POST-RACIAL AMERICA?: RACIALIZATION AND POLARIZATION OF POLICY-RELATED JUDGMENTS FOLLOWING THE 2008 U.S. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

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ABSTRACT

KRISTJEN B. LUNDBERG: Post-Racial America?: Racialization and Polarization of Policy-Related Judgments Following the 2008 U.S. Presidential Election (Under the direction of B. Keith Payne)

The promise of a “post-racial” America signaled by the 2008 election of President Obama has gone unfulfilled. Using representative samples of the American electorate, Study 1 confirmed that those with stronger explicit and implicit anti-Black attitudes before the 2008 election voiced more negative policy-related judgments in July 2009 (racialization hypothesis). Study 2 demonstrated that the difference in policy-related judgments between high-prejudice and low-prejudice respondents was increasing over time between May 2009 and July 2010 (polarization hypothesis). Both the racialization and polarization of policy-related judgments were mediated by more negative evaluations of Obama. Study 3 suggested that the particular pattern of mediation may be unique to the Obama administration. Particularly noteworthy is that the measure of policy-related judgments used refers to issues (e.g., the economy, health care) that naively should be uninfluenced by racial attitudes. These findings suggest that racial attitudes continue to play a substantial role in today’s political climate.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

“Welcome to the latest buzz word in the political lexicon, post-racial. It is what Senator Barack Obama signals in his victory speech in South Carolina when he tells of the woman who used to work for segregationist Strom Thurmond and now, knocks on doors for the Obama campaign… The post-racial era… is the era where civil rights veterans of the past century are consigned to history and Americans begin to make race-free judgments on who should lead them.”

Daniel Schorr, NPR Senior News Analyst, January 2008

The campaign for and 2008 election of Barack Obama as President of the United States was heralded by many as the beginning of a new era in U.S history and carried with it the promise of a post-racial America (for a review see Tesler & Sears, 2010). Yet, in the days immediately following the election, news reports indicated a surge in hate crimes against Black Americans (Associated Press, 2008 November 15), including vandalism, physical attacks, and even cross burnings. The alluring ideal of an election driven by “race-free judgments” was further dispelled as researchers verified the substantial impact that racial attitudes had played in the election outcome (Payne et al., 2010; Pasek et al., 2009; Greenwald, Smith, Sriram, Bar-Anan, & Nosek, 2009; Piston, 2010; Tesler & Sears, 2010). Though the election of the nation’s first Black president was certainly an important milestone in America’s racial history, the voting patterns of the American electorate in November 2008 continued to reflect an inveterate anti-Black prejudice. Analysis of these patterns led one team of researchers to estimate that the
elimination of anti-Black prejudice from the American electorate would have increased Obama’s margin of victory by 5.17 percentage points (Pasek et al., 2009). Or, as Payne and colleagues succinctly stated, “Mr. Obama was not elected because of an absence of prejudice, but despite its continuing presence” (Payne et al., 2010, p. 373).

Just as individuals did not make race-free judgments about who should lead them, it is unlikely that they are now making race-free judgments about how they are being governed. Rather, it may be that racial attitudes are continuing to influence perceptions and evaluations of President Obama just as they did Candidate Obama and with substantial attendant consequences. One potential consequence, of particular interest to the research presented here, is that the racial lens through which Obama is viewed may result in the spillover of those racial attitudes from evaluations of Obama to evaluations of the policy issues with which he is associated. In effect, it may be that the continued accessibility and use of racial attitudes in evaluating Obama—and, by proxy, public policies—is leading to the racialization of even presumably nonracial issues (e.g., health care, the economy), such that knowing a person’s attitude toward Blacks may allow us to make a reliable prediction about how he or she views the performance of the government in addressing policy issues. Specifically, one might expect that those high in prejudice are more negatively evaluating President Obama and, thus, his administration’s policy decisions.

Further, these evaluations are unlikely to remain static once formed. With regular exposure to new pieces of information via the media, social networks, and other outlets, those in the American electorate are frequently provided with the opportunity to update their evaluations of President Obama, public policies, and the general state of the country.
If racial attitudes are indeed leading to biased interpretations of Obama and his policies, one would expect that the subjectivity with which new information is assessed would lead to increasing polarization in the American electorate. For example, imagine that an individual’s evaluations of Obama and his policies (informed by his or her racial attitude) are somewhat negative. As that person learns about Obama’s actions (e.g., a new economic proposal or a speech outlining health care reforms), it is likely that the information will not be approached neutrally, but rather with the expectation of disagreement. When that person does, in fact, disagree with Obama’s stance or actions, doing so may not only reinforce an already negative assessment of him, but perhaps also make it stronger. Therefore, it is anticipated that, given the passage of time and the opportunity to accumulate subjectively construed information, one will see increasing polarization in the American electorate driven by racial attitudes, such that the difference in evaluations of Obama and his administration’s policies between those high and low in prejudice increases over time.

The research presented here tests for evidence of such racialization and polarization. It is hypothesized that:

H1a: Racial attitudes are predictive of judgments regarding purportedly non-racial policy issues that are strongly associated with President Obama’s administration, such that those with stronger anti-Black attitudes voice more negative policy-related judgments.

H1b: The relationship between racial attitudes and policy-related judgments is mediated by evaluations of President Obama, such that stronger anti-Black
attitudes are predictive of more negative evaluations of Obama that are in turn predictive of more negative policy-related judgments.

H1c: This pattern of relationships among racial attitudes, evaluations of Obama, and policy-related judgments is unique to the Obama administration given his status as the nation’s first Black president.

H2a: Racial attitudes are predictive of a polarized pattern of change in policy-related judgments over time, such that the differences in policy-related judgments between those with more positive and more negative attitudes toward Blacks increases over time.

H2b: This polarization itself (i.e., the differential rates of change in policy-related judgments) is mediated by evaluations of President Obama.

Connecting Racial Attitudes, Perceptions of Obama, and Policy-Related Judgments

Media and Public Perceptions

Claims that racism is motivating criticisms of President Obama and his administration’s policies have been made repeatedly in the public domain. For example, in a September 2009 interview with NBC Nightly News, former President Jimmy Carter made the following statement: “I think an overwhelming portion of the intensely demonstrated animosity toward President Barack Obama is based on the fact that he is a black man… because of the belief of many white people, not just in the South but around the country, that African-Americans are not qualified to lead this great country” (as cited in Murray, 2009). These comments were made in the context of a discussion concerning
the then-recent actions of Representative Joe Wilson, who had yelled “You lie!” at the
president during his nationally televised address to Congress on health care reform.
Others concurred with former President Carter, opining that such an outburst on the floor
of Congress would never have occurred with a White man in the presidency (Dowd,
2009). However, Michael Steele, then chairman of the Republican National Committee,
released a statement refuting the claim that such responses constituted racism, in which
he said, “President Carter is flat-out wrong… This isn’t about race. It is about policy” (as
cited in CNN, 2009; see also Parker, 2009).

Similar charges of racism have been levied throughout Obama’s presidency,
notably in response to the so-called “birther” movement, which called into question the
true location of Obama’s birth, suggesting that he was actually born in Kenya and is not a
U.S. citizen. One commentator called the birther movement “a proxy for racism that is
unacceptable to articulate in more direct terms” (Thrush, 2009). And, responding to the
birther controversy, PBS host Tavis Smiley predicted that the 2012 presidential race will
be “the ugliest, the nastiest, the most divisive, and the most racist… in the history of this
republic” (“The Last Word,” MSNBC, 2011). Still, others continue to insist that their
disagreement with Obama is based on competing political ideologies and a lack of shared
values, and some even claim that Obama himself may be fostering and exploiting the
cries of racism for political gain (Forman, 2011). Thus, these denials of any racial
undertones in criticism of President Obama’s policies and the assertion that the real
disagreement lies in the substance of the debate are a frequent refrain. But, is the
contention that race has nothing to do with it a reflection of reality?

Theoretical and Empirical Support
**Connecting racial attitudes and evaluations of Obama.** Do racial attitudes affect how one evaluates Obama? A long-standing and substantial body of research suggests that they do. Information accessible at the time of judgment—whether unobtrusively or subliminally primed or chronically accessible—influences how one perceives and evaluates another person (e.g., Higgins, Rholes, & Jones, 1977; Srull & Wyer, 1979; Bargh & Pietromonaco, 1982; Bargh & Pratto, 1986). The activation and use of stereotypes, in particular, has garnered considerable attention, and researchers have repeatedly demonstrated that the same set of information may be processed and interpreted quite differently depending on the stereotype activated at the time of judgment. For example, individuals who have been nonconsciously primed with words related to the stereotype of Black Americans (e.g., afro, jazz, ghetto) are more likely to judge a race-unspecified target person as hostile (Devine, 1989; see also Lepore & Brown, 1997). Pictures of guns are more quickly and correctly categorized when preceded by pictures of Black rather than White men (Payne, 2001, 2006; see also Correll, Park, Wittenbrink, & Judd, 2002). And, participants primed with ape-related words (thereby activating the Black-ape association) judge police to be more justified in using violence against a Black suspect than a White suspect (Goff, Eberhardt, Williams, & Jackson, 2008).

Of course, the likelihood that stereotypes will be used in processing information about others is subject to certain constraints: Firstly and most obviously, the stereotype must be activated. While it was once thought that stereotype activation automatically occurred following category activation (e.g., encountering an outgroup member) due to shared cultural knowledge of stereotypes (Devine, 1989), subsequent research has
clarified that factors such as one’s existing level of prejudice may, in fact, moderate the extent to which negative stereotypes are activated in conjunction with categorical information (Lepore & Brown, 1997; Gawronski, Geschke, & Banse, 2003). Gawronski et al. (2003), for example, found that implicitly measured attitudes toward an ethnic minority group moderated the impact of category membership on the construal of ambiguous information and dispositional inferences made regarding a target individual. In other words, the relationship between encountering an outgroup member and forming a negative impression of that person was amplified by existing prejudicial attitudes. In fact, in Gawronski et al.’s research, those with negative implicit attitudes toward a group of people were more likely to form negative impressions about a member of that group regardless of their motivation to control prejudiced reactions (Dunton & Fazio, 1997). In regards to President Obama then, those who possess anti-Black attitudes may be more likely to access negative stereotypes about Black Americans when encountering information about him and to evaluate him according to those stereotypes.

The evidence that racial attitudes are influencing evaluations of Obama has already began to accumulate. As mentioned previously, various research teams have documented the extent to which racial attitudes played a pivotal role in predicting voter behavior during the 2008 presidential election (Payne et al., 2010; Pasek et al., 2009; Greenwald et al., 2009; Piston, 2010; Tesler & Sears, 2010). Additionally, Hehman, Gaertner, and Dovidio (2011) demonstrated that explicit anti-Black prejudice predicts Whites’ negative evaluations of Obama’s job performance, as mediated by perceptions of Obama’s “un-Americanism.” And, Kosloff, Greenberg, Schmader, Dechesne, and Weise (2010) found that, for some participants, making their own racial identity salient was
sufficient to produce a greater likelihood of associating Obama with and endorsing
political smears about him (e.g., being a Muslim, being a socialist). The salience of race
during the 2008 election season and the initial years of Obama’s presidency has likely
contributed to the chronic activation and accessibility of racial attitudes and stereotypes
and, thus, an increased likelihood of their contribution to evaluations of both Obama and,
by extension, the policy-related issues with which he is associated (see also Mendelberg,
2008).

**Connecting racially-informed evaluations of Obama with policy-related
judgments.** Why, though, would these racially-informed evaluations of Obama spill over
to influence policy-related judgments? Such hypothesized connections are easily derived
from two existing sets of theories. The first is a general class of theories that make
predictions about the need for evaluative or cognitive consistency. For example, Heider’s
(1946, 1958) balance theory with its emphasis on the tendency to achieve balanced triads
(for a review see Eagly & Chaiken, 1993) predicts that a person who 1) dislikes Obama
and 2) knows that Obama endorses a particular policy position must also 3) dislike that
policy position in order to achieve a balanced triad. In short: If I do not like Obama, I am
more likely to disagree with him. Within the parameters of balance theory, it is irrelevant
where the dislike for Obama originated (i.e., whether it was motivated by racial attitudes
or not). Contemporary theories of racism, on the other hand, can explain the relationship
between disliking Obama and the policies with which he is associated while also
accommodating the role of racial attitudes in predicting that relationship.

One such theory is that of aversive racism (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986; Dovidio &
Gaertner, 2004). Proponents of aversive racism theory posit that there is a clash between
the desire to adhere to social egalitarian norms and the negative feelings experienced
toward members of a minority group. Because an individual may strongly desire both to
be and to appear to others to be unprejudiced, they are likely to explicitly deny any
negative feelings they may be experiencing toward an outgroup member. Nonetheless,
these negative feelings may leak out, so to speak, as the individual discriminates in subtle
ways and particularly in situations in which their behavior can be justified on the basis of
non-racial factors. For example, Dovidio and Gaertner (2000) found that White
participants were significantly less likely to recommend a Black candidate than a White
candidate for a job opening when the candidate possessed moderate qualifications, while
no such discrimination occurred when the qualifications were less equivocal (i.e., clearly
strong or weak). Hodson, Dovidio, and Gaertner (2002) extended these findings,
demonstrating that racial attitudes moderated the effect, such that the discriminatory
behavior in ambiguous circumstances was amplified for highly prejudiced participants.
Thus, in the current context, an individual may experience negative feelings toward
President Obama as a Black man and voice such disapproval, but—desiring both to be
and to appear to be unprejudiced—may deny that the feelings are racially driven. Instead,
the individual may attribute such feelings to, for example, disapproval over Obama’s
handling of economic policy. In other words, it is likely far more acceptable to self and
others to oppose Obama because of his policies rather than his race.

