MUNICIPAL GOVERNANCE AND DEMOCRATIC PERCEPTIONS: THE ROLE OF PARTY COMPETITION AND MUNICIPAL GOVERNANCE ON EVALUATIONS OF DEMOCRACY

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ABSTRACT

KATHERINE M. MCKIERNAN: Municipal Governance and Democratic Perceptions:
The Role of Party Competition and Municipal Governance on Evaluations of Democracy
(Under the direction of Evelyne Huber.)

This paper seeks to explore the role of municipal political experiences in shaping perceptions of national level democracy. I argue that the variation in citizens' perceptions of quality of democracy can be explained using municipal-level democratic cues. In addition to evaluating democracy based on national level elections, institutions, and trends, citizens are likely to determine the level on democracy based on immediate, observable democracy at the level of government closest to themselves. I use a multilevel model in order to evaluate how the structure of municipal electoral competition and government investment patterns affect individual perceptions of democracy.

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INTRODUCTION

When third party observers evaluate the quality of democracy in newly developed democracies, they do so using a range of indicators for democratic institutions and processes. However, these outside evaluations fail to consider the perceptions of citizens living within the regime. Citizens' perceptions of the quality of democracy illustrate their relative acceptance of the regime at large. If citizens have favorable perceptions of national-level democracy, they are likely to work within the current institutions rather than demand changes in democratic structures. These perceptions depend on whether governments are meeting citizens expectations for democracy. In new democracies, citizens will adopt a minimalist definition of what it means to be democratic, focusing most on free and fair elections while in older democracies, citizens are likely to expect higher levels of civil rights (Brinks, Leiras and Mainwaring 2014). In this paper, I explore how citizens' experiences with political institutions, procedures, and investment influence their evaluations of national quality of democracy.

Citizens evaluations of democracy are likely shaped by their interactions with government officials and processes. This offers clear implications for policy makers: where experiences with governments are positive, citizens will be more likely to favorably evaluate the political system whereas when evaluations are negative, citizens are less likely to see high levels of democracy or experience high levels of trust. Traditionally, perceptions have been explained using a number of individual-level characteristics that seek to explore how capable citizens are of evaluating their governments (Carlin and Zechmeister 2015). Furthermore, citizen's perceptions of democracy can be explained using national level cues such as the state of the economy and perceived corruption. However, the literature provides little insight on how variation in sub-state governance affects citizens' evaluations of the

quality of democracy in the regime [1] .

I argue that citizens' perceptions of the quality of democracy are affected by municipal-level cues. Citizens use experiences with local governments as information shortcuts to assess the quality of national-level governance and institutions. Thus, variation in municipal-level governance helps to explain within-state variation in citizens' perceptions of the quality of the regime's democracy. I argue that when political elites facilitate municipal democratic elections, build strong municipal infrastructures, and implement policies that improve citizens quality of life, citizens are more likely to see the entire country as democratic.

When classifying democracies, there are many countries with weak democratic institutions that do not cleanly fit the category of democracy or autocracy. In weak democracies and hybrid regimes, there is variance in the number of voices in the political system, the level of competition, and the level of democracy within the country (Gibson 2005; Gingerich 2013; Giraudy 2010). These differences increase the importance of municipal cues since they help to capture the within-country variance in democracy. When a citizen lives in an authoritarian pocket, they may see their country as less democratic than those citizens living in municipalities with stronger cues that democracy is "working". Municipal cues, therefore, may act as a key source of information for citizens about the political process and its effectiveness. Citizens are likely to evaluate the effectiveness of governance based on immediate needs: financial situations, infrastructure, and access to public goods (Faguet 2014; Gingerich 2013). Since this access is provided by municipal-level governments, citizens may use these municipal experiences to derive information about the quality of national-level democracy.

In this paper, I test my theory that citizens use municipal-level cues to evaluate national quality of democracy in the context of municipal elections in Colombia. Colombia is a hard test of the theory: it is a unitary government where there is a great deal of autonomy given to local governments, but they are not legally classified as a federation with a distinct realm of authority reserved to departments and municipalities. This creates a conservative test for

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[1] The Geographic Variance is detailed in the Data and Methods Section in Figure 2 and Figure 4

the effect of municipal-level cues where municipal characteristics include both mandated and discretionary investment across levels of governance. I run a multi-level model including both individual-level factors that contribute to perceptions of the quality of democracy and two types of municipal cues: process-based cues, focusing on elections, and results-based cues focused on investment in government services. These measures seek to address signals sent by municipal governments about a commitment to meeting basic needs and the structure of party competition. In newly formed democracies, elections constitute the most basic definition of democracy, so a focus on elections represents a minimum threshold for building democratic regimes.

Evaluating Quality of Democracy

Scholars have used various different measures to evaluate the quality of democracy in newly democratic regions. These measures focus on two dimensions of democracy: procedure and results. Procedural components of democracy are characterized by the institutionalization of democratic processes such as the rule of law, accountability, and responsiveness while results are focused on the freedoms afforded to citizens and the pursuit of equality in policy implementation (Morlino 2004). Although both dimensions affect citizens' perceptions of the quality of democracy in the regime, there is little understanding about how their effects differ.

A central puzzle in evaluating quality of democracy is how best to distinguish between democratic procedures and democratic results. Traditional measures of democracy often focus on the level of democracy, which prioritize democratic procedures as a precondition for democratic outcomes. This is evident in the unidimensional scales of democracy employed by both Polity and Freedom House measures (Altman and Pérez-Liñán 2002). However, focusing on procedures restricts our ability to broadly conceptualize variations in democracy. In new democracies, this problem is especially prevalent since competitive elections are often introduced before institutions that establish rule of law, civil society, and accountability (Rose and Shin 2001). Thus, democratic institutions are able to survive in authoritarian regimes. Furthermore, authoritarian and hybrid regimes often use elections

as a way to enhance their own legitimacy, without truly practicing democratic governance (Brownlee 2009; Diamond 2002; Gandhi and Przeworski 2007; Howard and Roessler 2006; Magaloni 2006). Scholars have sought to overcome this issue by disaggregating the components of democratic governance. For example, Levine and Molina (2011) measure quality of democracy as the development of basic elements of democratic governance, which combines an electoral dimension, a participation dimension, accountability, responsiveness, and government sovereignty. Yet this approach continues to ignore the importance of citizens perceptions of democracy (Brinks, Leiras and Mainwaring 2014).

Considering perceptions of the quality of democracy allows scholars to account for citizens' changing expectations for democratic governance as a democracy ages. In new democracies, citizens adopt a minimalist definition of what it means to be democratic, focusing primarily on free and fair elections, while in older democracies, citizens are likely to expect more expansive civil liberties and social welfare (Brinks, Leiras and Mainwaring 2014). I focus on perceptions of the quality of democracy, therefore, to account for citizens contextual understandings of democracy. This allows me to better evaluate how municipal experiences influence national-level evaluations of democracy.

Introducing additional levels of government further complicates how to best evaluate quality of democracy. Subnational governance likely affects perceptions of the quality of democracy because it introduces within-state geographic variation into citizens' experiences with local institutions. When democratizing reforms are introduced at the local level, such as participatory budgeting, village councils, or increased electoral competition, these changes to government institutions, procedures, and policies positively affect how citizens' feel about the regime in which they live (Truex 2014; Manion 1996; Malesky and Schuler 2010).

Government decentralization also produces variation in the implementation of policy, the structure of governing institutions, and the quality of democracy across municipalities. In federal states, regions have institutionalized autonomy over some government functions (Riker 1964). In unitary states, however, the central government often still extends governing power to locally elected municipal leaders. We see here that experiences with municipal

governance should matter across various types of formal power sharing agreements.

Scholars offer a variety of perspectives on how and to what extent municipal-level institutions and governance affect citizens' perceptions of the nation's overall quality of democracy. Some argue that democratic governance can be improved by increasing participatory venues to provide citizens with greater accountability and responsiveness from their representatives (Faguet 2014). However, the extent to which these reforms affect citizens' perceptions regarding the quality of democracy depends largely on the outcome of policy reforms. Faguet (2014) asserts that although the transference of power to municipal governments and the enactment of institutional reforms may threaten fiscal stability, they generally improve the quality of democratic governance. In turn, these reforms improve perceived levels of democracy. Truex (2014) finds that this logic has limits, however, since citizens have non-uniform expectations for democracy. Thus, elites are only able to manipulate citizen satisfaction with and support for regimes in limited subsamples of the population through municipal-level reforms.

Furthermore, scholars show that the size of a municipality affects how citizens evaluate of the quality of their regime's democracy. In smaller municipalities, citizens are more likely to see themselves as having real power in government (Lassen and Serritzlew 2011). Thus, citizens perceptions of the quality of democracy should be higher in smaller municipalities.

