INTRA-PARTY DISSENT OVER EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

Erica Elizabeth Edwards

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Approved by:
Gary Marks
Liesbet Hooghe
Marco Steenbergen
John D. Stephens
Bernhard Weßels
ABSTRACT

Erica Elizabeth Edwards: Intra-Party Dissent Over European Integration
(Under the direction of Gary Marks)

European integration is the single most divisive issue within European political parties. The post-Maastricht movement of the EU from the economic realm strongly into the political realm has galvanized political systems and has provoked deep tensions inside major parties, most recently within the French Socialists and the Dutch VVD. Despite its substantive importance, the theme of intra-party dissent has managed to skirt scholarly attention. This is particularly true with regards to divisions over European integration. Studies have typically focused on national party positioning on EU issues and on conflicts among political parties on European matters, leaving dissent within parties on the backbenches of the academic agenda. In this dissertation, I explore the nature, causes, and consequences of intra-party dissent over European integration. In particular, I address the following questions: How can one explain the variability of internal party dissent across countries, across party families, and across time? What are the consequences of this dissent for individual parties and, more broadly, for national party systems?
TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES .................................................................................................................................................. vii
LIST OF FIGURES .............................................................................................................................................. viii

Chapter

I. UNITED WE STAND? INTRA-PARTY DISSENT OVER EUROPEAN INTEGRATION .............................................. 1
   Introduction ...................................................................................................................................................... 1
   Measuring Intra-Party Dissent ....................................................................................................................... 3
   Explaining Intra-Party Dissent ...................................................................................................................... 9
      Electoral System ...................................................................................................................................... 10
      Strategic Competition ............................................................................................................................... 11
      Party Position Change .............................................................................................................................. 13
      Cleavage Theory .................................................................................................................................. 15
   Data and Methods ...................................................................................................................................... 17
   Empirical Analysis ...................................................................................................................................... 20
   Conclusion .................................................................................................................................................. 23

II. PRODUCTS OF THEIR PAST? CLEAVAGES AND INTRA-PARTY DISSENT .......................................................... 26
   Introduction .................................................................................................................................................. 26
   A Cleavage Theory of Intra-Party Dissent .................................................................................................... 27
   Hypothesizing Variation Among and Within Party Families ................................................................. 30
IV. TAKING EUROPE TO ITS EXTREMES:
EXTREMIST PARTIES AND PUBLIC EUROSKÉPTICISM ..........90

Introduction ......................................................................................................90
Extremist Parties and Public Euroskepticism: Hypotheses ......................92
Party Euroskepticism: Concept and Measurement .......................................98
Data, Operationalization, and Method ..........................................................102
Empirical Analysis ........................................................................................110
Conclusion .....................................................................................................116

V. THE IMPACT OF EU ISSUE SALIENCE AND
INTA-PARTY DISSENT ON EU ISSUE VOTING ..........118

Introduction ....................................................................................................118
EU Issue Voting ............................................................................................120
The Impact of EU Issue Salience and Intra-Party Dissent ......................121
EU Issue Salience ................................................................................121
Intra-Party Dissent ...............................................................................124
Data, Operationalization, and Method .........................................................126
Results ..........................................................................................................131
Conclusion ...................................................................................................134

APPENDICES .....................................................................................................136
Appendix 1A ...............................................................................................136
Appendix 1B ...............................................................................................137
Appendix 1C ...............................................................................................139
Appendix 3A ...............................................................................................140

REFERENCES .....................................................................................................142
LIST OF TABLES

Table

1.1 Variable description (chapter 1) .................................................................20
1.2 Analysis of intra-party dissent over European integration, 1996-2002 ..........21
2.1 Summary scores of index of cleavage tension ...........................................53
2.2 Variable description (chapter 2) .................................................................58
2.3 Analysis of intra-party dissent over European integration, 2002 .................59
3.1 Mass-elite linkages and the EU – simple model .......................................81
3.2 Mass-elite linkages and electoral context ..................................................83
3.3 Mass-elite linkages and party (system) attributes .......................................84
3.4 Mass-elite linkages and opinion leadership ..............................................86
4.1 Euroskeptic rightwing parties .................................................................101
4.2 Euroskeptic leftwing parties .................................................................101
4.3 Variable description (chapter 4) ...............................................................107
4.4 Analysis of variance .................................................................................110
4.5 Determinants of Euroskepticism (multilevel analysis) ...............................112
5.1 Extent of EU issue voting by level of salience ...........................................132
5.2 Extent of EU issue voting by level of intra-party dissent ...........................133
LIST OF FIGURES

Figure

1.1 Distribution of parties by intra-party dissent over European integration ........8
1.2 Variation in intra-party dissent, 1983-2002 ..............................................9
2.1 Distribution of parties by intra-party dissent, broken down by party family (1996-2002) .................................................................47
2.2 Distribution of parties by intra-party dissent, broken down by party family sub-group (1996-2002) .........................................................50
4.1 Cueing effect of rightwing Euroskeptic parties on national identity ........114
4.2 Cueing effect of leftwing Euroskeptic parties on economic anxiety ........115
European integration is the single most divisive issue within national political parties. The post-Maastricht movement of the European Union (EU) from the economic realm strongly into the political realm has provoked deep tensions inside major parties, thereby galvanizing entire political systems. While some may contend that such a statement is exaggerated and perhaps even alarmist, events leading up to the 2005 French and Dutch referendums on the European Constitution point to the disruptive potential of the EU issue for political parties. Indeed, what was most striking about both constitutional campaigns was not the debate incited among political parties, or even in the mass public for that matter, but rather the schisms ignited within political parties. So high was the level of discord in the French Parti Socialiste (PS) that not even an internal vote by members to decide the official party stance could quell overt dissent. The infighting, which pitted former Prime Minister Laurent Fabius (head of the No campaign) against PS Secretariat-General François Hollande (head of the Yes campaign), not only left left-wing voters without a clear signal as they stepped into the ballot box but also reactivated old debates among top-level elites about how to define the party’s core ideology (Ivaldi, 2006: 51). The consequence of internal dissent for the Dutch Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie (VVD) was no less devastating, as Geert
Wilders’s outspoken opposition to the European project (and particularly Turkey’s bid for EU membership) prompted his successful split from the VVD. His newly formed *Partij voor de Vrijheid* (PVV) gained nine seats in the November 2006 parliamentary elections, seats that presumably would have gone to the VVD had the party not lost part of its support base with the departure of Wilder.

Despite its clear substantive importance, the theme of intra-party dissent has managed to skirt scholarly attention. This is particularly true with regards to divisions over European integration. Studies have typically focused on national party positioning on EU issues and on conflicts *among* political parties on European matters, relegating dissent *within* parties to the backbenches of the academia. This is somewhat surprising given that the fiercest competition often occurs inside parties, as they try to squash dissent on problematic issues such as the EU (Taggart, 1998; Mair, 2000; Hooghe et al., 2004).

This article fills a lacuna in the scholarly literature and refines previous work on party positioning by investigating the relatively unexplored issue of intra-party dissent. More specifically, I consider the following questions: what are the nature and causes of intra-party dissent on European issues, and how can we explain the variability of this dissent across countries and across parties? In addressing these questions, the study makes several key contributions. First, it compiles data from a series of expert surveys to develop a quantitative measure of dissent within political parties on EU-related matters spanning from 1984 to 2002 (Ray, 1999a; Marks and Steenbergen, 1999; Hooghe et al., 2006). Second, it demonstrates that there is large variation in intra-party dissent across parties and that this dissent has increased since the 1980s. And finally, the article
provides a model to account for this variation. I conclude that three factors – type of electoral system, changes in party position on the EU, and a party’s historical legacies and programmatic commitments – all have a bearing on the degree of dissent that a political party is likely to experience.

The article develops as follows. I begin in section two with a discussion of how to effectively quantify internal dissent at the party leadership level and proceed to introduce a cross-national measure of intra-party dissent on European integration spanning from 1984-2002. Next, I offer an overview of variation in intra-party dissent, demonstrating that there is considerable variation at the country and party levels. In the following step, I elaborate four plausible explanations of internal dissent. I present the data and statistical method used to analyze internal party dissent in section five, while the sixth step considers the results from the empirical analysis. Finally, I conclude by drawing out the implications of these findings for future research on the subject.

Measuring Intra-Party Dissent

Sources of quantitative data on internal party dissent over EU issues are rare. While the past several decades have been characterized by a flurry of studies on the issue positioning of political parties, the methods for data gathering most often used are not particularly amenable to determining dissent within parties. Consider, for example, the most prominent data source on the positioning of political parties – party manifestos (Budge et al., 2001). These texts are of little use in deciphering internal dissent, as parties are highly unlikely to ‘air their dirty laundry’, so to speak, in a strategic document designed to garner votes. Indeed, some parties may even choose to omit certain divisive
issues from their manifestos altogether. In either case, party manifestos give us little purchase on intra-party dissent.

Dimensional analysis of mass survey data and roll-call votes, two additional methods commonly employed to determine the positions of political parties, are also ineffective for scholars interested in dissent – at least at the party leadership level. With regard to the former, the most common survey design asks respondents to position themselves on a policy preference scale. While this information can be used to infer the mean position of the party’s electorate and consequently dissent within the electorate on an issue, it provides no information on the party leadership itself.

Similarly, though analysing the voting records of individual legislators would seem to provide an easy and straightforward measure of intra-party dissent, particularly since the information is readily available to the public, such votes are more a measure of lack of party discipline in the legislature than of disagreement amongst the party leadership. The institutional environment (i.e. the rules of the game) inside the legislature combined with the potential electoral costs of party disunity provide powerful incentives for individual members of parliament (MPs) to tow the party line. As Kitschelt notes, “the uniformity of legislative roll-call voting conduct among representatives of the same party…may be a matter of organisational coercion more than of programmatic commitment” (2000: 859). Moreover, since not all votes within a given national legislature are taken by role call, this method paints only a partial picture MP voting behaviour.

Given the limitations of party manifestos, mass survey data, and roll-call votes, expert surveys provide a useful method for determining dissent within political parties at
the leadership level. Expert surveys are an increasingly popular mechanism for measuring policy positions of political parties (Castles and Mair, 1984; Huber and Inglehart, 1995; Laver and Hunt, 1992; Ray, 1999a; Marks and Steenbergen, 1999; Benoit and Laver, 2006). And the unique virtues of this method makes it particularly well suited for assessing levels of internal party dissent. In their cross-validation study of party positioning on European integration, Marks et al. (2007: 26) point to three strengths of expert surveys: direct quantification (experts make evaluations using a structured scale), flexibility (researchers are able to gather information on any topic, not merely those appearing in party manifestos), and validity (experts employ a variety of sources of information – party behaviour, MP opinions, official documents). The latter two are most important with regard to uncovering dissent, as they make it possible for researchers to ask the tough questions and to elicit accurate responses. The flexibility of the expert survey methodology enables researchers to inquire about some of the more unseemly topics, such as dissent, that are unlikely to appear in formal party documents. Moreover, the array of information that experts bring to bear when making judgments, i.e. the fact that they consider not only what party leaders say but also what they do (Mair, 2001), allows them more fully to ascertain what is really going on within political parties, thereby increasing the validity of their assessments. In other words, expert surveys are more likely to yield an accurate measure of the phenomenon of intra-party dissent because it considerably more difficult for party leaders to hide their skeletons when experts are rummaging through all of the closets.

This article brings together data stemming from three rounds of expert surveys carried out in 1996, 1999, and 2002 by researchers at the University of North Carolina in
Chapel Hill (Ray, 1999a; Marks and Steenbergen, 1999; Hooghe et al., 2002). All three data projects entailed expert surveys on the orientations of national political parties towards European integration and tapped dissent within political parties on EU issues. Given the high congruence among the three questionnaires, I am able to merge the data into one series with six time-points – 1984, 1988, 1992, 1996, 1999, and 2002.

I measure intra-party dissent by relying on two questions asking country experts to evaluate the overall level of dissent on European integration within national political parties on a five-point (for 1984-99) and a ten-point (for 2002) scale. To ease comparison over time, I have converted all responses to a ten-point scale. Thus, internal dissent is operationalized as the mean expert score along a ten-point scale with lower scores indicating minor levels of dissent and higher scores indicating greater levels of dissent. The standard deviation of the expert judgments allows us to assess the reliability of the data. These standard deviations range from 1.12 in 1988 to 1.61 in 2002, which is comparable to the levels of expert agreements reported in other expert surveys (e.g. Huber and Inglehart, 1995; Laver and Hunt, 1992).

Figure 1.1 provides the overall distribution of political parties by intra-party dissent from 1984-2002. The bottom line charts the percentage of political parties experiencing high levels of dissent (defined as above 4.00 on a 10-point scale), while the

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1 The three data sets are described and evaluated in detail elsewhere. See, for example, Ray (1999b); Steenbergen and Marks (2007), and Marks et al. (2006).

2 The exact question wording is provided in Appendix 1A.

3 There are two potential problems with pooling this data: 1) the question wording and the response scale changed between the 1984-99 surveys and the 2002 survey (see Appendix 1A), and 2) three time points (1984, 1988, and 1992) were obtained by asking 1996 expert survey respondents to retrospect about dissent. To ensure that the measure is not overstating the stability of dissent (particularly in the 1984-96 period) and to obtain estimates of reliability, I ran a Wiley-Wiley analysis.

4 Appendices 1B and 1C provides descriptive statistics as well as more detailed data on the distribution of parties by internal dissent.
top line indicates the percentage registering low levels (defined as below 4.01 on a 10-point scale). As the figure suggests, levels of internal dissent on EU matters are generally rather low, with the majority of parties at each time point displaying lower levels of dissent. This observation should not be surprising. For reasons suggested below, political parties have strong incentives to avoid (or at the least to mask) divisions. Moreover, this observation should not diminish the importance of internal dissent. Political parties in the post-Maastricht era appear to be experiencing greater levels of internal disagreement. Starting in 1992, the percentage of parties registering significant dissent (above 4.01) begins to climb. This increase in divisions over EU matters coincides with two other important phenomena. Since the early 1990s, Europe has witnessed low levels of public support for the integration project (Eichenberg and Dalton, 1993, 2003; Anderson and Kalenthaler, 1996; Franklin et al., 1994) coupled with greater opportunities for the public to express their concerns, paving the way for what some scholars suggest is a “constraining dissensus” (Hooghe and Marks, 1999; Hix, 1999; van der Eijk and Franklin, 1996).
FIGURE 1.1: Distribution of parties by intra-party dissent over European integration, 1984-2002

Does intra-party dissent vary and, if so, how is this variation structured? The box-plot in figure 1.2 offers answers to these questions, demonstrating that internal party dissent varies both across and within countries. Interpreting the box-plot is relatively straightforward. The dark bands represent the median scores for each country. The lines of the first and the third quartiles form the upper and lower bounds of the boxes, which represent the inter-quartile ranges and correspond to 50 percent of the observations within each country. The whiskers jutting from the boxes extend to the minimum and maximum scores. Finally, the circles represent outliers (observations that are more than 1.5 box lengths from the upper or lower end of the boxes). What the figure brings into sharp relief is that although there is some degree of cross-national variation, internal party dissent
varies considerably more within than across countries, i.e. most of the variation is at the party level.

![Variation in intra-party dissent, 1984-2002](image)

**FIGURE 1.2: Variation in intra-party dissent, 1984-2002**

**Explaining Intra-Party Dissent**

How can we explain intra-party dissent over European integration? Aside from in-depth case studies of particular national parties (e.g. Garry, 1995; Baker et al., 1993; Cowley, 2002; Whiteley and Seyd, 1999), there has been little to no research on dissent within political parties arising from issues of European integration. The hypotheses explicated in this section draw on four key theoretical perspectives. Though none speaks directly to the issue, each has transparent implications for internal party dissent.
Electoral System

The institutional environment can be a powerful shaper of intra-party politics. Institutional arrangements, notably electoral systems, presidentialism versus parliamentarism, parliamentary procedures, and intra-party decisional arrangements, provide strong incentives for party leaders to either compete or cooperate with their fellow party leaders. The institutional setting, therefore, has a direct impact on intra-party dynamics.

The literature on party discipline points to the importance of the electoral system as a particular factor affecting differing levels of parliamentary unity (Katz, 1980; Harmel and Janda, 1982; Bowler et al., 1999; Boucek, 2001). Here, a distinction is drawn between plurality and proportional representation (PR) systems. The expectation is that there should be higher levels of intra-party dissent in plurality systems than in PR systems. The reason for this is two-fold. First, the electoral system influences exit costs, which in turn influences the level of conflict within parties. In plurality systems, the logic of two-party competition acts as a disincentive for politicians to exit. Since the start-up costs for dissenters and independents wanting to set up new parties is exceedingly high, politicians have little alternative but to remain where they are. The end result is greater heterogeneity of preferences and higher internal conflict. In PR systems, by contrast, parties face a much lower penalty if they split, which they tend to do with comparative regularity. Thus, while conflict tends to be internalized within parties in plurality systems, in PR systems conflict is largely externalized.

Second, the electoral system has a bearing on the number of parties in competition, which in turn affects the level of partisanship and intra-party competition in
a party system (Duverger, 1954). Single-member plurality systems tend to reduce the number of parties, compressing the number of viable government parties towards two. To compete in such a system, parties must widen their electorate base. As a result, plurality systems tend to breed broad, diffuse (and therefore conflict ridden) parties. PR systems, by contrast, foster multi-party systems. Parties emanating from PR systems tend to be smaller and to have narrower, more homogeneous constituencies. They are therefore less prone to dissent.

This leads to the following hypothesis:

**Hypothesis 1:** Political parties competing in plurality or majority electoral systems are more likely to exhibit internal dissent than those competing in proportional representation systems (PR).

**Strategic Competition**

A second explanation of intra-party dissent relates to the strategic actions of political parties and pits mainstream parties against minor, peripheral parties (Budge et al., 1987; Rabinowitz and Macdonald, 1989). Three hypotheses seem plausible. First, parties located on the extremes on the left/right dimension of party competition should be less prone to internal dissent. Unlike mainstream parties that attempt to protect the status quo by suppressing the salience of new issues that cut across existing dimensions of party competition, parties on the periphery have strategic incentives to “shake up” the existing party system (Riker, 1982; Rabinowitz and Macdonald, 1989). Marginalized on the main left/right axis of contention, these parties look for new, tangential issues on which to compete, and the EU provides just such an issue. Such a strategy, however, is only likely
to work if the party has a unified and coherent voice. Apart from this strategic incentive, extreme parties might be less prone to divisions simply because they are more ideologically coherent.

Second, one can approach strategic competition from the perspective of party size. For the reasons set out in the previous section on electoral systems, the expectation is that parties winning a larger share of the vote will experience higher levels of dissent. These parties must appeal to a broader spectrum of interests and are consequently more likely to be divided on particular issues.

Finally, one would expect governing parties to exhibit lower levels of internal dissent. The reason is three-fold. First, parties in government have historically been more pro-European, as these parties have been the driving force behind the integration process (Marks and Wilson, 2000). Second, research suggests that parties ridden with internal dissent are unable to effectively cue their supporters on European issues (Ray, 2003; Steenbergen et al., 2007; Gabel and Scheve, 2007) and often suffer electorally (Evans, 1998, 2002). Thus, governing parties are under particular pressure to present a united front, lest they lose their position of power. Lastly, governing parties have a functional need to be united, since they must travel to Brussels and negotiate with a coherent voice on specific EU policy issues.

These three hypotheses are summarized below:

**Hypothesis 2:** Political parties located on the extremes of the left/right political spectrum should experience less internal dissent than those situated in the centre.
**Hypothesis 3:** There is a positive relationship between the size of a political party (i.e. the percentage of the vote share a party receives) and the level in intra-party dissent.

**Hypothesis 4:** Governing political parties should experience lower levels of internal dissent than parties that have not participated in government.

**Party Position Change**

The third line of argumentation is motivated by research on the dynamics of parties’ policy positions and explains internal party dissent as a response to changes in parties’ EU positions (Stimson et al., 1995; Erikson et al., 2002; Adams et al., 2004). A number of factors are likely to influence where parties position themselves in a policy space and, in particular, why parties relocate their positions on an issue. Though a rigorous explanation of shifts in party positions is beyond the scope of this study, it is worthwhile to briefly consider what factors might induce such change. Economic conditions (Pennings, 1998), linkages with socioeconomic groups (Esping-Andersen, 1985; Hillebrand and Irwin, 1999), characteristics of the welfare system (Esping-Andersen, 1990), type of electoral system (Cox, 1990; Powell, 2000; Dow, 2001), number of parties in the system (Cox, 1990; Merrill and Adams, 2002), and party elites’ expectations concerning post-election bargaining over the governing coalition are all plausible sources of position change. Particularly interesting in the case of European integration are the role that public opinion plays in eliciting party position change and the
divergent preferences of candidates, party activists, and party members and how this impacts policy dynamics (Aldrich, 1983; McGann, 2002; Miller and Schofield, 2003).

For the purposes of the present analysis, however, I am not interested in why parties amend their positions but in how this change induces internal dissent. I contend that parties that experience a sharp change in position on an issue are likely to experience internal divisions over the matter. Why might this be the case? The literature on activists and partisan realignments in the US context offers at least one possible explanation. Activists and party leaders tend to have differing goals (Schlesinger, 1994; Aldrich, 1983, 1995). While the former play the role of “ambitious office seekers,” whose chief focus is “to become the party-in-government by appealing to the electorate,” the latter give primacy to ideology and seek to prevent the leaders of the party from ‘selling out’ (Aldrich, 1995: 183). But what happens when a segment of the leadership does ‘sell out’ and the party’s position is altered, either to reap an electoral dividend or to maintain the peace in an existing governing coalition? And worse yet, what happens if the planned position shift fails to pay off? The result is likely internal dissent.5

I therefore expect the following:

**Hypothesis 5:** There is a positive relationship between party position change on European integration and level of intra-party dissent; i.e. the greater the shift in a party’s position on European integration, the greater the extent of internal dissent the party is likely to exhibit.

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5 There is, of course, a possible endogeneity problem related to this relationship. In other words, it is possible that position shifts are the result of internal divisions rather than being their cause. Imagine that a party has taken a consistent liberal stance that is failing to pay dividend. Inside the party a group of dissenters arises, people who feel the party’s position is problematic and who create internal dissent by calling this position openly into question. If they become sufficiently powerful, then the position may actually shift. Indeed, this is the story of the Democratic Leadership Council in the Democratic Party.
Cleavage Theory

According to cleavage theory (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967; also see Zuckerman, 1982; Kriesi, 1998), party ideologies in Western Europe have formed around historically rooted cleavages based on class, religion, centre/periphery, and, in recent decades, new politics (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967; Mair, 1997; Inglehart, 1990; Kitschelt, 1994). These cleavages and their historical interactions constitute institutional frameworks that shape and constrain political parties’ responses to European integration. The final explanation elaborated here draws on Lipset and Rokkan’s seminal theory and on its application to party positioning on European integration (Marks and Wilson, 2000; Marks et al., 2002) to suggest that the ease with which political parties are able to assimilate European integration depends on the extent to which the EU activates pre-existing cleavages within party families.6

This notion makes sense from an institutionalist perspective; organizations filter new issues through existing frameworks (Hall and Taylor, 1996; Thelen, 1999). Political parties are organizations with embedded ideologies and long-standing programmatic guarantees that engender intense loyalty on the parts of leaders and activists. Over time, they develop elaborate party organizations, build up constituency ties, and establish reputations for particular programs and policies (Budge et al., 1987). Given the immense costs of abandoning such structures and commitments, political parties cannot simply reinvent themselves with each new challenge or electoral cycle, but instead interpret new issues in light of their historically-rooted orientations. As Marks and Wilson note, “a

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6 Substantive hypotheses linking particular party families to varying levels of internal party dissent are elaborated in Chapter 2.
political party has its own ‘bounded rationality’ that shapes the way in which it comes to terms with new challenges and uncertainties” (2000: 434).

