

Carolina Planning

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Carolina Planning

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Forum	Planning from the Bottom Up	Elizabeth Morton Heidi Walter Powell	3
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Articles	Reflections on Donor Coordination: An Attempt to Establish a Microcomputer-based Development Project Directory in Sudan	Dale Whittington Craig Calhoun	8
	Development on the Urban Fringe: Recent Chinese Experience	Simon Powell	15
	No Voice, No Choice: Community Group Involvement in London's Metropolitan Strategic Planning Process	Judith Allen	23
	Population—A Key Component of Planning Education for Developing Countries	Linda Lacey	30

Commentary	Meeting the Needs of Developing Countries: Introducing a New Program of Study	Linda Lacey	39
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Editor's Note

In our shrinking world, it is important for U.S. planning professionals to understand the difficulties their counterparts face in other countries. European planning issues may resemble those in the U.S., but the variety of political, social and economic systems there make the approaches very different from one another and from ours. Third World planning issues include population control and providing food and shelter, which may seem far removed from issues we consider to be planning-related. But the problems of overcrowding, hunger and homelessness affect our personal and professional lives.

This issue of *Carolina Planning* examines the profession in a variety of international contexts and from a variety of perspectives. The problems planners face in other parts of the world, and the approaches they have taken, provide insights into the way we practice planning in the United States.

The interview with Viennese Professor Walter Stöhr and the first feature article by Dale Whittington and Craig Calhoun are applications-oriented, involving fieldwork. Stöhr discusses the collection and analysis of European local development initiatives—an alternative approach to economic development, which utilizes local resources to build strong economies. Dale Whittington and Craig Calhoun share their experience trying to establish a microcomputer-based development project directory for donor coordination in Sudan.

The next two articles evaluate planning problems, albeit in very different contexts. Simon Powell examines the related problems of planning for industrial development on the urban fringe of Nanjing, China, and of ensuring agricultural self-sufficiency. Judith Allen describes the Greater London Council's (GLC) challenge to Britain's "conventional wisdom," which sees planning only as a tool for controlling development. Allen then analyzes the positive impact of the GLC's approach on London's disempowered groups.

Linda Lacey takes a prescriptive approach by proposing new ways of teaching population studies to planners. She illustrates in Commentary the application of such an approach through the new curriculum at the Department of City and Regional Planning.

Carolina Planning staff extends a special thanks to the North Carolina chapter of the APA whose efforts have helped increase the journal's subscribers. Staff also thanks contributors to the John Parker Trust Fund, advertisers and regular subscribers for their continued support.

Heidi Walter Powell
Editor

Carolina Planning welcomes comments and suggestions on the articles published and will be happy to accept new material for future editions from interested persons. Such material should be submitted to the Editor typewritten and double spaced.

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Forum

Planning from the Bottom Up

An Interview with Professor Walter Stöhr

Elizabeth Morton
Heidi Walter Powell

Walter Stöhr is a professor of regional planning, and Director of the Interdisciplinary Institute for Urban and Regional Studies, University of Economics (Wirtschaftsuniversität), Vienna, Austria. He is currently undertaking a compilation and analysis of local economic development initiatives in several regions of Europe, and has recently completed a study on the impacts of industrial parks in the United States and abroad.

CP: Please describe the "European Perspectives Project" that you are working on for United Nations University.

STOHR: UN University is located in Tokyo, but it does research worldwide. The study which was contracted to me will document experiences from Europe. The goal is to see how local or regional communities have successfully restructured internally, and primarily out of their own initiative and resources, to cope with the changing international division of labor. A team of twelve case-study authors is examining what experiences have been made in several major regions of Europe as a result of this restructuring. We are conducting research in rural areas, which is the most common area type in the analysis, and old industrial areas, where declining industries have to be restructured—these are the two major problem areas. We also look at small- and intermediate-sized cities and at some restructuring cases of large metropolitan areas which have very specific problems and different potentials.

CP: Could you give some examples of the types of development activities you have found?

STOHR: We're looking at the actors within individual communities who have initiated this change process. We're considering the type of actor and how he or she has related to local institutional, political or social structures in bringing about such a change. The precondition has always been an actor, but actors vary from clergy to an entrepreneur who became more than just a private entrepreneur, but a social entrepreneur—he tried to stimulate activities

in addition to his own enterprise. Very often the actor would be a local authority. For the most part, successful local authorities were in countries with dynamic local governments which had recently introduced increasing autonomy for political and economic development at the local level.

CP: You've stressed the importance of internal development, and have described two types of external inputs which tend to increase dependency: central government and large multiregional or multinational enterprises. Is one of these the "lesser of two evils"? Do depressed regions have more room for innovation and flexibility under one set of external conditions?

STOHR: One cannot generalize by saying that one is better or worse than the other. In the centrally planned countries, two of which are included in this study (Hungary and Poland), the central government is always the major initiator of development at the local level, but the government has brought about a dependency of local communities which has to a great extent stifled their ability to act out of their own initiative. This also very often happens with multinational companies. Multinational companies—the typical case is a company town—will become such a dominating factor in a local community that no other initiatives can emerge successfully. In both cases, local communities can avoid this dependence. Some of the Eastern European case studies show that there are ways to avoid this complete dependence on central government. These studies have identified niches within which local initiatives are legally permitted and



will be tolerated and which can mobilize human and other resources for local development successfully. The same can be applied to large company towns. There are ways in which a local community can try to benefit from the multinational company without becoming completely dependent on it by using it as a catalyst for introducing new technologies which local firms can take advantage of. So the question here very often is: How can we promote the involvement of local firms in servicing or initially contracting or subcontracting with MNCs, rather than leaving these companies to get all their inputs from outside the region.

CP: How is the "community interest" usually represented in negotiations as areas try to attract new high-tech and industrial development? Specifically, do you feel the community as a whole has been served by the presence of Research Triangle Park?

STOHR: Most often, local or regional authorities will negotiate with external firms — that is the normal pattern. The negotiator may also be a separate company set up for development. In Research Triangle Park, Triangle J Council of Governments substitutes for or represents local government in negotiations. My impression of Research Triangle Park is that it was able to attract large enterprises, both public and private. This is important for creating a new image and for starting high-technology activities in North Carolina, since the state has traditionally had a different image and different dominant sectors. The question is: How broad has this effect become and how broad will it become? Research Triangle Park seems to be

comprised of a large number of enterprises that close themselves off from the outside; they try not to interrelate with other enterprises, while benefitting from local resources like university knowledge. Once they get this knowledge, however, they want to monopolize it, refusing to share with neighboring enterprises. This is one of the dangers of attracting large corporations. It might be possible to establish a number of facilities within Research Triangle Park to establish which would be able to house small- and medium-sized enterprises, sort-of on an incubator basis, to establish relations and offer services to the large enterprises. The small- and medium-sized enterprises would thereby become beneficiaries of some of the innovations that the large enterprises are developing in Research Triangle Park. The incubator could be within the park, adjacent to, or outside the park. This would provide a type of spillover or multiplier which would certainly broaden the impact of such a research technology park.

CP: Have local development endeavors been successful in utilizing locally available resources, rather than attempting to create or attract high-tech industries?

STOHR: Many of the case studies that we have analyzed in the European context show that the panacea of introducing high-technology industries is often not considered by local communities as the most important aspect. The most important aspect is to transform existing sectors, retraining their traditional strengths, but adapting them to modern requirements and to existing world market conditions. Localities must transform and modernize existing enterprises and find new forms of cooperation among



Stöhr proposes an incubator function for RTP

existing enterprises which would permit them to become competitive without being closed down and replaced by high-technology firms. There are a number of success stories even in sectors considered as declining in industrialized countries. The Italian textile industry, for example, has had a marvelous success story. After initial closures, the Italians modernized small and decentralized plants which today are completely competitive because they've changed their technology and they've changed their product mix. They are now making very good money. They've become profitable despite strong competition from East Asian firms in textiles and similar sectors. They've been able to carve out functions which the low-wage countries cannot fulfill.

CP: What do you think of industrial recruitment as an economic development strategy and how prevalent is it?

STOHR: Industrial recruitment has been the dominant strategy of local communities that try to outbid other communities to attract outside firms. Usually the only criteria which communities specified were that firms be large, powerful and willing to create a large number of jobs in the area. The types of jobs that would be created, and the types of entrepreneurial functions that would be transferred to the area were usually overlooked. These have turned out to be key elements. If a firm offers only routine jobs without providing any key entrepreneurial functions, it may have a negative effect on the community. The firm may draw labor from other sectors—agriculture or services—because it may pay slightly higher wages. But it does not create any developmental potential. It is very important for local communities to make arrangements with such enterprises to locate key entrepreneurial functions like research and development or marketing or headquarter functions. These are certainly the essential functions that, if attracted to the area, bring much greater benefits because they are creating quality jobs and the determination of company policy is much more accessible to local employees. If a firm performs only routine functions, the local community merely implements what was decided somewhere else. One therefore, by definition becomes more dependent on outside decisionmakers. It is important for local communities to become aware of these key issues so that they can advocate for their interests in negotiations with outside firms. In defining their interests, communities should not look only at the number of jobs or magnitude of capital invested, but at the *types* of jobs and *types* of investment that will be made. Such qualitative issues have very often been overlooked.

CP: What are some advantages and disadvantages of using qualitative development indicators?

STOHR: Qualitative measures are not substitutes for quantitative measures. They should be used together, and one can quantify many of the qualitative criteria. One would try to quantify qualitative criteria in order to make a more objective evaluation. In the past, however, researchers have excluded qualitative characteristics because they could not be evaluated with sufficiently rigid quantitative tests. If a characteristic is important, it is sensible to forgo the "rigid criterion" and include something which may be methodologically less demanding but which would still serve an important function in evaluating such a project.

CP: How might one measure qualitative characteristics over time? If one were interested in examining changes in culture, for example, how would one test or prove such an hypothesis?

STOHR: Culture might be a "soft" area in this respect; however, even within the economics field you have a number of qualitative criteria which have not been taken into consideration in the past. For example, an area experiencing a decline of independent firms and an increasing number of branch plants needs to be considered. Such factors indicate that the autonomy of the regional economy is gradually being debilitated. Similarly, if one looks at the qualification strata of the workforce, one sees that there are large increases in employment, but they all happen in only one stratum—maybe the least qualified or the most qualified only, which happens very often in high-technology zones such as Silicon Valley. Once alerted to this phenomenon, one would ask the question: "What happens if the labor market begins demanding the intermediate qualifications?" One would then try to develop activities which would give employment to a less bifurcated labor market than that which often results from a high-technology industry. Another qualitative characteristic is how much research and development money firms in the region are spending. If one calculates the rate of total R&D expenditures compared to total expenditures of these enterprises, one gets a qualitative characteristic measured in quantitative terms.

CP: Have you found a greater degree of similarity among types of areas you've defined, such as "rural" or "old industrial," or within individual countries? What sorts of similarities and differences have you found among local development initiatives?

STOHR: There are more similar characteristics among areas of similar type. Rural local development initiatives will probably resemble one another more closely than they will initiatives in old industrial areas in their own countries. The experiences in old or declining industrial

areas between European countries will be more similar with those of other areas. There are certain nationally determined restrictions and advantages. National policy, for instance, or national constitutional conditions, will restrict or promote possibilities existing in all types of areas. A highly centralized political and administrative structure will probably have a negative impact on the development of all types of local initiatives. In a decentralized federal country on the other hand, all areas would benefit from the increased autonomy of local and regional authorities, irrespective of area type.

CP: Might you not have other problems under such a decentralized system; for example, the emergence of company towns which you spoke of earlier?

STOHR: I think company towns would cut across countries. Company towns would normally emerge in sparsely settled areas with no other economic activities besides agriculture and maybe some local support services. These would generally be rural, peripheral areas. Sweden, for instance, has such communities in its northernmost territories where iron mining dominates the economy. No other economic activity of any magnitude exists there.

CP: What common development problems do such peripheral areas face? Have you found any particularly innovative local development initiatives in peripheral areas?

STOHR: If one defines peripheral areas as those without easy access to major population centers or economic activities, this means that they are marginal to existing markets, and in this respect are handicapped. On the other hand, with regard to local initiatives, it has been observed that this distance provides them with greater maneuverability. That is, the central government tends to exert less control. In Scandinavia, this peripheral location has been considered an advantage because it has given local communities more of an "action radius" to develop initiatives on their own. There are, therefore, advantages and disadvantages. The art is to use the advantages to specialize in products which do not need extensive transport networks. For instance, particularly in high-technology fields, air has become the most important medium for transportation. One can try to develop a strategy which satisfies both requirements.

Scandinavia presents an interesting example of an attempt to bring computer-based homework into peripheral areas where one can link up computers fairly easily. This enables residents to remain in dispersed settlement patterns in peripheral locations.

Another example of an innovative initiative is from Scotland—the concept of a community cooperative. These are cooperatives which are geared not only to one sector



Initiatives in Scandinavia's peripheral areas enable residents to remain in dispersed settlements.

— they are multisectoral. They try to include not only production, but service activities and social services. They are therefore multifunctional and multisectoral.