Decentralization has led to questions about how some authoritarian governments manage to persist in regions, regardless of national-level democracy. These regimes are not reproduced by the central government for continued support (Giraudy 2010), but rather are able to survive by practicing "boundary control" that minimizes their interaction with surrounding democratic regions and focuses on maximizing subnational autonomy (Gibson 2005). The opposite trend, subnational units that uphold democratic principles within traditionally authoritarian states, is also possible (Gilley 2010). Subnational units can behave as either "authoritarian pockets" or "democratic enclaves", but are constrained by the national-level government within which they operate due to the order of decentralization and restrictions on fiscal autonomy and economic capacity (Falleti 2005; González 2012;

Gingerich 2013). In the case of authoritarian pockets, the national government will rarely intervene if a provincial government is neither openly authoritarian nor flagrantly violating human rights (Behrend 2011). Instead, national governments tend to focus on securing necessary support for elections, policy implementations, and approval of legislation (Behrend 2011). Within-regime variance provides a framework for considering how perceptions of quality of democracy change across subnational units. Democratization reforms are employed non-uniformly across subnational units, which is likely to increase the variance in subnational experiences and perceptions of the quality of democracy.

The Role of Municipal Governments

In this paper, I argue that people build their perceptions of the quality of democracy not only using national-level information, but also by evaluating their experiences at the municipal level. Municipal governments offer readily-accessible signals concerning the provision of necessary resources and the implementation of national level policy. In all states, information about the quality of the regime's governance can come from a variety of sources–the news, the economy, personal ideology, and personal preference over elected representatives can all affect the degree with which people think democracy "works" in their country. However, access to this information varies between established and weak democracies. When national-level democracy is weak, I argue that citizens rely more on municipal-level experiences to determine the quality of national-level democracy.

In weak democracies and hybrid regimes, traditional evaluations of the quality of democracy are muddled due to coexisting democratic institutions and authoritarian practices. In the case of hybrid regimes, democratic institutions such as competitive elections and participatory venues help to increase regime stability (Gandhi and Przeworski 2007; Lehoucq and Pérez-Liñán 2013). Since democratic institutions can exist in both democracies and autocracies, evaluating the quality of democracy must look beyond institutions.

Although citizens in liberal democracies and authoritarian regimes are likely to reach a consensus about the level of democracy in their country, in hybrid regimes and elec-

toral democracies there is greater variation in citizens' evaluations. The perceived level of democracy in a country is easily influenced by a country's experiences with past difficulties establishing democratic regimes and histories of democratic backsliding. Citizens will use heuristic cues to evaluate elite decisions and democracy (Rodden and Wibbels 2010). I argue that citizens will respond to local level cues to evaluate national democracy and that variance in municipal-level democracy helps to explain the variance in citizen perceptions of the quality of democracy.

Third party observers such as Polity and Freedom House tend to assume that these cues occur at the national level (Rodden and Wibbels 2010). Uncompetitive elections, national-level corruption, electoral fraud, and government repression all serve as signs that democratization is ineffective (Truex 2014; Reuter and Robertson 2012, 2015; Pop-Eleches and Robertson 2015; Lupu 2014; Morgan 2011). However, a focus on national cues does not account for the variance in electoral systems within developing and weak democracies that permit enduring subnational authoritarian pockets (Behrend 2011; Gibson 2005; Giraudy 2010)]. While at the national level there may be limited competition and strong, centralized regimes, localities may be the initial locations for democratic reforms and growing oppositions that signal a potential change in national government structure.

This was the story in Mexico, where the single-party authoritarian regime under the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) opened a greater space for the opposition in municipal governments that initially allowed the PRI to maintain national strength, but ultimately acted as a catalyst for democratization(Magaloni 2006). Early municipal reforms gave citizens a space to open up the political system and helped citizens push for greater democratization. This was possible because citizens' demands placed on the political system changed. Citizens change their demands on elected officials and their expected levels of responsiveness as their information about the political system changed(Truex 2014). In Mexico, citizens first began pushing for greater democracy at the subnational level. After experiencing improvements with regional democracy, citizens pushed for increased levels of democratic competition at the national level.

In this case, municipal cues may have changed the demands of citizens with respect to

democratization. In addition to improvements in elections, increased venues for participation, spaces for deliberation, and evidence of coalitions and cooperation can all signal that democracy is becoming stronger or more efficient. However, these indicators may not be evenly distributed across a country. Electoral cues exist in each municipality in both federal and unitary systems. Municipal governments are often the level of governance closest to the people and the space where immediate needs are met. This allows municipalities to act as an accessible venue to derive larger cues about the national quality of democracy by providing immediate information about political processes and direct experiences to the citizens. Furthermore, since municipal governments implement national policy, citizens might form judgments about the success of national-level governments based on their experiences with municipal governance.

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│      DV: Quality of Democracy    │
│         [Trust Level]            │
└─────────────────────────────────┘
        ↑                    ↑
       /                      \
┌──────────────────┐   ┌──────────────────┐
│   IV: Process     │   │   IV: Results     │
│ [Party Competition]│   │   [Investment]    │
└──────────────────┘   └──────────────────┘
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
Fig. 1: Theoretical Diagram

Citizens are offered two broad classes of cues that allow them to update their beliefs about the quality of democracy. The first type of cue is process-oriented, where citizens have direct experiences with the institutions and processes of democratic governance. Broadly, this includes evidence of separation of powers, law making, and the justice system. The second cues are results-oriented cues, which focus on the implementation of policies and the observable results of democratic processes. I argue that both of these cues are likely

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to influence the perception of the quality of democracy (see Figure 1). Quality of democracy can be evaluated in different ways: as the perceived level of democracy (how democratic is your country?) or the level of trust in democratic institutions and processes. Thus, I consider the quality of democracy in both ways. While process-based and results-based cues are both likely to influence the perceived quality of democracy, citizens responses to these cues will differ. Therefore, both measures of quality of democracy are necessary to see how citizens evaluations change based on process-based and results-based cues.

Signals concerning the democratic process and democratic results represent citizen's ability to see the government providing for their basic needs. Each of these cues captures one of the two main dimensions of quality of democracy (Morlino 2004; Levine and Molina 2011). I argue that both dimensions–experience with institutions and the observed results– have the potential to change a citizen's evaluation of democracy because they allow citizens to update their beliefs about the political system by offering signs that the system is either succeeding, representing a high level of democracy, or failing, indicating that democracy is not meeting the needs of the people. These cues further capture the probability that citizens will base evaluations on a limited set of experiences that they share with people within their network.

Process-based cues include venues for citizen participation, evidence of deliberative measures within the government, and the degrees of civil liberties (Morlino 2004). I chose to focus on electoral cues because elections are often the first step in democratization. Furthermore, elections send a strong signal about the current state of democracy in two ways. The first is that elections allow candidates to send a message about policies including which policies are succeeding, which policies are failing, and which aspects of governance most need to be addressed. The second signal that elections offer is the level of consensus among elites. The structure of elections, including the number of candidates competing and their discourse, sends a signal to voters about the level of convergence and divergence of opinions, the relationships between government officials, and the role of elected officials. These cues work with national-level information to offer a more nuanced impression of the current state of democratic institutions. Thus, if citizens are receiving more information about the

success or failures of democracy at the subnational level than the national level, this information is likely to color their interpretation of national democracy. When elections are free, fair, and competitive, they meet the minimum definition of democracy and send a positive signal that democratic institutions are functioning. Where elections show evidence of fractionalization, are uncompetitive, or are perceived as corrupt, citizens receive a signal that democratic institutions are failing. I focus on differences in electoral competition across municipalities as a simple measure of within-country variance that prioritizes the first tenet of democracy: free, fair, and competitive elections.

Results-based cues send a more ambiguous signal about the state of democracy. There are various ways in which citizens evaluate changes in outcomes including access to public goods, improvements in the standard of living, opportunities available to citizens, and the efficiency of government services. Where there are improvements in access to goods and services, I hypothesize that citizens will see this as evidence of successful democracy and have a more favorable evaluation of the quality of democracy nationally. Conversely, where citizens see worsening local conditions and services, they are likely to see democracy as less successful. Measuring results poses questions of how to determine if the government is meeting the needs of citizens and how to asses questions of credit claiming across levels of governance. In a decentralized context, municipal governments receive money both via local taxation and federal transfers. However, municipal governments do not have consistent levels of autonomy in how to invest money that may not be observed by citizens within the municipality. How funds gained through taxation and transfers are invested offers insights concerning the focus of municipal governments and their ability to provide better governance through discretionary investment. Focusing on results allows me to account for subnational variance in democracy where local governments share similar electoral structures.

Citizens are universally exposed to both types of cues: as residents of a municipality, citizens receive signals concerning democratic results within the municipality through the observed quality of public programs, roads and transportation, and interactions with government services. Furthermore, during electoral campaigns they are continuously exposed

to messages about democracy, regardless of their decision to vote. Together, citizens use this information to evaluate both the government in power and the political regime.