The logic of cleavage theory is generalizable across issues, but the dual nature of European integration, as both an economic enterprise with considerable distributional implications and a political project in which the sovereignty of nations is pooled and constrained (Hooghe and Marks, 2001), makes it particularly problematic for parties. Cleavage theory has been applied to the case of European integration to demonstrate that political cleavages provide powerful tools for explaining how political parties respond to these two components of European integration (Marks and Wilson, 2000; also see Hix and Lord, 1997; Hix, 1999). The last explanation of dissent extends this line of reasoning, arguing that if one wants to understand dissent within political parties, one must again turn to their distinctive historical experiences and more specifically the extent to which the dual nature of the EU activates pre-existing cleavages within political families.

Consider as an example the conservative party family. Conservative parties should be particularly susceptible to internal strife over European integration because of the long-standing tension between neoliberal and national conservatism (see also, Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson 2004). Historically, conservative parties have combined two different groups: neoliberals, who support free markets and minimal state intervention, and nationalists, who reject the importance of class to political issues (Marks and Wilson, 2000). The double nature of European integration touches directly upon this pre-existing fissure. For neoliberals, the European project of economic integration is largely an extension of their fundamental political-economic ideals. They are therefore in favor of
European integration to the extent that it enhances regime competition and leads to a more integrated market. Though neoliberals believe that the focus of European integration should be economic, they acknowledge that some supranational political structures may be needed to realize the goal of market integration and are therefore willing to cede some national autonomy if it leads to enhanced economic integration. This stands in stark opposition to nationalists who reject any dilution of national control. As defenders of national culture, language, community, and above all national sovereignty, nationalists are hostile to European integration in any form. The endemic tension between neoliberals and nationalists suggests that conservative parties should be particularly vulnerable to internal strife over European integration (Hooghe et al., 2004). Generalizing from this, I assert that the facility with which political parties are able to assimilate the issue of European integration is influenced by the legacy of past political conflicts and the degree to which the two-pronged nature of the EU triggers pre-existing cleavages within political families.

This leads to a final hypothesis:

**Hypothesis 6:** *The level of intra-party dissent over European integration is influenced by the historical experiences and programmatic commitments of political parties as summarized by the party families that have arisen from them.*

**Data and Methods**

In order to examine the hypotheses outlined above, I analyze intra-party dissent within fourteen Western European member states by incorporating expert survey data into a random coefficients model. In this section, I operationalize the key theoretical
factors influencing internal party dissent and briefly comment on the statistical approach that I employ.

The first set of hypotheses relate to the electoral context in which parties must compete, specifically the electoral system. Here, a distinction is made between plurality or majority systems (value of 1) and proportional representation systems (value of 0). The category of PR systems includes list PR systems with and without thresholds, mixed member PR systems, and Greece’s system of reinforced PR. The category of plurality/majority systems includes first-past-the-post, the single transferable vote, and the two-round system that is used in French legislative elections.

The next group of variables are utilized to test the strategic competition argument. Given my expectation that extreme parties are less likely to exhibit internal dissent, I include a dichotomous variable that captures left/right extremism. Parties that are one standard deviation below or above the mean left/right ideological position of all parties in a country in a given year are coded as extreme (value of 1). Party size refers to the vote share that a political party receives in the national legislative election for the lower house in the year of or the year prior to the time point in question. Finally, government participation is a dummy variable with 1 indicating that a political party was in government in the year under investigation and 0 indicating that a party was in opposition.

Data on EU party position is gleaned from the Ray and Chapel Hill expert surveys described above. Country experts were asked to evaluate the position of each national political party along a seven-point scale ranging from “strongly opposed to European integration” to “strongly in favour of European integration.” Party position change is
operationalized as the absolute value of the difference in EU party position between two successive time points.

Finally, the cleavage explanation asserts that the ease with which political parties are able to incorporate European integration depends on the extent to which the dual nature of the EU activates pre-existing cleavages within political families. To investigate the impact of political cleavages, I include dummy variables for ten party families – radical right, conservative, liberal, Christian democratic, social democratic, green, radical left, regionalist, Protestant, and agrarian – in my model. In line with Lipset and Rokkan (1967), I make distinctions between liberal and agrarian parties and between Christian democratic parties with Catholic roots and Protestant parties.7 Table 1.1 at the end of this section summarizes the variables included in the analysis.

I analyze intra-party dissent over European integration by incorporating the variables described above into a hierarchical or random coefficients model.8 I choose to employ a random effects model versus a fixed effect model for two reasons. First, given that the presence of time invariant and rarely changing variables precludes the estimation of unit fixed effects, random effects serve as a good second best option (Plümper et al., 2005). And second, results of the Hausman specification test comparing the fixed versus random effects suggest that the latter is more appropriate (Hausman, 1978). The variance components were estimated using maximum likelihood. And all estimations were conducted in Stata version 9.

7 This operationalization coincides with previous studies on cleavage theory and party positioning on European integration (see Marks et al., 2002).

8 The model does not contain a lagged dependent variable. Apart from the fact that the use of lagged dependent variables has come under attack in recent years (Achen, 2000), the lags in the current data are too large to be meaningful.
### TABLE 1.1: Variable description

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intra-party dissent</td>
<td>Degree of dissent within a party on European integration as measured using the following expert survey items: For 1984-99, “[What is] the degree of dissent within the party over the party leadership’s position?” (1=complete unity; 5=leadership position opposed by a majority of party activists). For 2002, “How much internal dissent has there been in the various parties in [COUNTRY] over European integration over the course of 2002?” (1=party is completely united; 10=party is extremely divided). To facilitate comparison over time, all responses are converted to a 10-point scale with lower scores indicating minor dissent and higher scores representing major dissent. Source: Ray (1999a), Marks and Steenbergen (1999), Hooghe et al. (2002).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral system</td>
<td>A dummy variable indicating the type of electoral system a country employs. 1=proportional representation (PR with or without thresholds, mixed member PR, Greece’s reinforced PR), 0=plurality/majority (first-past-the-post, single transferable vote, France’s two round system)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Referendum</td>
<td>A dummy variable indicating if a country has held a referendum on an EU issue. 1=referendum; 0=no referendum.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left/right extremism</td>
<td>A dummy variable indicating that a party is one standard deviation above or below the mean left/right ideological position of all parties in a given year. Source: Ray (1999a), Marks and Steenbergen (1999), Hooghe et al. (2002).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vote</td>
<td>Vote share that a party received in national legislative election to the lower house in the year of or the year prior to the time point of evaluation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government participation</td>
<td>A dummy variable indicating that a party was in government at the time point of evaluation. 1=in government; 0=in opposition.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party position change</td>
<td>Absolute value of the difference in EU party position at $t$ and $t-1$. EU party position is the mean expert score obtained using the following question: “[What is] the overall orientation of the party leadership toward European integration?” 1=strongly opposed to integration; 7=strongly in favour of integration. Source: Ray (1999a), Marks and Steenbergen (1999), Hooghe et al. (2002).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party family</td>
<td>Series of dummy variables indicating whether a party is a member of a particular party family. Source: Hooghe et al., 2002.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Empirical Analysis

What are the sources of internal party division over European integration? The results of the statistical analysis are included in Table 1.2 and provide support for three of the broad sets of hypotheses under investigation – electoral system, party position change, and political cleavages.
TABLE 1.2: Analysis of intra-party dissent over European integration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Unstandardized Coefficients (b)</th>
<th>Standard Errors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Electoral system</td>
<td>0.790**</td>
<td>0.392</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left/right extremism</td>
<td>0.120</td>
<td>0.208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vote</td>
<td>0.014*</td>
<td>0.009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government participation</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>0.177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party position change</td>
<td>1.237***</td>
<td>0.215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Party family</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>1.123**</td>
<td>0.413</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>0.409</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christen democratic</td>
<td>-0.007</td>
<td>0.447</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social democratic</td>
<td>1.137**</td>
<td>0.417</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green</td>
<td>1.070**</td>
<td>0.430</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radical left</td>
<td>0.860**</td>
<td>0.393</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regionalist</td>
<td>0.560</td>
<td>0.511</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td>1.622**</td>
<td>0.672</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agrarian</td>
<td>1.580***</td>
<td>0.486</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Year</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>0.482**</td>
<td>0.271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>0.588**</td>
<td>0.256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>-0.137</td>
<td>0.269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>0.111</td>
<td>0.258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.933***</td>
<td>0.486</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma^u$</td>
<td>0.515</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma^e$</td>
<td>1.375</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$p$</td>
<td>0.123</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>340</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Table entries are ML random effects panel estimates and their estimated standard errors. Reference values: 1988 (year), radical right (party family). *p<0.10 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01 (one-tailed).

First, the type of electoral system appears to influence the level of dissent within parties. The strong and statistically significant effect of the electoral system variable indicates that parties competing in plurality or majority systems, such as the United Kingdom or France, are more prone to divisions. Second, shifts in parties’ positions on European integration seem to be strongly related to internal party dissent. Party position change is positively and significantly associated with internal party dissent, suggesting
that divisions may be a response to changes in parties’ policy positions. Though the current analysis cannot determine what compels political parties to alter their position on the EU, it is clear from the results presented here that such a move is likely to disrupt the delicate balance within parties. Finally, the expectations regarding political cleavages are also born out in the data. Party family accounts for 14 percent of the variance of dissent within parties. Moreover, the coefficients for several of the categorical variables are strong and statistically significant. These coefficients represent the difference between the mean of a particular party family and the mean of the omitted family. Here, radical right serves as the reference category. Since this family displays relatively low levels of dissent, any party family similarly located on the low end of the dissent spectrum will have a small and statistically insignificant coefficient. Overall, the findings suggest that the legacies of past political conflicts influence the extent to which political parties are able to assimilate the EU issue.

While the empirical analysis strongly confirms the hypotheses drawn from the electoral system, position change, and cleavage theory arguments, the expectations regarding strategic competition fail to withstand scrutiny. Beginning with left/right extremism, there is no evidence that minor, peripheral parties are less apt to experience divisions. The effect is not only insignificant but is signed in the opposite direction than that hypothesized. The vote variable does reach statistical significance and is in the expected positive direction, but the effect of party size is quite small. Finally, the results provide no indication that parties in government are less prone to dissent, as the government participation variable is both insignificant and incorrectly signed.

I am aware that the causal arrow may, in fact, flow in both directions. Untangling this reciprocal causality knot is beyond the prevue of this article, but is currently being investigated in a related article.
Lastly, the analysis suggests that intra-party dissent is influenced by the nature of the times, as the results show a positive and significant period effect for 1992 and 1996. The process of European integration is dynamic and the changes that have occurred, such as the inclusion of new member states and the expansion of policy-making authority in Brussels, are bound to have changed the nature of internal party dissent. The fall-out from the Maastricht Treaty put a definite end to permissive consensus so that one should expect parties to become more responsive to their constituencies – possibly by changing their policy position and consequently eliciting dissent.

**Conclusion**

European integration engenders conflict. While this has been true since the launching of the project in the 1950s, the evolution of the EU from a technocratic, economic organization to a supranational political body over the past decade has created new and reactivated old uncertainties over the nature and future of European integration. The result has been even greater contestation over Europe (see Marks and Steenbergen, 2001). To date, the analytical lens of most party and EU scholars has focused on mapping the positions of political parties on the EU issue and on uncovering and explaining divisions among parties on this issue. The present study redirects attention to what occurs within political parties by exploring the character and causes of intra-party dissent on European integration.

This article presents evidence that internal dissent on EU issues exists and, perhaps equally as important for social scientists, can be measured using expert survey data; that this dissent varies considerably across parties and has increased since the
1980s; and finally, that the causes of internal dissent are multiple. The type of electoral system in which a party competes, changes in a party’s position on European integration, and the party family to which a party belongs all influence a party’s level of internal dissent.

The findings of my analysis carry weight. From the perspective of research design, the analysis provides one of the only cross-national quantitative studies employing intra-party dissent as a dependent variable. By and large, the limited previous work on intra-party dissent over European integration has applied a qualitative case study approach focusing on a single party or a subset of parties. This type of approach is useful in illuminating causal processes, but it limits generalizability. At the theoretical level, the article offers a useful foray into analysing the causal paths leading to internal party dissent over European integration.

The study also hints at future avenues of research. Paramount is the need to develop a more refined measure of the historical tendencies and programmatic commitments of party families (see Chapter 2). Second, the analysis only begins to consider dissent in dynamic terms. What prompts these changes in party position? While the present analysis provides evidence that changes in party positions lead to dissent, what happens when the causal arrow is reversed? In other words, does intra-party dissent induce change in a party’s position on European integration? Finally, what are the larger-scale implications of internal party dissent on the EU issue for national party systems? Consistent with van der Eijk and Franklin’s (2004) sleeping giant hypothesis, there is a growing evidence of a so-called “electoral connection” in EU politics whereby electorate attitudes play a roll in shaping and constraining party stances.
on European integration (Carrubba, 2000; Steenbergen et al., 2007). Along a similar vein, there is an expanding literature indicating that public mobilization over the EU project might alter the landscapes of national political competition by influencing national vote choice (Evans, 1998, 2002; Gabel 2000; Tillman, 2004; de Vries, 2007). How does intra-party dissent factor into these scenarios?
May 29, 2005, may be the date of note in history books, marking the rejection by French voters of the European Constitutional Treaty, but December 1st 2004 will not soon be forgotten by France’s Parti Socialiste (PS). Hoping to quell intra-party dissent over the controversial European document, Socialist leaders staged an internal referendum among party members to determine the official party stance. Though 59 percent voted to endorse the Treaty, the desired effect of subduing party infighting was not achieved. Rather the reverse. Prime Minister Laurent Fabius and his socialist allies continued to reject the Treaty, and their support within the party appeared to grow as the day of reckoning approached. The power struggle not only left the party’s supporters without a clear signal as they stepped into the ballot box the following May, but it also reignited a long-standing debate among top-level elites about how to define the party’s core ideology (Ivaldi, 2006).

Was this schism to be expected? The line of reasoning presented in this article suggests ‘yes’. While division over European integration in France has traditionally been the domain of Gaullist parties on the right of the political spectrum, I argue that the historical predispositions of the PS (and of socialist parties more generally) made internal party dissent a likely outcome.
This article sets out a cleavage theory model of party dissent over European integration. Drawing on Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan’s (1967) classic model of political cleavages, I argue that if one seeks to understand when, where, and to what extent internal divisions manifest themselves, one must look to the particular vulnerabilities of parties, which are primarily shaped by their historical experiences as summarized in party families. As Marks and Wilson (2000) show, political cleavages provide a key for explaining how parties respond to issues of European integration. I extend this argument to intra-party dissent, contending that present-day rifts within political parties are not *sui generis* but reflect durable and deep-seated tensions.

In the next section I set out a theory of intra-party dissent. I then apply this theory to generate expectations about variation in dissent among and within party families. Finally, I test my hypotheses against data from expert surveys of political parties across the European Union (EU).

**A Cleavage Theory of Intra-Party Dissent**

Which political parties are most vulnerable to internal dissent over European issues? My point of theoretical departure is an historical institutional perspective which posits that rifts within political parties can be explained as expressions of prior, often deeply-rooted, tensions. The model draws on Lipset and Rokkan’s (1967) theory of social cleavages (Zuckerman, 1982; Kriesi, 1998). In their influential 1967 article, the authors link the configuration of European parties to social and cultural divisions that existed when party systems were established in the second half of the nineteenth century. They contend that the historical conflicts arising in successive critical junctures, namely
the national revolution, the Protestant Reformation, and the Industrial Revolution, gave rise to enduring societal divisions that continue to shape identities, social institutions, and patterns of political contestation.

Few scholars today accept the notion that party competition is frozen along the lines described by Lipset and Rokkan (1967); nevertheless, class, religious, and centre/periphery cleavages remain important in framing how political parties respond to new issues (Sartori, 1968; Dalton et al., 1984; Bartolini and Mair, 1990; Kitschelt, 1997; Mair, 1997). This makes sense from an institutionalist point of view (Hall and Taylor, 1996; Thelen, 1999): organizations filter new issues through existing mental frames. Political parties are organizations with embedded ideologies and long-standing programs that engender intense loyalty on the part of leaders and activists (Budge et al., 1987). Given the high cost of abandoning constituency ties and programmatic commitments, political parties cannot reinvent themselves with each new challenge or electoral cycle. That is to say, “a political party has its own ‘bounded rationality’ that shapes the way in which it comes to terms with new challenges and uncertainties” (Marks and Wilson, 2000: 434).

While the logic of embedded cleavages and commitments may be generalized across a range of issues, the dual nature of contemporary European integration makes this a particularly interesting area of exploration. The European project simultaneously entails economic and political integration. From its origins in the 1950s, the creation of Europe has been an economic venture, involving the removal of tariff and non-tariff barriers, the creation of a single market, and the establishment of a monetary union and a common currency. However, European integration is also a political project, involving
the transfer of authority from national actors to subnational and supranational actors as EU decision making infiltrates new policy areas (including environmental, social, and foreign and security) and engages new sets of actors (including interest groups, social movements, political parties, and citizens). This qualitative and quantitative shift in the nature of the EU has gone hand-in-hand with heightened public contestation and increased politicization of the integration process by political elites.

Lipset and Rokkan’s cleavage theory has been adapted to explain how political parties respond to these two components of European integration (Marks and Wilson, 2000; Hix and Lord, 1997; Hix, 1999; Kriesi et al., 2006). The present article deepens and extends this line of reasoning. I suggest that divisions over European integration are not new schisms. Rather, they reflect entrenched tensions within party families and within individual parties that developed and solidified through the successive layering of traditional cleavages. The ability of political parties to assimilate the issue of European integration is influenced by the legacy of past political tensions and the extent to which the dual nature of the EU (i.e. the friction between the economic and political dimensions) reactivates pre-existing cleavages within political families.10

This model leads one to expect levels of intra-party dissent over European integration to vary among party families, but cleavage theory also hints at the possibility of variation within party families. Lipset and Rokkan’s theory highlights that the effect of a particular cleavage is often mediated by its interaction with prior societal cleavages

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10 Along a similar vein, Kriesi et al. (2006: 927) suggest an intensification of political conflicts within mainstream parties as they adjust their ideological positions to accommodate or “embed” European integration into the existing two-dimensional political space (defined by the authors as socio-economic and cultural).
and by “different conditions of national politics and socioeconomic development” (1967: 114). Societal cleavages do not translate mechanically into constellations of political parties: “there are considerations of organizational and electoral strategy; there is the weighing of payoffs of alliances against losses through split-offs; and there is the successive narrowing of the ‘mobilization market’ through the time sequences of organizational efforts” (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967: 141). The result is marked geographical variation in party systems and, as I argue below, parallel variation within and among party families.

**Hypothesizing Variation Among and Within Party Families**

The previous paragraphs apply cleavage theory to intra-party dissent over European integration *in general*. Below, I offer more specific expectations concerning variation in internal party dissent both among and within party families (see Table 2.1 in the next section for a summary).

**Class Cleavage**

The double-barreled nature of European integration generates friction for parties competing on either side of the class cleavage (Hix, 1999; Hooghe and Marks, 1999; Ladrech, 1997; Hix and Lord, 1997). Emerging out of the industrial revolution and the conflict between blue-collar workers and owners of capital, the *social democratic* party family sits on the left side of the class cleavage. These parties tend to favor social equality and generous welfare spending and are rooted in the belief that “the economy
must be brought under control through an interventionalist state” (Padgett and Paterson, 1991: 49).

The European project pulls social democratic parties in opposing directions (Featherstone, 1988; Ladrech, 1997, 2000), challenging their economic ideals and setting the stage for dissent. On the negative side, economic integration jeopardizes nation-wide socialist achievements “by intensifying international economic competition and undermining Keynesian responses to it” (Marks and Wilson, 2000: 437). Increased capital mobility, pressure for greater labor flexibility, and heightened labor substitutability across countries – all consequences of deeper market integration – diminish the bargaining power of labor and increase that of employers. On the positive side, in an era of welfare state crisis (Huber and Stephens, 2001; Pierson, 2001) and decline of social democracy (Piven, 1992; Gillespie, 1993; Kitschelt, 1994), European political integration offers a potential respite to this otherwise austere forecast by restructuring authoritative regulation at the European level.11

Given this tension, the potential for conflict remains high, especially for social democratic parties in countries with generous welfare states and powerfully organized labor. European integration is a political hazard in strong social democratic contexts, e.g. in Scandinavia, where national achievements are beyond replication at the European level.

11 The unmitigated failure of French President François Mitterrand’s attempt at “socialism in one country” in the early 1980s provided an important wake-up call, signalling that economic and political isolation from the European organization was largely untenable. Since then, most social democrats have embraced the virtues of European integration, advocating a project of regulated capitalism to rival the more neoliberal and nationalist projects put forth by other party families (see Marks and Wilson, 2000: 442-48).
level. In such contexts, social democrats fear that European integration will dilute redistribution and diminish the capacity of labor to bargain effectively.\(^{12}\)

On the right side of the political spectrum, conservative parties are confronted with a similar rationale running in the opposite direction. For these more neoliberal parties, the European economic project has the benefit of constraining the economic intervention of national governments. The transaction costs of shifting investment across countries are minimized, inducing national governments to compete in attracting capital to their countries. The threat of political integration, however, looms large for these parties. Left unchecked, political integration runs the risk of developing a supranational government at the EU level capable of regulating markets.

The conservative party family is particularly susceptible to internal strife over European integration because of the long-standing tension between the neoliberal tradition, supporting free markets and minimal state intervention, and the national tradition, rejecting the importance of class to political issues (Hooghe et al., 2004; Mair, 2000). The double nature of European integration touches directly upon this pre-existing fissure. For neoliberals, the European project of economic integration is largely an extension of their fundamental political-economic ideals, leading them to favor the venture to the extent that it improves regime competition and leads to a more integrated market. Though they believe that the focus of European integration should be economic, neoliberals acknowledge that some supranational political structures may be needed to realize the goal of market integration and are therefore willing to cede a degree of

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\(^{12}\) This argument is similar to that of Kriesi et al. (2006) who distinguish between a “classical left”, which opposes economic liberalism and open borders because they threaten left achievements at the national level, and a “modernised left”, which embraces globalisation and tries to reconcile endorsements of neoliberal free trade with concerns for social justice. Also see Kriesi (2007: 86-7) and Giddens (1998).
national autonomy if it leads to enhanced economic integration. This stands in stark opposition to nationalists who reject any dilution of national control. As defenders of national culture, language, community, and above all national sovereignty, nationalists are hostile to European integration in any form. The endemic tension between neoliberals and nationalists leads to the expectation that conservative parties will be particularly vulnerable to infighting over European integration. Moreover, variation among these parties will reflect the relative strength of the two opposing strands of conservatism.

In contrast, situated on the extreme left of the class cleavage, radical left parties of a communist bent should have little problem assimilating European integration, as they tend to reject the EU on both economic and political grounds. For these parties, European integration is not only an anathema to their extreme left goals (e.g. public control over capital flows, heavy national investment in industrial policy, statutory employment, etc.), but it is viewed as fundamentally undemocratic and controlled by capitalist interests (Christensen, 1996; Hooghe et al., 2004). In its party manifesto for the 2004 European elections, for example, the Communist Party of Greece (KKE) called for “deliverance from the bonds of the EU” (i.e. withdrawal from the EU), claiming that the European endeavor is nothing more than an alliance created “to enhance big capital’s share of the international capitalist market” and that the Treaties of Maastricht, Amsterdam, and Nice as well as the European Constitution “deliver the coup de grace to popular rights and to democracy.”

Since they are inclined to oppose the European

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project on both economic and political fronts, my expectation is that communist radical left parties will exhibit relatively low levels of internal dissent on EU issues.

It is important to note, however, that this expectation does not hold for the entire radical left party family. As we will see below, the emergence of a new politics cleavage across Europe has spurred the development of a second variant of radical left parties – the so-called “new left”. While these parties tend to share the communists’ views on the economic evils of the EU, they have adopted a more positive line on the political dimension. Thus, while communist parties should be unified, the opposite should be true for new left parties.