In Hungary, the rural local cooperatives are established on a territorial basis. They can employ all types of activities, not only agricultural, but manufacturing and service activities. In this respect, they are similar to a multisectoral complex, but they have a territorial bond and are therefore interested in developing that territorial unit with whatever sector activity seems feasible and promising. This is quite different from the average cooperative, which is usually only an agricultural, manufacturing or marketing cooperative. These traditional cooperatives are linked primarily to international markets; their major allegiances are with such markets rather than with the local community or territorial unit. A similar example is the Basque Mondragon cooperative. Here, a territorial identity is also the basis for the cooperative federation, a whole system of cooperatives. The goal is to develop broad packages of activities within the community rather than to specialize in fields which are only world market-oriented but have few local linkages and narrow multipliers.

CP: What are the current attitudes internationally, regarding the promotion of these kinds of development activities?

STOHR: In many European countries, and also in the United States, it has been considered proper to separate governmental activities from private enterprise activities—and for understandable reasons. However, the development of new technologies—the microelectronic-oriented technologies—and the example of Japan have triggered a change in this attitude. The Japanese have been suc-

cessful in the semiconductor industry because the government, in this case the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, is integrated with private industry. Together they developed a common strategy of sectoral development, particularly in the computer industry, which has given Japanese industry tremendous advantages over U.S. industry. An imitation of the Japanese model currently under negotiation in the U.S. is Sematech, which is the first joint venture between the U.S. government and private enterprise. In this project, the federal government would team up with about a dozen computer firms to create a joint computer development center.

CP: What can and should be the role of national governments in stimulating the type of internal development you advocate?

STOHR: In a departure from past practices, governments would not try to create jobs directly in rural or old industrial areas, or only attract capital to these areas through capital incentives. This policy has proven to be very short-sighted because it assumes that capital and jobs are homogenous factors—neither is. It is much more important for central government to improve access to communications to rural or old industrial areas about new technologies, both regarding world market conditions and potential niches of unmet demand which might be locally filled, and also about organizational management practices. The government should be more involved in facilitating information access than trying to intervene by giving capital or employment incentives in an unqualified way. Another important step would be to promote the formation of innovative structures. In Japan, the central government has promoted the establishment of local private-public-university partnerships, tripartite partnerships, as the basis of local innovation and development. If such local partnerships are provided, the government is willing to co-finance an applied research center, for instance, for local industry, particularly for local small- and medium-sized enterprises.

CP: What approach can areas lacking the resources to develop a tripartite partnership take to stimulate development?

STOHR: The Basque cooperative, Mondragon, has been very successful in linking up with foreign universities in the U.S. and in France, from which it draws basic research data. The cooperative then transforms the technologies in its center for applied technological innovation, for use within members' own regional contexts. Distance from a university can often be bridged quite successfully by transferring information which, if well-organized, can be sufficient for a brief period. In the long-run, such an area

would certainly need to develop its own local university or research and training functions under a university-like label. But if this is not possible initially, there are substitutes, as the case studies have shown.

CP: What are the prospects for high-tech development? Do you see any new innovations or trends either in the technology itself, or the spatial patterns that emerge as a result?

STOHR: Microelectronics development is extremely important, but there are new developments such as biotechnologies and new materials which are also very important. The Japanese have identified five areas of innovation which they promote. One is microelectronics; a second is computers; a third is new materials, such as ceramics; a fourth is biotechnology; and finally telecommunications. Microelectronics is a key innovative element, both technologically and spatially. It permits the efficient operation of small machines and small firms, which are flexible enough to produce for differentiated demand. Small- and medium-sized enterprises can then be very competitive in a decentralized pattern. Such "flexible automation" is spatially important because it can be established outside of the large agglomerations, where small- and medium-sized firms dominate. □

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Reflections on Donor Coordination: An Attempt to Establish a Microcomputer-based Development Project Directory in Sudan

Dale Whittington
Craig Calhoun

The World Bank and USAID have encouraged the coordination of Third World donor organizations as a worthwhile and feasible endeavor. However, the authors' experience in Sudan illustrates that, despite the availability of microcomputers and the tacit agreement of the donor organizations themselves, donor coordination is not easily obtained.

In the summer of 1987, the government of Sudan expelled several private voluntary aid organizations from the country and prohibited them from future operations in Sudan. The international press reported this event as another inexplicable example of erratic behavior by an African government. In fact, these and other aid organizations had been operating in Sudan as if there were no sovereign government in the country. Representatives of these donors were flying in and out of Khartoum, the country's capital, without the slightest pretense of coordinating their activities with the Sudanese government or other aid organizations. The recent action of the government of Sudan was an understandable attempt to obtain at least some minimal knowledge of and control over donor activities.

Ironically, the World Bank recently cited Sudan as a country which has made significant progress in improving donor coordination (IBRD, 1984, p. 42). Our own work in Sudan suggests, however, that the problem of donor coordination is indeed serious and is likely to prove much more intractable than is commonly realized. In the summer of 1984, we initiated a project in Sudan funded by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) to work with the Sudanese Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MOFEP). The purpose of the project was to establish microcomputer-based decision support and management information systems. One of several components of our effort was to create a computerized data base of all ongoing, planned and completed development projects in Sudan which would assist the MOFEP, and the donors with the planning and management of development assistance.

The Ministry and USAID conceived of this project as a preliminary step to promote donor coordination; it was

to provide a fast, easy way for a donor to find out what other donors had done or were doing in a particular sector or region. This article describes the failure of the donors to provide the information required for this project data base to function effectively. We offer several explanations of the donors' failure to cooperate with the MOFEP and discuss the implications of this experience for future attempts at donor coordination.

Background

There has for some time been a growing awareness among both bilateral and multilateral donors that lack of donor coordination is a major problem. It is at least partly responsible for the failure of African economies to effectively utilize their development assistance. In its report *Toward Sustained Development in Sub-Saharan Africa*, the World Bank paints a comprehensive, sobering picture of the region's economic problems, and outlines a series of policy measures necessary for its economic rehabilitation. Two of the report's central recommendations pertain to the need for improved national economic management and donor aid coordination. The report calls for more strategic and flexible public sector planning by national governments. In addition, it calls for explicit commitments from both donors and recipient governments to implement their responsibilities under an agreed economic recovery program. Specifically, the World Bank calls for (1) strengthening management information systems in planning and finance ministries in order to facilitate timely policy analysis and strategic planning, and (2) providing high-quality technical assistance to those governments interested in building up such capacity (IBRD, 1984, p. 39).



The World Bank report pays particular attention to the need for improved donor coordination.

Aid administration is a particularly important area for institutional reform. Basic information on aid flows is often lacking; responsibility for donor contact and negotiation is unclear; links seldom exist between the plan, the budget, sector ministries, project entities, and donor activities. . . . The weaknesses of uncoordinated aid are increasingly recognized by African governments and donors. More consultative groups, UNDP-sponsored roundtables, and other arrangements have been set up to coordinate aid. . . . However, consultative groups have generally suffered from two major weaknesses. First, the commitments made by both governments and donors on program content and financial support have not been firm enough. Second, the groups have failed to get more involved in detail — priorities and assistance for particular sectors, programs, and projects, or specific changes in pricing and other incentive policies (IBRD, 1984, pp. 39–43).

Such increased involvement by donors in the details of aid administration is dependent upon improved access to information on both government and donor development activities. Our project was an attempt to work toward improvements in these areas in Sudan.

The World Bank's call for improved donor coordination and public sector planning certainly preceded the publication of this report, and Sudan was one of the first countries in Sub-Saharan Africa to initiate serious efforts along these lines. At the sixth Consultative Group Meeting for Sudan held in Paris in January 1983, several donors, including the United States and the European Economic

Community (EEC), called for the formation of subgroups of donors and government representatives, organized by sector, which would meet in Khartoum and monitor the implementation of Sudan's economic recovery program. The idea for these sector subgroups developed from the World Bank's country implementation review process, in which Bank and government representatives meet to review progress on Bank investment programs. At the January 1983 Consultative Group meeting, the chief World Bank representative and chairman of the Consultative Group reaffirmed the Bank's support for such monitoring activities and welcomed the inclusion of other donors in such discussions.

The discussions held during this Consultative Group meeting led to the establishment of the Joint Monitoring Committee (JMC) in 1983. The JMC was chaired by the Minister of Finance and Economic Planning and included the resident representatives of the World Bank, International Monetary Fund and concerned donors. Its primary purpose was to provide a local forum for more detailed discussions of how donor assistance could be better coordinated with Sudan's economic policies and investment program. It was originally envisioned that the JMC would meet quarterly in Khartoum, and the JMC Secretariat, consisting of staff from the planning wing of the MOFEP, would prepare progress reports and analyses for the quarterly meetings and for the annual Consultative Group meeting.

The JMC met three times in 1983 and by the seventh Consultative Group Meeting in December 1983, it was clear to the donors that additional technical staff needed to be assigned to the JMC Secretariat if the work of the JMC was to be productive. Getting donors and government representatives together was beneficial, but they needed information and analysis on the problems they were to discuss. Still, members of the seventh Consultative Group Meeting were enthusiastic about the potential contribution of the JMC. The chairman's report notes that there was a consensus that the JMC was performing a useful function and that donors should support it in the coming year. The representative of the Netherlands said that the JMC was a good start toward donor coordination in Sudan and that it might have applicability in other African countries. The EEC representative supported the work of the JMC and hoped that the coordination that had been started would be intensified and extended. Finally, the Sudanese Minister of Finance and Economic Planning at the time promised a strengthening of the JMC and noted that the local donor representatives would need timely information on commitments and disbursements from their central offices in order to support its work.

The seventh Consultative Group also assigned the JMC

several matters to examine, the most important of which was aid disbursement. The Minister of MOFEP suggested that a comprehensive review of donor disbursement procedures needed to be conducted in order to understand the reasons for the slowdown in disbursement of commodity aid. The representatives of the Arab Fund and the African Development Bank expressed the view that the issue of undisbursed project assistance should be examined to see if ways could be found to increase the flow of previously committed money, and also recommended that this task be given to the Joint Monitoring Committee.

Thus, in December 1983, there was ostensibly strong support for improved donor coordination in Sudan and for the work of the JMC, when quite independently we proposed to the USAID Khartoum mission director that a microcomputer data base of development projects in Sudan be established. Our initial idea was to create a data base using commercially available software (dBase III); each record in the data base would contain various kinds of information on a specific development project. Users could easily search the project data bases for projects of a certain type (e.g., all agricultural and irrigation projects in a particular region, or all energy projects funded by Western European donors which are behind schedule).

As originally envisioned, this computerized project directory was to serve two primary objectives. First, a centralized, easily accessible project data base would provide an overview of donor-financed development activities, and promote the dissemination of information on projects among donors. The MOFEP staff could prepare reports in response to specific requests from donors or government agencies for project information. Although conceptually simple, the importance of this objective of information storage and dissemination should not be underestimated. The institutional memory of donor organizations in countries such as Sudan is quite short due to brief staff assignments, so there is an urgent need for basic data on project activities. Paper records are poorly maintained, and project reports are not widely circulated.

The second objective, and ultimately the more important one, was to begin to establish a project data base which would support an improved planning and budgeting system within the MOFEP. An up-to-date, centralized project data base is essential for (1) the preparation of the development budget, (2) sectoral planning, (3) the estimation of recurrent costs, and (4) project monitoring and evaluation. One major goal was to provide the Ministry with an early warning system for implementation and financial problems on development projects.

The need for a centralized set of data on development projects was widely recognized within the MOFEP and the donor community. The April, 1984 World Bank

report, *Sudan: Planning and Budgeting for Recovery*, by R. Ridker, called for the establishment of a centralized project directory, and actually proposed two project data forms for use in system design and data collection. The MOFEP itself had made several attempts to collect project data, and various forms were available in the Ministry. For example, when we began our project in the summer of 1984, we were shown a collection of handwritten index cards which contained limited project information. In addition, the UNDP Advisors to the MOFEP had drafted forms to be used to collect information on project activities.

This discussion demonstrates that, although the computerization of a project directory may have been somewhat original in Khartoum, the need for a central file of information on development projects was widely recognized, both by the MOFEP and the donor community. In our opinion, however, the actual physical processing and management of the records for approximately 250 ongoing, donor-financed development projects and 750 loans and grants proved a major impediment to both simple data analysis and improved planning and budgeting procedures. A computer data base was the most practical way to efficiently manage this much information in a timely manner. In the summer of 1984, we arrived in Khartoum to attempt to create such a data base.

Data Collection Efforts

The development of the software for the project directory was quite straightforward. By far the most difficult part of establishing the project directory was the collection of the data to put into the system. There were three primary places where project data could be located: donor offices, the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning



Omdurman Market, Sudan.

itself and the implementing agencies. This section describes the efforts to collect data from the donor community.