The existing evidence for these hypothesized relationships among racial attitudes,
evaluations of Obama, and policy-related judgments is thin. However, it is not non-
existent. Knowles, Lowery, and Schaumberg (2010), for example, have shown that
implicit and explicit measures of racial prejudice completed in October 2008 each
uniquely predicted opposition to Obama’s health care reform plan one year later (see also Tesler & Sears, 2010). Interestingly, when the plan was attributed to former President Bill Clinton, no such effect was observed, bolstering the researchers’ claim that the opposition is driven by racial prejudice.

**Polarization over time.** Finally, what support is there for the idea that these policy-related judgments, informed by racial attitudes and evaluations of Obama, may polarize over time? Work derived from social judgment theory (for a review see Eagly & Chaiken, 1993) exemplifies how attitudes may lead to biased evaluations of new information such that one’s attitude subsequently becomes more extreme. For example, in an experiment conducted by Lord, Ross, and Lepper (1979), participants who supported or opposed capital punishment rated attitude-congruent reports on capital punishment as more convincing and valid than attitude-incongruent reports. Further, they reported more extreme attitudes after reading the material (see also Houston & Fazio, 1989). Therefore, in regard to the current political climate, as voters encounter new pieces of information regarding Obama and his policies, their racial attitudes may influence not only their construal of the information, but in doing so may also reinforce and subtly shift their policy-related attitudes to a slightly more extreme position.

Though this review of the literature provides both a theoretical grounding for and compelling evidence regarding the racialization of American politics, it also reveals certain gaps in the present body of knowledge. Therefore, the research presented here seeks to build upon and expand the existing knowledge base in three key ways: Firstly, it directly tests the mediating effect of attitudes toward Obama on the relationship between
racial attitudes and policy-related judgments. As noted previously, existing research has experimentally demonstrated the negative effect of associating Obama with a policy plan (Knowles et al., 2010) and measured the impact of racial attitudes on agreement with Obama’s policy views. But, to my knowledge, there has not yet been a direct test of the extent to which evaluations of Obama is the mediating link. Secondly, the research presented demonstrates the extent of polarization in public opinion over time. As stated previously, it is unlikely that these evaluations of Obama and his policies remain static once formed, and it is a popular assertion that American politics have grown increasingly polarized. Therefore, the analyses presented assess the polarization phenomenon, as well as evaluate a potential causal mechanism for the effect. Thirdly and finally, a nationally representative sample of the American electorate is utilized (as did Tesler & Sears, 2010), which affords a rare opportunity to make inferences about these psychological processes in regards to the whole of the American electorate. The significance of this opportunity will be discussed more thoroughly in the succeeding section.

**The Predictive Validity of Implicit Measures**

In addition to these aspirations of offering insight into the current political climate in the U.S., the current analysis seeks also to contribute to our understanding of the predictive validity of implicitly measured racial attitudes. Explicit prejudice is commonly defined as negative attitudes based on group membership that are consciously endorsed and reported. Implicit prejudice, in contrast, refers to associations that may occur spontaneously and without volition and whose influence on thought and behavior may not even be consciously recognized (Fazio & Olson, 2003; Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006). Though explicit expressions of prejudice against Blacks are increasingly rare
occurrences in America (Bobo, 2001; Schuman, Steeh, Bobo, & Krysan, 1997), the continued existence of racial disparities has led many (researcher and layperson alike) to doubt that prejudice itself has disappeared. Rather, it may be that racial attitudes are only partially captured by the verbal self-reports that purport to measure explicit prejudice (e.g., feeling thermometers, Kinder and Sanders’ (1996) racial resentment scale). Implicit prejudice, in contrast, is measured indirectly via procedures that do not require conscious introspection and are designed to capture automatic responses (e.g., the affect misattribution procedure [AMP; Payne, Cheng, Govorun, & Stewart, 2005], the Implicit Association Test [IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998]). Accordingly, these measures are generally considered to be free of the self-presentational concerns that plague explicit measures, and some have even posited that they represent psychological tendencies that are not accessible in consciousness (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995).

That measures of implicit prejudice are predictive of a diverse range of outcome measures is well established. To date, those outcome measures have included: less friendly non-verbal behavior in inter-group interactions (Dovidio, Kawakami, & Gaertner, 2002; Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, & Williams, 1995; McConnell & Leibold, 2001; Dasgupta & Rivera, 2006; Hofmann, Gschwendner, Castelli, & Schmitt, 2008); biased judgments in social perception and judgment (Lambert, Payne, Ramsey, & Schaffer, 2005; Maner et al., 2005; Gawronski, Geschke, & Banse, 2003; Bodenhausen, 1988); discriminatory mock hiring decisions (Ziegart & Hanges, 2005); policy evaluations (Yogeeswaran & Dasgupta, 2010); and helping behavior (Gabriel, Banse, & Hug, 2007). Further, particularly for socially sensitive topics, implicit measures may be more predictive of behavior and judgment than explicit measures (Greenwald, Poehlman,
Yet, despite the mounting body of evidence to support the predictive validity of implicit measures of prejudice, two issues concerning its use continue to be raised: (1) Do implicit measures predict consequential, real-world behaviors?; and (2) Do they have utility as predictors above and beyond what could be captured solely by explicit measures?

Regarding the first issue, some critics of implicit bias research have argued that implicit measures may tap into only flawed approximations of prejudice (Arkes & Tetlock, 2004; Tetlock & Mitchell, 2008). One main thrust of their opposition is that such research does not have meaningful outcome measures. They claim that the artificiality of the lab setting, the purportedly inconsequential behavioral measures (e.g., eye blinking, hypothetical decisions), and the non-representative convenience samples of undergraduate students upon which researchers heavily rely all contribute to a lack of external validity. Or, as Tetlock and Mitchell (2008) stated, “Proponents [of implicit measures] have yet to provide compelling evidence for their assertions about the pervasiveness of unconscious bias and its behavioral consequences in early twenty-first century America” (pp. 12-13). Addressing such concerns and further establishing the validity of implicit measures could, therefore, be accomplished in part by demonstrating their ability to predict judgments and behaviors of substantial import in real-world (i.e., non-laboratory) settings. And, researchers have already begun devoting themselves to such a task. Much research conducted in the wake of the 2008 election with its focus on voting behavior (Payne et al., 2010; Pasek et al., 2009; Greenwald, Smith, Sriram, Ban-Aanan, & Nosek, 2009; Arcuri et al., 2008) certainly meets the criterion of assessing the impact of implicit measures in a consequential, real-world setting. The research presented
here adds to these findings by examining how implicit measures influence policy-related judgments (i.e., public opinion) and changes in those judgments over time. As public opinion and changes in public opinion are known to influence policymaking, it seems reasonable to consider these outcome measures as within the realm of consequential behaviors. For example, Page and Shapiro (1983) found that changes in public opinion were predictive of later congruent changes in policy (see also Manza & Cook, 2001). Therefore, the work presented may further underscore the importance and usefulness of implicit measures in predicting consequential behaviors in real-world settings.

Regarding the second issue, a recurrent question concerning implicit measures has been whether they have predictive validity above and beyond that of explicit measures. Therefore, research that illuminates the unique predictive capabilities of implicit measures, by considering them in conjunction with explicit measures, can serve an important function by informing existing social cognitive theoretical models (Perugini, Richetin, & Zogmaister, 2010). As Perugini and colleagues argued, the issue is not whether implicit measures predict behavior, but rather “what type of behavior, under what conditions, for whom, and with what measure” (p. 255). By continuing to uncover information regarding the circumstances in which each class of measures appears to be a better predictor of behavior and by modeling the relationship between the measures (i.e., additive, interactive, etc.), the research community will attain a better understanding of both the utility of the measures and the nature of the constructs and processes being assessed. The analyses presented here, in particular, make their contribution by examining the unique effects of explicit and implicit prejudice in predicting public
political opinion, as well as their role in predicting how those opinions may change over time.
CHAPTER 2
STUDY 1: TEST FOR RACIALIZATION

The goal of Study 1 was to provide an initial test of the racialization hypothesis by exploring the ability of measures of explicit and implicit prejudice to predict policy-related judgments. It was expected that higher levels of prejudice (measured one to two months before the 2008 presidential election) would be predictive of more negative policy-related judgments nine to ten months later (Hypothesis 1a). Further, it was expected that evaluations of President Obama would mediate this relationship such that higher levels of prejudice would be predictive of more negative evaluations of Obama that were in turn predictive of more negative policy-related judgments (Hypothesis 1b).

Method

Respondents and Sampling

The sample for this analysis was drawn from the American National Election Studies (ANES) 2008-2009 Panel Study. The respondents in these studies were a representative sample of the American electorate, and the data have been weighted to reflect then-current population demographics. Respondents were recruited by telephone using random digit dialing and compensated to complete one survey on the Internet each month. The first cohort completed surveys from January 2008 to September 2009, and the second cohort from September 2008 to September 2009. Those without Internet access were provided with a free web appliance and free Internet service for the duration
of the study. Informed consent was obtained from all respondents. (For further information on the sampling and recruitment techniques for this study, please see DeBell, Krosnick, and Lupia [2010].) Data from four separate “waves” of the ANES 2008-2009 Panel Study were included in this study, and the retention rates for those waves are as follows: Of the 4,194 respondents who completed the recruitment interview, 2,586 were retained at Wave 9 (September 2008); 2,628 at Wave 10 (October 2008); 2,389 at Wave 17 (May 2009); and 2,313 at Wave 19 (July 2009). After excluding those (a) who failed to complete one or more of the primary measures of interest and (b) for whom the appropriate sampling weight was not available, the final sample size was 1,842 respondents.

**Measurements**

**Outcome variable.** The construct of policy-related judgments was operationalized using measures of perceived direction of the country, collected in July 2009, in which respondents were asked to judge whether the country had improved or worsened since January 2009. Specifically, respondents were asked to compare the current state of five policy-related issues (i.e., our relations with foreign countries, the federal budget deficit, health care in the U.S., poverty in the U.S., and the economy) to how they were in January 2009. Responses were assessed on a 5-point scale (1 = much better, 5 = much worse), and a composite variable using these five responses ($\alpha = .72$) was created such that higher numbers reflect perceived worsening of the country (weighted $M = 3.57$, $SD = .59$). It is notable that, on average, respondents believed that the country’s performance in terms of these policy-related issues had worsened since January 2009. (Question wordings and response options can be found in Appendix A.)
Using perceived direction of the country as a measure of policy-related judgments was deemed most appropriate for the analysis because it, although not explicitly referencing President Obama, still required that respondents assess how well the country had been performing since he had assumed the office of the presidency. Further, the issues on which respondents were being queried (e.g., health care) were presumably unrelated to their racial attitudes, which provided a critical opportunity to test the racialization hypothesis.

**Predictor variables.** Explicit and implicit racial attitudes toward Blacks served as the primary predictors of interest. Implicit attitudes toward Blacks were measured in either September or October of 2008 (date of completion based on random assignment), using the Affect Misattribution Procedure (AMP; Payne, Cheng, Govorun, & Stewart, 2005). In this procedure, participants completed 48 trials in which they were briefly presented with a photograph of the face of a White or Black man, followed by a Chinese ideograph. Each trial began with a fixation point, followed by a face presented for 75 ms, followed next by a pictograph for 250 ms, which was followed by a black and white noise mask. The mask remained on the screen until a response was registered. Respondents were instructed to judge whether each ideograph was pleasant or unpleasant while avoiding influence from the photos. The proportion of unpleasant responses to symbols as a function of Black primes (i.e., indicating higher prejudice) was considered the implicit attitude (weighted \( M = .45, SD = .28 \)). Given its 0-1 scale, 0 can be interpreted as those who were maximally positive toward Blacks. Additionally, the proportion of unpleasant responses to symbols as a function of White primes (weighted \( M = .37, SD = .26 \)) was calculated in order that it could be included in the model as well.
to control for a general tendency to respond with an unpleasant judgment. Thus, the proportion of unpleasant responses on Black trials while controlling for White trials can be interpreted as the unique effect of Black racial cues on evaluative judgments.

Explicit attitudes toward Blacks were represented by a composite of single-item measures of warm/cold feelings toward Blacks (as a difference score in warm/cold feelings toward Blacks and warm/cold feelings toward Whites), sympathy for Blacks, admiration for Blacks, and perceptions that Blacks have too much political influence ($\alpha = .62$). All measures were taken in September or October 2008. The composite was coded and standardized to a 0-1 scale such that 0 can be interpreted as those who were maximally positive toward Blacks (weighted $M = .53, SD = .17$). (Question wordings and response options can be found in Appendix A.)

**Mediator variable.** Evaluations of President Obama was represented by a composite of measures of liking for Obama, emotional responses (anger, hope, fear, and pride) to Obama, happiness that he won the election, and various job approval measures (e.g., how he is handling his job as president, the economy, the war in Iraq, etc.) ($\alpha = .97$). All measures were taken in May 2009. The composite was coded and standardized to a 0-1 scale such that 0 can be interpreted as those who were maximally approving of Obama (weighted $M = .43, SD = .25$). (Question wordings and response options can be found in Appendix A.)

