecuador and Convergencia in Venezuela—or were

important coalition partners of the president, especially in the Bolivian case where presidents rely on a legislative coalition to win office, as was the case with NFR and UCS.

Third, since I expect contenders to be parties which can build a deeply rooted clientelistic network, I hypothesized that they would be more nationalized than the other types and that there would be a first mover advantage, with parties that incorporate local party bosses into their network early being more credible distributors of patronage than late-comers. The results confirm that when new party entry takes place at the time of transition, the party is more likely to be a contender rather than a flop, flash or flat party. This supports the concept of a first mover advantage. Second, when parties are nationalized, they are more likely to be contenders than flop parties. Though not significant in the model, the sign on nationalization for flat and flash parties is also interesting and consistent with expectations. Flat parties, which tend to be cadre/leftist parties are the most programmatic in the sample, are estimated to be more nationalized than contenders. As parties which make primarily programmatic appeals, I expect them to have the most even support around the territory than parties that make non-programmatic appeals. Personalist and clientelistic parties are likely to have support which is much more pockety.

Lastly, I tested for effect by electoral systems, as measured with average district magnitude, and found the expected result: as the district magnitude increases, the effective threshold of representation declines and the probability that new party entrants are flop rather than contenders increases. Also significant, but not reported here, is that as district magnitude increases, the probability that parties will be of the flop sort rather than

of the flash or flat type. A more familiar formulation is that as district magnitude declines, contender, flash and flat parties become more probable than flop parties. This result confirms that the effect of the electoral system is rather trivial, at least at moderate and high levels of district magnitude. Electoral systems have the most powerful influence on the performance of new party entrants when district magnitude is very small.

Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter was to explore competing models of party performance in non-programmatic party systems. If tests of the extant literature had been confirmed and tests of preliminary indicators of my alternative model had been disconfirmed, it would have been unnecessary to engage in a theory building exercise for the new context. However, this analysis found no evidence to support the arguments that social structural or programmatic party variables predict electoral performance. Furthermore, it found tentative support for elements of an organizational and non-programmatic focused explanation of electoral performance. Party organizations in the region remain a black box, and so further investigation will require a theoretical model to generate predictions for how party organization and strategy influence electoral performance. I turn to this task next in Chapter 4. Testing of the theory will follow in Chapter 5, where I closely examine new parties in Ecuador which emerged since the 1978 transition to democracy.

CHAPTER IV

A LINKAGE-BASED APPROACH TO PREDICTING NEW PARTY

PERFORMANCE

Voters and Their Collective Action Problem

In this section I argue that parties serve as a potential solution to a key collective

action problem for voters. The dominant explanations of party performance address

institutionalized and programmatic party arenas in which parties have settled on a

particular organizational form—the party as a brand with a relatively fixed set of

positions on relatively few bundles of issues—to solve a voter's collective action problem

in a particular way. I argue that the range of possible collective action solutions is wider

than the programmatic party solution and use generic solutions outlined in the literature

on collective action problems to develop the range of solutions available to new party

entrants.

In Chapter III, I demonstrated that explanatory models based upon programmatic

party competition do not adequately account for new party trajectories in Ecuador,

Bolivia, and Venezuela. In this chapter I develop an alternative model which explains

new party performance in these non-programmatically structured contexts.

Non-programmatic structuration does not imply that parties and politicians fail to

mobilize highly salient political divisions. Indeed, political campaigns in Latin America

of the last quarter century have demonstrated the potency of positions for and against

liberalizing economic reforms, the incorporation of indigenous communities, government reform and transparency, among many other issues. In many cases, parties—especially in campaigns for the presidency—win or lose elections on these bases. Such easy rhetoric, however, does not constitute programmatic party competition, which is a concept that implies deeper organizational ideology work and enduring ideological and organizationally structured relationships between parties and voters. I argue that to the extent that the easy rhetoric is sent to and received by an electorate, it are largely a supplemental strategy for a new entrant, and that the critical and enduring linkage for an aspirant seeking to be a contender must be based upon ties to the electorate that are derived from vote-buying or very narrowly targeted club-goods, where the basis of the club is most commonly a geographical location and not an economic sectoral or social location. That is, a necessary condition for parties that seek to be contenders in a party system that is neither institutionalized nor programmatically structured is that they establish and maintain vote buying and machine relationships with targeted and highly concentrated voters in pockets around the country.

Programmatic party competition as a long-term strategy fails in contexts where economic, social and civil society organizations are weak and fragmented, where inequality is high, where party systems are inchoate, and where the state is politicized. In such a context, a programmatic message targeted to a broad-based constituency is simply not credible because the political environment lacks the attributes upon which programmatic competition is based. A credible programmatic pledge requires that voters have the expectation that there is some reasonable chance of attaining the pledge if elected—that is, it requires that voters can behave as prospective voters looking to the

future with a significant amount of confidence in the capacity of a party to deliver.[17] If voters lack confidence in the institutions of governance, or if winning doesn't lead to governing because governance is so fragmented and politicized, then even if voters support a given position or platform and trust the intentions of the party, it would be naïve to behave as prospective voters. Where chronic failures in governance yield voter time horizons that are short or non-existent, voters are only at best capable of making retrospective decisions with respect to aggregate outcomes, such as inflation rates or social stability and at worst they make voting choices based upon other modes of linkage altogether. Knowing this, parties have few incentives to invest in programmatic party development as a strategy to project it into the national political arena. The result is a vicious cycle of a politicized state incentivizing particularistic parties which then further politicize the state.

In order to think about this problem, it is useful to consider Aldrich's (1995) conceptualization of parties as potential organizational solutions to the collective action problem of voters. Although Aldrich theorizes on parties as a solution to three additional problems—collective action problems for candidates, ambition problems among politicians, and social choice problems among politicians—party success as conceptualized here, as electoral success, leads us to consider only the one problem.

One way to approach the voter's collective action problem is by using the "calculus of voting" model (Downs 1957). Though I don't seek to make a strong rational choice argument for voting and turnout with respect to the assumption of voter rationality, the calculus of voting approach provides a useful heuristic for thinking

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[17] This is not to say that voters will necessarily behave as prospective voters, and in fact most voters use retrospective voting strategies to simplify the voting decision (Fiorina, 1981).

conceptually about voters and their motivations, even if those motivations may have sources other than rationality.[18] It is not necessary that I enter the debate about whether a strict assumption of instrumental rationality is required, or whether extra-rational motives "stretch the rational choice model or break it" (Chong 1996). Either way, I can use the calculus of voting approach to isolate distinctive motivations that a voter may have for voting and to think about how parties may use alternative strategies to influence those motivations. In the calculus of voting model as specified by Riker and Ordeshook (1968, 1973), the reward for voting, R, is:

$$R=P*B+D-C$$

where B is the differential benefit a voter receives if her preferred candidate wins over an alternative candidate, P is the probability that her vote will decide the election, D is for duty or any positive reward the voter receives from the act of voting,[19] and C is the cost of voting, summarized in Table 4.1.

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[18] Green and Shapiro (1994, chapter 4) offer a thorough critique of rational choice approaches to the paradox of voting, in which the calculus of voting model predicts that at equilibrium, few citizens would vote. Of course, Aldrich (1995) argues that the political party is a solution to the turnout problem, and so in most democracies we are observing turnout net the party solution. See Hershey (2006) for a review and critique of the paradox of voting by a rational choice theorist and Friedman (1996) for a diversity of positions on the issue, including a contribution by the psychologist, Abelson (1996), who outlines the foundations for expressive, rather than instrumental, motives for voting.

[19] Many authors criticize Riker and Ordeshook for incorporating the D term into Downs' original specification on the grounds that it uses a post hoc adjustment designed to rescue the model and conform to the empirical reality that many citizens, in fact, vote. It is a term which so stretches the assumption of instrumental rationality that the model and its predictions become non-falsifiable in the sense that it leaves little outside the purview of rationality; competing, non-rationalistic, explanations cease to exist. However, it does not lead to tautology in my approach, where the explanation allows room for non-instrumental terms in the decision calculus and where the purpose of the analysis is to explore the diversity of linkage mechanisms between party and voter, and the domain of applicability for each.

Table 4.1:

Terms in the Calculus of Voting Model

Term	Meaning	Example
R-Reward	The reward a voter receives from the act of voting	This is the left-hand-side term, and as such is the combined effect of the other terms.
P-Probability	The probability that a citizen, by voting, will bring about the benefit, B.	Essentially, the probability that a citizen's vote will decide the election.
B-Benefit	The differential benefit that a voter receives from the success of her most preferred candidate over her less preferred one.	This term is often derived from a programmatic offering, but may be a selective incentive that is conditional on the candidate's victory.
C-Cost	The cost to the individual for the act of voting.	Includes costs associated with registering to vote, making a decision, opportunity cost of the time to vote, transportation costs, etc.
D-Duty	The satisfactions to the citizen for the act of voting.	Satisfaction from affirming regime support or partisan support.

Notice, this is not a model to predict which candidate the voter will choose—she will always choose her most preferred candidate—but rather a model for predicting whether the voter will go through the trouble of voting. Also notice that B, the benefit she will receive if her candidate wins, is discounted by the value of P in deciding whether she should vote or not, which is distinct from the fact that the benefit, B, will accrue to her if her candidate wins. She will only vote when R, the reward for the act of voting, is positive, though she will of course expect to receive (if her candidate wins) the benefit, B, whether she votes or not.

This expression represents a collective action problem because most individual voters, if left to their own individual decision calculus, will receive a negative reward, R, for going through the trouble of voting when other supporters of their preferred candidate are voting. The more voters there are, the lower the probability, P, that their vote will

count. It is not a stretch to assume that the P*B term essentially disappears to zero, with the only remaining incentives for voting being D and C. The individual voter, then, will free-ride. That is, when their preferred candidate wins and delivers the benefit, B, the voter will get the benefit without going through the trouble of incurring a negative reward, R. If all voters preferring a given candidate perform this calculation and fail to vote, their candidate will lose and each individual's payoff will be worse than if they had all voted.

A simple prisoner's dilemma illustrates the problem. Table 4.2 below shows the payoff two voters, both preferring the same candidate, will receive given the outcome of an election. Assume that if their candidate wins and delivers some good, each will receive the benefit of winning, Bw, of 1. If their less preferred candidate wins, they will receive no benefit, 0. Assume that both voters have little reason to believe that they will be casting the deciding vote, and therefore that P is zero, making the P*B term zero. Assume that one or two votes will be enough for their preferred candidate to win, but no votes will result in a loss. Assume there is no intrinsic duty in voting, D=0, but that the cost of voting—registering to vote, getting to the poll, and investing in the process of figuring out which candidate will give them the benefit of 1—is some small value, say .1. In this case, each voter's reward for voting, R, is:

$$R = P*B+D-C = 0*1+0-.1 = -.1$$

The overall benefit for each voter will then be the benefit of winning plus R, which in this case is negative. Thus, if a voter's candidate wins and she votes, the overall benefit is Bw+R or .9; if her candidate wins and she doesn't vote, her overall benefit is 1. In the

matrix below, voter 1's payoff appears first in parenthesis and voter 2's payoff appears second.

Table 4.2:

The Collective Action Problem for Voters

		Voter 2	
		vote	not vote
Voter 1	vote	(.9, .9)	(.9, 1)
	not vote	(1, .9)	(0, 0)

In this scenario, though the Pareto optimal solution is for both voters to vote, both voters will conclude that their vote will not be decisive and that not voting will save them the cost of voting; that is, each will free-ride. Therefore, both voters will not vote and the outcome will be the bottom right payoff of 0, 0, a Pareto inferior solution. This type of outcome—the potential that an individually rational decision will lead to Pareto inferior outcome—is what makes a collective action problem.

Aldrich's insight is that parties are motivated to form in order to help voters solve this problem, thereby making parties a collective action solution for voters. Parties, however, have several alternatives for approaching this problem, and it is the particular solution that parties adopt which leads to the conceptual distinction between what Kitschelt (2000) has called personalistic, clientelistic, and programmatic party types.[20]

Collective Action Solutions to the Voter's Collective Action Problem

In order to develop the menu of party solutions for the voter's collective action problem, it is helpful to return to the "calculus of voting" equation and bring into

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[20] Though I largely retain the party types that Kitschelt elaborates, my argument differs in that he claims the party types are distinguished by *which* type of problem they solve while I argue here that they are distinguished by *how* they solve the problem. I'll return to this point later.

consideration the distinction between the types of goods a party can deliver to voters. First the latter. Parties seek to deliver goods to voters in exchange for their vote. Goods can be private goods, club goods, common pool resources, or public goods. These four types of goods can be distinguished by their classification on two features: rivalry and excludability. A private good is both rivalrous and excludable. A club good is not rivalrous but it is excludable. A common-pool resource is rivalrous but non-excludable. A public good is neither rivalrous nor excludable. Figure 4.1 represents the distinction.

Figure 4.1:

Types of Party Deliverables

	Excludable	Non-excludable
Rivalrous	Private Goods	Common Pool Resources
Non-rivalrous	Club Goods	Public Goods

In the context of party-voter linkages, private goods are selective incentives or party payoffs to voters for support. Parties, in attempting to secure a vote, can deliver a job, a sack of flour, or some other favor. Public goods, on the other hand, are provided to all, and one voter's consumption doesn't limit another's. In the context of national electoral politics, public goods are rarely the substance of contestation. Instead, they are provided by the state, with a typical example being national defense. It is difficult for parties to claim credit for public goods primarily because all other parties can also claim credit. Competition on valence issues, such as corruption, belongs in the domain of public goods. Most goods promised by parties are club goods, at least from the perspective of the nation as a whole, because so much of what parties promise is rooted in distributional politics. However, club goods vary in the breath of club membership. In terms of

electoral politics, club goods vary in the target voter base of a given campaign promise. The construction of a public highway and a neighborhood park, for example, represent an extremely broad and an extremely narrow club benefit, respectively. They are both club goods to the extent that budgetary allocations are zero sum, where money that goes towards a good that benefits one club means that the money won't benefit a different club—that is, they are excludable by the very fact that they are located in one locale rather than another or targeted to one group of voters rather than another.

A party's strategic choice of what type of club good to pledge will depend, to a large extent, on the degree to which the underlying social structure is constructed on the basis of broad-based social groups or highly fragmented and particularistic interests (Weyland 1996). If, for example, workers are organized into corporatist structures with peak associations, a new party will be able to campaign on wages or working conditions, and those promises will reach a broad-based club. If, on the other hand, union density is low, sectoral divisions are deep, a large percentage of the population is employed in the informal sector and living in new and sprawling urban shantytowns, new entrants have little choice but to target much narrower clubs, often neighborhood by neighborhood, with pledges of soccer fields, the extension of water services, and the like.

Now, returning to the calculus of voting model and incorporating the distinctions between private, broad club goods, and narrow club goods, from the perspective of a voter contemplating the calculus of voting, the party can devise a strategy which operates on any of the terms in the calculus of voting model to overcome collective action problems and thereby mobilize voters. Of course, a new party's concern is not to generally solve the collective action problem, but to solve the collective action problem

of likely or potential supporters. That is, whatever their strategy, it will be a discriminating one in which it solves the problem but only for its likely supporters. The strategies outlined here are pure strategies, and I will take up the issue of whether parties combine strategies later.

A party can operate on the B term with a campaign that sharpens and raises the relative benefit for a voter of their victory rather than the another party's victory. Or, they can operate on the D term, by constructing a sense of loyalty to the party. Alternatively, they can operate on the C term by lowering the costs of voting or raising the cost of not voting. I will outline potential party approaches using four scenarios.

In scenario 1, a **vote-buying strategy**, the party focuses exclusively on the cost of voting term, specifically by offering a private good to offset the cost a voter incurs. This is a very narrow definition of vote-buying and excludes other modes of direct exchange between parties and voters which are typical of clientelism. For example, it excludes exchange which occurs at times not close to an election and it excludes the exchange of narrow club goods for the support of entire social or geographic locations. In the vote-buying scenario, the voter is indifferent to the benefit, B, accrued if the candidate wins. They may perceive the benefit to be zero or even negative, as long as the payoff offsets the combined effect of the other terms. The voter will have little sense of duty, D, to the political regime or the party. The task for a party is simply to offset the opportunity cost of voting, to facilitate voting on election day, to make the act of voting simple, and if necessary, to enforce compliance. Notice, when operating on the cost term alone, the delivery of the private good is independent of the outcome of the election—the voter receives the good for voting, win or lose. It is easy to imagine this scenario. The voter

will be poor and believe he has no stake in the outcome of the election. Such a person will often accept a gift sufficient to surpass the opportunity cost of voting. The gift may be equal to the voter's wage rate over a couple hours of work. If election day is a national holiday or the voter is idle, it may be even lower. The party will offer a ride to the polling station to offset the time and transportation costs. On the ride, the party will provide the information necessary for casting the ballot, often nothing more than a party list number or symbol. Finally, the party can go even further and usher the voter through the polling station and assist in the marking of the ballot if circumstances allow.

A party which seeks to operate on the other terms in the equation faces a different challenge, and they will often operate multiple terms at once. They can adopt scenarios two, three of four, as follows. In scenario two, the party will adopt a **programmatic strategy** by offering a broad club good. In order to do so, the club must exist or be constructed by an entrepreneurial politician, as when ethnic or social identities are mobilized. The party's strategy is to offer a program of significant and credible benefit over what the alternative parties offer. It is important to note that the benefit a programmatic party offers must be credible, and one can think of the value of B in this circumstance as being discounted by the probability that the party, if elected, will be able to deliver the benefit. We can adopt the term p_c as a term to capture the probability that the expected benefit, B, is credible if the party is victorious. The calculus of voting model, as a model developed for application in contexts of programmatic party competition, does not include a term for this discount rate. One could easily incorporate it and assume that it was 1 in contexts where party systems are institutionalized, competition in the party system as a whole is programmatic, and electoral victory implies

that a party will implement its program. In many contexts out of the developed world, however, this term will take on a value less than one, and in a country with poor governance, an inchoate party system, and fragmented society it will be much less than one.

Parties that rely on programmatic strategies often operate on the duty term, D, by leveraging group solidarities, collective identities, or shared ideologies that may exist among members of the targeted broad club. Finally, a programmatic party solves the voter's information problem by building a strong and enduring brand name (Snyder and Ting 2002) which is associated with support of the provision of the good, such that the voter's task of choosing is simple.

In scenario three, the party adopts a **machine strategy** by offering a narrow club good. Their linkage strategy will be similar to the programmatic party in that they offer a club good, but the nature of the good—in other words, the benefit, B—will be different. In particular, this party will deliver club goods targeted at geographic constituencies, and local representatives to the national legislature (or other sorts of delegates from the party center) will act as brokers between the center and the constituency. This type of club good, commonly called pork, has a benefit term, B, which, unlike a broad club good, is not so discounted by small credibility probabilities. If elected, a voter can be confidence that the party will deliver. The strategy of delivering a narrow club good is distinctive from the vote buying strategy in that the former is contingent on the outcome of the election, while in the latter it is independent of the outcome of the election. Machines provide a benefit if they win; the pure vote-buyers provide a payoff regardless. Parties that adopt this linkage strategy can't count on an ideologically-rooted duty term, D, to

motivate voter turnout since the linkage is not ideologically based. They can, however, operate on the duty term by cultivating loyalty rooted in kinship ties or hierarchical networks of relationships typical of mafias. The costs of voting, and particularly the voter information problems, for this type of party will often be solved by local politicians who build reputations as reliable providers of the local club goods and as tenacious advocates for local interests.

Finally, in the fourth scenario, the party solves the collective action problem by adopting a **personalistic strategy** which offers a charismatic or prominent personality as the benefit over which voters are choosing. With this linkage strategy, the party highlights the qualities of the leader, their ideas, and their interest in the plight of the people. The personalistic party need not *sound* ideologically empty, though in fact they are almost always quite ideologically flexible per the discretion of the leader (Stokes 2001). On the other hand, personalistic politics my be ideologically incoherent by design when the politician is aware that complex or ambitious proposals are neither effective nor credible. Whether ideologically sounding or not, the central element of the linkage is to highlight the central personality. Though Mainwaring and Torcal (2005) measure personalistic strategies by looking for newcomers and independents (2005, p. 216), such strategies can be adopted by long-standing parties and found among politicians with very clear partisan affiliations. In terms of the calculus of voting, the strategy aims to amplify the benefit term, B, by promising many things to many people; to amplify the duty term, D, by creating a person affection for and loyalty to the leader; and to reduce the cost term, C, by simplifying the information burden by casting the choice as one for or against the central personality.

The theoretical framework I have developed here is distinct from the one developed by Kitschelt (2000), where he argues that programmatic, clientelistic, and personalistic parties differ in that programmatic parties solve both social choice and collective action problems, while clientelistic parties solve only collective action problems and not social choice problems, and personalistic parties solve neither. The approach used here states that all types of parties attempt to solve the collective action problem facing voters. I argue that the three types of parties are different in *how* they solve the problem, not in *whether* they solve the problem. Furthermore, this alternative application of Aldrich's general scheme to the personalistic-clientelistic-programmatic typology applies to the social choice problem facing politicians as well. For Aldrich (1995), the social choice problem addresses the instability of voting in congress if members are operating outside of parties. In such a setting, voting in congress based upon temporary coalitions can "cycle" and yield no equilibrium in the voting outcomes. This problem is not germane to the issue of party-voter linkages in the way that Aldrich develops it. As a social choice solution, parties enable politicians to acquire and maintain durable voting coalitions *in congress*. Second, this phenomena of cycling in the legislature can occur whether the legislator's preferences and their voting are over programmatic or non-programmatic goods. Clientelistic and personalistic legislators face the same social choice problem as programmatic legislators, and will often opt to solve it by building a party organization which can sustain a durable government coalition, though the mechanisms they choose may differ (Morgenstern 2004). In sum, each type of party can act as a solution to each of Aldrich's four problems, but they will do so with distinctive approaches that are deployed with distinctive organizational forms. The focus

of this project is on voter mobilization and the collective action problem of voters, and in the next section I turn to the issue of which organizational form parties will adopt in order to solve the problem using one of the four strategies outlined above.

Table 4.3:

Party Strategy and Calculus of Voting

Party Strategy	The party will...
Scenario 1: The Vote-Buying Strategy	
Marginal Benefit, p*B	...make no effort to alter.
Duty, D	...make no effort to alter.
Cost of Voting, C	...offset with selective benefit.
	...reduce election day costs with service.
	...reduce information costs with simple cues.
	...reduce net cost of voting by inflicting a punishment for not voting.
Scenario 2: The Programmatic Strategy	
Marginal Benefit, p*B	...increase B using credible offers of broad club good to preexisting or newly created clubs.
	...reduce the probability that the voter will decide the election as the breadth of the club increases.
Duty, D	...increase D by creating or targeting cohesive and solidaristic clubs or cultivating a strong party identification.
Cost of Voting, C	...reduce information costs with a strong and enduring brand name.
Scenario 3: The Machine Strategy	
Marginal Benefit, p*B	...increase B using credible offers of narrow club goods to geographically-based clubs.
Duty, D	...increase D by incorporating citizens into a local machine culture and organization.
Cost of Voting, C	...reduce information costs with the reputation of a local boss as a reliable source of club goods.
Scenario 4: The Personalistic Strategy	
Marginal Benefit, p*B	...increase B by selling the party leader and his/her concern for the people as a broad club good.
Duty, D	...increase D by creating a sense of personal connection between the leader and the voters.
Cost of Voting, C	...reduce information costs by designing campaigns as a referendum on the leader.

Organizational Diversity and Collective Action Problems

In this section, I map the correspondence between the collective action solutions available and developed in the prior section to particular organizational forms that parties on the ground adopt. At this point, I assume that parties adopt only one of the strategies above, and therefore consider them as a pure case. Later, I will take up this issue of whether and how parties combine linkage strategies.

Vote-Buying Party Organization

The distinguishing element of the vote-buying strategy is that it places a private good in the hands of a voter to offset the costs of voting. In this sense, it is clientelism narrowly construed. (Stokes 2005). What organizational form is required to execute a successful vote-buying strategy?

First, such a party must have access to resources which they can then distribute in exchange for the vote, and they include the cost of the selective benefit and any other service provided to the voter. The source of the resources can be vote poor but resource rich domestic supporters, in which case the party executes the transaction with vote rich but resource poor supporters (Kitschelt 2000). Alternatively, parties that have access to the state at either the sub-national or national level can channel state resources to the electoral campaign if state controls are weak, as when legislators incorporate a high degree of discretion into spending bills (Kitschelt and Wilkinson, forthcoming). Although this project does not focus on the party in government or the legislature, it is clear that a vote-buying party will adopt institutional arrangements at the elite level that are complementary to the institutional form of the party in the electorate. The specific organizational arrangement at the elite level will depend on the degree of state autonomy from party politics, the degree of interest group corporatism or pluralism, and the nature of the economy—in short, on the source of the funds. It is sufficient here to say that the strategy will operate most efficiently when, whatever the source, there is high discretion and low transparency in the acquisition and distribution of funds.

Second, a vote-buying party will often have strong and enduring contacts in local electoral markets. Though the vote-buying linkage itself is by definition a weak one, it

requires an local infrastructure to deploy it. The party will have a well entrenched network of activists involved in neighborhoods. According to Stokes (2005), a "bottom-heavy, decentralized" party is necessary because it allows parties to predict with high accuracy the voting intentions of a citizen, to bring pressure via the social networks of the locale on the voters to comply and not defect, to have information about whether or not particular voters comply, and to punish those who don't comply. She terms this reversal of accountability between voter and office-seeker "perverse accountability" because if an office-seeker is armed with information about how the voters casts a ballot and is in a position to punish the voter for that choice, the voter is then accountable to the office-seeker rather than the other way around.

Stokes argues that voters will be less inclined to cooperate in a one-shot exchange of their vote for a payoff—under such conditions the voter will have an incentive to defect from the vote-buying agreement and vote for their preferred candidate. The defection is reduced if the vote for payoff game is repeated. Thus, we could expect that parties adopting a vote-buying strategy will build an organization designed to return repeatedly to the same areas to harvest votes. The early network established in a given locale represents a sunk cost for a party, and the marginal cost of seeking those same votes the following election cycle will be much smaller than rolling out a new network of trust and accountability elsewhere. Vote buyers will have low electoral volatility in their core electoral bailiwicks.

Finally, again following Stokes, there is reason to believe that clientelistic strategies will operate most effectively in areas with relatively immobile residents and in small and medium-sized communities because the social fabric will be denser and

relationships stronger and more enduring. Vote-buying operates most efficiently when it is overlaid on such a community. Therefore, we can expect that vote-buying parties will target rural communities, and small and medium sized cities, rather than large cities or newly created urban sectors which arise in the course of urbanization. To the extent that vote-buying relationships endure and can be defended by party leaders, new parties which seek to deploy a vote-buying strategy will need to seek out unaligned voters who fit the profile of the citizen likely to be purchased. This may be difficult in a fully enfranchised electorate or one where the electoral marketplace is growing in the relatively transient urban shantytowns but not in the relatively stable small and medium-sized communities.

In sum, vote-buying parties will solve the voter's collective action problem by building an organization with distinctive features, and if new parties displaying the markers of this organization also follow a distinctive performance trajectory, we will be able to draw conclusions about the organizational predictors of new party performance.

Programmatic Party Organization

If programmatic strategies solve the voter's collective action problem by credibly promising broad club goods, by leveraging solidaristic and ideological sentiments, and by reducing information costs with a strong and enduring brand name, the party will build an organization of a different sort.

First, the party will invest heavily in articulating a coherent and credible party platform. This will require an organization designed to deliberate over and settle upon fairly detailed policy commitments that are consistent with the interests of its constituent members. As with the vote-buying parties, the party will require complementary

institutional arrangements at the legislative and executive levels, and these complementary arrangements will be designed to implement its legislative agenda and execute the law with the bureaucracy. Technical expertise and effectiveness in government will be part of the party's appeal. For a new entrant in an institutionalized and programmatic party system where governance is effective, such a case may be difficult to make; for a new party in an inchoate and non-programmatic party system in an poorly governed state, the case may be impossible to make.

Policy deliberation and commitment will take place in a context of formal or informal integration of its organization with that of the organized social, economic or civil society groups with which it allies. Whatever the specific nature of these links, it presupposes the existence of organization on the part of its allies in civil society. The programmatic strategy need not extend its organizational reach into local communities—though of course it may where the underlying social relations are organized along partisan lines with encompassing organizations that operate down to the neighborhood level—but it will at least have strong relationships with opinion leaders and interest groups which are effectively members of the party coalition. A successful programmatic strategy will require that the party make strong and enduring commitments to deliver the broad public goods valued by the coalition members. Even if voters are not directly members of either the party or of the party's constituent coalition groups, they will often filter the information they receive about a party through the mass media messages distributed by these groups.

Where voters are highly encapsulated, the programmatic party can operate most efficiently, and so parties will seek voters deeply committed to issue positions, though the

particular competitive environment will determine the particular strategic move a party makes. For example, when an existing party is threatened with a likely electoral loss, Carmines and Stimson (1989) and Miller and Schofield (2003) describe alternative mechanisms through which programmatic politicians will mobilize new issues or stake out new policy positions, respectively, in the hope of capturing new voters. Issue activists turned partisan activists play a key role in cementing the identity of a given party with a given issue or position over the long-run, again highlighting the centrality of the organizationally articulated broad club goods to the programmatic strategy. In the context of new party entry, the comparative literature is filled with arguments concerning the strategic interaction of new parties and existing parties over issue divides, and the key role of organized social and economic groups in transferring those issues into partisan political competition (for example, see Lipset and Rokkan 1967, Collier and Collier 1991, Scully 1992, Yashar 2005)

A programmatic party will invest heavily in disseminating its relatively specialized policy positions either through its organizational infrastructure, or, more commonly in modern political environments, via the mass media.

Whatever the specific mechanism might be, the party will invest its resources in specifying its programmatic message, in contesting attempts to alter it, and in developing channels to disseminate it. In so far as these investments are aimed at the electorate, I should emphasize, they are organizational solutions to collective action, and not social choice, problems.

Machine Party Organization

If machine parties solve collective action problems by delivering club goods to extremely narrowly constructed constituencies, and especially those constructed on a geographic basis, they we can expect that they will build yet another type of distinctive party organization.