At the July 1984 meeting of the Joint Monitoring Committee, the Undersecretary of Planning formally announced that USAID had agreed to fund our project to establish a microcomputer-based development project data base. He requested the donors' assistance in this work, reminding them of discussions along these lines at the December 1983 Consultative Group Meeting. In August 1984, together with staff from the Secretariat of the JMC, we personally visited the representatives of the major bilateral and international donors in Khartoum to explain the nature of the proposed project directory and to elicit their help in completing two data forms which had been designed to collect information on donor-financed development projects. We paid personal visits to the Khartoum representatives of the following donors: UNDP, World Bank, EEC, France, United Kingdom, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Switzerland and USAID. These visits were followed up by a formal written request to twenty-two donors from the Undersecretary of Planning in August 1984, in which he requested their assistance in completing these two forms. In addition to the eleven donors noted above, this letter was sent to the Embassy of Denmark, African Development Bank, OPEC Fund for International Development, Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development, Islamic Development Bank, Abu Dhabi Fund for Economic and Social Development, Abu Dhabi Government, Saudi Fund for Development, Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development, UNCDF and International Fund for Agricultural Development.

To the best of our knowledge, the Undersecretary never received a reply to his letter from the World Bank, UNDP, EEC, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Switzerland, Kuwait Fund for Economic Development, or the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development. Contrary to the expectations of the Western donors, by far the most complete, thorough and prompt responses were received from the Arab donors. Most of the major Western donors never even bothered to answer the Undersecretary's letter; even among the respondents, several replied in a superficial and incomplete manner.

In November 1984 and in January 1985, we again visited the Khartoum offices of many of these donors to request their cooperation in this effort. The Undersecretary of Planning also sent a follow-up letter in January 1985, noting the importance of this work for the JMC. By the summer of 1985, the Undersecretary had received only two replies to his second request for project profiles from the donors: a letter from the Federal Republic of Germany informing the undersecretary that they did not have

time to fill out the forms, and two project data forms from the Swiss Embassy.

What we find extraordinary about this experience is that the majority of the donors did not even feel obliged to answer the Undersecretary's letters, a seemingly simple courtesy. Perhaps the experience with the World Bank best illustrates the lack of donor cooperation in this effort. As noted, this effort was directly responsive to World Bank policy objectives in Sub-Saharan Africa. The World Bank's own mission to Sudan in March 1984 called for the establishment of a computerized data base in Sudan. World Bank staff in both Khartoum and Washington were contacted personally on several occasions to make specific suggestions for changes in the project directory. These were incorporated into the system design. World Bank staff continually promised to cooperate with the MOFEP and USAID to support this effort. Yet the World Bank did not complete the data forms nor did it answer the letters from the Undersecretary.

Reasons for the Donors' Failure to Cooperate

In their recent book, *Does Aid Work?* (1986), Robert Cassen and his associates note three main reasons for donors' reluctance to undertake meaningful aid coordination efforts:

- a. Coordination is likely to impair the freedom with which donors can pursue their political and commercial interests through their aid programs.
- b. Donors know that there are both ideological and technical subjects on which they are likely to disagree, and aid coordination would create conflicts.
- c. Aid coordination can be costly in administrative time and money.

Although these explanations certainly have merit, based on our experience in Sudan the problem of donor coordination seems likely to be more invidious than these reasons suggest. We found both related and additional explanations for the failure of the donors to cooperate with the MOFEP and USAID to establish a central depository of information on projects. We have categorized them into three groups: (1) reasons internal to the donor bureaucracy, (2) donors' impressions of the external planning environment, and (3) donors' impressions of the microcomputer technology itself. Each of these explanations was informally proffered to us by donor representatives themselves in follow-up interviews we conducted in the summer of 1985.

First, even if donors' intentions are good, there is a variety of organizational pressures which mitigate against real cooperation. Donor bureaucracies are not structured

to promote aid coordination. There are few bureaucratic incentives to individuals within donor bureaucracies to work with other donors. As the World Bank has noted, donor coordination is administratively demanding and time consuming and it is rarely rewarded in terms of professional evaluation or promotion (1984, p. 43). Both executives and junior staff are evaluated by central offices which have little awareness of efforts by their field staff to work with other donors. In fact, central office personnel evaluation procedures often foster competition between donors. An enterprising program officer who lets others know some of his "best" project ideas may well find them funded by other donors. On the other hand, many donors make most of their major programming decisions at the central headquarters so that individuals in the field typically feel there is little they can do to promote donor coordination, even if they wanted to. Finally, the donors' field offices are typically understaffed relative to central headquarters, and the individuals from whom we requested assistance were often extremely busy.

The second set of explanations concerns the donors' perceptions of their external planning environment. Given the pressures on their time, donor representatives were forced to make a judgment as to the likelihood of success of our effort to establish a computerized project data base, and the effectiveness of such a system if it were established. Too often, the subjective probability assigned to both of these events was low. The likelihood that we would succeed in creating the system in the first place was perceived to be low, in part because each donor felt the other donors would not cooperate. Therefore, individual donors saw little reason to participate in the data collection effort themselves. The Western bilateral donors, in particular, felt that the Arab donors would not cooperate. This is a classic "free rider" problem which we had hoped to address by reaching a collective agreement in the JMC to support this effort. In the end, however, the JMC failed to meet regularly. Moreover, little informal pressure could be exerted on donors who did not participate.

The donors also had little regard for the efficacy of the planning wing of the Ministry. To many donor representatives, the planning wing was so ineffective as to be irrelevant to their objectives. Their primary interest in the Planning Ministry had become finding the easiest, fastest means of getting their projects approved and their funds disbursed. An effective planning operation in the MOFEP would inevitably entail less discretion on the part of the donors in programming their aid and, in the short run at least, this was perceived to be an obstacle to their aid program rather than a necessary step in institutional development. It was thus not clear to donors that the



The capital city of Sudan, Khartoum.

MOFEP wanted the effort to succeed. As one representative of a private voluntary organization put it,

I don't really think you will be able to establish this microcomputer data base, but what happens if you do? I see more problems for me than advantages. Why should I want to give the Planning Ministry the information to meddle in our affairs?

Another related reason for the donors' failure to cooperate which pertained to their impression of the external planning environment was that the project was perceived to be too closely tied to USAID. For the planning wing of the MOFEP to have a centralized data base of development projects was bad enough; for USAID to be the only donor with such centralized information was even worse. At the July 1984 JMC meeting, this project was announced to the donors. Both USAID and MOFEP representatives assured the other donors that the data in the project directory would be available to all. However, the donors' skepticism is understandable in an environment where data is scarce and is typically treated as proprietary. There was a fear that the planning wing of MOFEP, and indirectly USAID, would have much greater access to the project data base. For at least one donor representative, there was also an underlying apprehension about creating the institutional capability in what was then a military dictatorship to create and manage centralized data bases. (This concern was not entirely unwarranted. Within a matter of just a few weeks after the creation of the new Management Information System Unit in the MOFEP, one of the USAID-supplied computers was commandeered by the security police whose stated objective was to set up a data base of automobile license plates in Khartoum).

A third set of reasons for the donors' lack of cooperation relates to their impressions of the technology itself. Individuals working for donor agencies in a place like Sudan can hardly be expected to be up-to-date in the latest developments in microcomputer technology, and, indeed,

they were not. For this reason, they were unable to realistically evaluate the magnitude of the software development which we proposed and the likelihood that it would succeed. Many had had frustrating experiences with main-frame computers of some sort and tended to extrapolate their horror stories to microcomputers. We encountered a wide range of skeptical comments about computers in general. At least five individuals independently offered us that sage advice, "garbage in; garbage out," implying that the whole effort was futile. The message was really that computers were an inappropriate technology in such a data-poor environment; that this was simply another example of a capital-intensive technology being pushed by donors without regard to the needs and capabilities of the local economy. We disagree with this line of reasoning, but it certainly deserves serious examination (see Calhoun, Drummond and Whittington, 1987).

In contrast to hardware issues, several donor representatives felt that the software development applications we proposed were far too sophisticated. In reality, the software development was the easiest, most tractable and least time consuming part of our assignment. Maintaining software and training people in its use, on the other hand, is an important issue.

Implications for Future Donor Coordination Efforts

To date, the campaign for donor coordination has been carried out at a fairly superficial level. It is one more exercise in what Robertson (1985) has termed the "ritual of planned development." Many of the donors that rhetorically call for coordination simply do not want it. Moreover, many Western donors adopt a patronizing attitude towards the whole process. Their attitude is also a source of misunderstanding about their own and others' performance. At the center of this patronizing attitude is a belief in their own bureaucratic efficiency and in the inefficiency of the host country's bureaucracy.

Although donors such as the World Bank support the idea of improved donor coordination, their representatives do not really know what this entails in terms of data management and analysis. Most donor coordination efforts have not proceeded beyond the level of general discussions because donors place data management demands upon the ministries of finance and planning which even the donors themselves do not know how to address. Few donor representatives have thought seriously about how they would manage the flow of paperwork associated with hundreds of millions of dollars of aid from thirty donor agencies—all with different accounting procedures, currencies and priorities—with the limited budget available to a minister of finance or planning in an aid-dependent economy such as Sudan's.

Ironically, donors' demands for information on the recipient government's development projects and policies may be greatest precisely in those cases where the government is least able to respond and where the development plans are least likely to be effective. Such demands can contribute to the destruction of host country planning institutions (Morss, 1984). This suggests to us that the field staff of donor agencies concerned with aid administration need to spend less time giving advice to ministries of finance and planning about data management and planning problems which they themselves have never faced, and more time actually working with these bureaucracies to improve their management information and decision support systems. In our experience, many of the staff of the MOFEP want to do a better job managing and coordinating donor assistance, but it is a complicated task with which they need help—particularly in the area of microcomputer applications. Donors tend to berate them, but offer little in the way of ideas or concrete assistance. Moreover, donors do not adequately appreciate the nature of the data management demands they themselves are placing on the development planning enterprise.

Calls for improved donor coordination are likely to fail unless underlying organizational and attitudinal issues are addressed more directly and seriously. Part of the problem is simply that all donors want to *coordinate*, but no one wants to be *coordinated*. Based on our experiences in Sudan, we believe future improvements in the area of donor coordination depend in large part upon more explicit policy directives from top management in both multilateral and bilateral donor agencies. Almost without exception, the donor representatives in Khartoum with whom we dealt treated donor coordination as a peripheral concern. Typically, their primary responsibility was to see that the budget targets for their aid allocations were spent, not that they were effectively coordinated with national government priorities and the work of other donors.

Top managers in donor agencies must change the incentive structure which their staff faces, in order that time spent on coordination with other donors is recognized and rewarded in personnel evaluations and advancement. Until then, real progress in donor coordination will be slow. We suggest that management experiment with ways of obtaining written evaluations of staff job performance from national government counterparts in the ministries with which they deal. Management must also realize that donor coordination efforts are time consuming and require a long-term commitment to the institutional development of both the donor agency and the national government. If serious attention is given to the issue of donor coordination, information management support of the kind we tried to develop will be essential. □

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Development on the Urban Fringe: Recent Chinese Experience

Simon G. Powell

The challenge of developing on the urban fringe takes on new dimensions in the changing economic climate of China. This article explores the difficulties planners face in trying to balance China's desire for increased industrial growth on the fringe with the political goal of Chinese cities to maintain a self-sufficient agricultural base.

Introduction

In recent years, Western media reports have emphasized the dramatic reforms which have been sweeping contemporary China, transforming a rigid, bureaucratic socialist system into a burgeoning market economy. True, important advances have been made in China since 1978 when Deng Xiaoping consolidated his power-base. But as many foreign firms, lured to China by the prospect of one billion consumers have discovered to their cost, China is far from being a market economy.

The reality of economic reform in China is a picture of uneven and patchy development. The official planning system—despite some relaxations—still controls the production and supply of the most important goods and commodities, and in many ways remains as unwieldy now as it was under the Maoists. It is in this context—a system in a state of upheaval—that current developments on the urban fringe must be placed.


Nanjing: the setting

One common location of relative prosperity in the current phase of development is on the urban fringe. The extent and depth of development will vary from city to city, but belts of significant rural wealth are to be found on the outskirts of most Chinese cities.

Throughout history Nanjing has been one of China's most important cities. First settled in 472 B.C., Nanjing has at various times been China's capital. Situated on a plain in southwestern Jiangsu province, eastern China, Nanjing is surrounded by a terrain of low hills and rivers, most notably the Yangzi.

The urban core is surrounded by suburban city districts of mixed land use—Dachang, Qixia, Yuhuatai and Pukou. Beyond the suburban districts are the five city-administered rural counties—Jiangpu, Jiangning, Liuhe, Lishui and Gaochun—with 198,000 hectares (ha) of cultivable land (see Figure 1). The periphery also contains a diversity of mineral wealth including deposits of iron, gypsum, lead, zinc and manganese as well as limestone and sandstone. Agriculture and rural industry are both well developed.

Figure 1. Nanjing Municipality



Source: unpublished Japanese military maps.



Table 1 illustrates the growth of Nanjing in this century:

Table 1. Nanjing*. Population. Spatial Growth. Various Years.

	Population (millions)		Area (km ²)		Population Densities (persons/km ²)**
	City	Municipality	City	Municipality	City
1922	0.3	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
1931	0.63	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
1937	1.01	n/a	840	n/a	1202
1949	1.14	n/a	840	n/a	1357
1960	1.65	n/a	840	n/a	1964
1970	1.58	n/a	840	n/a	1880
1973	1.3	2.4	840	3190	1547
1977	1.7	3.2	840	4500	2023
1979	1.95	n/a	840	n/a	n/a
1981	2.08	3.65	867	4718	2399
1982	2.13	3.74	867	4718	2456
1983	2.17	4.56	867	6516	2502
1984	2.2	4.6	867	6516	2537

*Nanjing is the municipality consisting of the urban core and the suburban districts (city) and the 5 city-administered counties.