**Control variables.** In order to test the unique effects of explicit and implicit racial attitudes on perceived direction of the country, a number of demographic control variables were included in the analyses.¹ These included:

¹Note that previous reports on this research cited the use of two additional control variables: political party affiliation and political ideology. After careful consideration, it was determined that those measures should
1. **Gender:** This measurement was collected in January 2008. It was dummy-coded such that 0 represents males and 1 represents females.

2. **Level of education:** This measurement was collected in January 2008. In this analysis, there were five dummy-coded variables representing level of education, one each for less than high school, high school graduate, some college, college graduate, and graduate work. Each of these was entered into the model, except for “less than high school,” which served as the reference group.

3. **Income:** This measurement was collected in January 2008. In this analysis, there were seven dummy-coded variables representing household income level, one each for those who declined to give their income, less than $25,000, $25,000-39,000, $40,000-59,000, $60,000-84,000, $85,000-175,000, and more than $175,000. Each of these was entered into the model, except for “less than $25,000,” which serves as the reference group.

4. **Age:** This measurement was collected in January 2008, but represents the participant’s age on Election Day 2008. Given that the minimum voting age is 18, it was centered at 18 years of age.

**Sampling Weights**

This analysis utilized sampling weights provided by ANES, which are intended to correct for unequal probabilities of selection and nonresponse bias. Specifically, the cumulative late panel weight for Wave 19 (July 2009) was used, because it is applicable to the use of data collected from Wave 9 (September 2008) onward through Wave 19, and is therefore most appropriate for the data used in this analysis.

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If the primary question of interest is the contribution of racial attitudes to political views on policy-related issues, a disservice is done by also including political views as a predictor and thereby potentially obscuring important findings.
Results

In order to test the hypothesis that attitudes toward Blacks are predictive of policy-related judgments in the current political context, perceived direction of the country was regressed simultaneously on both explicit and implicit attitudes toward Blacks, as well as the full set of control variables, with the selected weight applied. Explicit prejudice was significantly predictive of more negative judgments regarding the perceived direction of the country \((B = .98, SE = .08, t = 11.89, p < .0001)\), and implicit prejudice was, as well \((B = .20, SE = .06, t = 3.25, p = .001)\). (See Figure 1.) In other words, those with more negative explicit and implicit attitudes toward Blacks were more likely to perceive the country as having worsened on these policy-related issues since January 2009. These findings provide initial evidence that issues that naively should be uninfluenced by attitudes toward Blacks are racialized in the current political context.

In order to test the hypothesis that there was a significant indirect effect of racial attitudes on policy-related judgments as mediated by evaluations of Obama, two additional weighted regression analyses were conducted and then the Monte Carlo Method for Assessing Mediation (MCMAM; see MacKinnon, Lockwood, & Williams, 2004) was utilized to test the significance of the indirect effect.\(^2\) Specific calculations were made through use of a web utility provided by Selig and Preacher (2008). First, the evaluations of Obama composite was simultaneously regressed on both explicit and implicit attitudes and the full set of control variables and appropriately weighted. Both

\(^2\)Note that previous reports on this research cited the use of an SPSS macro developed by Preacher and Hayes (2008) to test the significance of the indirect effect via a bias-corrected bootstrapping procedure. It was subsequently discovered that the macro was incompatible with the use of sampling weights. Therefore, it was determined that weighted regression analyses should be conducted and the parameter and standard error estimates subjected to the MCMAM procedure. The MCMAM simulates random draws from the sampling distributions of \(\hat{a}\) and \(\hat{b}\) and uses them to generate a sampling distribution of the product of \(\hat{a}\) and \(\hat{b}\) from which a confidence interval for the indirect effect estimate can be calculated. If the values within the confidence interval do not contain zero, there is evidence to support a significant indirect effect.
explicit prejudice \((B = .56, \ SE = .03, \ t = 16.70, \ p < .0001)\) and implicit prejudice \((B = .11, \ SE = .02, \ t = 4.36, \ p < .0001)\) were found to be uniquely and significantly predictive of more negative evaluations of Obama. (See Figure 1.) In other words, those with more negative explicit and implicit attitudes toward Blacks were more likely to evaluate Obama negatively. Second, perceived direction of the country was simultaneously regressed on both explicit and implicit attitudes, evaluations of Obama, and the full set of control variables, and appropriately weighted. Evaluations of Obama were significantly predictive of more negative policy-related judgments \((B = 1.33, \ SE = .05, \ t = 27.43, \ p < .0001)\). However, when controlling for evaluations of Obama, explicit prejudice, though still significant, decreases in magnitude \((B = .24, \ SE = .08, \ t = 3.18, \ p = .002)\), and implicit prejudice \((B = .05, \ SE = .05, \ t = 1.05, \ p = .29)\) fails to achieve significance as a predictor. (See Figure 1.)

Using 20,000 repetitions for the simulation, the MCMAM procedure indicated that the indirect effects of both explicit and implicit attitudes toward Blacks on perceived direction of the country through evaluations of Obama were significant. For explicit attitudes, the indirect effect point estimate of 0.75 had a 95% confidence interval of 0.64 to 0.85. For implicit attitudes, the indirect effect point estimate of 0.14 had a 95% confidence interval of 0.08 to 0.21. Thus, the analyses revealed that evaluations of Obama mediated the relationships between both explicit and implicit racial prejudice and perceived direction of the country.

**Testing Model Assumptions**

In fitting the models described above, it was assumed that the residuals were normally distributed. A visual inspection of residual distribution plots for each of the
three regression models fit revealed no flagrant departures from normality. It also was assumed that there was a constant variance in the residuals. In order to test this assumption, scatterplots of the sets of residuals by the predicted values and by the main predictors of interest (i.e., explicit and implicit racial attitudes—and, evaluations of Obama, as appropriate) were created. A visual inspection of these plots revealed a fairly even distribution of the residuals across all values of the predictor. Therefore, it was concluded that the analyses were consistent with the assumptions of normality and homoscedasticity.

Discussion

These findings suggest that racial attitudes were predictive of public opinion on policy-related issues (e.g., health care, the economy, etc.) such that those who held more negative attitudes toward Blacks prior to the 2008 election were also likely to make more negative judgments regarding the perceived direction of the country approximately six months into the Obama administration. What is particularly noteworthy about these results is that the measure of perceived direction of the country was composed of policy-related items that, for the most part, have historically had nothing to do with racial attitudes (as opposed to other policy-related issues such as crime or affirmative action, which have long been considered proxy measures of racial attitudes [Hurwitz & Peffley, 1997; see Sears, van Laar, Carillo, & Kosterman, 1997]). Further, the relationships between racial attitudes and policy-related judgments were mediated by evaluations of Obama. These results provide initial support for the racialization hypothesis, the idea that racial attitudes are informing attitudes toward Obama and that these racially-informed evaluations are spilling over to influence judgments on policy-related issues.
Ruling Out an Alternative Interpretation

It is possible that the mediating role played by evaluations of Obama was not unique to President Obama as a Black American, but rather may have extended to evaluations of other prominent Democrats. In order to rule out this alternative hypothesis, a single-item measure of liking for Hillary Clinton measured in May 2009 was utilized. Responses were originally assessed on a 7-point scale (0 = *Like her a great deal*, 6 = *Dislike her a great deal*). They were re-coded and standardized to a 0-1 scale such that 0 can be interpreted as those who were maximally positive toward Clinton (weighted $M = .45$, $SD = .35$). While a single-item measure may not be considered ideal, it nevertheless provides the best opportunity afforded by this data set to contrast the mediating role of evaluations of Obama with evaluations of another prominent Democrat. (Question wording and response options can be found in Appendix A.)

The sample size for the current analyses was 1,841. The same analysis procedures outlined previously, in which weighted regression analyses and the MCMAM were utilized, were again followed. First, perceived direction of the country was regressed simultaneously on both explicit and implicit attitudes toward Blacks, as well as the full set of control variables, with the selected weight applied. As before, explicit prejudice was significantly predictive of more negative judgments regarding the perceived direction of the country ($B = .99$, $SE = .08$, $t = 11.94$, $p < .0001$), and implicit prejudice was, as well ($B = .19$, $SE = .06$, $t = 3.24$, $p = .001$). Second, evaluations of Obama and evaluations of Clinton were independently regressed on both explicit and implicit attitudes and the full set of control variables and appropriately weighted. In the case of Obama, as before, both explicit prejudice ($B = .56$, $SE = .03$, $t = 16.70$, $p < .0001$) and
implicit prejudice \((B = .11, SE = .02, t = 4.36, p < .0001)\) were found to be uniquely and significantly predictive of more negative evaluations. In the case of Clinton, explicit prejudice \((B = .58, SE = .05, t = 12.36, p < .0001)\) and implicit prejudice \((B = .08, SE = .03, t = 2.31, p = .02)\) were also found to be uniquely and significantly predictive of more negative evaluations. Third, perceived direction of the country was simultaneously regressed on both explicit and implicit attitudes, evaluations of Obama, evaluations of Clinton, and the full set of control variables, and appropriately weighted. Evaluations of Obama remained significantly predictive of more negative policy-related judgments \((B = 1.34, SE = .06, t = 20.82, p < .0001)\), while evaluations of Clinton were not significantly predictive of policy-related judgments \((B = -.01, SE = .05, t = -.19, p = .85)\). Additionally, explicit prejudice, though still significant, decreased in magnitude \((B = .24, SE = .08, t = 3.24, p = .001)\), and implicit prejudice \((B = .05, SE = .05, t = 1.04, p = .30)\) failed to achieve significance as a predictor.

Using 20,000 repetitions for the simulation, the MCMAM essentially replicated the previous finding, indicating that the indirect effects of both explicit and implicit attitudes toward Blacks on perceived direction of the country through evaluations of Obama remained significant even when accounting for the influence of attitudes toward Clinton. For explicit attitudes, the indirect effect point estimate of 0.75 had a 95% confidence interval of 0.64 to 0.87. For implicit attitudes, the indirect effect point estimate of 0.14 had a 95% confidence interval of 0.08 to 0.21. However, the analyses failed to find support for evaluations of Clinton as a mediator of the relationship between racial attitudes and policy-related attitudes. For explicit attitudes, the indirect effect point
estimate of .01 had a 95% confidence interval of -.06 to .05. For implicit attitudes, the indirect effect point estimate of .001 had a 95% confidence interval of -.01 to .01.³

Thus, liking for Hillary Clinton, another prominent Democrat, did not mediate the relationship between racial attitudes and policy-related judgments. This finding provides further support for the idea that the unique racial lens through which Obama as a Black American is perceived may be allowing racial attitudes to inform responses to the current administration’s actions and policies.

³The same diagnostic tests as conducted in the previous analysis were conducted on these data, with the same conclusions drawn: The analyses appeared to be consistent with the assumptions of normality and homoscedasticity.
Having established initial support for the racialization hypothesis by demonstrating that Obama may serve as a mediating link between racial attitudes and policy-related judgments, attention was then turned to the second set of hypotheses regarding the polarization of these judgments. Study 2 assessed whether both explicit and implicit racial attitudes were uniquely predictive of a polarized pattern of change in policy-related judgments over time. It was expected that the differences in policy-related judgments between those with more positive and more negative attitudes toward Blacks would increase over time (Hypothesis 2a) and that these differential rates of change in policy-related judgments (if observed) would be mediated by evaluations of President Obama (Hypothesis 2b). To evaluate these hypotheses, a series of weighted multilevel and single-level regression models were fit, testing for evidence of mediation using the MCMAM procedure employed previously.

Method

Respondents and Sampling

The sample for this analysis was drawn from both the ANES 2008-2009 Panel Study and the ANES 2010 Panel Recontact Survey. From the ANES 2008-2009 Panel Study, data were drawn from the same four “waves” included in Study 1: Wave 9 (September 2008), Wave 10 (October 2008), Wave 17 (May 2009), and Wave 19 (July

CHAPTER 3
STUDY 2: TEST FOR POLARIZATION
Regarding the ANES 2010 Recontact Survey, of those respondents who completed any portion of the 2008-2009 Panel Study, a subset was identified as eligible for recontact. Those respondents were re-contacted by ANES affiliates in June and July of 2010 and asked to complete an additional survey on a variety of political topics. Of the original 4,194 respondents who completed the 2008-2009 Panel Study, 1,571 respondents completed the 2010 Recontact Survey.\(^4\) (For further information on the sampling and recruitment techniques for the 2008-2009 Panel Study and the 2010 Recontact study, please see DeBell, Krosnick, and Lupia [2010] and DeBell, Hutchings, Jackman, and Segura [2010].) For this analysis, after excluding those (a) who failed to complete at least one of the three measures of the outcome variable, (b) who failed to complete one or more measures that serve as predictor variables in the present analysis, and (c) for whom the appropriate sampling weight is not available, the final sample size for this analysis was 2,138 respondents with a total of 5,582 observations.