This linkage strategy between party and voter is mediated by local brokers who develop deeply integrated and monopolistic political and economic organizations in a given location, and who can effectively defend their position against newcomers. This approach does not easily coexist alongside competing political organizations, so we would expect it to have a hierarchical organization where loyalty is valued, and benefits derived from electoral success are narrow club goods which will often resemble private goods. In fact, however, this strategy does not operate in a strict vote for payoff exchange; rather, the goods accrue to the party machine only if they win local office and the goods are then distributed often very selectively during the course of the term. The goods are designed to feed the pyramidal machine, and mechanisms of discipline and distribution exist throughout the organization to filter goods through the layers and down to the voter level, thereby ensuring the minimal level of community support. Patronage in the form of jobs, for example, is not strictly a vote-buying strategy because the jobs are a benefit not just for the recipient, but for entire families, extended families, or even larger units. The benefit of the job in a narrow-club good sense is that it provides much more than an offset of the costs of voting, but a livelihood for the recipient and his/her family, and a point of entry into the machine for solving problems on a larger menu of other items important for the good of the unit. To borrow somewhat coarsely from Esping-

Anderson (1990), this local political and economic solution functions something akin to the male-breadwinner model, where kinship is emphasized over the market and the state for securing social provisions.

The machine strategy will cultivate loyalty from local voters using carrots and sticks. On the one hand, the successful machine will reward loyal members with benefits; on the other hand, the machine is in a powerful position to punish disloyal citizens.

Its success will depend upon its ability to be densely integrated into the local community. Therefore, even more so than the vote-buying strategy, on election day the machine approach will be able to deliver the voters, monitor compliance, and dole out punishment to defectors.

In the geographical sphere of its control, the machine will have relatively few competitors and its strong position will be enduring. In some national settings, where party systems are fragmented and the institutional rules generate fragile ties between the local machine and the national party leaders, we might expect that the local machine will shift loyalties from one party to another depending upon the national competitive circumstances. Therefore, volatility in national voting tallies may obscure what at the local level is in fact high levels of continuity.

Personalistic Party Organization

The personalistic strategy solves the voter's collective action problem by leveraging the attributes of the candidate to operate on all three terms in the calculus of voting. A focus on the candidate simultaneously pitches the candidate as the public good which will benefit the populace, creates a bond between the voter and the candidate, and reduces the voter information burden to perhaps its simplest terms.

As a pure strategy, it is perhaps the least costly approach in that it is a virtually organizationally unmediated linkage between the party and the voter. This linkage can forego the organizational intermediaries that link the party and the voter and rely exclusively on the mass media and the reputational capital of the party leader.

This strategy will be most effective when it removes the focus from the programmatic differences between itself and other alternatives and focuses instead on the competence and integrity of the party leader.

Combining Pure Strategies

Some parties build an organization that combines two or more of the four pure strategies. Since building a party is resource intensive, and since some collective action solutions will be at odds with others, we should not expect all combinations to easily coexist or be equally likely.

One difficult combination will be the programmatic strategy with either the vote-buying or the machine strategies. There is an inherent tension in these linkages in that the former is grounded in relatively large bundles of principled positions, while the latter two eschew principle. The programmatic strategy generates voter loyalty with a record of delivering broad public goods which, as I have defined them, overlay a social or economic location. To the extent that these locations correspond to the geographical location of vote-buying and machine strategies, the tension may be less than when the broad clubs are not geographically concentrated. But even when it is, the internal allocative process of resources will generate tension as the programmatic activists attempt to marshal resources to build social and economic coalitions, negotiate policy trade-offs, commit to party platforms, and advertise their message while the machine or

vote-buying activists seek to skim resources for more discretionary purposes (Kitschelt 2000).

In spite of the tensions inherent in the attempt, there are important accounts of programmatic parties in the Americas diversifying their linkage strategies to include clientelistic relationships with non-core voters (on the Brazilian PT see Samuels 2004 and Hunter 2006; on the Uruguayan Frente Amplio see Luna forthcoming; on the Chilean UDI see Luna manuscript; on the Argentine Peronists see Levitsky 2003). Two observations are of note. First, in each case the diversification is presented as a strategic adaptation of an existing party motivated by the need to become or remain competitive at the highest levels in the national arena. Each of these parties began their lives and established their reputations almost exclusively as programmatic alternatives. For example, Lula's more pragmatic faction within the party did not triumph over the more doctrinal labor faction until his party had accumulated over a decade of experience successfully mobilizing labor voters and governing at the local and state levels (Samuels 2004). Second, even when parties have adapted by using mixed linkage strategies, the augmentation of the primary programmatic linkage with a clientelistic one has generated tensions within the party.

The organization apparatus used to sustain a vote-buying strategy and a machine strategy are very similar, and so empirical examples of parties using both of these strategies will be relatively common. Furthermore, neither approach is logically contradictory with the other.

The personalistic strategy is one that could be deployed as a supplemental strategy to the others, though it will coexist much less comfortably with the programmatic

strategy than with the others. This strategy will most often target "floating voters" who are not incorporated into either machine, vote-buying or programmatic cultures or organizations. In combination with the programmatic strategy, personalistic appeals will most often be resisted, however, by the core constituencies to the extent that they dilute the message and damage the credibility of the party brand.

The vote-buying strategy, like the personalist strategy, will often operate as a supplemental strategy…

In sum, we can think of parties as having dominant and sometimes supplemental strategies linking themselves to voters to solve the voter collective action problem with one among several organizational solutions.

Distinctive Organization, Distinctive Electoral Trajectory

In this section I relate the organizational solutions developed above theoretically to the new party electoral trajectories I find in chapter II. The are related because different electoral strategies, having distinctive voter-party linkages, will have distinctive electoral performances. In this project, the most general statement of my argument is that variation in the electoral strategy is causally related to variation in electoral performance, contingent on characteristics of the national electoral arena and net the effects of other correlates of electoral success, such as electoral rules.

Personalist Strategies and Performance Trajectories

Personalistic strategies, when not combined with other linkage strategies, are the most vulnerable to exogenous shocks and attacks by competitors because they rely on relatively weak and organizationally unmediated bonds between the party and the voter. When deployed effectively at the national level, it may provide any given party with a big

boost in electoral support, but that support is equally vulnerable to erosion. In inchoate party systems where many voters are not linked by more enduring bonds to any parties, the personalistic strategy can make a big initial splash. Empirically, we see this outcome rather frequently and especially in presidential elections when outsider candidates mobilize vast amounts of voter discontent to capture executive office.

In terms of the electoral trajectories of new parties, we may therefore expect to find correlates of the initial electoral intercept. For the personalist linkage, the intercept will be a function the politicians ability to cover the country via the mass media with a simple message that reverberates in the imagination of the unaligned voters. The populist and anti-political appeals made by politicians such as Fujimori (1990) in Peru, Chavez (1998) in Venezuela, Correa (2005) and Gutierrez (2002) in Ecuador, and Collor (1990) in Brazil fit the profile. Each of these politicians competed for executive office with little or no electoral support in the legislature. Missing from this list, of course, are many failed personalist politicians. Personalist appeals that fail and have no alternative linkage to back up their electoral efforts barely register on the radar of electoral politics and we would expect to find them in the category of "flop" parties.

In addition to outsider politics, personalist politicians seem to have arisen from one of two additional sources in third wave democracies of Latin America. First, politicians who are locally successful have sometimes ventured into the national electoral arena posing as outsider or independent candidates. Their electoral success in local politics is most often based upon alternative strategies, and they are often machine bosses. Whether they mistake the organizational basis of their local support for charismatic appeal or have other incentives for making attempts at the national level, they

nearly always fail in their aspirations for executive office. Second, politicians from a traditionally dominant national party sometimes split off and deploy a personalist strategy based upon the credibility of a real or mythical glorious past. Recent examples of this strategy are Caldera in Venezuela and Duran-Ballen in Ecuador.

In addition to an intercept, electoral trajectories are defined by a slope which represents the rate of growth or decline over time. The slope of the "flop" trajectory is largely irrelevant in that the near zero intercept tells the bulk of the story. But for personalist parties that manage to enter with a high intercept, as all of the above named politicians did, it is clear that we must make distinctions among the group.

For initially successful personalist new parties, the intercept is not the destiny, and we can use a slope for that purpose. Initially successful personalist parties can be split into those which quickly died (for example, Duran-Ballen's PUR, Caldera's Convergencia, Collor's PRN) and those which endured and grew (Fujimori's C90, Chavez' MVR, Guttierez' PSP). There are features of the party's organization which helps distinguish these groups. If they fail to win executive office, even if they come close, they tend to follow the "flash" trajectory because they have no venue from which to cultivate an alternative linkage strategy.

If they win executive office, but once in office fail to either, 1) construct an enduring coalition of programmatic or machine politicians; or 2) fail to leverage their executive victory into more far reaching dominance of the state, then they will follow the "flash" trajectory. Like a house built upon sand, whatever their initial glory, they will soon decline. Personalist politicians who manage to do one or both of these things will follow either the "explosive" or the "contender" trajectories. The first alternative—of

altering strategy by building an enduring coalition—is more germane to democratic politics. To create an enduring party in a democracy, personalist linkages must be replaced by a dominant strategy of programmatic or machine linkages. One of the assumptions of this project, outlined and defended earlier in chapter II, is that the initial strategic approach of a party will not tend to change. The cases in the literature on strategic adaptation all highlight late-adaptors. We might not be surprised to find, then, that there are few empirical cases of personalist vehicles which immediately upon executive victory adapt to a programmatic, machine, or vote-buying linkage. The second alternative—of altering strategy by leveraging executive victory to broader state dominance—is more logically consistent with personalism because it need not diminish the dominance of the party leader. This approach will, however, be in tension with democratic norms and procedures and empirically we will find it in cases where the party leader has damaged the democratic credentials of the regime. For example, both Fujimori and Chavez adopted extra-constitutional maneuvers to translate their electoral victory into a transformation of the regime and state (On Venezuela see Ellner and Hellinger 2003, Molina 2004).

The personalist strategy, without executive office, is not a viable one. As a result, we should not expect to find personalist politics playing a very large direct role in legislative elections. Of course, personalism as a supplemental strategy will be attractive to parties with a legislative presence because it will provide coattail effects to the associated legislative and local politicians.

Programmatic Strategies and Performance Trajectories

The explanation of this project is context dependent, and it departs from most other studies of new party performance because it seeks to understand new party performance in an arena of party competition that is hostile to programmatic strategies. Programmatic politics, I argue above, is a difficult linkage strategy because programmatic appeals are not credible. If this is correct, we should expect to find parties that attempt the programmatic strategy to follow an electoral trajectory which does not lead to a dominant position in the system. That is, we should not expect to find programmatic parties among the group of "contender" or "explosive" parties.

Parties that make social or economic based appeals and which build coalitions with the organized bases of their appeals will only tap into a small segment of the population because most citizens don't exist socially or economically in groups with an collective identity and organization. Even when group identities are constructed and organizationally manifested, as in the case of indigenous social movements in the Andean region (Van Cott 2005, Yashar 2005), it will be difficult to translate these social movements into strong electoral movements because short of an unlikely overwhelming occupation of the state institutions, the programmatic pledges of any such parties will ring hollow. That is, the target constituency may be very large, and that large constituency may be actively engaged in the life of the groups civic associations, but in the electoral arena the group members will discount the benefit that would accrue to them in victory by the extremely small probability that victory would deliver the broad club goods. This difficulty is reinforced to the extent that members of the target constituency are already integrated into existing machine organizations.

Nevertheless, programmatic parties operate on the "duty" term by mobilizing identity and ideology, and can be expected to cultivate enduring support from true-believers. Therefore, over the medium-term—say, for example, over the five election cycles I observe in this project—we can expect programmatic parties to follow the "flat" trajectory where a relatively small cohort of supporters vote for the party consistently over time, scoring modest electoral victories at the national level, and prospering at the sub-national level to the extent that their target constituents are not incorporated into political machines.

Target constituents who's support is not as tightly cemented and who lie at the margins or outside the influence of the machine and vote-buying parties may initially support a programmatic new entrant, but their support will be fragile, and will dissipate when they discover that the party can't deliver on its pledges. Therefore, support will be highest initially.

Programmatic parties may find an opportunity for electoral success in one other circumstance which lies outside the regular cycle of legislative and executive electoral politics. Referenda or elections for constituent assemblies are critical junctures, during which a platform for or against a particular policy or a platform of state reform is a credible promise, leading voters to an altered calculus of voting.

Machine Strategies and Performance Trajectories

The machine strategy is the one viable party-voter linkage in an inchoate party system where state autonomy is low and the underlying social structure is fragmented and disorganized because a successful machine strategy does not depend upon the existence of any of these conditions, and in fact thrives in their absence.

The logic of a party machine strategy is local. Therefore, a successful party machine at the national level will be constructed in one of two ways. Either a national party will be a coalition of many local machines, each dependent upon the reputation of local bosses. As developed above, these machines will be well diversified beyond electoral politics, and will include state, economic and even social organizational components. This arrangement may be fragile, with frequently shifting coalitions, especially where national party competition is dominated by machine politics. Alternatively, a national machine party could be constructed on the backbone of a vertically and/or horizontally integrated economic enterprise with broad regional or national reach. The various local operations will be incorporated into the national organization with more durable, and largely non-political, associations and subject to the disciplinary mechanisms of the economic enterprise. This arrangement will be more durable.

Successful new machine parties involve a substantial sunk cost, and can only be constructed under limited conditions. First, a successful new national machine party can be built when the party founder has an underlying economic infrastructure upon which to build the political machine. This will only work when the various parties to the enterprise—labor, suppliers, distributors, etc.—are weak and lack autonomy from the center. Second, a successful new national machine can be constructed if the component elements of a pre-existing machine are somehow dislodged and become available for incorporation under a new boss. These openings will often look like party splits, and will occur when an existing party loses its leadership and opens the door for a power struggle at the top, or when someone within the party challenges the leader. In many respects,

then, the party is not genuinely new but a reorganization at the elite level. Still, these transitions are critical junctures that can generate many new parties and predictable electoral trajectories. In general, one leader will emerge victorious by capturing the machine network of the preexisting machine and follow a "contender" trajectory, and the other party organizations will wither along the "flop" trajectory.

Vote-Buying Strategies and Performance Trajectories

Though conceptually distinct in terms of the calculus of voting, the vote-buying strategy will not often constitute a dominant strategy. As outlined above, the organizational infrastructure necessary to deploy this linkage is substantial and similar to the machine infrastructure. Therefore, I expect it to operate primarily as a supplemental strategy to the machine strategy.

CHAPTER V

NEW PARTY ENTRANTS IN ECUADOR: 1978-2002

Introduction

This chapter is an analysis of new party entrants in the Ecuadorian system since the

1978 transition to democracy. It shows that parties which entered on the "contender"

trajectory were ones which inherited or build a party with national reach, though support

around the country may not have been very even; which used a machine linkage as its

dominant strategy to connect with voters; and which have access to substantial discretionary

resources. Because this explanation is context specific, applying to party systems which

coexist with the state is politicized and fragmented, it begins with a discussion of the

relationship between the state, parties and sectoral interests and it reviews the basic

characteristics of the Ecuadorian party system. Then it moves into an analysis of eight new

entrants—two each of the contender, flash, flat, and flop types.

Particularistic Interests, Parties and the State

This section traces the evolution of organized interests in Ecuadorian society, and

their relationship with the state. It describes the sectoral basis for profound regional and other

geographical divisions and the propensity for horizontally and vertically integrated business

conglomerates to develop, organize and lobby for particularistic political advantage in the

course of their rivalries.

Sectoral Interests

One of the most enduring and important questions concerning the Ecuadorian party system asks why the level of nationalization remains so low. According to the approach of Jones and Mainwaring (2003)—whose measure of Party System Nationalization (PSNS) is the sum of individual party nationalization scores, each equal to one minus the GINI coefficient of a party's vote share across the roughly 20 departments[21], weighted by their share of the national vote—Ecuador is the least nationalized party system of the North, Central and South American countries in their study. PSNS scores for provincial deputies in the national congress, updated and adjusted using the added detail of the electoral dataset for this project, are reported in Table 5.1 below. Party system nationalization begins the episode at .61, and is virtually unchanged from the start to the end of the period.

Table 5.1:

Party System Nationalization Scores in Ecuador

Election	PSNS
4/29/1979	0.61
1/29/1984	0.53
6/1/1986	0.50
1/31/1988	0.62
6/17/1990	0.55

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[21] There were 20 provinces from 1978 to 1988, 21 from 1990 to 1998 when the Amazonian province of Sucumbios was created out of Napo Province, and 22 since 2002 when Orellana was created out of Napo Province. For a theoretical account of the creation of the two provinces, see Ryder and Brown (2000). Note that the formation of these two provinces out of a larger existing province are inconsistent with the argument by Rice and Van Cott (2006) that new districts offer a unique opportunity for indigenous party mobilizations. These districts were not new in the sense that voters were newly enfranchised. If their creation implied some advantage for the indigenous party Pachakutik, it was not because "new districts present particularly favorable ground for new political vehicles because they do not have to compete with incumbents, who might otherwise have a tight grip on political resources and established ties with voters" (p. 720). Rather, according to Ryder and Brown, these districts were spun off of Napo because of the steady arrival of large numbers of migrants over several decades and the creation of boom-towns. Incumbents existed from before their creation. For example, the parroquia of Loreto (#6455) in the canton of the same name existed as a continuous unit in both Napo prior to 2002 and in Orellana since 2002. [Move this to its own treatment in the pachakutik section].

Election	PSNS
5/17/1992	0.58
5/1/1994	0.57
5/19/1996	0.59
5/31/1998	0.62
10/20/2002	0.59

In order to visually portray the degree of inequality of support across the provinces, Figure 5.1 shows a line for perfect equality and the Lorenz Curves for three multi-province parties[22] from 2002—the one with the lowest PNS (META), the party with the highest PNS (PRIAN), and a party with a PNS which is about equal to the system average PSNS (MUPP).

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[22] By definition, parties that only compete in one province have the theoretical and empirical minimum PNS of .045.

Figure 5.1:

2002 PNS Lorenz Curves for Parties at Min, Max, and Mean

Most analyses of party politics and electoral behavior in Ecuador, including studies of

nationalization, highlight the regionalization of the country. The three principle regions—the

western coastal plains, the central Andean highlands, and the eastern Amazon jungle—are

culturally, economically, socially, and politically distinctive.[23] See inset of Figure 5.2 below.

The coastal region is centered on the largest city, Guayaquil, and is economically dominated

by financial and export-oriented enterprises. It is popularly understood as the hub of

freewheeling business, the home of populism, and the origin of 20th century liberalism which

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[23] In addition to the three main regions, the country contains the Galapagos Islands, which are alternatively
classified as a separate special region or a part of the coast. Though it exists as its own province, the Galapagos
is marginal to the political life of the country, except to the extent that it is an electoral district with contestable
seats.

arose and successfully challenged the highland conservatism from the days of Spanish colonization. The coast was the destination and remains the home to the majority of post-independence immigrants. It includes prominent Arab and Afro-Ecuadorian communities. The capital city, Quito, is located in the highlands region and is the base of the traditional conservative elite, where the Catholic Church is strong. Business enterprises in the highlands have traditionally been focused on domestic consumption and the hacienda system dominated until the 1960s. Indigenous groups are populous in the highlands. The Amazon region contains a mere 4% of the population and has been historically isolated, but the discovery of large oil reserves in the 1960s prompted some exploration, development, and migration into the region.

Figure 5.2:

Ecuadorian Provinces and Regions

Regionalization, in itself, however, is epiphenomenal of other forces. In particular, though regionalized party competition is evident in campaigns and electoral results, I argue that in more important respects party politics operates under a logic that is geographically concentrated to areas that are smaller than the region. As Bonilla observes, "Politics are ruled

by clientelism, by partimonialism, and by national coalitions based on links between local parties in Quito and Guayaquil and local caudillos in the provinces" (2001, p 7). Certainly, parties adopt some strategies that are rooted in the regional divide, a divide which has received considerable attention (León 2003, León 1994, Quintero 1991, Pachano 1985, Pachano 2006). These strategies are most prominent in presidential elections. For example, all competitive president/vice-president tickets are balanced with one candidate from the coast and one from the highlands. Nevertheless, the existence of these strategies only obscures the fact that enduring party-voter linkages are built on the basis of exchanges between parties and smaller constituencies over much narrower club goods. Pachano notes: "Because of the type of relationship parties have with their electorates, they are forced to produce results that do not satisfy the expectation of the population as a whole. The parties must be rooted in territorially and socially defined groups of voters in order to survive. This situation transforms parties into expressions of partiality and not of public good, and leads them to develop a great ability to represent specific interests and local arenas, but also leaves them with an enormous deficiency in representing national interests" (2006, p 102).

In order to understand this persistent low level of nationalization, it is helpful to begin with a brief description of the structure of the economy. Analysts of the Ecuadorian economy from over the last three decades agree that ownership of most of the key manufacturing, agricultural and service sector enterprises is highly concentrated (EIU 2006, Martz 1987, Hurtado 1980). Ownership evolved into several competing horizontally and vertically integrated conglomerates which have distinctive geographical hubs. This pattern was due in large part to the geographical features of the country, with the three geographical regions largely isolated from each other up until the last three decades. Even within the three main

regions, communities were poorly connected. The central highlands, for example, contains a string of provincial cities occupying main valleys running north to south along the spine of the Andes. This geographical pattern inhibited transportation and telecommunication linkages between provincial Andean cities, which came relatively recently. It was not until the 1950s, when the country embarked on an import-substitution industrialization model, that it began to build an infrastructure of roads and communications adequate to integrate the country and sustain domestic markets that were national in scope (Hurtado, 1980). Until integration, the two main cities, as well as many of the isolated provincial capitals, each generated their own sub-economies and often with distinctive and competing interests. The legacy of this pattern with respect to capital ownership and political authority was a series of locally entrenched monopolies, or in the case of the largest cities, a few competing oligopolies. The social and economic changes that were sparked by industrialization and later by economic liberalization have challenged the control of these entrenched brokers, but to a large extent these challenges have not been successful.[24]

Economically, Ecuador has been a laggard in its liberalizing reforms and many sectors of the economy remain insulated from competitive forces and concentrated in the so-called "grupos monopolicos,"—monopolistic groups. These groups classically carry the family name of the top broker or founder and in common parlance, Ecuadorians are fond of referring to them as "mafias."[25] For example, the Noboa Group, headquartered in Guayaquil and best known as the world's top banana exporter, is a conglomerate which controls

[24] As I write, newly elected president Rafael Correa, who ran without any congressional candidates and on a platform promising state restructuring, a constituent assembly, and the end of the domination of corrupt traditional parties, is marshalling another challenge to the political elite. It remains too early to predict the outcome.

[25] Personal interviews PLN-2 (2006), German Rodas at Universidad Andino Simon Bolivar.

hundreds of mostly coastal enterprises in the fruit growing, food processing, exporting, transportation, media, chemical, retail, and financial sectors. Likewise, to name two more examples, the Malo Group operates in the southern highland province of Azuay centered on the city of Cuenca, and the Proinco Group operates in the capital province of Pichincha (CEDIS 1986).

The flip side to this concentration of productive enterprises is a population that is overwhelmingly living in poverty, working in the informal sector, and living in urban centers. See Table 5.2 below. Over the last four decades, Ecuador has been transformed from a country where one-third of the population occupied the cities in 1960 to a country where two-thirds of its 13 million inhabitants occupies the cities today. While the rural population has increased by about 60% from 1960 to 2000, the urban population has increased 428% over the same period (Maldonado 1985). The masses in Ecuador have been largely marginalized from the benefits of the country's economic growth over the last four decades. Labor unions have never been strong and social movements, until very recently, have never been sufficiently organized to effectively mobilized for their interests. According to Huber et al. (2006), during the 1990's, 41% of households subsist at below the $2/day poverty line, the highest level on the continent. Additionally, considering that literacy restrictions were removed from the franchise beginning in 1978—coming into effect for legislative elections beginning in 1984—many have also been marginalized from the country's political life until very recently. Prior to the 1979 presidential election, no more than 18% of the population had participated in a presidential election.

Table 5.2:

Population Demographics

Year	Gini	Informal (Non-Agricultural)	Labor Union Density	Poverty	Population	Urban Population
1960		57%			4,439,000	34%
1970		65%			5,970,000	40%
1980		63%			7,961,000	47%
1990	.43 (1994)	53%	14%	63%	10,264,000	55%
2000		52%			12,646,000	63%

Source: Huber-Stephens dataset [Gini-WIDER; Informal-International Labor Organization (online); Poverty-ECLAC; Labor Union Density-Roberts (1997); Population-WDI]

The Politicized State

The state in Ecuador has traditionally been an instrument for the dominant economic groups to wield for material economic advantage. Though they have faced many challenges in the post-war era—and in particular the populist challenges of Velasco Ibarra and the brief reformist military tenure of General Rodriguez Lara—they have retained a large degree of control over the state. Four out of five of Velasco Ibarra's terms as president and the tenure of Rodriguez Lara all ended prematurely and usually with a coup leading most reformist attempts, such as land reform, tax reform, and democratic openings, to be severely curtailed or reversed.

During the 1978 transition to democracy, reformists played a formative role in crafting the new constitution and the laws on parties and electoral competition with the intent of opening the political arena and state to previously excluded sectors. The fortunes of the economic elites, however, were heavily dependent upon the state and foreign capital and were not tied to the opening of domestic markets and the gains of domestic consumers and they outmaneuvered reformers and undermined the spirit if not the letter of most proposals. (Schodt 1987, Conaghan 1988, Isaacs 1993, Conaghan and Malloy 1994).

The Ecuadorian state is weak, fragmented, and politicized primarily because dominant economic groups are not unified, but highly competitive, and have contested each

other for control of the state seeking to extract particularistic benefits. The very legitimacy of the state is based upon its ability to subsidize the narrow interests of its most powerful economic interests and when it is unable to do so, or when reformist tendencies threaten this orientation, these dominant actors challenge the state and regime (Bonilla 2001). On the one hand, these competitors often unite to defend themselves from challenges from below; on the other hand, they often compete with each other given their distinctive sectoral interests which often, but not always, map onto the regional or sub-regional divides. Ecuador's poor progress in liberalizing the economy (Bonilla 2001) and its relatively low scores on indices of economic liberalization (Lora 2001) reflect the degree to which business interests are entrenched in the state and protecting their ability to extract rents. In particular, Ecuador has lagged in its financial liberalization. On Lora's index of financial liberalization (range 0-1), where a country like Argentina has nearly completely liberalized from .19 to .99 over the period 1985 to 2000, Ecuador has moved from .25 to .6 over the same period. Most disastrously, opposition to President Mahuad's structural adjustment program in 1999 by the conservative Guayaquil-based PSC and the coastal finance interests they represent led ultimately to a financial collapse and state bailout that cost $5 billion. Until this crisis and the dollarization of the economy in 2000, interest rates were heavily controlled. In addition, then as now, bank lending retains heavy sectoral requirements. Apart from state intervention in finance, former IDB economist Francisco Thoumi finds the practice of earmarking of government funds towards thousands of autonomous governmental organizations (Hurtado 1980) and the subsidization of energy consumption particularly distorting and disproportionately beneficial to the dominant economic groups and their income and wealth producing enterprises (Thoumi 1990).

In a 2006 study by Mejía et al, the authors use an expert survey conducted by the IPES for a 2006 report entitled "The Politics of Policies" to demonstrate that among a sample of 18 Latin American countries, Ecuador has the lowest quality on four of the five criteria measured, including "public-regardedness," "enforcement," and "efficiency" (Mejía et. al., 2006a). In other words, Ecuador produces the least "public-regarded" policy in a region that overall produces policy of very low public regard. Furthermore, they argue that the process of executive-legislative coalition building and negotiation is conducted by party leaders and not individual legislators. In the context of executive-party boss negotiation, "the allocation of particularistic and discretionary currencies in the form of pork and patronage tend to prevail over the negotiation of programmatic and more transparent agreements around policy concessions or ministerial offices" (p. 34).

The argument of this project is contextually circumscribed to electoral arenas where state autonomy is low and political participation is constrained. The economic and sociological patterns described above underpins the prevailing logic of competition in the party and state arenas, which is elitist and exclusionary. The discussion which follows elaborates on the condition of the Ecuadorian party system and its relationship with voters.

Voter Mobilization and Fragmentation

This section describes the party system and the electorate, highlighting the extreme fragmentation and political exclusion. I focus on the franchise, voter attitudes and party affiliation. I argue that Ecuador is an environment which is general hostile for the mobilization of salient political issues and divides, including indigenous ethnicity. Overall, this profile indicates that the size of the voter information problem is enormous. In such an

environment, it is far less costly for parties to establish and protect a core constituency with clientelistic modes of exchange than with their alternatives.

Scholars of Ecuadorian party politics have emphasized the breakdowns in representation that arise from non-programmatic strategies and governing practices of parties in the system, ranging from clientelism to policy particularism and populism (Menendez 1996, Bustamante 1997, Burbano 1998, De la Torre 1996, Pachano 2006, Mejia et. al. 2006a)

Party Formation and Party System Attributes

During the most recent democratic episode until 1994, party formation in Ecuador rarely occurred as the emergence of a "genuinely new" organization (Hug 2001) or, in the terms of Laver (2005), as a citizen-turned-candidate. Rather, formation was most commonly the result of dissident party members leaving one party and starting a new party. Leading up to the 1978 transition, there had traditionally been five major political tendencies. First, there was the Liberal (PLRE) and Conservative PCE) parties with origins in the late 19th century. These parties dominated political contestation until the mid-20th century, when a Marxist left emerged beginning in 1926 and a populist coastal tradition emerged in 1946 which later became the CFP. Additionally, a populist highland tradition emerged surrounding the five-time president Velasco Ibarra. Unlike it's coastal populist counterpart, Velasco Ibarra eschewed organization and build instead a very poorly institutionalized personalist movement which projected only very weakly into the Third Wave party system .