While these cues exist at the national level, in weak democracies where the national quality of democracy is unclear, municipal governance is important in giving citizens the necessary information to interpret their experiences and update their beliefs about national democracy. Where decentralization reforms offer high levels of autonomy to subnational governments, subnational cues become even more important since autonomous subnational governments send signals that might differ from those at the national level. Furthermore, even where signals overlap, municipal governments are largely responsible for enforcing national policy, offering a deeper insight into outcomes. This is evident through differences in the structure of elections across levels of government. Municipal governments are able to send direct signals concerning outcomes since they are the most immediate providers of services that citizens interact with regularly.

Empirical Tests and Expectations

In order to test my theory, I create a multi-level model that separates the individual-level factors that influence perception of quality of democracy from the municipal-level cues citizens receive about democracy in their country. In the context of a single-country case study, this model controls for national level cues, which provide constant information to citizens. In models for both types of cues, my dependent variable is "quality of democracy" operationalized in two ways: as the perceived level of democracy and as trust in democratic institutions and processes. Including both dependent variables allows me to separate how exposure to different cus effects perceived quality of democracy.

My variables of interest are municipal-level democratic cues. Here, I include both process-based cues and results-based cues. I measure process-based cues as party competition and restrict my analysis to the number of parties competing for mayor and the margin of victory that these parties experience. In order to capture results-based cues, I consider the investment that municipalities commit to social services, municipal infrastructure, the agricultural sector, and to improving spaces for political participation and development at

the local level. These categories capture the services most clearly provided by local governments.

In Colombia, the process of decentralization gives municipalities autonomy within certain limits. Municipalities have the exclusive right to tax real property through Decree 1421 in 1993 and its revisions in 1998 and 2005. Municipalities also are responsible for determining the base and rates of excise taxes. However,each municipality is responsible for creating a development plan to submit to the federal government for approval to request additional funds and provide information about ongoing programs and municipal budgets. Additional autonomy is granted to Bogotá that allows it to set additional taxes for businesses. The national government is able to limit the autonomy of municipalities due to the reliance on fiscal transfers from the central government.

Approximately 70% of the federal budget is designated transfers to municipal governments. Thus, the majority of investment and spending occurs at the municipal level under the guidelines and framework designated by the national government. The large proportion of funds gained through federal transfers offer municipalities autonomy over how to invest money to meet the needs of their citizens ,but the transfers include guidelines emphasizing municipalities commitment to following their proposed development plans, focusing social investment on education and health care, and complying with central government development plans (Faguet and Sanchez 2008). According to the Constitutional reforms in 2001, Colombia determines transfers based on relative poverty, population, fiscal efficiency, and administrative efficiency of the municipalities and provides general purpose, block grant, transfers for water utilities, sports and recreation, culture, and investment The exact formula for determining transfers is vague, but offers incentives for municipalities to invest in municipal infrastructure and improve municipal administration to receive more federal transfers towards social programs. Any city with over 100,000 residents appoints a comptroller responsible for the municipality's finances. To demonstrate fiscal efficiency, municipalities must keep balanced budgets or they are penalized with a reduction in transfers and discretionary funds under the "Traffic Light Law" of 1997. Fiscal transfers include both earmarked and free funds, with the earmarked funds intended to insure equality in

access to social programs across municipalities. These funds allow the central government to intervene for the purpose of greater equality in implementing programs and in active conflict zones.

At the municipal level, I also control for the municipalities experience with rebel group takeover to account for experience with the Colombian Civil War, the proportion of the municipality that is rural, and the size of the municipality.

At the individual level, I consider exposure to news media since the level of interaction with the news will change a citizen's knowledge about the national level regime and provide additional information about the quality of democracy. This increase in available cues holds regardless of whether the news is state controlled or independent. I also consider the citizens' perceptions of the state of the national economy, which is shown to influence their perception of the government and expect that those who see the economy as better will also see the country as more democratic. I include whether the citizen voted. While this is a form of political participation, whether a citizen votes may serve as an indicator for their trust in the democratic system. Finally, I control for a citizen's level of education and gender. While there is evidence that citizens may also be influenced by their income, I do not include this variable because of the high volume of respondents that do not indicate their income which excludes the wealthiest and poorest respondents from the sample. Instead, I trust that education is a meaningful proxy for income as is standard in survey research (Carlin and Zechmeister 2015).

Process-Based Cues

The number of parties competing reflects democracy's assumption that there should be a place in politics for various opinions to be heard. However, when too many people compete for office, we can reasonably assume that citizens will have the opposite concern–if there are too many candidates, there is a question of whether there can be consensus between elites seeking influence. As a result, I expect that an increase in parties will initially improve perceptions of the quality of democracy, but, after reaching a certain number of parties, there will be a decrease in perceived quality of democracy. This suggests that there is

an optimal number of parties competing for office that will maximize perceived quality of democracy. Where only one party competes, people receive cues that there is minimal competition. Conversely, where many fragmented parties compete, citizens receive the opposite message that there is little government consensus and efficiency. Thus, a non-linear relationship should emerge. Furthermore, in a democracy, we expect that elections are competitive rather than nominal. Thus, more competitive elections should lead to higher perceptions of the quality of democracy. I measure competitiveness by subtracting the percent of the vote received by the party receiving the second most votes from the percent of votes received by the winning political party.

This interpretation of process-based cues leads to two related hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1a: As the number of parties competing for office increases, perceptions of the quality of democracy will increase initially and decrease with the addition of additional parties. This hypothesis assumes a "crowding out" effect in which there are too many political parties in the system and trust in electoral processes should decrease.

Hypothesis 1b: As an election becomes more competitive, citizens' perceptions of the quality of democracy will improve.

Results-Based Cues

I use investment in various government services and programs to proxy results-based cues since investment represents a commitment to various municipal services [2] . When considering investment categories, I consider the investment per capita in each municipality. This allows me to capture a comparable measure of how much, per person, municipal governments invest in services. I argue that where investment in each of these services is higher, perceptions of the quality of democracy will also be higher. This test assumes that greater levels of investment per capita acts as a proxy for commitment to providing different government services. For example, higher levels of investment in municipal political devel-

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[2] A potential criticism of this measure is that investment might better represent municipal capacity. However, higher levels of capacity should be correlated with the ability to provide higher quality governance. Furthermore, since the degree of investment that is earmarked is inconsistent across municipalities, variance in investments should represent municipal governance

opment indicates greater commitment to opening spaces for local political engagement and participation.

This leads to the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 2: As investment in the agricultural sector, municipal political development, social services, and municipal infrastructure increase, citizens' perceptions of the quality of democracy will improve. In municipalities with large rural populations, the effect of agricultural investment will be larger.

Since municipal-level GDP data is not available, I focus on absolute GDP per capita to allow for the variance in available funds in each municipality due to available tax revenue and the degree of federal transfers.

I test this theory in the context of Colombia because it is a hard test for the theory. If there is evidence that municipal level factors drive perceptions of democracy in a unitary country–where there is lower constitutional separation between the municipalities and the central government–than it may suggest that municipal level cues will continue to have an effect in federal states. Colombia's vague rules concerning fiscal transfers and municipal autonomy force municipalities to compete for funds by showing fiscal responsibility via balanced municipal budgets. Furthermore, unlike in federal states where the effects of authoritarian pockets have been studied, there have not been studies exploring potential authoritarian pockets within Colombia, where the level of democracy is assumed to be consistent across the country. Despite these conditions, there is a high level of variance in how democratic respondents see Colombia. Geographic variance in respondents may be explained by differences across Colombian municipalities.

Data and Methods

I test this theory using two sets of data. First, in order to consider perceptions of democracy and individual factors, I use data from the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) for Colombia from the 2008 and 2012 surveys ((N.d.) LAPOP). With these rounds of surveys, I remove 2010 because it was a national election year, and thus I expect the fo-

cus of citizens to be on national, rather than municipal, cues. Excluding a national election year, therefore, allows me to focus on respondents average evaluations of the quality of democracy when national-level information is constant. I would expect that a national-level election year would take the focus from municipal-level cues to national-level cues and the effect of municipal-level cues on citizens' evaluations would disappear.

The use of LAPOP survey data allows me to identify perceptions of the quality of democracy, respondents' access to news media, perceptions of the national economy, perceptions of corruption, and whether or not the respondent voted. I am also able to identify respondents levels of education and their gender. The LAPOP survey is used to construct my dependent variables and to control for demographic characteristics of the respondents.