**Measurements**

**Outcome variable.** The primary outcome variable was again a measure of perceived direction of country (i.e., improving or worsening), which was collected at three time points following the 2008 election: May 2009, July 2009, and July 2010. As described previously, participants were asked to compare the current state of five policy-related issues (i.e., our relations with foreign countries, the federal budget deficit, health care in the U.S., poverty in the U.S., and the economy) to how they were in January 2009. Responses were assessed on a 5-point scale (1 = *much better*, 5 = *much worse*). (The

\(^4\)It should be noted that these 1,571 respondents did not set the upper limit for the sample size. A multilevel modeling approach can incorporate missing observations for the outcome variable, whereas more conventional methods cannot. Under the assumption that the data are missing at random, as long as a respondent has completed the outcome measure at least once, that respondent can be included in the sample (see Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002).
question wording and response options were exactly the same at each of the three time points. See Appendix A.) For each time point, a composite variable using these five responses (α’s > .70) was created such that higher numbers reflect perceived worsening of the country. On average, the respondents in this sample believed, at each of these time points, that the country was slightly worse than it was in January 2009 (see Table 1).

**Predictor variables.** Explicit and implicit racial attitudes toward Blacks again served as the primary predictors of interest, represented by the same measures used in the previous analysis. To remind, both measures were adapted to a 0-1 scale such that 0 can be interpreted as those who were maximally positive toward Blacks.

Time also was considered a predictor variable in these analyses. It was coded such that 0 represented the initial measure taken in May 2009 and each two-month interval was considered a single unit. Therefore, May 2009 was coded as 0, July 2009 as 1, and July 2010 as 7. Therefore, 0 can be interpreted as perceived direction of the country in May 2009 (i.e., where participants “began” in their trajectory, at least as far as these data allowed).

**Mediator variable.** Disapproval of Obama also was represented by the same measure used in the previous analysis. To remind, the composite was coded and standardized to a 0-1 scale such that 0 can be interpreted as those who were maximally approving of Obama.

**Control variables.** As before, in order to test the unique effects of explicit and implicit racial attitudes on perceived direction of the country, a number of demographic control variables were included in subsequent analyses. These included gender, level of education, income, and age, and were coded as described previously.
**Sampling Weights**

This analysis utilized sampling weights provided by ANES, which are intended to correct for unequal probabilities of selection and nonresponse bias. Specifically, the cross-sectional weight for Wave 17 (May 2009) was used. The use of a multilevel model presents challenges in the selection of appropriate weight(s) in that weights may be specified at both Level 1 (observations) and Level 2 (person). In a hierarchical multilevel model, the relationship between the Level 1 and 2 weights is a bit clearer conceptually. Take the example of students nested within schools: The Level 2 weights would be selected to account for the probability of a school being selected, while the Level 1 weights would be selected to account for the conditional probability of a student being selected given that the school was selected, as well as potentially rescaled to standardize the magnitude of the weight across clusters (see Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal, 2006; Carle, 2009; Pfeffermann et al., 1998). The extension to longitudinal multilevel models is less clear. At both levels, it is the person in which we are interested and that person’s ability to represent a proportion of the American electorate with his or her responses. Additionally, the weight of a person’s response to a measure inputted at Level 1 is almost wholly redundant with the weight of that person’s response to a measure inputted at Level 2. Therefore, it was determined that the selected weight be specified at Level 2 only.\(^5\)

**Exploratory Analyses**

Given that repeated measures of perceived direction of the country were collected from the same individuals, it was assumed that these data required the use of multilevel analyses.\(^5\)

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\(^5\)Additional analyses were conducted in which the Wave 17, Wave 19, and recontact cross-sectional weights were specified at Level 1, keeping the Wave 17 cross-sectional weight specified at Level 2. A similar pattern of results emerged.
modeling to account for the dependencies in the data. Preliminary data analyses supported this assumption. A random-effects ANOVA model (or null model) was fit to perceived direction of the country (see Table 2). The resulting intra-class correlation coefficient (ICC) of .61, which is calculated by dividing the between-person variance estimate by the total variance estimate \( \frac{\hat{\tau}_{00}}{\hat{\tau}_{00} + \hat{\alpha}^2} \), indicated that 61% of the variance in perceived direction of the country could be attributed to between-person differences. The ICC also can be interpreted as a measure of the degree of dependence within the data (i.e., the existence of between-person differences also implies a dependence in the observations within-person). Viewed from this perspective, the ICC indicated that, perceived direction of the country scores were correlated .61 within any given individual. This result indicated a high level of dependence in the data and bolstered the decision to employ a multilevel modeling approach.

Additionally, before proceeding to the full analysis, it was appropriate to determine the proper specification of the growth model (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). To assist in making such decisions, an unconditional growth model was fit to perceived direction of the country, in which time was the only predictor. The results indicated that there was significant variability among both the intercepts \( \hat{\alpha}_{00} \) and slopes \( \hat{\alpha}_{11} \). In other words, the respondents varied significantly in their initial values on the perceived direction of the country measure, as well as in the trajectories that their responses followed over time. Despite the non-significant fixed effect of time \( (p = .36) \), these results suggested that the multilevel model should include random effects components for both the intercepts (i.e., initial values of perceived direction) and the slopes (i.e., the predicted rate of change in perceived direction over time). This decision was bolstered by
a visual inspection of a sample of individual model-implied trajectories for rate of change of perceived direction of the country over time (see Figure 2), which also indicated significant variability in intercepts and slopes.

The unconditional growth model also produced a significant (positive) covariance between the intercepts and slopes ($\hat{\tau}_{10}$). This covariance was standardized into a correlation by dividing by the product of the standard deviations ($\hat{\tau}_{10}/(\sqrt{\hat{\tau}_{00}} * \sqrt{\hat{\tau}_{11}})$), which resulted in a correlation of 0.311. This statistic indicates that the higher one’s initial value, the greater one’s slope. In other words, the worse that a respondent believed the country to be in May 2009, the more likely that respondent would be to report that the country had worsened even more on subsequent survey dates.

Finally, the unconditional growth model indicated that, after accounting for the effect of time, the residual (within-person) variance was reduced, but remained significant (see Table 2). Approximately 20% of the variance within an individual’s scores could be explained by the passing of time.

Data Analysis Plan

Testing for Racialization and Polarization

In order to observe the differing effects of explicit and implicit racial attitudes when considered both independently and simultaneously, as well as their incremental explanatory value above and beyond that of the control variables, four separate multilevel models were initially fit in addition to the null model and the unconditional growth model described previously (see Table 2). Model 1 included time and all of the demographic control variables as predictors. Models 2 and 3 built on Model 1 by adding explicit or implicit racial attitudes, respectively, as a predictor, while Model 4 assessed the effects of...
explicit and implicit racial attitudes simultaneously. Model 1 served as a point of comparison for each of the three models that followed, allowing for the incremental value of explicit and/or implicit racial attitudes to be assessed. In each of Models 2, 3, and 4, the underlying question being addressed remained the same: Did racial attitudes predict a polarizing rate of change in policy-related judgments over time such that the differences in policy-related judgments between those with more positive and more negative attitudes toward Blacks increased over time? Thus, in each of those three critical models, the parameter estimates for one or both measures of racial attitudes and for the interaction of the racial attitudes measures with time were of greatest interest. However, it should be noted that Model 4 provided the most conservative test of the hypotheses in that it assessed the unique predictive power of both explicit and implicit attitudes above and beyond what could be accounted for by the alternative measure of racial attitudes or by demographic characteristics.

**Mediation Analyses**

After observing the effects of racial attitudes on policy-related judgments and the rate of change of policy-related judgments over time, attention was then turned to what might account for those effects, specifically the potential role of evaluations of Obama as a mediator. As Model 4 provided the most conservative test of the hypotheses, it served as the focus of the mediation analyses. Note that there were four relationships of interest that could be mediated by evaluations of Obama: (1) explicit racial attitudes or (2) implicit racial attitudes predicting perceived direction of the country, and (3) explicit attitudes or (4) implicit racial attitudes predicting rate of change of perceived direction of the country.
Given that, in this model, the main predictor variables of interest and the proposed mediator were measured at the upper-level (at the level of the person), while the outcome variable was measured at the lower-level (repeated measures within persons), the scenario considered is what has been referred to as upper-level mediation (Kenny, Kashy, & Bolger, 1998) or a $2 \rightarrow 2 \rightarrow 1$ model (Krull & MacKinnon, 1999, 2001). In this case, it was appropriate to test for evidence of mediation by first fitting a series of weighted multilevel models to determine the parameter estimates for each of the paths in the mediation models of interest (i.e., the total effects, the direct effects, and the indirect effects) and then testing the significance of each of the four indirect effects (see Figure 3). The data analysis plan was as follows:

**Step 1.** Fit a multilevel model (Model 4; as described in the previous section) regressing perceived direction of the country on implicit and explicit attitudes toward Blacks, controlling for the appropriate demographic variables and applying the appropriate sampling weight, to obtain the four total effect estimates ($\hat{c}_{\text{exp .int}}, \hat{c}_{\text{exp .slp}}, \hat{c}_{\text{imp .int}}$, and $\hat{c}_{\text{imp .slp}}$).\(^6\)

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\(^6\)Represented by the following equation:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{total}_{ij} &= \gamma_{0.0} + \gamma_{1.0}\text{time}_{ij} + \gamma_{1.1}\text{blackamp}_{ij} + \gamma_{1.2}\text{whiteamp}_{ij} + \gamma_{0.3}\text{explicit}_{ij} + \gamma_{0.4}\text{gender}_{ij} + \gamma_{0.5}\text{highschool}_{ij} + \\
& \quad \gamma_{0.6}\text{somecollege}_{ij} + \gamma_{0.7}\text{college}_{ij} + \gamma_{0.8}\text{graduate}_{ij} + \gamma_{0.9}\text{incomemissing}_{ij} + \gamma_{0.10}\text{income25.39}_{ij} + \\
& \quad \gamma_{0.11}\text{income40.59}_{ij} + \gamma_{0.12}\text{income60.84}_{ij} + \gamma_{0.13}\text{income85.175}_{ij} + \gamma_{0.14}\text{incomemorethan175}_{ij} + \gamma_{0.15}\text{age}_{ij} + \\
& \quad \gamma_{1.0}\text{blackamp}_{ij}\text{time}_{ij} + \gamma_{1.1}\text{whiteamp}_{ij}\text{time}_{ij} + \gamma_{1.2}\text{explicit}_{ij}\text{time}_{ij} + \gamma_{1.3}\text{gender}_{ij}\text{time}_{ij} + \\
& \quad \gamma_{1.4}\text{highschool}_{ij}\text{time}_{ij} + \gamma_{1.5}\text{somecollege}_{ij}\text{time}_{ij} + \gamma_{1.6}\text{college}_{ij}\text{time}_{ij} + \gamma_{1.7}\text{graduate}_{ij}\text{time}_{ij} + \\
& \quad \gamma_{1.8}\text{incomemissing}_{ij}\text{time}_{ij} + \gamma_{1.9}\text{income25.39}_{ij}\text{time}_{ij} + \gamma_{1.10}\text{income40.59}_{ij}\text{time}_{ij} + \\
& \quad \gamma_{1.11}\text{income60.84}_{ij}\text{time}_{ij} + \gamma_{1.12}\text{income85.175}_{ij}\text{time}_{ij} + \gamma_{1.13}\text{incomemorethan175}_{ij}\text{time}_{ij} + \gamma_{1.14}\text{age}_{ij}\text{time}_{ij} + \\
& \quad \tau_{0j} + \tau_{1j}\text{time}_{ij} + r_{ij}
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{bmatrix}
\tau_{0j} \\
\tau_{1j}
\end{bmatrix} \sim N\left(\begin{bmatrix}0 \\ 0\end{bmatrix}, \begin{bmatrix}r_{00} & r_{01} \\ r_{10} & r_{11}\end{bmatrix}\right)
\]

In this equation, $\gamma_{0.3}$ represents the total effect of explicit racial prejudice on perceived direction of the country in May 2009 ($c_{\text{exp .int}}$ path), while $\gamma_{0.1}$ represents the total effect of implicit racial prejudice on
**Step 2.** Regress evaluations of Obama on implicit and explicit attitudes toward Blacks, controlling for the appropriate demographic variables and applying the appropriate sampling weight, to obtain the first (IV → mediator) halves of the indirect effects (\(\hat{a}_{exp} \) and \(\hat{a}_{imp}\)).