By the 1978 transition, four of the five traditions—Liberalism, Conservativism, coastal populism, and the traditional left—experienced considerable reorganization and fragmentation while Velasqismo disappeared soon after Velasco Ibarra's death in 1979. Both Liberalism and Conservatism splintered as progressive factions from both formed new

parties, often rooted in opposition to the authoritarian rule of the 1970s and in support of the opening of the political system to the masses. The CFP entered the transition as the strongest and most cohesive of the party organizations, but fear of a presidential victory by its candidate, Asaad Bucaram, led the military and its allies to ban him from running by means of a rules technicality. Instead, the CFP placed a young lawyer named Jaime Roldos at the head of the ticket with the campaign slogan of "Roldos to the Presidency, Bucaram to Power." The anti-CFP forces' maneuvers were ultimately successful in undermining Bucaram's organization. By the second round election, irreconcilable factions had arisen within the party, with Roldos behaving far more independently than Bucaram had imagined. By 1981, with the death of both Roldos in a plane accident and Bucaram, the CFP followed the course of the traditional tendencies and splintered into many competing parties.

Overall, the Ecuadorian party system is poorly institutionalized (Mainwaring and Scully 1995, Bustamante 1999, Conaghan 1994), volatility is high (Arias 1995), and fragmentation is extreme (Conaghan 1995, Freidenberg 2000). Furthermore, party's are decentralized to the extent that they incorporate outlying provincial political leaders with their own independent base of support, and party vote switching is high (Desposato 2006).

Case Selection and Research Design

The analysis of Chapter 2 yielded five trajectories for new parties in the four country cases. In Ecuador, the 26 new multi-province parties were spread across four of the trajectory groups, covering all but the "explosive" group. See Table 5.3 below.

Table 5.3:

The Set of New Parties in Ecuador, 1979-2002

Trajectory	In Depth Analysis	Party	Year of Election 1	Vote Percentage				
				Election 1	Election 2	Election 3	Election 4	Election 5
Contenders	Yes	ID	1979	14.8	20.0	14.5	22.6	13.0
		PRE	1984	5.1	9.0	16.3	14.8	16.0
	Yes	PRIAN	2002	13.8				
Flat	Yes	FRA	1984	8.8	5.7	3.9	4.2	3.6
		DP-UDC	1984	7.3	9.4	10.9	10.0	7.2
		MPD	1979	4.9	6.5	7.3	5.8	5.0
	Yes	MUPP-NP	1996	7.1	2.1	4.2		
Flash	Yes	PD	1984	8.0	4.7	2.0	0.0	
	Yes	PUR	1992	14.8	3.9	0.0		
Flop	Yes	MCNP	1996	0.3	4.9	0.8		
		META	2002	0.8				
		MIAJ	1998	0.1	0.4			
		MIGN	1998	1.7	0.0			
		MIHE	1998	0.1	0.0			
		MIUN	1998	0.3	0.0			
		MPS	2002	2.0				
	Yes	PAB	1992	0.5	0.1	0.0		
		PCD	1984	2.7	2.3	1.2	0.9	0.5
		PDP	1988	0.4	1.0	0.1	0.0	
		PLN	1990	1.8	1.0	0.9	0.0	
		PL	2002	2.8	0.0			
		PAN	1996	0.9	1.9	0.0		
		PSP	2002	4.0				
		TSI	2002	1.1				
		UPL	1994	0.6	0.5	0.6	0.0	

In this chapter, I will draw on data from all parties as necessary, but focus in particular on eight of the parties. I will choose two parties from each trajectory group, as indicated in column one of Table 5.3. I select my cases for in-depth analysis according to two main criteria. First, in order to maximize the difficulty of confirming my linkage hypotheses; and second, in order to subject several of the principle institutional hypotheses to scrutiny.

Criterion 1: Linkage Strategy

Because my hypotheses hold that in a country like Ecuador, programmatic strategies will have limited appeal, machine strategies constitute a more successful linkage mechanism, and that vote-buying and personalistic strategies are secondary strategies, I will select some of my cases of in-depth analysis in such a way as to challenge these hypotheses. Specifically, from among the three contender parties I will select what is widely considered to be the most programmatic party in the system, Izquirda Democratica (ID). ID is a social democratic party and member of Socialist International. Its founder, Rodrigo Borja, was a vice president and was appointed an honorary president during the 1980s and 1990s[26] and is widely considered to have been a principled advocate of social democratic policies. If ID adopted a primarily programmatic linkage with its constituents, how did it enter the political arena as a contender?

Second, one general characterization from a visual inspection of the "flat" trajectory parties is that they are all relatively programmatic, which is a regularity that would be consistent with my theoretical expectation. In order to raise the empirical hurdle, I will inspect the least programmatic of these four parties, the Frente Radical Alfarista (FRA). Like the ID, FRA was formed by a group of dissident Liberals during the military dictatorship of the 1970s and was an outspoken advocate of democracy. Its founder, Abdón Caldeón, was assassinated in 1978 just after finishing fifth in the first round presidential election of that year. Following his death, however, the party lost its principled ideological moorings though it maintained its ability to draw a small but consistent share of the national vote. How did it do so if its ideological standard-bearer was eliminated?

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[26] Personal interview ID-2 (2006).

Third, I will use the only two "flash" parties in the sample. Both the Partido Democrata (PD) and the Partido Unidad Republicana (PUR) were founded after the transition by prominent dissident members of the traditional dominant parties from the two-party system of an earlier era—the Liberal Party and the Conservative Party. While the founder of PUR, Sixto Durán-Ballén, was a popular mayor of Quito, neither he nor any of the leaders of PD were charismatic personalities in the fashion of the earlier-era populist leaders, Asaad Bucaram or Velasco Ibarra. How did these parties capture such a high initial level of the vote only to see their support so rapidly disintegrate?

Finally, from among the "flop" parties, I will analyze two parties that stood to inherit or build substantial electoral vehicles at the time of their founding. The first, Movimiento Ciudadano Nuevo Pais (MCNP), was founded by an outsider radio personality Freddy Ehlers who allied with the newly formed indigenous party, Pachakutik (MUPP) and who finished in third place in the first round presidential election of 1996 and in fourth place in 1998. The second, Partido Asaad Bucaram (PAB), was founded by a son of Asaad Bucaram, Avicena Bucaram, who hoped to capitalize on his dead father's impressive former popularity and influence by reconstructing the coalition of popular sectors that once projected the father to the front of the electoral pack. These two parties seem to have at least the potential ingredients for better performance[27]. Though my hypotheses concerning "flop" parties, as a largely residual category, are a serious of negative statements concerning what these parties fail to do, does the story of their electoral failure lend support to the theory?

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[27] Many of the flop parties, in terms of asset endowments of program, personality or neighborhood brokers, don't have even a remote possibility of growing into prominence in the system.

Criterion 2: Institutional Rules

My second selection criterion for case selection concerns institutional rules. From an institutional perspective, post-transition Ecuadorian partisan politics can be conceived of as having two phases. Two primary moments of institutional innovation were each followed by a period of relative stability in the patterns of inter-party competition (Mejía, Pérez and Saiegh 2006).[28] Both episodes begin with moments of constitutional redesign, the first beginning in 1978 and the second in 1998.

The 1978 transition to democracy represented a fundamentally new institutional environment. The constitutional and party law authors attempted to craft a system which created incentives for political entrepreneurs to build large, national and programmatic parties (Hurtado 1990, Nohlen and Pachano 2005, Mejía 2002).

By the mid-1990s, the reforms of the transition were largely seen as failures and their credibility was exhausted. Over the course of nearly 20 years, new organizational actors had emerged and a vibrant if fragmented and disorganized civil society was asserting itself.

Because institutional rules have conventionally been hypothesized to have decisive effects on the party system, and particularly on the ability of new parties to compete, where possible I will select cases of new party entry from both the pre-1998 and the post-1998

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[28] This observation does not necessarily contradict the claim by Pachano (2006) that many elements of the institutional environment have been contested and subject to change throughout the period. Institutional reform has been nearly constant and used by political actors to solve "even small problems" (p. 104). He notes that no two elections have taken place under the same electoral rules. Still, the scale and type of changes that occurred in the mid-1990s significantly differentiates the two periods.

periods. For a summary of the party and electoral system rules of the two periods, see Table 5.4 below.

Table 5.4:

Party and Electoral Rules in Ecuador

	Phase 1: 1978 to about 1996	Phase 2: about 1996 to present
Legislative Structure Summary	Two-tier Unicameral with National and District Deputies	One-tier Unicameral with Purely District Deputies
Unicameral Structure	(1978-1998) Two-tier	(2002-present) One-tier
-National Tier	(1978-1996) 12 national deputies	(1998) 20 national deputies (2002-present) no national deputies
-National Tier Term	(1979-1984) 5 year term (1984-1998) 4 year term	(2002-present) no national deputies
-Provincial Tier	(1978-1996) variable 57-70 deputies	(1998-present) variable 100-101 deputies
-Provincial Tier Term	(1979-1984) 5 year term (1984-1996) 2 year term	(1998-present) 4 year term
Electoral System Summary	Party Centered with high Malapportionment	Candidate Centered with high Malapportionment
-Electoral System	(1979-1996) Closed list PR	(1998-present) Open list PR
-Electoral Formula	(1979-1996) Combined Hare/d'Hondt	(1998-present) d'Hondt
-Midterm elections	(1979-1984) none (1984-1994) provincial deputies only	(1996-2006) none
-Provincial Tier Districts	(1979-1988) 20 (1990-1998) 21	(2002-present) 22
-Provincial Tier Average District Magnitude	(1979-1996) 3.0	(1998-present) 4.6

Party Strength Summary	Strong National Parties, undermined by reelection limits	Weak National Parties
Reelection	(1983-1994) No immediate reelection	(1996-present) No term limits
Alliances	(1979-1996) no electoral alliances	(1998-present) province-level electoral alliances
Ballot Access for New Parties: -Signatures to register a party	(1978-1994) .5% per district	(1996-1998) 1.5% of national movements and parties (2002-present) 1% per district for independents
-Geographic distribution	(1979-1994) 10 provinces, including 3 largest	(1996-present) none
-Independent electoral movements	(1979-1994) none	(1996-present) independent provincial movements allowed
Party Survival Threshold	(1979) 5% of national vote in 2 consecutive (1983) no minimum threshold (1994-1996) 4% of national vote in 2 consecutive Penalty is loss of registration, but not seats	(1998-present) 5% national vote in 2 consecutive, applicable to parties but not movements Penalty is loss of registration, but not seats

In chapter III I argued that institutional variables which predict party entry, such as rules that raise the cost of party registration, and ones which influence party survival, such as rules which specify the conditions under which a party will be declared dead, are not germane to this project. The former institutions predict party entry but not party performance, while the latter could theoretically effect party performance, but only if one were seeking to discriminate among the many parties in what I term the "flop" category. I expect a third set of institutions which collectively determines the "threshold of representation," however, to predict which type of new entrant will appear in a party system.

I examine two elements of the threshold of representation in the quantitative cross national chapter: seat threshold and district magnitude. In Ecuador, the seat threshold is extremely low, which leaves only district magnitude as the driving force behind the effective threshold. Over the period analyzed here, district magnitude has varied immensely across districts and elections, from one to 18. Representation in the national chamber is awarded in part by state and in part according to population. Each state has been guaranteed one seat in the national chamber before 1996 and at least two seats beginning in 1996. Additionally, beyond a certain population, additional seats are allocated for a specified population increment. However, seven of the 22 provinces are sparsely populated. As an example of the extreme differential, in 1979 the smallest province of Galapagos contained 0.1% of the electorate and received 1.8% of the provincial tier seats, while the largest province of Guayas contained 25.7% of the electorate and received only 11.6 percent of the provincial tier seats. Consequently, Ecuador has one of the most highly malapportioned bodies in the region (Samuels and Snyder 2001).

With respect to party performance, this huge variation in district magnitude means that between districts, party performance trajectories vary widely. In the single member provinces,

competition conforms to Duverger's Law and two parties typically compete for the seat. In Figure 5.3 and Table 5.5 below, for example, party vote share is displayed in the Amazonian province of Pastaza, which was a single member district (SMD) from 1979 until 1994, after which the law changed and gave each province a minimum of two seats.

Table 5.5:

Party Performance, Pastaza Province

Party	1979	1984	1986	1988	1990	1992	1994	1996	1998	2002
AN		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
APRE	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	
CFP	16.5	0.0	0.0	2.4	1.5	1.4	0.5	1.0	0.0	1.6
DP-UDC		0.0	19.5	11.2	3.8	6.9	4.4	6.5	13.6	5.8
FADI		36.0	38.7	18.8	32.4	12.1	11.8	0.0	0.0	0.0
ID	39.2	0.0	0.0	35.5	15.2	5.8	34.2	0.0	11.5	12.8
MPD	5.6	0.0	1.7	0.0	0.0	1.5	8.6	20.2	14.7	6.9
MPS										4.6
MUPP-NP								12.8	13.6	15.8
PAN								0.0	2.1	
PCD		20.4	0.0	5.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
PDP				0.0	0.0	0.2				
PL										6.9
PLN					2.7	7.4	0.0			
PLRE	0.0	36.8	34.2	3.4	11.6	26.8	24.9	10.8	0.0	0.0
PRE		6.8	0.6	2.1	6.0	2.5	0.9	5.2	0.0	1.5
PRIAN										6.4
PSC	0.0	0.0	0.0	5.9	1.9	6.1	6.3	11.1	0.0	7.4
PS-FA	0.0	0.0	0.0	15.6	23.0	12.9	6.8	9.8	7.3	1.6
PSP										15.8
PUR						14.9	1.7			
UN-UNO	38.7	0.0	5.4	0.0	1.9	0.0	0.0	0.0	25.7	7.4
UPL							0.0	11.8	7.3	

Parties which never competed in Pastaza are excluded; null values indicate that the party did not exist.

Figure 5.3:

Party Performance, Pastaza Province

Note: Parties which never won more than 10% of the vote in the SMD years from 1979 to 1994 have been excluded (AN, APRE, MPS, PAN, PDP, PLN, PRE, PRIAN, PSC, UPL).

It is worth noting several points. First, in most elections while Pastaza was a single-member district, there were two dominant parties. Both parties usually had above 20% of the vote. Beginning in 1996 when the district gains two seats, two-party competition ends.

Second, many parties who participated in the election at the national level nonetheless chose to concede Pastaza. Concessions are evident in one of two ways. Either the party never

registered to compete in Pastaza and they did not appear on the ballot. These parties have 0% of the vote and appear along the x-axis in the figure. Otherwise, the party registered in the province and appeared on the ballot—usually because registration law had a geographic component which required participation in at least half of the provinces—but they did not exert any or much effort in the province. These parties won some votes, but usually not much more than 5% of the total. Note that parties which *never* exerted much effort in Pastaza have been excluded from the figure to simplify the presentation.

Third, in all of the SMD elections, there was a third and sometimes a fourth party which each won between about 10% to 20% of the vote. These challengers were always of one of two types. Either they resembled "flash" trajectory within the province, challenging in one election but losing and then quickly disappeared. This was the case in 1979 with the CFP, in 1984 with PCD, in 1986 with DP-UDC, and in 1992 with PUR. In two cases, beginning in 1988 with the PS and in 1994 with the MPD, the parties were able to sustain a challenge over multiple elections, but otherwise conceded and soon disappeared in this district. It is not surprising that the Socialist PS and the Maoist MPD followed this pattern. They are both parties with long organizational and ideological traditions and had the wherewithal to sustain an effort over multiple elections. Otherwise, parties in this moderate 10-20% range were previously dominant parties which suffered in the face of the challenge from a third party. This was the case with ID in 1990 and FADI in 1992.

A fourth observation is that volatility is extremely high in Pastaza over the SMD period. While there is a consistent pattern of two party competition in the district, the performance and sometimes even the identity of those two competitors has changed dramatically from election to election. There is only one case of two consecutive elections, from 1984 to 1986, in which the

two main competitors did not change. As a province with a high indigenous population, it is likely that the explanation for this instability conforms to Madrid's (2005) hypothesis that indigenous voters are very weakly attached to the traditional parties which compete for their votes, but that upon the emergence of an indigenous party, patterns of competition will stabilize as voters form more enduring and programmatic linkages with their legislative agents. From 1996 and through the elections of 1998 and 2002, the new indigenous party, Pachakutik, appeared poised to confirm this conclusion. It entered with almost 13% of the vote and grew slightly. However, the results of the most recent election in 2006 (outside the timeframe of both this analysis and Madrid's) show Pachakutik losing half its support to the upstart party PSP of recently disposed former president Lucio Gutiérrez, revealing the vulnerability of ethnic and programmatic linkages to machine and personalistic ones. Additional time points will be necessary to draw strong conclusions as to the ultimate status of this case with respect to the Madrid hypothesis.

A fifth and final observation is that in spite of the presence of two strong parties in the district, the very small size of Pastaza's electorate relative to the total electorate indicates that the big competitors in any given election may appear as a small player in national aggregations of the vote. From among the top two parties in each of the SMD elections, only ID and PUR were big players on the national scene during the same year they won big in Pastaza. The PCE (here identified as UN-UNO, following the naming convention of this project), the PLRE, FADI, and the PS-FA never won more than 9% of the national vote in the year they dominated Pastaza.

These electoral dynamics combine with other features of the small provinces. First, these provinces generally have weak social and economic connections with the two main provinces, implying that parties that generate their strength from social and economic coalitions formed in

the main cities have little strength in the outlying areas. Second, several of the historical leftist parties, together with the traditional Conservative and Liberal parties from the preexisting two party system, have had a long history of organizing in the peripheral provinces. Thus, despite the emerge of new party actors in the two main provinces from the 1970s onwards, the parties of the previous era inherited some advantage in their old ties. In sum, the application of the predicted electoral system incentives not withstanding, these outlying provinces enabled small party competitors to remain relevant in national politics.

On the opposite end of the district magnitude range, the provinces of Pichincha and Guayas have an effective threshold of representation which is extremely low, implying that the institutional rule will have very little effect on party performance there.

This analysis of Pastaza and the very high district magnitude in the two most populous districts together reveals how very small parties can have a large role on the national political scene.

This permissive system-level institutional configuration implies that the institutional nature of the parties themselves, over and above the effect of system-level institutions, will effect the degree to which parties will pursue particularistic rather than broad-based benefits and will achieve contender rather than other sorts of electoral trajectories. In fact, careful attention to the particular system-level institutional developments and changes leading up to and during Ecuador's latest democratic episode lead strongly to the conclusion that these institutions and their implementation and enforcement are endogenous to the parties and specifically to their propensity to favor particularistic rather than broad-based goods. This is not to argue that system-level institutions don't have the effect theory predicts, but that more fundamentally an

explanation of the party system or of the party system's policy outputs (Mejía et al. 2006) is centered on the nature of the party actors themselves.

<center>Data and Analysis</center>

This analysis uses interviews with party leaders and founders from the first years of a party's life and district-level electoral data over the entire period as well as parish-level electoral data for four elections.

In the Spring of 2006 I conducted 38 interviews of party founders, national committee members, provincial committee members, and candidates from the early years in the life of 22 parties. Several of the subjects were involved in the life of two or more parties. The interviews were semi-structured in that I had a series of questions on select topics, but posed follow-ups depending upon the profile and knowledge of the subject. My interviews focused on the origins, goals, organization, linkages and achievements of the party. My overarching goal in these interviews was to understand the strategic decisions and operations of the party as it projected itself into the national electoral arena. I was especially interested in the types of linkages the party established with local constituencies and organized elements of civil society and in the types of resources the parties had at their disposal.

My research includes the analysis of highly disaggregated electoral data for four elections: 1992, 1996, 1998 and 2002. Using these data, I am able to explore the spatial and temporal distribution of a party's support. I am particularly interested in a party's support across time and two geographical levels. First, parties in Ecuador typically have high levels of electoral volatility. Second, I expect variation operating at the province level to be important, especially because the provinces serve as the electoral districts. Third, I expect to find variation operating at the sub-province level which arises from the particular linkage strategy a party adopts.

Specifically, for parties that adopt programmatic or personalistic linkages, I expect their level of support to be more evenly distributed across parishes than parties that adopt a machine or vote-buying strategy. The latter two approaches will generally lead parties to be highly selective as to where the invest within a district. They will attempt to harvest a large percentage of the votes in relatively few of the district's parishes. In order to measure these effects, I will estimate "components of variance" models, following Morgenstern and Potthoff (2005) in their study of party nationalization. In their approach, they use district-level data to estimate random effects models across two levels: time and district. I, however, am interested in slightly different concepts with respect to the spatial distribution of the vote, and so adapt their approach by analyzing geographical units that do not correspond to electoral districts. My approach yields expectations that there will be important variance also within districts and across parishes. Therefore, I estimate these models on parish-level vote returns for each party across time, district, and parish. I first present comparative results in the following section, and then discuss the result party-by-party as I analyze each of the eight parties in the subsequent sections.

The dependent variable in this project is trajectory group and each party has been classified according to the posterior probabilities, as described in chapter 2. As a five-group categorical variable—each of the five trajectory groups are qualitatively distinctive—the explanatory task can be framed quite expansively, hypothesizing as to the predictors that distinguish each of the 10 possible pairs. However, Ecuador lacks parties of the "explosive" type, thereby eliminating four pairs. Furthermore, following the large-N analysis of Chapter 3, I will focus the analysis here on explaining why each party is or is not a "contender," thereby constraining the explanatory task to three pairs: differentiating contenders from flops, from flat, and from flash trajectories.

If the data from both sources support the hypotheses of this project, I can have strong confidence in the findings. For each party, I will begin with a background of the origins and initial performance of the party. Then, I will review the evidence from the interviews and from other primary and secondary sources. Third, I will present the results of the analysis of the electoral data.

Components of Variance of Parish-Level Electoral Support

Morgenstern and Potthoff (2005) apply a components of variance model to district-level electoral data in order to distinguish three elements of the variance in a party's electoral support: electoral volatility (the variance in a party's support between elections), district heterogeneity (the variance in a party's support within elections but between districts), and a residual "district time effect" (the residual variance in a party's support which cannot be accounted for by either time or district). They estimate random effects for both election and district.

I suspect that parties with machine and vote-buying linkages—more so than parties with programmatic and personalistic linkages—will focus their electoral effort on very concentrated geographic units within the district, and in particular on select parishes. Parishes normally overlay neighborhoods in large and medium sized urban areas and they overlay small rural communities. Parishes are the electoral unit within the district which are commonly controlled by caciques, or brokers, though as Burgwal (1995) has shown, it is not unusual to have brokers for smaller organizational units—such as communes—or to have competing brokers within a neighborhood. These brokers are normally able to deliver a large share of a parish's vote to a given party. If votes are won in this manner, I expect that the variance within an election and within a district, but between parishes will be a relatively high share of the total variance in a party's parish-level vote share. In sum, this analysis modifies Morgenstern and Potthoff's

approach because it estimates a components of variance model to parish-level rather than district-level data. It retains their approach of estimating a random effect for both election and district.

I conduct this analysis on the elections for which I have parish-level data: 1992, 1996, 1998 and 2002. The analysis takes place in three steps. First, I illustrate the strategy (Figure 5.4 below) with a map of the canton of Cotacachi and the vote share of the party PRE in each parish of the canton. Second, I estimate a components of variance model (Table 5.7 below) which in addition to election and province includes a parameter estimate for region. I incorporate region because nearly all analyses of Ecuadorian politics highlights the regional divide. The result shows that for the most part, region does not explain much of the parish-level variance. Finally, I estimate a components of variance model as described above (Table 5.8 below).

Illustrating the Parish-Level Strategy

The map below illustrates the logic of the broker-mediated strategy. In the highland province of Imbabura, the coastal party, PRE, won one of the three seats in 1992. The map shows the canton of Cotacachi, one of six cantons of the province which contains 9% of the province votes. The canton of Cotacachi has 10 parishes, three of which are quite large and all part of the main city, also called Cotacachi, which lies along the main road (shown in grey) and is known for its leather artisans and market. The map shows PRE's share of the vote in each parish of the canton, represented by a square shaded light to dark red. The 10 parishes are identified by a smaller colored circle within the square according to the map legend. The map reveals that the party concentrated its efforts on the three largest parishes—Sagrario, San Francisco, and Quiroga—where it won overall 27.5% of the vote. All three of these parishes are

part of the city of Cotacachi. In the other seven parishes, all isolated and far from the main road, it won overall only 11.9% of the total vote.

This result is suggestive that PRE, in deciding to compete for a seat in the province of Imbabura, focused its effort on select parishes within the province. My field research in Imbabura province confirmed that machine-based parties from the center (either Guayquil or Quito) seek out brokers in the periphery to mediate the exchange between the party and voters. One way to increase our confidence in this pattern would be to repeat the analysis for each party across the roughly 50 parishes in Imbabura Province. Alternatively, one can estimate the components of variance in parish-level results as I do below.

Figure 5.4:

PRE's Vote Share by Parish, Canton of Cotacachi, Province of Imbabura

Components of Variance-A Test For a Regional Effect

In Ecuador, region is often considered to be a primary divide. In this first preliminary model, I estimated the portion of the variance in parish-level results that we can account for at

the regional level for five relatively successful parties. Considering the primacy of region in nearly all discussions of Ecuadorian life, it has surprisingly little effect. It accounts for a large percentage of the variance for only one party: the PRE. The PRE is the only party with very pronounced regional patterns. Its mean province-level vote share (and standard deviation) over the four elections of this analysis for the coast, highland and jungle regions are 29.0% (8.6), 10.9% (6.1) and 7.4% (8.1), respectively. For all other main parties, region accounts for a relatively small part of the variance. There are generally two reasons for this. First, contrary to conventional wisdom, relatively successful parties based in one region usually compete successfully in the other regions. Second, relatively unsuccessful parties are often based in one provincial or sub-provincial stronghold and do equally poorly in other parts of its region as in other regions. It will be excluded from the model because this extra parameter often leads to difficulty for model convergence for smaller parties.

Table 5.6:

Components of Variance Across Election, Region, Province and Parish

Party	Mean Vote	S.D.	% variance				Dominant Strategy
			election	region	province	parish	
PRIAN	10.1%	6.5%	-	13%	28%	59%	parish dominant
PSC	18.1%	13.6%	4%	17%	26%	53%	parish dominant
ID	11.3%	10.7%	0%	5%	42%	52%	parish dominant
MUPP	9.2%	13.4%	0%	15%	35%	50%	parish dominant
PRE	15.8%	14.8%	0%	51%	14%	34%	region dominant

Components of Variance-Across Time, Province, and Parish

Table 5.8 below reports the result of a components of variance model for seven of the eight parties examined closely in this chapter (the other party, PD, had died by 1992) as well as for several other parties. It reveals that eight of the 13 parties adopt a parish-dominant strategy,

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which indicates that they have parish strongholds within provinces and between elections. The exceptions are as follows:

1) PRE has a majority of its variance between provinces which we can account for by its strong regional patterns of support as shown above;

2) FRA has a majority of its variance between provinces, which we can account for by its shift from coastal leadership under Cecilia Calderón to highland leadership under Fabián Alarcón. Also, it has some between election volatility which we can account for by its 2002 decline following corruption charges against Alarcón.

3) The DP-UDC has a larger than typical electoral volatility because of the popularity of its 1998 winning presidential candidate, Jamil Mahuad, and its subsequent plummeting popularity following his corruption charges, coup, and flight into exile.

4) The PUR has as relatively large Provincial variance because the party divided up districts with its electoral ally, the Conservative Party (PCE)

5) MCNP was the party of two highlanders—one a Quito radio personality and the other from Cuenca. They mobilized some support in the highland provinces, and very little in the coast and jungle.

6) META was unusual for a small party in that it had very even and very low support within the four provinces in which it competed. In fact, it was led by a woman living in exile, Ivonne Bakki, who did very little to mobilize support anywhere. This distribution of the variance reveals that after it registered, it failed to exert any effort in any parish.

Table 5.7:

Components of Variance Estimates

Party	Elections	Mean Vote Share	S.D.	Between Elections	Within Elections, between Provinces	Within Elections, Within Provinces, Between Parishes	Dominant Strategy
PSC (Legacy)	92, 96, 98, 02	18.1%	13.6%	9%	37%	54%	Parish Dominant
PRIAN (Contender)	02	10.1%	6.5%	na	39%	61%	Parish Dominant
ID (Contender)	92, 96, 98, 02	11.3%	10.7%	1%	47%	52%	Parish Dominant
PRE (Contender)	92, 96, 98, 02	15.8%	14.8%	3%	59%	38%	Province Dominant
MUPP (Flat)	96, 98, 02	9.2%	13.4%	0%	49%	51%	Parish Dominant
FRA (Flat)	92, 96, 98, 02	3.4%	6.5%	8%	54%	37%	Province Dominant
DP (Flat)	92, 96, 98, 02	11.7%	12.0%	15%	38%	47%	Parish Dominant
PUR (Flash)	92	11.8%	11.1%	na	56%	44%	Province Dominant
MCNP (Flop)	98, 02	2.7%	4.5%	4%	59%	38%	Province Dominant
PAB (Flop)	92	0.7%	2.1%	na	33%	67%	Parish Dominant
META (Flop)	02	0.2%	0.4%	na	79%	21%	Province Dominant
TSI (Flop)	02	0.5%	0.7%	na	48%	52%	Parish Dominant
PLN (Flop)	92	1.5%	5.3%	na	48%	52%	Parish Dominant

Flat Parties

The latent trajectory model of Chapter 2 produced the predicted "flat" trajectory which appears bolded in Figure 5.5 below. The four Ecuadorian cases which were classified into this group also appear in the figure. I have adjusted the scale of the vertical axis from a range of -10 to 60 (from Figure 2.7) to a range of 0 to 12 in order to make the individual trajectories distinguishable. Though in this perspective they appear to be a heterogeneous group, when plotted with the other parties on a –10 to 60 scale they appear as a distinct and homogeneous group. The analysis here will focus on one party from prior to the 1998 electoral reforms, the Frente Radical Alfarista (FRA), and one part that emerged after the electoral reforms, the Movimiento Unidad Plurinacional Pachakutik-Nuevo Pais (Pachakutik). The analytic question which will frame the analysis is: why are FRA and Pachakutik "flat" parties rather than "contenders"?