*Church-State Cleavage*

Originating in the Protestant Reformation, which pitted the Catholic Church against state- and nation-building elites, the church-state cleavage characterizes the second set of party families. *Christian democratic* parties correspond to the Catholic side of this cleavage. This party family has been among the most supportive of the EU project, as European integration coincides with the supranational aspirations of the Catholic Church. The anti-national bias of Catholic parties that arose from the historic battles with national state-builders feeds this affinity on the political side, while their practical desire for economic prosperity contributes to their support of international economic integration.\(^{14}\) Consequently, I hypothesize that Christian democratic parties will display high levels of internal party unity over European integration.

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\(^{14}\) Although Christian democratic parties differ from market oriented conservative parties in their support for relatively generous welfare programmes, neither set of parties doubts the benefits of economic neoliberalism.
Unlike their Catholic counterparts, however, Protestant parties should be marred with intra-party dissent. These political parties have been profoundly fashioned by the distinctive layering and intermingling of the church-state and centre-periphery cleavages characteristic of Scandinavia (Valen and Rokkan, 1974). Rooted in revivalist Lutheran fundamentalism, which grew out of opposition to the dominance of government elites and mainstream Lutheranism, these parties share none of the supranational proclivities of their Christian democratic counterparts and often exhibit a distinctly nationalist flavor. Though favoring economic integration at the European level because of its tendency to dampen the role of the state in the economy, the religiosity and opposition to central authority of Protestant parties leads them to vehemently oppose political integration (Karvonen, 1994; Madeley, 2004). Hence, I anticipate high levels of internal party dissent.

**Centre-Periphery Cleavage**

The centre-periphery cleavage emerged out of the national revolutions of the nineteenth century. The establishment of nation-states set administrative centers against peripheral, locally entrenched elites and resulted in ethnic and regionalist centre-periphery conflicts. In countries such as Britain, France, and Spain, with strong central states, this cleavage ultimately led to the suppression of strong territorially concentrated regional minorities (such as the Catalans, the Basque, the Scots, and the Welsh) and spurred the creation of regional political parties to defend such interests. In the more decentralized Protestant countries of Scandinavia, peripheral minorities remained
territorially dispersed, resulting in emergence of strong agrarian parties protecting the interests of farmers and Lutheran fundamentalists (Marks and Wilson, 2000: 438-9).

I expect *regionalist* parties to be fairly united in favor of European integration (Jolly, 2007). European integration transforms the political setting in which these parties operate. To begin, because European integration modifies the notion of political sovereignty, the age-old adversary of peripheral nationalism – the state – has changed in nature. On the one hand, the regionalists’ enemy has been weakened, as the nation-state’s competencies and authority have markedly diminished. On the other hand, as Alan Milward (1992) suggests, European integration can also be seen as a lifeboat for nation-states (particularly for smaller nation-states), assuring their physical and economic security and thereby providing a mechanism for their survival (see Alesina and Spolaore, 2003). Seen from the perspective of regionalist parties, the latter is a potential opportunity. The notion of “independence within Europe” becomes a more viable option since the wider EU context diminishes economic and military costs. More specifically, in economic terms regionalist parties stand to gain from the European project because it provides an expanded and more readily accessible venue within which regional firms can participate, not to mention the substantial economic support the EU grants to Europe’s poorest areas through its cohesion policies. Politically, European integration offers greater regional autonomy and representation and provides a more hospitable setting for ethno-territorial minorities than that provided within their national borders.

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15 Jolly (2007) quantitatively demonstrates the power of the viability argument in explaining EU support among regionalist parties. These findings are backed up by a case study of the Scottish National Party (SNP) in which the author shows that “independence in Europe” (i.e. viability) was decisive in the party’s decision to begin endorsing European integration in the mid-1980s. Also see Sillars (1986) and De Winter and Cachafeiro (2002: 488).
Though sharing similar centre-periphery origins, the *agrarian* party family should possess few of the regionalist’s tendencies for internal party cohesion since its moderately favorable position on economic integration is at odds with its decidedly negative stance towards political integration.\(^{16}\) Historically, agrarian (or centre) parties have represented rural areas and, similar to Protestant parties, bear the influences of the particular pattern of social cleavages characteristic of Scandinavia – namely the mingling of the church-state and centre-periphery cleavages with a third urban-rural divide. The degree to which these parties maintain their links to agrarian interests varies (Arter, 2001), but their common rural heritage combined with the weakness of feudalism and the absence of the strong centralizing hand of the Catholic Church at the time of their inception remain influential. Agrarian parties view themselves as ‘champions of the rural periphery’ and therefore are inclined to resist all movements toward centralization of authority, which benefit urban centers to the detriment of local interests and undermine national identity, regardless of whether such movements occur at the national or supranational level (Sundberg, 1999; Lindström and Wörlund, 1988). Moreover, politically motivated territorial politics has tended to encompass protection of values and culture. As Batory and Sitter note: “given the tendency to portray the countryside as the source of ‘authentic’ national identity in contrast to the cosmopolitan (and more multi-ethnic) cities, some agrarian parties are prone to define membership in the nation in ethnic (based on identity/culture) rather than civic (base on citizenship) terms (Smith, 1986)” (2004: 529). Consequently, similar to national conservative parties, agrarians

\(^{16}\) Some identify agrarians as a third variant of liberal parties (see Weßels, 1995; Hix and Lord, 1997); however, their distinctiveness leads me to include them in a separate party family (see Lipset and Rokkan, 1967).
oppose political integration because the EU is alien and disruptive to their own national cultural milieu (Urwin, 1980).

Economically, however, agrarian parties are more positive. Though they tend to view European integration as promoting industrial and commercial interests to their disadvantage, they find the agricultural subsidies of the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) appealing. Additionally, while the EU’s rules on competition from foreign goods and investment as well as on the allowances of national subsidies hurt farmers in some countries, they are potentially beneficial for agrarians elsewhere. The Swedish Centre Party’s shift in position toward European integration in the 1990s, for example, was supported by the Federation of Swedish Farmers (LRF), who identified the economic benefits of EU membership to Swedish farmers. Denmark provides a similar story in which agrarians focus more on the economic benefits of membership than the threat of foreign competition (Batory and Sitter, 2004: 532).

Finally, though included in this section, the liberal party family is actually rooted in three cleavages – the urban-rural (in England and Germany), the church-state (in the Low Countries, France, Italy, and Spain), and the centre-periphery (in the Nordic countries, Wales, and Scotland). Unsurprisingly given its diverse origins, this party family is the most ideologically heterogeneous of the families and is only broadly united by its opposition to ascription, clericalism, and aristocracy and by its support for economic and political freedoms. Though liberal parties of all stripes tend to favor greater economic freedoms and are accordingly inclined to support economic integration, their backing of political integration varies cross-nationally.
Liberal parties can be divided into two varieties, both of which I expect to be fairly united over EU issues (Smith, 1988; von Beyme, 1985). On the one hand, political or radical liberals (such as the Danish Radikale Venstre and the Dutch D66) are left-leaning on economic issues and support a broad interpretation of democratic rights. Rejecting nationalism, these parties seek to minimize the constraints that national borders exert over the lives of individuals. On the other hand, economic or conservative liberals (such as the Dutch Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie and the Belgian liberal parties) are right-leaning and stress greater economic freedom. These parties advance European integration as a means to lower trade barriers and to institutionalize free markets, i.e. they support negative integration with respect to the economy but reject the notion of Fortress Europe and oppose the social democratic project for regulated capitalism at the European level (Marks and Wilson, 2000: 449). Thus, although economic liberal parties favor European integration on economic grounds, they oppose political integration. I therefore hypothesize that these parties will be slightly more divided over European integration than their politically liberal counterparts.

New Politics Cleavage

The final three party families –radical right, green, and radical left (of the new left variety) – have grown out of the broad, so-called “new politics” or “new values” cleavage. Though its effect on the political space did not emerge until the late 1960s, the roots of this dimension lie in the post World War II era when the structuring capacity of the traditional cleavages described above began to dwindle as a result of

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17 This dimension takes on many guises in the literature: post-materialist/materialist (Inglehart, 1990); new politics/old politics (Franklin, 1992; Müller-Rommel, 1989); left-libertarian/right-authoritarian (Kitschelt, 1994); gal (green, alternative, left)/tan (traditional, authoritarian, national) (Hooghe et al., 2004).
secularization, tertiarization, value shifts, rising education levels, and increases in standards of living (Dalton et al., 1984; Franklin et al., 1992). In general, this cleavage contrasts old politics values – public order, national security, and traditional life styles – with new politics values – individual choice, participatory democracy, and environmental protection. European integration, with its close link to issues of national sovereignty and to the new political and cultural forms of competition connected with globalization, is intimately associated with this new politics cleavage (Kriesi et al., 2006: 924).

By far the most Euroskeptic party family, radical right parties should be relatively internally cohesive with regard to European integration, although their ambiguity concerning economics does open the door to mild dissent (Fieschi et al., 1996; Hooghe et al., 2004; De Vries and Edwards, 2009). Their internal unity stems from 1) the location of these parties decidedly at the right-authoritarian or tan (traditional, authoritarian, national) end of the new politics dimension and 2) the prominence of this dimension over the traditional economic left/right axis for these parties. Academics continue to debate the origin of the radical right as either a challenge to the new left on non-economic issues (e.g. nationalism and law and order) or as a response to economic insecurities and loss of confidence in governing parties (Ignazi, 1992; Harris, 1994; Kitschelt and McGann, 1997; Flanagan, 1987; Cole, 2005); but the party family’s ideological emphasis on nationalism, anti-immigration, traditionalism, and respect for authority is undisputed. Campaign slogans such as “the Netherlands is full” (List Pim

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18 Note that I am not discounting friction concerning the political dimension of European integration. Parties such as the German Republikaner and the French FN faced difficulties in the 1970-80s reconciling a supposed commitment to protecting European values and civilization against any external (i.e. non-European) threat with their strident opposition to any loss of national sovereignty. This tension appears to have dissipated with the Maastricht Treaty, as radical right parties dropped any notion of “European patriotism” and wholeheartedly denounced the Treaty (see Fieschi et al., 1996).
Fortuyn), “Denmark for the Danes” (Dansk Folkeparti), “in charge of our own country” (Vlaams Blok) as well as calls for an end to Überfremdung (over-foreignization) and publications like Jean-Marie Le Pen’s Les Français d’abord (The French First) illustrate the core sentiments of the radical right. With regard to Europe, scholars are quick to point out that their negative position (especially towards political integration) is simply an extension of radical right parties’ core domestic platforms (Fieschi et al., 1996; Hooghe et al., 2004). In the words of Le Pen: “My European programme is a faithful extrapolation from the national programs of the National Front, since the same dangers which threaten France threaten Europe” (as quoted in Fieschi et al., 1996: 239-40).

Economic issues tend to be less salient but are hardly irrelevant (Poguntke, 1993), and it is in this sphere that the stirrings of dissent concerning European integration arise. Attempting to formulate a more attractive platform and appeal to their declining middle class followers and to unskilled workers, a subset of far right parties has adopted elements of economic neoliberalism (Betz, 1993; Kitschelt and McGann, 1997). The Dansk Folkeparti, the Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ), and the Vlaams Blok support free trade and the single market, while others such as the France’s FN and the Italian Allianza Nationale (AN) remain more skeptical (Hooghe et al., 2004: 133). This economic aspect, however, has never been central, and as Kitschelt notes the tendency to embrace neoliberalism has declined as radical right parties have increasingly taken a more nationalistic and ethnocentric line (2001: 435; also see Kriesi et al., 2006). The extreme right’s ambivalent position on economic integration combined with its adamant rejection of political integration yields tension, leading one to expect moderate dissent over the EU issue.
The green party family, with ideological roots in the new social movements of the 1960s and 1970s and in the environmental critique of modern industrial society, sits firmly on the left-libertarian or gal (green, alternative, libertarian) end of the new politics spectrum. Green parties have increasingly adopted more favorable attitudes toward European integration, but I nonetheless expect them to be somewhat divided over the issue, as it rekindles pre-existing divisions. As Hooghe and Marks (2008) note, “For left/gal parties [e.g. green parties], the EU remains a difficult proposition because it combines gal policies with market liberalism.” On the one hand, essential values of the green movement, e.g. environmental sustainability, social justice, and global security, necessitate transnational or international coordination. Thus, the rhetoric of green parties suggests support for the “uniting of the peoples” of Europe and the erasure of borders to the extent that such action facilitates solutions to transnational problems and diminishes nationalist sentiments. On the other hand, paramount to green values is a sharp critique of advanced industrial society and the environmental, social, and human costs that accompany economic and technological advancement. Clearly, the EU’s focus on market principles, economic growth, and free trade does not sit well with this core green criticism.

Moreover, European integration revives the traditional strategic division between “realists” (favoring pragmatic efforts to gain and hold power) and “fundamentalists” (favoring strict adherence to ideology) (Doherty, 1992; Burchell, 2001; also see Poguntke, 1989; Kitschelt, 1988). To a large extent this debate has been resolved since even contemporary activists are likely to concede the utility of parliamentary representation in achieving green objectives (Doherty, 2002; Carter, 2001; Bomberg and
Carter, 2006: S99); nevertheless, its legacy persists and is brought into sharp relief in the context of European integration. The theory of political organization espoused by green parties – entailing direct democracy, decentralization, local influence, and diffusion of power (Burchell, 2001; Verdung, 1989; Kemp and Wall, 1990; Hainsworth, 1990) – is at odds with the EU’s remoteness, structural hierarchy, and secretive decision making. How can green fundamentalists, pioneers of the “anti-party” party model of grass-roots democracy, accept the apparent “mellowing” of green ideology that seems necessary to participate in the European project (Bomberg and Carter, 2006)?

Importantly, the revived realists/fundamentalists debate is not reserved for organizational matters but carries over into discussions about party programs. The cost of ‘playing the EU game’ seems to be increased de-radicalization, as evidenced by acceptance by some green parties of monetary union, emissions trading, and more recently the Constitutional Treaty\(^\text{19}\) as well as by the growing number of green campaigns focusing on ‘safer’ issues (i.e. reforming EU democracy and accountability) to the neglect of more vital green matters (i.e. the environmental consequences of economic growth or security) (Bomberg, 2002). Many green fundamentalists and grass-root activists have challenged such movements. Divisions within Germany’s Die Grünen, for example, came to light when Joschka Fischer, then Foreign Minister of Germany and leading Green figure, vocally supported a European government as well as NATO and military action in Afghanistan. As Bomberg notes, “These internal divisions [were] not

\[\text{19 Crum suggests that support for Constitutional Treaty by the majority of Green parties (most of whom opposed previous EU Treaties) may signal a trend toward Green parties “shedding their anti-establishment views and merging into the political mainstream” (2007: 74).}\]
new, but EU developments and activity certainly exposed and exacerbated them” (Bomberg, 2002: 37).

Finally, straddling both the new politics cleavage and the traditional left/right class cleavage, radical parties of the new left should be lightening rods for internal dissent.20 As the saying goes, “politics makes strange bedfellows”. This is certainly true for new left parties which tend to be umbrella organizations allying communists – rooted on the extreme left of the class cleavage – with ecologists, feminists, civil rights proponents, and anti-war activists – rooted on the left-libertarian or gael end of the new politics cleavage.21 While their communist heritage leads them to solidly reject economic integration for reasons already mentioned, the diverse preferences of the left-libertarian elements of these parties result in unclear stances on the political end. Despite this general ambiguity, however, the dominant tendency is to embrace political integration as it minimizes nationalism, promotes broad democratic and human rights, and encourages equal treatment of women and minorities. These disparate positions on the political and economic aspects of integration make new left parties susceptible to internal dissent.

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20 In their mapping of a new structural conflict in Western Europe, Kriesi et al. (2006: 925) place both the new left and the greens in the upper left-hand corner, indicating their preference for integration on the cultural dimension and demarcation on the economic dimension. This placement supports the expectation described here.

21 Finland’s Left Alliance provides a telling case in point. Based on the core values of freedom, democracy, and socially and ecologically sustainable development, the party was founded in 1990 from a merger of the Communist Party of Finland (SKP) with the Finnish People’s Democratic League (SKDL) and the Finnish Women’s Democratic League (SNDL); its one representative in the European Parliament sits with the United Left/Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL) party group. See http://www.vasemmistolitto.fi/en_GB/ (accessed 29 July 2007).
Patterns of Intra-Party Dissent

Does cleavage theory provide a useful explanation of internal party dissent over European integration? If the answer to this question is positive, i.e. if present-day dissent over European integration echoes pre-existing tensions, we should observe clear patterns of intra-party dissent. First, internal dissent over European integration should remain relatively stable over time. And second, party families – reflecting the amalgamation of parties’ historical experiences (including their past political divides) – should exhibit predictable patterns of variation in intra-party dissent. Cleavage theory implies durability. The ideologies, social institutions, and configurations of political contestation stemming from traditional social cleavages may not be frozen, but they are also not ephemeral. The influence of such structures persists and continually shapes how actors react to new situations and issues. Strategic theories, by contrast, suggest change. Identities and positions are more fleeting since they reflect how actors maneuver to capture votes or to alter the underlying dimensions of competition.

To measure intra-party dissent over European integration, I employ data stemming from three expert surveys carried out in 1996, 1999, and 2002 by researches at the University of North Carolina in Chapel Hill. My measure of intra-party dissent is based on a question asking country experts to evaluate the overall level of dissent within national political parties on European integration. For 1996 and 1999, the question utilizes a five-point scale, with the lowest score indicating complete unity and the highest score indicating that the majority of activists are opposed to the party leadership. The central dissent question in the 2002 survey asks experts to evaluate the overall level of dissent.

22 For exact question wordings and complete descriptions of the data sets, see Ray (1999); Steenbergen and Marks (2007); Marks et al. (2006).
dissent on a ten-point scale, ranging from “a party is completely united” (1) to “a party is completely divided” (10). For the descriptive section of the empirical analysis, I convert all responses to a ten-point scale to facilitate the merger of data from the three time points. The ordinary least squares (OLS) regression in the later empirical section only incorporates information from the 2002 survey.

On the whole, the data are consistent with a cleavage theory explanation of intra-party dissent. Beginning with the time element, internal party dissent displays little variation over the 1996-2002 period. I assess stability over time for each party family by treating intra-party dissent as a repeated measures variable (since it recurs in 1996, 1999, and 2002) and using the general linear model (GLM) procedure to obtain an analysis of variation. The results of the analysis suggest stability. None of the tests of within-subject effects are significant, indicating that intra-party dissent does not change considerably across the three time points.23

The patterns of party family variation illustrated in Figures 2.1 and 2.2 are in line with the expectations laid out in the previous section. Figure 2.1 pools expert survey data from 1996, 1999, and 2002 and charts the proportion of each party family that experiences high (black), medium (grey), and low (white) intra-party dissent. To establish these categories, I determine the mean level of internal dissent for all political parties at each time point. I then ascertain which parties fall one standard deviation or more below the mean point (low dissent parties), one standard deviation or more above the mean point (high dissent parties), and in the middle range (medium dissent parties).

23 Details are available upon request.
Low dissent is rare overall. Only 14 percent of the political parties included in the analysis fall into this category. Indeed, no party family breaks the 33 percent mark (with the liberals coming closest at 29 percent), and two party families – protestant and agrarian – register no parties having low dissent. In the post-Maastricht environment of heightened salience and greater contestation of EU issues, few parties seem able to escape internal dissent.

High dissent, by contrast, varies considerably, ranging from no high dissent parties in the Christian democratic and regionalist families to 57 percent in the case of the agrarians. Both sets of mainstream parties originating in the class cleavage appear prone to dissent, with 30 percent of conservative parties and 18 percent of social democratic parties classified as having high levels of dissent. For conservatives, the historical
tension between their national and neoliberal doctrines seems to be exacerbated by the
difficult decisions they face in the economic and political spheres of integration.
Similarly, the large percentage of social democratic parties marked by dissent is
consistent with the notion that market integration highlights the endemic socialist trade-off between protecting national social democratic achievements and pursuing progressive social policies at the transnational level.

Party families are not homogeneous groups. The effects of successive cleavages
are filtered through existing institutions and are powerfully shaped by elite interaction in
the formation of party systems (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967; Sartori, 1968; Kitschelt, 1997).
While differences among party families allow us to explain a large portion of the variance
among individual political parties, the power of the cleavage hypothesis is magnified
when we peer inside party families. The graphs below (Figure 2.2) differentiate subsets
within the social democratic, conservative, liberal, and radical left party families and
chart the proportion of each subgroup that displays high (black), medium (grey), and low
(white) intra-party dissent. The purchase gained by adopting this more refined approach
is immediately apparent. All four figures are consistent with a cleavage explanation of
intra-party dissent, with the conservative and radical left party families exhibiting sharp
differences between subsets and the socialist and liberal party families demonstrating
milder (though nonetheless significant) differentiation.

Focusing on the two cases where variation is the starkest, we find that
conservative parties of a national bent are more likely to display high dissent than their
neoliberal counterparts. Sixty percent of national conservatives are classified as high
dissenters, while no neoliberal parties fall into this category. Comparing mean levels of
intra-party dissent for the two groups is also telling: on a ten-point scale running from lower levels of dissent (1) to higher levels of dissent (10), the score of the national conservative parties is 5.9, over two times that of the economic conservative grouping. We likewise see sharp differences between subsets of the radical left party family. While there are no communist high dissent parties, almost one-third of new left parties fit this classification (see Figure 2.2b). It appears that new left parties such as Denmark’s *Socialistisk Folkeparti* (SF) – rooted in popular socialism and the green movement – and Spain’s *Izquierda Unida* (IU) – founded by a coalition of communist, humanist, green, and republican parties – face an uphill, and currently losing, battle bringing together their anti-(economic) integration communist elements and their more pro- (political) integration left-libertarian factions.
Sources: Intra-party dissent over European integration: Ray (1999a), Marks and Steenbergen (1999), Hooghe et al. (2002). Party family subgroups: Conservative (N=30): Marks and Wilson (2001: 456). Radical left (N=35): Coding based on core ideological tendency of party leadership. For coalition parties or parties formed through mergers, the core tenents of each partner are considered. Socialist (N=45): Strength of national social democracy is the combined scores for social democratic participation in government, organisational strength of labour, and extent to which resources in a society are allocated authoritatively; see Marks and Wilson (2001: 444). Liberal (N=41): Kirchner (1988) and Beyme (1985).

FIGURE 2.2: Distribution of parties by intra-party dissent, broken down by party family subgroups (1996-2002)
Although variation in the socialist party family is less pronounced, Figure 2.2c shows that high dissent parties are more common in countries with legacies of strong social democracy (27 percent) than in those with weak social democratic traditions (6 percent). The *Socialdemokratiet i Danmark* (SD) and Sweden’s *Arbetarepartiet Socialdemokraterna* (SAP) fall into the former category. Given their roles in establishing strong social democracy at home, it has been difficult for these parties to come to terms with a European construct that is characterized by negative integration. Though both the SD and the SAP have formally endorsed the European project of regulated capitalism, vocal factions within each maintain stark opposition (Aylott, 1997, 2002; Lawler, 1997; Sitter, 2001; Lindtröm, 1993; Saglie, 2000).

**A Statistical Model of Intra-party Dissent**

Descriptive statistics allow only a limited assessment of the cleavage theory hypothesis. In this section, I conduct a more rigorous analysis of intra-party dissent over European integration by developing an *index of cleavage tension* to estimate historical divisions within party families. I use this variable to examine the central hypothesis that prior tensions within party families and within individual parties are reactivated by the two-pronged nature of European integration (i.e. its economic and political dimensions), leading to internal dissent. I test this proposition using 2002 expert survey data while controlling for other factors, namely electoral system, occurrence of an EU referendum, left/right extremism, government participation, and EU party position.