**Step 3.** Fit a multilevel model regressing perceived direction of the country on evaluations of Obama, to obtain the second (mediator → DV) halves of the indirect effects (\(\hat{b}_{int} \) and \(\hat{b}_{slp}\)), and on explicit and implicit racial attitudes to obtain the four direct effect estimates (\(\hat{c}_{exp \_int} \), \(\hat{c}_{exp \_slp} \), \(\hat{c}_{imp \_int} \), and \(\hat{c}_{imp \_slp}\)), while controlling for the appropriate demographic variables and applying the appropriate sampling weight.

perceived direction of the country in May 2009 (\(c_{imp \_int}\) path). The parameter \(\gamma_{1,3}\) represents the total effect of explicit racial prejudice on the rate of change of perceived direction of the country (\(c_{exp \_slp}\) path), and \(\gamma_{1,1}\) represents the total effect of implicit racial prejudice on the rate of change of perceived direction of the country (\(c_{imp \_slp}\) path). It was assumed that the within-person residuals were independent and normally distributed with a mean 0 and variance \(\sigma^2\), and that the random effects were independent and bivariate normally distributed with means of 0, variances of \(\tau_{00}\) and \(\tau_{11}\), and a covariance of \(\tau_{10}\).

\[\text{obamaeval}_{ij} = \gamma_{0,0} + \gamma_{0,1}\text{blackamp}_{ij} + \gamma_{0,2}\text{whiteamp}_{ij} + \gamma_{0,3}\text{explicit}_{ij} + \gamma_{0,4}\text{gender}_{ij} + \gamma_{0,5}\text{highschool}_{ij} + \gamma_{0,6}\text{somecollege}_{ij} + \gamma_{0,7}\text{college}_{ij} + \gamma_{0,8}\text{graduate}_{ij} + \gamma_{0,9}\text{income}_{ij} + \gamma_{0,10}\text{income25}_{ij} + \gamma_{0,11}\text{income40}_{ij} + \gamma_{0,12}\text{income60}_{ij} + \gamma_{0,13}\text{income85}_{ij} + \gamma_{0,14}\text{incomeother}_{ij} + \gamma_{0,15}\text{age}_{ij} + u_{0j}\]

\[u_{0j} \sim N(0, \tau_{00})\]

In this equation, \(\gamma_{0,3}\) represents the effect of explicit racial prejudice on disapproval of Obama (\(a_{exp}\) path), and \(\gamma_{0,1}\) represents the effect of implicit racial prejudice on disapproval of Obama (\(a_{imp}\) path). It was assumed that the residuals were independent and normally distributed with a mean 0 and variance \(\tau_{00}\).

\[\text{direct}_{ij} = \gamma_{0,0} + \gamma_{1,0}\text{time}_{ij} + \gamma_{0,1}\text{blackamp}_{ij} + \gamma_{0,2}\text{whiteamp}_{ij} + \gamma_{0,3}\text{explicit}_{ij} + \gamma_{0,4}\text{gender}_{ij} + \gamma_{0,5}\text{highschool}_{ij} + \gamma_{0,6}\text{somecollege}_{ij} + \gamma_{0,7}\text{college}_{ij} + \gamma_{0,8}\text{graduate}_{ij} + \gamma_{0,9}\text{income}_{ij} + \gamma_{0,10}\text{income25}_{ij} + \gamma_{0,11}\text{income40}_{ij} + \gamma_{0,12}\text{income60}_{ij} + \gamma_{0,13}\text{income85}_{ij} + \gamma_{0,14}\text{incomeother}_{ij} + \gamma_{0,15}\text{age}_{ij} + \gamma_{0,16}\text{obamaeval}_{ij} + \gamma_{1,1}\text{blackamp}_{ij} + \gamma_{1,2}\text{whiteamp}_{ij} + \gamma_{1,3}\text{explicit}_{ij} + \gamma_{1,4}\text{gender}_{ij} + \gamma_{1,5}\text{highschool}_{ij} + \gamma_{1,6}\text{somecollege}_{ij} + \gamma_{1,7}\text{college}_{ij} + \gamma_{1,8}\text{graduate}_{ij} + \gamma_{1,9}\text{income}_{ij} + \gamma_{1,10}\text{income25}_{ij} + \gamma_{1,11}\text{income40}_{ij} + \gamma_{1,12}\text{income60}_{ij} + \gamma_{1,13}\text{income85}_{ij} + \gamma_{1,14}\text{incomeother}_{ij} + \gamma_{1,15}\text{age}_{ij} + r_{ij}\]

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Step 4. Test the significance of each of the four proposed mediation effects using the Monte Carlo Method for Assessing Mediation (MCMAM) via the web utility provided by Selig and Preacher (2008). To remind, the MCMAM uses simulated random draws from the sampling distributions of $\hat{a}$ and $\hat{b}$ to generate a sampling distribution of the product of $\hat{a}$ and $\hat{b}$ from which a confidence interval for the indirect effect estimate can be calculated. If the values within the confidence interval do not include zero, there is evidence to support a significant indirect effect.

Results

Testing for Racialization and Polarization

Results for each model fit can be found in Table 2, and for each of the critical models (i.e., Models 2, 3, and 4), the same general pattern emerged: Increases in explicit and/or increases in implicit racial prejudice significantly predicted higher initial values (i.e., in May 2009) of perceived direction (worsening) of the country. For example, Model 4 predicted that a 1-unit increase in explicit racial prejudice (i.e., moving from maximally positive to maximally negative) resulted, on average, in a .731-unit increase in an individual’s initial value of perceived direction, while a 1-unit increase in implicit

$$r_{ij} \sim N(0, \sigma^2)$$

$$\begin{bmatrix} u_{i0} \\ u_{ij} \end{bmatrix} \sim N \begin{bmatrix} 0 \\ \tau_{00} \\ \tau_{10} \end{bmatrix}$$

In this equation, $\gamma_{0.16}$ represents the effect of disapproval of Obama on perceived direction of the country in May 2009 ($b_{\text{int}}$ path), and $\gamma_{1.16}$ represents the effect of disapproval of Obama on the rate of change in perceived direction of the country ($b_{\text{slp}}$ path). The parameter $\gamma_{0.3}$ represents the direct effect of explicit racial prejudice on perceived direction of the country in May 2009 ($c_{\text{exp, int}}$ path), and $\gamma_{0.1}$ represents the direct effect of implicit racial prejudice on perceived direction of the country in May 2009 ($c_{\text{imp, int}}$ path). The parameter $\gamma_{1.3}$ represents the direct effect of explicit racial prejudice on the rate of change of perceived direction of the country ($c_{\text{exp, slp}}$ path), and $\gamma_{1.1}$ represents the direct effect of implicit racial prejudice on the rate of change of perceived direction of the country ($c_{\text{imp, slp}}$ path). Again, it was assumed that the within-person residuals were independent and normally distributed with a mean 0 and variance $\sigma^2$, and that the random effects were independent and bivariate normally distributed with means of 0, variances of $\tau_{00}$ and $\tau_{11}$, and a covariance of $\tau_{10}$.
racial prejudice (i.e., moving from maximally positive to maximally negative) resulted, on average, in a .139-unit increase in an individual’s initial value of perceived direction (after accounting for the control variables). In other words, for May 2009, the model implies that a person who was maximally negative in their explicit and implicit attitudes toward Blacks would have rated the country as nearly a point (.87-units) worse than it was in January 2009 on the 5-point scale.

Additionally, across each of the three critical models, increases in explicit and/or increases in implicit racial prejudice significantly predicted increases in the rate of change of perceived direction (worsening) of the country over time, as represented by the time-by-racial attitudes interaction terms (see Figures 4 and 5). (To remind, a single unit of time represents two months.) For example, Model 4 predicted that, from May 2009 to July 2009, individuals who were maximally positive in their explicit and implicit attitudes toward Blacks would slightly improve their evaluations of the country’s direction by .064 units (i.e., the main effect of time; after accounting for the control variables). For those who were maximally negative, though, Model 4 predicted a .119-unit increase (= .078 + .041) in the rate of change. In other words, from May 2009 to July 2009, the model implies that the difference between those who were maximally positive and maximally negative in their attitudes toward Blacks would have increased by .183-units to just over a scale point (1.053 on the 5-point scale).

In considering the differences in parameter estimates across Models 2, 3, and 4, it becomes clear that, when considered simultaneously (Model 4) as opposed to separately (Models 2 and 3), both the effects of explicit and implicit prejudice and their contributions to the rate of change decreased slightly in magnitude. As explicit and
implicit prejudice were significantly correlated ($r = .266, p < .0001$), these decreases are not surprising. Importantly, despite these decreases in magnitude, each measure of prejudice remained significant when controlling for the other, demonstrating the unique predictive power of both explicit and implicit racial attitudes.

In considering how much variance was explained by each of these models, the traditional $R^2$ used in determining the impact of general linear models is not available in multilevel modeling due to the partitioning of variance into different pools, including the within-person (residual) variance, the initial status (intercepts) variance, and the growth rate (slopes) variance. Therefore, each of these was considered separately, beginning with the within-person variance. In looking at the estimates in Table 2, one will note that the conditional within-person variance did not change across all the models. This result is not surprising, as time was the only Level 1 predictor in the model (i.e., the only variable that changed within persons), and therefore the only variable that could explain within-person variance.

In looking at the between-person variance in initial status (or intercepts) explained, adding the control variables to the model explained only 4.16% of the variance (Model 1), while the inclusion of explicit and/or implicit racial attitudes in the model increased the amount of variance explained (up to 12.66% total). It is also noteworthy that though both types of attitude measures explain additional variance independently, the total variance explained with the inclusion of the explicit measure (12.19%) is substantially larger than that explained with the inclusion of the implicit measure (6.47%) and not substantially different from the total amount of variance explained when both explicit and implicit measures are included simultaneously (12.66%). In other words,
though the fixed effect of implicit attitudes is significant, explicit attitudes toward Blacks seem to be a more powerful predictor of initial values of perceived direction of the country than implicit attitudes.

In looking at the between-person variance in growth rate (or slopes) explained, adding the control variables to the model explained only 5.20% of the variance, while the inclusion of explicit and/or implicit racial attitudes in the model again explained additional variance (up to 16.55% total). As before, both types of attitude measures explained additional variance independently, with 13.41% of the total variance explained by the inclusion of the explicit measure and 11.80% explained by the inclusion of the implicit measure. Unlike with the between-person differences in initial values, in this case of the between-person differences in slopes, the total variance explained when both measures are included simultaneously is several percentage points higher (16.55%) than when either is considered independently. This result suggests that both measures are powerful unique predictors of the rate of change of perceived direction of the country.

Mediation Analyses

Step 1. Model 4, described previously, served as the focus of the first step in the mediation analyses. To remind, it produced positive and significant estimates for each of the four parameters of interest (see Table 2 and Figure 3). Increases in explicit and increases in implicit racial prejudice uniquely predicted higher initial values (i.e., in May 2009) of perceived direction (worsening) of the country. Additionally, increases in explicit and increases in implicit racial prejudice uniquely predicted increases in the rate of change of perceived direction (worsening) of the country over time.
**Step 2.** At this second step in the mediation analysis, the model-fitting procedure demonstrated positive and significant estimates for both parameters of interest (see Table 3 and Figure 3). Increases in explicit and increases in implicit racial prejudice uniquely predicted higher levels of disapproval of Obama.

**Step 3.** At this third step in the mediation analysis, the model-fitting procedure produced estimates for both the second half of the indirect effects and the direct effects (see Table 4 and Figure 3). Regarding the second half of the indirect effects, increases in disapproval of Obama predicted higher initial values (i.e., in May 2009) of perceived direction (worsening) of the country and increases in the rate of change of perceived direction (worsening) of the country over time. Regarding the direct effects, after accounting for the effects of evaluations of Obama, the effects of both explicit and implicit racial prejudice on initial values (i.e., in May 2009) of perceived direction (worsening) of the country were no longer significant ($p > .535$). Further, while the direct effects of explicit and implicit racial prejudice on the rate of change in perceived direction remained (marginally) significant ($p < .097$), the effects decreased in magnitude after accounting for effects of evaluations of Obama.

It also is worth noting that the inclusion of evaluations of Obama in the model increased the amount of variance explained in both intercepts and slopes to 48.48% and 30.21%, respectively.

**Step 4.** To remind, there were four relationships of interest that could be mediated by evaluations of Obama: (1) explicit racial attitudes and (2) implicit racial attitudes predicting perceived direction of the country, as well as (3) explicit attitudes and (4) implicit racial attitudes predicting rate of change of perceived direction of the country. As
the results reported in Table 5 illustrate, for each of these predicted pathways, the indirect effect was significant. In other words, none of the confidence intervals obtained via the MCMAM procedure contained zero.

**Testing Model Assumptions**

At each step of the mediation analysis and at both the within- and between-person levels, it was assumed that the residuals were normally distributed. A visual inspection of residual distribution plots for each of the three models fit revealed no flagrant departures from normality. It also was assumed that there was a constant variance in the residuals at all levels of the predictor variables. In order to test this assumption, for all the three models fit, scatterplots of the residuals by the predicted values and by the main predictors of interest (i.e., explicit and implicit racial attitudes and evaluations of Obama) were created. A visual inspection of these plots revealed a fairly even distribution of the residuals across all values of the predictor. Therefore, it was concluded that the analyses were consistent with the assumptions of normality and homoscedasticity.

**Discussion**

This study extended the findings of Study 1 by demonstrating that increases in explicit and implicit anti-Black attitudes were predictive of increased levels of perceived worsening of the country not only at a single time point, but also over time. Those with more negative attitudes toward Blacks prior to the 2008 election were later likely both to believe the country was in a worsened position since the start of the Obama administration and to become more extreme in those beliefs over time, relative to those with more positive attitudes. Further, these relationships between racial attitudes and perceived direction of the country were mediated by evaluations of Obama: Those with
more negative racial attitudes also evaluated Obama more negatively. Those negative evaluations of Obama, in turn, predicted both more negative policy-related judgments and increasing relative negativity of those judgments over time.

It is interesting to note that the implicit measure of prejudice was a stronger predictor, in terms of variance explained, of differences in slopes rather than differences in intercepts. Explicit prejudice, on the other hand, appeared to explain a substantial amount of variance in both. Explicit measures are generally regarded as better predictors of deliberate or controlled behaviors such as verbal responses, while implicit measures have been shown to be better predictors of spontaneous or uncontrolled behaviors such as nonverbal cues (Dovidio et al., 2002; Fazio et al., 1995; McConnell & Leibold, 2001; Hofmann et al., 2008). The greater contribution of the implicit measure to variation in slopes suggests that such uncontrolled behaviors may be relatively more impactful as attitudes form and change over time.