Figure 5.5:

The "Flat" Trajectory in Ecuador

Frente Radical Alfarista (FRA)-The Radical Alfarista Front

The FRA is a party which has always had weak voter-party linkages, first in the 1980s based upon a personalistic linkage with its founder, and later in the 1990s based upon the a single political machine of a later leader. To the extent that it had any deep and enduring linkages, it was the machine-based strategy of the later generation leader, whose machine existed independent of and prior to its incorporation into the party. While the general tendency in Ecuador is that a "flat" party trajectory consists of parties using a programmatic linkage with small but loyal constituencies, in the case of the FRA, an alternative mechanism is operating to sustain it over the long-run. Its appearance as having lived a long life is misleading in that it has had discontinuities in its leadership and a fluid

identity. It technically meets the criteria I have used to decide whether a party over its lifetime is a single entity because of periods of coexistence of its multiple factions. Nevertheless, it has been factionalized with the balance of power shifting among the factions over time. The factionalization has not been deeply organizationally embedded, but operates mostly as divisions in the leadership. As a party which secured and defended its legal registration with electoral authorities from the time of the transition democracy, it has been an attractive target for independent politicians seeking an electoral vehicle.

Origins and Initial Electoral Performance

The FRA emerged during the transition to democracy under the leadership of Abdón Calderón. Calderón was a former Liberal Party (PLRE) member—and National Director in the mid 1960s[29]—from Guayaquil. He was a prominent and outspoken critic of the military regime during the years leading up to the presidential election in 1978. He was an "authentic liberal" and attempted first to create a faction within the PLRE and thereby shift that party's direction into opposition of the regime,[30] but ultimately split with the PLRE over their cooperation with the military regime.[31] Calderón was jailed several times for his activism against the dictatorship and the corruption of the regime and its collaborators. He ran for president in 1978, finishing in fifth place with about 9% of the vote. Calderón was assassinated on November 29, 1978 as he prepared for the 1979 congressional elections. An investigation concluded that the assassination was ordered by the Minister of Government of the regime, Jarrín Cahueñas, and he was convicted and served time.

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[29] Personal interview FRA-2 (2006).

[30] Personal interview FRA-2 (2006).

[31] Personal interview FRA-1 (2006).

After Calderón's death, the party leadership was taken over by his daughter, Cecilia Calderón de Castro. She had not previously been involved with the party, but was brought in—together with her husband, Ivan Castro—after her father's death. Under her leadership, the FRA first contested legislative elections in 1984 at both the provincial and national tiers because the dictatorship had stripped the party of its registration for the 1979 elections.[32] The results for the provincial tier appear in Table 5.9 below. In addition to the five provincial seats won in 1984, the party won a national tier seat for Edgar Molina Montalvo of the capital province, Pichincha. Ivan Castro, won a provincial seat from Guayas, a seat won by Cecilia two years later in 1986. During this era, there was a struggle for control of the party between Edgar Molina, who had been Calderón's vice-presidential candidate in 1978, and Cecilia Calderón, with Calderón and her clique triumphing. But the party was on the decline. By 1988, the party won only a national tier seat occupied by Calderón and a provincial tier seat occupied by a newcomer from Pichincha, Fabian Alarcón.

Alarcón was a politician with a base of support in Quito, and especially in certain sections. He received his political start in the Quito mayor's office under conservative Sixto Durán Ballén. He was a leader of the Partido Democrata (PD) in the early and mid 1980s. When the PD was declared extinct by the electoral authorities, Alarcón and othehad r aspiring politicians went in search of an alternative, and settle upon the FRA because like the PD, the FRA a common liberal (PLRE) heritage.[33] He began as a legislative candidate in FRA, but by 1991 he had worked his way into the executive council of the party, and by 1993 into the position of National Director. The party by this time had surrendered most of its support in the coastal region as well as the last remnants of the national appeal it had

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[32] TSE archives

previously channeled towards the national-tier seat. By the mid-1990s it had narrowed itself

to a party centered on Alarcón and a single seat in the large MMD province of Pichincha. He

participated in the presidential administration of President Durán Ballén from 1992 to 1995.

FRA won the Pichincha seat in 1992, 1994, and in 1996 through an electoral alliance with the

Liberal party from which FRA founder Abdón Calderón had split. The principled liberal and

democratic positions which propelled the party into national prominence at the transition to

democracy had been surrendered and political opportunism now ruled. Furthermore, through

an alliance with the party of Abdalá Bucaram, the leader of the populist party PRE, Alarcón

leveraged his seat in the chamber into the presidency of congress in 1995 and 1996. The PRE

was a "traditional enemy" of the FRA, and this alliance provoked a disagreement between

Cecilia Calderón and Alarcón which ended with Calderón's expulsion from the party.[34]

When president Bucarám fell from office in 1997 after congress declared him mentally

incapacitated, Alarcón negotiated an ascent to the presidency of the republic. In 1999,

following a corruption investigation into Alarcón by the Supreme Court of Justice triggered

by a complaint by Cecilia Calderón, among others, he spent four months in jail and his

reputation was severely damaged. By 2002, when he ran for legislative office as a provincial

deputy from Pichincha, he lost and the party was declared extinct. In sum, the party had three

phases: a initial principled though personalistic phase in opposition to the dictatorship which

was prematurely ended with the assassination of founder/leader Abdón Calderón before the

first legislative elections; a second phase under the leadership of his daughter, during which

the party leveraged the residual connections of the party, the reputation of the dead founder

[33] Personal interview FRA-3 (2006).

[34] Personal interview FRA-1 (2006).

and the sympathies towards his daughter into a moderate electoral showing[35]; and a third

phase under the leadership of a cohort of orphaned politicians from the recently eliminated

PD.

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[35] Universidad Andino Simon Bolivar's German Rodas made this point.

Table 5.8:

FRA Election Results, Provincial Deputies

Region	Province	1984		1986		1988		1990		1992		1994		1996		1998		2002	
		%V	Seats	%V	Seats	%V	Seats	%V	Seats	%V	Seats	%V	Seats	%V	Seats	%V	Seats	%V	Seats
Amazon	Morona Santiago	17.1		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		1.1		12.3		0.0	
Amazon	Napo	9.6		3.2		0.0		0.0		0.0		1.2		0.8		30.5	2	7.0	
Amazon	Orellana	na		na		na		na		na		na		na		na		5.6	
Amazon	Pastaza	0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		1.4		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0	
Amazon	Sucumbios	na		na		na		0.0		0.8		11.1		2.4		3.9		9.4	
Amazon	Zamora Chinchipe	8.6		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.7		0.3		0.6		19.6	1	3.5	
Andes	Azuay	3.9		0.0		1.2		1.3		3.8		1.0		0.6		1.6		0.0	
Andes	Bolivar	0.0		22.2	1	12.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		5.1		0.4	
Andes	Canar	6.9		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		9.0		1.9		0.0	
Andes	Carchi	0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		1.4		0.7		2.1		3.3		2.5	
Andes	Chimborazo	6.0		2.9		3.7		2.2		2.4		2.6		1.8		7.0		0.0	
Andes	Cotopaxi	15.8	1	8.2		7.2		2.8		0.0		1.7		0.8		9.3		4.7	
Andes	Imbabura	2.9		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.9		2.6		16.9	1*	8.8	
Andes	Loja	3.6		1.6		1.3		7.5		6.0		0.4		1.6		3.2		0.0	
Andes	Pichincha	5.3		1.5		2.6		11.0	1	7.3	1	12.0	1	3.8		3.4		3.1	
Andes	Tungurahua	5.5		2.3		0.0		1.7		1.2		1.2		1.8		6.3	1*	7.3	
Coast	El Oro	9.8		13.4	1	7.2		5.0		2.1		1.1		0.0		5.4		0.4	
Coast	Esmeraldas	3.4		1.2		1.9		2.5		0.0		14.3		10.8		5.0		9.1	
Coast	Guayas	14.9	2	9.3	1	5.8	1	1.6		3.7		1.8		1.4		1.0		0.4	
Coast	Los Rios	14.2	1	12.1		8.7		6.1		3.1		4.0		1.3		2.7		1.0	
Coast	Manabi	10.0	1	8.3		4.5		3.9		2.0		7.8		3.2		2.6		1.0	
Other	Galapagos	26.7		19.5		0.0		0.9		2.9		0.0		2.1		8.2		0.0	
	Overall	**8.8**	**5**	**5.7**	**3**	**3.9**	**1**	**4.2**	**1**	**3.6**	**1**	**4.7**	**1**	**2.4**	**2*#**	**2.7**	**5**	**1.6**	**0**

* Alliance seats; # Province level details not available

Linkage Strategy

The FRA's linkage strategy varied over its lifetime and depended upon the leadership. The initial phase under Abdón Calderón was principled and around the issue of opposition to the authoritarian regime[36], but not organizationally and institutionally articulated, thus inconsistent with the concept of a programmatic voter-party linkage. One ID leader, contrasting the leadership style and political project of Calderón and Borja, noted that Calderón was brave and honorable in confronting the dictatorship, but he was not a political talent like Borja and he did not build an organization, city by city, like the one build by ID.[37] There is no evidence that Calderón invested his time in building an organization with linkages to non-elite sectors. While he had prior political experience within the PLRE, of the other 13 founders of the party, only César Ballentini had experience. They others were former PLRE members "without any importance." "They were friends of his, nothing more than friends, his 13 friends" from Guayaquil who "didn't represent anything".[38] In his split with the PLRE, he didn't bring with him any of the party resources and networks. His strategy relied primarily on the mass media and his critique of the regime, which were "endorsed by public opinion and by the mass media."[39] Though a respected economist in elite circles, his "folkloric" style and ability to translate his advocacy of liberal economic and political principles into "common language" generated popular appeal.[40] In preparation for the presidential election the candidate traveled the country building relationships in

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[36] Personal interview FRA-2 (2006).

[37] Personal interview ID-3 (2006).

[38] Personal interview FRA-2 (2006).

[39] Personal interview FRA-1 (2006).

[40] Personal interview FRA-2 (2006).

peripheral provinces, but there is no evidence that these relationships were anything but agreements between Calderón and the local elites. In the second phase, under the leadership of his daughter, the party continued to rely on the legacy of the founder and Cecilia's prominent national role, which she generated in the struggle for justice for her father's death. Together with Molina based in Quito, they re-registered the party and began preparations for the 1984 elections. But divisions emerged between the new leadership in Guayaquil and Molina's base in the Andes, largely over control of state campaign allocations and candidate lists. Though Molina secured a place on the list and a seat in the national-tier of the legislature over opposition from the Guayaquil leadership, he left the party the day before his inauguration,[41] and the ambition of constructing a national party all but ended. An early leader described the party in this stage as a "family thing; less than family, husband and wife."[42]

The entry of Alarcón marked a further deterioration for the principled life of the party. A party leader from Calderón's day noted that, "if Abdón Calderón, who was a radical, or I had been in the FRA, Alarcón would never have entered."[43] Alarcón and several other orphaned politicians of the PD were in search of a party and settled on the FRA. They considered and rejected the social democratic ID because of its membership in the Socialist International.[44] They saw the FRA, on the other hand, as nationalist, independent and under weak leadership. It was ripe for a takeover. One leader of ID explained bluntly, "Alarcón robbed the party from Calderón; he seized the party and Alarcón didn't represent anything or

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[41] Under Ecuadorian party law, legislators that disaffiliate are not required to surrender their seat.

[42] Personal interview FRA-2 (2006).

[43] Personal interview FRA-2 (2006).

[44] Personal interview FRA-3 (2006).

anybody in the country." Upon their entry, the center of gravity began to move towards Pichincha and Alarcón's base. Alarcón is considered a skilled political operative. Pachano (2006 note 12) notes that FRA was a small party which had influence beyond its numbers. During Alarcón's leadership, it never had more than three deputies, though it gained the presidency of congress twice and an interim presidency of the republic once. It's base was concentrated in a section of Quito in which Alarcón had an organization. One leader commenting on the transition between Calderón and Alarcón noted, "the party was wiped out, and so [Cecilia Calderón and her husband] served it to him in Quito because he needed a party and he had his own structure."[45]

Electoral Institutions

Electoral rules had a strong effect on the electoral performance of the FRA, but not in the way I had expected. In chapter 3, I hypothesize that party entry rules would not have an effect of party performance. However, in a political system where many politicians operate from extremely small territorially-based constituencies according to a machine or vote-buying strategy, and where the electoral rules require that a party compete in a wide range of constituencies distributed across the country, the system generates incentives for local machine bosses to build coalitions with other machines in order to get on the ballot. Once on the ballot, the party need not maintain its geographic distribution as long as it is able to sustain the minimum national vote threshold required by law for continued existence. This configuration of entry and survival rules generates incentives for the behavior we saw from Fabián Alarcón. He had a constituency large enough to compete and win on his own without threat to his party's survival, but not territorially distributed enough to found his own party.

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[45] Personal interview FRA-2 (2006).

Thus, rather than registering a new party, it was far less costly to occupy an existing party and take it over. The geographic requirement of the entry rule, therefore, effectively elongated what would have been the natural life of the FRA. It would have died in the late 1980s or early 1990s as the support, first generated by its founder, declined along what would likely have been classified as a "flash" trajectory.

The district magnitude, which grew more permissive over time, was never a problem for the FRA because during its two phases of life it was always based in one of the two provinces with a large district magnitude and able to easily surpass the threshold of representation. Furthermore, in the low district magnitude provinces, and in a highly fragmented system which lacks nationalized parties, it was periodically able to win one of these peripheral provinces, most likely by allying with a prominent local broker and channeling its resources very selectively.

Contender Possibilities

From the start, the FRA had little prospect of becoming a contender party. Its first generation of leaders had the ambition to build a strong national party. They began to assemble a coalition of provincial politicians with their own local bases of support, and they mobilized support with a well articulated program of primarily political, but also economic, liberalization around a partisan divide that cleaved the electorate at the time of transition. Indeed, the democratic opening that evolved out of opposition to the military regime in particular and to the long tradition of political exclusion in general provided the opportunity for at least two other new parties, ID and DP-UDC, to successfully enter the political arena, the former as a contender and the latter as a "flat" party with a programmatic strategy as its primary linkage mechanism. FRA's message together with the prominence of its leader

provided the brand name that programmatic and personalistic strategies rely upon to simplify the information burden for voters. However, unlike its other principled competitors, FRA never had the opportunity build a dense organization. Its founder's early death and his successor's more parochial concerns ended the possibility of transferring the initial success into either an enduring programmatic party along the "flat" trajectory or an enduring machine party along the "contender" path. Additionally, while the FRA was hard-hitting critic of the regime and kept out of the transition negotiations, ID and DP-UDC had a more measured opposition to the military regime and both, but especially the DP-UDC, reaped the benefits of being participants in the transition negotiations.

The party never inherited or stood a chance for assembling the types of resources necessary for building a contender. Calderón himself didn't have an obvious independent source of party-building capital, and wasn't himself connected with any of the powerful economic interests. The fact that the PLRE continued to exist and compete at the transition combined with the pittance of support he brought with him when he left that party meant that he didn't gain any organizational inheritance in the departure.

Finally, in the larger scheme of the fracturing of the Liberal tendency in the years leading up to the transition (see appendix x), the FRA was a late-comer and thus at a disadvantage, especially relative to Rodrigo Borja's ID which by 1978 had a far more developed party-building project underway.

Movimiento Unidad Plurinacional Pachakutik-Nuevo País (Pachakutik)

The Pachakutik Plurinacional Unity Movement-New Country

Pachakutik is Ecuador's primary indigenous party, formed in 1996. Until Bolivia's Evo Morales and his MAS party captured the presidency in 2005, Pachakutik was the most

successful indigenous party ever in the Americas. It is the political arm of a dense national social movement organization which itself has a collegial leadership that emphasizes internal democracy and consensus—though not without tensions and failures in this regard. The party's linkage strategy is almost purely programmatic, without substantial personalistic, machine or vote-buying components. It is a case, however, that offers some of the most compelling evidence against the efficacy of a programmatic strategy as a way to achieve the "contender" trajectory in Ecuador. Despite high levels of social mobilization in the 1990s, despite a broad spectrum of non-indigenous allies, and despite a prominent role and important victories in the 1997-1998 constituent assembly which was intended to fundamentally alter the openness of the political system and thereby reform the state, the underlying sub-provincial territorial logic of the political system and entrenchment of the particularistic interests in the state was not changed, leaving Pachakutik's programmatic platforms with respect to policy and governance lacking in credibility. In terms of the calculus of voting model, without credibility, a programmatic party's ability to alter a voter's "benefit" term is undermined.

Origins and Initial Electoral Performance

Pachakutik was formed and competed for the first time in national elections in 1996. The party emerged as the electoral arm of the indigenous social movement, CONAIE. In a comparison group with other indigenous political parties of the America's, Pachakutik's electoral performance is impressive, and its trajectory can legitimately be described as a "meteoric rise" (Van Cott, 2005, p 99). Its successes have received considerable attention from scholars. However, in a broader comparative framework reaching beyond the indigenous party family, it's electoral successes are extremely modest. As time passes and

election cycles accumulate, its status as a "flat" party, rather than a "contender" or an "explosive" party, hardens. If we add the just-complete December 2006 election result of 5.6% as the fourth in Pachakutik's national legislative series, it confirms Barrera's conclusion—one of the few early dissents from the fanfare that surrounded the emergence of Pachakutik—that its level of support has been relatively modest and constant since its founding through all types of elections, national, constituent assembly, and local (Barrera 2001).[46] Province-level legislative results appear in Table 5.10 below.

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[46] Personal interview Pachakutik-1 (2006).

Table 5.9:

Pachakutik Election Results, Provincial Deputies.

Region	Province	1996		1998		2002	
		% Vote	Seats	% Vote	Seats	% Vote	Seats
Amazon	Morona Santiago	19.3		30.4	1	23.0	1
Amazon	Napo	25.7	1	26.8	1	21.9	1
Amazon	Orellana	na		na		14.2	
Amazon	Pastaza	12.8	1	13.6	1*	15.8	
Amazon	Sucumbios	18.8		0.0		7.3	1*
Amazon	Zamora Chinchipe	0.0		4.2		18.4	2*
Andes	Azuay	28.5	2	6.7	1*	5.5	1*
Andes	Bolivar	9.7		21.6	1	15.3	1
Andes	Canar	13.9		10.1		13.0	
Andes	Carchi	0.0		2.2		1.7	
Andes	Chimborazo	18.8	1	4.4		11.4	1*
Andes	Cotopaxi	15.7	1	11.2	1	14.9	1
Andes	Imbabura	16.0		6.2	1*	16.8	1
Andes	Loja	0.0		3.1		3.7	
Andes	Pichincha	13.5	1	3.7		5.9	1*
Andes	Tungurahua	11.9		5.3		5.4	
Coast	El Oro	0.0		1.7		3.0	
Coast	Esmeraldas	0.0		0.0		2.9	
Coast	Guayas	0.0		0.0		2.7	
Coast	Los Rios	1.7		1.2		4.4	
Coast	Manabi	0.0		1.5		1.0	
Other	Galapagos	0.0		0.0		0.0	
	Overall	**7.1**	**7**	**2.1**	**7**	**4.2**	**11**

* Alliance seats.

Pachakutik's strength is in the indigenous provinces of the Andes and Amazon regions, though their strength does not extend evenly through those regions. For example, at the outset the party did not even contest the northernmost and southernmost Andean provinces of Carchi and Loja. By the time of the party's founding, CONAIE didn't operate in much of the coastal region, and the party didn't register to compete in any but one of its five provinces in 1996.

Despite this regional differential, the geographical distribution of its support is consistent with a programmatic strategy in one important respect: its support has been

relatively stable over time within district. In the provinces where fluctuations appear high, as in Imbabura, this is most often the result of the way in which vote share is computed for a party which participates in an alliance. For example, in the Andean province of Imbabura, in 1996 and 2002 Pachakutik participated on its own. In 1998 they participated in a three-way alliance and the alliance drew 18.6% of the vote. Its alliance partners, PS-FA and MCNP, were weak in Imbabura in the elections prior to and after the 1996 election. MCNP did not contest the 1996 and 2002 elections, and the PS-FA drew 3.3% and 5.3% respectively. We can conclude, therefore, that Pachakutik is responsible for the lions share of the alliance's total votes in 1998, and that the apparent dip is an artifact of the way I distribute alliance votes equally among alliance partners.

In the components of variance analysis of parish-level election results on Pachakutik, volatility accounts for almost none of the variance, with variance within election but between provinces accounting for 49% of the total variance, and residual variance within elections and provinces but between parishes accounts for 51% of the total variance. See Table 5.11 below. Overall, Pachakutik has a very high level of variance, equivalent to a standard deviation of 13.4% on its mean of 9.2%. This result is somewhat surprising. For an indigenous and programmatic party, we would expect that its appeal would vary primarily between provinces, especially to the extent that provinces overlay ethnicity, as they largely do in Ecuador. On the contrary, Pachakutik's support is distributed quite unevenly within provinces. One possible cause for this result may be that indigenous peoples are more commonly found in rural parishes than in urban ones, leading to heterogeneity of party support within the province.

Table 5.10:

Components of Variance, Pachakutik, 1996-2002

Component	Variance	% of Total
Time	0.4	0.2%
Province	87.3	48.9%
Parish	90.8	50.9%
Total	**178.5**	**100.0%**
Mean % Vote	9.2%	

Linkage Strategy

Pachakutik has consistently adopted a programmatic strategy to link with its voters. At its origins, it was able to build a fairly broad based social coalition, with the indigenous movement at its heart, but also including a wide range of other social movements (under the umbrella organization of the Coordinatora de Movimientos Sociales) and prominent progressive politicians (Andolina 2003). For example, Julie Cesar Trujillo was an early non-indigenous member of its National Committee. Trujillo is a veteran politician who—together with Osvaldo Hurtado—helped form the transition-era party, DP-UDC. DP-UDC at its founding was a Christian democratic party modeled roughly on the Chilean PDC and formed when Trujillo led the progressive wing of the PCE to join forces with a struggling PDC under Hurtado's leadership. Yet, even with many impressive members and allies, Pachakutik has languished.

The indigenous population of Ecuador ranges from 8% to 40%, depending upon the measure employed and the source of the estimate.[47] Adding to that the non-indigenous members of its social coalition, it should have had sufficient support to mount a stronger challenge to the traditional parties, especially if, as Van Cott (2005) claims, their rise came in

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[47] Census figures, CONAIE publications, and survey self-reporting reach different conclusions. See Yashar (2005) for discussion on estimates of the indigenous population of Ecuador.

the face of the decline of the other parties on the left and if, as Madrid (2005) argues, indigenous peoples were only very weakly incorporated into prior non-indigenous party organizations.

Prior to and just after the formation of the party, the indigenous movement experienced significant electoral victories. They first mobilization came in opposition to various liberalizing economic reforms proposed via referendum by the government of the Durán Ballén. Their success in defeating these efforts generated confidence in their ability to mobilize electorally for reform of the state. Unlike participation in the normal legislative process, which in the 1990s was largely locked up by a traditional political establishment, contestation over issues related to regime and state spill beyond the executive and legislative arenas and into civil society and politics in the streets. Indeed, Pachano (2006) notes the tremendous instability of electoral and institutional rules over the entire democratic episode. The indigenous movement mobilized politically in 1996 over an agenda whose principle component was state institutional reform and openness. Despite the successful campaign to hold a constitutional assembly and their prominent role in the body, they did not institutionalize norms which would generate credible programmatic policy pledges in distributional politics.

In this project, I argue that a programmatic strategy is not a winning strategy in Ecuador. In order to succeed on the pledge to deliver broad public goods, it is necessary that the pledges be credible. The system-level logic of politics and governance in Ecuador undermines this credibility. According to Chandra (2005), political entrepreneurs will be successful in mobilizing social cleavages when those cleavages are institutionalized, as for

example is the case with caste and tribe, but not religion, in India under their post-colonial affirmative action policies.

One reason for Pachakutik's languishing electoral performance may be that it failed to achieve reforms in the 1997-98 assembly of the type that incentivized credible contestation on the basis of ethnicity. As in India, the Ecuadorian state is a large player in the economy and a important element in the fortunes of any group hoping for political, social and economic advancement; however, unlike India, where access to the state is institutionalized through affirmative action programs among other things, Ecuador provides no such benefits either before or as a result of the constitutional reforms. On the contrary, the constitutional reform process granted only symbolic ethnic victories, and not material ones. The victories were important, to be sure. Andolina (2003 p 722) characterizes them as "new indigenous rights, citizen rights and constitutive principles." Nevertheless, they only amounted to abstract acknowledgements of the status of indigenous peoples with a nod to their legitimate role in the state, but without enacting particular benefits.[48]

In sum, though the indigenous movement generated initially strong support in contesting various elements of state reform, it failed to translate ethnicity into a political issue over which the party could credibly contest access to the state and other material benefits.

Electoral Institutions

The institutional environment had little effect on Pachakutik's performance profile. There is a large debate in the literature about the effect of party registration rules on Pachakutic's *entry*. Van Cott (2005) and Birnir (2004) argue that the 1994 reforms to party

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[48] For review and analysis of Pachakutik's role in the constituent assembly see Van Cott (2005, 2003), Andolina (2003), Lucero (2003).

registration rules—and in particular the changes allowing 1) the registration of political "movements" in addition to political "parties;" 2) the formation of electoral alliances; and 3) the relaxation of the provincial distribution component which dropped the provision that a party register in at least two of the coastal provinces (Acosta, et al 2006, Birnir 2004)—were decisive in Pachakutik's decision to enter. Andolina (1999) and Collins (2001), on the other hand find that these barriers were merely "psychological" and not material barriers to entry. Though this important question is beyond the scope of this project, the electoral profile of the cross-party family cases presented here suggests that Pachakutik could have managed to register to complete in the coast in accordance with the pre-reform rules. In particular, the very low intercept of many of the trajectory groups and the highly selective province-by-province registration strategies pursued by some of the pre-reform parties raises doubts about the rigor of the registration rules to block any party's entry, but especially a party that is widely supported in much of the country. The party needed only to gather the requisite signatures in the coastal province, not marshal a credible challenge for one of the seats. Much smaller parties with far fewer resources have managed to do so over the years.

The influence of district magnitude and electoral thresholds, which I argue could effect electoral performance if a party's expected support were well below the threshold, is largely irrelevant to Pachakutik. There was little doubt that Pachakutik could generate support in the districts—even the single member districts—in which the indigenous movement was large and organized. Additionally, the effective threshold in larger districts, such as Pichincha, was so low that it wouldn't prevent voters from supporting the party.

Contender Possibilities

Pachano argues, "Pachakutik has adopted the same logic as the system as a whole, forced to take refuge in local bastions in order to build up its electoral strength at the cost of not having a presence in other regions" (2006 p. 126). Indeed, the party's strength is conventionally seen as more formidable in elections for local and provincial positions where its constituents are concentrated. But the party is limited in the extent that it can expand the breadth of its coalition beyond indigenous voters precisely because state fragmentation and politicization prohibits policy formulation around a logic of broad club goods. The breadth of their coalition, in fact, has atrophied as non-indigenous leaders and organizations have left or been expelled from the party. In this respect, it is evolving in the opposite direction as the MAS in Bolivia.

It remains possible that a change of strategy to a more pragmatic one, which incorporates less principled elements such as vote buying and machine strategies, could alter the trajectory of the party, in much the same way as the PT in Brazil altered strategy. If Pachakutik's politicians gain experience and credibility in governance at lower levels they may retain the possibility of winning programmatic support beyond a narrow indigenous base, but there is little hope that the system will sustain such a party without a larger project to organize and broaden the social base. In fact, this very strategy, of dual electoral and social initiatives, has in fact generated tensions within movement and between the social organization and the electoral arm (Van Cott 2005, Yashar 2005, Beck and Mijelski 2001). To the extent that the elected politicians engaged in the give and take of negotiation and coalition building, the social organization grew disenchanted with what it perceived as sell-outs of the core principles. Furthermore, Ecuadorian executives have often effectively used the electoral vehicle to drive wedges between the otherwise remarkable unified federation of

regional and provincial indigenous organizations by manipulating alliances through offers of positions and perks to its leaders. These dynamics illustrate the inherent tension involved in an effort to combine programmatic strategies with machine and clientelistic ones.

Flash Parties

The latent trajectory model of Chapter 2 produced the predicted "flash" trajectory which appears bolded in Figure 5.6 below. The two Ecuadorian cases which were classified into this group also appear in the figure. I have adjusted the scale of the vertical axis from a range of -10 to 60 (from Figure 2.7) to a range of -5 to 25 in order to make the individual trajectories distinguishable. Though in this perspective they appear to be a heterogeneous group, when plotted with the other parties on a –10 to 60 scale they appear as a distinct and homogeneous group.

Figure 5.6:

The "Flash" Trajectory in Ecuador

Partido Unidad Republicana (PUR)-United Republic Party

The PUR's voter-party linkage was a combination of machine and personalist

strategies designed to put the party founder, Sixto Durán Ballén, into the presidency, and a

web of other veteran politicians into the prominent posts and elected office. Despite the

ultimate collapse of the party, early party founders insist that they had long-term ambitions

for the party.[49] It was, on the one hand, a party of the right in its predispositions, having

origins in the PCE and PSC. But its initial electoral success was built around the reputation

of the party founder and his ability to bring together a relatively large group of experienced

politicians and economic elites in select pockets around the country seeking particularistic

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[49] Personal interviews TSI-1 (2006), PUR-1 (2006).

benefit for their narrow interests. Coordination at the elite level quickly broke down, even before the first round of the presidential election, leaving the party weak. Furthermore, the very reputational capital that made Durán a focal point for other provincial politicians in outlaying areas was damaged when his vice-president was charged with corruption, resigned, and fled into exile. Durán, too, faced suspicion and by the end of his term the party disbanded and many of its remaining leaders folded into the Conservative Party (PCE).

Origins and Initial Electoral Performance

The conventional understanding on the PUR is that the party formed as a split by Sixto Durán with the PSC in a nomination battle between himself and the ultimate nominee, Jaime Nebot. Certainly, the trajectory of the party, combined with the accompanying narrative, conforms to this account. Durán, having lost the nomination and challenged its legitimacy, withdrew from the PSC with the support of others who objected to the firm grip on leadership by León Febres-Cordero. At its origins, the PSC was a highland party of reformist dissidents from the Conservative Party (PCE). But with the transition to democracy, coastal businessman Febres-Cordero used the fledgling party as his platform to contest a 1978 national-tier seat in the legislature from his base in Guayaquil. Durán was its presidential candidate. But Febres-Cordero was the party's most prominent and outspoken member and is credited with resurrecting the party (Hurtado 1990). In preparation for 1992's election, Durán recreated himself as an independent candidate and won the election in the second round against PSC candidate Nebot.