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24 Note that social democratic dominance has lapsed in both countries recently. The 2001 and 2005 Danish elections resulted in coalitions led by the centre-right *Venstre* (V), and the control of the Swedish SAP ended in 2006 with the ascendance of the centre-right *Moderata samlingspartiet* (M).

25 An alternative specification of the cleavage theory hypothesis is to use party family dummies (Chapter 1). Such an analysis yields results similar to those presented here.
Developing a single variable to capture cleavage tensions is a challenge, for it requires quantifying the historical characteristics and programmatic pledges of parties. To construct the *index of cleavage tension*, I plot the ten Western European party families (and their subsets) on two scales corresponding to the political and economic dimensions of European integration. Both scales range from strongly in favor (+2) to strongly opposed (-2), with zero representing a neutral point. I rely on descriptions provided by Marks et al, supplemented by standard secondary sources, to identify the positions of party families (Marks et al., 2002: 587). A party family’s score on a specific dimension of European integration should summarize its historical legacies and programmatic commitments on that particular aspect of integration. My expectation is that the tension between the economic and political dimensions is a decisive source of intra-party dissent. To capture this tension, I measure the distance between a party family’s positions on each of the scales. If a party family crosses the midpoint, i.e. if it is moderately or strongly opposed on one dimension and moderately or strongly in favor on the other, I multiply the family’s score by two.

Table 2.1 provides summary scores of the index of cleavage tension for the various party families and their subsets.
### TABLE 2.1: Summary scores of index of cleavage tension

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party Family</th>
<th>Cleavage Location</th>
<th>Position on European Economic Integration</th>
<th>Position on European Political Integration</th>
<th>Secondary Sources</th>
<th>Index of Cleavage Tension</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Radical left communist</td>
<td><em>Class cleavage:</em> extreme left on state regulation of markets, welfare, social justice, democratic decision making.</td>
<td><em>Strongly opposed:</em> integration increases economic inequality and decreases the capacity of national governments to regulate markets. (-2)</td>
<td><em>Moderately opposed:</em> supranational institutions are inherently undemocratic and controlled by corporate interests. (-1)</td>
<td>Middlemas 1980; Christensen 1996; Kitschelt 1994; Waller and Fennema 1988; Timmermann 1987</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>new left</td>
<td><em>New politics cleavage:</em> extreme left in some countries; environmental protection, life-style choice, women’s and minority rights.</td>
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<tr>
<td>strong national social democracy</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>weak national social democracy</td>
<td><em>Moderately in favour:</em> integration increases economic growth. (+1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE 2.1: continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party Family</th>
<th>Cleavage Location</th>
<th>Position on European Economic Integration</th>
<th>Position on European Political Integration</th>
<th>Secondary Sources</th>
<th>Index of Cleavage Tension</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>Centre/periphery cleavage (UK, Germany); church/state cleavage (Low Countries, France, Italy, Spain); opposition to ascription, clericalism, and aristocracy, and support for economic and political freedoms.</td>
<td>Strongly in favour: integration enhances market competition and economic freedoms. (+2)</td>
<td>Neutral: limited supranational authority is necessary to facilitate free markets; however, oppose re-regulation at European level. (0)</td>
<td>Beyme 1985; Salvadori 1977; Smith 1988; Bille and Pedersen 2004; Kirchner 1988; Benedetto and Quaglia 2007; Callot 1988; Guiat 2003</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>conservative/ economic</td>
<td>Strongly in favour: integration enhances market competition and economic freedoms. (+2)</td>
<td>Strongly in favour: supranationalism moderates nationalism; political freedom from borders increased; however, democracy is weakened. (+2)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Family</td>
<td>Cleavage Location</td>
<td>Position on European Economic Integration</td>
<td>Position on European Political Integration</td>
<td>Secondary Sources</td>
<td>Index of Cleavage Tension</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>Class cleavage: support for free markets, minimal state intervention, and defence of national community.</td>
<td>Strongly in favour: integration extends free markets and pressures competing national governments to reduce market regulation. (+2)</td>
<td>Neutral: limited supranational authority is necessary to facilitate free markets. (0)</td>
<td>Baker et al 1993; Demker 1997; Harmel and Svasand 1997; Evans 1998; Garry 1995; Norris and Lovenduski 2004; Sowemimo 1996; Whiteley 1994; Whiteley and Seyd 1999; Hainsworth 1999; Knapp and Le Gales 1993</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>economic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Strongly opposed: supranational authority undermines national sovereignty, national culture, and democracy. (-2)</td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>national</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>Church/state cleavage: support for social market economy, supranational Catholic church, conservative values.</td>
<td>Strongly in favour: integration increases economic growth and limits division within Europe. (+2)</td>
<td>Strongly in favour: supranational institutions provide a capacity for positive regulation while constraining nationalism. (+2)</td>
<td>Durand 1997; Gerard and Hecke 2004; Hanley 1994; Irving 1979; Kalyvas 1996; Lamberts 1997; van Kersbergen 1994; van Hecke 2004</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>democratic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Family</td>
<td>Cleavage Location</td>
<td>Position on European Economic Integration</td>
<td>Position on European Political Integration</td>
<td>Secondary Sources</td>
<td>Index of Cleavage Tension</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td>Church/state cleavage: fundamentalist Lutheran opposition to liberalism, permissiveness, and central state elites.</td>
<td>Moderately in favour: integration weakens the role of the state in the economy. (+1)</td>
<td>Strongly opposed: integration shifts authority further away from national control to a more alien cultural milieu. (-2)</td>
<td>Valen and Rokkan 1974; Karvonen 1994; Madeley 1994, 2004</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agrarian</td>
<td>Centre/periphery cleavage (Scandinavia, Switzerland): defence of farmers and the periphery.</td>
<td>Moderately in favour: integration is driven mainly by industrial and commercial interests but includes agriculture subsidies and may entail economic benefits. (+1)</td>
<td>Moderately opposed: shifts authority further away from local control to a more alien cultural milieu. (-1)</td>
<td>Christensen 1997; Elder and Gooderham 1978; Urwin 1980; Arter 2001; Sundberg 1999; Batory and Sitter 2004;</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: This table modifies and extends Marks, Wilson, & Ray, 2002, p. 587. Position on European economic/political integration measured on a four-point scale ranging from strongly in favor (+2) to strongly opposed (-2), with 0 representing a neutral point. Index of cleavage tension is the distance between a party family’s positions on the European economic/political integration scales. If a party family crosses the midpoint, i.e. if it is moderately or strongly opposed on one dimension and moderately or strongly in favor on the other, the score by multiplied by two, e.g. the index of cleavage tension for national conservatives = 8 [4 (distance) * 2 (crosses midpoint)].
In addition to the main variable of interest, I incorporate a number of controls to account for national and individual party characteristics. At the national level, I control for type of electoral system and the occurrence (at any point) of a referendum on European integration. Research on parliamentary unity suggests that the institutional setting can have a significant bearing on the internal divisiveness of political parties (Katz, 1980; Boucek, 2002; Harmel and Janda, 1982; Bowler et al., 1999). In particular, parties competing in plurality systems tend to be more internally divided than those competing in proportional representation (PR) systems. There is also good reason to believe that political parties from countries that have held referendums on European integration may be more prone to internal dissent. National referendums take contestation out of the hands of parties and deliver it to citizens who cast votes not for political parties, but for (or often against) a particular issue (Leduc, 2002; de Vreese, 2006; Hobolt, 2006). Consequently, they tend to be “flash points” for the politicization of EU issues and often lead to party disunity (Hooghe and Marks, 2008).

At the individual party level, I include controls for left/right extremism, government participation, and EU position. Scholars have shown that peripheral parties that are marginalized on the main left/right axis of contention look for secondary issues (e.g. the EU) on which to compete (Riker, 1982; Rabinowitz and Macdonald, 1989), a strategy that should only work if the party is relatively united on the issue. The amount of time a party has spent in government may also influence internal dissent. Parties that are in government often have more opportunities to steer the trajectory of European integration, making them more likely to stand united behind the project. Governing parties also have a functional need to be united since they must travel to Brussels and
negotiate with a coherent voice on specific EU policy issues. Finally, I control for a party’s EU position anticipating that pro-integrationist parties will be more united on EU issues than their more Euroskeptic counterparts. The table below summarizes the indicators used in the analysis.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intra-party dissent</td>
<td>Degree of dissent within a party on European integration as measured using the following expert survey items: For 1984-99, “[What is] the degree of dissent within the party over the party leadership’s position?” (1=complete unity; 5=leadership position opposed by a majority of party activists). For 2002, “How much internal dissent has there been in the various parties in [COUNTRY] over European integration over the course of 2002?” (1=party is completely united; 10=party is extremely divided). To facilitate comparison over time, all responses are converted to a 10-point scale with lower scores indicating minor dissent and higher scores representing major dissent. Sources: Ray (1999), Marks and Steenbergen (1999), Hooghe et al. (2002).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Index of cleavage tension</td>
<td>A variable capturing the historical experiences or programmatic commitments of political parties. 0=no tension; 8=extreme tension. Sources: See Table 2.1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral system</td>
<td>A dummy variable indicating the type of electoral system a country employs. 1=proportional representation (PR with or without thresholds, mixed member PR, Greece’s reinforced PR), 0=plurality/majority (first-past-the-post, single transferable vote, France’s two round system)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Referendum</td>
<td>A dummy variable indicating that a country has held a referendum on an EU issue. 1=referendum; 0=no referendum.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left/right extremism</td>
<td>A dummy variable indicating that a party is one standard deviation above or below the mean left/right ideological position of all parties in a given year. Sources: Ray (1999), Marks and Steenbergen (1999), Hooghe et al. (2002).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government participation</td>
<td>Cumulative months a political party has been in government since 1980.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU position</td>
<td>EU position as measured using the following item: “[What is] the overall orientation of the party leadership toward European integration?” (1=strongly opposed to integration; 7=strongly in favour of integration). This variable was centred on the mean. Sources: Ray (1999), Marks and Steenbergen (1999), Hooghe et al. (2002).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 2.3: Analysis of intra-party dissent over European integration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Unstandardized Coefficients (b)</th>
<th>Robust Standard Errors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Index of cleavage tension</td>
<td>0.230*</td>
<td>0.047</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral system</td>
<td>0.106</td>
<td>0.169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Referendum</td>
<td>0.070</td>
<td>0.124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left/right extremism</td>
<td>-0.168</td>
<td>0.277</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government participation</td>
<td>0.004*</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Position</td>
<td>-0.477*</td>
<td>0.129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>5.204*</td>
<td>0.824</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[R^2 = 0.510\]
N 85

**Notes:** Table entries are OLS estimates with robust, cluster-corrected standard errors. All party-level variables have been weighted by vote size. *p<0.01 (two-tailed).

The OLS regression results presented in Table 2.3 confirm the cleavage hypothesis. The coefficient for the index of cleavage tension is positive and statistically significant. Moreover, computing the predicted probabilities reveals that cleavage tension has a large substantive effect: intra-party dissent increases by 18 percent when the strength of the cleavage tension variable moves from its minimum (1) to its maximum (8) value.\(^{26}\) These results suggest that current schisms within political parties over European integration are largely manifestations of entrenched, pre-existing hostilities. Internal divisions on EU issues arise when parties are unable to reconcile the two streams – economic and political – of European integration. The findings presented in Table 2.3 indicate that a political party’s ability to successfully square these two, often competing, aspects of the European project depends on the party’s past experiences.

\(^{26}\) The predicted probabilities are calculated using CLARIFY (Tomz et al., 2003).
Conclusion

For much of the EU’s history, political parties have avoided politicizing integration for fear of provoking internal conflict. Research has shown that this apprehension is well founded. Disunity hampers effective partisan cueing, diminishes electoral popularity, and at its extreme can be the death nell of a political party. But as Hooghe and Marks (2008) note, “With the Maastricht Accord of 1991, decision making on European integration entered the contentious world of party competition, elections, and referendums.” In other words, conflict over the EU is inescapable in Europe’s existing political environment, and it appears that for many political parties so, too, is internal dissent.

Returning to the question posed at the outset, which political parties are most vulnerable to divisive pressures? This article has argued that an answer to this question can be found by applying Lipset and Rokkan’s theory of social cleavages. The central thesis posited here is that current rifts within political parties reflect deep-seated tensions rekindled by the dual European integration. Consequently, to understand current divides over Europe, such as that faced by France’s Parti Socialiste, we must turn to their distinctive historical legacies rooted in societal cleavages.

The empirical results presented in this article lend credence to this assertion. Data from expert surveys on party positioning on European integration reveal that intra-party dissent displays stability over time, yet varies in an explicable way across and within party families. Political parties are products of their past, profoundly shaped by their enduring ideological tendencies, long-standing constituency ties, programmatic commitments, and, from a longer historical perspective, by prior crises and upheavals.
Embedded historical experience provides a key not only to the positions that political parties take on Europe, but also to the extent to which European issues engender conflict within parties. The findings of this article add to the body of literature on cleavage theory and party positioning, bolstering the notion that historical predispositions rooted in political cleavages provide “‘prism[s]’ through which political parties come to terms with new issues that arise in a polity” (Marks and Wilson, 2001: 459). By focusing on internal party dissent, this study addresses a fundamental lacuna in the literature on party politics.
CHAPTER 3
WHO’S CUEING WHOM? MASS-ELITE LINKAGES AND THE FUTURE OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION*

In recent years, ‘Euroskepticism’ has become a standard theme in the public opinion literature about European integration. Scholars generally agree that the age of “permissive consensus” (Lindberg and Scheingold, 1970) died with the Maastricht Treaty and gave way to a “constraining dissensus” (Hooghe and Marks, 2005). Although there have been downturns in public support for European integration before, it is clear that Europeans have grown considerably more weary of the integration process than they once were. The outcomes of the recent referendums in France and the Netherlands illustrate this new public sentiment towards the European Union (EU).

Euroskepticism may be as much a reaction of discontent with the politics of European integration as it is a reaction of discontent with specific policies. In the aftermath of the French and Dutch referendums of 2005, there was a great deal of discussion about an alleged gap between the political elites and the masses. Many argued that pro-European political elites had been so eager to pursue further integration that they had lost track of the concerns and desires of the citizens. They also failed to persuade citizens of the wisdom of their policies. Instead, critics argued, the elites had moved

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ahead with European integration in a vacuum of public support, as became painfully evident during the referendums. The French and Dutch were frustrated that they had been ignored by the elites, and this resulted in a resounding ‘nay’ against the European Constitution.

Accusations that political elites are out of touch are rarely new and usually politically motivated. This is undoubtedly true as well for the recent referendums, which were unmitigated debacles for pro-European politicians and provided ample ammunition for their opponents. Nevertheless, these accusations demonstrate once more the importance of understanding mass-elite linkages in the process of European integration. Who is driving integration – the masses, the elites, or perhaps both? Put differently, who is cueing whom?

Mass-elite linkages can take two forms. First, political elites can adopt whatever position the mass public takes on European integration. This bottom-up connection – Carrubba (2001) calls it an “electoral connection” – assures correspondence between masses and elites through a process of representation. Second, mass publics can adopt the positions of the political elites. This top-down process assures correspondence between masses and elites through a process of information and persuasion. The breakdown of either process could cause a disconnection between masses and elites.

There is now considerable evidence for both of these processes. Evidence for a bottom-up process is most prominent in Carrubba (2001), while evidence for a top-down process is evident in a variety of studies (Feld and Wildgen, 1976; Franklin et al., 1994; Weßels, 1995; Steenbergen and Jones, 2002; Ray, 2003). However, with few exceptions (most notably Weßels, 1995), there have been no systematic efforts to estimate the
impact of both processes simultaneously. Moreover, efforts to understand the contingent nature of cueing effects have only recently begun and have focused exclusively on the top-down linkage (see Ray, 2003). Thus, our understanding of mass-elite linkages in the context of European integration remains incomplete.

This article revisits the question of who is cueing whom. Using Eurobarometer and expert survey data for the period 1984-2002, we estimate a series of dynamic simultaneous equations models that allow for both top-down and bottom-up effects. Our focus is on linkages between national party elites and their supporters, since this has been the emphasis of most prior studies and is a particularly good place to observe the politics of European integration. We consider how context and attributes of political parties and their supporters influence the nature of the linkage between these actors. We conclude by drawing out the implications of our findings for the future of European integration.

The Politics of European Integration: Two Views

According to received wisdom, at least until the late 1980s the process of European integration was accompanied by a “permissive consensus” on the part of the European citizenry. The technical nature of the European project and its marginal impact on the individual lives of citizens created a scenario in which an ill-informed, disinterested, and generally favorably disposed public gave political elites free reign in pursuing integration. For the most part, the permissive consensus thesis suggests that there is no mass-elite linkage or that, if one exists, it is only ever so slight and runs from top to bottom (see Feld and Wildgen, 1976).
Much has been made of the ‘erosion’ of this permissive consensus in the post-Maastricht era. The EU of the 1990s and of today is more relevant to the lives and interests of European citizens, as it increasingly affects their individual welfare and involves policies (notably the common currency, citizenship, immigration, common defense and foreign policy) that are both highly salient and highly controversial (Gabel, 2000; Hooghe and Marks, 2005). Moreover, recent scholarship casts doubt on the permissive consensus theory. Research on public support for European integration suggests that even relatively disinterested and ill-informed individuals hold meaningful and systematic preferences on the EU. Relying on self-interest and macro-economic explanations of political attitudes, utilitarian theory implies that those who experience direct material gains from EU policies tend to support integration, while those who are hurt by such policies are likely to be against it (Eichenberg and Dalton, 1993; Gabel, 1998a, 1998b; Anderson and Reichert, 1995;). Work on national identity and support for integration also suggests the public holds meaningful preferences on the EU but that their evaluations rely on symbolic political considerations, i.e. feelings of national identity (Carey, 2002; McLaren, 2002; Hooghe and Marks, 2005; De Vries and Edwards, 2009).

**European Integration as a Bottom-Up Process**

This work on public opinion and mass behavior suggests the potential for a bottom-up connection, whereby mass publics shape elite positions over European integration. One implication of the EU becoming a more salient issue and of individuals holding systematic preferences on European integration is that rational political parties have a strong incentive to base their positions toward EU policies on electorate
preferences (Carrubba, 2001). While parties may not be seeking to turn the EU into an issue to attract new voters, surely they are paying attention to their constituents in order to avoid losing them. If it is true that voters are now paying attention to the EU, then no rational party would pursue unpopular policies. Instead, parties would actively monitor the electorate, in particular their constituents, making sure to be on the same wavelength on EU matters. Note that in contrast to the permissive consensus argument, here constituents do not simply loosely define the space in which political elites can maneuver; rather, constituents continually feed party elites with information about their preferences, to which these elites invariably respond. In sum, the causal arrow goes from constituents to party elites.

In a recent article, Carrubba (2001) finds that there is evidence for this bottom-up connection in the EU and, moreover, that this is not a post-Maastricht phenomenon. Using a two-stage least squares regression model and party manifesto data from 1977-1992, Carrubba demonstrates that “the more pro-EU the electorate is, the more pro-EU national parties tend to be” (p. 153). His results are particularly suggestive since he focuses on the EU pre-Maastricht. It seems reasonable that we would observe public opinion exerting an influence on parties in a post-1992 Europe, in which the EU is salient and contested, but Carrubba shows that national political parties were responding to voters’ preferences on European integration years before the EU became such a heightened issue. Carrubba’s results are provocative and persuasive, in part because his estimates of the bottom-up effect control for potential reverse causation.
European Integration as a Top-Down Process

At least one other interpretation of the correlation between mass and elite preferences on European integration is possible: the causal arrow may flow from elites to masses. This, indeed, is the essence of top-down theories of integration, which stress that citizens take cues from political elites, including party leaders, and adjust their views to be more or less in line with those elites (Feld and Wilgden, 1976; Franklin et al., 1994; Weßels, 1995; Steenbergen and Jones, 2002; Ray, 2003). One theoretical impetus for the top-down view is a more pessimistic reading of the cognitive limitations of citizens than is typically found in bottom-up theories. Top-down theorists argue that European integration presents sufficiently technical issues that citizens may find it hard to formulate a view. For instance, it may be difficult to make utilitarian calculations about the impact of European integration, because it is unclear how the EU affects a person’s life (Chong, 2000). Boundedly rational (Simon, 1985) citizens may look for elite cues, including those from parties they tend to support, and may adjust their views accordingly, either through information or through persuasion (Zaller, 1992; Lupia and McCubbins, 1998). The top-down view may also represent a division of labor between citizens and elites, whereby citizens expect elites to provide them with information that can inform their opinions.

There is impressive evidence of top-down effects on public opinion toward European integration. The 1989 European Election Study provides evidence that the opinions of party supporters are for the most part related to the opinions taken by parties (van de Eijk and Franklin, 1996). Using party manifesto data as an indicator of a party’s position on European integration, Weßels analyzes the direction of influence between the
parties and their electorates and finds that “parties are able to mobilize their supporters, bringing them closer to the party, whether for or against the EC” (1995: 161). In his test of various theories of support for integration, Gabel (1998b) demonstrates that alongside utilitarian considerations elite cues are an important influence on public opinion. Similarly, Anderson (1998) illustrates that at least in some countries, notably Denmark and France, political influences are a key determinant of public support for the EU.

One of the most recent and informative contributions to this body of literature is Ray’s (2003) evaluation of the conditional influence of party positions on public opinion toward the EU. Ray points out that the empirical record of elite cueing is rather mixed when it comes to European integration and argues that the contradictory results stem from the conditional nature of partisan influence. His findings indicate that the effect of party positions on the electorate varies with levels of disagreement among parties, party unity, issue salience, and party attachment. Ray’s work is a significant advancement over many of the previous studies in that, like Carrubba (2001), he controls for reverse causation.27

A Conditional Duel-Process Model

Much of the literature gives predominance to either the bottom-up or top-down model of European integration. We start form the assumption that both are operating simultaneously. On one hand, it is increasingly costly for political parties to ignore public opinion. Although the issue has not yet led to a wholesale transformation of party competition in Europe, political entrepreneurs such as Haider in Austria, Le Pen in

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27 In examining the influence of intra-party dissent on voter opinion, Gabel and Scheve (2007) also control for reverse causation by means of an instrumental variable approach.
France, and Wilders in the Netherlands seem eager to wake the “sleeping giant” (van der Eijk and Franklin, 2004). On the other hand, it is also clear that politicians hope to manufacture the views that they would like to represent. Europeans may not be complete tabulae rasae when it comes to European integration, but neither are their views completely determined and unsusceptible to persuasion and information.

We propose, then, a dual-process model of European integration, whereby elites simultaneously seek to influence and respond to the mass public. Such a model requires that we estimate reciprocal effects between masses and elites. Reciprocal causation is not just a statistical nuisance that one has to deal with in order to test one’s favorite theory, be it bottom-up or top-down. Rather, reciprocal causation is of substantive interest, as bottom-up and top-down processes may be mutually reinforcing.

At the same time, we should allow the bottom-up and top-down effects to be conditional in nature. Too much of the literature assumes that these effects unfold in a homogeneous manner across different contexts. Ray’s (2003) work has begun to acknowledge the conditional nature of top-down processes. We believe that this work should be expanded by considering a greater variety of moderators and by extending the condition-seeking approach to bottom-up processes as well. In the end, we may find that the bottom-up and top-down processes operate uniformly. But such a finding cannot be a foregone conclusion, as bottom-up and top-down processes may respond to the electoral context of a nation, as well as attributes of party elites and supporters. We now consider these factors and suggest how they could influence mass-elite linkages.
Electoral Context

Three aspects of a nation’s electoral context may influence mass-elite linkages. First, the electoral system matters, whereby we draw a distinction between plurality and proportional representation (PR) systems. In keeping with Weßels (1999), we argue that party elites in PR systems focus on representing the party median, whereas parties in plurality systems are more concerned with the median voter. Since our focus is on linkages between party elites and party supporters, our prediction is that the bottom-up connection should be stronger in PR than in plurality systems. Top-down linkages may also be stronger in PR systems because parties tend to be less broad, as factions can split off while still retaining a decent chance of winning seats. Since parties are less broad, they are more likely to present a unified message on the topic of European integration.