**All figures deduced.

Compiled from materials in note 1.

The rapid increase in population in the 1920s was a result of Nanjing becoming China's capital once again. Nanjing suffered badly during the Japanese occupation but grew significantly in the 1950s, a period of rural-urban migration. Population growth was stalled in the late 1960s and early 1970s (the period of the Cultural Revolution) by a policy of rustification, in which significant numbers of city dwellers were forcibly moved to the countryside. However, by the end of the 1970s, with the return of those sent down to the countryside during the rustification movement, the city population continued to grow. Population densities within the city also grew steadily.

This growing pressure upon available space and infrastructure is one of the key problems currently facing Nanjing planners. There is a clear need to deflect further growth from an already over-crowded urban core and in particular to manage future industrial growth. This is an urban planning problem true for cities throughout the world. Another key concern is how to feed the expanding city. This is a rural planning problem, unique to the Third World and to China in particular, with its goal of urban self-sufficiency in foodstuffs. This article examines two problems.

Industrial Growth and Satellite Towns

The expansion of industrial activity within the city center has long been a problem for Nanjing planners. In the 1930s Nanjing had little in the way of an industrial base, its size and stature reflecting its role as capital city with all the administrative and bureaucratic organs which accompany such a position.² However, after Liberation in 1949, industrial growth in Nanjing was rapid:

Table 2. Nanjing. Industrial Growth. Various Years.

	Number of Enterprises		Gross Industrial Output Value* (\$Billions)		Industrial Employment (1000s)
	City	Rural Counties	City	Rural Counties	Municipality
1930s	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	16
1949		881	n/a	n/a	10
1952		1302	n/a	n/a	n/a
1979	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	350
1981	1236	876	2.4	0.13	570
1982	1250	974	2.3	0.2	n/a
1983	1261	1572	2.56	0.29	n/a
1984	1351	1524	2.91	0.33	n/a

*1981 Gross Industrial Output Value at 1970 constant prices; 1982ff. values at 1980 constant prices.

Compiled from materials in note 3.

The first expansion of industry was predominantly within the urban core. By the late 1950s, expansion of industrial activity was so extensive that shortages of housing, public utilities and other support services were becoming increasingly evident. In the 1960s, enterprises began to locate in the suburban districts to accommodate further industrial growth. Small townships such as Dachang, Longtan, Banqiao and Xishanqiao developed into significant industrial zones. However, development was somewhat mismanaged, with industrial development often conducted at the expense of the most productive farmland—surrounding the urban core—a major source of vegetables for urban consumption.

By the 1970s, industrial space in the urban core was all but saturated. Further growth, even if physically possible, would only exacerbate urban overcrowding, pollution and waste disposal problems. Thus, Nanjing planners continued the established trend of developing the industrial zone in the suburbs. By this time, the diversity of industrial concerns in the city center and suburbs was considerable. Activities included mining, metallurgy, telecommunications, machine-building, petrochemicals, trucks, and chemical fibres.

Currently, the suburbs themselves are becoming over-

crowded. Industrial growth is expanding through the suburbs into the city-administered rural counties. In an effort to effectively control this expansion, planners have tried to channel growth into designated satellite towns, such as the rural townships of Liuzhen, Zhujiang and Dongshan. The suburban townships of Dachang, Longtan, Banqiao and Xishanqiao, *de facto* satellite towns for a number of years, were included in this group.

The concept of satellite towns was first put forward by Chinese planners in the early 1950s. Ideally, such towns would range in size from 50,000 to 200,000 people. While access to the nearby city was considered important, it was perceived that satellite towns would be independent urban entities and the location of a significant number of urban-based employment opportunities, and adequate urban facilities.

Satellite towns were intended to relieve the pressures on China's overcrowded cities. Industrial enterprises realized that expansion was limited by several factors: a lack of space; increasing traffic congestion; housing shortages, a situation made worse by the significant in-migration to Chinese cities in the 1950s; and increasing levels of pollution—industrial and domestic—exacerbated by growing overcrowding.

However, the experience of satellite towns in Nanjing reveals a sharp divergence between planning theory and practical achievement. First, satellite town development has failed to match industrial growth with the construction of adequate urban infrastructure. Living conditions are poor, while living costs are high. Transportation and communications links, even to the city center, are weak. Education and sanitary standards are low.

Furthermore, much-needed capital investment funds are largely unavailable. While Kirkby reports that since 1982 some improvements in this situation are being made in the suburban satellite towns, the situation in the rural

Farming for urban consumption.



satellites remains bleak.⁴ Compare, for example, the figures in Table 3. Although not directly correlated to service provision in satellite towns, Table 3 gives a clear indication of the discrepancy in capital availability and service provision between the urban and suburban districts (City), and the remainder of the municipality.

Table 3. Nanjing. Investment. Service Provision.
Various indicators. 1981-1984. (\$ percapita)

	1981		1982		1983		1984	
	City	Rural Cos.	City	Rural Cos.	City	Rural Cos.	City	Rural Cos.
Gross investment in capital construction by State-owned units	78.9	4.4	116.1	6.4	90.5	1.7	133.1	2.7
Of which:								
1. Non-productive construction	38.2	1.4	56	2.9	45	1.3	51.7	1.7
2. Culture, education, health and research	13.3	0.4	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
3. Civil public utilities	7.5	0.2	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Secondary schools:								
1. Total number	169	155	170	162	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
2. Schools : students	1:769	1:451	1:759	1:451	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
3. Teachers : students	1:13	1:18	1:12	1:19	1:12	1:20	1:12	1:21
Primary schools:								
1. Total number	456	1225	456	1184	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
2. Schools : students	1:394	1:163	1:367	1:152	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
3. Teachers : students	1:20	1:24	1:18	1:23	1:19	1:25	1:21	1:25
Hospital beds:								
1. Total number	11219	3770	8802	2382	9068	3936	9245	4051
2. Beds : population	1:185	1:416	1:242	1:676	1:239	1:607	1:238	1:592

Some figures deduced.

Compiled from materials in note 5.

Satellite towns also suffer from poor management. All too often land use planning is weak, resulting in the siting of incompatible uses (e.g., chemical plants located next to hospitals and schools). The weakness of planning measures is also well illustrated by reports both of misuse and waste of valuable cultivable land around satellite towns.⁶

Currently the illegal use of land for housing construction around the rural satellites is of particular concern. In 1984 all but 3.4 percent of residential building space under construction by state and collective units was located in the city center and suburbs.⁷ For the most part, individuals in the rural satellites are responsible for housing construction. In many cases this has resulted in housing being built on land designated for other purposes. Liu Zhongchun reports that between 1976 and 1981, 1,000 ha of cultivable land were lost in the municipality to housing construc-

tion as well as brickworks, factories and commercial enterprises.⁸ However, the official figures for cultivable land availability in Table 4 do not reflect this—an indication that the official statistics must be treated with care. (More accurate information is unavailable, and most likely does not exist.)

In the suburban satellites, the issue now is not so much illegal use of land, but an absolute lack of land. The rate of construction is increasing, with ten-story residential buildings becoming more common. Population densities are rising, putting a severe strain on the already overburdened infrastructure.

Clearly, in both the suburban and rural satellite towns, much capital investment in infrastructure is needed. Too much of what little capital investment does take place serves only to create further pressure on the already weak existing infrastructure. This is a difficult situation with no easy solutions.

Another concern is that the industrial base which has been developed in the satellite towns, ostensibly providing the foundation for autonomous urban development, is weak. A distinction must be drawn here between the industry of suburban satellites, and that of the more recently-established rural satellites. The industrial base of the suburbs appears to be solid. As Table 2 indicates, virtually all of Nanjing's gross industrial output value is derived from the urban core and suburbs. While numerically the rural industrial base is large, it actually consists of small-scale undertakings using obsolete equipment with inferior technical levels.

Lack of capital is a distinguishing factor here. Poor planning is another. Supply of certain key raw materials is limited, and the planning system remains unable to meet the increasing demands for these materials from the wide range of enterprises which require them, leading to frustration and economic hardship.⁹ Zhang Fubao notes that the industrial base of Zhujiang for example, faces competition from more efficient, well-established factories for both markets and raw materials. In the current economic climate, in which industrial wage levels are linked to productivity and performance in the marketplace, there is little room for sentiment among competing factories. In this environment, fledgling industrial enterprises in the rural satellites will continue to find competition intense and growth difficult.

In Nanjing, the burden of deflecting future growth away from the urban core lies principally with the rural satellite towns. The suburban satellite towns have, in many respects, done as much as possible to reduce pressure on the urban center. Their future role in this regard is limited. Given this fact, the relatively severe difficulties currently experienced by rural satellite towns must be of critical concern to planners.

At this time, the rural satellite towns have only a weak industrial base from which to develop a wide range of urban-based employment. Their urban infrastructure is even less developed. Currently, their population growth owes more to peasants moving in from the countryside than any movement out from the city center. Furthermore, unless living conditions improve markedly, it is unlikely that any such movement from the city center would occur without a great deal of pressure from the authorities. While these towns may be promoting some localized wealth in the countryside around them, these benefits do little to ease the burden of overcrowding in the urban core.

For the moment, improvements remain unlikely. Investment capital is limited, and much of what is available continues to be used to shore up longstanding problems within the urban and suburban districts. It is difficult to see a way out of this situation. Significant inputs of capital and strict controls over current growth in the city center, suburbs, and rural counties are needed. Neither seems to be forthcoming.

Feeding the City

It has long been a planning goal that Chinese cities should, as much as possible, be self-sufficient in providing foodstuffs. To attain this goal, cities have included neighboring rural counties within their municipal boundaries. Self-sufficiency as a planning goal is politically important in that it gives a city a significant element of independence from the state planning system. It is also a reflection of economic reality because it is important that cities avoid long distance interprovincial trade and transfers of foodstuffs. Such movements inevitably involve high transportation costs, excessive amounts of spoilage and waste, and place a heavy burden upon an already fragile transportation and commercial system.

In pursuit of self-sufficiency, Nanjing planners have established two distinct production zones within the municipality. The first, cultivable land in the suburban districts, is a zone of predominantly vegetable production; the second, the rural counties, is a zone where grain is the major crop.

The establishment of a periurban vegetable production zone has numerous advantages. Vegetable producers have easy access to urban markets for sales to consumers, as well as to vegetable processing plants. This proximity minimizes spoilage and wastage losses incurred during shipment, as well as transport costs. There is also a plentiful water supply and the availability of night soil collected daily from the urban core. Pig breeding is strongly associated with vegetable production, and in Nanjing, periurban pig production is an important part of the city's meat supply (see Table 4).

Table 4. Nanjing. Agricultural Base. 1981-1984.

	1981	1982	1983	1984
Cultivable land (1000 ha):				
1. City	22.7	22.7	22.7	n/a
2. Rural Counties	135.3	135.3	198	n/a
Commercial vegetable-growing base: (1000 ha)				
1. City	4.7	n/a	n/a	n/a
2. Rural Counties	0.5	n/a	n/a	n/a
Output of major agricultural products: (1000 metric tons)				
1. Grain				
— City	108.8	115.2	110.5	120.5
— Rural Counties	857.8	993.4	1640.5	1737.8
2. Vegetables				
— City	283.4	297.3	261.8	303.8
— Rural Counties	59.7	67.9	206.6	383.9
3. Fruit				
— City	n/a	n/a	2.4	2.6
— Rural Counties	n/a	n/a	3.4	4.1
4. Hogs (1000)				
— City	160	172	145	n/a
— Rural Counties	460	443	769	n/a

Some figures deduced.

Compiled from materials in note 10.

In Nanjing, this zone of vegetable production was formally established in 1959. Production is highly specialized and intensive, with heavy inputs of both labor and fertilizer. Production is also mechanized to a significant degree. This zone has produced and continues to produce substantial quantities of vegetables for the city (see Table 4). The exception to this occurred during the early 1970s when, like much of China, Nanjing's vegetable base was cut to allow increased grain production.

Beyond this zone, significant amounts of vegetables are produced in the rural counties, as Table 4 illustrates. In the rural counties, however, grain is still the dominant crop, with vegetable production playing a subsidiary role.

Even for a city the size of Nanjing, with its fertile agricultural resource base, achieving a goal of self-sufficiency is not easy. As noted above for instance, there is still continuing pressure on periurban cultivable land for use in building projects.

Of greater significance are difficulties in grain production. Throughout history, producing sufficient grain to feed a huge population has been a yardstick by which regimes in China have been judged. This problem is especially severe around major cities, areas with large non-productive populations.



Despite the reemergence of free markets, foodstuffs in urban areas are in short supply.

Since the 1978 agricultural reforms, state planners have attempted to give peasants the incentive to improve agricultural outputs, particularly that of grain, by allowing them to sell privately or to the state, any produce beyond allotted production quotas. Peasants have been encouraged to diversify crop production (again after the fulfillment of allotted quotas) as well as to develop non-agrarian undertakings such as local industry, service occupations and animal husbandry.