This styled narrative, however, overlooks what some founding members of the PUR indicate was a more ambitious effort. In fact, though Durán was their marquee personality,

several suggest that he was not among the instigators of the party.[50] Instead, he was brought

in by the founders to head the list. Two more substantial calculations (beyond the electoral

ambitions of a single personality) were allegedly involved. First, Durán Ballén was involved

in a fundamental challenge with Febres-Cordero, attempting to redirect the party into genuine

political organization rooted in its founding Christian Democratic philosophy rather than as a

party in close alignment with Guayaquil business sectors (Hammond 2004). Having lost this

battle, Durán and other elements saw the creation of a new party as a chance to embark on

such a project. Furthermore, in the twilight of the troubled presidential administration of the

chief social democratic party, ID, the founders saw an opening to create a party which

included center-left support in the coalition. On top of the weakness in ID, the traditional left

in general was in disarray following the crumbling of the Soviet Union.[51] The PUR was

courting probably support from one moderate leftist faction, led by Alfredo Castillo, which

had formed the PLN. One founding member argued, "I wanted to make a party not only out

of the circumstances, but for the long-term."[52] Whatever their intentions, the tactical decision

over choice of a vice-presidential running mate for Durán rent the party in two. Durán was

favoring an alliance with the Conservative Party (PCE), placing hard-line liberal economist

Alberto Dahik on the ticket. PUR director, Mauricio Gándara, opposed a joint ticket with the

Conservative Party because it would alienate support on the left. Furthermore, Dahik wanted

the ticket to support PCE candidates in the legislative elections rather than the affiliates that

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[50] Personal interview TSI-1 (2006) indicates that there were five founders: Quito-based Mauricio Gándara, Marcelo Fernández Sánchez, Francisco Acosta Yëpez, Alfredo Lasso Freire and Guayaquil-based Jacinto Valesquez.

[51] Personal interview, PLN-1 (2006).

[52] Personal interview PUR-1 (2006).

Gándara and his clique had been cultivating in the provinces.[53] In the end, the alliance with the PCE was cemented, Gándara was expelled and many of his followers left the PUR. Durán had lost his core political operatives, and some argue that Ecuador under Durán Ballén was actually ruled by his Vice President, Dahik (Bonilla 2001).

Like so many new parties in Ecuador, the initial electoral effort is concentrated in a few provinces. The PUR, unlike most other new parties prior to the electoral reforms of the late 1990s, not only registered candidates in the number of provinces sufficient to secure the geographical distribution requirement, but competed very well in all those provinces. In four of the six provinces where it failed to win a seat, it was one or two positions out of qualifying. In the two-seat district of Bolivar, for example, it finished third. Furthermore, a comparison with the returns of the PCE, there is evidence that terms of the final deal between the two parties was that the PUR would support PCE candidates in select districts. With the exception of Pichincha, where both parties competed well and won two seats each, PUR never competed opposite a PCE candidate. The PCE won one seat each in Carchi and Tungurahua. See Table 5.12 below.

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[53] Personal interview TSI-1 (2006).

Table 5.11:

PUR Election Results, Provincial Deputies.

Region	DM	Province	1992		1994	
			% Vote	Seats	% Vote	Seats
Amazon	1	Morona Santiago	16.7		0.0	
Amazon	2	Napo	8.6		0.0	
Amazon	na	Orellana	na		na	
Amazon	1	Pastaza	14.9		1.7	
Amazon	1	Sucumbios	15.7		0.5	
Amazon	1	Zamora Chinchipe	0.0		0.0	
Andes	4	Azuay	19.5	1	0.0	
Andes	2	Bolivar	21.6		11.5	
Andes	2	Canar	0.0		0.0	
Andes	2	Carchi	0.0		0.0	
Andes	3	Chimborazo	22.4	1	7.9	
Andes	3	Cotopaxi	0.0		6.6	
Andes	3	Imbabura	16.1	1	3.6	
Andes	3	Loja	0.0		0.0	
Andes	8	Pichincha	19.1	2	1.7	
Andes	3	Tungurahua	0.0		3.3	
Coast	3	El Oro	16.2	1	16.5	
Coast	3	Esmeraldas	8.8		3.7	
Coast	10	Guayas	17.1	2	0.0	
Coast	4	Los Rios	14.0	1	10.7	
Coast	5	Manabi	15.8	1	14.2	1
Other	1	Galapagos	0.0		0.0	
		Overall	**14.8**	**10**	**3.9**	**1**

The components of variance analysis on PUR's parish-level vote percentage reveals that the party's high variance—equivalent to a standard deviation of 11.2%, which is nearly as high as its mean vote percentage across all parishes—is somewhat higher between provinces than it is within provinces but between parishes. See Table 5.13 below. This result is consistent with the party's strategy of not contesting seats in provinces in which its alliance partner, the PCE, was competing. Still, the high variance between parishes is consistent with a strategy in which the party selectively targets parishes in which to compete.

Table 5.12:

Components of Variance, PUR, 1992

Component	Variance	% of Total
Time	na	na
Province	69.1	56.1%
Parish	54.1	43.9%
Total	**123.2**	**100.0%**
Mean % Vote	11.8%	

Linkage Strategy

Whatever the original intent of the five founders of the party, PUR failed to build an organization with deep linkages throughout the country. Its very electoral strategy in alliance with the PCE was built upon pragmatism rather than principle. We cannot determine whether the alternative strategy of a long-term centrist alliance, as espoused by Gándara, would have been principled or simply an alternative pragmatic approach. But having lost his principle party-building cohort, Durán had little alternative but to lean on the PCE and a right-wing political agenda to solicit support, thereby alienating the left from his presidency. Indeed, one member of the Imbabura provincial party leadership –where the PUR competed and the PCE did not in 1992—described the origins of the PUR in the province as having formed out of the PCE, rather than out of the PSC, as most describe it.[54]

The party's principle linkage strategy was personalistic around Durán. As one of the founder's noted, they recruited him because he was "a well-known personality, a well-known man."[55] A provincial leader in Imbabura stated that prior to the 1992 campaign, she was not affiliated with any party and that she joined the effort because she liked Durán himself. In

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[54] Personal interview PUR-2 (2006). In fact, Durán was a member of the PCE before joining with the PSC.

[55] Personal interview PUR-1 (2006).

this remote province, he had assembled a party based upon linkages with prominent local politicians rather than by building an independent organization of his own linked. The linkages were elitist and not built upon any social or community organizational base. In the end, she indicated that it was the corruption scandals—not only of Durán's vice-president, but also involving his daughter—that cost the party its support in Imbabura province. [56]

Electoral Institutions

For the PUR, the threshold of representation—and principally the district magnitude—effected the electoral fortunes in that it set a target vote share that the party needed to win in order to secure a seat. In all but the two largest provinces, where the PUR competed, it's vote share was very close to the minimum needed to win one seat. This reflects the tactical calculations the party made as it recruited provincial politicians to its cause and candidate lists.

In its initial 1992 election, it competed and exerted considerable effort in five of the nine single-member and two-member districts, but failed to win any seats. It competed and exerted considerable effort in six of the nine moderately sized districts of three or four seats and won a seat in five of them. In the three large districts of five to 10 seats, it won at least one seat in each and five overall.

By the 1994 election, as the party's future was in doubt, most local politicians abandoned the party. Only in Manabi, Los Rios, and El Oro did the party perform at a level where winning a seat was possible. This is consistent with what one would expect in districts with few seats—two or a few parties have competitive vote returns, and all other parties have little.

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[56] Personal interview PUR-2 (2006).

In sum, despite the relatively low average district magnitude that existed in the early 1990's, the electoral system offered little obstacle to PUR's initial high entry. On the one hand, it took advantage of the high district magnitude provinces was able to win five seats; on the other hand, in the low and moderate district magnitude provinces, given the highly fragmented party system and the absence of nationalized parties, it was able to very selectively channel its resources and win a few seats. By 1994, the incentives generated by small districts made its support evaporate quickly in those places and, consequently, overall its decline was sharp.

Contender Possibilities

In winning the presidency at the time of party formation, the PUR secured access to the resources of the state. These resources could have been used, as they have by so many other Ecuadorian politicians, to build a party organization. However, with the party's linkage resting almost entirely on Durán's reputation, following scandal, the party had little opportunity to strengthen ties with the provincial affiliates it had secured at the outset. Building an organizational network with deep and disciplined ties takes substantial time, and Durán's governing problems interrupted the process. Additionally, Durán was in his seventies and the party had not established a cohort of potential leaders that could have taken his place in the leadership. In short, the party was not consolidated as a machine organization with the procedures, hierarchy, and national reach needed to project it onto a contender trajectory.

Partido Demócrata (PD)-Democratic Party

Origins and Initial Electoral Performance

The PD was founded by Francisco Huerta Montalvo, and other dissidents of the PLRE, at the time of transition to democracy. Though at times identified as "center-left," as for example by Coppedge (1997) and in the party's own proceedings from their convention in 1984,[57] the party behaved as a network of provincial and pragmatic politicians around Huerta's leadership.

After Huerta left the party before the 1986 elections, it lost most of its support. Many of its leaders defected from the party in search of other affiliations. Among them was Fabián Alarcón who moved to the FRA, as analyzed above.

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[57] Proceedings of the PD 10th convention in the city of Ibarra, 1984.

Table 5.13:

PD Election Results, Provincial Deputies.

Region	DM	Province	1984		1986		1988	
			% Vote	Seats	% Vote	Seats	% Vote	Seats
Amazon	1	Morona Santiago	0.0		0.0		0.0	
Amazon	2	Napo	0.0		0.0		0.0	
Amazon	na	Orellana	na		na		na	
Amazon	1	Pastaza	0.0		0.0		0.0	
Amazon	na	Sucumbios	na		na		na	
Amazon	1	Zamora Chinchipe	25.6	1	0.0		0.0	
Andes	3	Azuay	14.0	1	6.9		4.9	
Andes	2	Bolivar	7.3		0.0		2.2	
Andes	2	Canar	6.7		0.0		0.0	
Andes	2	Carchi	0.0		0.0		0.0	
Andes	3	Chimborazo	0.0		6.7		7.6	
Andes	3	Cotopaxi	7.1		4.6		0.0	
Andes	3	Imbabura	15.0	1	7.9		0.0	
Andes	3	Loja	11.5		4.3		0.0	
Andes	6	Pichincha	15.4	1	6.4		4.7	
Andes	3	Tungurahua	11.5		17.1	1	3.1	
Coast	3	El Oro	0.0		2.0		0.0	
Coast	3	Esmeraldas	4.2		1.1		1.5	
Coast	9	Guayas	3.7		2.5		0.6	
Coast	3	Los Rios	2.9		7.9		0.0	
Coast	5	Manabi	6.6	1	3.1		1.3	
Other	1	Galapagos	0.0		3.4		0.0	
		Overall	8.0	5	4.7	1	2.0	0

Linkage Strategy

The party deployed a primarily personalist strategy in two respects. First, the party relied upon the leadership of Huerta. He was a prominent leader of the PLRE who was a very promising and charismatic potential candidate for the presidency in 1978. He would have been chosen at the head of the ticket were it not for a technicality which disqualified him that

year.[58] Later, the old-guard leadership of the PLRE was resistant to Huerta and the new cohort of leadership around him, so Huerta and his colleagues left and formed the PD.[59]

Second, the PD attempted to present itself as the authentic, if reformist, branch of the old time PLRE. The PLRE at this time had few organized roots in the widely expanded electorate of the early 1980s. Still, it had a residual reputation, especially in the coastal region, as a defender of traditional liberal values which invoked the personalities of Eloy Alfaro and other liberal heroes of the Ecuadorian nation. Huerta and his followers attempted to capitalize on this brand by co-opting symbolic elements of the party. For example, they originally registered their party as "Partido Radical Democrata," meant to suggest continuity with the "Partido Liberal Radical Ecuatoriano." The old-guard PLRE challenged this registration with the electoral authorities, who decided in the PLRE's favor. The party had to drop "Radical" from its name and call itself the "Partido Democrata."[60] Nevertheless, the new group cultivated this image of itself and benefited as a result. The effort is in some ways programmatic, in that it attempts to solve the voter information problem by providing simple cues around an ideology. Nevertheless, a programmatic linkage implies deeper and more enduring ties to organized and enduring ethnic, social or economic constituents. The PD lacked these ties and was simply leveraging the reputational capital of its lineage.

Electoral Institutions

As with the PUR, the PD's tactical electoral decisions were shaped by the district magnitude. In most districts, where the magnitude was very low, the party was forced to decide whether or not to compete. We see in the district results evidence that party leaders

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[58] Personal interview FRA-2 (2006).

[59] Personal interview PD-1 (2006).

[60] See PD-TSE correspondence of 1983.

made a discrete decision about whether to register, to register but not compete, or to register and compete. In 1984 it registered to compete in 13 districts, only three more than the 10 required by law for that election. All seven districts in which it did not compete had a low district magnitude of three or less. Among those in which it registered, in the two seat districts of Bolivar and Canar, it didn't come close to winning a seat. In the three-seat districts in which it competed, it won a seat in three, came close in two more, and it didn't come close in three others. Finally, it took advantage of the high district magnitude in Manabí, Pichincha, and Guayas and won a seat in the two former and came close in Guayas. By the second election, the low magnitude of most of the districts contributed to the fast decline of the party. The logic of the effect of district magnitude when it is low is that if a party doesn't expect to be competitive at a very high level, then it is not worth competing at all in a district. The district level results suggest that local politicians which had supported the party in 1984 had begun defecting. This happened in Zamora Chinchipe, Azuay, Bolivar, Canar, Cotopaxi, Imbabura, Loja, and Manabi. Only in Tungurahua did the party's support sustain itself for one more election.

In sum, despite the relatively low average district magnitude that existed in the mid 1980's, the electoral system offered little obstacle to PD's entry with a high intercept. In the three high district magnitude provinces the party was able to win one seat with a low vote share, In the other low district magnitude provinces, given the highly fragmented party system and the absence of nationalized parties, it was able to very selectively channel its resources and win a few seats. By 1986, the incentives of the small districts made its support evaporate in those places, hastening its overall decline.

Contender Possibilities

PD never managed to secure access to state or private resources sufficient to project itself onto a contender trajectory. One of the factors which undermined its prospects was that it failed to gain access to resources of the state. After losing the 1984 presidential election, it supported the center-left ID in the second round as party of the "bloque progresista" and would have gained access to patronage via the Borja administration had ID won the election. However, ID lost and PD ended up in opposition. Furthermore, the PD did not win executive office in either of the two major cities, which has often been the way in which parties have secured access to party-building resources.

Additionally, in the course of splitting with the PLRE following the transitional elections, the PD did not inherit any substantial machine network, and in particular not in one of the two primary provinces. Lacking such resources, by the 1986 mid-term elections, members of the party coalition from outlying provinces had begun to defect to other party competitors.

In 1985, the party was disrupted by major organizational battles. Two rival factions each held national meetings in June and July of that year, both claiming to be the legitimate forum. The matter was adjudicated in front of the electoral authorities, the TSE, and decided in favor of the dominant faction of followers of Huerta.[61] However, by 1988 the founder had left, and other important members were finding other partisan homes.

The PD entered at a disadvantage in that it was one of the latter defectors from the PLRE. Potential liberal allies of the party had already been incorporated into earlier defectors, especially into ID, but also into FRA. This is consistent with the finding in Chapter III that early movers have an advantage over late-comers. In Appendix 4, one can see from

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[61] See correspondence in TSE archives.

its origins in 1978 as a split from the PLRE that PD is located within the general Liberal tradition. Like all parties within the tradition that began after ID, it lived only a few electoral cycles before dying.[62]

The party never managed to build a clientelistic organization with national reach. In the national legislature, it won five seats in provinces of all three regions of the country during its first year out in 1984. However, the party focused its attention at the national level and did not build an organization rooted in local constituencies with candidates for city and provincial level offices.

I hypothesize that contenders in the Ecuadorian system must be weakly constrained by ideological and social structural ties. The PD meets this requirement. First, as party leaders left the party over the course of about four years, they joined parties which are widely varied on the ideological spectrum.[63] For example, prominent leaders joined the following parties, coded according to Coppedge (1997): Heinz Moeller Freile and Nicolás Lapentti joined the far right PSC; Fabián Alarcón joined the center-right FRA; Javier Munoz, Washington Bonilla joined center-left DP-UDC; Marco Poaño Maya joined personalist PRE; and Cesár Alarcón ultimately joined the center-left Partido Alianza Nacional which he renamed Partido Libertad. Second, the party adopted some formal positions that conformed with liberalism of Ecuador in the 1980s—opposition to the dictatorship, economic openness, etc.[64]—but the key attribute of this feature is that the party be constrained to uphold those

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[62] CID was a party from within the liberal tradition that predated ID. It was born in 1965 to sustain its leader, Otto Arosemena, in his candidacy for the presidency. In November of 1966, a constituent assembly choose him as president and he served until 1968. Though it lived into the 1978 democratic transition, and Arosemena won a national deputy seat at that time, it was a personalist vehicle that never aspired to build a national political organization. It, too, soon died.

[63] Personal interview PD-1 (2006).

[64] See "Plan of Government" and "Declaration of Principles"

positions via its linkages with groups in civil society. As described earlier in this chapter, civil society is generally weak in Ecuador and consequently does not serve as a strong constraint on any party. In the case of the PD, the party had no substantial linkages with even the weak groups that did exist in Ecuadorian society, and so it had considerable room to maneuver and compromise on its declared principles.

Overall, while the PD was generally weakly constrained by a strong programmatic orientation and social linkages, it lacked access to resources and it lacked the constituency-based network with national reach which is needed to achieve contender status in Ecuador.

Contenders

The latent trajectory model of Chapter 2 produced the predicted "contender" trajectory which appears bolded in Figure 5.7 below. The three Ecuadorian cases which were classified into this group also appear in the figure. I have adjusted the scale of the vertical axis from a range of -10 to 60 (from Figure 2.7) to a range of 0 to 25 in order to make the individual trajectories distinguishable. Though in this perspective they appear to be a heterogeneous group, when plotted with the other parties on a –10 to 60 scale they appear as a distinct and homogeneous group.

Figure 5.7:

The "Contender" Trajectory in Ecuador

Izquierda Democratica (ID)-Democratic Left

ID was formed in the 1970s by a group of dissidents from the PLRE. Leadership was

collegial and the platform was social democratic and principled. Despite the fact the ID is

widely considered the most institutionalized party in the country, the absence of a strong

underlying organized social base made the party vulnerable to the same clientelistic

incentives that shape other parties in the system. By 1984, when the conservative

administration of PSC president León Febres-Cordero was in office, the cohesion of the party

was easily weakened. Febres-Cordero directed a concerted effort to build a majority

congressional alliance by soliciting defectors from ID and other parties of the opposition

"bloque progressista" (Conaghan 1988). His success in picking off ID legislators is reflected

in the results from the 1986 mid-term elections in Table 5.15 below, when ID lost a third of

its seats. By the end of his term, however, Febres-Cordero's agenda had mostly collapsed and the campaign for the 1988 election, in which Borja was considered a favorite to win, enabled ID to woo back support from its fickle provincial allies. Borja won the 1988 election, but executive office has never been kind to Ecuadorian parties. His administration was hampered by economic crisis, governance crisis, and what many on the left felt to be Borja's sell-out to a program of soft liberalizing economic reforms. These problems ultimately undermined ID's credibility as a principled programmatic party. One party leader from this period emphasized that the great weakness of ID arose following Borja's presidency because, even though it was "one of the respectable governments that this country has had, it didn't satisfy everybody and it left things undone."[65] From there, ID largely retreated from its national social democratic strategy with a broad-based platform and devolved to a political machine delivering particularistic goods to narrow geographically defined constituencies, primarily within provinces of the Andes, but also in provinces in other regions.

Origins and Initial Electoral Performance

ID entered the national political arena in 1979 with 14.8% of the national vote, the highest intercept of any new party since Ecuador's transition. It contested national legislative, presidential and sub-national elections during each election since then. The interruptions in the generally upward trajectory over the first five elections arose as a result of its overall success. The drop in 1986 was the result of efforts of the governing PSC party to build a legislative majority by wooing members of ID and the wider opposition to switch parties. Conaghan (1988) recounts specific and brazen efforts by president León Febres-Cordero to

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[65] Personal interview ID-1 (2006).

this end. The second drop in 1990 was during the mid-term elections following ID president's 1988 election and reflected discontent with the president's tenure.

Rodrigo Borja is widely considered the principle party leader, though he is rarely consider to be a leader of the charismatic type nor one who maintained his leadership through a personalist style (Freidenberg 2001). He served as one of the party's founding members, president of the country from 1988 until 1992, and leader of the party for many years. Party leadership has been fairly collegial and ID is the only main party to hold a primary election to choose its presidential candidate, though it did so only once in advance of the 1988 presidential elections.[66] One party founder described the party as being initiated and organized collectively by "a small group of young people" on the one hand, and by "poor neighborhood leaders" on the other.[67] In this founder's account, there was a notable omission of any mention of labor leaders or leaders of other organized sectors, though upon my specific inquiry he indicated that the party was forming organizational linkages with labor and artisan unions.

The party was born following the 1968 election of Jose Maria Velasco Ibarra to the presidency. Velasco Ibarra, a highland populist caudillo who had been elected to his fifth term of office in June, arranged a congressional pact with the PLRE after he defeated them in the elections. This alliance, known as the "Pacto Mordoré," caused considerable dissention within the PLRE ranks and contributed to the departure of Borja, Manuel Córdova, and other more principled members of the PLRE.[68]

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[66] Under the leadership of Raul Baca, there was a movement to implement primaries for all candidacies in the party, but this effort ultimately failed. See Personal interview ID-1 (2006).

[67] Personal interview ID-2 (2006).

[68] ID is sometimes erroneously thought to have started in 1968. In that year, a coalition of mostly center-left parties—including PSE, CFP, PLRE and other small parties—joined in what was called the "Frente de

The party is social democratic and a member of Socialist International. Still, one of the big questions with respect to ID is whether or not it is truly a "modern" party. In an interview with a party leader from 1976 until around 1993 when renounced his membership, the subject discusses his disenchantment with ID and with the programmatic potential for the entire party system in Ecuador. He believes that "countries like Ecuador aren't prepared for a party regime"; that in order for them to "operate under a party mentality, under a party structure, they will need…fifty or sixty years."[69]

Prior to participating at the national level in the 1978 presidential elections, the party fielded candidates in the 1970 elections for municipal, provincial, and national legislative posts. The relatively strong results propelled the party's ambitions for national office. beginning in 1978.[70] Despite winning two national congressional seats in the June 1970 election—including one for Borja in the province of Pichincha and one in Azuay—Velasco Ibarra staged a self-coup on June 22 when he dismissed congress and the Supreme Court. The elected deputies never took their seats.

Izquierda Democratica" to support the candidacy of Andrés Córdova for the presidential election. See Personal interview ID-2 (2006).

[69] Personal interview ID-3 (2006).

[70] Personal interview ID-2 (2006).

Table 5.14:

ID Election Results, Provincial Deputies.

Region	Province	1979		1984		1986		1988		1990		1992		1994		1996		1998		2002	
		%V	Seats	%V	Seats	%V	Seats	%V	Seats	%V	Seats	%V	Seats	%V	Seats	%V	Seats	%V	Seats	%V	Seats
Amazon	Morona Santiago	50.8	1	41.1	1	0.0		45.1	1	30.4		24.7	1	23.1		22.9		11.9	2*	9.5	1
Amazon	Napo	21.8		33.1	1	18.8	1	25.0	2	25.2	1	17.7	1	16.0		7.4		3.9		6.6	
Amazon	Orellana																			8.7	1
Amazon	Pastaza	39.2	1	0.0		0.0		35.5	1	15.2		5.8		34.2	1	0.0		11.5		12.8	
Amazon	Sucumbios									18.4		11.8		7.5		0.0		5.1		2.4	
Amazon	Zamora Chinchipe	0.0		25.3		22.6		35.7	1	21.7		0.0		4.0		0.0		4.2		3.5	
Andes	Azuay	18.4	1	25.6	1	29.1	2	39.3	2	16.2	1	0.0		20.1	1	12.1		6.7	1*	33.3	3
Andes	Bolivar	13.0		27.9	1	19.6		28.2	1	23.4	1	25.8	1	19.5		11.7		16.1	1	12.2	1
Andes	Canar	22.6		38.8	2	20.3		35.9	1	22.8	1	21.3	1	10.6		10.3		15.8	1	12.4	
Andes	Carchi	22.5	1	38.8	1	28.8	1	32.8	1	17.7		17.0		24.4	1	17.7		17.9	1	18.1	1
Andes	Chimborazo	18.3	1	26.5	1	12.8		22.6	2	12.8		22.0	1	14.6	1	5.5		16.6	1	7.6	1
Andes	Cotopaxi	6.2		19.9	1	15.0	1	19.6	1	11.2		10.5		8.3		5.2		6.1	1*	9.4	
Andes	Imbabura	33.4	2	37.0	2	17.5	1	29.9	2	31.8	2	19.9	1	12.0		15.3		13.9		13.0	
Andes	Loja	2.2		19.6	1	14.7		25.2	1	13.8	1	10.9		12.9		4.2		9.1		7.0	1
Andes	Pichincha	21.5	2	23.8	2	19.2	2	29.1	3	15.8	1	11.2	1	12.7	1	10.2		27.5	7	28.4	6
Andes	Tungurahua	19.3	1	23.6	1	17.7	2	28.2	2	12.0		9.4		12.3		10.6		16.7	1	8.2	
Coast	El Oro	15.8	1	27.2	1	16.5	1	30.1	1	15.1		11.3		17.6	1	24.0		6.9		10.5	1
Coast	Esmeraldas	13.5		14.4	1	7.0		17.1	1	15.6	2	12.8		9.8		2.0		10.4		6.1	
Coast	Guayas	8.8	1	8.5	1	7.1	1	11.6	1	5.7	1	3.4		4.4		2.2		4.0		3.5	
Coast	Los Rios	12.0		15.9	1	12.2		16.4	1	6.8		3.1		4.0		1.1		2.8		5.9	
Coast	Manabi	6.6		17.0	1	13.7	1	19.8	2	16.1	1	9.9		4.8		4.8		3.4		6.8	
Other	Galapagos	64.6	1	35.9	1	31.2	1	17.4		26.7		19.7		7.9		0.0		8.2		8.9	
	Overall	**14.8**	**13**	**20.0**	**21**	**14.5**	**14**	**22.6**	**27**	**13.0**	**12**	**9.0**	**7**	**10.0**	**6**	**7.2**	**3#**	**12.2**	**16***	**12.1**	**16**

*Alliance seats; # Province level details not available.

Table 5.15:

Components of Variance, ID, 1992, 1996, 1998, 2002

Component	Variance	% of Total
Time	1.1	1.0%
Province	53.2	46.7%
Parish	59.6	52.3%
Total	**113.9**	**100.0%**
Mean % Vote	11.3%	

Linkage Strategy

ID's strategic linkages are somewhat ambiguous and mixed. I argue below that the programmatic content of the party is largely rhetorical; therefore, it is largely absent. The principle reason for this is that the party is not strongly linked with any social, economic, or ethnic group that is able to enforce the party's programmatic platform and constrain its non-programmatic linkage strategy. Despite the emergence of Borja as the key leader in the party, especially following the 1980 death of Manuel Córdova,[71] the party isn't strongly personalistic. Personalism has played the role one would expect in a presidential system and the fortunes of ID have undoubtedly risen and fallen with the popularity of Borja. Personalism is used as a supplemental linkage strategy. He ran for president five times—1978, 1984, 1988, 1998 and 2002. Term limits prevented his run in 1992, and in both 1996 and 2006 ID supported an outsider on the presidential ticket. Nevertheless, there is a certain significant amount of political support that does not rise and fall with the popularity of Borja. The key linkage mechanism for ID is the machine type and there is likely to be some supplemental vote-buying that occurs.

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[71] Personal interview ID-3 (2006).

The key to the organization, according to one founder, is the neighborhood cells. "There is an enormous multitude of cells."[72] He continue, "these cells answer to the leadership of the parish because the neighborhoods together form the parish; the group of parishes form the canton; the group of cantons form the province; and the group of 22 provinces form the national structure, in the form of a pyramid." As the response to question concerning the organizational footing of the party, this conception of the party as operating under a fundamentally geographic logic is revealing. Alternatively, he might have offered a organizing logic that mapped onto functional or sectoral locations. The pyramid metaphor is consistent with an organization adopting machine-based linkage strategy.

The social democratic programmatic rhetoric has always been strong from ID. One leader is quoted in 2006 as saying, "Ecuadorian social democracy has something in common with European social democracy, except that European social democracy is less radical, less ambitious…They have many accomplishments and little left to conquer and so they dedicate themselves to defend their achievements…We have little to defend and much to accomplish." [73] Nevertheless, the formal organizational articulation of the programmatic linkage is weak. In the interviews I conducted, the description of the founding years lacks a strong emphasis on organizationally articulated social-political linkages. One founder notes that the initial organizational effort involved "many years of my life traveling the country leading conferences about the ideology of our party and to organize the membership and the leadership bodies around the country."[74] When asked specifically whether this work including building linkages with organized civil society, and unions in particular, he agreed

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[72] Personal interview ID-2 (2006).

[73] Personal interview ID-2 (2006).