In order to evaluate the municipal cues for democracy, I use municipal panel data collected through Universidad de los Andes' Center for Economic Development (*Facultad de Economia: Centro de Datos* 2015). My subset of data includes the absolute investment in different municipal services for 2004-2008 and mayoral election data from the 2007 and 2011 elections in each of the 1119 municipalities in Colombia. The investment data is reported in thousands of pesos. The election data provides the names and political parties of each candidate, the raw votes for each candidate and the number of ballots that were discounted because they were either invalid, left blank, or were never cast. Furthermore, this dataset includes demographic characteristics for each municipality such as the total population broken down by urban and rural populations. With this data, I will measure lagged effects of investment per capita and two waves of local elections. I only include observations of municipalities from which there are survey respondents, which allows me to test 81 total municipalities for process-based cues and 53 total municipalities for results-based cues. The reduced number of municipalities for results-based cues occurs because I only look at a single round of LAPOP survey data. [3] .

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[3] Using LAPOP survey methods, the respondents are voting-aged individuals from each of the geographic regions of Colombia. In 2008, these respondents were stratified geographically, pulled from municipalities, and clustered as urban or rural. In 2012, this survey changed to better capture within-municipality variance and increase the number of sampling points within municipalities. Across both waves of surveys, one respondent per household is interviewed but institutionalized individuals (including those in boarding schools, hospitals, police academies, military barracks, and county jails) are excluded. Each non-institutionalized voting age

My dependent variable in my models is "Perception of the Quality of Democracy". I divide this variable into two component parts: perceived level of democracy and trust in democratic institutions and processes. Perceived level of democracy provides an overall measure of citizens' perception of the quality of the regime's democracy whereas trust in democratic institutions provides a more nuanced representation of citizens' experiences with democratic governance. These two components also reflect citizens' distinct responses to policy outcomes versus satisfaction with governing institutions. I measure level of democracy using a LAPOP survey question that directly asks "In your opinion, is (Colombia) very democratic, somewhat democratic, a little democratic, or not democratic? [4] ". I recode this variable so that 1 represents "not democratic" and 4 represents "very democratic". Although this question asks directly about democracy, the respondent's evaluation is likely influenced by both his or her experience with governance and preference for the current leadership. When considering responses for perceived level of democracy in 1, most respondents chose category 3, "somewhat democratic", but about as many respondents see Colombia as "very democratic" as those that see Colombia as "a little democratic" [5] . I also divide the perception of democracy geographically to see the variance of the proportion of respondents who evaluate the level of democracy as "not democratic" and "very democratic in each municipality. In Figure 2, each bar represents a municipality and the proportion of respondents who see Colombia as "not democratic" varies from 0 to just over 15% while the respondents who see Colombia as "very democratic" ranges from 0 to just over 70%.

My second dependent variable is an index of questions pertaining to independent components of democracy. This index captures the level of trust in democratic institutions and processes, and is correlated with the perception of the level of democracy at $r = 0.32$.

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person has an equal probability of being included in the survey sample. Each subsample is drawn from stratified regions, municipal size, and urban/rural regions to avoid excluding subgroups from geographic regions, different sized municipalities, or the capital city due to the random sample. My sample is equivalent to the LAPOP samples for 2008 and 2012.

[4] For each survey question, the questions are translated from Spanish to English

[5] I produce the summary statistics based on my largest sample that will be tested, for the election hypotheses

Level of Democracy	Proportion of Responses
Not Democratic	.046
A Little Democratic	.232
Somewhat Democratic	.501
Very Democratic	.221

Table 1: Responses for Level of Democracy

(a) Proportion of Respondents Responding Not Democratic

(b) Proportions of Respondents Responding Very Democratic

Fig. 2: Geographic Variance in Responses for Level of Democracy

Respondents were asked to rate how much they agree with a series of statements from 1-meaning not at all, to 7- meaning completely. I include the following questions:

1. To what extent do you respect your political institutions?

2. To what point do you have confidence in elections?

3. To what extent do you have confidence in political parties?

4. To what extent do you believe that political parties represent you?

5. To what extent do you believe that your basic rights as a citizen are protected by the political system?

6. To what point do you believe the government promotes and protects democratic principles?

7. To what extent are you proud to live in your political system?

8. To what extent do you believe that you can help the political system?

I include each of these questions because they reflect trust in electoral dimensions of democracy, representation, and commitment to democratic principles. Questions one and two capture citizens' feelings about democratic institutions while questions three and four capture how well institutions represent the population. Questions five and six explore whether citizens believe, broadly, that the country upholds democratic standards and respects rights. Finally, questions seven and eight consider whether citizens have political efficacy and relative support for their political regime. Combined, these questions create a comprehensive assessment of the level of respect in institutions, the commitment of the political system to upholding democratic principals, belief in democracy at large, and the level of representation in the political system. Each question, therefore, contributes to a comprehensive understanding of the quality of democracy from both an individual and institutional level.

While the trust variable would benefit from including more information in trust for each branch of government, the ultimate goal of this variable, to capture the quality of democracy, is better realized by focusing on questions concerning the political system at large, institutionalized parties, support for democracy, and efficacy to avoid the instability of trust in weak institutions based on who currently holds power. Question seven might also tap into nationalism, but the benefit of including relative pride for the political system is that it looks at the system at large rather than separating each component part of democracy. The alternative, including questions about support for the presidency, congress, and the supreme court, risks capturing fleeting support based on partisan affiliations or rule of law rather than trust in democracy. Pride in the political system, therefore, taps into feelings about the entire political system. Furthermore, pride in the political system can indicate support for democracy as opposed to alternate forms of government. Similarly, question eight might also tap into optimism, but it explores the degree to which citizens believe their vote holds value. [6]

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[6] When the tests are repeated with pride removed from the index, the results are consistent.

This variable is built using an additive index where each question contributes to $1/8$ of the total score for perceptions of the quality of democracy. Using Stata to create this index, I find that the answers track together reliably at $\alpha = 0.83$. This method creates a continuous scale ranging from 1 to 7 where 1 is no trust in institutions and 7 is the highest level of trust in institutions. The correlation between these eight questions can be seen in Figure 2.

Question	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Respect Institutions	1.00							
Rights Protected	0.41	1.00						
Proud	0.46	0.57	1.00					
Can Help System	0.48	0.44	0.63	1.00				
Confidence in Parties	0.22	0.35	0.34	0.30	1.00			
Promotes and Protects Principles	0.33	0.36	0.42	0.38	0.29	1.00		
Political Parties Representative	0.19	0.33	0.30	0.26	0.36	0.34	1.00	
Confidence in Elections	0.28	0.36	0.38	0.37	0.41	0.38	0.33	1.00

Table 2: Correlation Matrix of Component Questions

In addition to a correlation matrix, I run a factor analysis to see if these questions are capturing the same underlying latent variable. The factor analysis shows ambiguity over whether these questions are best represented as one or two factors. The Eigen Test, which is most commonly used, suggests that these components represent two factors with R^2 values of 0.72 and 0.61. However, a parallel analysis, optimal coordinates analysis, and acceleration factor test all suggest that these questions are best represented as a single factor with a R^2 value of 0.84. This suggests that each question is tapping into a single dimension and can be included in a single index.

The overall distribution of trust in democratic institutions and processes can be seen in Figure 3 and the municipal variance in the highest and lowest evaluations can be seen in Figure 4. Municipalities range from 0 to 25% of the respondents exhibiting low levels of trust and 0 to just under 30% showing high levels of trust.

In order to operationalize the individual-level variables, I evaluate exposure to news media by considering two sets of questions. In 2008, citizens were asked how often they listened to the news on the radio, watched the news on TV, read the news in the newspaper, or read the news on-line as four separate questions. In 2012, however, they were asked whether they did any of the above in a single question. Both ways the questions were asked

Fig. 3: Distribution of Trust in Democratic Institutions and Processes

(a) Proportion of Respondents With Low Levels of Trust

(b) Proportions of Respondents With High Levels of Trust

Fig. 4: Geographic Variance in Responses for Trust in Democratic Institutions and Processes

were coded 1, everyday, 2, one to two times a week, 3, rarely, or 4, never. In order to make these questions comparable, I convert the 2008 survey so that if any of the types of media are coded as 1, then exposure to media is coded 1, indicating that the person accessed a news source everyday. Similarly, if the most exposure to media is coded 2, then the exposure overall is coded 2. By extracting the code indicating the most access to news media, I am able to make these variables comparable across survey years. I invert the scale so that an

Question	1	2	3	4	5	yes	no
News Access	.011	.066	.145	.777			
Economic Perceptions	.063	.249	.520	.157	.011		
Voted						.644	.356
Perception of Corruption	.029	.133	.328	.510			
Rebel Occupation						.606	.393

Table 3: Proportion of Respondents for Each Control

increase in categories corresponds with an increase in how frequently respondents consume the news. In my sample, respondents news access can be found in Table 3, showing that most respondents consume some form of news daily.