Though tests of the key hypotheses did reach statistical significance, some may note that the sizes of the effects remained fairly small. For example, as noted previously, Model 4 predicted that, after controlling for the demographic variables, the difference in policy-related judgments between those who were maximally positive and those who were maximally negative in their attitudes toward Blacks increased from just under a point (.87 units) on the 5-point scale to just over a point (1.053 units). However, though the range of a single scale point may seem relatively insubstantial, the psychological difference marked by that point (e.g., between the state of the country being “about the same” and “slightly worse”) may be anything but insubstantial. Given the influences of public opinion and changes in public opinion on policy-making (see Page & Shapiro,
1983; Manza & Cook, 2001), the potential influence of a constituent who perceives the country to be remaining steady versus one who perceives declines may be quite impactful. Additionally, while a great deal of between-person variance remains unexplained by the included predictors, the ability to explain 12-16% of why individuals differ in their opinions of the state of the country and why those opinions change over time is still important when one considers that these effects are representative of the views of the American electorate, a body in which small shifts can have large impacts.

**Limitations**

While the present analysis did provide support for the hypotheses, it was not without its limitations. First of all, perceived direction of the country was measured at only three time points, the last two being spaced one year apart. The first two years of Obama’s presidency were a tumultuous time in U.S. politics, and there were surely many variations in general perceptions of how well the country was faring for which these data cannot account. Secondly, while the data seemed to support the hypothesis that Obama’s unique role as a Black politician has created the connection between racial attitudes and policy-related judgments, such a statement would be strengthened if the same pattern of relationships was not present in data collected during other presidential administrations. It is to this task that attention was then turned.
Studies 1 and 2 provided strong support for the idea that the U.S.’s first Black president has acted as a medium for racializing and polarizing public opinion on a variety of nonracial issues. As the mediation analyses demonstrated, the relationship between prejudice toward Blacks and perceived worsening of the country was partially explained by more negative evaluations of Obama. Further, the non-significance of evaluations of Hillary Clinton as a mediator of the relationship between these two seemingly disparate sets of attitudes suggests that the effect cannot be generalized to prominent Democratic politicians. However, it was assumed to this point that, independent of the current political context, attitudes toward Blacks should not be expected to predict one’s stance on, for example, the state of the nation’s economy. In other words, that these policy-related issues (e.g., the economy) are typically nonracial issues (i.e., not informed by one’s racial attitudes) was a hypothesis that remained to be tested. Further, the interpretation of the previously reported results, particularly the emphasis on the unique role of Obama as the nation’s first Black president, would be bolstered by demonstrating that the observed set of relationships—racial attitudes predicting policy-related judgments as mediated by evaluations of the president—was not present in data collected during previous presidential administrations.
Therefore, a third analysis was conducted to assess the same pattern of results utilizing data collected during the administration of former President George W. Bush. It was hypothesized that, after controlling for various demographic measures (e.g., gender, education, etc.), (1) there would be a non-significant correlation between racial attitudes and policy-related judgments; and (2) there would be a non-significant indirect effect of racial attitudes on policy-related judgments as mediated by evaluations of Bush (Hypothesis 1c).

**Method**

**Respondents and Sampling**

The sample for this analysis was drawn from both the ANES 2000 and 2002 Time Series Studies. The respondents in these studies were a representative sample of the American electorate at the time, and the data have been weighted to reflect then-current population demographics. Some respondents were selected by traditional area probability sampling and interviewed face-to-face, while others were recruited using random digit dialing and interviewed by telephone. Informed consent was obtained from all respondents, and they were compensated for their time. (For comprehensive information on the sampling and recruitment techniques for these studies, please see www.electionstudies.org.) The final available sample size for this analysis was 1,040 respondents.

**Measurements**

**Outcome variable.** The construct of policy-related judgments was operationalized using measures of perceived direction of the country taken from the 2002 pre-election interviews (conducted September-November 2002). Respondents were asked
to evaluate the current state of the nation’s economy and its current position in the world as compared to the previous year. The former was assessed on a 5-point scale (1 = *much better*, 5 = *much worse*), and the latter was assessed on a 3-point scale (1 = *weaker*, 3 = *stronger*; reverse scored).\(^9\) (Question wordings and all response options can be found in Appendix B.) Both responses were scored such that higher numbers reflected perceived worsening of the country, standardized to a 0-1 scale, and averaged to create a composite variable (weighted \(M = 0.60, SD = 0.26; r = .28, p < .0001\)).

**Predictor variable.** The primary predictor of interest was a measure of explicit attitudes toward Blacks taken from the 2000 post-election interviews (conducted November-December 2000). (A measure of implicit attitudes toward Blacks was unavailable in this dataset.) Participants responded to a variety of items assessing the underlying construct of explicit attitudes toward Blacks including: a single-item measure of feelings toward Blacks (0 = *cold/disliking*, 100 = *warm/liking*); a single-item measure of perceptions that Blacks have too much political influence (1 = *too much influence*, 3 = *too little influence*); and three items assessing racial stereotypes of Blacks (e.g., 1 = *hardworking*, 7 = *lazy*).\(^{10}\) (Question wordings and all response options can be found in Appendix B.) All responses were scored such that higher numbers reflected more negative attitudes toward Blacks, standardized to a 0-1 scale, and averaged to create a composite variable (weighted \(M = 0.43, SD = 0.17; \alpha = 0.67\)).

\(^9\)Some may note that the questions afforded by these surveys for assessing the construct of “perceived direction of the country” were slightly different from and perhaps less ideal than those used in the previous analyses. Though the reliability of this scale was quite low (\(\alpha = 0.37\)), it nevertheless provided the best opportunity afforded by older ANES data sets to compare the pattern of relationships observed in the Obama administration to those of a previous administration.

\(^{10}\)Note that this explicit prejudice composite did not include the four items from Kinder and Sanders’ (1996) Racial Resentment Scale as originally proposed. This alteration was made in order to better approximate the measure of explicit prejudice used in previous analyses.
**Mediator variable.** The potential mediator variable was a measure of evaluations of former President George W. Bush taken from the 2002 pre-election interviews (conducted September-November 2002). Participants responded to a variety of measures assessing the underlying construct of evaluations of Bush including: a single-item measure of feelings toward him (0 = cold/disliking, 100 = warm/liking) and four measures of job approval (i.e., approval of the way Bush is handling his job as president, the economy, foreign relations, and the war on terrorism; 1 = strongly approve, 4 = strongly disapprove). (Question wordings and all response options can be found in Appendix B.) All responses were scored such that higher numbers reflected more disapproval of Bush, standardized to a 0-1 scale, and averaged to create a composite variable (weighted \( M = 0.36, SD = 0.30; \alpha = 0.91 \)).

**Control variables.** In order to test the unique effects of explicit and implicit racial attitudes on perceived direction of the country, a number of demographic control variables were included in subsequent analyses. These included:

1. *Gender:* This measurement was dummy-coded such that 0 represented males and 1 represented females.
2. *Level of education:* This measurement was assessed in the 2000 pre-election survey. It was coded such that there are five dummy-coded categories: less than high school, high school graduate, some college, college graduate, and graduate work. Each of these was entered into the model, except for “less than high school,” which served as the reference group.
3. *Income:* This measurement was assessed in the 2000 pre-election survey and represented the respondent’s income rather than total household income. It was
coded such that there were five dummy-coded categories: less than $25,000, $25,000-74,999, $75,000-114,999, $115,000-$149,999, and more than $150,000. Each of these was entered into the model, except for “less than $25,000,” which served as the reference group.

4. Age: This measurement refers to the participant’s age at the time of the 2000 election. Given that the minimum voting age is 18, it was recoded such that 0 represented an 18-year old.

**Sampling Weights**

This analysis utilized sampling weights provided by ANES, which are intended to correct for unequal probabilities of selection and nonresponse bias. Specifically, the 2002 pre-election weight was used, because it is applicable to the use of data collected through the 2002 pre-election interviews, and is therefore most appropriate for the data to be used in this analysis.

**Results**

In order to test the hypothesis that there was a non-significant correlation between racial attitudes and policy-related judgments during the early years of President George W. Bush’s administration, perceived direction of the country was regressed on explicit attitudes toward Blacks, as well as the full set of control variables, with the selected weight applied. Contrary to the first hypothesis, explicit prejudice did significantly predict perceived direction of the country ($B = -0.15$, $SE = 0.05$, $t = -3.10$, $p = .002$). Specifically, a more negative attitude toward Blacks was predictive of more positive policy-related judgments under this previous presidential administration.
In order to test the hypothesis that there was a non-significant indirect effect of racial attitudes on policy-related judgments as mediated by evaluations of Bush, two additional weighted regression analyses were conducted and then the Monte Carlo Method for Assessing Mediation (MCMAM; Selig & Preacher, 2009) was utilized to test the significance of the indirect effect. When evaluations of Bush was regressed on explicit attitudes and the full set of control variables and appropriately weighted, explicit prejudice was found to be significantly predictive of more positive evaluations of Bush ($B = -0.37, SE = 0.06, t = -6.86, p < .0001$). Thus, those who held more negative attitudes toward Blacks were more likely to evaluate Bush positively. When perceived direction of the country was regressed on explicit attitudes, evaluations of Bush, and the full set of control variables and appropriately weighted, explicit prejudice was no longer a significant predictor of perceived direction of the country ($B = 0.03, SE = 0.04, t = 0.72, p = 0.47$), while evaluations of Bush was significantly predictive of perceived direction of the country ($B = 0.47, SE = 0.02, t = 20.64, p < .0001$). In other words, while explicit attitudes toward Blacks were no longer associated with policy-related judgments, those with more negative evaluations of Bush were also likely to report more negative policy-related judgments. Using 20,000 repetitions for the simulation, the MCMAM procedure indicated that the indirect effect of explicit attitudes toward Blacks on perceived direction of the country through evaluations of Bush was significant with a point estimate of -0.18 and a 95% confidence interval of -0.23 to -0.13.

Testing Model Assumptions

In fitting the models necessary for this analysis, it was assumed that the residuals were normally distributed. A visual inspection of residual distribution plots for each of
the three regression models fit revealed no flagrant departures from normality. It also was assumed that there was a constant variance in the residuals. In order to test this assumption, scatterplots of both sets of residuals by the predicted values and by the main predictors of interest (i.e., explicit racial attitudes and evaluations of Bush, as appropriate) were created. A visual inspection of these plots revealed a fairly even distribution of the residuals across all values of the predictor. Therefore, it was concluded that the analyses were consistent with the assumptions of normality and homoscedasticity.

Discussion

Evaluating these results in terms of the strictest stated hypotheses, one can see that they are not directly supported. Contrary to expectations, there was a significant relationship between racial attitudes and policy-related judgments and a significant indirect effect of racial attitudes on policy-related judgments as mediated by evaluations of Bush. However, the nature of the relationship between racial attitudes and policy-related judgments was opposite in valence for the Obama administration (Studies 1 and 2) as compared to the Bush administration. In the case of Obama, the more negative one’s attitude toward Blacks, the worse one perceived the country to be doing; while during the Bush administration, the more negative one’s attitude toward Blacks, the better one perceived the country to be doing. Thus, though Obama may not be unique in mediating this significant relationship between racial attitudes and policy-related judgments, he may be unique in the particular pattern of mediation. It is only with Obama that negative racial attitudes negatively impacted policy-related judgments.
CHAPTER 5
GENERAL DISCUSSION

The findings reported here suggest that, rather than having ushered in a post-racial era in American history, the election of Barack Obama may have had the opposite effect, infusing purportedly race-neutral policy issues with negative racial undertones. Study 1 confirmed that those with stronger anti-Black attitudes before the 2008 election voiced more negative policy-related judgments in July 2009 and that this racialization of policy-related issues was mediated by more negative evaluations of Obama. Study 2 demonstrated that the differences in policy-related judgments between those with more positive and more negative attitudes toward Blacks was increasing over time between May 2009 and July 2010 and that this polarization was mediated by more negative evaluations of Obama. Study 3 suggested that, though racial attitudes have been predictive of policy-related judgments under a previous presidential administration, the particular pattern of mediation—specifically, the positive correlation between explicit anti-Black prejudice and disapproval of the president—may be unique to the Obama administration.

Two points bear repeating: First, all three studies utilized nationally representative samples of the American electorate and have been weighted to reflect then-current population demographics. This fact allows for much greater confidence than is afforded by convenience sampling that the population about which inferences are being made is
indeed the whole of American voters and that the effects observed were, and perhaps continue to be, impactful at the national level. Second, the policy-related judgments outcome measure assessed respondents’ views on a variety of issues (e.g., the economy) that, on the face of it, should be uninfluenced by racial attitudes. And yet, the ability of racial attitudes to predict how respondents viewed the country’s direction was a robust finding across all three studies. In short, despite the hopes that were pinned on him by many, Obama has not signaled the beginning of a post-racial era in American history.