[74] Personal interview ID-2 (2006).

but did not elaborate. Instead, he proceeded immediately to reemphasize the conferences, and in particular efforts at universities and high schools in order to "attract the youth." Independently, a different subject confirmed that ID "did not have a real link with the unions" and that it "gave much more emphasis to the intellectual sector," by which he meant professors, students and a middle class sympathetic to social democratic rhetoric.[75] A third subject, who was a leader based in Guayaquil and has since left the party, emphasized that during the time when ID was seeking to build a party that stretched outside of Quito and the highlands, they operated by reaching out to prominent individuals in provincial cities around the country. "We went from city to city, from province to province, looking for men that we had heard were men of stature, that were young professionals, successful businessmen, people of progressive ideas." This account of party-building was indistinguishable from those I heard in interview from provincial capitals about the party building efforts of other plainly pragmatic parties, such as PRIAN and PUR. Importantly, this subject also failed to identify any social organizational basis for the construction of the party. In fact, he lamented, "there are no group, class or social organizations" in Ecuador.

One subject emphasized that the party is distinct from all others in that it has never defended the economic interests of any group. "We serve what we consider the national interest." I followed up by asking, "Then how would you describe your base of support and the nature of the linkages with your base?" In response, he began a description of the sources of the party's financial resources and included 1) party funding resources from the state; 2) membership dues; and 3) interest on the parties investments. This response is again notable

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[75] Personal interview ID-1 (2006).

for what it omits; namely, the subject confirms that the base of the support for the party was not organized segments of civil society.

In one interview with an early party leader, the subject observes that the early 1980s were a difficult time for ID and other parties of the left in Latin America. The emergence of an agenda of liberalizing economic reforms and the debt crisis "martyred the party ideologies."[76] He continued, these underlying currents "gave rise to our entry into a new phase in which the political wasn't dominant, but they were purely electoral periods. The party began to change, it began to live the electoral process, though we wanted to be different." The Borja presidency represented a turning point for the party because it led to "a discontent in a large part of the masses of the party because the process that had already played out via the presidency and in government didn't necessarily attend to their aspirations which they show through their groups, clienteles, and ideological expectations." The difficulties of the Borja presidency were concurrent with the rise of the debt crisis and the Washington Consensus and together undermined the credibility of ID's programmatic appeal.

I argue in this project that the basis for social and civic organization in Ecuador is not primarily social and economic location, but rather geographical location. Consequently, constituencies for a party are geographic. As ID emerged, it seems to have attempted to project a rhetoric and programmatic agenda onto this underlying organizational logic, as when it speaks of feeding poor children and struggles for social justice. But a society that is not socially and economically structured, but only geographically structured does not generate broad-based demands. It is organized to produce particularistic demands and a

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[76] Personal interview ID-1 (2006).

principled programmatic social democratic party will struggle to avoid devolving into a particularistic patronage machine. The anthropological study by Burgwal (1995) of a land invasion on the outskirts of Quito and the subsequent evolution of a relationship of particularistic exchange between the community leaders and leftist party brokers—including FADI, ID, DP and others—uses fascinating ethnographic detail to show how clientelism can coexist with a social democratic, socialist, or Marxist worldview when social fragmentation is extreme. In his study, electoral support was exchanged for only narrow club goods: state protection following the illegal land invasion, neighborhood food kitchens, etc.

These conclusions are consistent with other accounts of ID. Friedenberg (2001) argues that ID is simultaneously center-left and clientelistically rooted to its voters. Jones (2005), using Latinobarometer data, shows that ID supporters are simultaneously more leftist and higher income than three other important parties in the system (PRE, PSC and PSP).[77] This profile is consistent with a party base that consists of a middle class which is linked programmatically. It would reflect a payoff to the effort described by two of the party founders of their tours of the country spreading the social democratic ideology to more educated sectors at universities and high schools. Many Ecuadorians, however, express no affiliation with political parties, and so voters who end up voting with ID may do so because they are incorporated via brokers into local machine networks that are ultimately loyal to ID but not strongly partisan.

Electoral Institutions

Until the end of Borja's presidential term in 1992, ID seemed well on its way to building a nationalized political party, although it did so primarily constituency-by-

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[77] It is also higher income than PRIAN, though not significantly more leftist.

constituency with machine strategies rather than with broad-based programmatic strategies. Its support, in any case, was high enough that district magnitude did not influence its trajectory. In the small district magnitude districts it was almost always competitive. There are only four occasions during its first five elections where the party did not compete for a district seat, and each occasion was in one of the small Amazon districts. As a share of the national vote, however, these concessions have a trivial impact on its vote share.

Beginning in 1992, we can see that ID began its retreat to the highland districts where it is based. Many of the outlying provincial brokers that had supported ID during its accent to power defected to other parties. Having lost popular support from the difficult Borja presidency, and having faced challenges on the coast from the competing parties based in that region, the districts where magnitude was low or moderate most likely led ID to concede them to the coastal parties, which in turn likely had an effect on its trajectory, which was declining by this time. The retreat from the Amazon districts was similar, though slightly later, and coincided with the rise of indigenous mobilization and the rise of Pachakutik. Also, the relaxation of the electoral rules—and especially party registration rules—beginning in the mid 1990s altered ID's performance indirectly by weakening the ability of the party to retain the working partnerships with outlying provincial brokers who were freed up to pursue political careers independent of the main parties.

Contender Possibilities

ID meets all the conditions to be a contender. First, it gained access to resources necessary to feed a machine strategy. Prior to winning the presidency in 1988, it won many provincial and municipal positions. Second, it spent many years prior to the 1978 transition constructing a network of affiliates around the country. The network operated according to a

geographic logic and consisted of a complex network of brokers between the central party leaders and the neighborhood operatives. Furthermore, the network incorporated allies in all regions of the country. Finally, although the party adopted a social democratic rhetoric, it did not have linkages with social and economic organizations that forced it to both a) invest heavily in broad-based programmatic policy and b) refrain from sullying itself in the sometimes ideologically distasteful business of particularistic exchange.

Partido Renovador Institucional Acción Nacional (PRIAN)-

Institutional Renewal Party of National Action

PRIAN is a contender party built upon the national corporate network owned by its founder, Alvaro Noboa. The party uses machine and vote-buying strategies to link with voters. It is notorious in its lack of programmatic content, and for using the resources of the Noboa Group to both buy and coerce electoral support. As Ecuador's richest man and at the helm of extremely diversified business ventures, PRIAN has considerable leverage in most provinces of the country.

Origins and Initial Electoral Performance

In 1994, Alvaro Noboa and his step mother inherited personal fortunes and business enterprises from Luis Noboa, the family patriarch. Alvaro acquired control of the bulk of the businesses in a subsequent legal battle. The Noboa Group is known as a major banana exporting enterprise, though its business interests include banking, transportation, the media, construction, and many other sectors. In 1996, Alvaro Noboa was given the cabinet-level post of President of the Monetary Board by president Abdalá Bucarám, his old friend and the leader of the populist PRE party. Many accuse Noboa of using his position and the resources of the state to influence the legal proceedings on his father's estate, which ruled in his favor.

Upon the premature fall from office and exile of Bucarám in 1997, the PRE—together with CFP, APRE and UPL—supported Noboa in a 1998 run for the presidency. While the PRE was Noboa's principle party supporter, he is widely seen as being independent of both Bucarám and the PRE. Noboa reached the second round, but lost. For the 2000 local elections, Noboa had organized an independent movement, MIAN (Movimiento Independiente Alvaro Noboa), but the party fared poorly.

By the 2002 election, Noboa had organized a full-blown political party, PRIAN. Unlike the previous MIAN, which in 2000 was only registered in the provinces in which it competed, PRIAN was registered as a national party with the national electoral authorities. He contested the presidency and legislative seats that year. The party entered with 13.8% of the vote—only one point below the post-transition high for Ecuador. From the model estimated in Chapter II, PRIAN is classified as a contender, but with only a 56% probability. There is a 44% chance that the party is a "flash" party. This uncertainty arises for two reasons. First, PRIAN's data series includes only one time-point. Second, the flash and contender trajectories originate at nearly identical intercepts, just above 12%. Though I use five time points when possible in this project, even one additional time point would be sufficient to classify a party as being in one group or another with much more than 56% probability. Although the 2006 elections were excluded from this project, PRIAN's lower house vote percentage of 27.7% that year would place it very squarely in the contender group. In fact, with a vote gain between election 1 and election 2 of nearly 14%, it far exceeds the estimated slope of just 1% point per election. Nevertheless, one other party used in the sample had a similar level of growth between the first two elections and was classified

as a contender: Bolivia's MIR won just over 10% of the vote in its first election and just

under 22% in its second. Therefore, I am highly confident in treating PRIAN as a contender.

Table 5.16:

PRIAN Election Results, Provincial Deputies.

Region	DM	Province	2002		2006*	
			% Vote	Seats	% Vote	Seats
Amazon	2	Morona Santiago	6.9		7.5	
Amazon	2	Napo	2.4		2.0	
Amazon	2	Orellana	13.5		7.0	1
Amazon	2	Pastaza	6.4		8.5	
Amazon	2	Sucumbios	8.2		21.4	1
Amazon	2	Zamora Chinchipe	3.4		6.5	
Andes	5	Azuay	8.2		16.2	1
Andes	3	Bolivar	5.1		7.1	
Andes	3	Canar	15.0		0	
Andes	3	Carchi	14.0	1	31.0	2
Andes	4	Chimborazo	7.6		15.9	1
Andes	4	Cotopaxi	9.8	1	11.6	
Andes	4	Imbabura	14.7		29.9	1
Andes	4	Loja	7.2		17.5	1
Andes	14	Pichincha	8.3	1	23.9	4
Andes	4	Tungurahua	8.1		25.4	1
Coast	4	El Oro	7.3		22.2	1
Coast	4	Esmeraldas	6.6		36.2	2
Coast	18	Guayas	18.3	4	36.2	7
Coast	5	Los Rios	12.2	1	18.9	1
Coast	8	Manabi	15.1	2	40.0	4
Other	2	Galapagos	5.8		2.7	
		Overall	**13.8**	**10**	**27.7**	**28**

*2006 were excluded from Chapter II analysis.

Table 5.17:

Components of Variance, PRIAN, 2002

Component	Variance	% of Total
Time	na	
Province	16.9	39.5%
Parish	25.9	60.5%
Total	**42.8**	**100.0%**
Mean % Vote	10.1%	

Linkage Strategy

PRIAN follows a machine linkage strategy, supplemented by vote buying and personalism. Programmatic content is almost completely absent. The components of variance analysis shows that the party followed a highly parish-based strategy, more so than most other parties. To so degree this results from the fact that the party completely rather strongly across all provinces. Still, the parish level results reveal that the party was highly selective in choosing parishes with provinces in which to invest.

One party leader who helped shepherd the party from movement to party described how he traveled the country and made contact with people he knew in order to form provincial chapters of the party and to get registered across the country. The work was solely about making contacts and building an organization sufficient to mount a campaign. Unlike ID's effort, PRIAN's party building years around the country did not include any effort to communicate the ideology of the party and create allegiance to a national project. In fact, this leader, when describing how PRIAN just barely registered with the electoral authorities by the deadline, noted that if they failed, "we would have had to look for another party."[78] Beyond the national leadership of the party, it was nothing more than a series of weak connections with prominent provincial brokers.

These provincial brokers were expected to contribute their own resources to the electoral effort.[79] The party machine, therefore, had two networks. One network was under the direct control of Noboa via the business enterprises he runs. Through this network he was able to use employees of the firms, down to the plantation and shop managers, to enlist employees as party members. The other network was a series of looser connections with provincial elites who were often in one way or another associated with Noboa's businesses,

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[78] Personal interview PRIAN-2 (2006).

but not under his direct influence and who brought their own local influence to bare in order to deliver votes. One 2002 legislative candidate from Ibarra province, for example, was a business person associated with the Quaker Oatmeal company in the province and described a loose business relationship with Noboa. [80]

Electoral Institutions

PRIAN entered into an electoral system environment that had grown more permissive, with the average district magnitude having risen to 4.5. Half the provinces still had fairly low magnitude of two or three, but eight had a magnitude of four or five and three had a magnitude of between eight and 18. PRIAN had a strong start with victories primarily in the coast and in the large districts. But by 2006, it was the largest party in congress with 28% of the seats and had won in districts of all sizes, though it exerted very little effort in all but Sucumbios among the 2-seat districts that year. The electoral system had little effect on the performance of PRIAN except at the margins and primarily to the extent that it conceded in some of the small districts.

Contender Possibilities

PRIAN fits the profile of a party likely to be a contender. First, it had at its disposal the personal fortune of its party founder, the richest man in Ecuador, and he proved willing to spend it lavishly on his bid for the presidency and his bid to build an organization. Second, the party was built upon the preexisting national business networks of the Noboa Group. In this respect the party was unusual. There are very few organizations in Ecuador with a national scope. Many account for the limited success of the indigenous Pachakutik by citing the preexisting national indigenous social movement. In a similar way, though obviously

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[79] Personal interview PRIAN-3 (2006).

with a network of substantively different content, PRIAN was able to mobilize this business network to get out the vote and secure the loyalty of provincial politicians. Third, the party was not ideologically constrained by any organizational base from pursuing a pragmatic course of action, and especially from making pledges to geographically rather than socially oriented constituencies. Though the party contributed a considerable amount of resources to a personalist strategy, promoting the ability of its leader to run the country with the same degree of success as he runs his business, he is not a popular figure. The parties success came despite his personality, not because of it.

<div align="center">Flop Parties</div>

The latent trajectory model of Chapter 2 produced the predicted "flop" trajectory which appears bolded in Figure 5.8 below. The 15 Ecuadorian cases which were classified into this group also appear in the figure. I have adjusted the scale of the vertical axis from a range of -10 to 60 (from Figure 2.7) to a range of -1 to 5 in order to make the individual trajectories distinguishable. Though in this perspective they appear to be a heterogeneous group, when plotted with the other parties on a –10 to 60 scale they appear as a distinct and homogeneous group.

<div align="center">Figure 5.8:</div>

<div align="center">The "Flop" Trajectory in Ecuador</div>

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[80] Personal interview PRIAN-3 (2006).

Movimiento Ciudadanos Nuevo País (MCNP)

New Country Citizens Movement

Origins and Initial Electoral Performance

MCNP is an electoral movement formed by the radio personality, Freddy Ehlers. Its

birth cannot be separated from the origins of Pachakutik, which by deciding to support him in

1996 rather than field its own presidential candidate propelled him to national prominence.

Ehlers was a leader and vocal supporter of political reform and the political incorporation of

a wide array of social sectors who felt excluded from national political life. He took

advantage of the window of opportunity for political reform generated by the indigenous

mobilizations, the institutional reform proposals by then president Durán-Ballén, and the

political and economic crises of the late 1990s to craft himself as a consensus candidate for a

wide array of social movements, and most prominently of the indigenous movement. He

rejected efforts to build a party organization preferring instead the vague rhetoric of a

political movement.

Table 5.18:

MCNP Election Results, Provincial Deputies.

Region	Province	1996		1998		2002	
		% Vote	Seats	% Vote	Seats	% Vote	Seats
Amazon	Morona Santiago	0.0		0.0		0.0	
Amazon	Napo	0.0		0.0		0.0	
Amazon	Orellana					8.7	
Amazon	Pastaza	0.0		0.0		0.0	
Amazon	Sucumbios	0.0		9.7		7.3	
Amazon	Zamora Chinchipe	0.0		0.0		0.0	
Andes	Azuay	0.0		14.9		5.5	
Andes	Bolivar	0.0		1.0		0.0	
Andes	Canar	0.0		9.5	1*	0.0	
Andes	Carchi	0.0		2.2		0.0	
Andes	Chimborazo	0.0		8.2		1.6	
Andes	Cotopaxi	1.5		0.0		1.6	
Andes	Imbabura	0.0		6.2	1*	0.0	
Andes	Loja	1.2		3.1		0.0	
Andes	Pichincha	0.0		3.7		1.8	
Andes	Tungurahua	2.1		5.4		3.5	
Coast	El Oro	0.0		1.7		0.0	
Coast	Esmeraldas	0.0		2.6		0.0	
Coast	Guayas	0.3		6.1		0.0	
Coast	Los Rios	0.0		2.2		0.8	
Coast	Manabi	0.0		1.5		0.0	
Other	Galapagos	0.0		5.7		0.0	
	National	**0.3**	**0**	**4.9**	**2***	**0.8**	**0**

*Alliance Seats

Table 5.19:

Components of Variance, MCNP, 1996, 1998, 2002

Component	Variance	% of Total
Time	0.7	3.5%
Province	11.7	58.8%
Parish	7.5	37.7%
Total	**19.9**	**100.0%**
Mean % Vote	2.7%	

Linkage Strategy

MCNP's primary linkage strategy was personalistic. Ehlers' and his base of support was strongly in favor of a program of political reform, so it included programmatic elements. But a crucial ingredient of a programmatic party is that it have well formed and organizationally articulated relationships with social, ethnic, or economic groups in society. Ehlers' eschewed party building efforts and especially efforts to create a strong organization.[81] This aversion to organized party life was consistent with their rhetoric proclaiming disgust with traditional political life as it is known in Ecuador and with their advocacy of a new political order built upon new but unspecified methods of social solidarity and citizen participation. In addition, and with the exception of the indigenous movement, the coalition of social organizations which supported the party were themselves very fluid in identity and organization. Rather than register as a political party—which would have required the drafting of party statutes, a plan of government, and other formalized elements of party life—Ehlers insisted that the organization register as a "national political movement" and thus obviate the need for traditional elements of party life.

While only weakly programmatic in the full sense of the concept, Ehlers and leaders of MCNP were highly principled. There is no evidence that they engaged in either vote-buying or machine strategies in forging linkages with the citizenry.

Electoral Institutions

MCNP entered at a time when entry barriers were reduced and when district magnitude began climbing. Nevertheless, district magnitude remained low or moderate in large parts of the country and may have influenced the party trajectory. When the party was potentially nationally prominent, and especially in 1998, brokers from several small and

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[81] Personal interview MCNP-1 (2006).

medium sized districts cast their fortunes with Ehlers leading to a temporary spike in the national vote shares. When the party focused on the presidency at the expense of its own slate of legislative candidates in 1996, or when the party was not potentially nationally prominent in 2002 and beyond, it only rarely generated support in the small and medium districts.

In its first election of 1996 the party was primarily focused on the presidential candidacy of Freddy Ehlers and on the alliance with Pachakutik for the legislative slate. Beginning in 1998 when it began running legislative candidates, it behaved like most other parties. In districts with low magnitude the party the party often conceded. However, in districts in which it had secured the commitment of local notables, it performed well. In particular, it did well in Azuay, which is Ehler's home province, and in Guayas, where León Roldos—former vice-president under Hurtado and brother of former president Jaime Roldos—was on the national legislative ticket. There was a significant amount of optimism for the Ehler's presidential ticket in both 1996 and in 1998 and in both years Pachakutik offered him its official support.[82] Therefore, MCNP was able to secure some support from peripheral provincial politicians and we see a spike in the 1998 electoral support; however, in 2002 and especially 2006 (not reported) the party retreats to the home province of its founder and begins conceding most other districts. By 2002 the party was operating completely independently of the indigenous movement and without the support of León Roldos, who had launched his own promising electoral platform to compete for the presidency. By 2006 the party only competed in four provinces, and only successfully in Azuay.

Contender Possibilities

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[82] In 1998, the indigenous movement's support was divided, as reported by Beck and Mijelski (2001).

Without the low result for 1996, the party may have been classified as a "flash" trajectory. Such a result might be more intuitively consistent with its actual performance than "flop." Still, the primary efforts of the party were focused on the presidency for Ehlers and in this respect the legislative results which yield the flop classification underscore the lack of depth in the party's organization. Beyond Ehlers, there was not much of a party.

The prospects of a contender trajectory are hard to imagine. If Ehlers had won the presidential election of either 1996 or 1998, he would have governed without any or much of a legislative contingent of his own. He may have been able to use the discretion and resources of executive office to build a party, but he had no ambition to do so. Though Pachakutik would have been a legislative ally, support from any other parties would have been at best unreliable and at worst unlikely. Most critically, contender possibilities for MCNP were forgone by Ehlers rejection of the corrupt tradition of politics in Ecuador, and in particular of what I term "machine" strategies. His social base of support is simply not large and organized enough to build a credible programmatic alternative to the clientelistic realities found in Ecuador. At best, MCNP would have been a "flash" party, in which Ehlers and allies come to office based upon the euphoria of disenchanted voters for an outsider alternative. Then, lacking the political style and networks to govern with any degree of success, the party would have quickly disappeared.

Partido Asaad Bucaram (PAB)

Origins and Initial Electoral Performance

PAB was founded by Avicena Bucaram, one of Asaad Bucaram's sons. In the early 1980s, when the father died, his CFP party was divided into three groups: the Roldos faction, which ultimately became PCD; a second Roldos faction called the PRE that formed under the

leadership of Abdalá Bucaram upon President Roldos' death; and the loyalists to the father led by his son Averroes, who led the remnants of the CFP. There was a rift between Asaad's two son's, Averroes and Avicena, and with Averroes in firm control of the CFP, Avicena launched a new party beginning in the late 1980s. The party never gathered much support and quickly disappeared.

Very few of the members of the CFP followed Avicena into the new PAB. Thus, the party didn't inherit any of the substantial local networks, which either remained with the CFP or joined with Abdalá Bucaram's newly created PRE. Key members of PAB were Bolívar González, its 1992 presidential candidate and Wilson de la Cadena, the leader of the Pichincha cell.[83]

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[83] Personal Interview PAB-2 (2006).

Table 5.20:

PAB Election Results, Provincial Deputies.

Region	Province	1992		1994	
		% Vote	Seats	% Vote	Seats
Amazon	Morona Santiago	0.0		0.0	
Amazon	Napo	7.6		0.0	
Amazon	Orellana	na		na	
Amazon	Pastaza	0.0		0.0	
Amazon	Sucumbios	0.6		0.0	
Amazon	Zamora Chinchipe	0.0		0.0	
Andes	Azuay	0.0		0.0	
Andes	Bolivar	1.0		0.9	
Andes	Canar	0.0		0.0	
Andes	Carchi	0.4		0.0	
Andes	Chimborazo	1.1		0.0	
Andes	Cotopaxi	1.5		0.0	
Andes	Imbabura	0.0		0.0	
Andes	Loja	0.0		0.0	
Andes	Pichincha	0.4		0.3	
Andes	Tungurahua	0.6		0.0	
Coast	El Oro	0.6		0.4	
Coast	Esmeraldas	0.7		0.0	
Coast	Guayas	0.3		0.0	
Coast	Los Rios	0.3		0.0	
Coast	Manabi	0.5		0.0	
Other	Galapagos	0.0		0.0	
	National	**0.5**	**0**	**0.1**	**0**

Table 5.21:

Components of Variance, PAB, 1992

Component	Variance	% of Total
Time	Na	
Province	1.5	32.6%
Parish	3.1	67.4%
Total	**4.6**	**100.0%**
Mean % Vote	0.7%	

Linkage Strategy

PAB had no natural constituents or preexisting organizational base on which to build either a machine or a programmatic linkage. Furthermore, it lacked the resources, local brokers and networks to implement a robust vote-buying strategy. Instead, the party relied upon personalist appeals invoking the values, style and persona of the deceased Asaad Bucaram.[84] This strategy is also evident in the symbols, Declaration of Principles, and Plan of Governance of the party. The party's leadership attempted to bring together local leaders to deliver votes to the party, but with few excepts—and notably in the parish of Tena in the province of Napo, which I discuss below—local leaders with large followings were mostly unavailable, having already been incorporated into other more promising and productive party machines.

Electoral Institutions

As I argue in Chapter III above, the threshold of representation will only effect electoral performance for office-seeking parties who don't expect to win anywhere near the threshold. Only in this circumstance will a party fail to win seats in the mechanical votes-to seats computation and therefore fail to win votes as voters contemplate whether voting for a party would amount to wasting a vote. When a party and voters expect a party to compete at or near the threshold of representation, that party becomes a reasonable choice for all voters to consider and the party has reason to invest resources in contestation for a seat. Otherwise, both party and voters will fail to invest and participate in the voter mobilization efforts. In this way, the electoral system seems to have eliminated PAB from consideration in any electoral contest, with the possible exception of Napo province in 1992 where it won 7.6% of the vote. Of the 1,986 votes it won out the province's nearly 30,000 votes, 839 (42%) came

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[84] Personal Interview PAB-1 (2006).

from the capital parish of Tena (one of the provinces 40 parishes), and most of the rest came from the canton of the same name.

Contender Possibilities

PAB had no possibility of growing into a contender. It lacked access to resources and it lacked a national coalition of local political machines.

<p align="center">Comparative Summary of Party Analyses</p>

In this section I summarize the findings of the eight party case studies above. Table 5.22 below summarizes key predictors of the contender trajectory. I argue in this project that for a party to become a contender, they must have access to substantial resources, they must build a national political machine which often will incorporate local political machines, and they must be unfettered by programmatic positions derived from relationships with external social or economic organizations. From among these eight parties, only PRIAN and ID meet all the conditions.

Several new parties in the system have branded themselves as principled programmatic parties, including FRA, ID, Pachakutik, PD, and MCNP. However, only Pachakutik is constrained to adhering strictly to its rhetoric by pressure from an organized social organization, CONAIE. It is this constraint that prohibits Pachakutik's electoral growth. As I argue above, lower social and economic groups are not organized into large and formally organized organizations with national reach, and CONAIE is no exception. With no organization in any provinces of the coastal region, and with ideological principles which prevent it from making alternative and non-programmatic appeals in that area, the party will never grow to be a strong contender in the national political arena without making strategic adaptations.

A new party must gain access to substantial discretionary party building resources. Given the nature of the Ecuadorian state described earlier, ID was able to use municipal, provincial, and national office to secure discretionary resources. PRIAN was able to deploy the enormous personal fortune of its founder, Alvaro Noboa. None of the other parties had or gained access to those resources, though Pachakutik inherited the substantial human resources from its allied social organization. With the exception of MCNP and Pachakutik, the other four parties—FRA, PUR, PD, and PAB—all attempted to build networks of local machines. In effect, they attempted to mimic the strategy that ID and PRE, another contender, followed in Ecuador. For various reasons, they all failed to build a coordinated and sustained coalition. FRA and PD both formed as schisms of the old Liberal Party and attempted to claim some of the same ideological ground as ID, which had the same origin. But ID, having formed earlier than both, may have secured the local alliances and thus prevented any consolidation of FRA and PD, who would have appealed to similar local leaders. This is not to say that the linkages that any of these three parties sought were programmatic in the deeply organizationally articulated sense, but only that these three parties, coming from the same tradition, had certain natural potential allies who they targeted. Similarly, both PUR and PAB attempted relatively late in the electoral game to build networks of local politicians amongst their natural constituencies, the conservatives whose lineage lies with the old PCE and the populists whose lineage lies with the old CFP, respectively. See Appendix 4. Those natural allies were already incorporated into other newly formed parties. Within the conservative lineage the PSC was dominant and with the populist lineage the PRE was dominant. PRIAN seems to have secured support from within both of these general tendencies, but it entered with instant credibility, a preexisting network,

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and substantial leverage against local party leaders by virtue of the Noboa Group's business

enterprises.

Table 5.22:

Summary of Key Predictors of Contender Parties

		Substantial Party Building Resources	Ideological Constraints	Network	First Mover
Contenders	ID	**Yes-local and provincial government**	No	**National**	**1979**
	PRIAN	**Yes-personal fortune**	**No**	**National**	2002
Flat	Pachakutik	**Yes-social movement**	Yes	Regional	1996
	FRA (1984-1988)	No	**No**	Provincial	1984
	FRA (1990-2002)	No	**No**	Provincial	1984
Flash	PUR	No	**No**	**National**	1992
	PD	No	**No**	Regional	1984
Flop	PAB	No	**No**	None	1992
	MCNP	No	**No**	None	1996

Linkage Strategy

The attributes of a contender party map onto the machine strategy because they reflect the organizational articulation of a successfully deployed political machine. This conclusion is consistent with Pachano (2006) who notes, "Both large and small parties, whether rooted in a certain sector or a certain ideology, must adapt to the provincial or local orientation of politics" (p. 112). Table 5.23 below summarizes the linkage strategies deployed by the eight parties of the case study. The evidence of this analysis supports the assertion that in order for a party to reach national prominence as a "contender," it must adopt a machine party strategy and build an organization oriented towards that end.

From a normative perspective, this is indeed bad news for the future of representative democracy in Ecuador. It suggests that, at least through the medium term or until Ecuador passes through fundamental social and/or economic transformations that generate organized groups capable of collective action in support of broad club goods—as I describe them in

Chapter IV—new party actors which conform to the highest ideals of democratic theory will not be among the main actors in politics and governance.

Table 5.23:

Summary of Primary and Secondary Linkage Strategies

		Personalist Strategy	Machine Strategy	Vote-Buying Strategy	Programmatic Strategy
Contenders	ID	No	Strong	Likely	Weak
	PRIAN	Weak	Strong	Likely	No
Flat	Pachakutik	No	No	Unlikely	Strong
	FRA (1984-1988)	Strong	Weak	Unlikely	Weak
	FRA (1990-2002)	Strong	Weak	Likely	No
Flash	PUR	Strong	Weak	Likely	Weak
	PD	Weak	Strong	Likely	Weak
Flop	PAB	Strong	Weak	Unlikely	No
	MCNP	Strong	Weak	Unlikely	No

Electoral Institutions

Several patterns are visible in the analyses of the effect of electoral institutions on performance trajectories. First, in districts with a low magnitude it is clear that all parties make decisions about whether to compete or not. The psychological and mechanical effects of district magnitude encourage these choices. Before 1996, because party registration laws required that parties register to compete in at least half the districts include the three largest of Guayas, Pichincha and Manabi, we often see very low vote shares in at least some of these small districts. This suggests that a party registered but failed to exert effort. Nevertheless, comparisons within a district show that it is rare that results defy the expectation that in single member districts we find no more than two or three competitive parties and in two member districts we find no more than three or four competitive parties. The analysis of Pastaza district earlier in this chapter, for example, confirmed this result.