For perception of the national economy, I use the question "How would you evaluate the economic situation of (Colombia)?" This question is asked on a 5-point scale where 1 is very good, 2 is good, 3 is neither good nor poor, 4 is poor, and 5 is very poor. I invert this scale so that 5 represents a very good economy. In Table 3, most citizens see the economy as neither good nor poor. Whether a citizen voted is coded as 1 for yes and 0 for no and more than half of the respondents voted in Table 3. I also include a variable for perception of corruption that is coded from 1, not widespread, to 4, very widespread, where most respondents saw corruption as "very widespread" in Table 3. Finally, I use Education as a proxy for income in order to account for the high proportion of missing data on the income question. Education is measured as the last year of schooling that the respondent completed, where most respondents had ten years of schooling in Figure 5.

Municipal level electoral variables are operationalized using the 2007 mayoral elections, which should affect the 2008 surveys and the 2011 elections that should affect the 2012 surveys while investment variables for 2004-2008 are paired with the 2008 elections. In order to evaluate the number of voices in the elections, I count the number of candidates competing for mayor. This variable does not include write-in candidates or unmarked ballots. In order to evaluate the margin of victory, I convert raw votes to percentage of the total vote and subtract the percent of votes the second-place candidate received from the percent of the vote that the winning candidate received. For investment, I include investment per capita in agriculture, political development, social programs, and infrastructure. I consider

Fig. 5: Distribution of Years of Education

investment four ways: as a one year lag, as the difference between two years to account for change in investment, as average investment over the prior two years, and as average investment from 2004-2008. These categories allow time for any programs or results of the investment to be witnessed and to consider immediate changes in investment. In order to further control for differences between municipalities, I include the logged population of the municipality, the proportion of the population that is rural, and a dummy variable to represent whether a municipality has experienced occupation by a rebel group during the Colombian Civil War.

In most municipalities, only a handful of parties compete, but there are municipalities with up to fourteen independent parties as seen in Figure 6. Many of these elections were also decided by a very small margin of victory, as seen in Figure 7. When evaluating investment, most respondents live in a municipality with low levels of investment in agriculture, political development, and municipal infrastructure while many respondents see high levels of social investment, as seen in Figure 8. The high levels of social investment occur because the limits on transfers from the central government stipulate high levels of investment in health and education.

On each of my dependent variables, I run multi-level models. When I evaluate the

Fig. 6: Number of Parties Competing for Mayor

Fig. 7: Margin of Victory in Mayoral Elections

(a) Agriculture Investment

(b) Political Development Investment

(c) Social Investment

(d) Municipal Infrastructure Investment

Fig. 8: Investment in Local Programs and Services

perceived level of democracy, I perform an ordered logit model since there are four ordered categories [7] . However, when testing trust, I use a continuous scale from 1 to 7 and run the multi-level model using Ordinary Least Squares regression.

Process-Based Cues

In order to test the effect of process-based cues on perceptions of the quality of democracy, I run the following model:

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[7] I also run this as an ordered logit with robust standard errors in the appendix, see Table 11

$$\text{Quality of Democracy} = \beta_0 + \beta_1\text{Access to News Media} + \beta_2\text{Economic Perception} + \beta_3\text{Voted} +$$

$$\beta_4\text{Education} + \beta_5\text{Corruption} + \beta_6\text{Number of Parties} + \beta_7\text{Parties}^2 +$$

$$\beta_8\text{Margin of Victory} + \beta_9\text{Population (log)} + \beta_{10}\text{Proportion Rural} +$$

$$\beta_{11}\text{Conflict} + \epsilon$$

$$(1)$$

As detailed above, β_1 through β_4 represent the individual level determinants and β_5 through β_{11} represent municipal-level determinants. Within the multi-level model framework, I allow the intercept to vary by municipality.

In hypothesis 1a, I predict that as the number of candidates competing increases, the perception of quality of democracy increases at first and then decreases. As a result, I expect that the coefficient on β_6Number of Parties will be positive while the coefficient on β_7 Parties^2 will be negative. This captures the idea that as more parties enter the political system perceptions will initially improve before experiencing a "crowding out" effect.

In hypothesis 1b, I predict that as elections become more competitive, citizens' perceptions of the quality of democracy will improve. As a result, I predict that as the margin of victory decreases, meaning the difference in votes between the top candidates is smaller, the perception of quality of democracy will increase. Thus, I expect the coefficient on β_8Margin of Victory to be negative.

Results-Based Cues

I follow the same modeling structure when considering results-based cues. Thus, I test the following model:

$$\text{Quality of Democracy} = \beta_0 + \beta_1\text{Access to News Media} + \beta_2\text{Economic Perception} + \beta_3\text{Voted} +$$
$$\beta_4\text{Education} + \beta_5\text{Corruption} + \beta_6\text{Population (log)} + \beta_7\text{Proportion Rural} +$$
$$\beta_8\text{Agriculture} + \beta_9\text{Agriculture*Rural} + \beta_{10}\text{Political Development} +$$
$$\beta_{11}\text{Social Programs} + \beta_{12}\text{Municipal Infrastructure} + \beta_{13}\text{Conflict} + \epsilon$$

$$(2)$$

This model follows the same structure as the model in equation 1. Here, I expect the coefficients on β_8 Agriculture, β_{10} Political Development, β_{11} Social Programs and β_{12} Municipal Infrastructure will all be positive so that increases in investment correspond with increases in perceptions of the quality of democracy. This follows the expectations outlined in Hypothesis 2.

I control for the effects of individual-level factors. I expect that as perception of the countries economic condition improves, perceptions of quality of democracy will improve. Since income and education are both associated with greater political awareness, I expect that wealthier and more educated citizens will have a lower perception of the quality of democracy so that these coefficients will be negative. Furthermore, citizens with higher perceptions of corruption are likely to have lower evaluations of the quality of democracy. Finally, I expect respondents in municipalities that have higher levels of experience with conflict and larger populations will have lower perceptions of the quality of democracy.

This data does not sample from every municipality each year, so many municipalities are not included in the analysis. However, since municipalities are sampled at random across each region of Colombia, these municipalities represent Colombia's population.

Results and Analysis

I separate my analysis into an analysis of process-based and results-based cues. In each of the models, I allow the intercepts to vary by municipality. Despite the random effects of municipalities, the constant slopes allow me to consider the overall effect of each type of signal that voters receive.

Process-Based Cues

There is limited support that municipal-level electoral cues change citizens perceptions of the quality of national democracy. This is evident in Table 4.

The margin of victory for the winning mayoral candidate is not statistically significant in citizens evaluations of the level of democracy or their trust in democracy. Thus, the level of competitiveness does not appear to alter citizen's evaluations of democracy.

When evaluating the effects of parties, however, I find mixed results. In order to evaluate when the number of parties are statistically significant, I produce marginal effects to account for the changes in the effect of parties across the number of parties. When evaluating the level of democracy, the number of parties are not statistically significant. This implies that the number of parties does not alter perceived levels of democracy.

However, the number of parties has a statistically significant effect on trust in democracy from three through nine parties, as seen in Figure 9. Within this range, an increase in the number of parties competing for mayor has an increasingly negative effect. Since the mean number of parties across municipalities is 5 parties, the results indicate that the majority of respondents find an increase in competing parties decreases their trust in democracy. These results suggest that the increase in parties occurs beyond the observable range and that the squared term is not appropriate [8] . The results hold when I control for rebel control of the municipality.

The coefficients on parties and parties squared are both negative. This indicates that,

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[8] The results without the squared term are in the appendix in Table 10

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Level of Democracy	Level of Democracy	Trust in Democracy	Trust in Democracy
	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se
main				
News Access	0.267**	0.311**	0.187**	0.216**
	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.03)	(0.05)
Economic Perceptions	0.413**	0.502**	0.301**	0.276**
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Education	-0.025**	-0.017	-0.035**	-0.035**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Voted	0.313**	0.364**	0.150**	0.271**
	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.04)	(0.06)
Population (log)	0.024	0.173**	-0.062**	-0.086**
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Proportion Rural	0.006	0.596	-0.238	-0.447*
	(0.37)	(0.45)	(0.20)	(0.27)
Gender	-0.058	-0.060	0.040	0.003
	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.04)	(0.06)
Perception of Corruption	0.034	0.067	-0.119**	-0.080**
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Parties	-0.013	-0.045	-0.026	-0.029
	(0.11)	(0.16)	(0.05)	(0.10)
Parties^2	-0.002	-0.003	-0.002	-0.004
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)
Margin of Victory	-0.000	-0.008	0.002	0.002
	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Rebel Groups		-0.290*		0.069
		(0.17)		(0.10)
Intercept			4.265**	4.199**
			(0.45)	(0.58)
τ_1	-0.810	1.275		
	(0.85)	(0.99)		
τ_2	1.365	3.510**		
	(0.85)	(0.99)		
τ_3	3.708**	5.698**		
	(0.86)	(1.00)		
Between-Municipality Variance	0.124**	0.095*		
	(0.05)	(0.05)		
Random Effects			-1.599**	-1.629**
			(0.18)	(0.24)
N	1977.000	1339.000	2706.000	1379.000
AIC	4512.530	3098.719	8216.820	4162.686
BIC	4596.370	3181.914	8299.465	4241.123

Table 4: Regression Results for Electoral Cues

Fig. 9: Marginal Effect of the Number of Parties

Fig. 10: Predicted Trust in Democracy Across Number of Parties

rather than an increase in parties competing initially improving perceptions of the quality of democracy before experiencing a "crowding out" that decreases the perceptions of democracy, an increase in the number of parties will lower perceptions of the quality of democracy at an increasing rate. Based on the marginal effect of the number of parties in Figure 9, this effect is statistically significant from three through nine parties. This leads to a more linear trend in Figure 10. When I restrict my analysis to where the effect of political parties is statistically significant, 2585 of the 2706 survey respondents live in municipalities with three through nine parties competing. This suggests that in Colombia, the number of parties competing send a cue to citizens that democratic institutions are weak, thus lowering

their trust in institutions from about 4.5 to 4 on the continuous, 7 point scale.

