

Institutional Constraints on Members of National Parliaments

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ABSTRACT

EMANUEL EMIL COMAN: Institutional Constraints on Members of
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This dissertation explores the relationship between institutional arrangements and vote unity in national parliaments. It does so with the help of a new dataset of votes from 33 different parliaments as well as interviews with members of Romanian parliament conducted in 2010. The findings affirm the importance of vote of confidence procedure and provides a new theoretical explanation for why it leads to unity despite being used only rarely: it leads to the selection of party members that share similar ideological views; it encourages the creation of mechanisms through which party leaders can control backbenchers. I also find that electoral rules that increase the parliament's members to voters lead to vote disunity only in systems with little party institutionalization. Where parties are strong, their leaders have the capacity to topple the pressures felt by backbenchers.

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Introduction

Politicians in the U.S. constantly depict themselves as defenders of their local constituencies against the political games of Washington D. C. and try to distance themselves from the positions taken by their parties. Being a political maverick who fights against the establishment is an electoral asset. Politicians in all democracies try to present themselves as representatives of the people in touch with their daily needs, but they vary in the extent to which they show allegiance to their voters or their parties. This study looks at how institutional arrangements influence the degrees of allegiance to voters or party leadership, as reflected in members of parliaments' (MP) behavior on parliament floors as well as MP interaction with their constituents. It does so with the help of votes taken in 33 national parliaments as well as in depth interviews taken with members of the Romanian Chamber of Deputies.

The study is grounded in the principal-agent theory, widely used in works on U.S. Congress (Ferejohn, 1999; McCubbins and Schwartz 1984; Epstein and O'Halloran 1999). In a nutshell, the theory says that when taking decisions on the Parliament floor a MP acts as an agent with two principals: her constituents and her party. Hence, the MP's decisions are a function of her ideal position, the position of her constituents, and that of her party leaders. Institutional arrangements influence the extent to which the agent feels responsive to the two principals. The existing literature has extensively affirmed the role of institutional arrangements, and has focused primarily on the vote of confidence procedure and electoral rules (Diermeier and

Feddersen 1998; Persson and Tabellini 2003; Huber 1996; Collie 1985; Loewenberg and Patterson 1975; Weaver and Rockman 1993).

Understanding how institutions influence the MP behavior through has normative consequences. There is however, no agreement on whether party or voters' allegiance increases the quality of polity. Constituents want to know that their representatives put their needs above those of their parties, and consequently, politicians present themselves as defenders of popular interest for it is electorally rewarding. Leaders of the civil society, especially in the newly established democracies, also favor individual accountability for it is regarded as the antidote to corruption, cronyism and money politics.

Academics on the other hand, tend to favor parties over voters (Carey, 2009). They do so for a few reasons. First, cohesive parties are an integral part of indirect democracy for they assure voters that the decisions they make at the polls influence policy. Second, the degree of party unity influences government capacity to shape policy and avoid deadlock (Carey 2007). Third, the democratization literature has emphasized the importance of strong, institutionalized parties in the success of new democracies. Strong, united opposition parties can limit the abuses of those in power and increase the likelihood of peaceful transfer of power through democratic elections (see Jung and Shapiro 1995; Reynolds 2006; Huntington 1991). As a result, institutional arrangements leading to strong parties could become part of the repertoire of constitutional designers in new democracies. This study takes a non-normative stance, looking at the role of institutions and leaving the normative conclusions to the reader.

Focusing solely on institutions may ignore some other important factors such as MPs attributes or cultural traits of voters (see Searing, 1985). From a normative perspective the focus on institutions rather than individuals is warranted, for institutions are easier to create and change. For instance, if we find that certain institutions lead to strong, united parties and if we accept that such parties are important for democratic order, we can include these institutions in the constitutional design of new democracies.

The study is made of three chapters, each constituting empirical analyses of the relationship between institutional arrangements and MP behavior.

The first chapter looks at the effect of institutions on party unity in 33 national legislatures. It is expected that institutions that empower constituents at the expense of party leaders lead to the emergence of mavericks, which translates into lower party unity. The analysis retests some of the hypotheses found in the literature, with the help of a database of votes from 33 national parliaments in Europe, Latin America and Asia. Following the existing literature I focus on the confidence procedure and electoral rules. While the literature has repeatedly affirmed the role of both it has not established which is more important or how they act in conjunction.

The empirical tests in Chapter 1 are the first to confirm the relationship between the vote of confidence procedure and vote unity, a relationship previously affirmed yet never confirmed empirically. The confidence procedure emerges as the single most important explanans of vote unity in national parliaments. It influences votes directly through increasing the benefits of unity for both backbenchers and

leaders, and indirectly through the development of control mechanisms for party leaders, such as the allocation of campaign resources, influence over electoral lists, the allocation of leadership positions in parliament etc. These control mechanisms lead to vote unity, but are also more likely to develop in systems with vote of confidence procedure, where unity is more beneficial. In such systems party leaders are more likely to push for the development of control mechanisms and backbenchers are also more likely to accept them for they help avoid some collective action problems (Cox and McCubbins, 1993; Aldrich, 1995). Testing these predictors in a single regression without accounting for the possible causal relationships among them—as the previous literature has done it—is prone to multicollinearity, and implicitly non-results.

The chapter also challenges the view that electoral rules that make candidates individually accountable to voters necessarily lead to more vote defections. It suggests that higher personal accountability decreases vote unity only if party leaders do not control candidate nomination. Where parties control nomination the effect of electoral rules is neutralized. This finding is in tone with what recent literature on vote unity in mixed electoral systems (see Shugart and Wattenberg, 2003): MPs elected in single member districts are not more likely to defect from their party position than those elected on party lists if party leaders control their nomination process (see Ferrara, 2004 on Italy, Crisp, 2007 on Venezuela).

The second and third chapters focus solely on the effect of electoral rules on MP behavior, and look at the consequences of the 2008 Romanian electoral reform. In 2008 Romania moved from a closed list proportional representation system to a

system in which all candidates run in single member districts. The electoral reform was meant to make MPs more individually accountable to constituents who can now single them out at the polls, with consequences over their behavior inside the Parliament. The two chapters look at MP behavior before and after the reform.

Chapter 2 looks at MP vote defection from the party position before and after the reform. It uses vote records from the Romanian Chamber of Deputies from the first year of the 2004-2008 term (pre-reform) and the first year of the 2008-2012 term (post-reform). Based on the expectations in the literature, post-reform MPs should defect more often from the vote position of their party than pre-reform MPs. The empirical tests find that because parties in Romania have kept strong leverage over their backbenchers, the expected effect is seen only in the less important votes in which party leaders allow defection. This finding emphasizes the role of party leadership control over nominations, and thus is in tone with the first chapter. Furthermore, the tests find that the MPs elected after the reform are more likely to engage in other activities that bring the appreciation of voters, such as proposing legislation or questioning the cabinet.

Chapter 2 suggests that the reform has made MPs more active on the Chamber's floor, but cannot establish whether this is a reflection of better representation or of mere theatre. Hence, Chapter 3 looks at whether the electoral reform has made MPs more accountable to their voters, and whether this is likely to increase the quality of representation. It does so with the help of post 2008 election surveys as well as in depth interviews with members of the Romanian Chamber of Deputies. The conclusions of the chapter paint a rather somber image of the reform.

Thus, while all MPs interviewed claimed that the reform has made representatives more accountable to their constituents, they had hard times naming specific channels through which representatives get legislative input from their constituents. The one such channel—the weekly meetings with constituents—is used for requests unrelated with the role of the legislator: to legislate. If anything, the new electoral law has led to stronger clientelistic ties between voters and representatives, and created advantages for candidates with high financial resources.

Furthermore, the analysis finds that because Romania is a unitary state politics are framed at the national level and few issues have different implications for voters in different districts. This finding questions the utility of making candidates more identifiable at the polls, and thus fits within the debate about the normative consequences of individual accountability. The supporters of individual accountability in elections claim that it makes representatives more responsive to the needs of their districts and thus take more local input when legislating. However, if the channels of transmitting the information from voters to representatives are weak, and if the interests of voters do not vary significantly across regions, making MPs easily identifiable at the polls is futile. If anything, it may have negative consequences such as the development of clientelistic ties between the representative and her constituents.

1. Institutions and Vote Unity in Parliaments: Evidence from 33

National Chambers

A vast literature has affirmed the relationship between institutional arrangements and party vote unity in national parliaments. The theoretical foundation for this literature is the “competing principals” paradigm, according to which the vote decision of an individual MP (the agent) is influenced by the wishes of voters and party group leaders (the principals) (Ferejohn 1999; McCubbins and Schwartz 1984; Epstein and O’Halloran 1999). Institutional arrangements that increase the control of voters over their representatives decrease vote unity, while arrangements that increase the control of party leaders increase it (Carey 2007; Carey 2009; Sieberer 2006; Morgenstern 2003). Additionally, the literature has focused on arrangements that endow party leaders with the capacity to recruit members that share similar political views or to control the legislative agenda and thus filter out controversial votes (Cox and McCubbins, 2005; Doring, 1995; Aleman, 2006; Mattson and Strom, 1995).

The literature on vote unity has primarily emphasized two institutional features: the vote of confidence procedure (Cox, 1987; Carey, 2007; Carey, 2009) and electoral rules (Collie 1985; Loewenberg and Patterson 1975; Haspel et al, 1998; Thames, 2005). This literature suffers from several shortcomings. First, while empirical works have found mixed results about the role of electoral rules, no empirical work to date has found a relationship between vote of confidence procedure and vote unity. Also, the literature has not provided a theoretical mechanism that relates the vote of confidence procedure to higher vote unity in parliaments. Based on the existing literature (Huber, 1996; Diermeier and Feddersen, 1998) one should

expect vote unity in votes of confidence, but since these are rare occurrences there is no reason to expect higher vote unity in other votes in systems with the procedure. Furthermore, the vote of confidence and electoral rules have been analyzed separately, and we do not know how important each one is, nor how they act in conjunction. The few large N tests that tested both hypotheses fell short of reaching definitive conclusions (see Carey 2007; Carey 2009). This chapter seeks to fill these gaps in the literature with the help of a large dataset of votes from 33 national parliaments. The purpose of the chapter is three-fold. More broadly, it seeks to confirm some of the theoretical expectations from the literature on vote unity. Also, with the help of the largest dataset of votes to date the study hopes to confirm some of the relationships that have been repeatedly affirmed yet never fully confirmed in the literature. One such relationship is the one between the vote of confidence procedure and vote unity. It also seeks to provide a theoretical mechanism linking the confidence procedure to vote unity. Finally, the study strives for more definitive answers about the importance of each of the two institutional arrangements emphasized in the literature—the vote of confidence and electoral rules—as well as the ways in which they may interact.

The chapter proceeds as follows: the next section introduces some theoretical expectations about the effect of institutions on vote unity. The following two sections describe the data and present the results of the tests and their interpretation. The chapter concludes by summarizing the consequences of institutions for vote unity.

1.1 Institutions and Vote Unity: Hypotheses

Vote unity in parliaments has been conceptualized as the result of (1) the extent to which MPs feel responsive to their party leaders or their voters, (2) the ideological unity of party members, (3) the capacity of party leaders to influence which votes make it to the floor.

The competing principals paradigm—originated in the literature on US Congress—has been at the origin of most studies on vote unity. Simply put, when voting on the floor an individual member of Congress acts as an agent with two principals: her party group in Congress and her constituency. The vote decision of an individual member is thus the consequence of: a) her ideal position on the issue, b) the position of her party and c) that of her constituency (Ferejohn, 1999; McCubbins and Schwartz 1984; Epstein and O'Halloran 1999). This framework has been successfully applied to studies of vote behavior in the European Parliament (Hix, Noury, and Roland 2007), as well as multi-country comparative studies (Carey 2007; Carey 2009).

Institutions influence how much each of the two principals influence the agent, with consequences over the degree of party vote unity in parliament. To the extent that they increase the capacity of leaders at the expense of constituents, these institutions lead to vote unity. Among the institutions influencing the control of the principals, electoral rules have been the most emphasized. Electoral rules influence the extent to which MPs feel responsive to voters or party leaders, which in turn influences the MPs' vote behavior (Thames 2001; Haspel et al 1998; Collie 1985; Loewenberg and Patterson 1975; Weaver and Rockman 1993; Hix 2004; Thames 2005). The competing

principals literature has also emphasized the role of sticks and carrots at the hands of party leaders that give them an edge in the struggle to control the agent, such as control over leadership positions inside the party or the legislature, pork barrel spending, campaign support, expulsion from the party etc (see Cox and McCubbins 1993; Bowler, Farrell and Katz 1999).

Vote unity has also been understood as the result of ideological cohesion of party members. A party is more likely to show a high degree of unity if its members share similar ideological views, which should translate in similar policy and vote preferences (Ozbudun 1970). Krehbiel (2000) suggests that party vote unity in the US House of Representatives is more likely to be determined by representatives' preferences than party discipline. Similarly, Snyder and Groseclose (2000) find that individual vote behavior is the result of both individual preferences and party discipline. Some institutional arrangements endow party leaders with the capacity to recruit the "right" type of backbenchers who share their ideological views and implicitly their policy preferences. The party group membership in the parliament can be influenced through the selection of candidates in legislative elections, but also through strategies of recruiting party members and leaders at local or national levels (see Jones and Hwang, 2005).

Finally, the literature has focused on filtering mechanisms that allow party leaders to keep unwanted votes away from the floor. In the context of the US Congress the literature has focused on the agenda setting capacity of party coalitions (Cox and McCubbins 2005). In the European and Latin American contexts, the literature has emphasized the role of parliamentary institutions in charge with setting the daily

agenda (see Doring 1995; Aleman 2006), restrictions on individual members' initiatives, or the capacity of committees to prevent bills from reaching the floor (Mattson and Strom 1995; Doring 2001).

The scholarly literature on vote unity in parliaments has emphasized the distinction between parliamentary and presidential systems, and the distinction between plurality and proportional representation (PR) systems of elections. The classic divide is between the PR /parliamentary systems of continental Europe and the plurality/presidential system of the United States. In a closed list PR electoral system voters cannot single out individual candidates, which in turn makes elected officials less responsive to voters; also, in most PR systems control over the candidate list gives party leaders extra leverage over their backbenchers (Collie 1985; Loewenberg and Patterson 1975; Weaver and Rockman 1993). On top of these, the vote of confidence procedure of the parliamentary systems allows party leaders more control over their backbenchers (Diermeier and Feddersen 1998; Persson and Tabellini 2003; Huber 1996). These political arrangements account for the proverbial party discipline of European democracies. At the opposite spectrum, American plurality elections induce Congressmen to be individually responsive to their voters while the presidential system eliminates the fear of losing a vote of confidence and thus makes the whipping efforts of party leaders more difficult. Hence, the higher floor independence of American Congressmen.

While the parliamentary/presidential and closed list PR/ plurality distinctions have remained the norm in undergraduate comparative politics textbooks, the more recent scholarly literature has delved more deeply into the mechanisms through which

these institutional arrangements influence vote unity. This is especially true of electoral rules, and is a consequence of the fact that with the advent of mixed systems few countries still fall within the PR vs plurality pattern (see Shugart and Wattenberg 2003).

The main characteristic of parliamentary systems considered in the literature is the vote of confidence procedure. Backbenchers in systems with vote of confidence procedures are expected to toe the party line because failing to pass a vote of confidence can have tremendous costs, namely the dissolution of the parliament and calling of new elections (Huber, 1996; Diermeier and Feddersen 1998). Based on this account the vote of confidence increases the control of party leaders over backbenchers and thus fits the competing principals paradigm. The threat of new elections however, is not present in most votes, for votes of confidence are rare occurrences. Why should one expect overall higher levels of unity in parliamentary systems than in presidential ones? MPs may be more united in votes of confidence, but since these are such rare occurrences, the effect over the average unity in all votes should be negligible.

There are two indirect ways in which the existence of the confidence procedure may influence unity in non-confidence votes. First, one can expect that the threat of losing a vote of confidence may lead to the development of control mechanisms in the hands of party leaders to help them avoid party dissent when faced with a confidence vote. Previous works grounded in distribution theory have shown that parliamentary institutional reforms take place when they are beneficial to a part of MPs who form a minimum winning coalition (see Longley and Hoffman 1999; also Cox 1987). MPs

work within the confines of institutional arrangements, but they are also the agents of institutional change. Party leaders in systems with vote of confidence procedure are more likely to push for the development of mechanisms of control, for their use brings higher benefits. Backbenchers are also more likely to accept these control mechanisms for they help avoid some collective action problems¹. Hence, we can expect more mechanisms that empower party leaders to be present in countries with vote of confidence procedure. The procedure increases the benefits of vote unity, which in turn makes the creation of leadership control mechanisms beneficial to a large number of MPs and thus facilitates the formation of minimum winning coalitions necessary for reform.

Second, the high costs associated with the loss of a vote of confidence may influence the recruitment strategies of party leaders. Although the confidence procedure is rarely invoked, the fact that losing one is extremely costly may convince leaders to recruit backbenchers that share their ideological inclinations and thus minimize the probability of policy disagreements when faced with a vote of confidence. This in turn should translate into higher vote unity in all votes. The existence of the confidence procedure may lead to the development of institutional arrangements that endow leaders with control over the recruitment of members, and push leaders into using these mechanisms to recruit members with similar ideological

¹ In a given vote the rank and file is facing a collective action problem. Let us imagine the situation in which an individual member would like to see the policy endorsed by her party pass, because a negative vote leads to the demise of the government and the calling of new elections. This policy however, is not popular in her constituency. The MP may vote against it, hoping that her vote will not influence the final outcome. However, if a certain number of MPs think this way, the policy does not pass, and the outcome is costly for all of them (Cox and McCubbins 1993; Aldrich 1995).

views. This argument is not related to the competing principals theory but to the cartel theory (see Cox and McCubbins, 1993).

Given these expectations I hypothesize that:

H1: Vote unity in systems with vote of confidence procedure is higher than in those without the procedure.

The vote of confidence procedure may not be the only mechanism through which the parliamentary/presidential distinction is relevant. Publicly elected presidents can influence the vote behavior of members of parliament because they possess the capacity to reward or punish backbencher behavior (Linz 1994; Calvo 2007; Carey 2009). Therefore, party leaders in presidential systems have to counteract a third principal. To the extent that the president and party leaders have contradicting views, this should translate into lower vote unity. Carey (2009) finds that this problem is more acute for leaders of the president's party. In parliamentary systems where executive and legislative powers are fused, government parties should have more resources to discipline their members. Hence, one can expect higher vote unity. In presidential systems the resources are split with the president. Carey (2009) finds that because of this, unity in government parties is higher in parliamentary than in presidential systems. To sum up,

H2: Vote unity should be lower in systems with popularly elected presidents than in parliamentary systems.

H2a: Vote unity should be higher for parties in government in parliamentary systems than in presidential systems.