Small district size combines with the overall fragmentation of the party system, the lack of nationalized parties and the tendency towards machine party-voter linkages (mediated by local brokers) to create surprising opportunities for parties in these mostly peripheral provinces. These provinces were not usually programmatically allied with any particular party and had a tendency to shift allegiance between parties from election to election. This is in contrast to a political system with nationalized parties and low average district magnitude where the same few political parties will be competitive in each district and overall. Small district magnitude is usually associated with a restricted population of performance trajectories, but Ecuador reveals that this outcome is contingent upon the existence of a nationalized party system. Where party systems are highly localized, it appears that even though the district-level dynamics of competition will be consistent with Duverger's Law, overall the party system can be allow for a diversity of performance trajectories as parties compete for the loyalty of local brokers who can deliver the votes in local constituencies. The electoral system is not a great obstacle to any particular trajectory group since a party can compete and win in one or very few districts with low magnitude, and these results will only have a very small effect on nationally aggregated election results. In other words, in this configuration we can expect to see not only "contender" and "flop" trajectories, but also the "flat" and "flash" trajectories which would normally be culled in systems with many small district.. In Ecuador, this situation was especially the case beginning in 1996 when parties were no longer required to register in multiple provinces in order to compete at all.

Second, the three large districts of Guayas, Pichincha and Manabi offered opportunities for parties to compete for a seat even with a small share of the vote. A party with even a small source of resources would be able to woo support from a group a voters

sufficient to win a seat. The FRA's Fabian Alarcón, for example, used his position within the municipality of Quito and later from within the national legislature to secure support from a few parishes in Pichincha and enable a relatively long political career.

There was one surprising outcome which resulted from the electoral system. Until about 1996 there were incentives for politicians across the country to cohere into a coalition. These were institutional incentives rather than programmatic ones. So, for example, above we saw that the requirement that parties register in at least half the districts served as an impediment (though not a large one) for new parties to enter. This led potential new entrants to enter via an existing party in either an enduring alliance or by taking over a small party which had not yet lost its registration with the electoral authorities. The indirect consequence of this incentive on electoral trajectories was a higher vote share for some parties, and especially for the contenders, as they allied with local politicians in the peripheral provinces. Also, in several cases it led to the appearance of a prolonged life (a "flat" trajectory) for some smaller parties that might otherwise have disappeared. We saw this in the case of the FRA and I indicated that had these laws not existed, FRA would likely have been classified as two instances of "flash" and/or "flop" parties rather than a single instance of a "flat" party. When electoral laws changed beginning in 1996, major parties of the two urban centers (Quito in Pichincha province and Guayaquil in Guayas province) lost control of brokers from the periphery and suffered an overall decline in their trajectory, though this occurred mostly beyond the first five elections I analyze in this project. Also, party's of the "flat" type became more purely populated by those with programmatic linkages with the electorate. Pragmatic

politicians like Fabian Alarcón would no longer have an incentive to hijack a fledgling party and instead could start an independent political movement.[85]

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[85] The incidence of "flop" parties greatly increased at this time. This suggests that entry rules have an effect on the entry decision, which is a different issue from the one I study here.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

Summary of Main Findings

Most broadly, this project seeks first to model the relevant variation in new party

performance and second to explain that performance in political arenas where party

competition is volatile and weakly formally institutionalized. Many of the literatures on

parties and party systems arose from the study of advanced democracies, and the study of

new party performance is no exception. It is common among scholars of Latin America and

the rest of the developing world to observe that the literatures which formed to explain the

advanced party systems do not always travel well (Levistsky 2003, Morgenstern and Nacif

2002, Huber, Mustillo and Stephens under review). This observation justifies theoretical

modifications to the existing models or the development of new models in order to extend

our ability to explain outcomes of important political phenomena. In the treatment of parties

and party systems, party system instability has often been the reason extant explanations

don't work well. We have many indicators to measure variation on the levels of stability in

parties and party systems. For example, volatility, fragmentation, and institutionalization are

just a few of the concepts which enable us to identify the variation in stability across regions

and between countries or parties within a region.

In Chapter II, I used measures of institutionalization and representation to show the

degree of variation in party and system stability among Latin American countries. On the one

hand, scholars of the developing world have made great progress in our ability to simply *identify* and *measure* this variation. We have established, for example, some particular ways in which Latin America differs from European party systems. However, the state of knowledge with respect to *explaining* this variation or with respect to *explaining* particular phenomena in a different range of these measures—and especially lower in the range—remains incomplete and generally less sophisticated than the state of knowledge in the developed contexts. We seem to know much more about Europe than Latin America, and about Chile than Ecuador.

One of the motives for this project has been the lack of attention to parties and party systems which appear at the low end of the scale of our measures of institutionalization and representation. For example, a country like Ecuador has often been identified for what it is not. Ecuador is not institutionalized, but "inchoate;" its parties lack elite-mass congruence in political beliefs; its party system is not stable, but fluid and its voters are not loyal, but "floating." Yet it must be the case that for all or most questions which are important in stable systems—What explains party birth and death? What structures party competition? How is policy made? What enables parties to cohere? How are voters and parties linked?—they are important in unstable systems, and these systems must operate under some logic, if not the same logic of stable systems. Some of the most exciting and innovative work in Latin American politics is designed to formulate theory which specifies the logic under which these systems operate. It may be that Ecuador's party system is only weakly programmatically structured, but how does personalism and clientelism structure party competition? It may be that its parties are barely formally institutionalized, but are there ways in which they might be informally institutionalized? In this project, I look at one

particular attribute of party systems—new party performance—and develop a model to explain it for systems at the low range of representation and formal party system institutionalization, where extant models seem to fail.

Chapter II was motivated by the question: Is there a diversity in new party performance that is wider than the tendency of political scientists to classify new parties as either successful or failed? My expectation was that in weakly institutionalized systems and where parties perform their representative function poorly, there is wider variation. I noted that scholars of an earlier day and in another context had documented the observation and given it some theoretical consideration—namely, Converse and Dupeux (1962) had identified "flash" parties during the French 4th Republic—despite the fact that the literature otherwise mostly set aside this episode as anomalous.

I went on to use latent trajectory modeling to show that in fact there are five distinctive performance trajectories for new parties: there are "flop," "flat," "flash," "contender," and "explosive" types. Some of these types conform to our notions of the dichotomous success v. failure. For example, "flop" parties are clearly failures and the "contender" and "explosive" types are clearly successful. Nevertheless, two of these groups—"flat" and "flash"—are ambiguous. Depending upon how the analyst defines success, these parties could fall into either category. Furthermore, there is a clear substantive difference between "contender" parties which enter with moderate levels of support and slowly grow and "explosive" parties which enter with extremely high levels of support and quickly consolidate their level of voter support. Rather than lumping this diversity into two groups, there are theoretically sensible reasons to retain the distinctions.

I was interested in evaluating whether there is, in fact, a distinction between the variation we observe in institutionalized party systems and in poorly institutionalized party systems. Therefore, I included cases throughout the range of the institutionalization index. Chile is highly institutionalized, Venezuela has historically been treated as highly institutionalized (from the 1958 transition through the 1980s) but recently has declined, and Bolivia and Ecuador are poorly institutionalized. I found that in the institutionalized case of Chile, there are parties of only two types: "contenders" and "flops." This suggests that under the domain restriction of institutionalized and programmatically representative cases, it is sufficient to dichotomize new party performance into success and failure. That is, the practice of dichotomizing into success and failure in advanced democracies may not be problematic; furthermore, it may not be problematic to export that approach to a country like Chile which resembles the general tendency of an advanced industrial party system.

However, the other cases were populated with parties of either four or all five of the trajectory types. This confirms that the dichotomous classification of new parties into success and failure is *not* sufficient for the study of new party performance in poorly institutionalized party systems. Bolivia has parties of all five types, Ecuador has parties of all but the "explosive" type, and Venezuela has parties of all but the "contender" type. The intermittent appearance of the "explosive" type and its extremely rare occurrence seems to suggest that it deserves special treatment, though I set this issue aside for this project.

As a final step in Chapter II, I use the estimates of the model and the observed vote shares of the 297 parties in the analysis to classify each party into one of the five groups. The overwhelming majority of the parties are "flops." This distribution, however, is not troubling because the estimation technique I use here is specifically designed for populations that are

discretely—rather than normally or continuously—distributed. Nearly all parties are classified into one of the categories with an extremely high probability. Furthermore, when I encounter difficulty in classifying a party, it is always because the party has only been observed for less than five elections. Increasing the number of observations will always improve our ability to classify a party.

The approach of Chapter II advances work on new party performance in several ways. First, it uses a statistical technique—called both semi-parametric mixture models or latent trajectory models—specifically designed for longitudinal data we assume is discretely distributed. The technique fits the data and the research question. Second and related, the technique generates categories and classifies cases with rigorous and testable criteria, including an estimate of the error in the shape parameters and a level of confidence in the classifications of parties into groups. This represents an improvement over the conventional approach whereby scholars take the set of new parties and devise ad hoc criteria to sort them into successful and failed parties. Third, it incorporates all new parties into the analysis. Nearly all previous studies, with one notable exception being Hug (2001), study new party performance with a research design that looks either at a single party, a single party family, or a single national context. A generalized look across all parties is particularly well advised when party competition is not structured by programmatic politics. In such cases, the determinants of success and failure are likely to be independent of the particular bundle of issues unique to a country or a party family. For example, organizational features of the parties themselves, the nature of the relationship between parties and the state or between party and voters, or institutionalized rules of party entry and competition will determine winners and losers.

In Chapter III, I used the classifications of parties in Chapter II as the dependent variable and sought to explain a subset of these classifications. Specifically, I sought to predict whether a new party would be of the "contender" type rather than one of the other types.

This study is motivated by the observation that poorly institutionalized and representative party systems seem to operate under an alternative to the programmatic logic of competition. Therefore, I exclude parties from institutionalized party systems. Specifically, I exclude the parties from Chile. I could have included the Chilean case and/or incorporated other parties from institutionalized and programmatically representative systems and tested predictors by using a series of interaction terms. In such a research design, I would expect the interaction term to be significant. That is, certain predictors would function in institutionalized and programmatic contexts but not in the others, while other predictors would function in the latter but not in the former. However, with my relatively small sample, this approach would be difficult to sustain. Instead, I test a model using only the cases which conform to the non-programmatic conditions.

In order to do so, I gathered data on variables that have been conventionally used to predict party performance. These variables came from various schools of thought, but shared the assumption that party competition is programmatic. Specifically, I tested for the impact of predictors derived from the spatial model of competition and from social structural explanations. Also, I tested for the effect of an institutional variable—district magnitude— and for two economic control variables. The effect of the institutional environment is not hypothesized to be conditional upon the nature of party competition, and I would expect an effect whether or not party competition is institutionalized and representation is

programmatic. Additionally, I incorporated some gross measurements of variables that might predict party performance in an environment of non-programmatic party competition. I called these variables "organizational" variables because they are attributes of a party and the way it which it links with voters across the country and secures access to government. They are neutral with respect to a party's program.

This analysis of Chapter III forms the large-N stage of a model building nested research design. Party is the unit of analysis and I use the party classifications of Chapter III as the dependent variable. I test the effects of the predictors with a multinomial logit model. The analysis led to the conclusion that the theoretical schools which operate under the assumptions of programmatic party competition do not explain the distinction between "contender" parties and any of the other types.

The effect of district magnitude was significant, but substantively rather trivial. That is, as district magnitude increases, new parties are significantly more likely to be of the "flop" sort than of the "contender" sort. The converse would also be true: when district magnitude decreases, new parties are more likely to be contenders than flops. This finding suggests that voters behave strategically when districts are small. In that circumstance, they don't want to waste their vote on a small party. Despite this conclusion, we don't get any traction from this feature of the institutional environment in distinguishing between contenders and any of the other types of parties. That is, we must draw upon other attributes of the system or of the parties themselves in order to distinguish between the substantively interesting alternatives. Additionally, one of the control variables was significant. Under highly inflationary conditions, new parties that enter are more likely to be of the "contender" type rather than of the "flat" or "flash" types.

The set of variables which I use to test the impact of party organization yield partly supportive results. Alone, they would not satisfy many readers, but recall that the function of this large-N analysis in a nested research design is mostly exploratory and designed to determine whether more careful theory development is justified. The variables are derived from hypotheses mostly adapted from the work on the strategic adaptation of existing parties and on work related to clientelism. The results are not conclusive—mostly because the availability of data at the level of parties and organizations for all but major parties is sparse—but they are sufficient to justify the conclusion that this line of argument deserves more careful theoretical development and analytic attention. Therefore, in Chapters IV and V, I develop these features of the project.

Chapter III's results were sufficient to warrant a theory-building effort designed to formulate an alternative to conventional predictors of new party performance which are rooted in programmatic patterns of party competition. Specifically, I sought a general theoretical framework that would accommodate the diversity of ways in which parties are linked with voters, including programmatic linkage, but not limited to it. Select authors in diverse literatures—especially the ones on the strategic adaptation of parties, on non-programmatic linkages, and in the spatial tradition—have looked to the calculus of voting model to construct theories which concern the relationship of voters to parties and the specific behavior of parties. At first glance, this is a rather peculiar way to use the calculus of voting model because the model is primarily concerned with explaining a voter's choice of whether or not to vote; it does not address the voter's partisan vote choice and it does not address the behavior of parties. Yet, at the heart of the model is the existence of a collective action problem among the electorate. That is, given the various incentives and costs that a

voter confronts as election day approaches, the voter is unlikely to vote even if they have a strong partisan preference. Given a collective action problem, one might wonder whether and/or which solutions exist to solve it. Aldrich (1995) addresses this specific question and proposes that political parties can function to solve a voter's collective action problem. They do so by operating on the various cost and benefit elements that a voter takes into consideration in the course of deciding whether or not to vote. In the course of doing so, the party is not only concerned with the narrow issue of getting voters to the polls, but also with having voters cast a ballot for them. Therefore, they will attempt to operate on the voter's decision making process in a way that rigs the outcome to their advantage. They do so, for example, by simplifying the information burden for voters, who are "information misers" attempting to make a vote choice with as little information as possible.[86] Alternatively, they might do so by rewarding voters who incur the cost of getting to the polls with a material payoff or punishing voters who fail to go to the polls. In sum, if parties function as a solution to the voter's collective action problem, and they will adopt diverse strategies to solve the problem, then the terms in the calculus of voting model are a very useful heuristic for thinking about the alternative strategies a party will use to get voters to the poll and casting a ballot in their favor.

In Chapter IV, I use the terms of the model to identify four distinctive party linkage strategies—the programmatic linkage, the personalistic linkage, the machine linkage and the vote-buying linkage. The strategies are distinguished by which term they operate on and by the way in which they operate on the term. The vote-buying strategy is the simplest, and I conceive of it very narrowly. I define vote-buying as an election day activity (or very nearly

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[86] Kitschelt is fond of referring to voters in the way.

so) designed to offset the cost of voting by providing a payoff and/or service. The other three strategies operate on the cost of voting term also, but through three distinct ways of altering the complex information environment. Furthermore, each of the three tackle the other two terms of the equation—the duty term and the benefit term—distinctly in the extent to which they pledge to deliver broad or narrow club goods, in the types of goods they pledge, and in the nature of the allegiance they attempt to create between the party and the voter. The first main conclusion of Chapter IV is that parties, as collective action solutions, will adopt one or more of the four strategies to secure a vote.

The next task of the chapter was to show that the four distinctive strategies are compatible with distinctive organizational attributes. If a party aims to secure votes with a vote-buying strategy it will build a different sort of organization than a party which aims to secure votes with a programmatic, machine or personalist strategy. The party as organization will be differently oriented to accomplishing many tasks including developing and promoting its reputation, relating to voters inside of and outside of election seasons, selecting and retaining the loyalty of core constituencies, and operating while in government or opposition.

The final goal of Chapter IV was to hypothesize about how each organizational articulated linkage strategy would perform in a party system which is not well institutionalized and poorly representative. I conclude that the machine strategy will have substantial advantages for medium-term electoral success in such a party system over the programmatic strategy. I predict that programmatically oriented parties will endure, but with low levels of electoral support. The vote-buying and personalist strategies are often supplemental strategies rather than primary strategies. Nevertheless, when party leaders build exclusively personalist organizations, we would expect them to be highly volatile. That is,

when they succeed initially, they have organizational attributes that make them vulnerable to eventual extinction unless they adapt with alternative strategies.

As a nested research design, the final stage of this analysis is to test and refine the theoretical expectations I develop in Chapter IV in a small-N qualitative context. I do so in Chapter V, which is a comparative analysis of eight new parties that have emerged in Ecuador since its transition to democracy in 1978.

An Agenda for Future Research

One of the principle findings of this study is that there exists in the population of new parties a distinctive group which follows what I have called an "explosive" performance trajectory. I set aside treatment of this group for several reasons. First, it appears to be relatively new, with the first case only appearing in the late 1990s. Second, it is estimated to be extremely rare, at only 1% of the population. In this sample, there are only three cases. Finally—and not unrelated to the first two issues—it lies beyond the scope of my principle purpose, which is to understand what distinguishes conventionally successful parties from the other trajectories. Explosive parties seem to be a special and unconventional case of success, and in any case they don't appear in Ecuador where I conducted the in depth qualitative comparisons. Explosive parties, nevertheless, raise fascinating questions about party emergence and consolidation.

Several issue deserve further consideration. First, it would be useful to confirm their low frequency and recent vintage on a larger sample. Additionally, in the case of a rare event, larger samples are needed to develop explanatory models. Second, explosive parties in this

sample have emerged only at times when contender parties were not also emerging. The fact that explosive and contender parties do not emerge concurrently supports the claim that they are qualitatively distinctive types. Third, the emergence of explosive parties seems related to the collapse of party systems. On the one hand, explosive parties are distinctive for their very high intercept. Therefore, careful treatment of this trajectory must explain why so many voters suddenly change their preferences to a single newcomer. Volatility is not unusual in many countries of the developing world, but volatility of this scale for a single party at a single point in time is rare. Additionally, explosive parties are distinctive because repeated measurements of their vote share at the second and subsequent elections indicate a quick consolidation of voter support. It may be necessary to explain this feature with a different line of reasoning than we find either in conventional explanations of party success or in the organizations-based explanation I develop in this project. In Venezuela, immediately following the first victory of Hugo Chavez' MVR, the party embarked on a successful project of major reform of the state, including many efforts of dubious constitutional legitimacy. It is likely that the party of former Peruvian president Alberto Fujimori would have also been classified as an explosive party. Like Chavez, Fujimori consolidated control through unconstitutional means. In Bolivia, where the other two cases of "explosive" parties have appeared, there is an effort underway by one of the explosive parties, Evo Morales' MAS, to reform the state. It may be the case that the future of MAS will depend upon his ability to successfully exert control over the state. Likewise, the other party, PODEMOS, is the voice of the opposition and its future may depend upon similar factors. Unlike MAS, PODEMOS has only been observed at one time point. It's vote gain was so high that it was classified as an explosive party with near certainly, but this classification has been made

without consideration of a slope and is therefore sensitive to what happens in the next election.

This study uses a generalized sample of parties across many countries and party families. As I argue above, such an approach is justifiable in cases where party competition is not programmatic. However, in Chapter III in the course of testing whether or not predictions derived from models of programmatic competition offer predictive power, I confronted the fact that there is no satisfactory way to measure these features on generalized samples and in a large-N analysis. One reason for this is that the study of party politics in advanced party systems often and for good reason focuses on a single party family or country; therefore, they can deploy measures of competition which are distinctive to that party family. For example, Kitschelt (1988) can use the strength of opposition to nuclear power as a proxy for the salience of left-libertarianism. However, were one to incorporate, for example, radical right parties and left libertarian parties into the same analysis, one would need to find a single indicator that could indicate salience and strength of issues on different axes. In this study, I used the Cross National Time Series dataset to code a variable for different forms of social protest under the assumption that parties will emerge when demand for new issue representation is high. But if programmatic politics is operating, more precision is necessary to pick up its presence. Particular demands will generate particular types of parties, and neither my approach, nor Hug's (2001), nor Harmel and Robertson's (1985) will allow for this type of precision. The work that is now becoming possible with cross-national comparative expert, elite and mass surveys—for example, by Kitschelt and his associates at Duke, by Alcántara and his associates at Salamanca, and the LAPOP and Latínbaromter

surveys, respectively—may enable us to begin devising measures up to this task, but to date I have not found an approach, and devising one was beyond the scope of this project.

In the course of conducting this research, I concluded that it would be helpful for the discipline to develop formal measurement instruments which allow a researcher to evaluate a party on a given attribute with relative ease. There are many conceptual schema according to which we could conceivably classify a party, yet on the whole there is an absence of easily deployable criteria for doing so. For example, upon arriving in Ecuador, it would have been helpful if I had been able to classify all the new parties with respect to "informal institutionalization," a concept developed by Freidenberg and Levitsky. The authors "conceptualize and operationalize" the concept and purport to "offer indicators of formality and informality in eight areas of party life" (forthcoming). Yet, the process by which they proceed is theoretically rather than empirically driven, it lacks the use of conventional techniques for testing the reliability and validating of their indicators, and it lacks a simple and reproducible formal measurement instrument for use by other scholars.

In thinking about an alternative approach, it is helpful to consider the discipline of psychology and its use of psychometric instruments for measuring and quantifying psychological phenomena. Often these phenomena are latent traits, such as antisocial behavior, which are not directly observable. They must be inferred by observing some behavior that is observable. In that field, scholars commonly adopt the following procedure: 1) identify a theoretically relevant psychological phenomena; 2) develop and validate an instrument for measuring the presence or level of the condition or disorder in a process that may, for example, use principle components analysis or factor analysis to translate a large number of observable items into the underlying latent trait; 3) publish the instrument in a

scholarly journal for use by other researchers. For example, the Developmental Behavioral Checklist is an instrument to assess behavioral and emotional disturbance in children and adolescents with mental retardation (Einfelt and Tonge 1995).[87] After undergoing the conventional scholarly review process, this instrument in now available for use in either clinical settings or in the course of conducting other research in which the psychological phenomena will enter the analysis as either dependent or independent variable. In all subsequent use, the instrument does not need to be defended and the analyst need not use a representative sample. In fact, it can be used on a single case to show the presence or absence of the trait. In this way, the discipline accumulates knowledge.

There is precedent for the use of formal measurement instruments in the study of organizations. Typically, this application takes place in the subfield of organizations in sociology or business schools. For example, Li et. al. published an instrument for the study of supply chain management in the Journal of Operations Management (2005). For a discussion on political science's use of such instruments, on why we have generally failed to develop them, and an argument advocating their use, see Heath and Martin (1997).

Shifting back to party politics, this discussion suggests an alternative to the Freidenberg and Levitsky approach. Borrowing the model of the Developmental Behavioral Checklist, one would: 1) develop a list of observable items that the analyst, via the literature, believes are related to formality or informality of party organization; 2) gather data on a large set of parties for each of these items; 3) use some technique, such factor analysis, to determine the underlying factors and identify the best items for measuring them (would this

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[87] My use of this particular instrument is for expository purposes and otherwise completely arbitrary. I don't know if it has been widely accepted in the field or whether or not it has been replaced by a newer instrument which takes into account an additional decades worth of research.

empirical approach confirm the presence of the eight factors developed by Freidenberg and Levitsky?); 4) name the factors and devise a way to compute a score (either by adding items up, averaging them, etc.) and devise a way to compute an overall "formal organization" score; 5) conduct a reliability and validity test of the instrument. It is important to emphasize that an instrument be relatively easy to administer by incorporating items that are precise, observable, and easily accessible.

In sum, parties, as complex organizations, would benefit from the existence of more precise and concise ways of measuring them and the discipline would benefit from considering the techniques of psychometric theory. This project hypothesizes that the key determinant of new party performance are rooted in organizational attributes. In Chapter V, I developed qualitative and sometimes ad hoc approaches to identify the dominant and supplemental strategies adopted by political parties in Ecuador and to show how they relate to each party's electoral performance. Yet the conclusions would be greatly strengthened with a more formalized and empirical approach to the conceptual development of the various linkage strategies.

As a final avenue of further research, this project reveals the need to approach the study of parties with detailed and disaggregated data, especially electoral data, constituency level party data, and individual level voter data. As a discipline, we lack ready and easy access to all three, though efforts are underway to improve that state of affairs. With regard to electoral data, I was largely successful in gathering district and sub-district level data about all parties, small and large, in Ecuador since 1979, with the exception of 1996. This was an enormous task which in the era of such high digital capacity is surprising. Electoral and institutional data should be publicly available over all countries throughout their

democratic experiences. Furthermore, given their systematic nature, they should be archived and organized using advanced relational database techniques which would enable us to model the natural and complex relationships that exist between the various types of data. The norm is to archive and distribute electoral and institutional data using printed volumes, spreadsheets, or html websites, all of which make their acquisition and analysis extremely cumbersome. In the course of this project I developed a district level electoral database for Chile and Ecuador using relational database techniques and those databases are available at my web page or upon request. Additionally, I envision a database of a much larger scope both in terms of country and election coverage and in terms of the data elements in could include.

With regard to the constituency level party data and individual level voter data, a shortcoming of this project is that it was build upon only very little constituency level data and not at all upon indicators derived from voters and their opinions about issues and politicians. This yielded many substantive obstacles, especially in the case study of Ecuador. I interviewed early party leaders and candidates in order to study how parties built their organizations and linked with voters. This approach was feasible and up to the task of understanding the goals and strategies of party leaders from past decades. However, there are at least two shortcomings to this approach. First, I found that many politicians, and especially the ones from successful parties, to be biased or misleading with respect to the goals and strategies of the party. There was a tendency, for example, to speak nobly about the party's program and internal democratic practices. Second, these data are insufficient to the extent that what central leaders intend to do and what they actually do may be different. This is especially the case when party systems are localized and party leaders from the center may

not even be aware of what the party does at the local level. The party may not operate at the

local level in the same way that it operates at the elite level. In Ecuador, it is common to

think of parties as being political machines run by party bosses. My research revealed,

however, that the machine environment is far more complex than this. There are weak and

shifting relationships between some local bosses and party leaders at the center, as Figure

5.3, which shows party support in Pastaza Province, suggests. This suggests that an

additional cause of a party's electoral success may be the way in which parties solve other

collective actions problems besides the voter's calculus of voting, and in particular the

politician's social choice and ambition problems (Aldrich, 1995).

APPENDIX 1. EXCLUDED ONE-DISTRICT PARTIES

Table A1.1: Profile of Excluded One-District Parties

Country	One-District Parties			
	Count	Max Vote Share	Mean Vote Share	Count VS >1%
Bolivia	0	na	na	na
Chile	2	0.15	0.045	0
Ecuador	73	3.48	0.068	1
Venezuela	574	2.47	0.022	4

Table A1.2: Profile of Excluded One-District Parties, by Election*

Country	Election	Count of Parties	Combined Vote Precentage	Mean Vote Percentage
Chile	1989	1	0.15%	0.15%
Chile	1993	2	0.03%	0.02%
Ecuador	1996	22	5.08%	0.23%
Ecuador	1998	24	1.67%	0.07%
Ecuador	2002	29	1.58%	0.05%
Venezuela	1968	9	0.31%	0.03%
Venezuela	1973	8	0.13%	0.02%
Venezuela	1983	11	0.09%	0.01%
Venezuela	1988	26	0.42%	0.02%
Venezuela	1993	93	1.10%	0.01%
Venezuela	1998	206	4.29%	0.02%
Venezuela	2000	117	7.87%	0.07%
Venezuela	2005	230	8.86%	0.04%

*If an election is not listed, there were no one-district parties

Table A1.3: Time Until Death of 1-District Parties*

# of Elections Before Death	# of Parties
1	386
2	56
3	4
4	1
5	0

*202 parties are still competing, so we haven't yet
observed their death. All are 3 cycles old or less.