Neither the presence of rebel groups nor the proportion of the municipality that is rural are statistically significant indicators of the level of democracy or trust in institutions at $p < 0.05$. However, population has an inconsistent effect: when citizens are in larger municipalities, they tend to see a higher level of democracy and have less trust in democracy. At the individual level, those who consume more news, those with higher perceptions of the national economy, and those who vote tend to have higher perceptions of the level of democracy and trust in democracy while those who are more educated and who see a higher level of corruption tend to see lower levels of democracy and have less trust in institutions.

Results-Based Cues

Similar to institutional cues, information concerning democratic outcomes also have mixed effects on the perceived levels of democracy. I run these tests only for individuals' perceptions in 2008 because there is a shortage of data available for 2010-2012 that prevents me from properly estimating the effects of outcomes on the second wave of surveys.

The outcomes of municipal investment have a different effect on the perceived level of democracy than the trust in democratic institutions. When considering the level of democracy, increased investment in municipal infrastructure– composed of investment in prisons, administration, municipal development, municipal spaces, and the justice system–is associated with increases in the perceived level of democracy. This is evident in Table 5, where investment in municipal infrastructure is positive and statistically significant when averaged over the prior two years and averaged over the prior five years. These models account for the delay from increases in spending and the observable effects of this investment that can be witnessed by the population. These results hold when controlling for occupation of rebel groups, although this occupation is not statistically significant [9]. As spending per capita in the municipality increases, the predicted probability in seeing Colombia as "very democratic" also increases.

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[9] These results can be found in the appendix in Table 12

	(1) Lagged Investment b/se	(2) Difference in Investment b/se	(3) Investment Over 2 Years b/se	(4) Investment Over 5 Years b/se
News Access	0.321**	0.315**	0.306**	0.311**
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Economic Perception	0.496**	0.503**	0.498**	0.496**
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Education	-0.015	-0.018	-0.017	-0.018
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Voted	0.335**	0.358**	0.338**	0.343**
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Gender	-0.056	-0.055	-0.061	-0.063
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)
Corruption	0.069	0.064	0.069	0.067
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Population (log)	0.016	0.136*	0.140*	0.132
	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.10)
Proportion Rural	0.495	0.691	0.906	0.842
	(0.53)	(0.52)	(0.59)	(0.53)
Agriculture	-0.047	0.081	0.065	0.019
	(0.04)	(0.11)	(0.05)	(0.04)
Proportion Rural*Agriculture	0.002	-0.083	-0.114	-0.063
	(0.06)	(0.15)	(0.07)	(0.06)
Municipal Infrastructure	0.005	-0.001	0.007**	0.008**
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Political Development	-0.012	-0.023	-0.067	-0.068
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Social	0.000	-0.001	-0.000	-0.001
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
τ_1	0.109	1.382	1.619	1.391
	(1.06)	(1.12)	(1.17)	(1.21)
τ_2	2.344**	3.633**	3.852**	3.623**
	(1.06)	(1.12)	(1.17)	(1.21)
τ_3	4.532**	5.808**	6.040**	5.811**
	(1.07)	(1.13)	(1.18)	(1.22)
Between-Municipality Variance	0.086	0.127**	0.086*	0.099*
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)
N	1339.000	1317.000	1339.000	1339.000
AIC	3099.512	3056.181	3099.806	3101.607
BIC	3187.907	3144.294	3188.201	3190.002

Table 5: Effect of Quality of Governance Cues on Level of Democracy

(a) Lagged Investment(1 year)

(b) Difference in Investment from 2007 to 2008

(c) Average Investment Over Prior 2 Years (2006 and 2007)

(d) Average Investment Over Prior 5 Years (2004-2008)

Fig. 11: Probability of Perceived Levels of Democracy Across Investment in Municipal Infrastructure

Substantively, increasing the investment in municipal development has large effect on the probability that the respondent sees Colombia as "very democratic". In Figure 11,average investment over the prior two years and average investment over the prior five years see decreases in the proportion of respondents who see Colombia as "a little democratic". While the respondents are least likely to say that Colombia is "not democratic" and most likely to say it is "somewhat democratic", the categories "a little democratic" and "very democratic" see substantial change. When I control for the effects of long-term investment in the municipality in Figure 11d, the probability of seeing Colombia as "very democratic" increases from 0.2 to about 0.4, a 20% increase in the proportion of respondents with higher evaluations of Colombia. Conversely, the probability of evaluating Colombia as "a little democratic" falls by the same magnitude.These results closely mirror the changes when investment is averaged over two years.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Lagged Investment	Difference in Investment	Investment Over 2 Years	Investment Over 5 Years
	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se
News Access	0.221**	0.218**	0.216**	0.218**
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Economic Perception	0.276**	0.281**	0.277**	0.275**
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Education	-0.036**	-0.037**	-0.036**	-0.035**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Voted	0.268**	0.270**	0.269**	0.265**
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Gender	0.006	0.002	0.004	0.002
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Perception of Corruption	-0.080**	-0.084**	-0.080**	-0.079**
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Population (log)	-0.104**	-0.042	-0.058	-0.111**
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Proportion Rural	-0.199	-0.185	0.048	-0.318
	(0.32)	(0.29)	(0.35)	(0.30)
Agriculture	-0.011	0.030	0.034	0.004
	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Proportion Rural*Agriculture	-0.014	-0.028	-0.070	-0.036
	(0.04)	(0.09)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Municipal Infrastructure	-0.001	0.001	-0.000	0.001
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Political Development	0.028	-0.010	0.001	0.024
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Social	0.001	-0.001	0.001	0.000
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Intercept	4.263**	3.758**	3.624**	4.519**
	(0.63)	(0.63)	(0.69)	(0.68)
Random Effects	-1.665**	-1.590**	-1.673**	-1.723**
	(0.25)	(0.24)	(0.26)	(0.28)
N	1379.000	1357.000	1379.000	1379.000
AIC	4161.089	4099.494	4162.917	4162.285
BIC	4244.755	4182.903	4246.583	4245.951

Table 6: Effect of Quality of Governance Cues on Trust in Democracy

However, investment in agriculture, social programs, and political development do not have a statistically significant effect on perceived levels of democracy. Thus, while I find some support for results-based cues influencing perceptions of the level of democracy, the support is limited to improvements in the municipality and municipal operations.

When considering trust in democratic institutions and processes, the effect of outcomes cues disappears, as seen in Table 6. Thus, citizens tend to consider outcomes when determining an overall level of democracy, but they consider their experiences with institutions, such as elections, when determining their level of trust in democracy. Both level of democracy and trust are components of a functioning democracy: in a high quality democracy, citizens are likely to both see their country as democratic and trust that the institutions are functioning. However, these two measures of the strength of democracy seem to be evaluated using different metrics that test the overall quality of democracy.

I focus on 2008 and 2012 because I suspect that during a Presidential election year, the focus will be on national, rather than subnational, cues. Thus, in a presidential year, I would not expect variance in municipalities to effect perceptions of the quality of democracy because the primary source of information used to evaluate democracy will occur at the national level. When I run the models on 2010, these expectations are supported: process-based cues no longer effect the trust in democratic institutions and no categories of municipal investment are statistically significant. Thus, municipal cues are most important outside of the context of national level changes. [10]

Discussion

I find weak support for the role of municipal level cues on perceptions of the quality of democracy in Colombia. Municipal cues do have an influence on citizen's evaluations, however, these cues do not operate equally across different measures for the quality of democracy. Overall, institutional cues that provide information about the process of democratic governance tend to influence the level of trust that citizens have in democracy while results-based cues, which provide information about the outcomes of democracy, have an effect on perceptions of the overall level of democracy.