While the relationship between vote of confidence and vote unity has been repeatedly affirmed, no empirical test to date has validated it. The paucity of vote data from national parliaments has made it difficult for the few cross-national studies to reach definitive conclusions. Also, the few large N studies have not been able to separate the two mechanisms noted above (see Sieberer 2006; Carey 2007; Carey 2009). Because countries with elected presidents also tend to lack vote of confidence procedure, it is difficult to test these two hypotheses in a single regression without running into multicollinearity. As Carey (2009) notes, in order for these two effects to be discerned one needs vote data from hybrid regimes that combine publicly elected presidents with vote of confidence procedures. This study tries to tackle both problems with the help of the largest database of votes to date from 33 different parliaments, of which 5 are hybrid regimes.

The literature on party unity has extensively focused on the role played by electoral rules (Collie 1985; Loewenberg and Patterson 1975; Weaver and Rockman 1993; Hix 2004; Haspel et al 1998; Thames 2005). The more recent literature has departed from the PR vs. plurality dichotomy and has focused instead on a wide range of mechanisms that encourage personal or collective accountability by candidates for office. In a nutshell, electoral systems that encourage personal accountability are systems in which candidates for office improve their chances of election if they develop personal reputations outside of their parties' reputations (see Depauw and Martin 2009). This literature looks at characteristics of systems such as district size,

vote pooling, ballot control or number of votes cast by each voter² (Carey and Shugart 1995; Wallack et al 2003; Hallerberg and Marier 2004).

The influence of electoral rules on vote unity has been extensively tested in studies of mixed member systems of elections which elect part of their MPs in single member districts and part on lists. The expectation is that MPs elected in single member districts be more responsive to their constituents and therefore vote more independently than their list colleagues. The tests to date however, have shown mixed results. Thus, while Thames (2001) finds a significant effect of mode of election on vote defection in the Russian Duma, Haspel et al (1998) find no such effect. Subsequent studies of mixed member-systems have found little or no connection between mode of election and vote behavior. This lack of results has been explained through the connections between the MPs elected through the two electoral tiers (contamination effect), as well as the capacity of party leaders to induce MPs to stick to the party line and thus counteract the possible effect of increased responsibility to voters (Bawn and Thies 2003; Ferrara 2004; Thames 2005; Crisp 2007).

Recent cross-national studies (Carey 2007, 2009) have found that parties in systems where candidates compete against other members of their own party in elections are more prone to disunity. Studies of vote behavior in the European Parliament have found that members of European Parliament elected in systems that empower the leaders of their national party are more likely to defect from the vote position of their European party group and to side with their national group (Hix 2004;

² For a detailed description of these four mechanisms see Carey and Shugart (1995).

Coman 2009). Following the expectations from the existing literature I hypothesize that:

H3: Vote unity should be lower in electoral systems that encourage MP individual accountability than in systems that encourage party accountability.

This expectation has been the norm in the literature and rests on the assumption that electoral systems in which candidates can be singled out more easily always give an edge to voters over party leaders in their struggle to control the agent. Hence one should always expect more vote defections in such systems. This assumption is certainly true in systems where the candidate selection process is not influenced by party leaders. The United States is one such case. The mixed member systems literature has shown however that in countries where party leaders control the selection process the voter advantage is neutralized. For instance, Crisp (2007) suggests that the capacity of Venezuelan party leaders to control the selection of candidates neutralizes the incentives for personal votes of the MPs elected in single member districts. Similarly, Thames (2005) finds that in the countries with strong party institutionalization of Eastern Europe party leaders are able to overcome the pressures for vote independence from MPs elected in single member districts. Control over nomination gives party leaders an important stick to control MPs who are concerned about finding themselves in electable positions in upcoming elections, but also allows leaders to filter candidates and select those that are more likely to share their views and thus to toe the party line once in parliament (see Krehbiel 2000). Both of these mechanisms are likely to increase vote unity.

If anything, electoral systems that make candidates individually accountable may give an advantage to party leaders who control nomination for they now possess a more valuable tool: control over the nomination in a single member district as opposed to control over a long list of names. Just as voters can single out candidates more easily, so do party leaders³. Furthermore, previous literature has shown that MP vote behavior is more important for party leaders than for constituents. Voters are less aware of the voting records of their representatives, and political leaders have an information advantage (Ferejohn 1999). If both principals increase their control over the agent, yet vote behavior is more important for party leaders, one can expect higher vote unity. This expectation is confirmed by Ferrara (2004), who finds that because of strong leadership control over nomination in the mixed member Italian system, MPs elected in single member districts are more likely to toe the party line than those elected on lists. To sum up:

H3a: Electoral rules that increase candidate personal accountability are likely to decrease unity in parties whose candidate nomination is not controlled by leaders; where nominations are controlled by leaders, the effect of personal accountability should be neutralized.

Previous works on discipline inside parliaments have confirmed the importance of sticks and carrots that endow leaders with control over backbenchers such as leadership positions inside the party or the legislature, pork barrel spending, campaign support, expulsion from the party etc (see Cox and McCubbins 1993;

³ This is obviously not true about open list PR systems, which are usually associated with high individual accountability.

Bowler, Farrell and Katz 1999). While the literature has emphasized a wide range of mechanisms through which party leaders can exercise control over backbenchers, here I look at one such source of leadership control: government involvement in campaign finance. The literature on campaign spending has shown that reliance on government funds for electoral campaigns increases party centralization, for in most cases party leaders control the distribution of funds (Fisher and Eisenstadt 2004). On the other hand, candidates who rely on private donors for campaign money are more likely to pursue the interests of these donors— voters or businesses— and thus to diverge from their party's position more often.⁴ Control over campaign funds also gives leaders control over the party political message emphasized in the campaign, and thus allow them to keep controversial issues out of the party agenda. This in turn is likely to build a more cohesive block of representatives to the parliament. In conclusion,

H4: Vote unity should be higher in systems in which MPs rely on government funds than in systems in which they rely on private donors in electoral campaigns.

1.2 Data

The empirical tests use vote data from 33 different national parliamentary chambers. The tests include the roll call votes from 16 of the 19 parliaments analyzed

⁴ The choice of testing only one of the many mechanisms at the hand of party leaders is dictated by the availability of data. Gathering information from a wide range of countries about the many possible mechanisms that could be considered is a difficult endeavor, especially since these mechanisms are difficult to quantify. Also, the goal of the study is not to test an exhaustive list of mechanisms through which party leaders control backbencher behavior, but more generally to illustrate the causal relationship between the vote of confidence procedure and the development of control mechanisms as well as their effect on vote unity.

in Carey (2007) and Carey (2009) and add votes from 17 new parliaments⁵. Since vote results are still difficult to get in many countries, the criterion for the inclusion of the 17 new parliaments was the availability of data. Table 1.1 depicts the vote data by country together with descriptive statistics for all country level variables.

<Table 1.1 around here>

The dependent variable looks at the degree of vote unity in each party measured as adjusted weighted rice index. This measurement is obtained in three steps. First, I compute Rice indexes for each party in each vote based on the widely accepted formula developed by Rice (1925). These scores are then averaged based on a formula developed by Carey (2007; 2009) that gives more weight to contested votes. Furthermore, the final scores are adjusted for small party bias (see Desposato 2005) based on the formula used in Carey (2009) (see Appendix 1 for details).⁶

⁵ The use of votes from Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Russia is problematic for in these countries votes are passed with majorities of all MPs in the legislature, regardless of how many are present at the time of the vote. This means that a nonvote (absence) has the same effect as a negative vote, which makes it difficult to interpret its meaning. It is possible that a MP who misses a vote does so because she wants to cast a negative vote. But she may also be absent for other reasons, unrelated to the particular vote (see Carey 2009, 97). In the three countries, treating nonvotes as nay votes is likely to underestimate the index of unity, while treating them as absences is likely to overestimate the index. To avoid such problems I do not include the three countries in the analysis.

⁶ I also used an additional measurement for the dependent variable, the degree of party unity. This measurement adds (1) the number of times a party got stuffed, that is it lost a vote although it could have won it had all its members taken the vote position taken by a plurality of party members to the number of times the party; (2) the number of times a party got rolled, that is it could have prevented the passing of a vote had it voted together. This additional measure is meant to account for the role of coalitions in determining the overall degree of unity. All tests in Table 1.3 are replicated using this

The operationalizations of the independent variables are presented in Table 1.2⁷.

Some of the variables need further explanation. To measure whether the electoral system encourages individual or collective accountability I use an index developed by Hallerberg and Marier (2004). The index is based on the four mechanisms through which electoral rules encourage the development of individual or party accountability according to Carey and Shugart (1995) (see Appendix 1). The index runs from “0,” for a system that fully encourages party accountability to “1,” for a system that fully encourages personal accountability. *Candidate selection* is a dummy variable that differentiates between parties that allow central leadership to control the selection of candidates for office (“1”) and those that do not (“0”). Selection is controlled in systems in which leaders influence the list of candidates directly and in systems in which local organizations determine the candidates, yet the central organization approves the final list. In all other cases candidate selection is considered not controlled by leaders⁸.

<Table 1.2 around here>

additional measurement of unity. The results reported in Tables A1 and A3 of the Appendix show similar results to those reported in Table 1.3.

⁷ The operationalizations together with the sources used are detailed in the Appendixes.

⁸ As the basis of this variable I use the six-point categorization used by Bille (2001) to characterize nomination control in Western democracies. Categories 1 to 4 in Bille (2001) are recoded as “controlled by leadership” (score of “1”) and categories 5-6 as “locally controlled nominations” (score of “0”).

The models also include a series of control variables, which I present below together with theoretical expectations about them.

Politics in federal systems are more locally organized, which leads to many different voices inside parties, with consequences over their ideological cohesiveness. This should translate into lower vote unity. The effective number of parties is computed based on the formula developed by Laakso and Taagepera (1979). The expectation is that parties in fragmented systems be more cohesive ideologically for they occupy smaller ideological spaces. This should translate into higher rice indexes. The age of regime is expected to be positively correlated with party unity. Parties should be better organized and more ideologically homogenous in better established democracies than in new ones (see Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Thames 2005). Vote frequency is measured as the number of votes per month and is meant to partially control for the fact that the parliaments analyzed have different rules for calling votes. Some parliaments publish all votes, some only specific votes, and others only requested roll call votes (Hug 2010; Carrubba and Gabel, 1999; Carrubba et al, 2006). The literature has not established the effect—if any—that the rules for calling a vote have on vote unity. If roll call votes are called by party leaders on controversial issues one can expect lower unity in these votes. If, on the other hand, votes are called exactly to control backbenchers, then one can expect higher unity (Sieberer 2006). The frequency of votes is used here as a proxy for how easy it is to call a vote, with low frequencies meaning higher difficulty to call votes⁹. Finally, the analyses consider the

⁹ Additionally all the statistical tests in Table 1.3 are replicated using a small number of parliaments that report vote results with high frequency. As a cutpoint, these analyses include only parliaments that record at least 25 votes per month. This reduces

share of seats held by the party in the parliament. Based on existing literature, two different expectations can be derived (Carey 2009, 149). If one thinks of larger parties as political units that display higher ideological variance, then one should expect them to be less unified in votes. If, on the other hand, one considers the fact that leaders of larger parties have more access to resources to reward backbenchers' behavior, then one should expect higher vote unity.

1.3 Models and Results

Table 1.3 presents the results of the statistical analyses. To account for the fact that the predictors are at two levels of aggregation (system and party level), I use a random effects GLS model written as:

$$y_{ij} = \beta_{0j} + \beta_1 S_{1j} + \beta_2 S_{2j} + \beta_3 S_{3j} + \dots + \beta_{10} S_{10j} + \beta_{11} P_{1ij} + \beta_{12} P_{2ij} + \beta_{13} P_{3ij} + e_{ij}$$

where

$$\beta_{0j} = \beta_0 + u_{0j}$$

S_1 to S_{10} refer to system variables and P_1 - P_2 to party level variables.

Subscript i differentiates among parties and subscript j among countries.

<Table 1.3 around here>

Table 1.3 presents the results of 9 different models. Models 1 to 4 test the effect of electoral rules on vote unity. The results in Model 1 find no relationship

the sample to 19 parliaments. The results based on the small sample reported in Tables A2 and A3 of the Appendix are similar to those based on the full sample, regardless of the way in which we measure unity.

between personal accountability in elections and vote unity in parliaments, which is counter to what the previous literature has claimed. Hence, Models 2 to 4 test the alternative hypothesis H3a. Based on H3a the effect of electoral rules should be contingent on how involved party leaders are in the process of candidate nomination. Electoral systems that make candidates more accountable to voters should decrease party unity only if party leaders do not control the nomination process. The analyses in Models 2 to 4 find a significant interactive effect between individual accountability and candidate selection.

As Brambor, Clark and Golder (2006, 73) point out, in order to fully understand the effects of interactive terms, one needs to calculate substantively meaningful marginal effects and standard errors. To this end Table 1.4 details the effect of individual accountability in vote unity for parties with leadership controlled candidate selection and for parties without it. The coefficients in Table 1.4 show that for parties in which leaders do not control candidate selection, personal accountability decreases vote unity. Moving from the minimum to the maximum value of the Hallerberg and Marrier index, decreases vote unity by .21, roughly one standard deviation. This effect is significant at the 0.01 level. The coefficients in Table 1.4 also suggest an opposite effect of accountability on unity for parties whose leaders control candidate selection. This effect however, falls short of statistical significance (t-value of 1.57).

The effect of personal accountability is strongly reduced in Model 4 when I control for whether the parties come from systems with vote of confidence procedure, the predictor that is significant in all models in which is included. As a consequence,

the marginal effects of personal accountability for both parties with and without leadership-controlled nominations become statistically insignificant.

<Table 1.4 around here>

Models 5 and 6 test the effect of government involvement in campaign funding. We associated higher government involvement with higher leadership control over backbenchers as well as control over their parties' political platforms and implicitly higher vote unity. The results in Model 1.5 support this hypothesis. Higher levels of campaign subsidies as proportions of total campaign expenditures are associated with higher levels of party vote unity. The effect is significant in the presence of controls but, similarly to the effect of personal accountability, it turns insignificant when I control for the vote of confidence procedure in Model 6.

The vote of confidence procedure emerges as the most important explanans of vote unity. The relationship between vote of confidence and vote unity remains significant throughout all models in which this predictor is included. In substantive terms this relationship is very strong. Thus, based on the results from Model 9 (full model), moving from a system without the confidence procedure to one with the procedure increases the average rice index by .13, roughly one half of a standard deviation.

The fact that the effects of both personal accountability and government subsidies for electoral campaigns decrease considerably when we control for the existence of vote of confidence procedure seem to support our expectations about the relationship between the vote of confidence procedure and the development of

mechanisms of backbencher control. Control over nomination of candidates gives leaders an important control tool over backbenchers who know that leaders may punish vote dissent when selecting candidates for future elections, but also allows leaders to select candidates with similar ideological convictions who are less likely to defect. The same is true of campaign subsidies.

With the data at hand I tested the causal relationships between vote of confidence and government involvement in campaign finance as well as between vote of confidence and leadership control over candidate selection. The tests reported in Tables 1.5 and 1.6 show that after controlling for the other explanations considered in the literature (see Lundell, 2004; Nassmacher, 2009; Koß, 2011) the vote of confidence procedure is a significant predictor of both government campaign subsidies and leadership control over candidate selection. These relationships explain some of the results in Table 1.3 and are in accord with our expectations about the indirect effect of the confidence procedure on vote unity through the development of sticks and carrots as well as selection of party representatives to parliament. The development of mechanisms of control is a time-laden process, and therefore the cross-sectional tests in Tables 1.5 and 1.6 are not definitive. Future research should model the relationship between vote of confidence procedure and the development of control mechanisms across time.

The analysis reported in Table 1.7 tests the relationship between the confidence procedure and party ideological disunity. If confidence procedure influences vote unity through the selection of party representatives that are ideologically similar, then parties in systems without the procedure should be less

cohesive ideologically. To tap the ideological disunity of each party in the dataset I use a proxy that measures the ideological cohesion of their supporters as reflected in public opinion surveys. One can expect parties to attract supporters with a wide range of ideological beliefs when they have candidates running for office with a wide range of ideological beliefs. The supporters of a party are all respondents who declare that particular party as their vote preference. The list of surveys used can be found in the Appendix 3. To compute the ideological cohesion of party supporters I look at a survey question that asks respondents to place themselves on an 11-point left-right ideological scale, and compute the standard deviation of their placement. Higher standard deviation represents more ideological disunity. The results in Table 1.7, Model 1 support our expectation about the causal relationship between the confidence procedure and ideological cohesion: parties are more ideologically cohesive in systems with vote of confidence procedure.

<Tables 1.5, 1.6, and 1.7 around here>

Models 7 and 8 in Table 1.3 test whether the existence of presidents as third principals affect in any way vote unity. The two tests fail to confirm an effect of presidentialism on vote unity. The test in Model 9 also fails to confirm the interactive effect found by Carey (2009) between presidentialism and government party (H2a).

Among the control variables considered here, only the party seat share shows a significant effect on vote unity. The tests find that larger parties are more united in votes, suggesting that better access to resources give the leaders of large parties an important advantage in their struggle to control the agent. This relationship is

significant in all models in which is included. None of the other control variables has a significant effect on vote unity. Thus, in accord with what Carey (2006; 2009) has found, parties in federal systems are not less united than parties in unitary systems. Also, party fragmentation does not make parties more united ideologically. At least this is not reflected in higher vote unity. Furthermore, the tests do not find a significant relationship between the age of the democratic establishment and party vote unity. Finally, I do not find a relationship between the frequency with which votes are recorded in parliaments and party vote indexes. These results are quite similar across the models in which these controls are included.

1.4 Concluding Remarks

This study tests the relationship between institutions and party vote unity in national parliaments with the help of the largest dataset of votes to date.

The paper brings two theoretical contributions. First, it provides an explanation for why one should expect high vote unity in political systems with vote of confidence procedure although the procedure is rarely invoked. The costs associated with losing a vote of confidence lead to the development of stronger backbencher control mechanisms, as well as the recruitment of members with similar political views. The leaders' control over the selection of candidates in elections increases their control over backbenchers in the parliament, but this selection control is more likely to develop in countries where there is a vote of confidence procedure and implicitly higher need for vote unity. The same is true of the development of government involvement in campaign finance. This finding has implications for large N tests of

vote unity that use both types of institutions, for their use in the same regression is problematic due to multicollinearity. This may partially explain the dearth of definitive findings in the existing large N literature. Similarly, parties in systems with vote of confidence procedure have members with similar ideological inclinations, which is likely to be a function of recruiting efforts by the party leaders.

Second, the study challenges a rather established view that electoral rules that make candidates individually accountable to voters necessarily lead to vote independence. The results presented here suggest that the effect of individual accountability is contingent on the extent to which party leaders control the selection of candidates for office. Higher electoral accountability translates into higher party unity only when leaders do not control the candidate nomination process. This is because control over single member district nomination gives them more power in relationship with backbenchers than control over a multi-member list.