APPENDIX 2. VOTE PERCENTAGE, BY PARTY, SORTED BY COUNTRY AND MODAL TRAJECTORY

Country	Party	Modal Trajectory	Year of Election 1	Vote Percentage in Election...				
				1	2	3	4	5
Bolivia	MAS	Explosive	2002	20.94	53.74			
Bolivia	PODEMOS	Explosive	2005	28.59				
Bolivia	MIR	Contender	1985	10.17	21.88	16.77	16.32	0.00
Bolivia	UN	Flat	2005	7.80				
Bolivia	CONDEPA	Flash	1989	12.22	14.27	17.16	0.37	0.00
Bolivia	NFR	Flash	2002	20.91	0.68			
Bolivia	UCS	Flash	1993	13.74	16.11	5.51	0.00	
Bolivia	ACP	Flop	1985	0.88	0.00			
Bolivia	ARBOL	Flop	1993	1.87	0.00			
Bolivia	ARENA	Flop	1985	0.58	0.00			
Bolivia	ASD	Flop	1993	1.84	0.00			
Bolivia	AUR	Flop	1985	0.64	0.00			
Bolivia	EJE	Flop	1993	1.09	0.84	0.00		
Bolivia	FNP	Flop	1985	0.67	0.00			
Bolivia	FPU	Flop	1985	2.54	0.00			
Bolivia	FREPAB	Flop	2005	0.30				
Bolivia	FULKA	Flop	1989	1.17	0.00			
Bolivia	IU	Flop	1985	0.73	8.10	0.97	3.71	0.00
Bolivia	MBL	Flop	1993	5.35	3.09	0.00		
Bolivia	MCC	Flop	2002	0.63	0.00			
Bolivia	MFD	Flop	1993	0.38	0.00			
Bolivia	MIN	Flop	1989	0.69	0.00			
Bolivia	MIP	Flop	2002	6.09	2.16			
Bolivia	MKN	Flop	1993	0.75	0.00			
Bolivia	MNRI	Flop	1985	5.53	0.00			
Bolivia	MNRI-1	Flop	1985	0.81	0.00			
Bolivia	MNRV	Flop	1985	5.01	0.00			
Bolivia	MRTK	Flop	1985	0.87	0.00			
Bolivia	MRTKL	Flop	1985	2.22	1.63	0.00		
Bolivia	PDB	Flop	1997	0.48	0.00			
Bolivia	PDC	Flop	1985	1.62	0.00			
Bolivia	PLJ	Flop	2002	2.72	0.00			
Bolivia	POR	Flop	1985	0.92	0.00			
Bolivia	USTB	Flop	2005	0.26				
Bolivia	VR-9	Flop	1993	1.28	0.00			
Bolivia	VSB	Flop	1997	1.39	0.00			
Chile	PPD	Contender	1989	11.45	11.84	12.55	12.73	15.42
Chile	PSCH	Contender	1993	11.93	11.05	10.00	10.05	
Chile	RN	Contender	1989	18.28	16.31	16.77	13.77	14.12
Chile	UDI	Contender	1989	9.42	12.11	14.45	25.18	22.36
Chile	ANI	Flop	2005	0.31				

Chile	LV	Flop	1989	0.22	0.00			
Chile	NAP	Flop	1997	0.15	0.00			
Chile	PAIS	Flop	1989	4.38	0.00			
Chile	PAN	Flop	1989	0.85	0.00			
Chile	PAR	Flop	2005	0.40				
Chile	PDR	Flop	1989	0.42	0.00			
Chile	PH	Flop	1989	0.77	1.01	2.91	1.13	1.56
Chile	PL (1989)	Flop	1989	0.69	0.00			
Chile	PL (2001)	Flop	2001	0.06	0.00			
Chile	PRSD	Flop	1989	0.02	0.00			
Chile	PSD	Flop	1993	0.79	0.00			
Chile	PSUR	Flop	1989	0.70	0.20	0.36	0.00	
Chile	UCC	Flop	1993	3.21	1.19	0.00		
Ecuador	ID	Contender	1979	14.80	20.01	14.48	22.62	13.04
Ecuador	PRE	Contender	1984	5.06	9.04	16.33	14.81	16.03
Ecuador	PRIAN	Contender	2002	13.84				
Ecuador	AN	Flat	1984	8.81	5.65	3.94	4.19	3.59
Ecuador	DP-UDC	Flat	1984	7.32	9.37	10.88	10.05	7.22
Ecuador	MPD	Flat	1979	4.92	6.53	7.31	5.85	4.97
Ecuador	MUPP-NP	Flat	1996	7.13	2.14	4.22		
Ecuador	PD	Flash	1984	8.03	4.65	1.99	0.00	
Ecuador	PUR	Flash	1992	14.76	3.90	0.00		
Ecuador	MCNP	Flop	1996	0.25	4.95	0.77		
Ecuador	META	Flop	2002	0.75				
Ecuador	MIAJ	Flop	1998	0.06	0.42			
Ecuador	MIGN	Flop	1998	1.67	0.00			
Ecuador	MIHE	Flop	1998	0.11	0.00			
Ecuador	MIUN	Flop	1998	0.26	0.00			
Ecuador	MPS	Flop	2002	2.05				
Ecuador	PAB	Flop	1992	0.45	0.08	0.00		
Ecuador	PCD	Flop	1984	2.70	2.30	1.16	0.88	0.46
Ecuador	PDP	Flop	1988	0.42	0.99	0.08	0.00	
Ecuador	PL	Flop	1990	1.78	0.99	0.88	0.85	1.87
Ecuador	PSP	Flop	2002	3.95				
Ecuador	TSI	Flop	2002	1.13				
Ecuador	UPL	Flop	1994	0.57	0.50	0.58	0.00	
Venezuela	MVR	Explosive	1998	20.01	44.38	55.08		
Venezuela	LCR	Flat	1978	0.24	0.54	1.65	20.68	2.93
Venezuela	MAS	Flat	1973	5.29	6.16	5.75	10.15	10.81
Venezuela	PPT	Flat	1998	3.40	2.27	5.81		
Venezuela	CCN(1)	Flash	1968	10.96	4.31	0.21	0.00	
Venezuela	CONVERGENCIA	Flash	1993	13.84	2.51	1.07	0.00	
Venezuela	FDP(1)	Flash	1963	9.58	5.31	1.25	0.26	0.00
Venezuela	FND(1)	Flash	1963	13.33	2.57	0.26	0.00	
Venezuela	MEP	Flash	1968	12.94	4.96	2.22	1.97	1.61
Venezuela	PODEMOS	Flash	2005	8.16				

Venezuela	PRVZL	Flash	1998	10.52	6.94	0.17		
Venezuela	AA	Flop	1993	0.02	0.11	0.23		
Venezuela	ABP	Flop	2000	1.10	0.00			
Venezuela	ACTIVE	Flop	1998	0.01	0.01	0.02		
Venezuela	AFIN	Flop	1978	0.00	0.00			
Venezuela	AIR	Flop	1968	0.25	0.00			
Venezuela	ALCINA	Flop	1973	0.03	0.00			
Venezuela	ALVE(2)	Flop	1998	0.01	0.00			
Venezuela	AM(1)	Flop	1968	0.06	0.00			
Venezuela	AMI	Flop	1983	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00	
Venezuela	AMOR	Flop	1988	0.00	0.02	0.00		
Venezuela	ANDI	Flop	1998	0.01	0.00			
Venezuela	ANPRI	Flop	1998	0.01	0.00			
Venezuela	AP	Flop	1993	0.16	0.10	0.00		
Venezuela	APERTURA	Flop	1998	1.56	0.01	0.00		
Venezuela	API(1)	Flop	1968	0.51	0.00			
Venezuela	API(2)	Flop	1988	0.00	0.00			
Venezuela	APRO	Flop	2000	0.02	0.00			
Venezuela	ARPA(1)	Flop	1973	0.04	0.00			
Venezuela	ARPA(2)	Flop	1988	0.00	0.00			
Venezuela	ASD	Flop	2000	0.07	0.00			
Venezuela	BR	Flop	2000	0.32	0.08			
Venezuela	CADECIDE	Flop	2000	0.20	0.01			
Venezuela	CC	Flop	1978	1.62	0.00			
Venezuela	CCN(2)	Flop	1988	0.06	0.02	0.01	0.01	
Venezuela	CD(2)	Flop	1993	0.02	0.01	0.03		
Venezuela	CEM	Flop	1993	0.08	0.00			
Venezuela	CEPAS	Flop	1963	0.15	0.00			
Venezuela	CIMA(1)	Flop	1983	0.29	0.00			
Venezuela	CON	Flop	1998	0.06	0.01	0.00		
Venezuela	CON LA VIDA	Flop	1998	0.04	0.00			
Venezuela	CONFE	Flop	1983	0.07	0.00			
Venezuela	CONSTRUCTORES	Flop	2000	0.14	0.00			
Venezuela	CRV	Flop	2005	0.04				
Venezuela	DC(1)	Flop	1973	0.17	0.00			
Venezuela	DC(2)	Flop	1993	0.22	0.00			
Venezuela	DP(1)	Flop	1973	0.01	0.00			
Venezuela	DR	Flop	1998	0.14	0.00	0.10		
Venezuela	EEF 94	Flop	1993	0.01	0.00			
Venezuela	EI	Flop	1983	0.02	0.00			
Venezuela	EL	Flop	1998	0.02	0.01	0.11		
Venezuela	ENCUENTRO	Flop	2000	0.83	0.00			
Venezuela	EPAP	Flop	1993	0.05	0.00			
Venezuela	EPI	Flop	1993	0.00	0.00			
Venezuela	F1	Flop	1988	1.30	0.28	0.03	0.23	0.00
Venezuela	FACTOR E	Flop	1993	0.03	0.00			

Venezuela	FACTOR X	Flop	2000	0.01	0.00			
Venezuela	FAI	Flop	1993	0.02	0.01	0.00	0.04	
Venezuela	FD	Flop	1993	0.05	0.08	0.00		
Venezuela	FDP(2)	Flop	1993	0.07	0.00			
Venezuela	FE	Flop	1973	0.05	0.02	0.04	0.02	0.00
Venezuela	FEI	Flop	1968	0.03	0.00			
Venezuela	FEVO(1)	Flop	1973	0.00	0.00	0.00		
Venezuela	FEVO(2)	Flop	1988	0.04	0.03	0.00		
Venezuela	FID	Flop	1988	0.01	0.00			
Venezuela	FIN	Flop	1983	0.00	0.03	0.00	0.07	
Venezuela	FIR	Flop	1968	0.06	0.00			
Venezuela	FL	Flop	2005	0.02				
Venezuela	FNP	Flop	1988	0.03	0.00			
Venezuela	FP	Flop	1998	0.11	0.02	0.20		
Venezuela	FPI	Flop	1993	0.27	0.00			
Venezuela	FRD	Flop	1998	0.01	0.00	0.06		
Venezuela	FRENAMAC	Flop	2000	0.01	0.00			
Venezuela	FS	Flop	1998	0.13	0.00			
Venezuela	FUN	Flop	1973	0.35	0.25	0.19	0.16	0.20
Venezuela	FURE	Flop	1978	0.00	0.00			
Venezuela	FUTURO SEGURO	Flop	1988	0.01	0.00			
Venezuela	FVI	Flop	2005	0.02				
Venezuela	GAR	Flop	1978	0.17	0.23	0.00		
Venezuela	GE	Flop	1993	0.27	0.20	0.11	0.38	
Venezuela	GEIJM	Flop	1993	0.00	0.00			
Venezuela	GEM	Flop	1998	0.03	0.00			
Venezuela	GENTE-MIRANDA	Flop	1998	0.01	0.01			
Venezuela	GIRASOL	Flop	1993	0.14	0.01	0.00		
Venezuela	GOA	Flop	1983	0.02	0.01	0.00		
Venezuela	IA	Flop	1988	0.00	0.01	0.00		
Venezuela	ICC(1)	Flop	1983	0.97	0.00			
Venezuela	ICC(2)	Flop	1988	0.05	0.00			
Venezuela	ICC(3)	Flop	1993	0.02	0.00			
Venezuela	ICC(4)	Flop	1998	0.09	0.00			
Venezuela	IDEAL	Flop	1988	0.00	0.02	0.00		
Venezuela	INCVF	Flop	1998	0.03	0.00	0.00		
Venezuela	INICIATIVA Propia	Flop	2000	0.05	0.00			
Venezuela	IP	Flop	1973	0.63	0.00			
Venezuela	IPCN	Flop	1998	0.16	0.17	0.92		
Venezuela	IPDC	Flop	1978	0.12	0.00			
Venezuela	IPV	Flop	1998	0.16	0.00	0.01		
Venezuela	IR	Flop	1958	0.75	0.00			
Venezuela	IRE	Flop	1983	0.45	0.27	0.03	0.00	
Venezuela	IRENE	Flop	1998	1.28	0.05	0.00		
Venezuela	IZQUIERDA	Flop	2000	0.84	0.05			
Venezuela	JUAN BIMBA	Flop	2005	0.10				

Venezuela	LA LLAVE	Flop	1998	0.01	0.00			
Venezuela	LIDER	Flop	1988	0.08	0.01	0.00	0.00	
Venezuela	LNR (OLVARRIA)	Flop	1988	0.35	0.00			
Venezuela	LS(1)	Flop	1978	0.57	0.91	0.46	0.09	0.00
Venezuela	LS(2)	Flop	2005	0.35				
Venezuela	M 2000	Flop	2000	0.01	0.00			
Venezuela	MAI(1)	Flop	1978	0.01	0.00			
Venezuela	MAN	Flop	1958	0.58	0.55	0.67	0.29	0.00
Venezuela	MANO	Flop	1988	0.00	0.00			
Venezuela	MAP	Flop	1993	0.00	0.00			
Venezuela	MAR	Flop	1993	0.02	0.03	0.00		
Venezuela	MCGN	Flop	2005	0.08				
Venezuela	MCM	Flop	2005	0.62				
Venezuela	MDA	Flop	2000	0.02	0.00			
Venezuela	MDD	Flop	2000	0.48	0.13			
Venezuela	MDI	Flop	1968	0.50	0.14	0.00		
Venezuela	MDP	Flop	1993	0.21	0.00			
Venezuela	MDP-BR	Flop	1998	0.31	0.00			
Venezuela	MDT	Flop	1978	0.43	0.00			
Venezuela	MEM	Flop	1988	0.01	0.00			
Venezuela	MENI	Flop	1963	0.65	0.38	0.00		
Venezuela	MIAP	Flop	1988	0.06	0.01	0.00		
Venezuela	MID	Flop	1993	0.04	0.00			
Venezuela	MIL	Flop	1993	0.01	0.03	0.01		
Venezuela	MIN	Flop	1978	1.58	0.81	0.47	0.62	0.37
Venezuela	MIO	Flop	1983	0.15	0.01	0.02	0.00	0.01
Venezuela	MIPV	Flop	1998	0.00	0.00			
Venezuela	MIR	Flop	1973	1.00	2.35	1.58	0.00	
Venezuela	MIRA	Flop	1998	0.02	0.00	0.04		
Venezuela	MIRU	Flop	1988	0.00	0.00			
Venezuela	ML(1)	Flop	1968	0.01	0.00	0.00		
Venezuela	ML(2)	Flop	2005	0.05				
Venezuela	MLPU	Flop	2005	0.01				
Venezuela	MNBD	Flop	1998	0.02	0.00			
Venezuela	MNV	Flop	1988	0.07	0.00			
Venezuela	MOBARE 200-4F	Flop	2005	0.68				
Venezuela	MOMO	Flop	1988	0.04	0.00			
Venezuela	MONCHO	Flop	1993	0.02	0.05	0.00		
Venezuela	MORENA	Flop	1978	0.50	0.01	0.00	0.00	
Venezuela	MPDIN	Flop	1983	0.00	0.06	0.02	0.00	
Venezuela	MPJ	Flop	2005	0.47				
Venezuela	MPJ(1)	Flop	1973	0.19	0.00			
Venezuela	MR	Flop	1993	0.03	0.13	0.01	0.55	
Venezuela	MRN	Flop	1993	0.17	0.02	0.00		
Venezuela	MSN	Flop	2005	0.42				
Venezuela	MT	Flop	2005	0.03				

Venezuela	NA	Flop	1983	1.05	0.16	0.00		
Venezuela	NED	Flop	2005	0.03				
Venezuela	NGD	Flop	1983	0.16	3.30	0.35	0.00	0.00
Venezuela	NOR	Flop	1978	0.00	0.04	0.03	0.06	0.00
Venezuela	NOSOTROS (PSN)	Flop	1988	0.07	0.00			
Venezuela	NR	Flop	1993	0.01	0.00			
Venezuela	NRD	Flop	1998	0.01	0.10	0.00		
Venezuela	NT	Flop	1988	0.03	0.00	0.00		
Venezuela	OI	Flop	1988	0.01	0.05	0.01	0.01	
Venezuela	ONDA	Flop	1993	0.10	0.04	0.23		
Venezuela	ONI	Flop	1988	0.01	0.02	0.07	0.01	
Venezuela	OPINA	Flop	1968	0.20	0.74	0.15	1.98	0.58
Venezuela	OPIR	Flop	1968	0.06	0.00			
Venezuela	ORA	Flop	1978	0.03	1.29	0.87	0.54	0.02
Venezuela	OVNI	Flop	1968	0.12	0.00			
Venezuela	PAN(1)	Flop	1963	0.51	0.00			
Venezuela	PAN(2)	Flop	1993	0.01	0.00	0.00		
Venezuela	PARTICIPA	Flop	1998	0.06	0.00	0.00		
Venezuela	PCI	Flop	1993	0.18	0.00			
Venezuela	PD	Flop	2005	0.06				
Venezuela	PENETRACION 88	Flop	1988	0.01	0.00			
Venezuela	PENSAMIENTO NAC	Flop	1993	0.00	0.00			
Venezuela	PEV	Flop	1993	0.11	0.00			
Venezuela	PG	Flop	1998	0.02	0.00			
Venezuela	PLV	Flop	1988	0.04	0.05	0.00		
Venezuela	PN(1)	Flop	1988	0.21	0.04	0.02	0.00	0.00
Venezuela	PND	Flop	1993	0.02	0.00			
Venezuela	PNI	Flop	1973	0.70	0.00			
Venezuela	PNV	Flop	1983	0.03	0.00			
Venezuela	PODER	Flop	1993	0.04	0.00			
Venezuela	PODER LABORAL	Flop	2005	0.24				
Venezuela	PPI	Flop	1998	0.02	0.00			
Venezuela	PQAC	Flop	1993	0.04	0.17	0.04	0.11	
Venezuela	PRIN	Flop	1963	3.44	2.39	0.00		
Venezuela	PRIVO	Flop	1968	0.17	0.00			
Venezuela	PRN	Flop	1973	0.09	0.00			
Venezuela	PROSOCIAL	Flop	1993	0.04	0.00			
Venezuela	PST(1)	Flop	1958	0.60	0.00			
Venezuela	PST(2)	Flop	1993	0.01	0.00			
Venezuela	PUEBLO	Flop	1988	0.03	0.00			
Venezuela	PVL	Flop	2005	0.33				
Venezuela	RC(1)	Flop	1998	0.02	0.01	0.00		
Venezuela	RC(2)	Flop	2005	0.09				
Venezuela	REINA	Flop	1973	0.01	0.00			
Venezuela	RENACE	Flop	1998	0.28	0.09			
Venezuela	RENOVACION	Flop	1988	0.11	0.12	1.27	0.00	

Venezuela	RHONA	Flop	1988	0.00	0.00			
Venezuela	RN(1)	Flop	1983	0.23	0.00			
Venezuela	RND	Flop	1998	0.02	0.00			
Venezuela	SENCO	Flop	1993	0.06	0.00			
Venezuela	SI(1)	Flop	1983	0.04	0.00			
Venezuela	SI(2)	Flop	1993	0.01	0.50	0.34	0.07	
Venezuela	SIGLO XXI	Flop	1988	0.01	0.00			
Venezuela	SOLIDARIDAD	Flop	2005	0.06				
Venezuela	SOLUCION	Flop	1998	0.10	0.01	0.10		
Venezuela	TNSD	Flop	1993	0.01	0.00			
Venezuela	TUPAMARO	Flop	2005	1.26				
Venezuela	U	Flop	1993	0.05	0.00			
Venezuela	UDH	Flop	1998	0.62	0.76	0.54		
Venezuela	UO	Flop	1993	0.04	0.00			
Venezuela	UP	Flop	1983	0.00	0.01	0.07	0.00	
Venezuela	UP(2)	Flop	2005	0.27				
Venezuela	UPC	Flop	1993	0.01	0.14			
Venezuela	UPP	Flop	1968	0.04	0.00			
Venezuela	UPV(2)	Flop	2005	1.36				
Venezuela	USP	Flop	2005	0.47				
Venezuela	UTOPIA	Flop	1983	0.00	0.00			
Venezuela	UVI	Flop	1993	0.10	0.01	0.00	0.00	
Venezuela	VDP	Flop	2005	0.06				
Venezuela	VISION	Flop	2005	0.02				
Venezuela	VOI(1)	Flop	1983	0.06	0.00			
Venezuela	VTM	Flop	2005	0.03				
Venezuela	VU	Flop	1998	0.05	0.00			
Venezuela	VUC	Flop	1978	0.89	0.00			
Venezuela	ZVPV	Flop	2005	0.05				

APPENDIX 3. ALTERNATIVE SAMPLES IN TRAJECTORY MODEL ESTIMATION

The coding decision about when a party is new is clear in most cases. However, interruptions in democratic competition introduce a potentially ambiguous decision point. This appendix includes SPMM estimations on two alternative samples: one for the 24 "legacy" parties alone and one for all parties, legacy and new. The legacy parties, including the trajectory group membership which results from an estimation on the first sample, are listed below in Table x. The estimation results appear in Figure X and Table X below.

Table A3.1: Legacy Parties

Country	Party	Trajectory	Vote Share				
			Election 1	Election 2	Election 3	Election 4	Election 5
Venezuela	AD	Player	49.45	32.70	25.57	44.45	39.68
Bolivia	MNR	Player	30.11	25.65	35.59	18.20	22.46
Chile	PDC	Player	25.99	27.12	22.98	18.92	20.76
Venezuela	COPEI	Player	15.20	20.81	24.00	30.24	39.81
Bolivia	ADN[88]	Crash	32.78	25.09		22.26	3.40
Ecuador	CFP	Crash	31.73	8.99	9.44	8.09	4.16
Venezuela	URD	Crash	26.76	17.38	9.26	3.19	1.68
Ecuador	PSC	Riser	6.37	11.45	12.61	12.42	24.46
Ecuador	PLRE	Flop	9.66	5.97	8.46	2.73	3.31
Ecuador	UN-UNO	Flop	8.86	3.53	1.39	2.00	4.24
Venezuela	PCV	Flop	6.23	2.82	1.20	1.04	1.75
Ecuador	PR	Flop	5.99	1.36	0.56	0.55	0.00
Chile	PC	Flop	4.99	6.88	5.22	5.14	
Ecuador	PNR	Flop	4.54	2.24	1.86	0.00	
Ecuador	FADI	Flop	4.48	5.13	6.06	2.39	2.11
Chile	PRSD	Flop	3.94	2.98	3.13	4.05	3.54
Ecuador	APRE	Flop	3.03	0.22	2.42	4.31	2.15
Ecuador	FNV	Flop	2.99	0.89	0.00		
Ecuador	PS-FA	Flop	2.62	1.76	4.39	4.31	8.87
Bolivia	PS-1	Flop	2.57	2.82	0.65	0.00	
Bolivia	FSB	Flop	1.34	0.75	1.27	0.00	
Chile	PN	Flop	0.79	0.04	0.00		
Venezuela	PSD	Flop	0.43	0.86	0.81	0.28	0.00
Chile	MAPU	Flop	0.10	0.00			

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[88] ADN's classification as "Crash" is highly influenced by its performance in election 5 which took place in 2002 immediately following the death of its founder, Banzer. If one drops the fifth observation, the party is classified as a "player" and conforms more closely to what country experts might expect.

Figure A3.1: 4-Group Model for Legacy Parties

Table A3.2: 4-Group Model of Legacy Party Electoral Performance

(Latent Trajectory Model; parties N=24; panel N=108)

Group	Population Prevalence	Share Parameters	
Players	16.70%**	Intercept	28.5**
Crash	12.50%*	Intercept	26.7**
		Slope	-6.1**
Contender	4.20%	Intercept	6.0
		Slope	3.7**
Flops	66.60%**	Intercept	3.3**
		Slope	-0.5

* significant at .1 level; ** significant at .05 level.
Intercepts are undefined at t=0 and have been adjusted to t=1

The result of the estimation above (on only legacy parties) offers support of the

decision to exclude them from an analysis of party performance because two of the groups

are distinctive. Both the group I have called "players" and the group I have called "crash" are

not found empirically in the estimates of models which include only new parties.

Furthermore, as groups consisting of parties with a long history in and out of democratic and

authoritarian regimes, we would not have a strong theoretical basis for expecting them to

exist in the population new parties. The predictors of their performance are likely to be distinct from predictors of new party trajectories.

The four legacy parties classified as "players" all began the democratic episode with a great deal of electoral strength, and remained strong throughout their first five elections. In fact, this set of four parties had a slope estimate which was not significant at the .05 level, suggesting that the group can be sufficiently described with the intercept alone—28.5% of the vote at election 1—and no slope. Three of the four parties in this group enter the founding election with a share of the vote which is not remarkably different from the share of the vote with which they exit the analysis five elections later. The one exception to this pattern is COPEI in Venezuela, and one can see that the posterior probability that this party belongs to this groups is relatively low. In fact, its posterior probability of belonging to the "riser" group (not reported here) makes up most of the difference.

The group classified as "crash" began the episode very strongly—even stronger on average than the "players"—but their support quickly deteriorates. Empirically, this group resembles the "flash" group of the new parties model in that it has a large negative slope, but it differs in that the intercept is much higher. If we take into consideration the fact that these parties were organizationally continuous and that they had consolidated bases of electoral support before competing in the first post-transition election—two attributes not characteristic of new parties—then this distinctively high intercept is not surprising, and suggests that the group is conceptually distinct from what we will find among new parties. Accounting for their electoral performance—and especially their very high intercept 33% of the vote at election 1—requires a different theoretically account than what one expects to use in accounting for the performance of "flash" parties.

The lone "riser" party, Ecuador's PSC, shares the profile of the "high rise" group in the main model, and as I show below, is classified with that group in a model including all new and preexisting parties. In many respects, it emerged from the transition to democracy in 1978 as a new organization, and there is some disagreement among scholars as to whether it should be considered new or not. By the transition, many of its leaders, including its founder, had faded away and it was revitalized beginning at that point under the leadership of León Febres-Cordero. Its classification as a new or preexisting party is ambiguous, but technically it does not qualify as a new party according to my definition, and so I exclude it from the analysis.

The last set of parties, which I also call "flop" parties, is distinctive from the flop parties of the main model in that the former greatly outlast the latter. In fact, the slope estimate, though slightly negative, is not significant. The trajectory of these parties is best described with a zero order polynomial—that is, with an intercept and no slope. Many of them are parties of the socialist and communist left or lingering elements of the traditional party system—liberals and conservatives—and they entered the new episode with long-standing and deep roots in a very narrow labor or traditional elite. It is no surprise that they manage to hang on much longer than upstart parties which enter and win few votes. Six of the 16 continue to compete today. As a group they may share many common features, but their inheritance from the prior democratic regime makes them a distinctive analytic class of parties.

The fact that there is a different theoretical foundation for understanding the performance of these preexisting parties means that it dilutes and confuses the analysis when they are included with the new parties. The consequences are not severe—as I indicate

above, some of the trajectory groups are distinctive in terms of the intercept, slop, or both, and will therefore yield new and distinctive groups in the model. But this is not always the case, and the model has difficulty detangling some of the more subtle distinctions. Let us consider how the inclusion legacy parties with new parties alters alter the results.

Figure x below graphs the six trajectories of the best fitting model when all parties—new parties and legacy parties—are included in the analysis. My argument here is that these trajectory groups conflate parties operating under distinctive logics; therefore, rather than adopting group names which imply meaning, I will identify the trajectories using numbers where 1 corresponds to the group with the highest intercept, 2 corresponds to the group with the second highest intercept, etc.

Figure A3.2: 6-Group Model for Sample of Legacy and New Parties

Trajectory 1 conflates the new parties I call explosive with one preexisting party from the "players" group, Venezuela's AD, with one exception: the new Bolivian party PODEMOS is removed from the group and placed on trajectory 2. This adjustment is trivial, however, because PODEMOS' trajectory is fully determined by only one data point, its first election in 2005, which at 28% more closely matches trajectory 2's intercept than trajectory 1's intercept. As one would expect, with such a shallow basis for computing its trajectory group, it has a 61% chance of being on trajectory 2 and a 39% chance of being on trajectory 1. When more data points become available its classification will take place with more certainty. In sum, trajectory 1, by including a member of the "player" set, takes on a less extreme shape than its "explosive" counterpart in the main model and thereby dilutes the truly dramatic rise of the new parties in that group. Figure X.A below compares the explosive trajectory of the new party sample with trajectory 1 of the combined sample.

Figure A3.3: Group by Group Comparison Across Samples

Trajectory 2 is composed entirely of preexisting parties, with the exception of

PODEMOS in Bolivia. Therefore, it is an entirely new trajectory relative to the new party

sample and conforms mostly to the shape of the "players" trajectory, though it is slightly

declining rather than flat. See Figure X.B above.

Trajectory 3 conflates three of the "flash" new parties—those which among that

group had a high level of initial success and slightly more staying power—with two of the

three "crash" parties. In other words, it conflates the death of two legacy parties (Venezuela's

URD and Ecuador's CFP) and the initial "flash" performance of three Bolivian parties (NFR,

Condepa, and UCS). See Figure X.C above.

Trajectory 4 corresponds very closely to the "contender" group of the new party sample. The only difference in the classification result is that it incorporates the Ecuadorian PSC, a party which, as I mention above and argue in other sections of this project, closely resembles this group not only in its electoral trajectory, but in other ways. See Figure X.D above.

Trajectories 5 combines many members of the groups of new parties which I call "flat" and "flash" parties with many members of the "flop" parties in the legacy only sample to yield a group which on average enters with around 6% of the vote and slowly declines, but not to the point of death. See Figure X.E above.

Trajectory 6 is largely the same as the "flop" group in the new party sample, and it incorporates a few of the poorest performing legacy parties from the "flop" group in that model. See Figure X.F above.

While I argue that the wholesale inclusion of legacy parties alters the model in important and problematic ways, one may wonder if and how coding errors which incorrectly classify parties as new or preexisting will effect the analysis. The case of Ecuador's PSC, which I code as a legacy party, suggests that the consequence can be trivial in that the parameter estimates are trivially changed. Chile's Socialist Party is another ambiguous case which, for reasons outlined elsewhere, I classify as new. It is classified together with other "contender" parties in both the new party sample and the sample which includes all parties. When the analysis turns to the incorporation of predictors of trajectory classification, the PSCH may be different in important ways from other members of this group, but at this stage of the analysis where I focus on forming the dependent variable, it does not seem to matter.

In sum, these results confirm a) that most preexisting parties have electoral profiles following a democratic transition that are empirically distinctive from the profiles of new parties; and b) that the estimates used in the main body of this project are not sensitive to the coding decisions for parties that are ambiguously new or preexisting.

APPENDIX 4. PARTY BIRTHS, DEATHS, SPLITS AND MERGERS IN ECUADOR

Year: 1943 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978

Legacy	CFP	1946 (CFP)
Flop	PAB	
Contender	PRE	
Contender	PRIAN	
Flop	PCD	
Legacy	APRE	1960s (PNG) (APRE)
Legacy	PSC	
Flash	PUR	
Contender	DP-UDC	(PDC) 1978 (DP-UDC)
Flash	MPS	
Legacy	PCE	1883
Legacy	PLRE	1878
Contender	ID	1970
Flop	UPL	
Flop	PDP	
Flash	PD	1972
Flash	FRA	1978
Legacy	CID	1965
Legacy	PSE	1926
Legacy	FADI	19?? (UDP) (FADI)
Flop	PLN	
Flash	MPD	1963
Legacy	PNR	1963
Legacy	PNV	1968
Flash	MCNP	
Flash	MUPP	
Flop	MIAJ	
Flash	PSP	
Flop	ITI	
Flop	TSI	
Flop	MSI	
Flop	MIC	
Flop	UCI	
Flop	META	

Key:
- Party changed hands, though the party registration with the electoral authorities was continuous.
- ( ) Party name changes are in parenthises
- date Dates or years at right angles indicate that dissident members of one party form a new party.
- date Dates or years at the end of a line indicate a party's death.
- Junctures where the directionality and/or continuity is ambiguous are marked with arrows.

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
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FRA-3. 2006. Personal Interview, March 27, 2006 in Pichincha. Former Legislative Candidate from Pichincha and Member of National Directorate in 1990s.

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