A second aspect of electoral context concerns the proximity of an election. Although rational party elites should continuously monitor mass preferences for integration, elections should create particularly strong incentives for elites to pay attention to the cues that their supporters give. Evidence for this hypothesis can be found in a study by Weßels (1995). Using Comparative Manifesto Project and Eurobarometer data from 1973 to 1991, he shows that in the nine months prior to an election, the relationship is largely bottom-up, as constituents exert a strong influence on the EU planks of the election manifestos. That said, during the pre- and post-election periods, i.e. three months before and after the election, the elite-mass linkages regarding European integration are by and large top-down. During these periods, parties may tune out

28 We would have made the opposite prediction had we focused on mass-elite linkages defined in terms of the median voter (see Adams et al., 2004).
constituents’ concerns and constituents may stop paying attention to issues, relying instead on party cues.

Finally, referendums provide a powerful mechanism for creating a bottom-up linkage between parties and their supporters. Countries that have referendums provide citizens with an alternative pathway for influencing policy, especially if the referendums are binding. Since it is potentially costly for party elites to embark on policies only to find them repudiated in a referendum, the referendum mechanism provides strong incentives for political parties to align their policy stances with the positions of their constituents. Party elites can no longer safely assume that their supporters will follow their lead in referendums (Siune et al., 1994; Buch and Hansen, 2002), as the Dutch and French social democrats discovered in the referendums over the European Constitution. On the contrary, it may be increasingly the case that parties want to know how their supporters feel before deciding what side to take in the campaign.

Referendums may also influence top-down linkages. Party elites who know that major EU policy changes have to go through a referendum have strong incentives to spend more time informing and persuading their supporters of the benefits of their views. Thus, referenda may instill in party elites a habit of taking their case to the public, which should strengthen the top-down connection.

Attributes of Parties and the Party System

Several attributes of political parties are important in shaping the nature of mass-elite linkages. First, greater issue salience should enhance the influence of parties on voters. If an issue is salient to a party, one can expect the party to vocalize its position
clearly and frequently. Such a strong signal means that even those who pay relatively little attention to politics are likely to be exposed to the party position (Zaller, 1992). By contrast, parties who place little emphasis on an issue are less likely to send a strong signal about their position, which in turn reduces their ability to cue their electorates. Thus, the more salient European integration is to a party, the more likely the party is to influence its voters (Ray, 2003).

We are less clear about the effect of salience on the bottom-up linkage. On one hand, parties may make a strategic decision to emphasize European integration, since they know that their position corresponds to that of their supporters (Steenbergen and Scott, 2004; Netjes and Binnema, 2006). On the other hand, salience may be a reflection of strong EU preferences of the party leadership, making it more difficult for party elites to adjust their views to supporters.

Second, the ability of a political party to effectively influence voters on EU issues is conditioned by the degree of intra-party dissent. More unified parties should exert greater influence over party supporters than more divided parties. European integration has provoked deep tensions inside several major parties, including the French Gaullists, the British Conservatives, the German CSU, the Danish and Swedish Social Democrats, and more recently the French Socialists, and the Dutch VVD. Disagreement within parties about the correct position to take on European integration can be expected to weaken the ability of a party to influence the opinions of its electorate (Ray, 2003; Gabel and Scheve, 2007). The presentation of competing messages by various party leaders will muddle the cues sent by the party to its supporters (Zaller, 1992). Moreover, cues may be muffled if internal party divisions deter a party from public discussion of European issues.
At the same time, the influence of party supporters might be increased in divided parties, as party elites may arbitrate between competing views by determining what is most popular with party supporters.

At the party system level, Ray (2003) has established that top-down effects are more prominent if there is inter-party dissent. The more consensus on European integration there is among political parties, the less political parties will benefit from stressing the issue. As a result, cues from party elites to their supporters will tend to be subdued, thus weakening the top-down effect. At the same time, inter-party consensus signifies a lack of competition over European integration. In the words of van der Eijk and Franklin, “the lack of inter-party policy differences on European matters makes it difficult for parties to fight elections on European issues” (1996: 369; see also Mair, 2000). This should have the effect of reducing the influence of supporters on party elites, thus weakening the bottom-up connection.

**Attributes of Party Supporters**

A final factor affecting the party-electorate linkage concerns the characteristics of the constituents themselves and specifically how many constituents are opinion leaders, defined as those citizens who actively discuss politics and seek to persuade others. Such citizens tend to be more interested in and better informed about politics, characteristics that have important implications. On the one hand, elites of parties with large numbers of opinion leaders may have a harder time ignoring the opinions of their constituents. Larger numbers of their party supporters have crystallized views about European integration, making public opinion more difficult to ignore. Opinion leaders pay attention to politics
and if a party moves too far away from its base, opinion leaders will notice and may communicate that information to other potential voters. Therefore, opinion leadership should intensify cue taking by parties.

There is, however, another side to opinion leadership. As the two-step flow model of communications (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954) would predict, party elites have to rely on opinion leaders to get their messages across to supporters. Parties that are starved from opinion leaders and that face a largely inattentive base may find it extremely difficult to get their point across. Opinion leadership may be important for another reason. Steenbergen and Jones (2002) show a particularly strong responsiveness of opinion leaders to party cues. Thus, parties with large numbers of opinion leaders may have an easier time relaying their message, thereby enhancing cueing effects from parties.

Methods

Data and Measures

Our data span 1984 to 2002 and come from two sources. First, we use Eurobarometers 21, 22, 29, 30, 37, 38, 45.1, 46, 51, 52, and 57.1 to capture public opinion towards European integration at the mass level. Second, we use Ray’s (1999) expert survey and the more recent Chapel Hill expert surveys (for 1999 and 2002) to measure party positions on European integration. While Carrubba (2001) and others have relied on data from the Party Manifesto Project to explore the mass-elite linkage on issues of European integration, we favor using expert survey data because they allow a clearer look at cue taking when there is no election on the horizon. Party manifestos are strategic documents that are written for an election. These documents are likely to reflect the
views of constituents, but they may not provide a good indication about the nature of
cueing during times when electoral concerns are less prominent.

Our measure of a party’s EU stance is the mean expert rating on a 7-point scale of
the party elite’s view of European integration (higher values indicate a more favorable
position). For purposes of the analysis, this scale was recoded to have a range of -1 to 1,
with negative values indicating opposition to European integration and positive values
indicating support. As our estimate of EU support at the mass level we take the following
question: “Generally speaking, do you think that (your country’s) membership in the
European Union is a good thing, neither good nor bad, or a bad thing.” Support for
European integration is measured as the difference between the proportion of a party's
support base who believe the EU is a good thing and the proportion who believe it is a
bad thing (Carrubba, 2001). This variable also has a theoretical range between -1 and 1.

We consider as a party’s support base all those Eurobarometer respondents who
share the ideological orientation of that party, where ideology was operationalized
through five categories (extreme left, moderate left, centre, moderate right, and extreme
right). We first determined party ideology using the Chapel Hill, Castles and Mair (1984),
and Huber and Inglehart (1995) expert surveys. We then matched a Eurobarometer
respondent’s ideology to one or more parties in the respondent’s country. This procedure
is consistent with Carrubba (2001).29

An alternative approach would be to use vote intention. However, this measure is unavailable for the
most recent Eurobarometer surveys. Moreover, vote intention poses methodological concerns because
respondents may intend to vote for a party because of its EU stance. This makes it difficult to determine
whether a respondent’s EU stance is a function of party cues or whether the respondent self-selected into
the party because of its EU stance. Identifying the electorate on the basis of ideology does not raise this
problem and has the added advantage that we do not focus on a party’s current electorate but on its
potential electorate (Carrubba, 2001). Note, however, that there is an implicit model of voting behavior
here that may not always hold true, namely that votes are cast on the basis of ideology using proximity of
the positions of the voter and the party. Nevertheless, identifying party supporters on the basis of ideology
**Statistical Approach**

A major point of difference from Carrubba (2001) and Ray (2003) is that we treat our data as a panel. Carrubba argues strongly against such a conceptualization, but we believe that the data bear all of the hallmarks of a panel. First, we have repeated observations for most of the political parties in our sample (57 percent of the parties are represented at all six time points; only 3.5 percent are represented only once). Second, and perhaps more controversial, we maintain that the data about party supporters can also be treated as a panel. It is true, as Carrubba stresses, that the Eurobarometer surveys do not contain a panel component. As such, no individual respondent is systematically included more than once in the survey. But our analysis does not focus on individuals but on aggregates, specifically on ideological strata. We treat sample statistics in these strata as indicators of the views and demographic characteristics of the support base of a party. Since the same ideological stratum tends to be associated with a given political party at different time points, treating the data about party supporters as a panel seems not only reasonable but necessary to account for autocorrelation. The failure to do so would imply that information about a party’s support base at times $t$ and $t+1$ are independent, which is problematic.

In treating the data as a panel, we encounter the difficulty that some of the predictors are endogenous. Most panel models assume that the predictors are exogenous, but this assumption fails here because of the reciprocal relationship between party elites and party supporters. For example, we would like to predict the EU-stance of party elites from the stance of supporters, but the latter may itself reflect the position of party elites. Seems reasonable. When we matched predicted vote intentions on the basis of ideology to actual vote intentions when we had data on them, we correctly classified 65 percent of the respondents (see also van der Eijk and Franklin, Ch. 20).
To overcome this problem we estimate a panel model with instrumental variables. Specifically, we estimate the following model:

\[ y_{it} = y_{it}\gamma + x_{it}\beta + \mu_i + \nu_{it} \]

Here \( y_{it} \) is the variable we seek to explain (the EU position of party elites or supporters), \( y_{it} \) is a vector of endogenous predictors (the EU position of party supporters and elites, respectively), and \( x_{it} \) is a vector of exogenous predictors, which, for identification purposes, has more elements than \( y_{it} \).\(^{30}\) Further, \( \mu_i \) contains unobserved unit effects (i.e. attributes of parties), whereas \( \nu_{it} \) contains random errors across units and time. Due to the endogenous nature of \( y_{it} \) it is correlated with \( \nu_{it} \). This complicates the estimation of \( \gamma \). An instrumental variables approach replaces \( y_{it} \) by a prediction based on a series of exogenous variables, thus allowing for consistent estimates. Following Baltagi and Chang (2000), we treat \( \mu_i \) as random effects which follow a normal distribution with a mean of zero and a variance of \( \sigma^2_{\mu} \).\(^{31}\) The variance components were estimated using the Swamy-Arora method, which can accommodate the unbalanced nature of our data. The fixed

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\(^{30}\) The model does not contain lagged values of the endogenous variables. Apart from the fact that the use of lagged dependent variables has come under attack in recent years (Achen, 2000), the lags in the current data are too large to be meaningful, averaging a little over two years. Moreover, the present approach addresses autocorrelation through a GLS approach. This approach has been shown to work well (Baltagi and Li, 1992), but, as an added security, we re-estimated the models with year dummies to capture period effects. The results from those models are not fundamentally different as far as the key relationships are concerned.

\(^{31}\) Statistically speaking, a random effects specification is appropriate only if the unit effects are uncorrelated with the exogenous predictors. As an empirical matter, this assumption is much more reasonable in the case of party supporters than in the case of party elites. Hence, we re-estimated the models for the party elites using a fixed effects approach. Although the estimates change somewhat, the overall pattern of the results is similar to those reported here.
effects were estimated using generalized two-stage least squares (G2SLS; Balestra and Varadharajan-Krishnakumar, 1987). All estimations were conducted in Stata version 9.

The exogenous predictors of the positions of party elites were derived mostly from Hooghe et al. (2002). Thus, we include left-right ideology and its square to accommodate the commonly observed curvilinear relationship, whereby the extreme left and extreme right are the least supportive of European integration. We also incorporate participation in the government as a predictor, since parties in the government tend to be more favorably disposed towards integration. To account the possibility that larger parties tend to be more supportive of the EU, we include electoral vote share. Finally, we add in a dummy variable for mainstream parties (Christian democrats, conservatives, liberals, and social democrats) to accommodate the empirical finding that those parties have been the most supportive of the unification process.

In the model for party supporters, we include the following exogenous predictors: median age, proportion of females, proportion of people employed in agriculture, proportion of manual laborers, proportion of non-manual laborers, proportion of executives, proportion of professionals, proportion of unemployed, first, second, and third education and income quartiles, and ideology and ideology squared. These factors have been found to influence opinions at the individual level (see Gabel, 1998a, 1998b) and seem to be good instrumental variables as well. Ideology is also an important control because the same ideological stratum could be the support base for different political parties.

The models for party elites and party supporters also contain a series of country dummy variables. The reason is that we have three levels of analysis in our data:
countries, parties, and time. While we could try to model country differences, this is not our primary interest. Hence, we remove country effects by including dummy variables.

Assessing the conditional nature of top-down and bottom-up effects poses special estimation problems since this involves interactions with the endogenous variables. We address these problems here by using a split-sample approach. That is, for a particular moderator we split the sample in an appropriate way and estimate separate models in each sub-sample. The drawbacks of this approach are two-fold. First, it is difficult to determine if differences in effects are significant, and, second, we are limited to considering the impact of one moderator at a time. Thus, out of necessity our inquiry into the moderator effects will be somewhat impressionistic.32

Results

Simple Models of Mass-Elite Linkages

Table 3.1 shows the estimates from a model without moderators. These estimates suggest that mass-elite linkages flow in both directions. First, we observe a powerful effect of the electorate on party elites, one that is consistent with Carrubba (2001). But we also observe a significant cueing effect of party elites on party supporters. This effect is weaker than the bottom-up flow, but it is consistent with top-down models of the mass-elite linkage. If party supporters were to move from complete opposition to complete support for the EU, then we would expect an increase in EU support of just over one point in the party stance. If the party were to make such a move, then supporters would

32 An alternative strategy is to create interactions between the moderators and the endogenous variables. These should then be treated as endogenous variables in their own right. The problem is that an accumulation of such interaction terms quickly creates problems as we wind up with more endogenous variables than there are instruments.
be expected to move by .14 points – a shift of 14 percentage points in net support for the EU. Of course, these are maximum effects that are not entirely realistic, but they give a good sense of the cueing effects in the data.

On the whole, these results lend support to the dual process model that we have proposed. That is to say, party elites seem responsive to the views of their supporters, but they also help to shape those views. Thus, there is mutual reinforcement between the two types of cueing process. Of course, the results in Table 3.1 are averages of sorts, as they collapse across the different moderators we have identified. We now consider how these moderators influence the estimates of mass elite-linkages.
### TABLE 3.1: Mass-elite linkages and the EU (simple models)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictor</th>
<th>Party Elites b</th>
<th>s.e.</th>
<th>Supporters B</th>
<th>s.e.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EU stance of supporters</td>
<td>0.527**</td>
<td>0.164</td>
<td>0.068*</td>
<td>0.031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU stance of party elites</td>
<td>0.304**</td>
<td>0.042</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party ideology</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party ideology squared</td>
<td>-.030**</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mainstream party</td>
<td>0.452**</td>
<td>0.061</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party in government</td>
<td>0.078**</td>
<td>0.023</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral vote share</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voter ideology</td>
<td>0.129*</td>
<td>0.052</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voter ideology squared</td>
<td>-.022*</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median age</td>
<td>-.002</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion female</td>
<td>-.492**</td>
<td>0.184</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion agriculture</td>
<td>0.267</td>
<td>0.582</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion manual labor</td>
<td>-.480*</td>
<td>0.270</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion non-manual labor</td>
<td>-.800**</td>
<td>0.220</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion executives</td>
<td>0.081</td>
<td>0.287</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion professionals</td>
<td>0.545</td>
<td>0.537</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion unemployed</td>
<td>-.909**</td>
<td>0.349</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt; education quartile</td>
<td>-.005</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt; education quartile</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3&lt;sup&gt;rd&lt;/sup&gt; education quartile</td>
<td>-.013</td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt; income quartile</td>
<td>-.052**</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt; income quartile</td>
<td>0.046**</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3&lt;sup&gt;rd&lt;/sup&gt; income quartile</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-1.215**</td>
<td>0.184</td>
<td>0.457*</td>
<td>0.241</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[
\sigma^2_\mu = 0.518 \quad \text{s.e.} = 0.084 \\
\sigma^2_v = 0.160 \quad \text{s.e.} = 0.158 \\
\rho = 0.913 \quad \text{s.e.} = 0.218 \\
\text{Within-R}^2 = 0.084 \quad \text{s.e.} = 0.107 \\
\text{Between-R}^2 = 0.449 \quad \text{s.e.} = 0.777 \\
\text{Total R}^2 = 0.457 \quad \text{s.e.} = 0.670
\]

**Notes:** Table entries are G2SLS random effects panel estimates and their estimated standard errors. The models include country dummies which have been suppressed in the table (these are available upon request from the authors). \(\rho\) is the proportion of the variance that is due to \(\sigma^2_\mu\). N=535. **p<.01, *p<.05, +p<.10 (one-tailed for EU Stances of Supporters and EU Stances of Party Elites; two-tailed for all other predictors).
Conditional Models of Mass-Elite Linkages

Electoral Context

Several electoral context effects emerge. First, breaking down the panel by electoral system suggests that both bottom-up and top-down linkages between party elites and supporters are stronger in PR systems (see Table 3.2).\(^{33}\) We observe a statistically significant positive effect of party supporters on elites in PR systems, but not in plurality systems. Even more telling is the estimate, which is over five times greater in PR systems.\(^{34}\) Likewise, the effect of party elites on supporters is stronger in PR systems, with the effect running in a negative direction in plurality systems.

Turning our attention to the effect of elections in Table 3.2, we obtain a counter-intuitive finding. First, there appears to be little impact of elections on the magnitude of the top-down linkage between party elites and supporters. Second, while there is a strong and significant effect of supporters on elites in non-election years, the effect dwindles (and becomes insignificant) in election years. One explanation for this finding is that election years pose conflicting demands on party elites. Not only do elites have to cater to their supporters, they may also wish to cater to the median voter, placate potential coalition partners, and consider the needs of party activists. In this mix of competing considerations, the weight of party supporters may be less than it is in non-election years. Future research should explore this possibility.

\(^{33}\) The category of PR systems includes list PR systems with and without thresholds, mixed member PR systems, and Greece’s system of reinforced PR. The category of plurality systems includes first-past-the-post, the single transferable vote, and the two round system that is used in French legislative elections.

\(^{34}\) Comparisons of statistical significance should be made with a great deal of care since the sample sizes of the sub-groups are dramatically different.
TABLE 3.2: Mass-elite linkages and electoral context

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Electoral Context</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>b</th>
<th>s.e.</th>
<th>b</th>
<th>s.e.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Electoral system:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PR</td>
<td>423</td>
<td>0.355*</td>
<td>0.163</td>
<td>0.080*</td>
<td>0.032</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plurality</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>0.067</td>
<td>0.128</td>
<td>-.068</td>
<td>0.064</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Election year:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>393</td>
<td>0.489**</td>
<td>0.167</td>
<td>0.054*</td>
<td>0.033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>0.282</td>
<td>0.067</td>
<td>0.059</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Referendum provision:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>269</td>
<td>0.094</td>
<td>0.156</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>0.028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>0.378*</td>
<td>0.173</td>
<td>0.071</td>
<td>0.060</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:** Table entries are G2SLS random effects panel estimates and their estimated standard errors. The estimate for party elites is the effect of the EU stance of party supporters. The estimate for party supporters is the effect of the EU stance of party elites. The models include country dummies and other predictors which have been suppressed in the table (these are available upon request from the authors). **p < .01, *p < .05, †p < .10 (one-tailed).

The referendum effects in Table 3.2 are more in line with our predictions. The bottom-up effects from party supporters on elites are much stronger in countries that have referendums than in countries that do not. The same is true of the top-down effects, although these fail to reach statistical significance. It seems, then, that referendums force party elites to pay closer attention to their supporters and perhaps also to provide stronger cues to their base.

**Party (System) Attributes**

Table 3 reveals that the linkage between party elites and supporters is shaped to a considerable extent by attributes of the parties and the party system. Considering the role
of issue salience first, we see that it moderates the impact of party cues on supporters.\footnote{We used a median split of the following salience question in the expert surveys: “During [year], how important has the EU been to the parties in their public stance?”}

Consistent with Ray (2003), we find that the EU stance of the party leadership influences supporters only if the issue is salient to the party. The impact of salience is less dramatic for the bottom-up connection. Regardless of the salience level, we observe a statistically significant effect from supporters on elites. The effect is slightly larger when the issue is less salient to the party, but this difference is probably not significant.

\begin{table}
\centering
\caption{Mass-elite linkages and party (system) attributes}
\begin{tabular}{llcccc}
\hline
 & & \multicolumn{2}{c}{Party Elites} & \multicolumn{2}{c}{Supporters} \\
 & & N & b & s.e. & b & s.e. \\
\hline
\textit{Issue salience:} & & & & & \\
Low & 291 & 0.509* & 0.223 & -.041 & 0.042 \\
High & 244 & 0.429** & 0.148 & 0.149** & 0.053 \\
\textit{Intra-party dissent:} & & & & & \\
Low & 259 & 0.242* & 0.143 & 0.107* & 0.049 \\
High & 276 & 0.390** & 0.158 & 0.047 & 0.057 \\
\textit{Inter-party dissent:} & & & & & \\
Low & 281 & 0.054 & 0.206 & 0.032 & 0.030 \\
High & 254 & 0.339* & 0.176 & 0.082^+ & 0.056 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\begin{flushright}
Notes: Table entries are G2SLS random effects panel estimates and their estimated standard errors. The estimate for party elites is the effect of the EU stance of party supporters. The estimate for party supporters is the effect of the EU stance of party elites. The models include country dummies and other predictors which have been suppressed in the table (these are available upon request from the authors). **p < .01, *p < .05, ^p < .10 (one-tailed).
\end{flushright}
\end{table}

Internal dissent also appears as an important moderator of mass-elite linkages, as Table 3 reveals.\footnote{We used a median split of the following dissent question in the expert surveys: “How much internal dissent has there been in the various parties in [country] over the issue of European integration in [year]?” (The question wording in 2002 deviated slightly from this format.)} Consistent with Ray (2003) and Gabel and Scheve (2007), we find that
low dissent strengthens parties’ ability to cue their supporters. Indeed, our data suggest that internally divided parties are unable to cue their base. Interestingly, internal dissent helps supporters to leverage influence over their parties. The effect of the EU stance of party supporters on party leaders is slightly larger in relatively divided parties than it is in relatively unified parties.

Finally, inter-party disagreement seems critical especially for bottom-up linkages. A lack of diverging views on European integration among parties means that the viewpoints of party supporters carry little weight. The impact of inter-party dissent on parties’ ability to cue their supporters is less clear-cut. While Ray (2003) argued that variation among the views of parties is critical for cueing supporters, we find little support for that hypothesis here.

**Supporter Attributes**

Finally, let us consider the one attribute of party supporters that we have identified as critical – opinion leadership. Here we use the Eurobarometer opinion leadership index. First, we calculated the proportion of party supporters that scored highest on this index. Next, we split the sample of parties in such a way that the 25 percent with the highest proportion of opinion leaders is considered high on opinion leadership. Our strict criteria imply that this group of parties truly has a large representation of opinion leaders.

Table 3.4 demonstrates the importance of opinion leadership for mass-elite linkages. First, the EU stance of party supporters influences party elites only in parties rich in opinion leaders. If there are comparatively few opinion leaders, then it becomes
much more difficult for supporters to have their views represented. Second, the ability of party elites to cue their supporters depends critically on strength of opinion leadership. Parties starved from opinion leaders are generally parties that have a difficult time cueing their supporters. Thus, when opinion leadership is weak, neither bottom-up nor top-down linkages seem to operate.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Electoral Context</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>b</th>
<th>s.e.</th>
<th>b</th>
<th>s.e.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Weak leadership</td>
<td>423</td>
<td>0.155</td>
<td>0.156</td>
<td>0.024</td>
<td>0.027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong leadership</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>0.766**</td>
<td>0.160</td>
<td>0.240**</td>
<td>0.090</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Notes:* Table entries are G2SLS random effects panel estimates and their estimated standard errors. The estimate for party elites is the effect of the EU stance of party supporters. The estimate for party supporters is the effect of the EU stance of party elites. The models include country dummies and other predictors which have been suppressed in the table (these are available upon request from the authors). **p < .01 (one-tailed).