The main empirical contribution of the paper is the unequivocal confirmation of the relationship between vote of confidence procedure and vote unity. Parties in systems with confidence procedure are more united, a statement strongly supported by the statistical models. This relationship is highly significant, and accounts for most of the variance in the dependent variable. While the previous literature has emphasized the role of both electoral rules and the vote of confidence procedure, it has not found definitive answers about which of the two factors is more important. This study finds that it is the vote of confidence procedure.

2. Legislative Behavior under High Constituency and Party Leadership Control: The Effect of the 2008 Romanian Electoral Reform

2.1 Introduction

A vast scholarly literature has been concerned with the effect of institutions on the responsiveness of members of parliament (MPs) to citizens and party leaders. Special attention has been given to electoral rules and the degree to which they push candidates in legislative elections into developing personal or party centered campaigns (Carey and Shugart 1995; Ames 1995; Golden and Chang 2001; Samuels 1999; Hallerberg and Marier 2004). This in turn, has direct implications on the degree of party unity inside legislatures. MPs in systems that encourage personal votes are more likely to diverge from the official vote position of their party than MPs elected in party-centered systems (Carey 2007; Carey 2009; Hix 2004).

This paper challenges some of the assertions in the existing literature by emphasizing the role of party leadership in mediating the effect of electoral institutions. While certain electoral arrangements make MPs more responsive to their voters, their effect on vote behavior inside legislatures is strongly influenced by party leaders' capacity to counteract the pressures for MP vote independence.

These findings are based on a series of tests of the effect of the 2008 Romanian electoral reform on the behavior of members of the Romanian Chamber of Deputies. The reform moved Romania from a closed list proportional representation electoral system to a system in which all candidates run in single member districts. Based on the

existing literature the shift should push MPs towards more personal reputation building, with consequences over their degree of vote independence. The empirical tests run here compare MP behavior before the reform with MP behavior after the reform, and the findings correct some of the assumptions about the relationship between electoral rules and MP behavior.

The empirical tests underline the role of party leadership control over MPs in mediating the effect of the electoral reform on the behavior of MPs. Because parties in Romania have kept strong leverage over their backbenchers, the expected effect of the electoral reform is seen only in the less important votes in which party leaders allow defection. Furthermore, the tests find that the MPs elected after the reform are more likely to engage in other activities that bring the appreciation of voters, such as proposing legislation or questioning the cabinet. Party leaders are more likely to allow such activities, which are less damaging than vote defection.

The paper proceeds as follows. The next section reviews the theoretical work on the connection between electoral rules and the development of party or constituency allegiances by legislators, together with some of the empirical findings in the literature.

Section three describes the 2008 Romanian reform and based on the theoretical lens exposed in section two, it hypothesizes about the implications of the reform on MP behavior. Section four tests the theoretical implications with data from the last two terms of the Romanian Chamber of Deputies (Lower House). The paper ends with concluding remarks about the effect of electoral rules on vote behavior inside legislatures.

2.2 Empowering Voters or Parties through Electoral Rules

This paper assesses the vote behavior of individual members of a national parliament within the principal-agent framework employed in the literature on vote behavior in legislatures.

Previous research has shown that candidates may benefit from having a reputation that departs from that of their party and that the incentive for this is influenced by electoral rules (Carey and Shugart 1995; Ames 1995; Golden and Chang 2001; Samuels 1999; Hallerberg and Marier 2004). Whether MPs feel they need to satisfy their voters or their party leaders influences their behavior inside the legislature. MPs in electoral systems that encourage personal reputation are more likely to account for their constituencies' wishes when voting on the floor of the legislature, and thus to defect from the vote position of their party (Carey 2007; Carey 2009; Hix 2004). Taking into account the wishes of the constituency when voting in the parliament is only one of many ways in which a MP can improve the way she fares with voters. Inside the legislature, responsive MPs also try to catch the media limelight. They do so through speeches, legislative initiation (in parliaments which allow them to do so), government questioning etc. Outside the parliament, MPs take trips to their districts where they participate in local activities that get media attention, organize events, hold press conferences, meet with constituents etc. (Fenno 1978; Norton 1999; Crisp 2007).

While the relationship between electoral rules and the development of party or personal reputations had been previously affirmed, Carey and Shugart (1995) were the first to develop a systematic method to account for this relationship. Carey and Shugart

(1995) classify electoral systems based on scores on four variables representing/summarizing mechanisms through which electoral rules push candidates into building personal or party reputations. *Ballot control* accounts for the degree to which party leaders or voters control ballots. In systems where party leaders have a strong grip on the candidate selection process, candidates are less likely to cultivate a personal reputation, whereas the opposite holds in systems where candidate selection process is in the hands of voters. *Vote pooling* taps whether votes cast for one candidate contribute to the number of seats the party receives in the district. If a candidate's chances of election depend on the party's ability to attract votes in the district, she feels more need for party reputation as opposed to personal reputation; the less dependent a candidate is on the fortunes of her party for election, the more likely she is to run a personal campaign. *Vote* accounts for whether the system allows the voter to cast a single vote for a party, multiple votes for candidates, or a single vote for a candidate. Systems that emphasize voting for the party lead to the development of party reputations, while systems in which the vote singles out candidates lead to the development of personal reputations¹⁰.

Finally, Carey and Shugart (1995) consider the role of district size, which is contingent on the value of variable *ballot*. If party leaders control ballot nomination, larger districts decrease the value of personal reputation. If voters control the ballot, large districts make personal reputation more beneficial for candidates. The methodology developed by Carey and Shugart (1995) was later used by Wallack et al

¹⁰ Carey and Shugart (1995) use a three point ordinal scale to code electoral systems on each of the three variables, with a score of "0" signifying incentives for party centered campaigns, and a score of "2" signifying incentives for personal campaigns. A score of "1" represents some intermediate category on each of the three variables.

(2003) and Hallerberg and Marier (2004).

The empirical tests of the relationship between incentives to run personal or party centered campaigns and vote unity in parliaments have shown mixed results. Thus, Hix (2004) finds a relationship between vote defection in the European Parliament and the way in which the members are elected in their countries. Sieberer (2006) on the other hand, finds inconclusive support for the relationship between incentives to cultivate a personal vote and party unity. In more recent works Carey (2007; 2009) finds that the degree of vote unity in national parliaments is influenced by the level of intra-party electoral competition. Party vote unity is lower in systems in which candidates compete with other members of their own party for personal votes.

A separate category of empirical tests involved legislative behavior in mixed-member (MM) systems (see Shugart and Wattenberg 2003). Most MM systems have some of their MPs elected in single member districts and some on proportional list, a situation that allows the researcher to test the effect of electoral rules on vote discipline in a controlled environment. MPs elected in single member districts should be more inclined to pursue personal reputations than the MPs elected through party lists, and thus to defect from the vote position of their party more often. Empirical tests of MM systems have also produced inconsistent results (see Thames 2001; Haspel et al 1998; Herron 2002).

The more recent empirical tests have departed from an extreme vision of the “best of both worlds” paradigm in which MPs elected on party lists should behave as those elected in PR closed list systems and the MPs elected in single member districts

should act as those elected in plurality systems. Instead they consider the role played by parties and the way in which they can influence vote unity irrespective of the electoral rules through which MPs are elected (Crisp 2007; Ferrara 2004; Thames 2005). The findings of these tests point out two aspects of theoretical relevance to the Romanian case.

First, the findings point to the difficulty of creating an additive index based on the variables proposed by Carey and Shugart (1995). Carey and Shugart (1995) describe four mechanisms through which electoral systems influence the development of personal or party oriented campaigns, but it is difficult to appreciate how the four mechanisms interact with each other. Based on the empirical works, the party leadership's capacity to control backbenchers through the *ballot*, as well as other mechanisms, acts as a game changer influencing the degree to which the other mechanisms identified by Carey and Shugart (1995) make a difference. For instance, Crisp (2007) suggests that the capacity of Venezuelan party organizations to control the ballot neutralizes the incentives for personal votes created by other aspects of the electoral system. Similarly, Ferrara (2004) finds that in Italy the role of party leaders in the selection of candidates is strong enough to topple the effect of the need for personal campaigning for the deputies elected in single member districts. In the mixed systems with little party institutionalization analyzed by Thames (2005), the candidates elected on party lists should be more likely to seek personal votes than those elected in single member districts. However, because the parties are not strong enough to exert their potential influence, the expected pattern does not emerge.

Second, the findings of the MM literature suggest that on top of the capacities

given to them by electoral rules, parties have additional characteristics that influence their level of control of the *ballot* (see Depauw and Martin 2009; Shomer 2009). Because of these additional characteristics, parties in some mixed systems have more control than in other mixed systems despite similar incentives provided by the electoral rules. The literature on candidate selection has shown that parties from countries with similar electoral systems may have different degrees of party leadership involvement in the candidate selection process (Bille 2001; Lundell 2004). For instance, the candidate selection process in the United States is much less controlled by party leaders than the candidate selection in Westminster democracies, despite the similar electoral systems. There is variation in the level of selection control even among parties inside the same political system (Bille 2001; Lundell 2004). Thus, while electoral rules do impact the degree of party control over the ballot, they only tell part of the story. Other party features with little or no connection to the electoral system may be at play.

When deriving theoretical expectations about the effect of the Romanian electoral reform one needs to pay special attention to the capacity of parties to control their members and the way in which this capacity influences the development of a personal connection between MPs and voters. Party capacity is judged based not only on the degree of ballot control but also on other mechanisms that have been recognized in the literature.

The next section gives a brief presentation of the new electoral rules. The possible effects on the behavior of MPs are then analyzed within the framework proposed by Carey and Shugart (1995). To sum up the findings, the new electoral rules made candidates more likely to develop a personal vote, but at the same time, the

influence of party leaders over party members has remained strong. When deriving expectations about the effect of the electoral reform on the development of personal reputations by Romanian MPs, special attention is given to the way in which the strong influence exercised by party leaders mediates this effect.

2.3 The Romanian Electoral Reform

Until the 2008 election Romania used a closed list proportional representation system with multiple member electoral districts. The reform of 2008 came as the result of long negotiations among the main political parties with the strong involvement of the Romanian presidency and civil society. From the moment the idea of electoral reform was introduced in the political discourse its explicit goal was to give voters the possibility to single out candidates (Pro-Democratia 2008). The system adopted in 2008 resembles mixed member systems for it requires candidates to run in single-member districts, yet the final results keep a close connection between the percentage of votes and the percentage of seats received by each party. The system however, does not include a candidate list element and thus does not fit the mixed-member category as defined by Shugart and Wattenberg (2003, 10). Below I give a brief presentation of these rules, with an emphasis on their main consequences.

Under the new electoral system the country is split into 42 electoral constituencies (*circumscripție*), each corresponding to a county. Each constituency is further split into single-member electoral districts (*colegiu*). The number of districts in each constituency is proportional to the population of the constituency. As the “single-member” label implies, each district gives only one seat. The allocation of seats takes

place in three stages. In the first stage candidates who gain a majority of votes in their districts are elected. The districts where no candidate wins a majority of votes are distributed in the second and third stages. In the second stage the votes obtained by each party in each constituency are pooled together, and based on their share of votes it is determined how many seats each party should get in each constituency. This is done by dividing the number of votes by a representation quota and the rounding down of that number. The representation quota is obtained by dividing the number of valid votes cast in a circumscription by the total number of seats/districts in that circumscription. Only parties that pass the 5% threshold take part in this redistribution. The seats allocated in the second stage are given to the candidates who win most votes in their individual districts, provided their seats are not already taken by candidates from other parties through outright majorities.

The unused votes at the second stage are again pooled by party at the national level. The number of unused votes by each party is divided by a representation quota, and the rounded number gives the number of extra seats each party gets from those seats unallocated in the first two stages¹¹. The individuals who gain these seats are

¹¹ To better understand the concept of unused votes I detail the process through which the redistributions of seats at the second and third stages are done. At the second stage the total number of valid votes cast in a circumscription is divided by the total number of seats/districts in that circumscription to obtain the representation quota. This quota can be understood as the number of votes necessary to gain one seat. Then the number of votes obtained by each party in a circumscription is divided by the representation quota to find the number of seats to which a party is entitled in that circumscription. Let us take a hypothetical example of a circumscription of 5 districts up for redistribution and 3 parties. The results of the divisions by the representation quota for the three parties may look something like 1.5, 2.8, and 0.7. The first party gains one seat at the second stage redistribution, the second gets 2 seats and the third none. The unused percentages (0.5, 0.8 and 0.7), or more likely the number of votes associated

decided in a manner similar to the one used at the second stage. The end result is that the percentage of votes obtained nationally by a party translates accurately into the percentage of seats obtained in the Chamber.

The system encourages candidates to work harder to become popular with their constituents in their district and to develop reputations separate from their party. Thus, all Romanian MPs are elected in single member districts, and even if an MP gains her seat through redistribution she gains the seat in the single member district in which she runs. If elected, she represents the district in which she ran and is expected to run for reelection in the same district. At re-election, her performance in parliament is judged by the same voters.

Also, although their fortunes still depend on how their parties fare with voters, candidates need to work harder individually to gain the appreciation of voters. In a list PR system a candidate who works hard in campaign primarily helps her party and only indirectly and marginally helps herself. Candidates face a collective action problem and there is little incentive for individual campaigns. Things look different in the new electoral system. Even if a candidate comes from a party that is popular in her constituency, and thus more likely to gain seats in that constituency, she still needs to work hard to either gain an outright majority of votes in the district, or to outperform her party colleagues from the other districts in the constituency. Hence, after the electoral reform Romanian MPs should put more effort into gaining the personal appreciation of their voters.

with them are pooled at the national level in the third stage of redistribution. The two unallocated seats are to be allocated in the third stage.

Furthermore, under the new law candidates run against candidates from other parties in their own district, but also against candidates from their own party from different districts in the same constituency. To gain a seat through redistribution-- the main manner through which seats are allocated-- a candidate is fighting against members of her own party. She has to gain more votes than the other candidates from her own party in the circumscription. Electoral systems in which candidates compete against members of their own party encourage legislators to develop reputations distinct from their copartisans' (Carey 2009, 133)¹².

To qualitatively assess the impact of the electoral reform on MP behavior, in the summer of 2009 and the fall of 2010 I interviewed over twenty Romanian MPs. Among them there was unanimous agreement that after the reform MPs tend to spend more time in their districts and to meet more often with their voters. The assessment of Mircea Giurgiu, a deputy who had served in previous terms is particularly relevant: "I used to be the only deputy to have weekly meetings with the public. Now many of the people who come to see me tell me first what other deputies that he/she has seen promised him/her. It is like they are pitting us against each other."

While voters were empowered after the electoral reform, the other principal— party leadership—has kept a strong capacity to punish and/or reward the agent. The previous literature on vote unity in parliaments has emphasized a wide range of sticks

¹² In the 2008 election candidates seemed well aware of this aspect. In an interview taken in the fall of 2010 with deputy Stelian Fuia, he appreciated that the main obstacle he had to surpass in the 2008 elections was the leader of his county party organization who ran in a different district. The leader of the county party organization asked all mayors in the county affiliated with his party not to campaign for Fuia. The purpose of the party leader was to surpass Fuia in the number of votes obtained.

and carrots that party leaders use to keep backbenchers in line, such as control over the list of candidates in elections, the threat of the vote of confidence procedure in parliamentary systems, the capacity to expel problematic members, the assignment of leadership positions inside the party or the legislature, pork barrel spending, campaign support etc. (Bowler, Farrell, and Katz 1999; Diermeier and Feddersen 1998; Huber 1996).

Although it is difficult to assess post-reform changes in all sources of party control, the analysis of three important sources suggest that party leaders have kept a strong capacity to control backbenchers. First, after the electoral reform none of the parties has changed its official rules for the selection of candidates in the legislative elections (Chiru and Ciobanu 2009, 203). In the pre-reform period, despite variance in the selection procedures for the closed list of candidates, the leadership control over nominations has been considered strong (see Stefan, 2004). Some party leaderships left the nomination at the hands of county organizations (UDMR, PSD), some used a list that compromised their needs with those of local organizations (PDL and PNL) while others imposed their lists entirely (PC and PRM)¹³. Despite this variance in procedures, in all parties the final list of candidates had to be approved by the central leadership, an important control tool in the hands of leaders (Bille 2001; Lundell 2004). More important, none of the parties has changed its nominations procedures. The obvious difference is that instead of selecting a ranked list of candidates, now parties select a list of candidates for single member districts. Because of this, the task of political

¹³ Party acronyms are as follows: PSD=Social Democratic Party; PNL= National Liberal Party; UDMR: Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania; PRM= Greater Romania Party; PC= Conservative Party.

leaders may be different, yet the final effect similar: after reform party leaders control the selection of party candidates for the uninominal districts and implicitly the behavior of backbenchers¹⁴.

Also, Romania is still a parliamentary system in which the threat of vote of confidence limits the ability of backbenchers to depart from the position of their party leadership¹⁵. As previous scholarly work has shown, the threat of using a vote of confidence is an important tool in the hands of political leaders in their quest for vote unity (Diermeier and Feddersen 1998; Hix, Noury, and Roland 2007; Persson and Tabellini 2003; Huber 1996).

Furthermore, post-reform parties have maintained their tools to punish disobedient members. There are four such tools included in the statutes of all parties: formal warning, loss of leadership positions inside the party, retirement of political support for members in public offices, and expulsion. The last two are particularly important because running under a party banner has been a sine-qua-non condition for

¹⁴ One of the deputies I interviewed in the summer of 2009 had changed his party affiliation before the 2008 elections. He had shifted from the Greater Romania Party to the Liberal Democratic Party. When asked how he got the opportunity to run for the Liberal Democratic Party he admitted to have negotiated with the president of the party. In return for his allegiance in the Chamber of Deputies in the 2004-2008 term, this MP was allowed to run in a safe college in 2008. Similarly, in the aftermath of the 2009 presidential elections a tape came out in which the Social Democratic candidate offered someone an eligible district in the 2008 elections in return for campaign funding (Jurnalul 2009). Recently, in a January 2010 late election for an electoral district in Bucharest, the 23-year-old son of a wealthy member of the Democratic Liberal Party was imposed by the party leader as the party candidate (Sbîrn 2010).

¹⁵ Recently in June of 2010 the Romanian government was able to pass a very unpopular piece of legislation that significantly reduced public sector wages and pensions by attaching it to a vote of confidence (Bilefsky 2010).

election before and after the electoral reform. No independent candidate has ever gained a seat in the Chamber of Deputies in the post-communist history. More important than the formal existence of these mechanisms is the fact that after the reform political leaders have shown willingness to apply them to members who do not toe the party line in important votes¹⁶.

To sum up, the electoral reform in Romania made MPs more likely to develop a personal connection with their constituencies. At the same time the party leaders' leverage over backbenchers has remained strong.

To better ascertain the possible consequences of the electoral reform on the MPs behavior, Table 2.1 codes the pre and post reform electoral systems in Romania based on three different methods: Carey and Shugart (1995), Wallack et al. (2003) and Hallerberg and Marier (2004). Based on each of the three methods the incentives to develop a personal vote have increased after the electoral reform. Based on Carey and Shugart's method (1995), what makes the after reform system more candidate centered is the size of the district. In systems in which the party controls the ballot, smaller districts lead to more candidate-centered campaigns. The size of the district also accounts for the difference in the Hallerberg and Marier (2004) index. The difference between the two electoral systems is even stronger based on the Wallack et al. (2003) because they consider single member district systems more conducive to personal reputations than do Carey and Shugart (1995).