These findings have broad applied and theoretical implications, three of which will be discussed here, including how these results speak to the racialization of non-racial policy issues, the prolonged impact of racial attitudes on political attitudes, and the predictive validity of implicit measures. Firstly, these findings seem to lend some credence to the frequently heard assertion that criticisms of President Obama and his policies are rooted in racism. Those with more negative attitudes toward Blacks before the 2008 election were more likely to believe that the country had worsened during the early years of the Obama administration, and this effect was driven, in part, by more negative evaluations of Obama. In other words, when former Republican National Committee Chairman Michael Steele said, “This isn’t about race. It is about policy,” he was only half right. It is about policy differences, and it is about race. Policy views, in the age of Obama, are partially informed by racial attitudes and the effect of those attitudes on evaluations of the nation’s first Black president. These results are consistent with existing research on the influence of prejudicial attitudes in person perception (e.g., Lepore & Brown, 1997; Gawronski et al., 2003) and theories of evaluative and cognitive consistency (e.g., Heider, 1946, 1958): Those with higher levels of anti-Black prejudice
may be more likely to access and apply negative racial stereotypes when encountering information about President Obama, and having formed a negative impression of him, the need for consistency dictates that those individuals would also more negatively evaluate Obama’s actions and policy positions. That racial attitudes would be expressed as policy-related attitudes is also consistent with the predictions of aversive racism theory (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986; Dovidio & Gaertner, 2004): It may be that the desire to suppress any displays of overt racism leads some members of the American electorate to channel their negative feelings toward the nation’s first Black president into more socially acceptable criticisms, such as disapproval of the policies with which he is strongly associated (e.g., health care reform).

Secondly, the observed increase in the difference of public opinion between those with more positive and those with more negative attitudes toward Blacks is striking not only in that it confirms what many have speculated about growing polarization in the American electorate, but also in that it can be explained, in part, by the prolonged impact of racial attitudes on political attitudes. To remind, in the Study 2 analyses, it was shown that attitudes toward Blacks measured in September and October 2008 predicted not only individuals’ judgments about how the country was faring months later, but also how those judgments were changing over the course of a 14-month period. The lengthy timeframe over which these findings extend is quite remarkable when one considers the number of intervening events that potentially could have weakened the ability of the racial attitudes measures to predict subsequent judgments. Between September 2008 (the time at which the first racial attitudes measures were taken) and May 2009 (the time at which evaluations of Obama and the first policy-related judgment measures were taken),
Barack Obama was elected to and assumed the presidency; ordered the closure of the Guantánamo Bay prison; outlined his energy policy; signed into law the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act; met with various foreign leaders including former British prime minister Gordon Brown, Russian president Dmitry Medvedev, and members of the Turkish parliament; and gifted his young daughters with a dog they named Bo. In that same time period, throughout the U.S., people were grappling with record high unemployment, government bail-outs of large corporations, the growing threat of the swine flu public health emergency, and a public debate over same-sex marriage.

These non-exhaustive lists are meant simply to illustrate the sheer number of intervening events happening at the national level, not to mention the many personal and local factors, that could have informed respondents’ judgments about the direction of the country. One might naively assume that, with the passage of time and Obama’s prominence on the national stage, members of the American electorate would update their opinions of him such that more recent events overshadowed the impact of his race. And yet, explicit and implicit attitudes toward Blacks continued to be a strong predictor of public opinion. These findings are consistent with the predictions of social judgment theory (see Eagly & Chaiken, 1993): It may be that racially informed evaluations of Obama were leading to biased construals of subsequent information about him such that the original evaluations were not only reinforced but strengthened such that they became more extreme. And, given the robust link between evaluations of Obama and policy-related judgments, it is to be expected that judgments of how the country is faring would follow the same polarizing path. Viewed from this perspective, if racial attitudes served
as a key factor in establishing initial attitudes toward Obama, they would, in a sense, influence every subsequent evaluation as well, making it perhaps less surprising that these measures would maintain their strength and be able to predict the trajectory of a political attitude over time.

Thirdly, Studies 1 and 2 are noteworthy in that they address frequently expressed concerns regarding and further establish the unique predictive validity of implicit measures. Across both studies, an implicit measure of prejudice—the affect misattribution procedure (AMP; Payne et al., 2005)—predicted the same patterns of effects as an explicit measure of prejudice: higher initial levels of perceived worsening of the country and increased worsening over time. Further, it remained a significant predictor even when controlling for explicit prejudice. In other words, an implicit measure contributed a unique, additive effect above and beyond an explicit measure in predicting policy-related judgments and the polarized pattern of change of those judgments over time. Though some critics (e.g., Arkes & Tetlock, 2004; Tetlock & Mitchell, 2008) have questioned the value of implicit measures, the findings reported here provide additional confirmation that implicit measures are not inferior to explicit ones in capturing “real” prejudice. They have once again been shown to be predictive of a consequential real-world behavior, as these effects were observed in a representative sample of the American electorate and on the meaningful outcome measure of public opinion (see Page & Shapiro, 1983; Manza & Cook, 2001). Further, given that implicit measures capture additional variance not explained by explicit measures and are not subject to the same self-presentational concerns and lack of introspective access that can
dilute explicit measures, they may be considered even more appropriate than explicit measures for the exploration of socially sensitive topics such as prejudice.

In addition to addressing these concerns over whether implicit measures predict meaningful discriminatory behaviors, these findings also inform existing social cognitive theoretical models. As mentioned previously, past research has demonstrated that explicit and implicit measures of prejudice predict different types of social behavior. Explicit measures have been shown to predict deliberate or controlled behaviors, while implicit measures have been better predictors of spontaneous or uncontrolled behaviors (Dovidio et al., 2002; Fazio et al., 1995; McConnell & Leibold, 2001; Hofmann et al., 2008). However, in these studies, it was shown that both explicit and implicit measures of prejudice independently and uniquely predicted policy-related judgments, which suggests that political attitudes are jointly driven by two types of processes, some of which are subject to the individual’s conscious control and others that are not. And, when one considers the messiness of the real world—the myriad contributions to one’s attitudes, the news sources sought or shunned, the conversations initiated or avoided and with whom, and so on—it makes intuitive sense that both conscious intentions and unchecked impulses ultimately would be decisive influences on one’s attitudes and how they could be expected to change over time.

**Future Directions**

One avenue of future research is to explore the role of potential moderators in the relationship between racial attitudes and policy-related judgments. Certain individual difference variables, such as political party affiliation, have been excluded from the present analyses in hopes of providing the most straightforward test of the racialization
and polarization hypotheses. However, it may be that the effects of racial prejudice on political attitudes are augmented for some people. For example, perhaps those who did not strongly identify with a political party prior to the 2008 election were more likely to be influenced by their racial attitudes in evaluating Obama and his policies than those who did strongly identify with a party and were, therefore, more likely to view him through the lens of political affiliation. Such analyses would be interesting not only from an applied perspective, but also in their ability to inform existing social cognitive theory, particularly if the unique effects of potential moderators on both explicit and implicit measures of prejudice are considered. Further, the incorporation of such individual difference variables into the multilevel models may provide an opportunity to explain additional between-person variance in intercepts and slopes that is not accounted for by the current set of demographic control and racial attitudes variables.

An additional outstanding question remains whether the differences in effects observed in data collected during the Obama versus Bush administrations might be attributed alternatively to the differences in views toward a Democratic and a Republican administration, respectively. Though the non-significant effect of Clinton (Study 1) makes this alternative interpretation less likely, it may be that Clinton’s role as Secretary of State in the Obama administration was not viewed by the American electorate as powerful enough to effect the direction of the country, thereby precluding her from serving a mediating role. Therefore, future research should explore whether a White Democratic presidential administration (e.g., that of former President Bill Clinton) presents a pattern of relationships among racial attitudes, presidential evaluations, and
policy-related judgments that is more similar to that of the Obama administration or the Bush administration.

Finally, given the polarization findings and what they suggest about the prolonged impact of racial attitudes on political attitudes, it would be worthwhile to explore whether a recursive function exists between racial and political attitudes. It may be that while racial attitudes are influencing evaluations of Obama and his policies, those political judgments are in turn influencing subsequent racial attitudes. In other words, we know that attitudes toward Blacks are influencing how one views Obama; but, are evaluations of Obama feeding back into and influencing how one feels toward Blacks in general? An analysis that simultaneously accounted for changes in racial attitudes and evaluations of Obama and his administration’s governance would best be able to address such a question and inform our understanding of the seemingly blurred boundary between racial and political attitudes in the current context.
CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

These findings suggest that racial attitudes have continued to play a substantial role in today’s political climate. The unique racial lens through which President Obama is viewed has allowed the racial attitudes of the American electorate to inform not only how they evaluate the president, but also their views of how they are being governed. Further, these racial attitudes appear to be driving increasing polarization of the American electorate, as those who differ in their racial attitudes also grow more and more divergent in their opinions of how the country is faring. Critically, these effects were observed independently for both explicit and implicit measures of prejudice, which suggests that racial attitudes may be influencing political judgments at two levels: in ways that are both carefully considered and uncontrolled by those who hold them.
### TABLES

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<tr>
<th>Perceived Direction (Worsening) of the Country</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
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<tr>
<td>May 2009</td>
<td>2133</td>
<td>3.57</td>
<td>0.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 2009</td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>3.56</td>
<td>0.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 2010</td>
<td>1281</td>
<td>3.59</td>
<td>0.76</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1. Average values (on a 5-point scale) for perceived direction of the country at each time point included in Study 2.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fixed effect estimates:</th>
<th>Null Model</th>
<th>Growth Model</th>
<th>Model 1 Controls Only</th>
<th>Model 2 Explicit and Controls</th>
<th>Model 3 Implicit and Controls</th>
<th>Model 4 Both and Controls</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>3.573*</td>
<td>3.567*</td>
<td>3.624*</td>
<td>3.189*</td>
<td>3.549*</td>
<td>3.18*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time</td>
<td>.003</td>
<td>-.015</td>
<td>-.066*</td>
<td>-.027</td>
<td>-.064*</td>
<td>-.064*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explicit prejudice</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.793*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.731*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time x Explicit</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.096*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.078*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implicit prejudice</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.297*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.139*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time x Implicit</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.058*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.041*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Random effects:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within-person variance estimate (Level 1 residuals), $\hat{\sigma}^2$</td>
<td>.154*</td>
<td>.123*</td>
<td>.123*</td>
<td>.123*</td>
<td>.123*</td>
<td>.123*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initial value (intercepts), $\hat{\tau}_{00}$</td>
<td>.245*ab</td>
<td>.216*</td>
<td>.207*</td>
<td>.189*</td>
<td>.202*</td>
<td>.188*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Growth rate (slopes), $\hat{\tau}_{11}$</td>
<td>.003*</td>
<td>.003*</td>
<td>.002*</td>
<td>.002*</td>
<td>.002*</td>
<td>.002*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Covariance among the intercepts and slopes, $\hat{\tau}_{10}$</td>
<td>.008*</td>
<td>.008*</td>
<td>.006*</td>
<td>.007*</td>
<td>.005*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variance Explained:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within-person variance$^c$</td>
<td>20.13%</td>
<td>20.13%</td>
<td>20.20%</td>
<td>20.11%</td>
<td>20.17%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initial value (intercepts), $\hat{\tau}_{00}$ $^d$</td>
<td>4.16%</td>
<td>12.19%</td>
<td>6.47%</td>
<td>12.66%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Growth rate (slopes), $\hat{\tau}_{11}$ $^d$</td>
<td>5.20%</td>
<td>13.41%</td>
<td>11.80%</td>
<td>16.55%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* $p < .05$

a These variance estimates are *unconditional*, i.e., not contingent on any predictor variables.
b This estimate represents the total between-person variance.
c As compared to the null model.
d As compared to the unconditional growth model.

Table 2. Study 2 results of weighted multilevel models assessing predictors for perceived direction of the country and the rate of change of perceived direction of the country.
Table 3. Study 2 mediation analysis, Step 2 results. Regression analysis simultaneously assessing the effects of explicit and implicit racial prejudice on evaluations of Obama.

* \( p \leq .05 \), ** \( p \leq .01 \), *** \( p \leq .0001 \)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter Estimates</th>
<th>Model Fit in Step 2 of Mediation Analyses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Model-implied average disapproval of Obama</td>
<td>.106*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effect of explicit racial prejudice on disapproval of Obama</td>
<td>.554**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effect of implicit racial prejudice on disapproval of Obama</td>
<td>.089**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 4. Study 2 mediation analysis, Step 3 results. Multilevel model simultaneously assessing the effects of explicit and implicit racial prejudice and evaluations of Obama, as well as the full set of control variables, on perceived direction (worsening) of the country.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome: Perceived Direction (Worsening) of the Country</th>
<th>Model Fit in Step 3 of Mediation Analyses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fixed effect estimates:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>3.062***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time</td>
<td>-.075**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explicit prejudice</td>
<td>.055</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time x Explicit</td>
<td>.034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implicit prejudice</td>
<td>.025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time x Implicit</td>
<td>.030*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluations of Obama</td>
<td>1.22***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time x Obama</td>
<td>.083***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Random effects:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within-person variance estimate (Level 1 residuals), $\sigma^2$</td>
<td>.123*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initial value (intercepts), $\hat{\tau}_{00}$</td>
<td>.111*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Growth rate (slopes), $\hat{\tau}_{11}$</td>
<td>.002*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Covariance among the intercepts and slopes, $\hat{\tau}_{10}$</td>
<td>.0001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variance Explained:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within-person variance</td>
<td>19.97%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initial value (intercepts), $\hat{\tau}_{00}$</td>
<td>48.48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Growth rate (slopes), $\hat{\tau}_{11}$</td>
<td>30.21%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* $p \leq .05$, ** $p \leq .01$, *** $p \leq .0001$
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indirect Effects</th>
<th>Point estimate ((\hat{a} \times \hat{b}))</th>
<th>95% Confidence Interval</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Of explicit racial prejudice on initial value of perceived direction via evaluations of Obama</td>
<td>0.6763</td>
<td>0.5546  to  0.8025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Of implicit racial prejudice on initial value of perceived direction via evaluations of Obama</td>
<td>0.1089</td>
<td>0.03862  to  0.1807</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Of explicit racial prejudice on rate of change of perceived direction via evaluations of Obama</td>
<td>0.0460</td>
<td>0.031  to  0.06183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Of implicit racial prejudice on rate of change of perceived direction via evaluations of Obama</td>
<td>0.0074</td>
<td>0.002501  to  0.01317</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5: Study 2 tests of indirect effects.
Figure 1: Study 1 mediation analysis assessing the impact of racial attitudes on policy-related judgments via evaluations of Obama. Parentheses contain the standard error estimates.