These policies have undoubtedly stimulated grain production within the municipality. However, pressure remains to increase grain output further. A key variable here is the official price of grain. Production quotas require the supply of a stated amount of grain at an official market price. This price, despite recent increases, is low relative to other crops, and also to the use-value of grain. Grain production is thus unpopular with the peasants, and production beyond personal need and the allotted grain quota is discouraged.

However, the bare fulfillment of production quotas alone does not satisfy urban grain demands. Thus, Nanjing planners are faced with the problem of how to increase grain output even further. Raising grain output quotas is not something that would be readily tolerated in the rural counties. In essence, the extent to which peasants can prosper is determined by their ability to generate wealth, through agrarian or other occupations, once allotted grain quotas have been met. Given that current quota levels represent significant inputs of land, labor and capital, raising grain quotas would have an immediate impact on peasant income levels, making it more difficult

to engage in anything but grain farming, and severely limiting their enthusiasm for agricultural production. (An emphasis upon grain production in the Cultural Revolution, for instance, was a key explanation for poor agricultural performance during that period.)

The alternatives to higher grain quotas are limited. In recent years, Nanjing has attempted to bolster its grain production by incorporating additional rural counties within the municipality. In 1974 Liuhe county was incorporated, followed in 1983, by Lishui and Gaochun counties. The effect of these latter additions upon agricultural output was marked (see Table 4); however, this impact was a one-time addition to production and is not in itself an answer to Nanjing's future increasing demands for agricultural produce.

Future sources of extra grain will be sought from increases in the per-unit yields of existing grain fields. There are two elements to this increase. The first element is the improvement of yields of farmers who produce the bare minimum of grain allowed by their quotas. This would facilitate increases in the quota without necessarily increasing inputs of land, although this will mean increases in labor and capital inputs. Second, the yields of farmers who specialize almost exclusively in grain production must be increased.

To implement the first element, agricultural production within the Nanjing countryside is demonstrating a growing sophistication. Liu Daochun et al. report that a growing number of peasant households are moving away from agricultural production itself to provide a variety of skilled agricultural production services to other peasants.¹¹ In this way, skills in such diverse areas as seedling cultivation, seed-strain development, disease and pest control and fertilizer application are becoming available to a wider range of peasants and it is hoped that per-unit yields will rise accordingly. However, for this to occur, planners need to ensure that supplies of chemical fertilizer, pesticides and other key farming inputs are available so that peasants can take advantage of the skills being offered to them. There have been reports that these supplies are both insufficient and irregular.¹²

Given what has been said about the poor returns for grain production, it may be surprising to discover that any producers are willing to specialize in grain production. Farmers are required to devote significantly higher inputs of land, labor and capital to grain production and subsequently they supply higher rates of commodity grain to the state than most producers. The key to this development is the amount of subsidy offered to these grain specialists. These subsidies may involve cheap and guaranteed supplies of fertilizer and pesticides, as well as direct

income subsidies, matching the incomes of grain specialists to those earned by peasants who diversify beyond grain. Such subsidies are expensive to the local authorities within the municipalities who administer them, but are justified by reports of both high per-unit yields and total output by the grain specialists.¹³ It is unclear, however, if this initial success can be maintained and developed to satisfy all of the city's grain demands.

Failure to increase grain output will certainly leave planners with hard choices about future developments in Nanjing. Increases in the non-productive population without concomitant increases in grain production will be difficult to accept. Furthermore, it is already clear that significant tensions exist within the rural counties as a result of the current direction of rural development within the municipality.

There are tensions, for instance, caused by the relative concentration of vegetable production, a source of high producer incomes, in the suburban districts. Table 4 indicates that since the addition of Lishui and Gaochun counties in 1983, the rural counties have a much bigger share of the vegetable market, but it is unlikely that this increase has done more than temporarily ease the tension.

Similarly, tensions are found within the rural counties as some producers prosper more than others. The further geographically removed peasants are from urban markets, the more difficult it becomes to take advantage of the current freedoms within the rural production system. Commercial and transport links to the city center from the periphery, only a distance of perhaps 50 to 60 km, are extremely weak. This is especially true to the north and west of the city beyond the Yangzi, and in the extreme south of the new city-administered counties of Lishui and Gaochun. Thus, on the periphery, income and employment opportunities are increasingly limited to the arable. Commodity production is likewise limited, which restricts the potential of the peripheral authorities to subsidize grain specialists, limiting the extent to which other peasants are able to diversify beyond grain and local development in general. This situation contrasts sharply with the prosperity exhibited by the rural communities more proximate to the city and suburbs.

Finally, as noted above, recent growth in rural satellites owes more to an influx of peasants from the countryside than to migration of urban dwellers from the city center and suburbs. While living conditions in the rural satellites may not appeal to existing city dwellers, they are attractive to peasants in the surrounding countryside, seeking more urban-based employment. Because the work has traditionally been seen as less rewarding, and certainly much harder than urban-based employment, it is difficult to maintain peasant enthusiasm for agricultural production.

Though planners are eager to develop rural satellites to relieve pressure on the city center and suburbs, the same development creates further difficulties for those planners seeking to encourage agricultural production in order to attain self-sufficiency.

Conclusion

Theoretical prescriptions for the development of the urban fringe of Nanjing have been quite readily made, but the reality of the economic environment in which these prescriptions have been implemented has produced only partial success. In Nanjing, the suburban satellite towns did much to relieve early pressure on the city center, but they tended to be developed without the necessary investment in urban infrastructure, a deficiency which is only now being rectified. Given the limited capital available, planners will find it difficult to effectively develop rural satellite towns and prevent them from falling into the same trap.

Furthermore, while the current economic environment in China has certainly proved successful in generating growth (albeit perhaps only in the short run), policies of increasing competitiveness pose problems for planners and their development goals. Industrial growth in the rural satellites is subject to fierce competition, hindering planning objectives for the strength of their industrial base. The opening up of urban markets to rural producers, combined with the low price of grain, has resulted in grain acreage being reduced in favor of more remunerative cash crops, making self-sufficiency more difficult to achieve.

This changed economic environment has created new problems and opportunities for planners, and has accentuated long-standing difficulties. The way in which planners react to this changing environment will largely be determined by the measure of flexibility they are given to solve problems and the resources that are made available to them. It will also depend on how much they themselves can adapt to planning in a system which if not governed by the market, certainly needs to respond to market forces. This represents a real challenge after planning in a rigid, socialist system. It is unclear from the material presented for Nanjing if they will have sufficient resolve or resources. □

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Land shortage on the urban fringe encourages peasants to use all available land.

NOTES

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No Voice, No Choice: Community Group Involvement in London's Metropolitan Strategic Planning Process

Judith Allen

London's increasingly expensive land market has intensified demands on commercial and residential land both within and outside the city center. These demands have greatly affected the poor and working class. Recognizing that the current planning structure does not adequately address the needs of these groups, the Greater London Council in 1981 developed the Community Areas Policy, a metropolitan strategic planning initiative to involve them. The impacts of its efforts challenged the traditional planning structure, and in 1986 the GLC was dissolved.

Introduction

The struggles during the late nineteenth century for local democratic governments which would address the needs of all citizens illustrates one common origin of town planning in both Britain and America. However, the way planning has subsequently been institutionalized in both countries makes it difficult to meet these aspirations. In practice, planning is characterized by an internal tension between aspirations for justice and the need for a rational urban property market demanded by the development industry. Sometimes these two interests coincide, but the speculative nature of much urban property development means that they more often conflict.

Between 1981 and 1986, the last elected administration at the Greater London Council (GLC) addressed these conflicts directly in a radically new approach to metropolitan strategic planning, as part of a general libertarian political program aimed at empowering specific groups within London. The program initially focused on the unemployed, women, and ethnic minorities and was extended to a wider range of groups during the period of office. Charismatic leadership, and a budget which made it the "fourteenth largest nation-state in the world," meant that the GLC had the resources to pursue these political commitments. It is commonly believed that the GLC's effectiveness in mobilizing these groups threatened the conservative central government and was the political source for national legislation abolishing not only the GLC, but the six other metropolitan governments in England in 1986.

This article outlines some of the ways in which the GLC's radical political program changed the practice of metropolitan strategic planning in London. In particular, it identifies how these changes in strategic planning processes represented a significant challenge to the conventional wisdom in British planning.

The Context: London's Land Market

The speculative land market in London is extremely buoyant. Office-space rents in central London, for example, are higher than in any other city in western Europe. The buoyancy of the land market is supported by high levels of direct investment by the central government in urban regeneration programs which promote and support speculative commercial development. At the same time, deregulation of the stock exchange has placed London on a level with Tokyo and New York in the world financial market, leading to an explosion of demand for large (35,000 square foot) trading floors. This need is largely being met through new development.

London generally has a "traditional" urban structure, in which poorer working class residential areas surround the central commercial area. Consequently, the effects of enhanced commercial land speculation in the center spread rapidly throughout inner London. The demand for commercial development has also intensified demand for inner city luxury housing, and the price of residential land here now exceeds that for commercial uses outside the central core. Within the British planning system, increased housing demand is far more difficult to manage than commercial demand, since the system basically controls changes between land uses, and not within any one use.

The Community Areas Policy

This analysis of the speculative land market in central London informed the way the GLC's general political program was interpreted in metropolitan strategic planning. The Community Areas Policy, a set of linked initiatives directly supporting communities threatened by commercial development, formed the centerpiece of the strategy. Fourteen local areas surrounding central London were

designated as "community areas." Within these areas, a wide range of groups could apply for capital grants to develop a variety of social and community facilities. Directing the money through community groups, rather than relying on direct public sector investment, was a major innovation in British planning.

Coupled with revenue support for community workers, the grants visibly linked the day-to-day concerns of community groups with wider planning objectives, thereby supporting the groups' participation in the revision of the metropolitan strategic plan. Thus, the grants helped counteract the tendency for participation to be dominated by metropolitan-wide interest groups and middle class "amenity groups."

Revising the Strategic Plan

The Community Areas Policy was further developed at the strategic level in the context of revising the Greater London Development Plan (GLDP), which was seriously out of date by 1981. A radical view of metropolitan planning generally informed the revisions, and the very high priority given to the Community Areas Policy strongly influenced specific policy changes.

Other innovative policy changes arose from the GLC's commitment to the development of planning policies relevant to all the groups included within its general political program. As with the Community Areas Policy, the planning work was facilitated by grants and broader policy programs directly supporting these groups. Much of the participation program associated with the revisions was organized around these groups, contrasting with traditional approaches which reflect either specific land uses or spatial subareas. At the same time, the "spatial visions" expressed in the revised GLDP grew out of this socially-based approach.

Thus, the strategic planning process as a whole was strongly integrated into the GLC's general political program.

Challenging Conventional Wisdom in Metropolitan Strategic Planning

Conventional wisdom arises out of a set of interlocking factors. By and large, it reflects what is feasible within a particular administrative structure, set of professional interests, broader political environment and social structure. These views then become embedded in the personal attitudes, values and approaches of members of the political system. The processes which institutionalize conventional wisdom become self-reinforcing and obscure the possibility of developing radically new approaches to meet wider social objectives.

It is significant, then, that the radical innovations in metropolitan strategic planning implemented by the last GLC administration had their roots outside the formal structure of the GLC and in the planning section of the 1981 London Labour Party manifesto. The process of writing the manifesto had been highly consultative, and was based on the London Labour Party's need to build a new electoral coalition in response to changes in the demographic composition of London. This coalition was largely built on addressing the needs of specific, but already relatively well-organized groups in London – the unemployed, women, and ethnic minorities. "Community groups" in London pushed their demands within this broader context, and the manifesto's planning commitments reflect the high level of politicization of "local planning" issues which had characterized the 1970s. The manifesto did, however, address for the first time the strategic dimension of these demands. The manifesto outlined the general political program of the last GLC administration and provided a broad framework for a radical approach to metropolitan strategic planning. A new kind of planning process was developed which emphasized five strategies focusing on key problems, immediate implementation, direct implementation, containing commercial development, and legislative barriers. This new process challenged the conventional wisdom about metropolitan strategic planning in ways that were not predicted in 1981.

Key Problems

The last GLC administration saw planning as focused on solving specific, immediate key problems. This raises the questions, "whose problems?" and more importantly, "who must be satisfied with the solutions?" These are political questions, and the answers were clear within the general political program of the administration. The clarity of the subsequent links between specific social groups, their problems, political support and planning policies facilitated widespread participation in metropolitan strategic planning.

The strategic planning approach which emerged from this process did not aim to be comprehensive, but it did aim to be comprehensible to the groups whose needs formed its basis. It consequently exposed the way comprehensive planning obscures effective political priorities.

In contrast, the conventional wisdom in Britain sees the planning system as one of "plan-making plus the control of development." Because all proposed changes in the use of land require specific planning permission, the plan-making process is dominated by designing a set of criteria against which specific planning applications will be judged.