¹⁶ Four of the members of the main governing party (PDL) voted against the reduction of wages and pensions in June 2010. The party leadership proposed the exclusion of two of them, while two others were given a final warning (Rata and Dordea 2010).

<Table 2.1 around here>

What are the possible effects of this shift towards personal reputation? The higher need to satisfy their constituencies pushes MPs to act more independently on the legislature floor than they used to before the electoral reform. This may come in conflict with the wishes of the party leadership, which has kept strong mechanisms to control the backbenchers. However, as the literature on coalition building suggests, it is in the interest of party leaders to allow some backbenchers to act independently on certain votes that are sensitive with their constituency (Mayhew 1974, 100-101; Shepsle 1974; Baron and Ferejohn 1989). If voting against the party makes the MP popular with her constituency, this improves her chances of re-election, which in turn benefits the party group as a whole.

Because after the reform backbenchers benefit from the development of personal reputations, party leaders should be more inclined to accept vote defections in the legislature. In a parliamentary system like Romania in which the cost of disunity is high, the leadership is limited in the number and type of votes in which it allows defection. After the electoral reform *I expect higher levels of defection in the less important votes*. For the more important votes I expect a smaller-- if any-- effect of the electoral reform on vote unity.

Vote indiscipline in important votes is more costly for party leaders, and therefore in these votes they are expected to fully use their control mechanisms to keep backbenchers in line. Even in the absence of party leadership action, in a parliamentary system like Romania backbenchers should be induced to unity in important votes. As

Diermeier and Feddersen (1998, 616) show, although the vote-of-confidence procedure is rarely used, what strengthens cohesion in all votes is the threat of using it. If a piece of legislation does not pass, the executive may resend it to the parliament and attach a vote of confidence to it. The threat of using the vote of confidence procedure is more credible in the more important votes.

One may argue that MPs have more leeway to vote on relatively unimportant votes regardless of their mode of election, and therefore why should one expect a change in behavior after the reform in these unimportant votes? The expected change in behavior is the result of greater pressures on MPs to satisfy their constituencies. While these pressures may be felt for all votes regardless of their importance, party leaders have the capacity to resist these pressures, and are more likely to exercise this capacity in the important votes in which defection is more costly. Hence, this theoretical expectation reflects the two characteristics of the new system emphasized above: greater MP responsiveness to voters and strong party leadership leverage.

MPs elected after the reform are expected to use means other than vote defection to impress their constituency more often than MPs in previous parliamentary terms. There are several reasons for this. First, there are high costs of vote disunity for both party leaders and backbenchers. Backbenchers fear retaliation from leaders, which is still strong after reform; also, regardless of the leadership's actions, vote independence may harm MPs for their individual actions may yield results that are collectively damaging (Cox and McCubbins 1993; Aldrich 1995). Party leaders are also likely to encourage their backbenchers to use these alternative strategies that make backbenchers popular with voters and thus offer good electoral prospects for the party

overall, and at the same time are less damaging to the party group unity. Crisp (2007, 1497) notes that party leaders in the Venezuelan National Assembly are more tolerant to pre-vote behavior than actual vote position.

Second, MPs elected after the reform need to impress their constituencies more than MPs elected under the old system, yet the benefits of vote independence tend to be small. In general, voters are unaware of the voting records of their representatives, and political leaders have an information advantage (Ferejohn 1999). Other types of behavior are more easily appreciated by voters. For instance, floor interventions and visits to the district have a greater impact on voters, especially in an age when they are covered by the media. Also, bill initiation can bring voter appreciation not necessarily because voters inform themselves about the origin of legislation, but because candidates themselves can claim the initiation of popular laws during electoral campaigns. Because vote independence brings little benefits, the new MPs are more likely to take on other forms of behavior that bring constituency appreciation such as legislative initiation, floor interventions or district visits.

2.4 Data and Models

To test the theoretical implications the following analyses look at MP behavior in the last two terms (2004-2008 and 2008-2012). Two sets of tests with different types of dependent variables are run. The first set evaluates the impact of the reform on vote behavior in the Romanian Chamber of Deputies. The second set of analyses evaluates the hypothesis about alternative strategies through which deputies can improve their re-election prospects.

2.4.1 Change in Vote behavior

To test the hypotheses about differences in vote behavior I use the results of all electronic votes that took place in the third semester of the 2004-2008 term and the second semester of current term (2008-2012)¹⁷. The activity of the Chamber of Deputies is split into semesters. The electronic vote is the default type of vote in the Chamber. The Chamber uses the secret vote for the election of its leadership positions or for any other situation if a leader of a party group asks it and a majority of MPs approve it through electronic vote. In practice these secret votes are rare. In the two semesters under analysis there were nine such votes, less than one percent of the total number of votes.

The database includes a total of over 1400 electronic votes. The dependent variable measures the proclivity of an individual MP to defect from her party position in each vote. The party position is the vote choice expressed by a plurality of members. This research design allows the analysis to control for characteristics of each individual vote. This is important because the main theoretical expectation is contingent on type of vote.

<Table 2.2 around here>

The independent variables are presented in Table 2.2. To capture how important each vote is for the party leadership, I create a dummy variable that differentiates

¹⁷ Ideally one would look at the same period of time within the term. The choice of the third semester in one term and the second semester in the other term is dictated by the availability of data. The electronic vote was introduced in January 2006, so for the 2004-2008 term the first semester in which votes were recorded is the third semester (January-July 2006). For the 2008-2012 term, only the votes from the first two semesters are published on the official website of the Chamber.

between final votes on pieces of legislation and all other votes. While this may be considered a rough operationalization, it is reasonable to assume that final votes are more important than procedural votes or votes on individual articles of a bill. The variable *Organic Law* differentiates between two types of votes that can take place inside the Romanian Chamber of Deputies and that require different types of majorities: ordinary procedures require a simple majority of all deputies in the room; final votes on organic procedures require the support of a majority of all deputies, regardless of how many attend the meeting.

The results of two binomial logit regressions are reported in Table 2.3. To recapitulate, I expect the MPs elected in 2008 be more likely to defect in the less important votes than those elected in 2004. I do not expect to find the same effect for important votes.

<Table 2.3 around here>

The tests in the two models in Table 2.3 confirm an interaction between the mode of election and the importance of votes. Table 2.4 details the effects of the interacted terms on the probability of vote defection. The probabilities are computed from the results in Model 2. The changes in probabilities in each of the two columns show that in each of the two terms considered the probability of defection is lower in final votes than in all other votes.

The rows of Table 2.4 detail the substantive effect of the electoral reform in important and unimportant votes. Figure 2.1 graphs this effect, together with the 95% confidence intervals. The results confirm that in unimportant votes MPs elected after

reform are more likely to defect than those elected before. Moving from a PR system to the new system of elections increases the probability of defection from .033 to .047. The relationship found for final votes looks different. The probability changes in important votes (third row in Table 2.4) reveal that MPs elected in single member districts are less likely to defect than those elected on party lists. In final votes a MP elected before the reform has a probability of defection of .027 and a MP elected after the reform has a probability of defection of .024.

<Table 2.4 around here>

<Figure 2.1 around here>

Additional controls are included. Although I account for party effects in three of the four models, there is a change in the government coalition between 2006 and 2009 that is not controlled for by the party dummies. Model 2 includes a dummy variable that accounts for whether the MP comes from a party in government. MPs from parties in government are less likely to defect. Also, defection is less likely to happen in votes that require special majorities than in regular votes (Model 2). Party group leaders are less likely to defect, while parliament leaders show more vote independence. To help the reader better fathom these findings, column four in Table 2.3 gives the marginal effects for each predictor.

To sum up, the analyses of electronic votes support the first part of our expectations about the effect of electoral change on MP behavior: under high party leadership capacity, MPs elected in single member districts are more likely to vote independently than MPs elected on closed lists in the less important votes only; the

same effect does not hold for the important votes. If anything, in important votes MPs elected after reform seem more likely to stick with their party than those elected before it¹⁸.

These effects are statistically significant (see Figure 2.1), yet their magnitude may seem small. This is especially the case with the effect of reform on vote behavior in important votes. We have to bear in mind however, that we are testing for the effect of one of many factors that may influence vote unity. Romania is a parliamentary system in which parties display very high levels of unity, a fact attributable to a variety of factors such as the existence of confidence procedure. By design, the analysis controls for these additional explanatory factors, for they remain constant between the two terms. However, it should not be surprising that the only explanans that varies in the model has a small effect.

Also, given the goal of the paper, finding a significant effect is more important than the magnitude of the effect. The paper is not primarily concerned with the effect of the Romanian electoral reform on the degree of vote unity in the Romanian parliament, but with the more general relationship between electoral rules and vote behavior under conditions of strong party leadership control. The Romanian reform offers the empirical ground to test some theoretical expectations. The relationships found may have a small substantive effect in Romania because of many other explanatory factors, but this may not be the case in other contexts.

Next, I examine the hypothesized effects on other forms of MP behavior.

¹⁸ For validation purposes, I have run the analyses in Table 2.3 using logistic models in which I cluster by legislator. The results (unreported here) are similar.

2.4.2 Effects of Electoral Reform on Non-Voting MP Behavior

I expect that the deputies elected in single member districts try to be more visible to their voters. This might be reflected in more visits to their districts, more speeches on the Chamber floor, or more legislative proposals. To test these expectations I look at two different forms of behavior inside the Chamber of Deputies that have been previously considered in the literature: law initiation and government questioning (see Crisp 2007; Mattson 1995; Franklin and Norton 1993; Searing 1985; Raunio 1996). The Romanian legislation allows each deputy the right to initiate legislation alone or together with other deputies and senators. Also, each deputy has the right to address the Cabinet or individual ministers questions and interpellations to which the members of the Cabinet must respond within two weeks (Regulamentul Camerei Deputatilor). I expect the deputies elected in 2008 be more likely to initiate legislation and to question members of the executive than those elected in 2004.

The analyses examine these forms of behavior in the first year of each of the two terms compared here (January-December, 2005 and January-December, 2009). The unit of analysis is the individual deputy. The database includes all deputies who served in either 2005 or 2009. Only the deputies who served throughout the entire year were considered and those who served in both years were treated as two different observations. The operationalization of the independent variables used is presented in Table 2.2, and the results of the analyses are presented in Table 2.5.

<Table 2.5 around here>

The dependent variable in Models 1 and 2 of Table 2.5 captures the number of

legislative initiations by each deputy in each of the two years. The Romanian Parliament website has information about the total number of laws proposed by each deputy alone or together with other deputies in each of the two years under consideration. The dependent variable in Models 3 and 4 measures the number of questions addressed to government by each MP in each of the two years. To account for the fact the Chamber met more often in 2005 than in 2009, and thus offered deputies more opportunities to act, the negative binomial regressions includes a variable exposure term.

The results of the negative binomial analyses in Models 1 and 2 of Table 2.5 show that there is a relationship between the mode of election and the frequency of legislative proposals, with the deputies elected in single member districts being more likely to introduce legislation¹⁹. Also, as the analyses in Models 3 and 4 show, the deputies elected in 2008 are more likely to address questions to the members of the executive. Both of these activities on the legislature's floor are likely to improve a deputy's standing in front of her constituency²⁰.

A number of controls at the individual and party level are used, as described in Table 2.2. One can expect party group leaders and parliament leaders to be more active and therefore to have higher scores on both dependent variables. This expectation

¹⁹ The results of the negative binomial regression showed that the overdispersion parameter alpha was significantly different from zero. In this case a negative binomial regression is considered more appropriate than a poisson regression.

²⁰ Similar results (unreported here) were obtained with zero-inflated negative binomial models.

however, is only partially supported by the data. Thus, parliament leaders are less likely to address questions to members of government. Also, the test finds the deputies from parties in the government coalition to be less likely to question members of the cabinet, but more likely to propose legislation. Finally, deputies who served in both terms are more likely to initiate legislation and to address questions to members of the cabinet.

The database includes 89 deputies who fully served in the first year of each term. This allows us to compare the behavior of the same deputy at two different times, in 2005 and 2009. Table 2.6 presents the results of t-tests that compare the differences in behavior for each of the 89 deputies. To account for the fact that the Chamber met more often in 2005 than in 2009, the units of analysis are the number of legislative initiatives per day and the number of questions per day respectively. The results show that the same deputies have become on average more active in the Chamber after they were elected in single member districts. The reported t-values confirm the fact that the differences are significant. On average, the same deputy is likely to propose eight times more pieces of legislation in 2009 than she was in 2005 and to ask twice as many questions to the executive.

<Table 2.6 about here>

This analysis is important for it looks at the behavior of the same deputies before and after a treatment. The results suggest that being elected in single member districts and knowing that they will be up for re-election in the same districts makes MPs more active inside the Chamber.

2.5 Concluding Remarks

This study reassesses how electoral rules and party leadership influence the behavior of MPs in legislatures. The Romanian case sheds light on the effect of an electoral reform increasing MPs' responsibility to voters, while leaving the capacity of party leadership unchanged.

The article confirms the importance of party leadership strength and connects it to parliamentary systems of government. The role of leadership is not only additive but interactive, as it mediates the effect that other system characteristics may have on vote behavior. In Romania after the electoral reform party leaders have kept a strong influence over backbenchers. Although the new electoral law encourages the development of personal reputation, its impact on floor vote defection has been minimal, with MPs elected in single member districts being more likely to defect in the less important votes that do not seriously damage party leaders.

These findings come counter to recent research on the Congress of the United States. Cox and Poole (2002) find that individual defections are more likely to take place in the important votes. These two sets of findings should not be regarded as contradictory, but rather as reflections of different relations of power between the two principals: in Romania party leadership is strong, whereas in a presidential and federal system like the US the power of the constituency increases at the expense of that of party leaders. In Romania MPs defect when leaders allow them to do so (unimportant votes), whereas in the US congressmen defect when the votes are important to their constituencies.

This study also confirms the fact that MPs elected in single member districts are more responsive to their voters, but shows that MPs can use means other than vote independence in the legislature to gain constituency support. In Romania the MPs elected in 2008 in single member districts are more likely to initiate legislation and to address questions to members of the executive than the MPs elected in 2004 on party lists. Although these are only two of many possible actions that MPs can take, it is reasonable to assume that they reflect a general difference. These results suggest that using non-voting means to gain constituency support, such as initiating legislation or questioning members of the Cabinet makes both backbenchers and party leaders better off. One may argue that constituencies are also better off. A MP who works hard to propose new legislation that favors her district may be more beneficial to her constituency than an MP who repeatedly departs from the vote position of her party.

Therefore, not finding a relationship between election mode in mixed member systems and vote behavior on the floor (see Haspel, Remington, and Smith 1998; also Herron 2002) does not mean that the “best of the two worlds” literature has it wrong. MPs elected in single member districts in mixed systems may be more responsive to their voters than their peers elected on party lists, but it may be more beneficial to all actors involved to respond to constituency accountability through means other than vote independence.

3. Increasing Representative Accountability through Electoral Laws: The Consequences of the 2008 Romanian Electoral Reform

3.1 Introduction

Proportional representation became widespread in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, when under pressure to enlarge the franchise many governments ditched their plurality electoral systems (Shugart and Wattenberg 2003; Cusack et al 2007). One interesting consequence has been that elected representatives became less connected to their constituencies. According to Shugart and Wattenberg (2001), in the last two decades or so, many countries have sought to strengthen ties between MPs and their constituents through the adoption of mixed electoral systems. These systems have some of the representatives elected in single member districts (SMDs) and some on lists, and thus combine MP accountability to voters (through SMDs) with proportionality (as a consequence of the list element).

Mixed systems to date have fallen short of entirely fulfilling the two desiderata. The list element makes MPs less accountable to their constituents. Where the list tier and the SMD tier are separately elected (parallel systems), elections may yield disproportional results. Therefore, mixed systems offer the opportunity to balance the degree to which each of the two goals are reached, but so far have failed to yield the reformers' ideal of full proportionality and full accountability²¹.

In 2008, Romania adopted an electoral system that has the prospect of offering the best of both worlds: it elects all candidates in single member districts and at the

²¹Full accountability refers here to having all members individually accountable to their voters through being elected in single member districts.

same time yields proportional results. The Romanian electoral system presents itself as an attractive alternative for electoral reformers, for it seeks to combine proportionality and accountability.

This chapter assesses the extent to which the reform has fulfilled its promises. It does so with the help of post election surveys as well as in depth interviews held with members of the Romanian Chamber of Deputies in the fall of 2010²². The assessment is done with the help of a theoretical framework developed by Shugart (2001). Broadly, this framework analyzes electoral systems based on how they tie MPs to voters and how they translate the proportions of votes obtained by parties into proportions of seats in legislatures. Although the analysis is based on a single case, the empirical observations are done at multiple time points (see Rueschemeyer 2003). The electoral reform provides a unique opportunity to test some fundamental expectations about electoral systems for we can compare observations on dependent variables before and after the reform. The fact that one country is observed at different points in time allows the study to control for some confounding factors.

The paper proceeds as follows: the next section introduces the theoretical framework provided by Shugart (2001). This is followed by a brief history of the Romanian reform with a focus on the goals of reformers. Section four assesses the extent to which these goals have been achieved. The paper ends with some remarks about the effect of electoral rules on accountability and proportionality.

²² The entire content of the interviews cited in this paper is available on the author's website.

3.2 Avoiding Extremes in Elections: Shugart's Theoretical Scheme

In a widely cited work Shugart (2001) argues that modern day electoral reforms are driven by extreme values on two dimensions that characterize each electoral system: the interparty dimension and the intraparty dimension.

The interparty dimension looks at the translation of party votes into parliament seats and implicitly, the representation of small interests. At one extreme majoritarian systems of representation benefit two major parties at the expense of smaller parties. In such systems representativeness is low. This phenomenon led to the reform in New Zealand in the nineties (Denemark 2001). At the other extreme, highly representative systems allow smaller interests to be heard, but fail to offer voters clear choices of government selection at the polls. Cabinet formation involves post election negotiations, and thus voters have little input into the selection of the executive (see Powel 2000). These systems may also lead to fragmented party systems and cabinet instability. The Italian electoral reform was driven by such problems (Katz 2003).

The intraparty dimension taps the degree to which electoral systems encourage candidates to develop personal or party reputations. At one extreme, there are closed list proportional systems in which voters choose party lists that are crafted by party leaders. Popular support for more individual accountability and implicitly for electoral reform is likely to emerge. This is what caused the Venezuelan reform of the nineties (Crisp and Rey 2001). At the other extreme, systems where candidates are encouraged to run on individual platforms as opposed to party banners lead to populist appeals and

the development of clientelistic ties between legislators and voters. The reform in Japan was driven by such situation (Reed and Thies 2003).