This finding has a great deal of political significance when one considers the distribution of opinion leadership across parties. Almost 74 percent of the mainstream parties score weak on opinion leadership, compared to just less than 50 percent of the remaining parties. If there is a disconnection between masses and elites, it seems to affect the mainstream parties disproportionately. Of course, these are also the parties that participate more frequently in the government and thus carry more weight in pushing European integration into new territory.

**Conclusions**

Mass-elite linkages lie at the heart of the politics of European integration. In this article, we have uncovered evidence that these linkages run in both directions: party
supporters influence elites and the reverse is also true. Additionally, we have uncovered evidence that mass-elite linkages are conditioned by a variety of factors, including the nature of the times, electoral context, party (system) attributes, and attributes of supporters. These findings carry significant weight. At a theoretical level, we have demonstrated that theories of mass-elite linkages on European integration should allow for reciprocal causation and explore the conditional nature of cueing effects. Conditionalities in the dynamic representation of party supporters carry special weight, since the literature to date has failed to explore them. At a methodological level, we have amended past efforts at estimating mass-elite linkages by explicitly incorporating the time series aspect of elite and opinion data about European integration. As a result, we believe that our estimates provide a more accurate view of the connections between masses and elites.

Finally, our findings are relevant for a practical understanding of the politics of European integration. On the whole, we find very little evidence for allegations that political elites are out of step with the masses when it comes to EU policies. There are strong bottom-up and top-down processes, which cause the EU stances of party supporters and elites to be associated. However, within mainstream political parties, there is more evidence of a disconnection between party elites and supporters. Those parties tend to attract relatively few opinion leaders, and where opinion leadership is weak, so are bottom-up and top-down linkages.

Of course, our study has limitations. We have only discussed one aspect of mass-elite linkages, namely the connection between national party elites and their supporters. A more comprehensive analysis would also consider connections between party elites and
the median voter, between government policies and citizen preferences, and between European parties and voters. Second, our analysis has explored the conditionalities of mass-elite linkages one at a time, rather than pitting them against each other in a multivariate analysis. Third, we lack data about the past three years. Finally, some of the moderators may suffer from endogeneity. For example, why do mainstream parties tend to attract fewer opinion leaders? These issues will have to be addressed in future research.

Despite these limitations, our results are suggestive of the future of European integration. The legitimacy of future integration efforts depends on the maintenance of an effective mass-elite linkage. While many factors play a role in this linkage, several stand out. First, referendum mechanisms seem to be a useful lubricant of mass-elite linkages. Since the end of our study period, the Dutch introduced a consultative referendum. While the outcome caused some parties to question the wisdom of a referendum, it has actually led to widespread discussions in the parties about how to better connect with their supporters.

Second, inter-party dissent is critical for an effective mass-elite linkage. In this regard, the rise of anti-EU political entrepreneurs may prove beneficial for the European integration process, as they force other actors to engage their base, either through representation or persuasion. Moreover, these entrepreneurs will help to increase the salience of the EU in national and European elections.

Finally, opinion leadership is a key component. Often ignored because it does not seem to affect opinion directly (e.g. Gabel, 1998b), we believe that a reappraisal of the role of opinion leadership is in order. Forging a better linkage between masses and elites
may require increasing awareness of and interest in the EU. This will take time and the
input of many actors, including the mass media and the EU itself. However, political
parties have a role to play in this process, by formulating clear positions, by emphasizing
the importance European integration as an issue, and by demonstrating that they take
their supporters seriously.
Over the past decade, the process of European integration has witnessed a dual trend: a downward spiral in public support for the integration project and a concomitant increase in the opportunities for the public to express these concerns. We need only look to at the recent popular rejections of the Constitutional Treaty in France and the Netherlands to see the powerful role that public opinion can play in constraining the integration process. Moreover, most European Union (EU) member states – and especially the six founding members – have recently witnessed a significant drop in public support for European unification (de Vries and van Kersbergen, 2007). Eichenberg and Dalton (2007) refer to this decline in popular support as the “Post-Maastricht Blues”, since the downturn occurred after the finalising of the Maastricht Treaty in December 1991. All in all, the “permissive consensus” characterizing EU politics in the 1970s and 1980s seems to have given way to what some scholars suggest is a “constraining dissensus” (Hooghe and Marks, 2007).

Against this backdrop of rising conflict and salience over Europe (see Marks and Steenbergen, 2004), the interaction between citizen and elite attitudes becomes evermore
important for the future of European integration. We revisit the important debate on elite-
mass linkages by examining the way in which political contexts shape citizens’ attitudes
towards Europe. Specifically, we focus on the role of political elites on both the extreme
right and left of the political spectrum in mobilizing Euroskepticism.

Within Western European party systems ‘Europhoria’ still constitutes the norm. Party politics in the EU-15 is characterized by “a distinct pro-integration core of social democrats, liberals, and Christian democrats that are ideologically inclined to endorse further steps of integration both economically and politically” (Crum, 2007: 55). So far, Euroskepticism constitutes something of a “touchstone of dissent” (Taggart, 1998). Strong opposition towards the integration process is often only found on the fringes of the left/right spectrum – the anti-EU position of the British Conservatives being the notable expectation (Taggart, 1998; Marks et al., 2002; Hooghe et al., 2002). Although Euroskeptic parties may be extreme in terms of their left/right positions, we demonstrate that these parties are a decisive force in swaying popular opinion against Europe by mobilizing the growing uncertainties about the future of European integration amongst the mass public.

Using a two-level hierarchical model to operationalize the cueing effects between extremist parties and mass publics, we show that Euroskeptic cues are, indeed, found on both extremes of the political spectrum and that these parties effectively mobilize anti-EU sentiment, but for different reasons. While Euroskeptic parties on the right rally opposition by stressing the defence of national sovereignty and identity considerations, leftwing extremist parties resist further integration on the basis of the neo-liberal character of the project and mobilize feelings of economic uncertainty.
This article is structured as follows. We begin by laying out the hypotheses guiding our empirical analysis. In a second step, we present an in-depth discussion of the concept of Euroskepticism and potential ways of measuring this phenomenon at the party level. Next, we discuss the data, methods, and operationalizations. Fourth, we present the results of the multi-level analysis. Finally, we conclude by highlighting the implications of these empirical findings.

**Extremist Parties and Public Euroskepticism: Hypotheses**

Within the extensive literature on public opinion towards the EU and the process of European integration, two perspectives dominate the discussion: the utilitarian and the national identity approaches. Utilitarian theory relies on self-interested or macro explanations of political attitudes and suggests that citizens are more likely to support integration if it results in a net benefit to the national economy or to their own pocketbook (Eichenberg and Dalton, 1993; Gabel, 1998a, b; Gabel and Palmer, 1995; Anderson and Reichert, 1995). Gabel (1998b) demonstrates this at the micro-level by showing that those who directly benefit from these economic gains, for example the highly educated, highly skilled, or farmers, exhibit greater levels of support. At the macro-level, Eichenberg and Dalton (1993) have found macroeconomic variables, such as GDP, to be positively related to support for the EU.

The second perspective highlights identity considerations as a decisive force shaping support for the EU (Carey and Lebo, 2001; Carey, 2002; McLaren, 2002; Bruter, 2005; Diez Medrano, 2003; Hooghe and Marks, 2005). Particularly following the shift in the process of European integration from a mostly economic to a more political project,
the criteria for evaluating the EU include economic as well as symbolic political considerations (i.e. feelings of national identity). Carey and Lebo (2001) show that declining levels of support can be explained by an increase in feelings of national identity. They argue that “[t]his increase in nationalism is negatively related to support for the European project because of the conflicts over sovereignty that developed in this era, such as the creation of a single European currency, the European Central Bank, and the increased primacy of European law” (Carey and Lebo, 2001: 3). Similarly, McLaren shows that “[a]ntipathy toward the EU is not just about cost/benefit calculations […] but about fear of, or hostility toward, other cultures” (2002: 553).

This article takes up both perspectives but examines the way in which political contexts influence these explanations. We know from previous work that the impact of both utilitarian and identity considerations on support or opposition towards Europe is not uniformly distributed across countries. For instance, recent research shows that cultural traditions or national symbols are of great value if one seeks to understand the influence of identity considerations on opinions about Europe (Diez Medrano, 2003; Bruter, 2005; Hooghe and Marks, 2005). Although national identities are shaped through socialization, they are also contested within national contexts and are subject to reinvention or reinterpretation over time (Smith, 1991). This idea implies that feelings of national identity are not necessarily stable but are subject to processes of societal conflict and political contestation. Authors within the utilitarian perspective have turned to institutional variables, such as types of welfare state or varieties of capitalism, to explain individual and cross-national variation (Kitschelt et al., 2004; Brinegar and Jolly, 2005). Specifically, the work by Brinegar and Jolly (2005) points to the mediating effect of
contextual factors, in particular national factor endowments and varieties of capitalism, on utilitarian explanations of EU support.

Our article adds to this body of work by exploring an important aspect of this cross-national variation, namely the role of political parties. We believe that partisan cueing is essential in understanding the conditions under which utilitarian and national identity considerations are mobilized against European integration within national contexts. Research has shown that the human capacity for calculation is more limited than utilitarian (and to a lesser extent national identity) models presume (Chong, 2000; Kinder, 1998). Consequently, we argue that cues presented by political elites provide citizens with cognitive short-cuts that help them decide what is in their interest.

An extensive literature within the field of EU studies has evolved demonstrating the importance of elites in shaping public opinion towards European integration (Janssen, 1991; Franklin et al., 1994; Weßels, 1995; Steenbergen and Jones, 2002; Ray, 2003; Gabel and Scheve, 2007; De Vries and Edwards, 2005; Steenbergen et al., 2007). These studies have mainly focused on the debate regarding the nature of cueing effects, i.e. top-down or bottom-up (the exception being De Vries and Edwards, 2005). In other words, the research focuses on the question: who is cueing whom? Although we acknowledge the centrality of this question, we feel that it is also important to understand the content of partisan cueing. This article attempts to provide insight into this issue.

Previous research on public opinion informs us that popular Euroskepticism is most likely rooted in feelings among citizens that their core economic interests and/or
their national identity are being threatened. But what is the structure of Euroskepticism among political parties? We contend that party-based Euroskepticism is structured similarly to that of the public.

Within Western Europe, national party systems have evolved around a dominant left/right axis with socialist (and/or social-democratic) parties on the left favouring state intervention in the economy and conservative parties on the right supporting free market ideas (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967). While conflict over Europe often was seen as largely independent from the dominant dimension of political conflict (Hix and Lord, 1997; Gabel and Anderson, 2002), recently authors increasingly argue that issues regarding European integration are linked to the left/right dimension (Marks and Wilson, 2000; Hooghe et al., 2002). Within this literature, the relationship between left/right placement and support for European integration is described as “the inverted U-curve” (Hooghe et al., 2002: 968). The inverted U-curve indicates that parties in the ideological mainstream – i.e. conservative, social and Christian democratic parties – are generally supportive of the integration process, as they have frequently been part of governing coalitions throughout Western Europe and were therefore largely responsible for the course of integration. Leftwing and rightwing extremist parties, however, most strongly

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37 Note that recent research points to the fact that these perspectives should be combined into one single explanatory framework rather than framed as alternatives (de Vries and van Kersbergen, 2007). Drawing on the concept of double allegiance, these authors argue that interest- and identity-based explanations capture different sides of the same coin, as the more citizens perceive integration to threaten their (economic and social-psychological) security and well-being, the less likely they will support the EU.

38 Some authors argue that the issue of European integration is even subsumed into the left/right dimension (Kreppel and Tsebelis, 1999; Noury and Roland, 2002; Hix et al., 2006). Whereas the left favors further political integration as a means to establish common economic regulation across Europe, parties on the right favored economic integration and the creation of the common market, but after the establishment of the European Monetary Union (EMU), object to further political integration.
oppose European integration. Hence, Euroskepticsim is found mostly outside of the political mainstream (Hooghe et al., 2002; Crum, 2007).

Interestingly, the Euroskepticism of these political parties is structured similarly to that of the mass public. Party Euroskepticism evolves around two dimensions: economic and cultural opposition to integration. Parties may oppose European integration with the defence of national sovereignty and national community and/or reject the European project on the basis of its neo-liberal character, which undermines the national welfare state (Marks and Wilson, 2000; Hooghe et al., 2002). Against this backdrop, it seems reasonable to assume that Euroskeptic extremist parties play an important role in mobilizing public sentiment against the EU. We expect that these Euroskeptic parties rally opposition towards the European project, but the raison d'être to do so varies for left- and rightwing parties. We hypothesize that extremist parties on the right tap into feelings of cultural insecurity to reject further integration and to defend national sovereignty against control from Brussels. These parties mobilize national identity considerations against the EU. A prime illustration of this phenomenon is the Dansk Folkeparti. This party views the EU mainly as a threat to Danish identity, values, and sovereignty. For example, they voiced their opposition to the Amsterdam Treaty in the 1998 campaign with the slogan “vote Danish, vote no”.

In contrast, leftwing extremist parties resist further integration in Europe on the basis of the neo-liberal character of the project and its negative influence on the welfare

39 See “Past ‘No’ haunts EU referendum” Copenhagen Post www.cphpost.dk/get/55301.htm
40 http://www.danskfolkeparti.dk/
state. These parties effectively cue voters against the EU on the basis of economic insecurity arguments. The extremist leftwing Socialistische Partij in the Netherlands, for instance, opposes further integration in Europe because it would threaten the Dutch welfare state and restrict the influence of the Dutch parliament on the formulation of social policy. In the 2005 referendum campaign regarding the Constitutional Treaty, the neo-liberal character of the European integration project and the hollowing-out of Dutch welfare provisions by Brussels constituted the key points of opposition to the Treaty brought to bear by the Socialist Party (Koole and Raap, 2005).

From the reasoning above, we can deduce two hypotheses:

**Hypothesis 1:** Rightwing extremist parties mobilize feelings of national identity against European integration.

**Hypothesis 2:** Leftwing extremist parties mobilize feelings of economic anxiety against European integration.

Hence, we expect an interaction effect between feelings national identity and the Euroskeptic cue of extremist rightwing parties as well as an interaction effect between feelings economic anxiety and the Euroskeptic cue of extremist leftwing parties, which are both in turn positively related to feelings of Euroskepticism. Two assumptions ground these hypotheses. First, we assume that the relationship between public opinion and political parties’ positions is top-down. When looking to the research on public opinion and mass behaviour in the context of the EU, this assumption seems reasonable, as we find strong support for elite cueing on integration issues (Ray, 2003; Steenbergen et al.,
Moreover, the goal of this article is to examine the content of the cueing effects rather than the direction. Second, unlike most studies on elite cueing effects on EU public opinion thus far, we do not assume the correspondence between parties’ opinions regarding the EU and the opinions of their respective party supporters. We argue that left- and rightwing extremist parties frame the European integration process in terms of a neoliberal threat or the defence of national sovereignty and mobilize feelings of economic anxiety and national identity against the EU regardless of whether citizens would support these parties in a specific election. Thus, we do not restrict the cueing effect of political parties only to party supporters as most of the elite cueing models propose.

**Party Euroskepticism: Concept and Measurement**

Before we turn to the empirical examination of the hypotheses, let us first discuss our understanding and classification of Euroskeptic parties. The word Euroskepticism has found wide usage in the field of EU studies. Notwithstanding, the term itself suffers from great conceptual ambiguity. Sometimes the term is used to describe any form of opposition or critique towards the process of European integration, whereas in other occasions the usage implies an ideological position that structures parties’ stances on other issues. Related to this, some authors conceive of Euroskepticism as a party strategy often employed by political parties on the fringes of the party system (Taggart, 1998), while others maintain that Euroskeptic party positioning is rooted in ideology – being it left/right or “new politics” (Marks and Wilson, 2000; Hooghe et al., 2002).

Furthermore, the literature on Euroskepticism among political parties has produced a wide variety of typologies and classifications. For instance, Taggart and
Szczerbiak (2002) distinguish two types of Euroskepticism – hard and soft. Hard Euroskepticism points at a “principled opposition to the EU and European integration,” whereas the soft version implies an “expression of qualified opposition to the EU, or a sense that ‘national interest’ is currently at odds with the EU’s trajectory” (Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2002: 7). Kopecky and Mudde (2002), on the contrary, view Euroskepticism as one of four ideal types of support or opposition towards the EU. These authors distinguish between two dimensions of EU support or opposition: European integration as an ideal and the EU as a set of institutions. Euroskeptics are those that support the ideal of integration but oppose the ways in which this ideal is currently transformed into treaties, policies, or institutions.

For the purposes of this article, we define Euroskepticism as a continuum of party stances on European integration ranging from extreme opposition to tremendous support for integration (for a similar conceptualization, see Ray 1999; 2007). Furthermore, we assume that Euroskepticism may constitute a conscious strategy by political entrepreneurs as well as be rooted in partisan ideology; indeed, these processes are most likely mutually enforcing rather than mutually exclusive (see Kopecky and Mudde 2002 for a similar argumentation). We measure Euroskepticism at the party level by drawing on an indicator from the 2002 Chapel Hill Expert Survey on party positioning towards European integration (Hooghe et al., 2003). In the survey, country experts were asked to place parties in their own country on a seven-point scale ranging from complete opposition to complete support for European integration. Parties included in this survey received at least two percent of the vote and/or one seat in the lower house of their national parliament. These expert party placements on the EU scale show remarkable
resemblance to placements on the basis of voter judgments using the European Election Survey or party positioning using party manifestos (Marks et al., 2007).

When should a party’s EU position be considered Euroskeptic? In order to classify a political party as Euroskeptic, we relate party stances to the mean position within a national party system rather than choosing an arbitrary cut-off point on the seven-point scale. A party is characterised as Euroskeptic when its EU position is at least one standard deviation below the mean EU stance of all parties in that system. This procedure seems more reasonable for our purposes, as we attempt to grasp the way in which utilitarian and national identity considerations are mobilized in national contexts.

Previous research indicates that parties and citizens in some countries are more Euroskeptic than in others – the United Kingdom and Scandinavian countries for instance. Hence, by relating individual party stances to the average EU position in a country, we can determine if a party can be considered Euroskeptic within the specific national context.

Note that the hypotheses presented in the previous section relate to the special role of extremist parties (in terms of left/right ideology) in mobilizing Euroskepticism. For this reason, we want to include only the Euroskeptic cues of parties on either the right or left extremes of the political spectrum. Here, extreme parties are those that are one standard deviation below or above the mean left/right ideological position of all parties in a country. Tables 4.1 and 4.2 below provide an overview of the rightwing and leftwing parties that can be considered as Euroskeptic.
### TABLE 4.1: Euroskeptic rightwing parties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Party Name</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs</td>
<td>Freedom Party of Austria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>Vlaams Blok (Vlaams Belang)</td>
<td>Flemish Block (Flemish Interest)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Dansk Folkeparti</td>
<td>Danish Peoples’ Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>Perussuomalaiset</td>
<td>True Finns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Front National</td>
<td>National Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Lega Nord</td>
<td>Northern League</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>Lijst Pim Fortuyn</td>
<td>List Pim Fortuyn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>Conservative Party</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:** All parties included here: 1) received at least one parliamentary seat or two percent of the vote in the last parliamentary election prior to 2003 and 2) can be classified as Euroskeptical and rightwing on the basis of country expert judgments. **Sources:** [www.electionworld.org](http://www.electionworld.org); 2002 Chapel Hill Expert Survey on European Integration (Hooghe et al. 2003)

### TABLE 4.2: Euroskeptic leftwing parties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Party Name</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Socialistisk Folkeparti</td>
<td>Socialist People’s Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>Vasemmistoliitto</td>
<td>Left Alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Parti Communiste Français</td>
<td>French Communist Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Partei des Demokatischen Sozialismus (Die Linkspartei)</td>
<td>Party of Democratic Socialism (The Left Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>Kommounistiko Komma Ellado</td>
<td>Communist Party of Greece</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>Sinn Féin</td>
<td>We Ourselves</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Rifondazione Communista</td>
<td>Party of Communist Refoundation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>Socialistische Partij</td>
<td>Socialist Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>Coligação Democrática Unitária</td>
<td>Unitary Democratic Coalition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Izquierda Unida</td>
<td>United Left</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Vänsterpartiet</td>
<td>Left Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Miljöpartiet de Gröna</td>
<td>Green Party</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:** All parties included here: 1) received at least one parliamentary seat or two percent of the vote in the last parliamentary election prior to 2003 and 2) can be classified as EU-sceptical and Leftwing on the basis of country expert judgments **Sources:** [www.electionworld.org](http://www.electionworld.org); 2002 Chapel Hill Expert Survey on European Integration (Hooghe et al. 2003)

The parties included in Tables 4.1 and 4.2 are the ‘usual suspects’. For instance, it is common knowledge that the *Dansk Folkeparti*, the *Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs*,
and the *Front National* are extremist rightwing parties that strongly oppose European integration. On the left, it is also not surprising that we included the Dutch *Socialistische Partij* and the communist parties in France, Italy, Greece, and Germany. The inclusion of the British Conservative party as a rightwing extremist Euroskeptic party, however, may be somewhat surprising, not so much in terms of the explicit Euroskeptic position of the party, as opposition to the EU has become more ingrained among British Conservatives since the creation of the European Monetary Union (EMU), but more in terms of the classification of the rightwing position of the party as extremist. Though this party may seem to be the ‘odd-one-out’ on the list, it meets our criterion for extreme, as its position is one standard deviation to the right of the mean party position on the left/right. To guarantee that our empirical results are not driven by the classification of the Conservative party, we also ran an analysis in which the British Conservatives were excluded and found similar results.

**Data, Operationalization, and Method**

In order to examine the role of left- and rightwing extremist parties in framing economic anxiety and national identity against the EU, we analyse public support for European integration within fourteen Western European EU member states using a two-level hierarchical linear model, which allows us to combine individual-level and contextual data.\(^{41}\) For the individual level data, we make use of the Eurobarometer survey 60.1 from November 2003. The contextual level data are based on the 2002 Chapel Hill Expert Survey on party positioning towards European integration (Hooghe et al., 2003)

\(^{41}\) Due to the fact that the 2002 Chapel Hill Expert Survey does not include Luxembourg, this country is excluded from the analysis.
and on OECD Economic Outlook data for 2003. In this section, we define the key theoretical factors Euroskepticism.

Support or opposition for European integration can be operationalized using a variety of different measures.\footnote{See Brinegar and Jolly (2004) for a complete discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of the various Eurobarometer measures of support for European integration.} We rely on the Eurobarometer’s “desired speed of integration” question, which asks respondents to consider the speed at which they would like European unification to proceed. Individuals are able choose their position on a seven-point scale ranging from integration should be brought to a “standstill” (1) to integration should proceed “as fast as possible” (7). Since our dependent variable is Euroskepticism, we have recoded this variable so that lower scores reflect more support for the EU while higher scores indicate greater opposition.\footnote{Note that our findings are also robust when we run the analysis using other Eurobarometer questions measuring public opinion towards the EU, such the “good/bad” membership question.}

We hypothesize national identity to be positively related to Euroskepticism. Following Hooghe and Marks (2005), we use to the following Eurobarometer question to distinguish exclusive from inclusive national identity: “In the near future, do you see yourself as (1) [nationality] only, (2) [nationality] and European, (3) European and [nationality], or (4) European only?” Individuals with an inclusive national identity have multiple identities, which may include regional, national, and European identities. These respondents are expected to reply using answer categories 2, 3 or 4. Individuals who conceive of their national identity as exclusive (i.e. those responding with answer category 1), however, identify only with the national level of governance and may therefore consider multilevel governance a threat. Thus, exclusive national identity can be expected to form an obstacle to support for European integration, as individuals
adhering to exclusive national identity view the nation-state as the level of political organization to which they owe allegiance. To operationalize exclusive national identity, we collapse answer categories 2, 3 and 4 to create a dummy variable in which 1 stands for exclusive national identity and 0 for inclusive. We expect extremist rightwing parties to cue those respondents that view their national identity as exclusive.44

Economic anxiety is operationalized by a combined index measuring the prospective economic conditions of the respondent. It includes two questions:

1. “What are your expectations for the year to come: will 2004 be better (1) worse (3) or the same (2) when it comes to the financial situation of your household?”
2. “What are your expectations for the year to come: will 2004 be better (1) worse (3) or the same (2) when it comes to your personal job situation?”