The "development control dominated" planning process generally has only very attenuated ideas about a desirable future pattern of land uses; this is all that is practicable where virtually all development is undertaken by the private sector. The overall pattern of land uses emerges from the application of these rules over a substantial period of time. Moreover, the land use pattern is to some extent unpredictable, depending on developers' decisions about which sites to develop and how to develop them most profitably. In the face of severe restrictions on public expenditure, public infrastructure investment tends to be dominated by private sector development decisions. In the process, investment in community facilities "gets lost." As a consequence, it is often argued that the main function of this type of planning is to remove key aspects of uncertainty from competition among developers.

The "development control dominated" approach to writing plans also leads to unfocused and ambiguous plan documents, since the planners attempt to anticipate all possible problems and considerations in the early stages of plan development. Such comprehensive plans are incomprehensible to all but the professionally initiated. The mystifying planning process then inhibits participation.



The City of London across the river Thames.

Planned Action "Now!"

The incoming Labour administration was committed to coming up with speedy answers to the key problems. The GLC was politically marginal. The fact that control alternated between the Labour and Tory parties at virtually every election clearly challenged the conventional wisdom that metropolitan strategic planning should be long-term in orientation. The GLC felt it was absurd to wait 20 to 25 years for solutions to the urgent problems of today, especially when they knew that the next elected administration would reverse many of their key policies. The commitment to planned action "now!" required developing strategic policies which could be implemented immediately. The Community Areas Policy exemplified this approach.

Direct Implementation

The GLC was committed to directly implementing its own plan. Metropolitan government in London was a "two tier" system. The GLC was responsible for providing a strategic planning framework within which the 33 second-tier boroughs could pursue locally adapted planning policies, as long as they were consistent with the GLDP. Boroughs thus held the main development control powers and were also free to develop formal local plans. The local government and planning system operated under the assumption that the bulk of public sector investment, outside of major metropolitan roads investment, would be undertaken by the boroughs. The GLC retained residual development control powers, mainly over very large developments and development affecting metropolitan roads. It also maintained a large public sector home-building program.

The division of responsibilities within the system was fairly sensible in a period of expanding public sector expenditure and relative political consensus over the use of public sector investment. Nevertheless, strong political divisions between inner and outer London always limited access to land and housing to solve inner London problems. From the mid-1970s on, fiscal crises in the inner London boroughs enhanced the importance of direct GLC investment, but there was substantial disagreement over whether to discourage speculative development in central London. Some of the inner boroughs were desperate for the increased property tax revenue generated by commercial development.

Thus, the GLC's commitment to the Community Areas Policy—interpreted as "no go" areas for commercial development—was not merely contentious; it could not be fully implemented without the cooperation of the boroughs. The grants program was welcomed by the boroughs,

because they could not afford to invest in community facilities themselves. More importantly, the grants raised significant community opposition to commercial development within these boroughs. Thus, the commitment to direct implementation by the GLC challenged an unspoken assumption, written into the very structure of London government, that the GLC would not become directly politically involved in "local" or borough planning issues.

Commercial Development

The last administration at the GLC was primarily concerned with the detrimental consequences of commercial development on inner London communities. The conventional wisdom of metropolitan strategic planning in the sixties and seventies emphasized organizing a broad pattern of land uses to facilitate private sector development by designating areas for future development. Within this context, the GLDP provided a framework for coordinating public sector infrastructure investment with private sector development.

The revised GLDP proposed a tightly drawn Central Activities Zone, within which commercial development would be contained. This zone was surrounded entirely by a Community Areas Ring, in which commercial development was largely prohibited. The administration accepted that this policy would increase land prices within the Central Activities Zone, and lead to increased speculative pressures around its boundary. Nevertheless, they argued that strong and clear strategic policies would facilitate control over these pressures. This strategic view of the relationship between the land market and planning policies underpinned more detailed policies throughout the plan.

Legislative Barriers

The final challenge to the accepted planning practice was of a different order. Revising the GLDP to meet the GLC's political objectives exposed many of the detailed ways that the institutional and legislative framework for planning facilitates the interests of developers as a group, while failing to provide protection for those who bear the social costs of development. By the time the GLC was abolished, work on a new legislative framework for planning was proposed and this concept gained momentum up to the general election in 1987.

By attempting to meet four apparently simple demands on metropolitan strategic planning, the GLC fundamentally questioned the conventional wisdom written into the legal and administrative framework for metropolitan strategic planning.



Increasing land values prompted British Rail to sell these flats for rehabilitation and owner-occupation at prices far beyond the means of the local population.

It is important to realize that these basic challenges to the conventional wisdom would not have led to a radically different kind of plan and planning process if they had not been closely linked with wider practical initiatives enabling broader general political participation in London. The next section examines the way this wider context affected participation in the metropolitan strategic planning process.

Challenging Cynicism: participation in metropolitan strategic planning

Organizing effective participation in metropolitan strategic planning is difficult at the best of times. During a period of economic recession, it becomes an even more challenging endeavor.

Three interrelated problems inhibit involvement by disempowered groups. First, their knowledge of London tends to be localized, reflecting spatially restricted access to housing, jobs and transportation. Second, particularly in a time of economic crisis, problems such as unemployment, inadequate housing, maintaining a household and raising children are of more immediate concern than commenting on issues about the long-range quality of life throughout the metropolitan area. Finally, the generally legalistic and bureaucratic ways of planning inhibit those who are uncertain, inarticulate and those who have been socialized to accept that they have no choice but to

acquiesce to the vagaries and whims of those with power, money or education.

Even at the best of times, participation at the metropolitan level tends to mobilize groups with a clear metropolitan-wide interest. In London, the roads lobby and private developers have always been prominent. Economic recession enhances their interest in planning as they try to increase their access to scarce resources. With access to resources to pursue their interests, these lobbyists can easily obscure the interests of less powerful groups. In this situation, planners are often left to defend the disempowered with very little political support and within an administrative framework which enjoins them to be "politically neutral."

elected members and the public. The GLC's political marginality further reinforced these processes, as planners avoided implementing policies which were politically contentious in order to avoid undoing their own work after the subsequent election.

Personal cynicism results from the placement of political administration within a broader social structure. It is not the result of the (in)competence or apathy of individuals, but rather the limits on what individuals can achieve within the broader system. The final administration at the GLC expanded these limits by developing the planning participation process within a general political strategy which addressed social structural issues. This departure from standard procedure generated enthusiasm



Residents of Lambeth Borough protest office and hotel development and advocate housing.

This critique of planning participation is well known. However, without considerable political and administrative resources, individual planners are powerless to correct it. In practice, planners have responded to these problems with a deep cynicism, reflecting an attempt to maintain their democratic aspirations within an institutional framework which frustrates their achievement.

Narrowly conceived "professional interests" often reinforce this cynicism. Making planning a technical exercise enhances the power of professional planners within political administrative systems, usually to the detriment of

among planning officers for participation, and involved previously excluded groups in the participation process. As a result, the extensive direct contact between officers and members of these groups mobilized officers' professional commitments to fair, just and democratic planning, and helped them overcome much of their cynicism.

The lessons that one can learn from this experience can usefully be analyzed in terms of the ways that narrow professional interests interact with personal cynicism to distort the participation process. The most direct way to do this is to reformulate four questions that cynical planners often ask about participation.

Willingness to Participate

The first question cynical planners ask is: "Are people willing and able to participate?" The experience of the GLC poses a far more disturbing question: "Is the local authority willing and able to participate?"

Three aspects of the GLC's participation program support this reformulation. First, the program was based on direct consultation with the specific social groups included in the GLC's general political strategy. These groups were in a position to respond positively and creatively because they were supported by broader grants and policy programs. Second, groups were encouraged to talk about their general concerns very early on in the planning process and were not restricted to simply commenting on "planning matters" as defined by planners. These general discussions often originated in policy work outside of the planning department and provided an important basis for developing specific planning policies addressing broader concerns. For example, the women's unit in the director general's department identified a series of specific planning problems associated with setting up women's centers as part of their general grants and policy work. Finally, the speed of the planning process itself generated a momentum which sustained interest in participation. In these ways the general political strategy of the GLC supported a planning participation process which led to innovative planning policies specifically addressing an increased scope of issues and problems for a wide range of disempowered groups.

Representation

Second, cynical planners ask: "Are local organizations representative of the urban poor?" The experience of the GLC's political commitment to specific social groups exposes the fallacy in the way this question is posed and suggests that it should be rephrased: "Is the local authority representative of the urban poor?"

In general, the narrow pursuit of professional interests within political administrative systems succeeds partly because it neglects to analyze the mobilization of bias within interlocking political, electoral, administrative and technical processes. This silence reinforces cynicism about participation, because it implicitly denies the existence of alternatives.

The GLC deliberately sought to mobilize bias in favor of disempowered groups. Participants in the metropolitan strategic planning process clearly derived their credentials and legitimacy from these broader political and democratic processes, not from the technical and professional preoccupations—or even aspirations—of planners. Without this strong political commitment, very little would have changed.

Organization

Third, cynical planners ask, "how should participation be organized?" Usually they mean, "should we use questionnaires, postal surveys, public meetings or exhibitions?" The experience at the GLC shows that the question must be linked to political and social organization generally, and the techniques used must support, and not undermine, broader social organization. Thus, the question can be reformulated: "How does the participation process fit into the wider social organization of the area?"

The GLC's participation exercise was based on clear political answers to this question. As a result, the single most effective, positive, and creative public meeting on the GLDP revisions was the women's meeting. Two hundred and fifty women packed a county hall conference room, and spent an evening enthusiastically talking about the variety of ways in which planning could help them. The success of this meeting ensured that women's issues were integrated throughout the revised GLDP. In contrast, later meetings organized around specific land use topics were desultory.

The GLC also developed a number of technical innovations. Meetings were tape recorded and oral comments were generally accepted as formal submissions. Copies of drafts of the plan, with people's own marginal comments, were also accepted. Small discussion groups were carefully planned to ensure that articulate members of community groups were present to encourage the less articulate to criticize the successive drafts. Meetings were chaired by people who were not part of the GLC, and politicians and senior officers rarely spoke at these meetings. Platforms were carefully balanced to demonstrate the GLC's commitment to particular groups. Documents were understandable, and available in a variety of languages.

It is necessary to explicitly design participation methods which provide details of the needs of specific social groups. Failure to develop this sort of approach suggests political failure, rather than the lack of appropriate techniques.

Data

Fourth, cynical planners ask, "what data is needed for planning and how is it to be collected?" The pursuit of professional interests suggests that answering this question is part of the planner's technical expertise. However, rephrasing the question illustrates its relation to participation: "What demands are being expressed through participation and what new data sources may be needed?"

Two examples from the Community Areas Policy show why rephrasing the question in this way is important. The first example relates to "creeping conversions"; that is,



The Community-based Coin Street Group is developing 56 new houses and flats.

changes of land use without planning permission. Creeping conversions can have substantial and irreversible impacts on small areas over very short periods of time. Planners usually rely on administrative records of permit applications to determine trends in current demand for particular land uses. Only after community groups persistently pointed out creeping conversions did GLC planners admit that land uses could change without planners' permission and begin to develop policies to tackle the problem.

The second example comes from the Community Areas grants program. After the first request for applications produced a totally unexpected flood of responses, one of the program administrators remarked, "I've been a planner for twenty years. I've always been told that it's part of my professional expertise to know what the community wants. Looking at these applications now, I know for the first time in my career what the community wants." The grants program enabled people to say in real and practical terms what they needed. Many of the groups who applied for grants would never have participated in a formal planning participation exercise, but their views about what they needed were integrated into the metropolitan strategic planning process from the beginning through the grants program.

The GLC's planning participation exercise, because it was set within the context of a general program of political participation, brought to light how planners' cynicism about participation is a consequence of power relationships in broader social and political structures. More importantly, it showed some of the ways that planning participation exercises can contribute to or modify these relationships.

Conclusion

The last GLC administration demonstrated not only how metropolitan strategic planning and public participation can be closely linked, but also how each is further linked to wider political and democratic processes. By developing an "alternative practice" which explicitly addressed questions of powerlessness within the wider urban society of London, the GLC exposed the ways in which "conventional" planning practice obscures power relationships.

The lasting legacy of the last GLC administration is not merely just that it provides a critique of "normal" or accepted planning practice. It also provides a way of thinking about planning practice which allows us to begin to develop equally creative and positive approaches in other political and social circumstances.

Many of the people associated with the last GLC administration currently feel tired and disappointed. But they do not feel that their efforts were wasted. To move so close to a vision of fair, just and democratic planning, to see what is involved in progressive social and political change, and to begin to understand how local authority planning can contribute to this change are inspiring. Indeed, many of the lessons learned from this experience have been adopted elsewhere in British planning. By giving an effective voice to disempowered social groups, the GLC showed that the structure of power within a society can be a matter of social choice. □

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Population—A Key Component of Planning Education for Developing Countries

Linda Lacey

During the next 20 years, much of the developing world will undergo significant demographic changes, such as population growth and urbanization. The effects of these changes can already be seen in many areas of Latin America, East Asia and especially Africa. This article suggests how to redesign population studies to provide planners with a framework for understanding the complex interrelationships between demographic factors and development. The commentary which follows provides an example of how the author and her colleagues are implementing such a program at DCRP.