According to Shugart (2003), the recent wave of electoral reforms in democratic societies is a move towards mixed systems, for these systems offer the prospect of moving away from extremes on either of the two dimensions, in search for what Shugart (2003, 28) calls “a theoretical midpoint of electoral efficiency.” Mixed systems elect some of legislators in single member districts and some on party lists. On the intra-party dimension they encourage individual accountability through single member districts. At the same time they can maintain party allegiances through the list, and thus avoid hyper-personalistic electoral campaigns. On the inter-party dimension the mixed systems may lead to proportional electoral results through the list element, but if needed, they can decrease proportionality to form strong party majorities and thus increase executive efficiency²³.

Applied to the Romanian reform, Shugart’s (2003) model highlights perceived shortcomings on the intraparty dimension, caused by low individual accountability, coupled with low public confidence in the political class. There were no shortcomings on the interparty dimension. At least they were not present in the discourse of reformers. Below I give a brief history of the reform process, with an emphasis on the causes of the reform.

²³ The degree of proportionality is influenced by two main choices at the hands of reformers: the proportion of legislators elected through each tier and the degree of linkage between the two tiers (see Shugart and Wattenberg, 2003, 14-15).

3.3 The History of the Romanian Electoral Reform

Until 2008 Romania used a closed-list proportional system of elections with 42 multi-member districts. Dissatisfaction with the system grew in early 2000s, linked to increasing levels of distrust in members of political class in general and of parliament in particular. Confidence in political class had been historically low in Romania, but it reached a nadir in the 2000s, when, under pressure from the European Union, Romanian governments took some anti-corruption measures²⁴. Fight against corruption became an important part of political rhetoric, and was associated with little public responsiveness to constituents (Pro-Democratia 2008, 17) It was believed that the closed list system benefitted corrupt and irresponsible politicians, elected because of their connections within their party. These connections were maintained through money and cronyism (Marian and King 2010, 10).

When the reform movement was initiated by the NGO called Pro-Democratia in mid 1990s, it was motivated by the alleged need to clean up the political class. It was believed that adopting a system that allowed voters to single out candidates would weed out old school legislators associated with the closed-list system of elections (Pro-Democratia 2008). Also, the system would make MPs more accountable to voters and thus more attentive to their needs.

From 2000 to 2007 Pro-Democratia led an intense campaign of informing the public about the benefits of reform, coupled with an effort at gaining the support of

²⁴ Surveys taken at the beginnings of the 2000s showed that the public confidence in the institution of Parliament was continuously decreasing (see Pro-Democratia 2008, 6).

political leaders. In 2006 the Parliament created a commission in charge with electoral reform, but its work was thwarted by disagreements among parties (Pro-Democratia 2008, 21).

The reformers' efforts received a boost in 2007 when President Băsescu decided to join the campaign, and to push the parliament into adopting a new electoral law before the 2008 elections. While Băsescu had previously affirmed his support for reform, his decision to take an active role was determined by the decision of the Parliament to suspend him in April of 2007 for alleged accusations of breaking the Constitution. According to the Romanian Constitution the suspension of the president by the parliament must be confirmed by a national referendum held within a month after the suspension (Constituția României, Art. 95). If the referendum fails to confirm the suspension, the president maintains her/his job. The President's campaign for referendum was directed against the members of the parliament, who were portrayed as products of the corrupt political system, interested in pursuing the will of their party leaders and unconcerned with the wishes of their constituents. The results of the referendum gave support to Băsescu's claims, as a large majority of voters (74%) stood by their president and voted against the parliament. The result of the referendum gave Băsescu legitimacy and led to a stronger push for reform (Marian and King 2010, 10).

As a consequence, in November 2007 Băsescu called a new referendum in which voters were asked whether they agreed to replace the closed list PR system with a majoritarian two-round system (Feșnic and Armeanu 2009). Although over 80% of voters opted for reform, the referendum was invalid because of low turnout. As the

promoter of this version of reform Băsescu was looking for popularity at the expense of legislature, but also for electoral benefits for his party, the Liberal Democratic Party (PDL). A two round majoritarian system like the one used in France is likely to benefit the larger parties (see Lijphart 1994). The party of the president was the most popular at the time.

This version of reform was not well received by Prime Minister Călin Popescu-Tăriceanu, who was the leader of the National Liberal Party (PNL), the third largest party at the time. In the fall of 2007 he proposed a mixed member proportional system similar to the one in Germany. His legislative proposal however, was declared unconstitutional by the Romanian Constitutional Court. After more discussions in the first months of 2008 the political parties and Pro-Democratia reached a compromise solution, a law that requires all candidates to run in single member districts but at the same time yields proportional results. The new law is described in section 2.3 of this dissertation.

The most interesting consequence of this complicated system is the fact that a candidate may win a district even if she came in second, third or fourth place. These outcomes are not unusual. Only 76% of all members of the Chamber of Deputies elected in 2008 finished first in their districts (Alegeri Parlamentare 2008).

The new law requires all candidates to run in single-member districts, and thus reflects the driving force behind the reform: the need to make legislators individually accountable to voters. Reformers did not intend any consequences over the interparty dimension. The pre-reform system was proportional, but not to an extent that would

cause extreme party fragmentation and political instability. Shugart (2003) develops an index of electoral efficiency and ranks countries based on how they manage to balance the need for proportionality with the need for clarity of responsibility for policy making. I computed this index for Romania using election results from 1992 to 2004. Figure 3.1 reproduces a chart from Shugart (2003, Fig. 2.1), which aligns a series of democracies based on the index scores on the interparty dimension. For comparison, I add the score of pre-reform Romania. Figure 3.1 shows that pre-reform Romania falls in the representative systems area, but is far from the hyper-representative extreme. On the contrary, of the countries in the representative group, Romania is second closest to the “0” mid-point of efficiency, being surpassed only by New Zealand post 1995 reform.

<Figure 3.1 around here>

As a consequence, the final version agreed upon was intended to yield proportional results. While the President promoted a less proportional law, he emphasized the changes it would bring on the intraparty dimension, and shunned the possible consequences for the proportionality of the system²⁵.

Below I evaluate the consequences of the reform. The main criterion used is the degree to which the reform helps avoid extremes on the two dimensions in Shugart

²⁵ In the days leading to the referendum for the two-round majoritarian system President Bănescu created a free telephone line that the voters could use to inform themselves about the referendum. Callers could hear a message that began with the greeting: “I am Traian Bănescu president of Romania. I am inviting you to clean up.” The message gave a detailed presentation of the effects of the law on the renewal of the political class, but said nothing about possible effects on the proportionality of the system (see România Liberă 2007a).

(2003), and thus helps approximate the ideal mid-point of efficiency. Additionally, I judge the results of reform against the intentions of the reformers.

3.4 The Assessment of the Reform

3.4.1 Effects on the Interparty Dimension

One of the heralded merits of the 2008 electoral law is its proportionality (Pro-Democrația 2008, 11). This proportionality is maintained without the help of a party list, in a system in which all legislators represent single member districts.

Table 3.1 shows the percentages of seats and votes obtained by the parties represented in the parliament in the last five elections. The results for both Senate and the Chamber of Deputies are reported. The 2008 results show that after the reform the system has remained highly proportional. The index of disproportionality reported in row three, suggests that the 2008 reform in fact increased proportionality. However, Marian and King (2010) show through simulations that given the 2008 vote results, the distribution of seats among parties would have been nearly identical under both the 2004 and 2008 electoral rules. Hence the higher proportionality of the 2008 elections is not a function of the electoral system, but of idiosyncrasies.

<Table 3.1 around here>

Despite the accuracy with which it translates votes into seats, the new electoral law may disadvantage small parties because of what Duverger (1972) calls psychological factors associated with the wasted vote problem. The wasted vote problem is associated with electoral systems that fail to accurately translate

proportions of votes into proportions of seats in the parliament. It has two aspects—mechanical and psychological—that lead to disadvantages for small parties (Duverger 1972, 248). The mechanical aspect states that in majoritarian systems the votes for small parties are less likely to be translated into seats and therefore are lost. The psychological aspect states that supporters of small parties, being aware of the mechanical aspect, are less likely to cast their vote for their preferred party and instead vote for a larger party that is close to their ideological preferences. Both of these mechanisms help large parties at the expense of small ones.

The 2008 Romanian electoral law does not create the mechanical part of the wasted vote problem. There are however two aspects of the new law that may activate psychological factors leading to the wasted vote problem.

First, although every vote eventually counts at one of the three rounds of seat allocation, sympathizers of small parties face the choice of influencing the fate of their own district or the overall distribution of seats in the chamber. A vote for the candidate of a small party in a given district is not lost for it helps your preferred party overall, but at redistribution the party may or may not get the seat in your district. Hence a vote for a small party may help the party overall, but not the party candidate in your own district. On the other hand a vote for the candidate of a larger party in the same district that is still close to your ideological preferences may be preferred for it gives you more leverage in determining your own representative.

Second, there is strong evidence that at the time of elections voters were unaware of many aspects of the electoral law, including the redistribution element (see

Feșnic and Armeanu 2009, 7). Even members of the political class were not completely aware of how redistribution would work. In the aftermath of elections the fact that candidates won seats while finishing second, third, or even fourth—a direct consequence of the redistribution process—was portrayed in the media as an oddity (Antena 3 2008). If voters are asked to cast their vote for one candidate without being fully aware of the redistribution process they should act as in a single member district plurality system and thus vote for larger parties.

To the extent that these two mechanisms are at play, given that none of the prescriptions of the new law benefits smaller parties, the 2008 law should disadvantage small parties. Empirical evidence from a post-2008 election survey support this claim. The European Social Survey was administered in Romania between December 2 and December 30 of 2008. The parliamentary elections were held on November 30. Two survey questions interest us: one asks respondents to say whether they feel close to any of the main political parties (party closeness); the other question asks respondents about their vote preference in the November elections (vote choice). With no wasted vote problem there should be a near perfect correlation between party closeness and vote choice.

Table 3.2 reports the cumulative results for the four parties represented in the parliament²⁶. Of the 267 respondents who feel close to PDL and went to the polls, 260 (over 97%) voted for their preferred party. Roughly the same percentage of PSD

²⁶ The choice of limiting the analysis to the parties represented in the parliament was dictated by the small number of people who declared themselves close to a given party, which makes the analysis difficult. This small sample problem is more acute for the small parties. As a consequence, I decided to only look at the sympathizers of the parties represented in the parliament.

sympathizers voted for PSD. The situation is quite different for center-right National Liberal Party (PNL), which finished third in the 2008 elections. Of the 103 PNL sympathizers who went to the polls, only 91, representing 88 % voted for a PNL candidate. Even more, most of the PNL defectors (eight respondents) voted for the other party of center-right orientation²⁷, the larger PDL. This is what the wasted vote theory would predict. Interestingly enough none of the 7 defectors of larger PDL gave their vote to PNL.

<Tables 3.2 and 3.3 around here>

Table 3.3 reports the aggregate answers to the same questions from the 2009 European Elections Study, conducted immediately after the 2009 election for the European Parliament. The vote choice is for elections to the European Parliament in which a closed list proportional system with a single, national district is used²⁸. If the differences in the 2008 survey are caused by the electoral law, they should not be present in the post European election survey. The information in Table 3.3 confirms this expectation. The rate of defection for the two large parties (PSD and PDL) is larger than in the 2008 parliamentary elections. Only 93% of PDL supporters voted for the PDL list and only 92% of PSD supporters voted for the PSD list. At the same time, PNL displays the largest degree of vote devotion among its supporters, opposite to

²⁷ Appreciation made based on their scores on the left-right dimension given in the 2006 Chapel Hill expert survey (see Hooghe et al 2010).

²⁸ Ideally, one would want to compare the 2008 post-election survey with 2004 post-election surveys. Unfortunately, I could not find any post 2004 elections survey that includes both questions of interests.

what the post 2008 election survey has found. 96% of PNL supporters voted for the PNL list in the 2009 European elections.

Things are less clear for the Hungarian minority party, UDMR, which displays an almost perfect level of vote devotion in both elections. UDMR is a special case for its voters are not united by ideological preferences, but by shared ethnicity. Hence the high degree of vote allegiance is likely to be a function of both stronger identification with the party and lack of party alternatives.

A system that benefits the two largest parties is not necessarily a bad thing. It may move the country to a more majoritarian system with two strong parties. In such systems voters are given more clear choices of governments before the elections, which may increase the clarity of responsibility and thus the efficiency of the system on the interparty dimension (Shugart 2003, 30; Powell 2000). Therefore I remain agnostic about the normative effects of the wasted vote problem. The effects however, were not intended by reformers. On the contrary, Pro-Democrația (2008, 17) lauds the fact that the 2008 elections brought the most proportional results in the post-communist period. Also, as the comparison with other systems in Figure 3.1 shows, there was no need for a move to a more majoritarian system.

The political leaders I interviewed in the fall of 2010 seemed unaware of the wasted vote problem. The MPs from PNL believed that the new law does not bring them advantages nor disadvantages compared to the 2004 law²⁹. The MPs from other

²⁹ This became apparent in a discussion I had over dinner with two Liberal deputies. During our discussion I brought empirical evidence that pointed to the wasted vote

parties believed that PNL was actually advantaged by the new system. The words of a Liberal Democrat deputy (Personal interview 5) are relevant in this sense:

“The system surely benefits PNL which gains many seats without winning districts. For example even the leader of the party, Crin Antonescu, gained his seat despite finishing third in his district.³⁰”

The words of this Liberal Democrat deputy point to the importance of counterfactual in any comparison. If we compare the 2008 system to a single member district plurality or a majoritarian two round system, then the new system clearly benefits PNL. However, if we compare the new system with the previous one—as one should—it becomes apparent that PNL is disadvantaged. Also, they suggest that there are differences in how deputies are perceived by their peers based on the place in which they finished in their district. Among the interviewed deputies, some were eager to mention they had finished first in their districts (see Personal interviews 7, 3). These differences in rank and status may also be perceived by constituents. Given that most MPs elected without winning their districts come from small parties, this consequence of the reform also benefits larger parties.

To sum up, on the interparty dimension, the new Romanian electoral system maintains the proportionality of the previous system intact. The new system, however, may advantage large parties because of two secondary mechanisms. First, the system

problem and its effect on their party's vote share, but they were all dismissed (see Personal interview 2).

³⁰ This opinion was not singular. For instance, another deputy saw the final version of the law as a concession made by PSD to their government partners PNL (Personal interview 7).

encourages the psychological aspect of the wasted vote problem, which leads supporters of small parties to vote for larger parties. Second, the MPs from small parties are more likely to be elected without winning their district. To the extent that this translates into lower legitimacy in the eyes of voters, these MPs have a handicap at reelection.

3.4.2 Effects on the Intraparty Dimension

The principal goal of the reform was to increase MPs' individual accountability. There were two consequences that derive from accountability that were intended by reformers: 1) the renewal of the political class; 2) higher MP responsiveness to constituents' needs. The discussion below analyzes the extent to which these desiderata were achieved.

3.4.2.1 The Renewal of the Political Class

Giving voters more power to “throw the rascals out” was the most advertised goal of reform. Voting in single member districts allows voters to single out unpopular politicians who under the old system allegedly gained their seats because of party connections and money. To assess whether the reform has brought this outcome, I first compare the rates of incumbent success in the last four elections. The election results depict a mixed picture. Figure 3.2 compares the proportion of winning candidates who served in the previous term in four elections for the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. Thirty seven percent of the deputies elected in 2008 served in the 2004-2008 term, a proportion similar to those in the previous three elections. Things look

different for the 2008-2012 Senate, in which only 24 percent of the senators served in the previous term. This share is significantly smaller than those of previous senates.

<Figure 3.2 around here>

The lower incumbency rate for the 2008 Senate is in part explained by the candidate selection process. Thus, only 50 percent of senators who finished their 2000-2004 term found themselves on the ballot in the 2008 elections, compared to 65 percent of 2008 incumbent deputies (Romanian Senate 2010; Romanian Chamber of Deputies 2010; BEC 2004; BEC 2008). The selection procedures for the 2008 elections differed among parties, but the same party had identical procedures for both chambers (Chiru 2010). Political parties may adjust their list of candidates for the single member districts as a response to public dissatisfaction with incumbent politicians. Hence, the fewer candidates selected from among incumbent senators may be a reflection of higher public dissatisfaction with senators than with deputies. I am not aware of such difference in perception, and with the information at hand one cannot establish a definitive explanation for the different fates of incumbent senators and deputies.

More important than the mere rate of replacement is the quality of the new members. Has the 2008 reform brought in fewer MPs associated with the old practices of corruption and traffic of influence? To judge whether this goal was achieved I use the candidate assessments performed by the NGO *Alianta pentru o Romania Curata* (Alliance for a Clean Romania-ARC). ARC has issued lists of undesirable candidates before the 2004 and 2008 parliamentary elections. Unfortunately ARC has changed

the criteria for inclusion, and therefore the lists are not comparable. The one criterion used in both lists is the candidates' use of state resources for personal benefit, or the benefit of other people connected to the candidate. Based on this criterion I create two new lists of "corrupt MPs" which include candidates accused of one or more of the following: the use of public positions for personal or family gains; breaking the principle of free competition through allocating state contracts to relatives or friends; outright acts of bribery.

<Table 3.4 around here>

The data reported in Table 3.4 suggest that corrupt candidates were less fortunate in 2008 than in 2004. First, the overall number of such candidates decreased in 2008, suggesting that parties became more careful about the process of candidate selection. It is however, difficult to assess whether this trend is a function of the electoral law. The fight against corruption became a much more salient issue after the center-right coalition took power in 2004, and thus voters became more aware of corrupt candidates³¹.

A second observation drawn from Table 3.4 is that a smaller proportion of corrupt candidates were elected in 2008 than in 2004. Only 58% of corrupt candidates were elected in 2008, compared to 74% in 2004. It may be that voters became more aware of corruption practices after 2004. However, even if voters had been more aware of candidates' behavior in 2004, there was little they could do to prevent their

³¹ Under pressure from the EU the national authorities intensified the fight against corruption and a considerable number of corruption cases came to the public eye. As a proof, 19 of the candidates on the 2008 list were put under accusation for corruption acts, whereas none of the candidates on the 2004 list was in such position.

election. The fact that the two electoral systems are so different makes comparisons difficult. All we can do is look at the overall number of corrupt candidates, which ignores important additional information. Thus, we do not account for the fact that some candidates were on better positions on the closed list than others in 2004 or that some ran in safer colleges than others in 2008. It may be that fewer corrupt candidates were elected in 2008 because they were put in less safe districts, while many corrupt candidates were on eligible positions on the 2004 closed lists. Since we do not have such information and the safeties of candidacies in the two elections are difficult to compare, the results in Table 3.4 should be interpreted with caution.

The interviews held with deputies revealed two additional negative features of the new MPs: they tend to have high financial capabilities, which helped them get the party nomination and win their seat; some MPs are popular figures with little or no legislative expertise.