Colombia has a multi-party system, where the modal number of parties competing for mayor across respondents was five. My results, however, suggest that once a third party enters a political system, the effect of adding additional parties is negative and statistically significant through nine parties. In this framework, the structure of municipal competition is sending a signal that lowers overall trust in democracy. It is possible that, in addition to lowering trust, the number of candidates competing contributes to the high overall perceptions of corruption.

Despite these characteristics, the margin of victory does not seem to have an effect on trust in democracy. In my sample, the margin of victory ranges from 0.03% of the vote to 56.73% of the vote. This suggests a large amount of variance in the level of competition

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[10] The full results can be found in the appendix in Tables 7 8 and 9

in mayoral elections. People, however, tend to respond more to the number of candidates competing than to the level of competition.

The importance of municipal infrastructure cues may be specific to Colombia. While the presence of rebel groups does not have a statistically significant effect on trust in democracy or level of democracy, the context of the Colombian civil war may increase the importance of a strong justice system and prison system on citizens' overall perceptions of the level of democracy. Furthermore, one of the components for determining the level of central-government transfers to municipalities is the strength of the municipal infrastructure. Strong municipal infrastructure is necessary to perform daily governance operations during ongoing threats to security and to continue to receive transfers that can be invested elsewhere. Thus, investment in municipal infrastructure likely offers a minimum threshold for outcomes in the same way that elections provide a first threshold for classification as a democracy.

These results suggest that cues for both democratic processes and outcomes influence citizens' evaluations of national democracy. In a weak democracy, citizens tend to be responsive to minimal cues, seeing changes in base characteristics, such as the number of parties competing for mayor and the strength of municipal governance, as stronger signals for the state of democracy than more nuanced measures such as the level of competition and investment in increasing political participation at the municipal level. Minimal support for my hypotheses indicates that, in Colombia, institutional cues are more likely to influence trust in democratic institutions and processes while results-based cues are more likely to influence the perceived level of democracy. Weak support for the importance of municipal experiences in shaping national level perceptions suggests that this could be explored in a cross-national setting where Colombia is compared to cases with a federal framework or to countries with weaker levels of decentralization to explore how the information derived from local experiences influences perceptions of the quality of democracy elsewhere.

National-level cues continue to effect citizens perceptions of democracy. I discounted 2010, due to the national presidential election, since in this information environment. I present the results of each of my main models for 2010. The results change drastically. Municipal elections now take on a "U" shape, rather than the inverted "U" I predicted, but only have statistical significance for three through six parties. This gives limited credibility to an ongoing importance of the 2007 municipal election. When considering outcomes, the difference in municipal spending is the only statistically significant finding.

Fig. 12: Marginal Effect of the Number of Parties

Fig. 13: Predicted Trust in Democracy Across Parties

When considering democratic results using investment, there is no longer statistical significance in any categories. Investment in municipal development is statistically significant for the difference in spending at $p < 0.1$ for perceived level of democracy and at $p < 0.05$ for trust in democracy. However, while some statistical significance remains, this is different than the findings in a non-national election year.

	(1)	(2)
	Level of Democracy	Trust in Democracy
	b/se	b/se
News Access	0.022	0.124**
	(0.09)	(0.05)
Economic Perception	0.338**	0.365**
	(0.06)	(0.04)
Education	-0.023*	-0.022**
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Voted	0.410**	0.214**
	(0.11)	(0.06)
Population (log)	-0.029	-0.009
	(0.06)	(0.04)
Proportion Rural	0.036	-0.057
	(0.41)	(0.26)
Gender	0.024	0.145**
	(0.10)	(0.06)
Perception of Corruption	-0.065	-0.163**
	(0.07)	(0.04)
Parties	0.051	-0.119
	(0.15)	(0.09)
Parties^2	-0.004	0.006
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Margin of Victory	-0.004	-0.003
	(0.01)	(0.00)
Intercept		4.009**
		(0.59)
τ_1	-2.559**	
	(0.94)	
τ_2	-0.533	
	(0.94)	
τ_3	1.736*	
	(0.94)	
Between-Municipality Variance	0.100*	
	(0.05)	
Random Effects		-1.420**
		(0.19)
N	1359.000	1400.000
AIC	3146.475	4203.444
BIC	3224.692	4276.863

Table 7: Regression Results for Electoral Cues, 2010

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Lagged Investment	Difference in Investment	Investment Over 2 Years	Investment Over 5 Years
	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se
News Access	0.027	0.009	0.027	0.030
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Economic Perception	0.343**	0.342**	0.341**	0.341**
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Education	-0.022*	-0.020	-0.023*	-0.022*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Voted	0.405**	0.423**	0.407**	0.405**
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Gender	0.024	0.009	0.025	0.025
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)
Perception of Corruption	-0.057	-0.063	-0.068	-0.065
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Population (log)	-0.125*	-0.066	-0.014	-0.048
	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.09)
Proportion Rural	-0.248	-0.282	0.365	0.194
	(0.54)	(0.43)	(0.55)	(0.61)
Agriculture	-0.058	-0.017	0.026	-0.000
	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Proportion Rural*Agriculture	0.038	0.039	-0.059	-0.037
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Municipal Infrastructure	-0.002	0.003*	0.000	0.001
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Political Development	0.027	-0.020	0.007	0.007
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Social	0.001	-0.001	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
τ_1	-3.729**	-3.257**	-2.364**	-2.862**
	(1.09)	(0.93)	(1.13)	(1.20)
τ_2	-1.704	-1.235	-0.339	-0.837
	(1.08)	(0.93)	(1.13)	(1.20)
τ_3	0.564	1.068	1.930*	1.431
	(1.08)	(0.93)	(1.13)	(1.20)
Between-Municipality Variance	0.077	0.079	0.097*	0.094*
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
N	1359.000	1335.000	1359.000	1359.000
AIC	3146.317	3075.068	3149.842	3149.778
BIC	3234.964	3163.412	3238.489	3238.424

Table 8: 2010 Effect of Results cues on Level of Democracy

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Lagged Investment	Difference in Investment	Investment Over 2 Years	Investment Over 5 Years
	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se
News Access	0.123**	0.126**	0.124**	0.125**
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Economic Perception	0.364**	0.375**	0.365**	0.364**
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Education	-0.023**	-0.023**	-0.022**	-0.023**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Voted	0.219**	0.221**	0.219**	0.216**
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Gender	0.144**	0.146**	0.146**	0.146**
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Perception of Corruption	-0.159**	-0.153**	-0.159**	-0.158**
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Population (log)	-0.106**	-0.068	-0.094*	-0.100*
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Proportion Rural	-0.015	-0.247	0.083	-0.010
	(0.35)	(0.27)	(0.35)	(0.39)
Agriculture	-0.025	-0.015	-0.012	-0.027
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Proportion Rural*Agriculture	-0.003	0.029	-0.024	-0.004
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Municipal Infrastructure	-0.001	0.003**	-0.001	0.001
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Political Development	0.035*	-0.005	0.031	0.021
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Social	0.001	-0.000	0.001	0.000
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Intercept	4.497**	4.254**	4.299**	4.466**
	(0.71)	(0.59)	(0.71)	(0.78)
Random Effects	-1.499**	-1.523**	-1.456**	-1.430**
	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.20)
N	1400.000	1376.000	1400.000	1400.000
AIC	4204.217	4133.137	4206.296	4207.955
BIC	4288.125	4216.768	4290.203	4291.863

Table 9: 2010 Effect of Results Cues on Trust in Democracy

Robustness Checks

	(1) Level of Democracy b/se	(2) Level fo Democracy b/se	(3) Trust in Democracy b/se	(4) Trust in Democracy b/se
News Access	0.267**	0.311**	0.187**	0.216**
	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.03)	(0.05)
Economic Perception	0.413**	0.502**	0.301**	0.276**
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Education	-0.025**	-0.017	-0.035**	-0.035**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Voted	0.312**	0.364**	0.150**	0.271**
	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.04)	(0.06)
Population (log)	0.025	0.176**	-0.061**	-0.081*
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Proportion Rural	0.000	0.602	-0.245	-0.438
	(0.37)	(0.45)	(0.20)	(0.27)
Gender	-0.059	-0.060	0.040	0.002
	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.04)	(0.06)
Perception of Corruption	0.034	0.067	-0.119**	-0.080**
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Parties	-0.039	-0.079**	-0.049**	-0.021
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Margin of Victory	-0.000	-0.008	0.002	0.002
	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Rebel		-0.296*		0.060
		(0.16)		(0.10)
Intercept			4.319**	4.276**
			(0.43)	(0.56)
τ_1	-0.870	1.224		
	(0.82)	(0.96)		
τ_2	1.305	3.459**		
	(0.82)	(0.96)		
τ_3	3.648**	5.647**		
	(0.82)	(0.97)		
Between-Municipality Variance	0.125**	0.095*		
	(0.05)	(0.05)		
Random Effects			-1.596**	-1.622**
			(0.18)	(0.24)
N	1977.000	1339.000	2706.000	1379.000
AIC	4510.588	3096.765	8215.022	4160.980
BIC	4588.839	3174.760	8291.764	4234.188