Most developing countries are undergoing major demographic transitions, characterized by rapid population growth and massive urban-bound movements of population. Estimations and projections developed by the United Nations indicate that many of the poorest countries are doubling in population every 20 years (United Nations, 1985). Accelerated population growth has led to high proportions of the population under 15 years of age which, in future years, will keep crude birth rates high in spite of declining levels of fertility. This situation is most apparent in sub-Saharan African countries and poor Asian and Latin American countries, where 46 to 52 percent of the population is under the age of 15 (United Nations, 1985).

The consequences of high levels of population growth and rapid urbanization have been particularly harsh for those countries at lower stages of development. At the national level, rapid growth has a direct effect on the quantity, quality, and distribution of educational facilities and services and health care services, both preventative and curative. High rates of population growth have also led to a greatly increased number of individuals entering the labor force. This increase forces governments to absorb successively larger cohorts of young adults into urban and rural economies (Birdsall, 1977). In poorer countries, many of these young labor force entrants will experience underemployment and unemployment rather than productive lives. In rural areas of many countries,

population pressures on limited land have resulted in rural out-migration, land fragmentation, overstocking and grazing, soil erosion and, in general, declines in land productivity. In urban areas, high levels of natural increase combined with rapid urban growth due to internal and international migration have led to numerous problems in cities: shortages of housing, water, sewage systems, electricity and social services; traffic congestion; and urban underemployment and unemployment.

Projects and programs designed by planners at all levels—community, rural, urban, regional and national—are affected by the demographic changes that are taking place. Population growth and rapid urbanization combined with limited resources interfere with the ability of planners to develop and implement social, physical and economic programs. However, just as population growth and rapid urbanization influence our ability to plan, population variables such as size, distribution, growth rate, age and sex composition, fertility, mortality, and migration levels, are influenced by efforts to promote social and economic development. Examples of such development efforts include squatter settlement upgrading programs in urban areas, improvements in agricultural technology, and the expansion of educational, health care facilities and other social services. Advances in transportation and communications systems, the promotion of industrialization, and integrated rural development initiatives can alter demographic trends.

The interrelationship between population and development is highly complex. However, in the past two decades, a wealth of literature has emerged that focuses on the consequences of population growth, the determinants of demographic change, population and development interrelationships and, in recent years, alternative ways to integrate population programs into development planning. It is important for planners to understand the relationships that exist among demographic factors—fertility, mortality and migration—as well as the many relationships that exist between population and development variables. Knowledge of this nature would assist professionals in developing more realistic goals and objectives. It would also raise awareness of the demographic consequences of planning actions and aid the profession in promoting the development and integration of population policy intervention strategies into planning activities at the national and subnational levels.

Few planning schools provide adequate training in the field of population. Much of the educational training related to population is limited to demographic estimation and projection techniques that require reliable census data and other secondary sources. However, as enrollments of students from developing countries are increasing in many programs across the country, many schools have or are in the process of developing international concentrations within their programs. For planning schools that focus on the needs of planners from developing countries, it is essential to redesign the teaching of population. It is important to have courses that explore population and development interrelationships, that assist students in developing skills in population intervention policies that include both fertility regulation measures and spatial policies, and that provide skills in estimating and projecting population trends in countries where census data are unavailable or unreliable.

The purpose of this article is to explore a two-course sequence in population for students who are either from developing countries or who are interested in pursuing a career in planning in developing countries. The first course, *Population and Planning in Developing Countries*, investigates the various interrelationships that exist between population and planning. The second course, *Demographic Techniques*, assists students evaluating the quality of demographic and other population-related data and developing skills in estimation and projection techniques in situations where census data and vital registration systems are unavailable or unreliable. Most sociology or biostatistics departments offer demographic techniques courses that focus predominately on developing countries. Given the limited faculty resources in most planning departments, I suggest that students in developing coun-



West Point Community, a large squatter settlement of about 25,000 in Monrovia, Liberia

tries concentrations take a demographic technique course as their second population course outside of the planning department.

It should be mentioned that, in most universities, courses are also offered in social and economic demography which expose students to population and development issues. However, these courses are not tailored to the needs of planning students, since much of the focus is on national development. Planning students require exposure to population-planning interactions at subnational levels—rural, regional, urban and local community levels.

The article is presented in two sections. First, a brief overview is provided on the demographic outlook for developing countries with an emphasis on Africa, since most African countries are experiencing declining economies, rapid population growth, and rapid urbanization. Next, a description is provided on possible topics that could be incorporated into a course on *Population and Planning*. Ideally, the materials should be presented as an entire course. However, it is hoped that planning educators with limited resources will be able to choose possible topics that can be incorporated into existing theory and methodology courses.

Demographic Outlook

Of the regions of the developing world, Africa will experience the greatest degree of demographic change during the next 20 years. Medium variant estimates and projections made by the United Nations indicate that from 1980 to the year 2000 Africa will increase in population by 401 million or 81 percent, Latin America by 188 million, or 51 percent; East Asia by 287 million, or 24 percent; and South Asia by 666 million, or 47 percent (United Nations, 1985). High levels of population growth

in African countries are readily apparent in the table, where medium variant estimates and projections are provided for select countries. The data clearly indicate that most countries have high rates of annual growth and will continue to double in population size every 20 years. In Kenya, with the highest annual growth rate of 4.12 percent, the average woman has eight children during her reproductive years. Consequently, the nation's population is expected to more than double by the end of the century, rising from 7.9 million in 1960 to 16.7 million in 1980 and to a projected 38.5 million by the year 2000.

Percent of Urban Population and Levels
of Population Growth in Select African Countries

	Urban Population (in Percentages)					
	1950	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000
<i>World</i>						
Developed Regions	53.6	60.3	66.4	70.6	74.2	77.8
Africa	14.8	18.4	22.9	28.7	35.5	42.2
Latin America	41.1	49.3	57.4	65.3	71.9	76.6
Asia	16.9	20.6	23.6	26.6	30.3	35.7
<i>Select sub-Saharan African Countries</i>						
Ghana	14.5	23.3	29.1	35.9	43.5	51.2
Kenya	5.6	7.4	10.2	14.2	19.5	26.2
Liberia	13.0	18.6	26.0	34.9	44.0	52.1
Namibia	15.4	23.3	33.5	45.2	57.0	66.0
Nigeria	10.5	13.1	16.4	20.4	26.1	33.4
Senegal	16.5	22.4	29.6	38.0	46.7	54.9
Swaziland	1.4	3.9	9.7	19.8	33.1	44.5
Tanzania	3.6	4.8	6.9	11.8	18.1	25.0

Population Estimates and Projections for Select African Countries
(Population in 1,000s)

<i>African Countries</i>	<i>Annual Rates of Growth</i>						
	1980-85	1950	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000
Ghana	3.25	4,242	6,772	8,614	11,457	15,886	21,923
Kenya	4.12	5,822	7,903	11,290	16,766	25,413	38,534
Liberia	3.16	855	1,047	1,365	1,871	2,571	3,564
Namibia	2.78	665	820	1,042	1,349	1,787	2,382
Nigeria	3.34	32,935	42,305	57,221	80,555	113,343	161,930
Senegal	2.66	2,500	3,041	4,008	5,708	7,501	10,036
Swaziland	3.03	277	338	426	558	759	1,041
Tanzania	3.52	7,886	10,025	13,513	18,867	26,998	39,129
Zambia	3.31	2,440	3,141	4,189	5,648	7,912	11,237

(Source: The United Nations. 1985. *United Nations World Population Prospects: Estimates and Projections as Assessed in 1982*. New York: United Nations.)

High levels of population growth are a result of high fertility rates, combined with the substantial reductions in infant and child mortality due to advances in health care, hygiene and nutrition and improved standards of living. Estimates of crude birth rates for Africa as a region show that rates have remained relatively constant during the past 30 years (49.8 per 1,000 in 1950 to 48.8 in 1980), while mortality rates have declined from 29.3 in 1950 to 17.7 per 1,000 in 1980 (World Bank, 1984).

Annual rates of growth have declined in many Latin American countries and most Asian countries. However, in absolute numbers these countries are still experiencing growth. While fertility levels have been reduced, mortality rates are also declining. Because of declines in mortality rates and the young age structure of population in these regions, we can expect fairly high levels of population growth in absolute numbers to take place during the coming decades (United Nations, 1985).

High levels of population growth are accompanied by rapid urbanization. Urban growth is a consequence of three factors: urban natural increase, migration and reclassification of urban areas. According to the United Nations, only 40 percent of urban growth is due to migration in developing countries (United Nations, 1982), while natural increase accounts for about 58 percent. This assertion is in debate in much of the migration literature; for example, Todaro argues that most urban growth is a result of migration. High levels of urban growth due to natural increase are a result of high levels of fertility among migrants, since many arrive in cities in their peak reproductive years (Todaro, 1979).

Urban-bound movements of population are in part a response to population pressures on limited resources. These pressures are most intense in rural areas, where population growth can exceed the productivity of the land. Some rural out-migrants move to more productive rural areas to seek employment and/or land for farming, but many move to urban locales. While out-migration can take place because of negative factors associated with the place of origin, the decision to move can also be made because of the attraction or pull of cities. Individuals and families from both rural and urban places of origin are attracted to urban locales for educational facilities, economic opportunities, and/or for the amenities that represent modern life-styles.

Africa as a region will experience the highest level of urban growth over the next two decades, in part because the region has been the least urbanized in the past. The spatial transformations that developing regions are experiencing can also be observed in the table. It should be mentioned that the data are based on estimations and projections and provide a crude indication of urban growth,

since countries vary in their definition of urban. In 1950, 32.8 million Africans resided in urban centers. By 1980, 136.7 million lived in urban locales and by the year 2000, we can expect close to 370 million to be urban dwellers (United Nations, 1985). Countries in East and West Africa that were the least urban in 1950 will experience the most urban growth. In Liberia, for example, only 13 percent of the population lived in urban centers in 1950, but if present trends continue, that rate is expected to increase to 52.1 percent by the year 2000. Similar patterns can be observed for other countries such as Ghana, Namibia, Senegal, Swaziland and Tanzania.

Proposed Course in Population and Planning

In order to develop effective plans and programs that take into account high levels of population growth and rapid urbanization, it is important to consider the recent demographic trends. In this section, I present a number of topics that could be incorporated into a course on Population and Planning in Developing Countries. Topics for the course are listed below, followed by a brief description of some of the major components:

1. Demographic Concepts and Measurements
2. Population and Development Interrelationships
 - a. Transition Theories
 - b. Consequences of Population Growth
 - c. Determinants of Demographic Behavior
3. Population Policy Intervention Strategies
4. Population and Planning Policy Questions

1. Demographic Concepts and Measurements

To understand the demographic trends that are taking place, it is important for students to know basic concepts and measurements of the components of demographic change: mortality, fertility, migration and nuptiality. In the analysis of fertility, they should know and be able to calculate crude birth rates, age-specific fertility rates, the general fertility rate, total fertility rates, and gross reproduction and net reproduction rates. They should also be able to calculate simple rates and ratios to analyze mortality, migration and nuptiality. Students should also be exposed to general concepts of population change involving the interaction of the components of demographic change—the balancing equation, natural increase, annual rates of growth, doubling time and stable population models. It is also important for them to study the age-sex structure and composition of populations using simple techniques such as dependency ratios, sex ratios, aging ratios, and population pyramids. These introductory measures should be complemented in their second semester with a course in demographic techniques.

2. Population and Development Interrelationships

Literature on the relationship between population and development falls under three broad headings: (a) transition theories which focus on the process of demographic change in the context of development, (b) consequences of population growth and rapid urbanization as it relates to development, and (c) literature on the determinants of demographic behavior.

a. Demographic Transition Theories

Once students have been exposed to basic demographic concepts and measurements, it is important to introduce them to theories that explain the process of demographic change as countries undergo stages of development. Three "transition theories" have emerged that attempt to relate demographic change to stages of cultural and socioeconomic development. All three are based upon the historic precedents of the developed world. Although these theories have been heavily criticized, they do provide students with a framework with which to understand the types of demographic characteristics that we can expect for countries at different stages of development.

The most widely-known theory is the demographic transition theory. It was first introduced by Notestein in 1945 and was more recently revised by Caldwell in his efforts to explain fertility behavior in the African context (Caldwell, 1978). The theory attempts to identify economic, social, cultural and technological factors that influence fertility and mortality rates in societies that are undergoing various stages of development.


In 1971, two additional theories were introduced that focused on mortality reductions and spatial patterns of mobility. Omran introduced the epidemiologic transition theory to explain the process of mortality reduction. He states that "the theory of epidemiologic transition focuses on the complex change in patterns of health and disease and on the interactions between these patterns and their demographic, economic, and sociologic determinants and consequences" (Omran, 1971). Reductions in mortality rates have accounted for much of the increase in rapid population growth. Factors that have led to mortality decline are highly complex and vary for countries that are at different stages of development.

Zelinsky, a geographer, introduced the mobility transition model to explain the types of spatial movements that we can expect as countries undergo the process of modernization. He states that, "There are definite, patterned regularities in the growth of personal mobility through space-time during recent history, and these regularities comprise an essential component of the modernization process" (Zelinsky, 1971, p. 121). He introduces students to the types of spatial movements and vital

transitions—fertility and mortality—that take place as societies move from "pre-modern" traditional societies to advanced societies. All three theories assist students in analyzing processes of demographic change in the context of modernization and development.