Explicit: \( = .56^{***} (.03) \)
Implicit: \( = .11^{***} (.02) \)

Explicit: \( = .98^{***} (.08) \)
Implicit: \( = .20^{**} (.06) \)

Explicit: \( = .24^{**} (.08) \)
Implicit: \( = .05 (.05) \)

* \( p \leq .05 \), ** \( p \leq .01 \), *** \( p \leq .0001 \)
Figure 2. Sample of individual model-implied trajectories for perceived direction of the country responses over time.
### Element Interpretation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Element</th>
<th>Interpretation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The total (direct) effect of explicit racial prejudice on perceived direction of the country in May 2009</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The direct effect of explicit racial prejudice on the rate of change of perceived direction of the country</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The total (direct) effect of implicit racial prejudice on perceived direction of the country in May 2009</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The direct effect of implicit racial prejudice on the rate of change of perceived direction of the country</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The effect of explicit racial prejudice on disapproval of Obama</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The effect of implicit racial prejudice on disapproval of Obama</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The effect of disapproval of Obama on perceived direction of the country in May 2009</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The effect of disapproval of Obama on the rate of change in perceived direction of the country</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3. Study 2 mediation model. Results reported correspond to Model 4 assessing the simultaneous influence of explicit and implicit racial attitudes on perceived direction (worsening) of the country via evaluations of Obama. Parentheses contain the standard error estimates. * $p \leq .05$, ** $p \leq .01$, *** $p \leq .0001$
Figure 4. Conditional simple slopes for perceived direction of the country over time at three levels of explicit prejudice: high (+1 SD), medium (mean), and low (-1 SD). Based on Study 2, Model 4 estimates.
Figure 5. Conditional simple slopes for perceived direction of the country over time at three levels of implicit prejudice: high (+1 SD), medium (mean), and low (-1 SD). Based on Study 2, Model 4 estimates.
Outcome Variable – Perceived Direction of the Country:

- Compared to January 2009, would you say the following is now (much better, somewhat better, about the same, somewhat worse, or much worse / much worse, somewhat worse, about the same, somewhat better, or much better)?
  *(Note: The orders of items and response options were randomized.)*

  __ Much better [1]
  __ Somewhat better [2]
  __ About the same [3]
  __ Somewhat worse [4]
  __ Much worse [5]

  **Target of Judgment**
  Our relations with foreign countries
  The federal budget deficit
  Health care in the U.S.
  Poverty in the U.S.

- Now thinking about the economy in the country as a whole, would you say that as compared to January 2009, the nation's economy is now better, about the same, or worse?

  __ Better [1]
  __ Much better or somewhat better?
    __ Much better [1]
    __ Somewhat better [2]
  __ About the same [2]

  __ Worse [3]
  __ Much worse or somewhat worse?
    __ Much worse [1]
    __ Somewhat worse [2]

Predictor Variable – Explicit Attitudes toward Blacks:

- Do you feel warm, cold, or neither warm nor cold toward blacks (whites)?

  __ Warm [1]
  __ Do you feel (extremely warm, moderately warm, or a little warm / a little warm, moderately warm, or extremely warm) toward blacks (whites)?
    __ Extremely warm [1]
__ Moderately warm [2]
__ A little warm [3]

__ Cold [2]

Do you feel (extremely cold, moderately cold, or a little cold / a little cold, moderately cold, or extremely cold) toward blacks (whites)?
__ Extremely cold [1]
__ Moderately cold [2]
__ A little cold [3]

__ Neither warm nor cold [3]

• How often have you felt sympathy for blacks? (Always, most of the time, about half the time, once in a while, or never / Never, once in a while, about half the time, most of the time, or always)?

__ Always [1]
__ Most of the time [2]
__ About half the time [3]
__ Once in a while [4]
__ Never [5]

• How often have you felt admiration for blacks? (Always, most of the time, about half the time, once in a while, or never / Never, once in a while, about half the time, most of the time, or always)?

__ Always [1]
__ Most of the time [2]
__ About half the time [3]
__ Once in a while [4]
__ Never [5]

• Would you say that blacks have too much influence in American politics, just about the right amount of influence in American politics, or too little influence in American politics? (R)

__ Too much influence [1]
__ Just about the right amount of influence [2]
__ Too little influence [3]

Mediator Variable – Evaluations of Obama:
• Do you like Barack Obama, dislike him, or neither like nor dislike him?

__ Like [1]
Do you like him (a great deal, a moderate amount, or a little / a little, a moderate amount, or a great deal)?
__ A great deal [1]
__ A moderate amount [2]
__ A little [3]

__ Dislike [2]
Do you dislike him (a great deal, a moderate amount, or a little / a little, a moderate amount, or a great deal)?
__ A great deal [1]
__ A moderate amount [2]
__ A little [3]

__ Neither like nor dislike [3]

- When you think about Barack Obama, how (emotional response) does he make you feel? (Extremely (emotional response), very (emotional response), moderately (emotional response), slightly (emotional response), or not (emotional response) at all? / Not (emotional response) at all, slightly (emotional response), moderately (emotional response), very (emotional response), or extremely (emotional response)?)

__ Extremely (emotional response) [1]
__ Very (emotional response) [2]
__ Moderately (emotional response) [3]
__ Slightly (emotional response) [4]
__ Not (emotional response) at all [5]

Emotional Responses
Angry (R)
Hopeful
Afraid (R)
Proud

- Are you happy, unhappy, or neither happy nor unhappy that Barack Obama won the election for President?

__ Happy [1]
Are you (extremely happy, moderately happy, or slightly happy / slightly happy, moderately happy, or extremely happy) that Barack Obama won the election for President?
__ Extremely happy [1]
__ Moderately happy [2]
__ Slightly happy [3]

__ Unhappy [2]
Are you (extremely unhappy, moderately unhappy, or slightly unhappy / slightly unhappy, moderately unhappy, or extremely unhappy) that Barack Obama won the election for president?
__ Extremely unhappy [1]
__ Moderately unhappy [2]
__ Slightly unhappy [3]
__ Neither happy nor unhappy [3]

• Do you approve, disapprove, or neither approve nor disapprove of the way Barack Obama is handling (target item)?

__ Approve [1]
   Do you approve (extremely strongly, moderately strongly, or slightly strongly / slightly strongly, moderately strongly, or extremely strongly)?
   __ Extremely strongly [1]
   __ Moderately strongly [2]
   __ Slightly strongly [3]

__ Disapprove [2]
   Do you disapprove (extremely strongly, moderately strongly, or slightly strongly / slightly strongly, moderately strongly, or extremely strongly)?
   __ Extremely strongly [1]
   __ Moderately strongly [2]
   __ Slightly strongly [3]

__ Neither approve nor disapprove [3]

Target of Judgment
His job as president
The economy
Our relations with foreign countries
The federal government’s budget deficit
The war in Iraq
The effort to reduce the risk of terrorist attacks in the United States
The war in Afghanistan
Education in the U.S.
Health care in the U.S.
The environment

Alternative Potential Mediator Variable – Evaluations of Hillary Clinton:
• Do you like Hillary Clinton, dislike her, or neither like nor dislike her?

__ Like [1]
Do you like her (a great deal, a moderate amount, or a little / a little, a moderate amount, or a great deal)?
   __ A great deal [1]
   __ A moderate amount [2]
   __ A little [3]

   __ Dislike [2]
   Do you dislike her (a great deal, a moderate amount, or a little / a little, a moderate amount, or a great deal)?
   __ A great deal [1]
   __ A moderate amount [2]
   __ A little [3]

   __ Neither like nor dislike [3]
APPENDIX B: SURVEY ITEMS DRAWN FROM THE ANES 2000 AND 2002 TIME SERIES STUDIES

Outcome Variable – Perceived Direction of the Country:

- Now thinking about the economy in the country as a whole, would you say that over the past year the nation's economy has gotten BETTER, STAYED ABOUT THE SAME, or gotten WORSE?

  1. Better  
  3. Same  
  5. Worse  
  D. Don't Know  
  R. Refused

  (Would you say) MUCH [better/worse] or SOMewhat [better/worse]?

  1. Much Better  
  2. Somewhat Better  
  4. Somewhat Worse  
  5. Much Worse  
  D. Don't Know  
  R. Refused

- Turning to some other issues facing the country. During the past year, would you say that the United States' position in the world has grown WEAKER, STAYED ABOUT THE SAME, or has it grown STRONGER?

  1. Weaker  
  3. Stayed about the Same  
  5. Stronger  
  D. Don't Know  
  R. Refused

Predictor Variable – Explicit Attitudes toward Blacks:

- I’d like to get your feelings toward some of our political leaders and other people who are in the news these days. I’ll read the name of a person and I’d like you to rate that person using something we call the feeling thermometer. The feeling thermometer can rate people from 0 to 100 degrees. Ratings between 50 degrees and 100 degrees mean that you feel favorable and warm toward the person. Ratings between 0 degrees and 50 degrees mean that you don’t feel favorable toward the person. Rating the person at the midpoint, the 50 degree mark, means you don’t feel particularly warm or cold toward the person. If we come to a person whose name you don’t recognize, you don’t need to rate that person. Just tell me and we’ll move on to the next one... Still using the thermometer, how would you rate Blacks?
Some people think that certain groups have too much influence in American life and politics, while other people feel that certain groups don't have as much influence as they deserve. I am going to read you a list of groups, for each one please tell me whether that group has too much influence, just about the right amount of influence or too little influence… What about Blacks? Would you say they have too much influence, just about the right amount of influence, or too little influence?

Assessing Racial Stereotypes

Imagine a seven-point scale on which the characteristics of the people in a group can be rated. In the first question a score of 1 means that you think almost all of the people in that group tend to be “hard-working.” A score of 7 means that you think most people in the group are “lazy.” A score of 4 means that you think that most people in the group are not closer to one end or the other, and of course, you may choose any number in between. Where would you rate blacks on a scale of 1 to 7? (where 1 indicates hard working, 7 means lazy, and 4 indicates most blacks are not closer to one end or the other.)

1 Hardworking
2
3
4
5
6
7 Lazy
8 Don’t Know

Again, please imagine a seven-point scale on which the characteristics of the people in a group can be rated. A score of 1 means that you think almost all of the people in that group tend to be “intelligent.” A score of 7 means that you think most people in the group are “unintelligent.” A score of 4 means that you think that most people in the group are not closer to one end or the other, and of course, you may choose any number in between. Where would you rate blacks on a scale of 1 to 7? (where 1 indicates intelligent, 7 means unintelligent, and 4 indicates most blacks are not closer to one end or the other.)

1 Intelligent
2
3
4
5
6
7 Unintelligent
8 Don’t Know
Thinking about trustworthiness as a general group characteristic, please imagine a seven point scale again. A score of 1 means that you think almost all of the people in that group tend to be trustworthy. A score of 7 means that you think most people in the group are untrustworthy. A score of 4 means that you think that most people in the group are not closer to one end or the other, and of course, you may choose any number in between. Where would you rate blacks on a scale of 1 to 7? (where 1 indicates trustworthy, 7 means untrustworthy, and 4 indicates most blacks are not closer to one end or the other.)

1. Trustworthy
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7. Untrustworthy
8. Don’t Know

Potential Mediator Variable – Evaluations of Bush

- Do you APPROVE or DISAPPROVE of the way George W. Bush is HANDLING (target of judgment)?

  1. Approve
  5. Disapprove
  D. Don't Know
  R. Refused

  (Do you [approve/disapprove]) STRONGLY or NOT STRONGLY?
  1. Strongly
  5. Not Strongly
  D. Don't Strongly
  R. Refused

Target of Judgment
His job as president
Our relations with foreign countries
The economy
The war on terrorism

- I'd like to get your feelings toward some people in the news these days. I'll read the name of a person and I'll ask you to rate that person on a thermometer that runs from 0 to 100 degrees. Rating above 50 means that you feel favorable and warm toward the person. Rating below 50 means that you feel unfavorable and cool toward the person. Rating right at the 50 degree mark means you don't feel particularly warm or cold.
You may use any number from 0 to 100 to tell me how favorable or unfavorable your feelings are. If we come to a person whose name you don't recognize, just tell me and we'll move on to the next one. The first person is: George W. Bush. Where on that thermometer would you rate George W. Bush?

0-100.
997. Don't Recognize
998. Don't Know where to rate
R. Refused
REFERENCES


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