Table 10: Electoral Cues Without Parties Squared

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Level of Democracy	Level of Democracy	Trust in Democracy	Trust in Democracy
	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se
News Access	0.267**	0.307**	0.191**	0.221**
	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Economic Perceptions	0.411**	0.501**	0.306**	0.282**
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Education	-0.025**	-0.018	-0.035**	-0.036**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Voted	0.321**	0.389**	0.154**	0.282**
	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.04)	(0.06)
Population (log)	0.018	0.122**	-0.064**	-0.079**
	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Proportion Rural	-0.030	0.429	-0.280**	-0.475**
	(0.28)	(0.34)	(0.14)	(0.19)
Gender	-0.054	-0.057	0.040	0.003
	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.04)	(0.06)
Perception of Corruption	0.035	0.068	-0.128**	-0.084**
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Parties	-0.003	-0.073	-0.022	0.017
	(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.05)	(0.07)
Parties^2	-0.004	0.000	-0.002	-0.003
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)
Margin of Victory	-0.002	-0.006	0.000	0.000
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Rebel		-0.279**		0.065
		(0.13)		(0.08)
Intercept			4.296**	4.185**
			(0.31)	(0.43)
τ_1	-0.863	0.686		
	(0.61)	(0.75)		
τ_2	1.289**	2.901**		
	(0.61)	(0.74)		
τ_3	3.584**	5.050**		
	(0.61)	(0.75)		
N	1977.000	1339.000	2706.000	1379.000
AIC	4520.421	3103.918	8228.213	4166.671
BIC	4598.672	3181.914	8299.052	4234.650

Table 11: Electoral Cues With Robust Standard Errors

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Lagged Investment	Difference in Investment	Investment Over 2 Years	Investment Over 5 Years
	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se
News Access	0.319**	0.311**	0.303**	0.310**
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Economic Perception	0.495**	0.505**	0.498**	0.496**
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Education	-0.015	-0.018	-0.017	-0.017
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Voted	0.336**	0.361**	0.339**	0.344**
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Gender	-0.054	-0.052	-0.060	-0.061
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)
Perception of Corruption	0.073	0.068	0.072	0.069
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Population (log)	0.068	0.230**	0.192**	0.186*
	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.10)
Proportion Rural	0.834	1.187**	1.272**	1.228**
	(0.56)	(0.56)	(0.62)	(0.57)
Agriculture	-0.042	0.092	0.073	0.022
	(0.04)	(0.11)	(0.05)	(0.04)
Proportion Rural*Agriculture	-0.010	-0.102	-0.130*	-0.079
	(0.06)	(0.15)	(0.07)	(0.06)
Municipal Infrastructure	0.004	-0.002	0.006**	0.007*
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Political Development	-0.009	-0.032	-0.065	-0.062
	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Social	0.000	-0.002	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Rebel	-0.246	-0.366**	-0.245	-0.286*
	(0.16)	(0.18)	(0.16)	(0.17)
τ_1	0.712	2.368**	2.260*	1.987
	(1.11)	(1.19)	(1.22)	(1.24)
τ_2	2.946**	4.618**	4.494**	4.219**
	(1.11)	(1.19)	(1.23)	(1.24)
τ_3	5.134**	6.792**	6.681**	6.407**
	(1.11)	(1.20)	(1.23)	(1.25)
Between-Municipality Variance	0.074	0.105*	0.076	0.087*
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)
N	1339.000	1317.000	1339.000	1339.000
AIC	3099.122	3054.265	3099.460	3100.732
BIC	3192.717	3147.561	3193.054	3194.326

Table 12: Effect of Quality of Governance Cues on Level of Democracy, Including Rebel Occupation

	(1) Lagged Investment b/se	(2) Difference in Investment b/se	(3) Investment Over 2 Years b/se	(4) Investment Over 5 Years b/se
News Access	0.320**	0.311**	0.298**	0.305**
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)
Economic Perception	0.492**	0.501**	0.495**	0.492**
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Education	-0.016	-0.020	-0.018	-0.019
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Voted	0.328**	0.363**	0.331**	0.341**
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Gender	-0.048	-0.046	-0.056	-0.058
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)
Perception of Corruption	0.072	0.063	0.070	0.069
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Population (log)	0.010	0.115**	0.129**	0.112
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.08)
Proportion Rural	0.484	0.604*	0.878*	0.769*
	(0.41)	(0.36)	(0.46)	(0.43)
Agriculture	-0.042	0.065	0.065	0.018
	(0.04)	(0.09)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Proportion Rural*Agriculture	-0.003	-0.058	-0.113*	-0.061
	(0.05)	(0.12)	(0.06)	(0.04)
Municipal Infrastructure	0.005**	-0.001	0.007**	0.007**
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Political Development	-0.014	-0.030	-0.058*	-0.064*
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Social	0.000	-0.001	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
τ_1	0.063	1.124	1.483	1.162
	(0.81)	(0.82)	(0.94)	(0.99)
τ_2	2.281**	3.349**	3.700**	3.375**
	(0.81)	(0.82)	(0.94)	(0.99)
τ_3	4.436**	5.476**	5.854**	5.525**
	(0.81)	(0.82)	(0.95)	(1.00)
N	1339.000	1317.000	1339.000	1339.000
AIC	3101.709	3063.042	3102.275	3105.487
BIC	3184.904	3145.972	3185.470	3188.682

Table 13: Effect of Quality of Governance Cues on Level of Democracy, Robust Standard Errors

	(1) Lagged Investment b/se	(2) Difference in Investment b/se	(3) Investment Over 2 Years b/se	(4) Investment Over 5 Years b/se
News Access	0.221**	0.219**	0.216**	0.218**
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Economic Perception	0.276**	0.281**	0.277**	0.276**
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Education	-0.036**	-0.037**	-0.036**	-0.035**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Voted	0.269**	0.270**	0.269**	0.265**
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Gender	0.006	0.002	0.004	0.002
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Perception of Corruption	-0.080**	-0.085**	-0.080**	-0.080**
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Population (log)	-0.107**	-0.055	-0.060	-0.124**
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Proportion Rural	-0.219	-0.255	0.029	-0.404
	(0.34)	(0.33)	(0.38)	(0.32)
Agriculture	-0.011	0.028	0.034	0.004
	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Proportion Rural*Agriculture	-0.013	-0.025	-0.069	-0.033
	(0.04)	(0.09)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Municipal Infrastructure	-0.001	0.001	-0.000	0.001
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Political Development	0.028	-0.009	0.001	0.023
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Social	0.001	-0.001	0.001	0.000
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Rebel	0.015	0.051	0.013	0.063
	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.10)
Intercept	4.299**	3.897**	3.658**	4.653**
	(0.67)	(0.69)	(0.73)	(0.70)
Random Effects	-1.667**	-1.594**	-1.674**	-1.737**
	(0.26)	(0.24)	(0.26)	(0.28)
N	1379.000	1357.000	1379.000	1379.000
AIC	4163.066	4101.263	4164.900	4163.860
BIC	4251.961	4189.884	4253.795	4252.755

Table 14: Effect of Quality of Governance Cues on Trust in Democracy, Including Rebel Occupation

	(1) Lagged Investment b/se	(2) Difference in Investment b/se	(3) Investment Over 2 Years b/se	(4) Investment Over 5 Years b/se
News Access	0.229**	0.223**	0.221**	0.223**
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Economic Perception	0.281**	0.287**	0.282**	0.280**
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Education	-0.037**	-0.038**	-0.037**	-0.036**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Voted	0.279**	0.280**	0.278**	0.270**
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Gender	0.007	0.002	0.005	0.003
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Perception of Corruption	-0.085**	-0.090**	-0.084**	-0.083**
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Population (log)	-0.101**	-0.042	-0.063*	-0.110**
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Proportion Rural	-0.255	-0.216	-0.035	-0.335
	(0.24)	(0.22)	(0.27)	(0.24)
Agriculture	-0.007	0.039	0.034	0.005
	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Proportion Rural*Agriculture	-0.015	-0.043	-0.067*	-0.037
	(0.03)	(0.07)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Municipal Infrastructure	-0.000	0.000	0.000	0.001
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Political Development	0.023	-0.004	0.004	0.025
	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Social	0.000	-0.001	0.001	-0.000
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Intercept	4.254**	3.775**	3.724**	4.507**
	(0.48)	(0.50)	(0.56)	(0.54)
N	1379.000	1357.000	1379.000	1379.000
AIC	4164.150	4104.408	4165.872	4163.634
BIC	4237.357	4177.390	4239.079	4236.842

Table 15: Effect of Quality of Governance Cues on Trust in Democracy, Robust Standard Errors

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