Individual campaign finance has historically been important in Romania because of the little amount of government campaign funds (Chiru 2010), but has become even more important after the reform. Under the pre-reform system the benefit of money brought by individual candidates spread among all candidates on the party list. Candidates running in single member districts however, make more use of the money they invest. The campaign they are financing helps them primarily, and only marginally their party colleagues who run in different districts. This in turn increases the value of individual finances, and candidates who can raise money—their own money or money from sponsors—are more likely to be selected to run in safer districts, and to win those districts. This expectation is empirically confirmed by the

wealth distribution among the newly elected MPs. Chiru (2010) finds that the 2008 election has brought in a large number of wealthy people, most of which finance their campaigns almost entirely.

The increased role of money in candidate selection and election is confirmed by one of the interviewees:

“The vote in uninominal colleges brought popular personalities such as actors who are good on TV, but are uninterested in the situation in the college they represent. Such an example is Mircea Diaconu, who is a senator from my region, yet never takes trips to his college. Another negative aspect is the fact that many enter because they have money, and that’s why we have many wealthy and influential people, but without expertise in areas where they are needed. That’s why many of my older colleagues think that in the permanent committees the quality of members has decreased significantly. Before there were members with expertise in certain areas, who were not very good at going to the rural areas of their districts and interacting with people” (Personal interview 3).

Similarly, another deputy (Personal interview 8) talked openly about the practice of buying candidacies in safe districts. The election of plutocrats is not only an unintended effect of reform, but comes quite contrary to what reformers had in mind. The election of wealthy and presumably corrupt MPs was among the main criticisms brought to the old system (Pro-Democrația 2008).

The words of interviewee 3 emphasize another negative effect of the new electoral law: it encourages the inclusion on ballots of popular figures who are easily identified by voters for reasons other than their political acumen or connection to voters in the electoral college. Another deputy (Personal interview 1) admitted he was asked to run because he was a well-known surgeon in his town and despite his lack of

political experience. Similarly, another deputy (Personal interview 4) believed he won his seat simply because people knew him as a reputable university professor.

3.4.2.2 MP Responsiveness to Voters

The reform was to lead to higher individual accountability, and thus to increase the responsiveness of MPs to the needs of their constituencies. This is the benefit of individual accountability most often mentioned in the literature (Carey 2007; Carey 2009) and was present in the vocabulary of Romanian reformers (Marian and King 2010, 12). For instance, in the aftermath of the 2007 referendum, President Băsescu emphasized the disconnect between the MPs who had voted for his suspension and the will of the constituents they represented.

More responsive MPs should take more input from the people they represent. When voting on the chamber floor, as well as when drafting legislation, MPs should be more attentive to their constituents' needs. The higher individual accountability brought by reform offered the prospect of increased popular legislative input. The analysis in chapter 2 finds that the Romanian deputies elected in 2008 are more likely to propose legislation and to ask questions to members of the Cabinet than those elected in 2004. Being more active in the Chamber, however, may be a function of higher responsiveness, or of mere desire to appear active (see Mattson 1995; Cumberbatch et al. 1992; Franklin and Norton 1993, p.109; Wiberg and Koura 1994, 35).

While it is difficult to establish to what extent the change in MP behavior found in chapter 2 is a function of concern for constituents' needs or mere theatre, the

interviews taken with Romanian deputies reveal serious barriers in the transmission of public intentions to legislators. Almost all deputies interviewed said that they take a lot of input from their constituencies, yet they had hard times naming specific channels through which they learned their voters' preferences. The only available channel is the weekly meeting with constituents, a channel emphasized by all deputies interviewed. Every weekend the MPs travel to their home districts to hold audiences. While audiences are not a new phenomenon, they have become widespread after the 2008 reform.

The audiences offer voters a great opportunity to influence the legislative process. In reality however, they fall short of reaching this goal. Most requests brought forward by constituents are disconnected from the legislative process and related to personal problems. There was general agreement among the deputies interviewed that most requests were for jobs, social housing, interventions in the judicial process etc. (see Personal interviews 1, 5, 6, 9, 10). One deputy appreciated that most questions should be addressed to members of the local councils:

“Ninety nine percent of requests are from people who do not have a job, their sewage is broken, gypsies stole their sewage caps to sell them, they have contestations in courts. All these things fall outside of a MPs attributions. That is why I plan on initiating a law that would introduce the uninominal system for the election of members of local councils. Most of the requests that I receive should target members of local councils (Personal interview 1).”

People prefer to go to their MPs instead of their local representatives because the reform has made MPs more accessible and because they are regarded as influential people. Other than regular voters, a special category of audience attendees are community leaders such as mayors or priests who look for funds for their towns or

churches. The opinion of another deputy vis-à-vis the role of audiences as instruments of fund allocation is reflective of the general opinion among the deputies interviewed:

“In general, there is little knowledge about what voters should expect from their representatives. There is a prejudice that makes voters harass their elected officials, to lobby some people who are perceived as mere managers of funds. As a consequence all that is expected are funds for local schools, roads, churches. The MP is forced to influence funds allocation, which brings advantages to gutsy MPs and encourage them to develop certain relationships with other colleagues, behaviors that do not benefit the country overall, but only certain regions with gutsy and well connected MPs.” (Personal interview 6; also see Personal interview 3)

The newly developed relationships between MPs and their local communities suggest a move towards the other extreme on the intraparty dimension: the development of personal, clientelistic relationships between elected officials and their local community. The situation described by interviewee 6 does not differ from the situation in Japan before the electoral reform (see Reed and Thies 2001). In the process of development of personalistic ties local community leaders play a crucial role. Thus, most requests by individual voters are difficult to pursue because they fall outside of the jurisdiction of the MP and because they bring little electoral benefit. Requests for funds by community leaders such as mayors, priests or school principals on the other hand, are easier to meet and more electorally rewarding (see Young 2009, 1). According to another deputy (Personal interview 10), the allocation of funds to local districts, mediated by mayors, is the main source of appreciation by voters:

“It is very difficult for the electorate to judge the performance of their representatives. For instance, a mayor is easily scrutinized based on how much he built, the quantity of funds attracted to the town etc. As a MP it is more difficult to present your accomplishments to your constituents. This is usually done through the mayors. If for example I obtain some funds for a town within

my electoral college, I travel with the mayor to that town, he introduces me to the people and tells them about the funds I obtained for them.”

The development of such clientelistic ties is likely to benefit the MPs from the parties in power, for they have more control over the purse. Thus, the development of clientelistic ties has helped the Mexican Partido Revolucionario Institucional and the Japanese Liberal Democratic Party win elections for many decades (Magaloni 2006; Scheiner 2006). While parties in power in Romania have always used allocation of funds for electoral purposes, the practice has become more important after reform, when directing funds to local communities has become more politically rewarding. Just as it is the case with personal campaign money, obtaining funds for the local community before the reform helped the individual MP only indirectly through bringing more votes for the party list. After reform however, MPs who bring money to their local communities can individually be singled out at the polls.

The roles of clientelistic relationships and funds allocation are reflected in the patterns in which constituents see MPs during audience time. Thus, voters do not necessarily go to the representative of their district (see Personal interviews 6, 11, 2). They are more likely to see a representative from their county—but not necessarily their district—who is a well-known political figure and thus perceived as more influential. Preferably this representative should come from a party in power³².

³² To test this assertion I visited deputy Ioan Oltean on a Friday during his audience time in the city of Bistrita. Oltean is the vice president of PDL, the leading party in the governing coalition and vice-president of the Chamber of Deputies. He also comes from a small county and is by far the most influential politician in that county. As a consequence the waiting room at his office was packed with people from all over the county, mostly mayors affiliated with PDL and priests looking for money. The

The disconnect between the legislative actions of representatives and the needs of their constituents may be a function of the centralized character of politics in Romania. Accounting for the needs of your constituents implies that constituents have such distinct needs. Based on the interview data it seems like the issues that constituents care about have a national rather than a local character:

“ The citizens of Deva [the deputy’s town] are first influenced by national issues; Deva is not a special place with its own laws and the lives of citizens are influenced by national not local politics” (Personal interview 2).

Similarly, another deputy (Personal interview 6) suggested that consultations with voters should not be done across counties, but across social categories. Rather than thinking about the needs of citizens in a given county, which do not differ substantially from the needs of the country as a whole, MPs should listen to the needs of professors, business owners, miners etc. (also see Personal interview 2).

This situation may be a function of the fact that Romania is a unitary and centralized state, in which local politics have not played a major role. Also, the previous system of elections did not encourage the development of locally driven concerns. It is possible that the new electoral system will lead to such development, but as of now there is little evidence pointing to that direction.

meetings were short and unorganized and often times interrupted by people who would just walk in. At the same time in the same city deputy Ioan Tintean was also holding his audiences, yet the office was almost empty. He is a first term deputy from an opposition party.

To sum up, on the intraparty dimension, the 2008 elections brought fewer candidates associated with corruption practices. While this may be a good indication that the reform has reached one of its principal goals, it is difficult to appreciate how much of the change is attributable to the reform and how much to idiosyncratic events. The interviews however, reveal that under the new system wealthy and populist candidates prosper. The reform was meant to increase MP responsiveness to voters, which should translate into more popular input in the legislation process. The interviews reveal serious barriers in the transmission of popular concerns to MPs. MPs have little interest in pursuing a local agenda for most issues are still framed at the national rather than local level.

3.5 Concluding Remarks

This study evaluates the 2008 Romanian electoral reform within the well-known framework developed by Shugart (2003). At the onset, the Romanian electoral law presented itself as a serious alternative to existing mixed systems for it yields proportional results, while having all MPs elected in single member districts. It gave reformers the prospect of combining the best of both worlds: individual accountability and proportionality.

The analysis however, identifies a series of shortcomings, and thus paints a rather somber image of the reform. Some of these shortcomings are specific to the Romanian case, while others are more general lessons about accountability and proportionality in elections. Some of the shortcomings are a function of the novelty of the system and may disappear; others reflect structural problems and are likely to stay.

Regarding proportionality, the study finds that what Duverger (1972) calls psychological aspect of the wasted vote problem is valid in the absence of disproportionality. Although the Romanian system translates votes into seats proportionately, supporters of smaller parties are still discouraged from voting for their party. There are two possible explanations. First, before the 2008 elections most voters were unaware of the redistribution system, and thus might have acted as they would under a plurality system. This may simply be a function of novelty decreasing over time. Second, the wasted votes may be the consequence of a rational choice between determining the fate of the district or the fate of the country overall. This mechanism is unrelated to the novelty of the elections, and to the extent that it is at work, it should create the wasted vote problem in the future.

Regarding accountability, the study suggests that the new law has increased the capacity of voters to throw the rascals out, and that voters have taken advantage of it. Fewer corrupt candidates were elected to the parliament in 2008 than in 2004. Unfortunately, with the data at hand it is hard to establish to what extent this is the result of the reform or of idiosyncratic events.

The analysis also points to negative traits of the new MPs. Thus, running in single member districts increases the benefit of individual campaign funds, which leads to wealthy candidates being selected by parties, and then elected by voters at the polls. This phenomenon is exacerbated by the sparse government funding of electoral campaigns. Also, the paper finds that the single member district system has brought to the parliament popular figures with little knowledge of political realities and needs of their constituents.

The paper also challenges some of the accepted benefits of accountability. It shows that increasing individual accountability does not necessarily translate into better representation of constituency interests in the legislative process. Because Romania is a unitary state very few issues have different implications for constituents based on the district where they live. As a consequence, very few channels for transmitting constituency preferences have developed. The only such channel—the weekly meetings—falls short of meeting its purpose, since most requests regard concrete things related to day-to-day needs as opposed to more abstract requests related to an MP's role—to legislate. This raises more general questions about how prepared citizens are to participate in the legislative process, and implicitly about the utility of increasing individual accountability in general, and in unitary states in particular. Individual accountability not only fails to fulfill its promise, but it encourages clientelistic ties between representatives and constituencies. In Romania, directing funds to local communities (buying off votes) has become an important tool for voter appreciation in the post-reform era.

Tables

Table 1.1: Description of vote data from 33 parliaments together with descriptive statistics for system level variables.

Country	Number of votes	Period covered	Average adjusted wtd rice	Confidence	Presidential	Individual accountability	Campaign subsidies	Federal	EFNP	Age of regime	Vote frequency
<i>Argentina</i>	64	Dec '93- Dec '95	0.76	0	1	0.14	45	1	2.82	11	2.66
<i>Australia</i>	457	May 96-July '98	0.99	1	0	0.5	15	1	2.56	77	16.92
<i>Belgium</i>	454	July '99- July '00	0.99	1	0	0.23	75	1	9.05	80	37.83
<i>Brazil</i>	452	March '95- Dec '98	0.80	0	1	0.53	0	1	8.04	9	9.82
<i>Canada</i>	735	May '94- April '97	0.87	1	0	0.6	25	1	2.35	75	21
<i>Chile</i>	522	Oct '98- May '00	0.85	0	1	0.43	0	0	5.14	10	26.1
<i>Czech R.</i>	4741	Jan '93- June '96	0.92	1	0	0.31	81	0	4.80	4	131.69
<i>Denmark</i>	427	June '06- June '07	0.99	1	0	0.43	25	0	4.89	87	35.58
<i>Ecuador</i>	22	July '98- June '02	0.92	0	1	0.11	65	0	4.69	20	0.26
<i>Estonia</i>	681	Jan '08- Dec '08	0.98	1	0	0.5	30	0	4.38	18	56.75
<i>Finland</i>	723	Sept '07- August '08	0.95	1	1	0.41	85	0	5.13	88	60.25
<i>France</i>	394	Jan '08- Dec '09	0.96	1	1	0.6	55	0	2.48	64	16.41
<i>Germany</i>	94	Jan '96- Dec '97	0.98	1	0	0.45	60	1	3.44	48	3.91
<i>Greece</i>	79	March '04- July '07	0.91	1	0	0.37	87	0	2.19	30	1.88
<i>Hungary</i>	2496	Jan '08- Dec '08	0.97	1	0	0.41	70	0	2.32	19	208

<i>Israel</i>	598	Oct '99- Nov'00	0.55	1	0	0.05	55	0	8.69	52	42.71
<i>Italy</i>	2906	Jan '09- Dec '09	0.90	1	0	0.52	35	0	3.06	62	242.16
<i>Latvia</i>	2006	Jan '08- Dec '08	0.91	1	0	0.43	0	0	6.00	18	167.16
<i>Lithuania</i>	1576	Jan '08- Dec '08	0.87	1	0	0.53	38	0	5.82	18	131.33
<i>Mexico</i>	299	Oct '98- April '00	0.91	0	1	0.46	85	1	2.85	2	15.73
<i>Netherlands</i>	20	Dec '06- March '09	0.99	1	0	0.14	20	0	5.6	62	0.71
<i>New Zealand</i>	592	Nov '90- August '93	0.96	1	0	0.6	0	0	1.76	71	17.93
<i>Peru</i>	689	March '99- June '00	0.70	0	1	0.59	0	0	2.91	1	43.06
<i>Philippines</i>	147	July '95- April '97	0.66	0	1	0.6	0	0	3.36	9	6.68
<i>Poland</i>	2183	Jan '08- Dec '08	0.95	1	1	0.42	20	0	2.82	18	181.91
<i>Romania</i>	1102	Jan '07- Dec '07	0.84	1	1	0.11	8	0	4.56	12	91.83
<i>Slovakia</i>	411	Oct '07- Sept '08	0.98	1	0	0.52	63	0	4.80	15	34.25
<i>Slovenia</i>	381	Jan '08- Oct '08	0.93	1	1	0.21	73	0	4.91	18	38.1
<i>Sweden</i>	532	Sept '07- August '08	0.99	1	0	0.4	60	0	4.15	88	44.33
<i>Switzerland</i>	690	Jan '07- Dec '07	0.60	0	0	0.39	0	1	4.99	88	57.5
<i>U. K.</i>	238	Jan '07- Dec '07	0.97	1	0	0.6	5	0	2.45	88	19.83
<i>United States</i>	987	Jan '09- Dec '09	0.84	0	1	0.6	5	1	1.93	90	82.25
<i>Uruguay</i>	22	Dec '90- August '94	0.76	0	1	0.42	40	0	3.33	6	0.45

Note: The sources for each variable can be found in Appendix 1 B.

Table 1.2: Descriptions of variables.

Predictor	Description
Confidence (s)	Dummy variable where “1” indicates that the party comes from a country with vote of confidence procedure.
Personal accountability (s)	Index measuring whether the electoral system encourages the development of personal accountability, based on Hallerberg and Marier (2004). The index runs from “0,” for a system that fully encourages party accountability to “1,” for a system that fully encourages personal accountability.
Candidate selection (p)	Dummy variable where a score of “1” means that the party leaders control the nomination procedure, and a score of “0” means that local organizations control it.
Campaign Subsidies (s)	The proportion of funds spent by parties in electoral campaigns that come from the government.
Presidential (s)	Dummy variable where “1” means that the party comes from a system with a popularly elected president.
Government party (p)	Dummy variable where “1” indicates that the party is in government at the time of the vote.
<i>Control variables</i>	
Federal (s)	Dummy variable where “1” indicates that the party comes from a federal system.
EFNP (s)	Effective number of parties computed based on the formula developed by Laakso and Taagepera (1979): $N = \frac{1}{\sum_{i=1}^n p_i^2}$ where n is the number of parties with at least one seat and p_i^2 is the square of party i 's proportion of seats.
Age of regime (s)	The number of years from the establishment of democratic order until the first vote in the database.
Vote frequency (s)	The number of votes recorded divided by the period in which they were recorded expressed in months.
Seat share (p)	The percent of seats that the party holds in the parliament.

Note: “s” refers to system-level and “p” to party-level variables.

Table 1.3: Predictors of vote unity in 33 parliaments.

Predictor	M 1	M 2	M 3	M 4	M 5	M 6	M 7	M 8	M 9
Main Predictors									
<i>Personal accountability</i>	-.0010 (.1481)	-.3880*** (.1484)	-.3239** (.1645)	-.2276 (.1452)					-.1539 (.1543)
<i>Candidate selection</i>		-.1784** (.0712)	-.1252* (.0747)	-.1142 (.0720)					-.0940 (.0744)
<i>Personal accountability* Candidate selection</i>		.5547*** (.1663)	.4151** (.1792)	.3101* (.1681)					.2832 (.1736)
<i>Campaign subsidies</i>					.0014** (.0006)	.0007 (.0006)			.0007 (.0005)
<i>Confidence</i>				.1557*** (.0373)		.1506*** (.0530)	.1697*** (.047)	.1425*** (.0512)	.1306*** (.0490)
<i>Presidential</i>							.0379 (.044)	.0074 (.0501)	-.0014 (.0402)
<i>Government party</i>								.0353 (.0310)	.0077 (.0283)
<i>Government party* Presidential</i>								-.0168 (.0451)	.0008 (.0394)
Control Variables									
<i>Federal</i>	-.0390 (.0514)		-.0192 (.0394)	.0204 (.0315)	-.0342 (.0474)	.0188 (.0454)			.0136 (.0329)
<i>ENPS</i>	-.0066 (.0129)		.0036 (.0096)	.0012 (.0073)	-.0084 (.0107)	-.0121 (.0094)			.0028 (.0078)

<i>Age of regime</i>	.0008 (.0007)		.0009* (.0005)	-.00008 (.00047)	.0009 (.0006)	-.0001 (.0006)			.00004 (.00049)
<i>Vote frequency</i>	.0002 (.0003)		.00006 (.00025)	-.0002 (.0002)	.0002 (.0003)	-.0001 (.0003)			-.0002 (.0002)
<i>Seat share</i>	.0019*** (.0007)		.0016** (.0006)	.0016 ** (.0006)	.0019*** (.0007)	.0019*** (.0007)			.0015** (.0007)
<i>Constant</i>	.8456*** (.1033)	1.025*** (.0668)	.9215*** (.1013)	.8505*** (.0892)	.7982*** (.0672)	.7816*** (.0597)	.7451*** (0.05)	.7673*** (.0568)	.7929*** (.1086)
<i>N parties^a</i>	235	207	207	207	235	235	235	235	236
<i>N legislatures</i>	33	33	33	33	33	33	33	33	33
<i>Variance explained</i>									
<i>System level</i>	.12	.28	.33	.61	.24	.43	.35	.36	.65
<i>Party level</i>	.03	.01	.03	.04	.03	.03	-	.002	.04

Notes: The entries are GLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses; ***<.01; **<.05; *<.1

^a The number of parties varies across models because data on candidate selection was not available for some parties.