On the basis of these questions, we construct an economic anxiety measure ranging from 1 (high anxiety) to 0 (low anxiety).

Recall that we conceptualise Euroskepticism at the party level as a spectrum ranging from complete support to complete opposition to the EU. To determine the left- and rightwing Euroskeptic cues, we utilize data on EU and left/right ideological positions deduced from the 2002 Chapel Hill Expert Survey described above. Several steps are involved. We first identify extremist parties as those parties that are at least one standard deviation above or below the mean left/right ideological position in a country. Next, we determine which of these extremist parties should also be classified as Euroskeptic; parties whose EU positions are at least one standard deviation below the mean EU stance of all parties in a system fall into the this category. Lastly, we measure the strength of a

---

44 Though this operationalisation of exclusive national identity may suffer from shortcomings in terms of question wording, this item has been cross-validated with other measures. Hooghe and Marks (2005) find similar results using either exclusive national identity or national attachment measures.
country’s left- or rightwing Euroskeptic cue by taking the identified party’s EU position obtained from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (recoded to reflect party Eurosceptism: 1=complete support; 7=complete opposition). In the cases of Ireland and Sweden, both of which have two leftwing extreme parties, we weight the parties’ EU positions by vote share to determine an overall leftwing Euroskeptic cue for each country. If a country does not have an extreme Euroskeptic party on either the right or the left, it receives a score of 0 for the cue. For example, since Portugal does not have an extreme rightwing Euroskeptic party, the strength of its rightwing Euroskeptic cue is coded as 0. Thus, the values of the left- and rightwing Euroskeptic cues range from no left/rightwing Euroskeptic cue (0) to strong left/rightwing Euroskeptic cue (7).

We are primarily interested in how left- and rightwing parties frame economic anxiety and national identity against European integration (see H1 and H2). To examine this, we incorporate two interaction terms into the model. We interact the right- and leftwing Euroskeptic cues described in the paragraph above with national identity and degree of economic anxiety respectively.

Finally, we include a number of individual- and country-level control variables. At the micro-level, we add in satisfaction with national democracy, trust in government, and employment status. These factors have been identified as determinants of support or opposition towards European integration (Anderson, 1998; Gabel, 1998a, b). Respondents with higher levels of democratic satisfaction and political trust are more likely to support the EU. The argument here is that “citizens who are more supportive of

45 The following hypothetical example helps to illustrate this procedure: A country has two extreme rightwing Euroskeptic parties, A and B, which together receive 20 percent of the popular vote. Party A, with 15 percent, has a much larger portion of the vote share than party B, which has only 5 percent. In this case, we would weight party A’s position by a factor of 0.75 and party B’s by a factor of 0.25. We would then add the two parties’ scores together to determine the overall rightwing Euroskeptic cue for the country.
the way political institutions work at home are more likely to support European institutions and their country’s participation in them” (Anderson, 1998: 14). Individuals with a manual work status are expected to be less supportive of the EU, as they are not able to directly reap the benefits of further economic integration (see Gabel, 1998a).

At the macro-level, we incorporate a control for the impact of national economic performance on public opinion towards the EU. A number of scholars have shown that support for or opposition to European integration varies in accordance with patterns of macroeconomic performance (Eichenberg and Dalton, 1993; Anderson and Kaltenthaler, 1996). We measure this effect by constructing a misery index combining national inflation (i.e. Consumer Price Indexes) and unemployment rates.

Table 4.3 summarizes the indicators used to operationalize the dependent and independent variables employed in the empirical analysis.
TABLE 4.3: Variable Description

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dependent Variable</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Euroskepticism index</td>
<td>Respondent’s support for European integration as measured as the desired speed of European integration, whereby 7=integration should be brought to a “standstill” and 1=integration should run “as fast as possible”. Source: Eurobarometer Survey 60.1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Independent Variables (Individual Level )</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exclusive national identity</td>
<td>Respondent’s feeling of national identity as measured by the following item: “In the near future, do you see yourself as (1) [nationality] only, (2) [nationality] and European, (3) European and [nationality], or (4) European only?” Exclusive national identity is coded as (1=1) (2,3,4=0). Source: Eurobarometer Survey 60.1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic anxiety</td>
<td>Combined index measuring prospective economic conditions of respondent, including two items: “What are your expectations for the year to come: will 2004 be better, worse or the same when it comes to the financial situation of your household?” 2. “What are your expectations for the year to come: will 2004 be better, worse or the same when it comes to your personal job situation?” Respondents that expect their financial and job situation to worsen in 2004 are coded 1 (highly anxious); those that expect one of the situations to worsen and one to stay stable are coded 0.75; those that expect their situation to be stable are coded 0.5; those that expect one of the situations to improve and one to stay stable are coded 0.25; those that expect their situation to improve are coded 0 (low anxiety). Source: Eurobarometer Survey 60.1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfaction with national democracy</td>
<td>Respondents’ satisfaction with national democracy as measured by the following item: “On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in [your country]?” 0= not satisfied at all; 1= very satisfied. Source: Eurobarometer Survey 60.1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in national government</td>
<td>A dummy variable indicating a respondent’s trust in national government as measured by the following item: “I would like to ask you how much you trust you have in [your national government]. Please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend to not trust it” (0=tend to trust; 1=tend to not trust). Source: Eurobarometer Survey 60.1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manual worker</td>
<td>A dummy variable indicating that a respondent employment status measured by the following item: “What is your current occupation?” coded as 1=manual, unskilled worker; 0=other type of worker. Source: Eurobarometer Survey 60.1.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
We examine how the political and economic contexts discussed above shape individual differentiation in Euroskepticism by employing a two-level hierarchical linear model (HLM). This method is appropriate since we are concerned with variation at both

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Misery index</td>
<td>An additive index combining national unemployment rates and inflation (i.e. Consumer Price Index). <em>Source:</em> OECD Employment Outlook.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leftwing Euroskeptic cue</td>
<td>Variable indicating the strength of a country’s leftwing Euroskeptic cue. Measured as the EU positions of the extreme leftwing Euroskeptic parties in a country. EU party position obtained using the following item: “[What is] the overall orientation of the party leadership toward European integration?” (recoded 1= complete support; 7= complete opposition) Extreme leftwing parties are those that are one standard deviation below the mean left/right ideological position of all parties in a country. Euroskeptic parties are those that are one standard deviation above the mean EU position of all parties in a country. In countries with multiple leftwing Euroskeptic parties, EU positions are weighted by parties’ vote shares. Countries with no leftwing Euroskeptic parties are coded as 0. (0= no leftwing Euroskeptic cue; 7= strong leftwing Euroskeptic cue) All data are based on expert judgments taken from the 2002 Chapel Hill Expert Survey. <em>Source:</em> Hooghe et al. 2003.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rightwing Euroskeptic cue</td>
<td>Variable indicating the strength of a country’s rightwing Euroskeptic cue. Measured as the EU positions of the extreme rightwing Euroskeptic parties in a country. EU party position obtained using the following item: “[What is] the overall orientation of the party leadership toward European integration?” (recoded 1= complete support; 7= complete opposition) Extreme rightwing parties are those that are one standard deviation above the mean left/right ideological position of all parties in a country. Euroskeptic parties are those that are one standard deviation above the mean EU position of all parties in a country. In countries with multiple rightwing Euroskeptic parties, EU positions are weighted by parties’ vote shares. Countries with no rightwing Euroskeptic parties are coded as 0. (0= no rightwing Euroskeptic cue; 7= strong rightwing Euroskeptic cue) All data are based on expert judgments taken from the 2002 Chapel Hill Expert Survey. <em>Source:</em> Hooghe et al. 2003.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
the individual and country levels. Particular country characteristics, namely the presence or absence of Euroskeptic left- or rightwing parties, provide important political contexts that interact with individual attributes, namely economic anxiety and national identity, to produce certain political effects. To explain variation among citizens, we must account for these variations across national contexts.

The data used in our analysis are hierarchical in nature, consisting of multiple units of data that are nested. Steenbergen and Jones (2002) suggest that using a technique for modelling multilevel data of this type allows for a single model that incorporates the different levels of data without assuming a single level of analysis. This facilitates the exploration of causal heterogeneity and provides a test for the generalizability of findings across different contexts. Additionally, our data are collected at the individual level but the individuals reside within a country and are more likely to share common characteristics with citizens in the same country than citizens of another country. Because the clustering of the data is a particular statistical problem, we must use modelling technique that takes into account the associated problems with standard errors. The appendix provides a detailed description of the model specification including equations.

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46 More specifically, as contextual measures are constant for individual cases residing within a given country, using standard modeling techniques such as logistic regression violates the assumption of independent observations. The result is that estimates of standard errors are reduced which increases the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis when accepting the null is more appropriate. HLM avoids this by estimating distinct models at each level and by estimating unique level 1 models for each level 2 unit (Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002). For our purposes, we estimate distinct individual level models that test the influences of national identity and other variables on Euroskepticism for each country. Next, we estimate a second level model that uses the country-level contextual measures to account for variation in the effects of the individual variables. In effect, this allows each country to have unique intercepts (average Euroskepticism), slopes (effects of individual characteristics, such as economic anxiety and national identity, on Euroskepticism), and error terms. At the second level, contextual effects are estimated by modeling the slopes for the influence of economic anxiety and national identity on Euroskepticism (i.e. the level 1 slope estimates are treated as dependent variables).
Empirical Analysis

Is there significant variation in Euroskepticism at the individual and country levels? We begin our empirical analysis by considering this question. To do so, we conduct an analysis of variance (ANOVA) on our indicator for Euroskepticism. The maximum likelihood estimates of the overall mean and variance components are provided in Table 4.4. Both of the variance components are significant, providing evidence of considerable variance in Euroskepticism at both the individual and the country levels. Next, we consider the ratio of each variance component to the total variance in Euroskepticism to obtain a better understanding of relative importance of the two levels of analysis (see Snijders and Bosker, 1999). We find that 85.5 percent of the variance is explained at the individual level $[((2.487/(2.487+0.423))*100]$, while 14.5 percent is explained at the country level $[(0.423/(2.487+0.423))*100]$. Given that the data is measured at the individual level, this is not surprising (Snijders and Bosker, 1999).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 4.4: Analysis of Variance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Estimates</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fixed Effects</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant 4.682*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.175)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Variance Components</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country-Level 0.423*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.161)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual Level 2.487*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.034)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-2 x Log Likelihood 40183.970</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note:* Table entries are maximum likelihood (IGLS) estimates with estimated standard errors in parentheses. * p< .05.

47 All estimates included in this article were obtained using MLwiN V2.1.
The analysis of variance indicates that there is significant variation in Euroskepticism at both the individual and country levels, but how well does the model specified in the previous section account for this variance? The maximum likelihood estimates of the fixed effects and the variance components of the multilevel model are provided in Table 4.5. When these results are compared to those provided in Table 4.4, we find that our model is a significant improvement over the base model: $\chi^2 = 1422.92$, df = 10, $p<.01$. This indicates that at least some of the predictors included in our model have effects that are significantly different from zero. Moreover, when we calculate the relative change in the variance components from our base model to our fully specified model (Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002; Snijders and Bosker, 1999), we find evidence that the individual-level and country-level predictors are powerful in explaining Euroskepticism. Taken as a whole, the individual-level variance components explain 12.5 percent of the individual variance in Euroskepticism $[((2.487-2.177)/2.487)*100]$. With regard to the country-level, we find that our predictors perform even better, accounting for 46.3 percent of the cross-national variance in Euroskepticism $[((0.423-0.227)/0.423)*100]$. 

Returning to our two main hypotheses, the individual parameter estimates support our expectations. Recall that our first hypothesis argued that rightwing extremist parties mobilize feelings of national identity against European integration. Our results indicate that this is indeed the case. The interaction between national identity and the presence of a Euroskeptic rightwing cue is significant and is in the anticipated positive direction (0.058). We also find strong backing for our second hypothesis suggesting that leftwing
extremist parties mobilize feelings of economic anxiety against European integration. The interaction between economic anxiety and the presence of a Euroskeptic leftwing cue is positive and significant (0.058).

**TABLE 4.5: Determinants of Euroskepticism (multilevel analysis)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictors</th>
<th>Estimates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fixed Effects</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>2.627*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.230)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exclusive National Identity</td>
<td>0.677*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.134)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Anxiety</td>
<td>0.513*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.134)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in National Institutions</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfaction with National Democracy</td>
<td>-0.624*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.021)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manual Worker</td>
<td>0.040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.034)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Misery Index</td>
<td>0.019*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rightwing Euroskeptic Cue</td>
<td>0.028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.024)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.032)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Exclusive Identity*</td>
<td>0.058*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rightwing Euroskeptic Cue*</td>
<td>(0.024)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Anxiety*</td>
<td>0.058*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leftwing Euroskeptic Cue*</td>
<td>(0.031)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
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<tr>
<td>Country-Level</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.108)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual-Level</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.030)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-2 x Log Likelihood</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:** Table entries are maximum likelihood (IGLS) estimates with estimated standard errors in parentheses. * p<.05 level, one-tailed.
Graphical representation of these interaction effects eases interpretation. Figure 4.1 illustrates the cueing effects of Euroskeptic rightwing parties on national identity while controlling for other variables (by holding them constant at their respective means). We chart inclusive versus exclusive identity across the minimum and maximum strength of the Euroskeptic rightwing cue. The lines represent the respondents with an inclusive or exclusive feeling of national identity. The intercepts are substantively interesting as they show that individuals with an exclusive national identity are more inclined to be Euroskeptic than their inclusive counterparts. The slopes of the lines represent the impact of the rightwing cueing effect. They demonstrate clearly that the cueing effect of Euroskeptic rightwing parties in mobilizing national identity against the EU is large in the case of feelings of exclusive national identity. Euroskepticism increases by 0.6 when the strength of the Euroskeptic rightwing cue moves from its minimum of zero to its maximum level of seven. In contrast, with a change of only 0.3, the cueing effect is only half as strong for respondents indicating that their national identity can coincide with their supranational identification.
FIGURE 4.1: Cueing effect of rightwing Eurosceptic parties on national identity

We follow a similar procedure in Figure 4.2 to show the cueing effects of Eurosceptic leftwing parties on economic anxiety. We graph economic anxiety across the minimum (0) and maximum (6.6) strength of the Eurosceptic leftwing cue. In this case, the lines represent the respondents with higher and lower levels of economic anxiety. The intercepts indicate that individuals with higher economic anxiety are more prone to Euroscepticism than those with lower economic anxiety. Moreover, the slopes of the lines demonstrate that the cueing effect of Eurosceptic leftwing parties in mobilizing public opinion against the EU is greater in the case of high economic anxiety.
(Euroskepticism increases by 0.5) and much lower when respondents indicate that they are less anxious about their economic situation (Euroskepticism increases by only 0.1).\textsuperscript{48}

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure4_2.png}
\caption{Cueing effect of leftwing Euroskeptic parties on economic anxiety}
\end{figure}

Finally, we consider our control variables. Beginning with the domestic politics variables, we find mixed results. Although the coefficients for satisfaction with national democracy and trust in national institutions are both in the expected negative direction (-0.624 and -0.002 respectively), the latter fails to reach statistical significance. Thus, the notion that individuals who are satisfied with the democratic performance of their national institutions are more inclined to display trust in political institutions in general
and are consequently less likely to be Euroskeptic finds only limited support (Anderson, 1998). Of the variables included to control for the utilitarian self-interest and macroeconomic explanations of EU support, only the country-level measure yields an affirmative result. The misery index is positive and significant (0.019), indicating that increases in unemployment and inflation lead to higher levels of Euroskepticism.

**Conclusion**

While ‘Europhoria’ still tends to be the name of the game amongst most Western European political parties, European integration is increasingly coming under fire from both the right and the left. Many are quick to dismiss the gravity of this party-based Euroskepticism since to date it is a phenomenon largely relegated to the extremes of the political spectrum. We suggest that this is unwise. Although Euroskeptic parties may be outliers in terms of their left/right position, we have argued and demonstrated that these parties are a decisive force in swaying popular opinion against Europe by mobilizing the growing uncertainties about the future of European integration amongst the mass public.

Employing a two-level hierarchical linear model that combines individual-level Eurobarometer data and contextual data, we have analysed the cueing effects of these extremist parties. We have uncovered evidence that Euroskeptic cues are found on both extremes of the political spectrum but for different reasons. On the extreme right, the battle cry is defence of national sovereignty, as parties successfully mobilize national identity considerations against the EU. Crying foul against the neo-liberal character of the EU project, parties on the extreme left appeal to citizens’ pocketbooks, effectively cueing voters against the EU on the basis of economic insecurity arguments.
In stressing the role of national political contexts in influencing public opinion towards European integration, our article offers an important contribution to the literature. Thus far, the EU support discussion has been dominated by two perspectives: the utilitarian approach emphasizes that citizens are more likely to support the EU if it results in a net benefit to their bank accounts, while the national identity approach argues national identity is decisive in shaping citizens opinions toward European integration. We have incorporated both of these viewpoints, but have highlighted the way in which political contexts influences these explanations, focusing particularly on the role of national political parties. Our analysis has demonstrated that partisan cueing is essential in understanding the conditions under which utilitarian and national identity considerations are mobilized against European integration. Moreover, this article takes an important step toward understanding the nature of partisan cueing in the European Union.
CHAPTER 5
THE IMPACT OF EU ISSUE SALIENCE AND INTRA-PARTY DISSENT
ON EU ISSUE VOTING

Nowhere are the consequences of Europe’s heightened politicization more explicit and more tangible than in the context of elections. Elections are highly visible events that have direct and immediate political implications both domestically and at the European level. Additionally, elections compel citizens to evaluate and filter the relative importance of numerous different considerations and make a single choice. The electoral context thus provides us with a rich setting in which to investigate “the complex interactions and relations between citizens and elites in a multi-level political structure” (Van der Eijk and Van der Brug, 2007: 7).

Our focus in this paper is on national elections and the extent to which vote choices for particular political parties are influenced by citizens’ attitudes towards European integration – a phenomenon referred to as EU issue voting. The topic of EU issue voting has recently received extensive scholarly attention (De Vries, 2007; Evans, 1998, 1999, 2001; Gabel, 2000; Tillman, 2004; Van der Eijk and Franklin, 2004; Van Holsteyn and De Ridder, 2005), yet there is scant literature on which parties actually profit from this process (De Vries, 2007a being an exception). Determining the so-called “winners” and “losers” of EU issue voting is important as it provides valuable insight into how certain parties are able to exploit EU issues to their advantage; in other words, it
provides a window into the politicization of Europe. In general, party leaders look to politicize an issue when they perceive potential electoral gains, and as Hooghe and Marks (2007) suggest determination of such advantages tends to be based on specific (dis)incentives, two of which we consider in the pages that follow.

We are interested in how the salience and the internal divisiveness of EU matters enhance or attenuate a party’s susceptibility to EU issue voting. Combining individual-level data from the 2004 European Election Survey (EES) with party-level data from the 2002 Chapel Hill Expert Survey on party positions, we consider two straightforward hypotheses. First, the more salient the EU issue is to a party, the larger the impact of EU issue voting is likely to be. Second, the more divisive the EU issue is to a party, the smaller the impact of EU issue voting is likely to be. To preview our analysis, we find that variation in EU issue voting is largely a function of these two party attributes. Indeed, parties only seem able to exploit European integration to their electoral advantage when they emphasize the issue and when they put forth a united front.

In the remainder of this paper, we develop and test a set of expectations regarding which political parties are likely to benefit from EU issue voting. We begin by briefly outlining the concept of EU issue voting. Next, we consider how two particular party characteristics – EU issue salience and intra-party dissent – enhance and/or diminish the likelihood that voters will base their party preferences on European issues. We then discuss the data and technique employed in our analyses. The final sections present our results and offer concluding remarks.
EU Issue Voting

There is an expanding body of research indicating that European matters play a role in national politics, particularly in national electoral politics. This influence can occur indirectly, either through the influence of European Parliamentary elections on national voting behavior (e.g. Van der Eijk and Franklin, 1996; Van der Eijk et al., 1996; Marsh, 1998) or through the impact of European integration on economic voting in national elections (e.g. Palmer and Tan, 1999; Scheve, 1999; Bohrer and Tan, 2000), but it also can occur directly through a mechanism referred to as EU issue voting. EU issue voting is the process whereby individual preferences over European integration influence vote choices in national elections (Tillman, 2004; De Vries; 2007).

EU issue voting is not a uniform phenomenon. Recent studies show that the degree to which voters’ positions on European matters influence their vote choice varies cross-nationally depending on the degree of EU issue salience among the electorate as well as on the choices on offer by political parties regarding European issues. In his examination of Austria, Finland, and Sweden, for example, Tillman (2004) finds evidence of EU issue voting at the time of accession, a period in which EU membership can be assumed to have been salient and at least somewhat divisive. Similarly, De Vries (2007) finds evidence of EU issue voting in Denmark and the United Kingdom, two countries characterized by high levels of partisan conflict over Europe, yet fails to find such evidence in Germany or the Netherlands, where partisan conflict over the EU is far more limited. These same conditions also appear to be important in the Central and Eastern EU member states. While De Vries and Tillman (2007) find no EU issue voting in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovenia, EU issues do appear to influence voters’
electoral preferences in Estonia, Latvia, Poland, and Slovakia, all of which demonstrate either high public salience or high party contestation (or both in the case of Poland).

The studies discussed above focus on variation across countries: EU issue voting is only likely to occur in certain national contexts, specifically those in which the levels of party conflict and public salience regarding Europe are high. But what explains variation within these countries? It is unlikely that all political parties will reap the benefits of EU issue voting, even when the environment is ripe. Although EU issue voting was fairly extensive in the 2001 Danish election, for example, De Vries shows that three groups – the Progress Party, the Conservative People’s Party, and the Social Liberal Party – experienced no significant electoral gains from EU issue voting. On the other hand, German voters’ EU preferences significantly influenced their vote choice for the Liberal Party in the 2002 election despite inhospitable national conditions (De Vries, 2007a: 122-3). What explains this cross-party variation?

The Impact of EU Issue Salience and Intra-Party Dissent

We contend that two party attributes – EU issue salience and intra-party dissent – condition the electoral prospects of political parties resulting from EU issue voting.49

EU Issue Salience

Our first argument concerns the extent to which a political party views European issues as important for its electoral appeal. We posit that parties demonstrating high

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49 In a previous study using national election surveys from Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom from 1992 to 2002, De Vries (2007) finds that cross-party variation in EU issue voting is largely a function of the degree to which the EU issue is salient to a respective party, the level of EU extremism, and opposition status.
levels of EU issue salience are more likely to benefit from EU issue voting than those for which Europe is less important.