TANZANIA

Birth Rates, Death Rates, and Rates of Natural Increase, 1950-1977



Population Growth, 1950-2025

(Assuming Continuing High Fertility)




Source: *Resources for Awareness of Populations, Impact on Development*. The Futures Group, Washington, D.C., 1981.

b. Consequences of Demographic Change

Much of the literature on the consequences of population growth focuses on the negative impact of population growth on the achievement of development objectives. Readings on rapid urbanization tend to investigate both


PERU

Birth Rates, Death Rates, and Rates of Natural Increase, 1950-1978



Population Growth, 1950-2025

(Assuming Continuing High Fertility)



the positive and negative aspects of urban-bound movements of population at the national and individual level. It is important for students to be exposed to literature in both of these areas. A classic book on population and development, *Population Growth and Economic Development in Low Income Countries*, was written by Coale and Hoover in 1958, to introduce students to macro-level consequences of rapid population growth. At The University of North Carolina, we use microcomputer models as well as literature on the consequences of population growth on development to examine Coale and Hoover's hypotheses. The RAPID model, Resources for the Awareness of Population Impacts on Development, explores the impact of rapid population growth on meeting development needs in a number of different sectors—agriculture, health, education, urbanization and housing. Models are available for over 20 countries at various levels of development. Students can change assumptions in the model and project future relationships to the year 2030. The models and literature alert students to the interdependencies that exist between population growth and development.

It is also of crucial importance that students be exposed to the microconsequences of rapid population growth, such as the detrimental effect of large families on maternal and child health and on child development. This area may be of particular interest to students who are interested in social welfare programs for the poor. It would assist them in understanding the interrelationships between family size, birth spacing, morbidity, malnutrition, low productivity, and poverty. Birdsall provides excellent summaries and bibliographies for this literature in some of her work (Birdsall, 1977; World Bank, 1984).

c. Determinants of Demographic Behavior

Knowledge of the determinants of demographic change assists students in understanding the factors that influence fertility, mortality and migratory behavior. Reviews of literature in this area provide insights on measures that can be implemented to control and guide demographic processes. More important, it provides a basis from which qualitative assessments can be made of future demographic trends.

In the past two decades, a wealth of literature has emerged on the determinants of fertility. The earlier literature attempted to explore the direct relationship between fertility and a host of socioeconomic variables, such as income, industrialization, urbanization, education, health, the status of women, family structure, religion, and ethnicity (Hardiman and Midgley, 1982). Different studies established different associations, and few explained why odd relationships could be found. Many of the earlier studies failed to realize that fertility is subject to biological constraints and is influenced by demographic

events as well as socioeconomic factors. For example, increases in the age of marriage contribute significantly to reductions in fertility. Davis and Blake, and, in recent years, Bongaarts, have introduced more realistic models to understand the interrelationship between fertility, demographic events and socioeconomic factors (Davis and Blake, 1956); Bongaarts et al., 1984). Much of the literature deals with the proximate determinants of fertility. The Bongaart model, in particular, shows that two classes of determinants influence fertility behavior. (Proximate determinants, consist of all biological and behavioral factors. These include as proportion of married women, frequency of intercourse, postpartum abstinence, lactational amenorrhea, contraception, induced abortion, natural sterility and pathological sterility; and (b) socioeconomic and environmental variables, such as social, cultural, economic, institutional, psychological, health and environmental considerations. In the model background, variables influence fertility through the proximate determinants, which directly affect fertility.

Socioeconomic ► Proximate ► Fertility
Environmental Variables Determinants

The proximate determinants of fertility literature evolved to assist those involved in developing and implementing population policies and/or family planning programs to understand the factors that influence reductions in fertility. The literature is beneficial for planners in that it provides a basis from which implications for future fertility trends can be derived.


Another body of literature on the determinants of fertility focuses on the economic rationale of family size. This literature consists of micro-level theories introduced by Easterlin on the economics of having children (1969) and writing in recent years by Caldwell on inter-generational flows of wealth. It also considers macro-level studies that investigate relationships between fertility and economic development. While fertility is lowest in countries which have attained high levels of economic development, some poor countries, such as Costa Rica, Cuba and Sri Lanka, are also experiencing significant reductions in fertility. It is important for students to investigate both the micro- and macro-level factors that lead to fertility reductions.

Of the components of demographic change, migration is most strongly influenced by planning decisions and is the factor that is most likely to lead to rapid growth at the sub-national level. In the last two decades, a great deal of literature has been written on migrant selectivity, factors that influence the decision to move, and spatial patterns of movement. Empirical studies and theoretical models have been developed by scholars in economics, sociology, geography, demography, cultural anthropology, and regional planning. Most of the studies focus on the

individual or household unit. Literature on the migration decision-making process include Lee's theory of migration (1966), Todaro's economic models of employment (1968) and DeJong's reader on migration decision-making (1981). There is also a wealth of literature on migrant selectivity in books and key demography journals, such as *International Migration Review*, *Demography*, and *Population and Development Review*. Caldwell's book, *African Rural-Urban Migration*, is a classic introduction to migrant differentials in the African context (1968). Orlansky and Dubrovsky's work, *The Effects of Rural-Urban Migration on Women's Role and Status in Latin America*, provides a comprehensive overview on female migration pattern differentials (1978). These sources assist students in understanding who moves and why. More importantly, it alerts students to the impact of sub-national planning activities on spatial mobility.

3. Population Policies

Population policies are explicit statements by national governments stating their intentions to establish demographic goals and objectives that will affect fertility, migration, and mortality. Measures to regulate fertility include: (a) the provision of family planning services either through clinics, outreach programs and/or through social marketing activities; (b) the dissemination of population, family life, and sex education information; (c) programs and policies to improve the status of women; (d) the provision of incentives and disincentives to encourage families to regulate family size and (e) the introduction of legal reforms.



Source: *Resources for Awareness of Populations, Impact on Development*. The Futures Group, Washington, D.C., 1983.

Most measures to alter mortality focus on improving the quality of health and nutrition of the population. There are a variety of strategies to alter migration patterns: rural development programs can include a full range of activities to improve living conditions and economic activities in rural areas; dispersed urbanization strategies can include the development of new major cities or growth centers, the development of secondary or regional cities and/or the development of rural service centers or market towns; restrictive policies to control individual movements to cities; and land colonialization schemes.

In most Asian countries and in some Latin American countries, governments have implemented population policies to control rapid population growth. Increasingly, African countries are also becoming aware of the need to control population growth and maldistributions of population. Countries such as Cameroon, Liberia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal and Sierra Leone are actively pursuing population policies in order to achieve national development objectives and to improve the health of children and mothers. Among the other sub-Saharan African countries devising development plans which discuss the problems created by rapid population growth and/or state the need for family planning services are Botswana, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Mauritius, Uganda and the Zambia (Isaacs, 1984).

Most of these countries recognize population policies as integral parts of efforts to promote social and economic well-being. This awareness was stated in the World Population Plan of Action during the first World Population Conference in Bucharest in 1974 and reaffirmed at the 1984 International Conference on Population in Mexico City, where 147 governments expressed their support for the establishment and implementation of policies to alter current demographic trends.

Effective policy implementation requires the integration of intervention strategies and programs into a number of socioeconomic development activities at all levels of governments and in most fields of planning. Since most population policies are implemented through ministries of planning, it is important for students to review the evolution of population policies and study the issues and problems of effective implementation. Planners who obtain positions in national or state-level planning agencies are assisting population policy implementation efforts by coordinating activities among different ministries, by ensuring that socioeconomic plans promote aspects of population programs and by controlling factors that have negative demographic effects.

4. Population and Planning Policy Questions

Much of the literature on population and development



West Point Community in Monrovia, Liberia

issues focuses on these relationships at the national level. In the last section of the course, students, through individual research projects, should attempt to investigate various population-planning relationships at the sub-national region as it relates to a variety of planning issues: rural development, regional planning, housing, social services planning, transportation planning, and urban planning. In examining each of the areas, it is important to discuss the following questions:

- a. How do present and future population growth and distribution influence planning activities?
- b. How do planning decisions alter demographic variables? What are the long-term impacts of planning activities on demographic trends?
- c. How should planners redesign strategies to promote socioeconomic change, given existing and future demographic trends?

The answers to these questions will vary since countries are at different levels of development. The questions do, however, provide a framework for developing innovative planning solutions that take into consideration bleak demographic trends.

Conclusion

Planners cannot alter the present demographic trends in the near future. At best, we can attempt to understand the processes and alter goals, objectives, plans and programs to take into account rapid population growth and rapid urbanization. Planners can assist in controlling and

guiding long-term demographic trends by becoming involved in population policies, both fertility regulation programs and spatial strategies.

I have introduced a number of topics and subtopics that can assist planning students in understanding population and development interrelationships. Knowledge in these areas will improve our ability to plan effectively in developing countries. It is hoped that planning educators will find the topics useful and will integrate components into existing courses or will design new courses that address population and planning issues. □

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Commentary

Meeting the Needs of Developing Countries: Introducing a New Program of Study

Linda Lacey

Each day, planners in developing countries face a number of interrelated complex problems. In low-income countries in particular, major cities are doubling in population every ten to fifteen years. As a result of uncontrolled urban growth, planners are confronted with high levels of unemployment, major traffic congestion within the urban core, massive housing shortages, and inadequate public services such as safe water, sewage systems, roads and electricity. Urban-based problems are closely linked to high levels of rural unemployment and uneven regional development. The interdependent nature of problems facing developing countries requires integrated regional, rural and urban planning strategies.

To assist planners in developing countries and individuals working in international assistance agencies develop appropriate solutions to development problems, the Department of City and Regional Planning at Chapel Hill has introduced a new concentration: Planning in Developing Areas. Policy areas that receive special emphasis include: (1) housing, (2) urban finance, (3) urban infrastructure and services, (4) environmental and resource management, (5) population and development planning and (6) regional development planning.

Housing problems are severe in low-income countries in which an estimated 40 to 90 percent of city residents reside in substandard housing, with limited access to water and sewage facilities. In countries where the majority of the urban population is poor, planners need to acquire skills in order to design and administer low-cost housing strategies which can provide better shelter for the urban poor. In the Department of City and Regional Planning (DCRP), students examine the evolution of housing strategies in developing countries. They study the failures of approaches, such as public housing projects used in the 1960s and 1970s, to meet the needs of large numbers of urban poor. They examine the problems of implementing more recent approaches, including site and service schemes and core unit housing programs.

Urban finance is of critical concern to planners, since national governments have limited resources for urban development. Our program exposes students to alternative strategies of managing and financing urban development projects through case studies in successful countries.

As mentioned above, urban-based problems are related to complex rural and regional development issues. In our program, students study interrelated causes of development problems such as rapid population growth, environment degradation, the breakdown of traditional and cultural values and norms, and political and economic instability. To understand the causes and consequences of development problems, students are exposed to theories in economics, spatial geography, sociology, history and cultural anthropology. Students gain technical planning skills in a number of areas to develop short- and long-term solutions to rural and regional problems. These skills are applied to problems in the areas of community development, regional planning, cost-benefit analysis, project appraisal, negotiation and population planning.

Faculty involved in the new concentration have a wealth of experience working directly with national ministries of planning, health and local government, national housing authorities and donor agencies such as the United Nations,

the World Bank and the United States Agency for International Development. Dale Whittington has worked on water resources policy and planning projects for the governments of Egypt, Haiti, Nigeria and Tanzania. He has also served as a technical adviser to the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, Government of the Sudan, on the use of microcomputers for development planning, budgeting and management. Dana Weist has recently been involved in a comprehensive review of the income tax structure and the development of a fiscal planning model for Jamaica. Linda Lacey has been involved in development projects in the areas of rural development, population planning and housing. She has worked on projects for the governments of Botswana, Tanzania, Sierra Leone, Nigeria and Liberia. She is currently assisting the governments of Botswana, Liberia and Nigeria in integrating population policies into health and national development plans.

To complement the skills and experience of DCRP faculty, senior policy analysts from the Research Triangle Institute are teaching courses in the new concentration. Founded in 1963, the Research Triangle Institute has over 50 senior staff, who have worked on a broad range of development issues in over 50 countries. Current projects focus on municipal finance management, integrated population and development planning, women in development, and water resources management. In the Spring of 1988, Dr. Rondinelli, a scholar in decentralization policies and regional development issues, will offer a course on regional development, Dr. McCullough, a DCRP alumnus and scholar in municipal finance, will co-teach a course with Weist on municipal finance in developing countries.

A number of programs and departments on campus offer courses and research experiences valuable to students interested in developing countries. Research centers include the Institute of Latin American Studies which coordinates courses, guest speakers and research related to Latin American countries, the Water Resources Research Institute, the Institute for Environmental Studies, the Center for Urban and Regional Studies, and the Carolina Population Center. Departments and programs that offer courses relevant to this concentration include the Public Administration program, the School of Public Health, and the departments of Sociology, Economics, Political Science and Geography.

Through the introduction of this new concentration, the Department of City and Regional Planning looks forward to playing a major role in assisting planners to guide the growth and development of cities and regions in developing countries. □



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