Table 1.4: Marginal effect of personal vote.

	Marginal effect of personal accountability	Standard error
Leadership controlled selection	.167 ^a	.106 ^b
Locally controlled selection	-.388*	.148

*<.01

The values are computed based on the results in Model 2.

^a Computed by adding the beta coefficients for *Personal vote* and *Personal vote*Candidate selection*.

^b Computed as $\hat{\sigma}_{\beta_1 + \beta_2} = \sqrt{\hat{\sigma}_{\beta_1}^2 + \hat{\sigma}_{\beta_2}^2 + 2\hat{\sigma}_{\beta_1, \beta_2}}$, where β_1 and β_2 are the coefficients for the regression terms *Personal vote* and *Personal vote*Candidate selection*.

Table 1.5: Predictors of electoral campaign subsidies in 36 democracies

Predictor	
<i>Confidence</i>	23.14* (11.46)
<i>ENPS</i>	-.07 (2.60)
<i>Economic freedom^a</i>	-1.58* (.70)
<i>GDP per capita^b</i>	.63 (.53)
<i>Constant</i>	113.85* (43.77)
<i>N</i>	36
<i>R-squared</i>	.23

*>.05

Notes: The entries are OLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses; the unit of analysis is the country;

^a Source: Heritage Foundation Index of Economic Freedom. The index runs from “1” meaning full state control of the economy to “100” meaning the least possible state intervention in the economy. Found at: <http://www.heritage.org/index/>
The expectation is that level of government involvement in campaign finance is lower in countries with strong traditions of free market economies, an expectation supported by the data (see Nassmacher 2009, 147).

^b Expressed as thousands of PPP American dollars. Source: CIA- The World Factbook. Found at: <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/>
The expectation is that wealthier countries have more budgetary resources and therefore are more likely to fund electoral campaigns.

Table 1.6: Predictors of leadership control over candidate selection in 36 democracies.

Predictor	
<i>Confidence</i>	7.33** (2.44)
<i>Seat share</i>	0.005 (0.008)
<i>District magnitude^a</i>	-.005 (.022)
<i>Area^b</i>	-.0004 (.0003)
<i>ENPS</i>	-.714 (.481)
<i>GDP per capita</i>	-.164* (.089)
<i>Constant</i>	4.601* (2.719)
<i>N parties</i>	220
<i>N countries</i>	36

*<.1; **<.01

Notes: The entries are random-effects GLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses;

^a The average number of representatives elected per district in each country. Source: Wallack et al, 2003.

The expectation is that leadership control is easier in large multi-member constituencies because coordination in compiling party lists is easier; also voters have less personal knowledge of the candidates (Lundell 2004, 33).

^b The area of the country expressed in thousands of square kilometers. Source: CIA-The World Factbook. Found at: <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/>

Two contending expectations about its effect have emerged in the literature. On one hand large territories require an extensive party organization, characterized by hierarchy, which may encourage centralized nomination. On the other hand in large polities central leaders have less knowledge of the local political leaders, which makes the efforts of centralizing nominations more difficult (Lundell 2004, 35).

Table 1.7: Predictors of ideological disunity in parties

Predictor	
<i>Confidence</i>	-.406** (.168)
<i>Number of supporters in the survey^a</i>	.0000 (.0002)
<i>Federal</i>	-.037 (.173)
<i>Personal accountability</i>	-.593 (.438)
<i>Constant</i>	2.500*** (.236)
<i>N parties</i>	186
<i>N countries</i>	33

*<.1; **<.05; ***<.01

Notes: The entries are random-effects GLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.

^aAccounts for the number of supporters for each party in the survey.

Table 2.1: Incentives for personal or party reputations before and after the electoral reform.

Method	Pre-Reform				After Reform			
	Ballot ^a	Pool ^a	Votes ^a	District ^b	Ballot ^a	Pool ^a	Votes ^a	District
<i>Carey and Shugart</i>	0	0	0	8.17	0	0	0	1
<i>Wallack et al.</i>	0	0	0	8.17	1	1 ^d	2	1
<i>Hallerberg and Marier index^c</i>			.05				.1	

Notes: ^a Ordinal variable with three categories “0”, “1”, and “2”. A score of “0” signifies incentives for personal votes, while a score of “2” signifies incentives for party votes.

^b The information about the size of district was taken from Wallack et al. (2003).

^c The index goes from “0” meaning extreme incentives for party vote to “1” meaning extreme incentives for personal vote. The values were computed based on the formula developed by Hallerberg and Marier (2004).

^d Walack et al. (2003) give SMD systems a score of “2” on the *Pool* variable because they consider that the electoral success of the party does not determine individual careers. The Romanian system is a bit complicated in this regard. Candidates in SMDs rely on their own abilities to outperform candidates from other parties in the district as well as from their own parties in different districts in their constituency. At the same time those who gain their seats at redistribution come from constituencies that did well at the national level, when compared to other constituencies. To this end a candidate relies on the fortunes of other party colleagues from different districts in the same constituency. To account for this aspect I give the new system a score of “1” on the *Pool* variable.

Table 2.2: List of predictors used in the statistical analyses.

Predictor	Description	Source
<i>Party-level variables (Table 3)</i>		
<i>Government</i>	The party is in government at the time of the vote	Stan and Zaharia, 2009
<i>Vote-level variables (Table 3)</i>		
<i>Post reform</i>	Dummy variable where “0” represents a vote that took place before the electoral reform and “1” represents a vote taken after the reform	Romanian Chamber of Deputies website
<i>Final vote</i>	Dummy variable where “1” represents a final vote on a piece of legislation, and “0” represents all other votes.	Romanian Chamber of Deputies website
<i>Organic law</i>	Dummy variable where “1” represents a final vote on an organic law and “0” represents a vote on an ordinary law.	Romanian Chamber of Deputies website
<i>Deputy-level variables (Tables 3 and 5)</i>		
<i>Post reform</i>	Dummy variable where “0” represents a deputy elected in 2004 on closed lists and “1” represents a deputy elected in 2008 in a single member district	Romanian Chamber of Deputies website
<i>Party group leader</i>	The deputy is a president, vice-president or secretary of her party group.	Romanian Chamber of Deputies website
<i>Both terms</i>	The deputy has served in both the 2004-2008 and the 2008-2012 term.	Romanian Chamber of Deputies website
<i>Government</i>	The deputy’s party is in the government party coalition	Stan and Zaharia, 2009
<i>Parliament leader</i>	The deputy is president or vice-president of the Chamber	Romanian Chamber of Deputies website

Note: The Romanian Chamber of Deputies website: www.cdep.ro

Table 2.3: Determinants of vote defection

Predictor	Model 1			Model 2			
	Coeff.	St. error	P> t	Coeff.	St. error	P> t	Marginal effects
<i>Post reform</i>	0.339	0.052	0.00	0.363	0.052	0.00	-0.006
<i>Final vote</i>	-0.178	0.018	0.00	-0.223	0.052	0.00	0.011
<i>Final vote* Post reform</i>	-0.481	0.059	0.00	-0.473	0.059	0.00	-0.010
<i>Organic law</i>				0.121	0.023	0.00	0.003
<i>Party group leader</i>				-0.073	0.029	0.01	-0.002
<i>Both terms</i>				-0.031	0.020	0.13	-0.001
<i>Government</i>				-0.394	0.030	0.00	-0.012
<i>Parliament leader</i>				0.437	0.063	0.00	0.014
<i>Party effects</i>							
<i>PSD</i>	1.050	0.029	0.00	0.715	0.039	0.00	0.026
<i>PNL</i>	0.303	0.033	0.00	0.245	0.034	0.00	0.007
<i>UDMR</i>	0.670	0.040	0.00	0.615	0.041	0.00	0.022
<i>PRM</i>	1.737	0.034	0.00	1.345	0.045	0.00	0.069
<i>PC</i>	1.053	0.041	0.00	1.032	0.041	0.00	0.045
<i>Constant</i>	-3.373	0.028	0.00	-2.978	0.041	0.00	
<i>Pseudo R²</i>		0.04			0.04		
<i>N</i>		238908			238908		
<i>Log likelihood</i>		-53703.476			-53703.476		

Note: The entries are Logistic coefficients with standard errors and observed probability values. Marginal effects are computed while holding all other variables constant at their mode. They are based on the analysis in Model 2.

Party acronyms: PSD=Social Democratic Party; PNL= National Liberal Party; UDMR: Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania; PRM= Greater Romania Party; PC= Conservative Party; the referent party is the Liberal Democratic Party.

Table 2.4: The effects of the interactive terms on party unity.

	Pre-Reform	Post-Reform	Difference
Not final	0.0332	0.0470	0.0138 (42%)
Final	0.0267	0.0240	-0.0027 (-10%)
Difference	-0.0065 (-19%)	-0.0230 (49%)	

Note: The entries represent the expected probabilities that defection occurs at various values of the two interactive terms, as well as probability changes if one moves from one hypothetical situation to another. All other variables were kept at their mode. The values in parentheses represent the probability changes expressed in percentage terms.

Table 2.5: Determinants of frequency of legislative proposals and questions addressed to members of the executive.

	Legislative proposals						Questions addressed					
Predictor	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3			Model 4		
	Coef.	St. error	P> z	Coef.	St. error	P> z	Coef.	St. error	P> z	Coef.	St. error	P> z
Individual characteristics												
<i>Post reform</i>	2.16	0.08	0.00	1.92	0.12	0.00	0.54	0.14	0.00	0.81	0.21	0.00
<i>Party group leader</i>				0.11	0.11	0.31				0.11	0.22	0.61
<i>Both terms</i>				0.27	0.07	0.00				0.28	0.14	0.04
<i>Government</i>				0.40	0.14	0.00				-0.46	0.26	0.08
<i>Parliament leader</i>				-0.25	0.25	0.32				-0.87	0.51	0.08
Party fixed effects												
<i>PSD</i>	-0.38	0.09	0.00	-0.41	0.09	0.00	-0.10	0.17	0.56	-0.14	0.17	0.42
<i>PNL</i>	-0.17	0.10	0.09	0.08	0.14	0.55	0.11	0.17	0.57	-0.15	0.25	0.56
<i>UDMR</i>	-0.48	0.16	0.00	-0.31	0.18	0.08	-0.73	0.28	0.00	-1.00	0.32	0.00
<i>PRM</i>	1.17	0.17	0.00	1.37	0.17	0.00	0.28	0.33	0.40	0.26	0.34	0.44
<i>PC</i>	0.74	0.18	0.00	0.85	0.19	0.00	0.29	0.34	0.40	0.06	0.37	0.87
<i>Constant</i>	-3.97	0.09	0.00	-4.17	0.10	0.00	-2.87	0.16	0.00	-2.85	0.19	0.00
<i>N</i>	607			607			607			607		
<i>Pseudo R²</i>	0.13			0.14			0.008			0.01		
<i>Log likelihood</i>	-1611.1914			-1599.1355			-1711.3364			-1705.6991		

Note: The entries are negative binomial coefficients with standard errors and observed probability values.

Party acronyms: PSD=Social Democratic Party; PNL= National Liberal Party; UDMR: Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania; PRM= Greater Romania Party; PC= Conservative Party; the referent party is the Liberal Democratic Party.

Table 2.6: Side by side comparison of behavior inside the legislature for the deputies who served in both terms.

	Legislative proposals per day	Questions addressed per day
<i>Average 2009</i>	0.160	0.144
<i>Average 2005</i>	0.021	0.077
<i>Difference</i>	0.139	0.067
<i>t-value</i>	7.634	2.024
<i>$P > t$</i>	0.000	0.046
<i>N</i>	89	89

Table 3.1: Results of the Last Five Elections for the Romanian Senate and Chamber of Deputies

Disprop. ^a	1992				1996				2000				2004				2008			
	Senate		C.D.		Senate		C.D.		Senate		C.D.		Senate		C.D.		Senate		C.D.	
	5.4		6.2		6.4		5.6		7.8		7		3.4		2.3		2.8		1.6	
Party	V	S	V	S	V	S	V	S	V	S	V	S	V	S	V	S	V	S	V	S
PSD ^b	28.3	34.3	27.7	34.3	23.1	28.7	21.5	26.5	37.1	46.4	36.6	44.9	37.2	41.6	36.8	39.7	34.2 ^c	35.8 ^c	33.1 ^c	34.1 ^c
CDR	20.2	23.8	20	24	30.7	37.1	30.2	35.7	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
PDL ^b	10.4	12.6	10.2	12.6	13.2 ^c	16.1 ^c	12.9 ^c	15.4 ^c	7.6	9.3	7	9	--	--	--	--	33.6	37.2	32.4	34.4
PUNR	8.1	9.8	7.7	8.8	4.2	4.9	4.4	5.2	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
UDMR	7.6	8.4	7.5	7.9	6.8	7.7	6.6	7.3	6.9	8.6	6.8	7.8	6.2	7.3	6.2	6.6	6.4	6.6	6.2	6.6
PDAR	3.3	3.5	2.9	0	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
PRM	3.8	4.2	3.9	4.7	4.5	5.6	4.5	5.2	21	26.4	19.4	24.3	13.6	15.3	13	14.4	3.6	--	3.1	--
PSM	3.2	3.5	3	3.8	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
PNL	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	7.5	9.3	6.9	8.7	--	--	--	--	18.7	20.4	18.6	19.5
DA	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	31.8	35.8	31.5	33.7	--	--	--	--

Notes: Party acronyms are as follows: PSD- Social Democratic Party; CDR-Democratic Convention of Romania; PDL- Liberal Democratic Party; PUNR- Romanian National Unity Party; UDMR-Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania; PDAR- Agrarian Democratic Party of Romania; PRM-Greater Romania Party; PSM-Socialist Party of Labor; PNL-National Liberal Party; DA- Justice and Truth Alliance.

^a Disproportionality of electoral system computed based on the formula developed by Gallagher (1991): $\sqrt{\frac{1}{2} \sum_{i=1}^n (v_i - s_i)^2}$,

where v_i is the percentage of votes and s_i is the percentage of seats obtained by party i .

^b Denotes parties that have changed their name across time; the acronym refers to the most recent name

^c Denotes elections in which the party was in alliance with a minor party.

Table 3.2: The relationship between party closeness and vote choice in the 2008 national elections.

VOTE CHOICE		PARTY CLOSENESS			
		<i>PDL</i>	<i>PSD</i>	<i>PNL</i>	<i>UDMR</i>
	<i>PDL</i>	260 (97.4%)	3	8	1
	<i>PSD</i>	5	239 (96.8%)	2	--
	<i>PNL</i>	--	2	91 (88.3%)	--
	<i>UDMR</i>	--	1	--	38 (97.4%)
	<i>OTHER</i>	2	2	2	--
	<i>TOTAL</i>	267	247	103	39

Source: 2008 European Social Survey

Table 3.3: The relationship between party closeness and vote choice in the 2009 European elections.

VOTE CHOICE		PARTY CLOSENESS			
		<i>PDL</i>	<i>PSD</i>	<i>PNL</i>	<i>UDMR</i>
	<i>PDL</i>	99 (93.4)	4	1	--
	<i>PSD</i>	2	111 (91.7%)	1	--
	<i>PNL</i>	--	2	47 (95.9%)	--
	<i>UDMR</i>	--	2	--	24 (100%)
	<i>OTHER</i>	5	2	--	--
	<i>TOTAL</i>	106	121	49	24

Source: 2009 European Elections Survey


Table 3.4: The Presence and Success of Corrupt Candidates in the 2004 and 2008 Romanian Elections

	2004	2008
Corrupt candidates	65	55
Elected	48 (74%)	32 (58%)

Source: Alianta pentru o Romania curata [Alliance for a Clean Romania], accessed at www.romaniacurata.ro.


Figures

Figure 2.1



Notes: Marginal effects are computed based on Model 2 in Table 3.
Since all other variables are dichotomous, they are kept at their mode.
The confidence intervals are set at 95%.

Figure 3.1: Positioning of democracies on Shugart's index of interparty efficiency.




Notes: Country acronyms are as follows: *AU- Australia; BE- Belgium; CA- Canada; CO- Colombia; DE- Germany; DK- Denmark; ES- Spain; FI- Finland; FR- France; GB- Great Britain; GR- Greece; IE- Ireland; IL- Israel; IT- Italy; JP- Japan; NL- Netherlands; NO- Norway; NZ- New Zealand; PT- Portugal; RO- Romania; SE- Sweden; US- United States; VE- Venezuela.*

The countries are only positioned on the horizontal dimension. Vertical arrangements are for visibility purposes.

Sources: Romania- computed using the method used by Shugart; all other countries- Shugart.

Figure 3.2: Proportion of members of parliament who served in the previous term.



Sources: Romanian Senate official website, accessed at www.senat.ro ; Romanian Chamber of Deputies official website, accessed at www.cdep.ro .

Appendix 1: Additional analyses of vote behavior in national parliaments.