Salience theory of party competition (Budge and Farlie, 1983; Riker, 1982; Budge et al., 2001) and the theory of issue ownership (Petrocik, 1996) suggest that parties elevate the importance of certain issues in order to reap electoral gains. Relying on partisan strategies and notion of adaptive change, these theories contend that political parties are responsible for pushing issues onto the political agenda and that their impetus to do so hinges on whether an issue is ‘favorable’ to them. Since political parties tend to prioritize electoral success (Downs, 1957), they consciously build their campaigns around those issues for which they have (or could have) the support of their constituents and/or a majority of voters.50

Over time, this manipulation of salience may lead to issue ownership. Salience theory is rooted in the assumption that parties differentiate themselves in an ideological space “not by directly opposing positions but by varying emphases on a shared position (Budge 2001: 60). Particular parties come to ‘own’ certain issues that they are perceived by the public as better able to ‘handle’ (Petrocik, 1996). As voters begin to associate certain parties with specific issues, parties respond by continuing to selectively emphasize those topics for which they have a good reputation and by de-emphasizing those connected to rival parties.

Though often considered relatively static, issue ownership need not be. As Steenbergen and Scott note: “Inherent in salience theory is the assumption that political

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50 While Riker (1982) and other theorists of strategic salience have tended to define the favorability of issues in terms of their utility in the electoral arena, Steenbergen and Scott (2004) refine the theory of strategic salience to include three goals of issue manipulation – vote-seeking, office-seeking, and cohesion-seeking.
parties influence issue salience *strategically*, i.e. in ways that allow them to accomplish certain goals” (2004: 167-8; emphasis added). Recent studies show that policy reputations are in fact flexible and therefore open to strategic manipulation (Bélanger, 2003; Meguid, 2005; Tavits, 2007). To the extent that this is true, one would expect political parties to heighten the importance of new issues when doing so is likely to alter mass alignments in their favor (see also Carmines and Stimson, 1989). In the European context, for example, parties on the periphery often have strategic incentives to “shake up” the existing party system (Riker, 1982; Rabinowitz and Macdonald, 1989). Marginalized on the main left/right axis of contention, these parties stand to gain electorally by playing up a new, tangential issue such as the EU. An implication of this is that the more important an issue is to a political party, the more likely voters will use this consideration when determining their vote choice.

An alternate line of reasoning, but one that yields the same implication for EU issue voting, stems from the literature on partisan cueing and support for European integration. Research has shown that the human capacity for calculation is fairly limited (Chong, 2000; Kinder, 1998). Cues presented by political elites provide citizens with cognitive short-cuts that help them decide what is in their interest. In the case of the EU, parties’ stances on European integration are used by party supporters to inform their own preferences. If an issue is salient to a party, one can expect the party to vocalize its position clearly and frequently. As a result, even those individuals who pay relatively little attention to politics are likely to be exposed to the party’s position (Zaller, 1992). The implication here is that the more important an issue is to a political party, the more
visible and coherent its message will be, and the more likely it is that voters will cast their votes with this consideration in mind.

**Intra-party Dissent**

Our second argument points to intra-party dissent as an impediment to EU issue voting. Research on party positions and opinion formation concerning EU matters points to internal party dissent as a culprit for weak elite-mass linkages (Ray, 2003; Steenbergen et al., 2007; Gabel and Scheve, 2007). We suggest that these ideas also translate to the electoral context. Our expectation is that parties exhibiting a high degree of internal divisiveness over European integration should experience low levels of EU issue voting. Two lines of explanation indicate why this is likely to be the case.

First, the presentation of competing messages by various party leaders is likely to muddle the cues sent by a party to its supporters (Ray, 2003; Steenbergen et al., 2007; also see Zaller, 1992). As noted previously, elite-driven theories of integration contend that citizens take cues from political elites, particularly party leaders. The EU presents voters with sufficiently complicated and technical issues that many find it hard to formulate a view and thus turn to partisan cues to guide them when they step into the voting box. Problems arise, however, when leaders present contradictory messages. Faced with too much ‘noise’, voters are liable to ignore the issue altogether. Having disregarded the issue, these citizens are unlikely to formulate their voting preferences on the basis of European integration; hence, we should expect low EU issue voting.51

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51 Building on Zaller’s (1992) general model of opinion formation, Gabel and Scheve (2007) envision a different response by party supporters confronted with “mixed messages” on European integration. Instead of ignoring the messages, voters respond to the multiple cues presented by dissident parties by differentiating among these cues on the bases of their own interests and values. In other words, citizens
While the above centers on the clarity of a signal, a second rationale points to the muted strength of a divided party’s message. Here, the relationship between internal party divisions and EU issue voting is indirect, working via EU issue salience. Our above discussion of salience highlighted the notion that parties strategically manipulate the importance of issues to meet their needs with the result being that they tend to de-emphasize topics that have the potential to be electorally damaging or that may lead to party splits. The conscientious management of EU issue salience has been one of the primary adaptive mechanisms of parties to European integration (Steenbergen and Scott, 2004). This has been particularly true for mainstream parties and others with difficulties accommodating the EU’s problematic bundle of issues into their existing political schemas (Marks and Wilson, 2000). Evidence suggests that internal rifts over EU matters are seldom new divides but tend to reflect pre-existing conflicts within parties (see Chapter 2). Aware of their own latent discords, parties opt to avoid the issue by keeping a lid on public discussion of the contentious topic. In terms of EU issue voting, such evasion techniques on the part of party leaders leave citizens with a muffled or non-existent signal, making it unlikely that these individuals will factor Europe into their voting decision.

As a number of studies have indicated, there are limits to the effectiveness of parties’ strategic manipulation of issue salience in the face of intra-party dissent (Scott, 2001; Steenbergen and Scott, 2004; Netjes and Binnema, 2007). Evidence has shown that there is a tipping point past which parties are unable to successfully suppress the issue. Indeed, in deeply divided parties, it seems that debate is unavoidable and listen and respond to those messages that coincide with their individual preferences. How this might bear on EU issue voting is unclear, though we suspect it will depend on the source (party leader or activist) and the strength of the message.
heightened salience inevitable. With regard to EU issue voting, however, our expectations do not change substantially. Though major internal divides should enhance EU issue salience which should in turn promote EU issue voting, this effect is likely to be offset by the negative influence of a divided party’s muddled cues.

Data, Operationalization, and Method

We examine the influence of salience and intra-party dissent on EU issue voting by combining mass survey data from the 2004 European Election Survey (EES) with data from the 2002 Chapel Hill Expert Survey on party positions on European integration. Our choice to rely on the EES instead of national election surveys stems from the breadth (cross-nationally) of the EES and the nature of the questions included. Unlike many national election surveys, the EES contains questions probing voters’ self and party placements on a European integration scale. This information is paramount, as it allows us to determine the extent to which voters’ EU preferences influence their vote choice (i.e. the extent of EU issue voting). Moreover, since the EES administers comparable surveys in member states across the EU, we are able to analyze the impact of EU issue voting on the electoral fortunes of fifty-six parties across ten West European countries.52

The dependent variable in our analysis is a voter’s party preference in a particular year, i.e. vote probability. To operationalize this variable, we rely on survey data, which directly measures these probabilities, rather than on actual vote choice, which requires voters to recall their voting behavior during the last election. Specifically, we employ the

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52 The following countries are included in the analysis: Austria, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and the United Kingdom. Belgium, France, Portugal, and Sweden are not included because information on vote probabilities in these countries is not available. Luxembourg is also excluded since data on EU issue salience and intra-party dissent are not available.
following question from the 2004 EES: “We have a number of parties in [COUNTRY], each of which would like to get your vote. Please tell me for each of the following how probable it is that you would ever vote for this party? 1 = not at all probable; 10 = very probable.”

The merits of using empirically measured electoral probabilities in lieu of actual vote choice are many (see Van der Eijk et al., 2006). Foremost, using actual vote choice necessitates a discrete-choice model – typically either conditional or multinomial logit. Though they are the norm in electoral studies, such estimation techniques entail heavy restrictions and frequently imply unjustifiable assumptions. A central limitation is their futility in the analysis of small party voting. This difficulty arises because discrete-choice models do not measure electoral utility (electoral preference) directly but instead require the post-hoc deduction of these utilities. In practice this means that parties receiving only a small portion of the vote must be eliminated from the analysis or else the utilities for these parties become too unstable. Eliminating parties (and therefore the individuals who selected them) restricts the choice options in the analysis. Not only does this potentially change the nature of the phenomenon under examination, but it results in a clear bias of estimation (Van der Eijk et al., 2006: 430-1).

Two additional advantages contribute to our decision to rely on survey-based vote probabilities to determine the extent of EU issue voting. First, the design allows us to estimate the effects of party characteristics (e.g. EU issue salience and intra-party dissent) and national context on electoral utility (i.e. electoral preference). As discussed below, the technique for analyzing electoral utilities entails constructing a “stacked” data matrix such that the cases to not pertain to particular respondents but to party*respondent
combinations. This structure facilitates the pooling of data from different surveys and enables us to include additional information about electoral contexts, party systems, and party attributes. Second, employing survey-based vote probabilities permits ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation, which requires fewer assumptions and restrictions and eases the interpretation of our results.\(^{53}\) In other words, this approach enables us to utilize a single integrated model to examine the effects of variables at multiple levels of analysis and do so using a straightforward and common estimation technique (Van der Eijk et al., 2006: 442).

We capture EU issue voting by creating an EU distance variable. This measure is based on EES questions asking respondents to place themselves and parties on a 10-point scale ranging from the process of European integration “has already gone too far” (1) to the process of European integration “should be pushed further” (10). We operationalize EU distance as the absolute value of the distance between a respondent’s self placement and the mean position of each party as perceived by all voters. The variable ranges from 0 to 10 with the lowest value indicating complete agreement with a party’s stance on the EU and the highest value representing complete disagreement. Our expectation is that as the value of the EU distance variable increases, i.e. as the distance between a respondent and a party increases, the likelihood that the individual will vote for that party should decrease. Thus, if EU issue voting is present the EU issue distance variable will be negative and significant.

We are primarily interested in how certain attributes of political parties, namely EU issue salience and internal party dissent, condition EU issue voting. To examine this,\(^{53}\) A number of studies have demonstrated that survey-based vote probabilities provide a valid measure of electoral utilities (e.g. Oppenhuis, 1995; Tillie, 1995; Van der Eijk et al., 1996; Van der Eijk et al., 2006).
we rely on data gleaned from the 2002 Chapel Hill Expert Survey. Our measure of EU issue salience is based on a question asking country experts to evaluate how important the EU has been to parties in their public stances. The scale ranges from “European integration is of no importance at all” (1) to “European integration is of great importance” (4). Our measure of intra-party dissent is based on a question asking experts to evaluate the overall level of dissent within national political parties on European integration on a 10-point scale, ranging from “a party is completely united” (1) to “a party is completely divided” (10).

In order to determine if EU issue voting occurs independently of other sources of voting behavior, we control for non-EU related policy factors as well as the socio-economic characteristics of the respondents. The policy variables include: left/right distance, government approval, and prospective and retrospective national economic evaluations. The socio-economic controls include: gender, employment status, religiosity, and education. These latter variables are incorporated into the analysis to ensure that a respondent’s attitude toward European integration is not merely a proxy for other factors. Much of the research on EU support points to socio-economic attributes to explain support or opposition to European integration. The argument is that economic integration in Europe has created differential benefits for EU citizens (Gabel, 1998) depending on their income and education levels as well as on the basis of their employment status.

Before conducting our analysis, we first must reconfigure the information described above into a ‘stacked’ data matrix in which the records do not represent respondents but rather respondent*party combinations. We begin with the dependent
variable – a voter’s party preference in 2004 (i.e. vote probability). The survey-based voter probabilities taken from the EES generate multiple variables—one for each party; however, we are interested in analyzing these separate probabilities simultaneously as a single dependent variable. To do so, we need to transform all of the respondent observations into records that represent respondent*party observations. “Because different parties are represented by different cases rather than by different variables,” in the stacked data matrix “the dependent variable pertains to parties in general and can be considered as a measure of generic party support [i.e. party preference in our analysis]” (Van der Brug et al., 2007: 174).

In addition to transforming the dependent variable, we must also make sure that all of the independent variables in the stacked file represent respondent*party observations. For the EU and left/right distance measures, no changes are needed since the variables already link respondents’ self placements on a scale to the positions of the respective parties on the same scale. This is not the case with the remaining control variables. Since we are unable to compute the relevant party characteristics for the government and economic evaluations and the socio-economic measures, we must construct them empirically by means of a linear transformation. Using the original data from the un-stacked dataset, we regress vote probabilities for each of the parties in turn on each of the independent variables. We then save the predicted values of the separate analyses, standardize them around their respective means, and include them in the stacked dataset (see Van der Eijk et al., 2006).

We examine the extent of EU issue voting by performing a series of OLS regression analyses using the stacked dataset described above. To assess the conditional
nature of EU issue voting, we follow a split-sample approach. In other words, for each moderator we split the sample in an appropriate way and estimate separate models in each sub-sample. The results of these analyses are provided in Tables 5.1 and 5.2.

Results

Who benefits from EU issue voting? The findings of the analyses support our main expectations. Political parties that highlight the importance of European issues and that manage to avoid the pitfalls of internal dissent are more likely to reap the electoral gains stemming from EU issues.

Beginning with Table 5.1, we find strong evidence of the hypothesized positive link between the salience of European integration and EU issue voting. Consistent with De Vries’ (2000a) findings in the British, Danish, Dutch, and German cases, these results show that variation in EU issue voting across parties is largely a function of the degree to which European integration is important to the respective parties. The negative and significant coefficient of the EU distance variable for the high salience group reveals that parties gain significantly from stressing EU matters. Emphasis on the issue diminishes the distance between the voter’s and the party’s preferences and in turn results in a greater probability that the individual will vote for the party in question. This is not the case with low salience parties as indicated by the insignificance coefficient for this group. This suggests that parties that do not give sufficient weight to European issues in their electoral campaigns should not expect to win votes on the basis of these issues. These

54 An alternative strategy is to create interactions between the moderators and the independent variable of interest – EU distance. Here we choose the split-sample approach to ease interpretation. However, the findings are robust when we run the analysis with interaction terms.
findings corroborate the ideas put forth by both the saliency theory of party competition (Budge and Farlie, 1983) and the theory of issue ownership (Petrocik, 1996). Importantly, they suggest that parties are able to strategically (and successfully) raise the salience of the European issue in order to boost their electoral fortunes.

### TABLE 5.1: Extent of EU issue voting by level of salience

<table>
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<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Low salience</th>
<th>High salience</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>EU distance</td>
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<td>-0.099***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.029)</td>
<td>(0.021)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left/right distance</td>
<td>-0.921***</td>
<td>-1.355***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.017)</td>
<td>(0.029)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government approval</td>
<td>0.453***</td>
<td>0.695***</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.139)</td>
<td>(0.131)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Prospective economic evaluation</td>
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<td>0.156</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.051)</td>
<td>(0.168)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Retrospective economic evaluation</td>
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<td>1.046***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.139)</td>
<td>(0.174)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>0.161</td>
<td>1.005***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.159)</td>
<td>(0.256)</td>
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<td>Class</td>
<td>0.146</td>
<td>0.311**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.128)</td>
<td>(0.139)</td>
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<td>Education</td>
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<td>0.397**</td>
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<td>(0.188)</td>
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<td>(0.043)</td>
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</table>

| $R^2$                  | 0.220        | 0.181         |
| N                     | 18465        | 24366         |

**Notes:** Table entries are OLS regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. The models include country dummies which have been suppressed in the table (available upon request from the authors). *p<0.10 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01 (one tailed for left/right and EU distance; two-tailed for all other predictors). **Sources:** 2004 European Election Survey; 2002 Chapel Hill Expert Survey on Party Positioning.
The results of our second pair of analyses point to internal dissent over European integration as another important moderator of EU issue voting. The evidence in Table 5.2 reveals that parties plagued by intra-party dissent are unable to capitalize on European integration to garner votes. The coefficient of the EU distance variable for the high salience group fails to reach statistical significance, while that of the low dissent grouping is both significant and in the expected negative direction. This finding is in line with public opinion studies indicating that internal dissent hampers parties’ abilities to send coherent messages and cue their supporters (Ray, 2003, Steenbergen et al., 2007, Gabel and Scheve, 2007). Moreover, though the analysis does not explicitly test the indirect link (via issue salience) between intra-party dissent and EU issue voting, our results are not inconsistent with this hypothesis.
TABLE 5.2: Extent of EU issue voting by level of intra-party dissent

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<th>Low dissent</th>
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<td>0.696***</td>
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<td>evaluation</td>
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R² 0.167 0.248
N 37711 10168

Notes: Table entries are OLS regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. The models include country dummies which have been suppressed in the table (available upon request from the authors). *p<0.10 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01 (one tailed for left/right and EU distance; two-tailed for all other predictors). Sources: 2004 European Election Survey; 2002 Chapel Hill Expert Survey on Party Positioning.

Conclusion

This paper considers how the politicization of European issues plays out in the context of domestic party competition. Specifically, it probes how the electoral prospects of political parties in national elections are influenced by the preferences of voters regarding EU matters. Consistent with other recent work, our study provides evidence of
an “electoral connection” (Carrubba, 2001) in EU politics whereby electorate attitudes play a roll in shaping and constraining stances on European integration.

So, who stands to gain from EU issue voting, i.e. who are the so-call “winners” and “losers”? We have argue that the ability of political parties to reap the electoral spoils of EU issue voting hinges on two important party attributes, namely EU issue salience and intra-party dissent.

Parties that render the EU issue salient are more likely to experience a boost from EU issue voting than those that deem integration relatively unimportant. Moreover, parties that are plagued by high internal dissent over European matters are less likely to benefit from EU issue voting than those that are unified on these topics. Our results substantiate these assertions. Employing EES and expert survey data, we demonstrate that EU issue salience and internal party dissent are integral in explaining the differential impact of EU issue voting on parties electoral fortunes.

These finding are important in that they bolster claims concerning the strategic politicization of European integration (Hooghe and Marks, 2007). Indeed, our analysis highlights that parties are able to strategically use the integration issue to their electoral benefit by increasing the importance of EU issues in their electoral campaigns. Moreover, these results indicate that parties’ fears concerning their Achilles heal – internal dissent – are well founded. For much of the EU’s history, political parties have eschewed politicizing European integration for fear of provoking conflict within. Our finding that intra-party dissent prohibits electoral gains suggests that this is in fact a rational strategy.
APPENDIX 1A

Questionnaire wording

The following is an excerpt from the 1996 Ray Expert Survey in which respondents were asked to make expert judgments of political parties at four time points (1984, 1988, 1992, and 1996) and the 1999 Marks/Steenbergen Expert Survey. Source: Ray (1999a); Marks and Steenbergen (1999).

Please use the form attached to evaluate the positions taken by political parties on the issue of European integration. Please evaluate the parties using the following scales.

The degree of dissent within the party over the party leadership’s position:
1=Complete unity
2=Minor dissent
3=Significant dissent
4=Party evenly split on the issue
5=Leadership position opposed by a majority of party activists

The following is an excerpt from the 2002 Chapel Hill Expert Survey. Source: Hooghe et al. (2002).

So far we have asked you to evaluate the position of the party leadership in general on European integration and EU policies. Yet a party leadership may or may not be united on an issue. We would now like you to think about conflict or dissent within parties.

How much internal dissent has there been in the various parties in [COUNTRY] over European integration over the course of 2002? If you believe that a party is completely united on European integration, please circle 1. If you believe it is extremely divided, circle 10. Intermediate numbers reflect the scale and intensity of disagreement inside the party.

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<tr>
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<th>Party B</th>
<th>Party C</th>
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<td><strong>Party is completely united</strong></td>
<td><strong>Party is extremely divided</strong></td>
<td><strong>Party is extremely divided</strong></td>
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## APPENDIX 1B

### Mean and standard deviation of intra-party dissent, 1984-2002

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APPENDIX 1B: continued

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## APPENDIX 1C

### Distribution of parties by intra-party dissent over European integration

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*Notes*: Table only includes political parties receiving at least 3 percent of the vote. *Sources*: Ray (1999), Steenbergen and Marks (2007), Hooghe et al. (2006).
APPENDIX 3A

HLM Model Specification

We begin by specifying the level 1 (individual-level) model. The dependent variable \( \text{Euroskepticism}_{ij} \) denotes the level of Euroskepticism for each respondent \((i)\) in each country-year \((j)\). In addition to the five individual-level predictors, the model includes an individual-level constant \( \beta_{0j} \), which enables us to bring in the level 2 (country-level) predictors.

\[
(1) \quad \text{Euroskepticism}_{ij} = \beta_{0j} + \beta_{1j}\text{ExclusiveNationalIdentity}_{ij} + \beta_{2j}\text{EconomicAnxiety}_{ij} + \beta_{3j}\text{TrustNationalGovernment}_{ij} + \beta_{4j}\text{SatisfactionNationalDemocracy}_{ij} + \beta_{5j}\text{ManualWorker}_{ij} + r_{ij}
\]

For each level 2 case (in the analysis a country-year), we estimate a unique level 1 model. This produces intercept and slope estimates specific to each country-year. At the second level, each of the level 1 coefficients (and their intercepts) could become a potential dependent variable (see Byrk and Raudenbush, 1992). The level 2 model is represented by equation 2 and includes the three country-level predictors.

\[
(2) \quad \beta_{0j} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01}\text{MiseryIndex}_{j} + \gamma_{02}\text{RWEuroscepticCue}_{j} + \gamma_{03}\text{LWEuroskeptic}_{j} + \delta_{0j}
\]

By substituting equation 2 into equation 1, we summarize the multilevel model in a single equation that brings together the predictors from the two levels (see equation 3). Since we do not assume that the predictors account for all of the variation in Euroskepticism at the two levels, the model includes variance components for \( \delta_{0j} \) and \( r_{ij} \). This allows us to consider how to account for Euroskepticism at different levels of analysis.

\[
(3) \quad \text{Euroskepticism}_{ij} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01}\text{MiseryIndex}_{j} + \gamma_{02}\text{RWEuroscepticCue}_{j} + \gamma_{03}\text{LWEuroskeptic}_{j} + \gamma_{10}\text{ExclusiveNationalIdentity}_{ij} + \gamma_{20}\text{EconomicAnxiety}_{ij} + \gamma_{30}\text{TrustNationalGovernment}_{ij} + \gamma_{40}\text{SatisfactionNationalDemocracy}_{ij} + \gamma_{50}\text{ManualWorker}_{ij} + \delta_{0j} + r_{ij}
\]

The model thus far assumes that the level 1 predictors have fixed effects. However, the two central hypotheses (H1 and H2) suggest heterogeneity in the effects of two of the level 1 predictors, namely exclusive national identity and economic anxiety. To model this interaction effect, we relax the assumption that exclusive national identity and economic anxiety, given by \( \beta_{1j} \) and \( \beta_{2j} \) in equation 1, are fixed and instead stipulate that the effects vary as a function of rightwing and leftwing Euroskeptic cues respectively. This produces the following:

\[
(4) \quad \beta_{1j} = \gamma_{10} + \gamma_{12}\text{RWEuroskepticCue}_{j} + \gamma_{13}\text{LWEuroskepticCue}_{j} + \delta_{0j}
\]
Equation 5 represents the fully specified model and includes the two cross-level interactions.

\[
(5) \quad \text{Euroskepticism}_{ij} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01}\text{MiseryIndex}_j + \gamma_{02}\text{RWEuroskepticCue}_j + \\
\gamma_{03}\text{LWEuroskepticCue}_j + \gamma_{10}\text{ExclusiveNationalIdentity}_y + \gamma_{20}\text{EconomicAnxiety}_y + \\
\gamma_{30}\text{TrustNatGovernment}_y + \gamma_{40}\text{SatisfactionNatDemocracy}_y + \gamma_{50}\text{ManualWorker}_y + \\
\gamma_{12}\text{RWEuroskepticCue}_j \ast \text{ExclusiveNationalIdentity}_y + \\
\gamma_{13}\text{LWEuroskepticCue}_j \ast \text{EconomicAnxiety}_y + \delta_0 + \delta_{1j}\text{ExclusiveNationalIdentity}_y + \\
\delta_{2j}\text{EconomicAnxiety}_y + r_{ij}
\]
REFERENCES