Table A 1. Determinants of party vote loses in 33 parliaments

Predictor	M 1	M 2	M 3	M 4	M 5	M 6	M 7	M 8	M 9
<i>Main Predictors</i>									
<i>Personal accountability</i>	1.003 (1.724)	5.348** (2.246)	2.678 (2.339)	.762 (2.215)					-.247 (2.273)
<i>Candidate selection</i>		3.093*** (.742)	1.383* (.767)	.597 (.797)					-.045 (.805)
<i>Personal accountability* Candidate selection</i>		-4.726** (2.115)	-1.781 (2.184)	.584 (2.289)					1.891 (2.318)
<i>Campaign subsidies</i>					-.018** (.008)	-.006 (.008)			-.001 (.008)
<i>Confidence</i>				-2.364*** (.681)		-2.159*** (.709)	-1.399** (.662)	-1.388** (.664)	-2.344*** (.839)
<i>Presidential</i>							-.155 (.615)	-.274 (.618)	.079 (.610)
<i>Government party</i>								.231 (.092)	-.594*** (.096)
<i>Government party* Presidential</i>								.257* (.152)	.296* (.167)
<i>Control Variables</i>									
<i>Federal</i>	1.290 (.637)		1.372** (.672)	-.301 (.706)	.95* (.567)	-.580 (.705)			-.228 (.704)

<i>ENPS</i>	.170 (.174)		.071 (.172)	.096 (.130)	.125 (.148)	.168 (.127)			.149 (.136)
<i>Age of regime</i>	-.015* (.008)		-.013 (.009)	-.007 (.007)	-.019** (.007)	-.007 (.008)			-.009 (.008)
<i>Vote frequency</i>	.0009 (.004)		.0006 (.004)	.005 (.004)	.002 (.004)	.006 (.004)			.006 (.004)
<i>Seat share</i>	.057*** (.003)		.037*** (.004)	.037*** (.004)	.057*** (.003)	.057*** (.003)			.047*** (.004)
<i>Constant</i>	-7.613*** (1.258)	-8.285*** (.976)	-7.949*** (1.478)	-6.024*** (1.341)	-6.244*** (.881)	-5.817*** (.854)	-4.430*** (.723)	-4.510*** (.725)	-5.934*** (1.669)
<i>N parties^a</i>	230	201	207	207	230	230	230	230	201
<i>N legislatures</i>	33	33	33	33	33	33	33	33	33

Notes: The entries are poisson random effects coefficients with standard errors in parentheses; ***<.01; **<.05; *<.1; the dependent variable counts the number of times a party got rolled (unsuccessfully tried to defend the status quo) or got stuffed (was not successful at passing a bill although they would have had enough votes).

^a The number of parties varies across models because data on candidate selection was not available for some parties.

Table A 2. Determinants of vote unity in 19 national parliaments.

Predictor	M 1	M 2	M 3	M 4	M 5	M 6	M7	M 8	M 9
<i>Main Predictors</i>									
<i>Personal accountability</i>	.193 (.290)	-.254 (.218)	-.177 (.293)	.023 (.247)					-.034 (.217)
<i>Candidate selection</i>		-.111 (.083)	-.084 (.087)	-.067 (.082)					-.077 (.083)
<i>Personal accountability*</i> <i>Candidate selection</i>		.367* (.187)	.279 (.257)	.212 (.230)					.275 (.213)
<i>Campaign subsidies</i>					.0019* (.0011)	.0003 (0012)			.0004 (.0006)
<i>Confidence</i>				.241*** (.066)		.278** (.122)	.175** (.084)	.175** (.074)	.205*** (.067)
<i>Presidential</i>							.008 (.067)	.009 (.063)	-.003 (.041)
<i>Government party</i>								.030 (.034)	.005 (.025)
<i>Government party*</i> <i>Presidential</i>								-.003 (.051)	.001 (.036)
<i>Control Variables</i>									
<i>Federal</i>	-.137 (.116)		-.149* (.082)	.013 (.072)	-.072 (.110)	.080 (.116)			.006 (.056)
<i>ENPS</i>	.009 (.026)		.009 (.020)	-.009 (.015)	-.013 (.020)	-.037* (.020)			-.009 (.013)

<i>Age of regime</i>	.0006 (.0012)		.001 (.001)	.0001 (.0007)	-.0002 (.0011)	-.0004 (.0010)			.0002 (.0005)
<i>Vote frequency</i>	-.0003 (.0006)		.00008 (.0004)	-.0005 (.0003)	.0002 (.0005)	-.0005 (.0005)			-.0005 (.0003)
<i>Seat share</i>	.003*** (.001)		.002*** (.0007)	.002*** (.0007)	.003*** (.001)	.003*** (.001)			.002*** (.0007)
<i>Constant</i>	.683*** (.234)	.976*** (.088)	.841*** (.204)	.734*** (.163)	.806*** (.131)	.829*** (.115)	.734*** (.091)	.720*** (.081)	.751*** (.163)
<i>N parties^a</i>	141	121	121	121	141	141	141	141	121
<i>N legislatures</i>	19	19	19	19	19	19	19	19	19
<i>Variance explained</i>									
<i>System level</i>	.15	.18	.36	.73	.29	.50	.28	.31	.75
<i>Party level</i>	.07	.002	.09	.09	.07	.07	-	.005	.09

Notes: The entries are GLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses; ***<.01; **<.05; *<.1.

^a The number of parties varies across models because data on candidate selection was not available for some parties.

Table A 3. Determinants of party vote loses in 19 parliaments.

Predictor	M 1	M 2	M 3	M 4	M 5	M 6	M7	M 8	M 9
<i>Main Predictors</i>									
<i>Personal accountability</i>	2.359 (1.924)	9.701*** (3.714)	7.699** (3.212)	5.166 (3.322)					6.044* (3.668)
<i>Candidate selection</i>		4.509*** (1.084)	3.056*** (1.052)	2.574** (1.057)					2.322** (1.111)
<i>Personal accountability* Candidate selection</i>		-8.905*** (3.177)	-6.409** (3.040)	-4.985 (3.060)					-4.720 (3.229)
<i>Campaign subsidies</i>					-.014 (.011)	.002 (.010)			.015 (.012)
<i>Confidence</i>				-2.179* (1.236)		-3.158** (1.268)	-2.370*** (.830)	-2.355*** (.826)	-2.615* (1.415)
<i>Presidential</i>							-.668 (.690)	-1.008 (.691)	.407 (1.006)
<i>Government party</i>								.214** (.093)	-.530*** (.099)
<i>Government party* Presidential</i>								.608*** (.179)	.646*** (.199)
<i>Control Variables</i>									
<i>Federal</i>	4.073*** (.975)		4.938*** (1.154)	3.090* (1.597)	3.517*** (1.089)	1.420 (1.394)			3.115** (1.579)
<i>ENPS</i>	.202 (.211)		.216 (.248)	.353 (.230)	.149 (.190)	.407** (.198)			.503* (.271)

<i>Age of regime</i>	-.043*** (.011)		-.048*** (.013)	-.043*** (.014)	-.042*** (.011)	-.034*** (.011)			-.047*** (.014)
<i>Vote frequency</i>	-.0004 (.0046)		.006 (.005)	.012** (.006)	.002 (.005)	.010** (.005)			.014** (.006)
<i>Seat share</i>	.058*** (.003)		.030*** (.004)	.030*** (.004)	.058*** (.003)	.058*** (.003)			.039*** (.005)
<i>Constant</i>	-7.775*** (1.703)	-9.965*** (1.474)	-10.49*** (2.351)	-9.036*** (2.339)	-6.235*** (1.159)	-6.412*** (1.136)	-3.530*** (.901)	-3.631*** (.897)	-10.55*** (3.321)
<i>N parties^a</i>	136	115	115	115	136	136	136	136	115
<i>N legislatures</i>	19	19	19	19	19	19	19	19	19

Notes: The entries are poisson random effects coefficients with standard errors in parentheses; ***<.01; **<.05; *<.1; the dependent variable counts the number of times a party got rolled (unsuccessfully tried to defend the status quo) or got stuffed (was not successful at passing a bill although they would have had enough votes).

^a The number of parties varies across models because data on candidate selection was not available for some parties.

Appendix 2: Coding rules for variables together with the sources used

1. Adjusted Weighted Rice Index

This measurement is obtained in three steps. First, I compute Rice indexes for each party in each vote based on the widely accepted formula developed by Rice (1925). The index for party i in vote j equals:

$$RICE_{ij} = |AYE_{ij} - NAY_{ij}|$$

where the two terms in the absolute value formula represent the number of positive and negative votes expressed as proportions of those voting aye or nay.

These scores are then averaged based on a formula developed by Carey (2007; 2009) that gives more weight to contested votes. The weighted rice is computed based on the formula

$$WRICE_i = \sum RICE_{ij} * CLOSE_j / \sum CLOSE_j$$

where

$$CLOSE_j = 1 - (1/THRESHOLD * |THRESHOLD - \% AYE|)$$

THRESHOLD represents the percentage of positive votes needed to pass the vote.

Furthermore, the final scores are adjusted for small party bias (see Desposato 2005) based on the formula used in Carey (2009):

$$ADJWTD RICE_i = WRICE_i - RICEDEVIANCE_i$$

$$RICEDEVIANCE_i = D_i / N_i$$

where N_i is the number of members in the party group. $D_i = \frac{\sum D_{ij}}{numvotes}$, $D_{ij} =$ minimum [AYE, NAY] as percentage of those voting, and *numvotes* is the total number of votes in which party i takes part.

Sources:

Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Czech R., Ecuador, Israel, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Philippines, Uruguay:

Carey, John M. 2010. *Carey data archive*. www.dartmouth.edu/~jcarey

US: Poole, Keith. 2010. *Keith Poole's Database*. Found at: <http://voteview.com/dwnl.htm>

Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, UK: personal dataset; see Appendix 3 for details.

2. Confidence

Dummy variable where “1” signifies parties from countries with vote of confidence procedure and “0” countries without the procedure.

Sources: Economist Intelligence Unit Country Profiles

3. Presidential

Dummy variable where “1” signifies parties from countries with heads of state elected through public vote.

Source: Economist Intelligence Unit Country Profiles.

4. Government party: Dummy variable where a score of “1” means that the party is in government at the time of the vote.

Sources:

Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Czech R., Ecuador, France, Israel, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Philippines, Poland, United States, Uruguay: Carey, John (2009). Legislative Voting and Accountability. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.

Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Netherlands, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom: Various December issues of the European Journal of Political Research “Political Data Yearbook.”

5. Individual accountability

Index developed in Hallerberg and Marier (2004) that runs from “0” meaning that the party comes from a system that fully encourages party accountability to “1” meaning a system that fully encourages individual accountability. At the origin of the index there is the article “Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Vote: a Rank Ordering of Electoral Formulas” by Carey and Shugart (1995) in which the authors enounce four mechanisms through which electoral rules influence the development of personal or party accountability. *Ballot control* accounts for the degree to which party leaders or voters control ballots. In systems where party leaders have a strong grip on the

candidate selection process, candidates are less likely to cultivate a personal reputation, whereas the opposite holds in systems where candidate selection process is in the hands of voters. *Vote pooling* taps whether votes cast for one candidate contribute to the number of seats the party receives in the district. If a candidate's chances of election depend on the party's ability to attract votes in the district, she feels more need for party reputation as opposed to personal reputation; the less dependent a candidate is on the fortunes of her party for election, the more likely she is to run a personal campaign. *Vote* accounts for whether the system allows the voter to cast a single vote for a party, multiple votes for candidates, or a single vote for a candidate. Systems that emphasize voting for the party lead to the development of party reputations, while systems in which the vote singles out candidates lead to the development of personal reputations¹. Finally, Carey and Shugart (1995) consider the role of *district size*, which is contingent on the value of variable *ballot*. If party leaders control ballot nomination, larger districts decrease the value of personal reputation. If voters control the ballot, large districts make personal reputation more beneficial for candidates. Hallerberg and Marier (2004) add the scores on *ballot*, *vote pooling* and *vote* together to create variable *a*. If the system is closed list, *a* is divided by the log of the district size. In the other systems the log of the district magnitude is added to *a*. The final index is obtained by dividing this score by 10.

Source for the four variables used to compute the index: Wallack et al (2003).

6. Candidate selection

Dummy variable where a score of "1" means that the party leaders control the nomination procedure, and a score of "0" means that local organizations control it. Selection is controlled in systems in which leaders influence the list of candidates directly and in systems in which local organizations determine the candidates, yet the central organization approves the final list. In all other cases candidate selection is considered not controlled by leaders. As the basis of this variable I use the six-point categorization used by Bille (2001) to characterize nomination control in Western democracies. Categories 1 to 4 in Bille (2001) are recoded as "controlled by leadership" (score of "1") and categories 5-6 as "locally controlled nominations" (score of "0").

Sources: personal dataset; see Appendix 2 (available online) for details.

7. Campaign Subsidies: The amount of government funds used in electoral campaign expressed as percentage of all funds used.

Sources:

Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Israel, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, U.K., Uruguay, USA: Nassmacher, Karl-Heinz. 2009. *The*

Funding of Party Competition: Political Finance in 25 Democracies. Nomos Publishers.

Argentina, Ecuador, Mexico, Belgium, Brazil, Chile, Latvia, New Zealand, Peru, Philippines, Switzerland, Czech Republic, Lithuania, Romania, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia: personal dataset; see Appendix 2 for details.

8. Federal: Dummy variable where a score of “1” means that the party comes from a federal system and a score of “0” from a unitary system.

Sources:

Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Czech R., Ecuador, France, Israel, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Philippines, Poland, United States, Uruguay: Carey, John (2009). *Legislative Voting and Accountability*. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.

Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Netherlands, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom: “Country Profiles,” *Economist Intelligence Unit*.

9. Effective number of parties. Computed based on the formula developed by Laakso and Taagapera (1979).

Sources:

Australia, Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Israel, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Netherlands, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, USA: Psephos Adam Carr’s Election Archive. Found at: <http://psephos.adam-carr.net/>

Argentina, Uruguay: Nohlen, Dieter. 2005. *Elections in the Americas*. Oxford University Press.

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Czech R., Slovakia: “Political Transformation and Political Process in Post-Communist Europe.” Dept. of Government, University of Essex. Found at: <http://www.essex.ac.uk/elections/>

Canada: “Elections Canada.” Found at: <http://www.elections.ca/home.aspx>

New Zealand: Vowles, Jack and Peter Aimer (1993). Voters' Vengeance: The 1990 Election in New Zealand and the Fate of the Fourth Labour Government. Auckland University Press.

10. Age of Regime. The number of years from the establishment of democratic order until the first vote in the database.

Source: Carey and Hix (2008).

11. Vote frequency: The number of votes recorded divided by the period in which they were recorded expressed in months.

Source: the vote dataset.

Appendix 3: Sources used for the collection of data in the personal datasets

1. Sources for the collection of votes

Belgium: La chambre des representants de Belgique. Found at:

<http://www.dekamer.be/kvvcr/showpage.cfm?section=/cricra&language=fr&cfm=/site/wwwcfm/cricra/cricragen.cfm?sess=1995960>

Denmark: Danish Folketing. Found at:

<http://www.ft.dk/?/Samling/20072/afstem/61.htm>

Estonia: Estonian Parliament. Found at:

http://www.riigikogu.ee/?op=ems&content_type=text/html&page=haaletus_kalender&navbar=no

Finland: Parliament of Finland. Found at:

<http://www.eduskunta.fi/thwfakta/aanestys/aax/aax3000.shtml>

France: French Chambre des Deputies. Found at: <http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/13/scrutins/table-2008-2009.asp>

Germany: Deutscher Bundestag Dokumentations und Informationssystem. Found at:

<http://dip.bundestag.de/>

Greece: Hellenic Parliament. Found at:

<http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/Praktika/Synedriaseis-Olomeleias?search=on&SessionPeriod=4ad35afa-06c3-42cb-8575-0a46b7aff1ed>

Hungary: Hungarian Parliament. Found at:

http://www.parlament.hu/internet/plsql/webpar.paramform?p_ckl=38&p_modul=SZ_AV_IROM_UJ&p_szulo=-4

Italy: Italian Chamber of Deputies. Found at:

<http://banchedati.camera.it/Votazioni/leg14/CercaVotazioni.Asp>

Latvia: Latvian Parliament. Found at:

http://www.saeima.lv/Likumdosana/likumdosana_stenogrammas.html

Lithuania: Lithuanian Parliament. Found at:

http://www3.lrs.lt/pls/inter/w5_sale.kad_ses

Netherlands: Dutch Parliament. Found at:

http://www3.lrs.lt/pls/inter/w5_sale.kad_ses

Poland: Polish Sejm. Found at:

<http://orka.sejm.gov.pl/SQL.nsf/posglos?OpenAgent&6>

Romania: Romanian Chamber of Deputies. Found at:

<http://www.cdep.ro/pls/steno/eVot.Data?dat=&cal=1>

Slovakia: Slovak Parliament. Found at: <http://www.nrsr.sk/nrdk/dk.aspx?Lang=sk>

Slovenia: Slovenian Parliament. Found at: <http://www.dz-rs.si/index.php?id=101>

Sweden: Swedish Parliament. Found at:
<http://www.riksdagen.se/Webbnav/index.aspx?nid=3150>

Switzerland: The Swiss Federal Assembly. Found at: <http://www.parlament.ch/F/ra-raete/ra-nr-nationalrat/Pages/ra-nr-abstimmungen.aspx>

UK: The Public Whip. Found at: <http://www.publicwhip.org.uk/divisions.php>

2. Sources used to code candidate selection

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Australia, France, Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden, Switzerland, UK: Lundell, Krister. 2004. "Determinants of candidate selection: the degree of centralization in comparative perspective." *Party Politics* 10(1): 25-47.

Belgium, Canada, Denmark: Bille (2001).

Brazil: Jones, Mark. 2005. "The Role of Parties and Party Systems in the Policymaking Process." Paper presented at the Workshop on State Reform, Public Policies, and Policymaking Processes, Inter-American Development Bank, Washington, D.C., February 28-March 2, 2005.

Samuels, David. 2008. "Political Ambition, Candidate Recruitment, and Legislative Politics in Brazil." In *Paths to Power: Political Recruitment and Candidate Selection in Latin America*, eds. Peter Siavelis and Scott Morgenstern. University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 76-91.

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Greece: European Parliament Directorate General for Internal Policies. (2009, March). *The Selection of Candidates for the European Parliament by National Parties and the Impact of European Political Parties*. Found at: <http://www.soc.utu.fi/sivustot/pcrc/files/mickelssonnurmi.pdf>

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Israel: Lundell (2004).

Italy: Wilson, Alex. 2008. "The Italian Election of April 2008: A Political Earthquake?" *West European Politics* 32 (1): 215-25.

Latvia: Centre for Public Policy Providus. 2006. "Monitoring of Anti-Corruption Law Making in Latvia." Found at: <http://www.partnershipfortransparency.info/uploads/completed%20projects/Latvia%20-%20Providus%20-%202006.pdf>

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Philippines: Bland, Gary. 2006. "Elections and the Development of Democratic Local Governance." Paper prepared for US Agency for International Development Office of Democracy and Governance. Found at: http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADH475.pdf

Peru: Levitsky, Stephen, and Maxwell A. Cameron. 2003. "Democracy without Parties? Political Parties and Regime Change in Fujimori's Peru." *Latin American Politics and Society* 45(3): 1-33.

Poland: Szczerbiak, Aleks. 1999. "Testing Party Models in East-Central Europe: Local Party Organization in Postcommunist Poland." *Party Politics* 5(4): 525-37.

Romania: Stefan, Laurentiu. 2004. *Patterns of Political Elite Recruitment in Post-Communist Romania*. Bucharest: Ziua Publishing House.

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Belgium: 1999 Belgian General Election Study.

Australia, Czech Republic, New Zealand, The Philippines: 1995 World Value Survey.

Italy, Lithuania: 2009 European Election Survey.

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USA: 2005 World Value Survey.

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