DEMOCRACY ON THE BALLOT: DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN CALIFORNIA AND THE UNITED KINGDOM

Cory Louis Breaux

A thesis submitted to the faculty at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in the Department of Political Science, Concentration TransAtlantic Studies.

Chapel Hill
2018

Approved by:

John D. Stephens

Rahsaan Maxwell

Robert Jenkins

ABSTRACT

Cory Louis Breaux: Democracy on the Ballot: Direct Democracy in California and the United
Kingdom
(Under the direction of John D. Stephens)

This essay compares direct democratic institutions between two cases: ballot initiatives

in California, and elite-controlled referendums in the United Kingdom (UK). The relationship

between direct democratic institutions and Lijphart's majoritarian and consensus models of

democracy is outlined in relation to the two cases, additionally considering the impact that these

institutions can have on voter choice and deliberation in democratic states. The essay finds that

though the direct democratic institutions of California and the UK are markedly different, neither

functions as an entirely majoritarian or entirely consensual device; instead, the institutional

features would appear to function as an additional dimension of democracy, in line with Vatter

and Bernauer's (2009) suggestion. Further, direct democratic institutions in both cases also

present opportunities for negative impacts on voter choice and the deliberative democratic

process.

To my parents, I couldn't have done this without all the love and support you've shown me from the beginning. Thank you for everything you have done for me.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF FIGURES

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

EC   European Commission

ECI   European Citizens' Initiative

EEC   European Economic Community

EU   European Union

SNP   Scottish National Party

UK   United Kingdom

US   United States

INTRODUCTION AND THEORY

Introduction

While all democratic governments share a common belief in what Abraham Lincoln

described as a "government not only *by* but *for* the people," the precise institutional details of

such a government vary greatly between democracies (Lijphart 2012, 1). One such institutional

variation lies in the inclusion of direct democratic institutions in the political process – while

some democracies have created institutions that give the final and exclusive decision-making

power to elected legislatures, others have chosen to give citizens direct input in the legislative

process (Qvortrup 2013). These institutions have taken a number of forms, including advisory

referendums, ballot initiatives and legislative vetoes (Gregorczuk 1998).

Though some European states have codified direct democratic institutions and make

frequent use of them, referendums have become increasingly common on an ad-hoc basis in

states that do not have a long-established tradition of direct democratic institutions. In particular,

ballot questions relating to EU policy issues and EU treaties "have become the norm" across

Western Europe, as lawmakers have turned to their constituents to seek consent for actions taken

at the European level (Kaufmann 2004, 3). At both the domestic and supranational level,

political elites have increasingly utilized referendums as a "safety valve for releasing popular

pressure" in the face of the rise of populist politics[1] across Europe, which can be seen as a

reflection of an increasing dissatisfaction in political institutions both at the national and

---

[1] For the scope of this essay, I will use populist politics to refer to the emergence of a political movement that emphasizes a "distinction between "the people" and "the elite" as an intrinsic characteristic of politics, and they argue that the interests of the people are more authentic and have greater legitimacy" (Stanley 2013, 642).

European level (S. B. Hobolt 2012, Topaloff 2017, 127). In particular, during 2016, multiple high-profile referendums occurred that fundamentally changed the European political landscape, the most notable example of which was British voters electing to leave the EU in June of that year.

On the other side of the Atlantic, direct democracy has played a significant role in the American political system. The country's founders, fearing that "unrestrained majorities could become a mob and be as great a threat to liberty as any tyrant," did not include any direct democratic institutions at the national level (Bailey 2015, 4). Beginning largely in the Progressive Era at the turn of the twentieth century, some individual states have chosen to include various direct democratic institutions. One of the most well-studied examples of American direct democratic institutions is the state of California, which has some of the most robust direct democratic institutions in the country (Braunstein 2004).

Though direct democratic institutions can be considered a strategy used by governments to give citizens greater influence in the political arena, they are inherently majoritarian by nature, and may serve to limit the input of minority groups on the political process, and craft a system that is less consensus-based and more majoritarian (Lijphart 2012).

Considering the diversity of direct democratic institutions in both Europe and the US, it is important to consider how these variations impact the political process. This essay will consider various features of referendums and direct democracy, using the UK and California – two governments with starkly different direct democratic institutions – as case studies to raise questions of how these institutions impact the political process.

Majoritarian and Consensus Models of Democracy

In his book *Patterns of Democracy*, Arend Lijphart analyzes democratic institutions across 36 different countries, and determines that there are ten major institutional differences between these states, clustered into "two clearly separate dimensions" – the *executives-parties dimension* and the *federal-unitary dimension* (Figure 1) (2012, 3). Using these two dimensions, Lijphart argues that democratic governments can then be categorized as following either a majoritarian (also called Westminster) model or a consensus model of democracy (Ibid.).

The Westminster model – named after the Palace of Westminster, the meeting place of the "original and best-known example" of the model, the Parliament of the UK – has been adopted and imitated by a number of democracies, including "most of Britain's former colonies in Asia, Africa, and the Caribbean," as well as Australia, Canada and New Zealand after their independence, a set of states totaling approximately 40 percent of people living in democracies (Dewan and Spirling 2011, Lijphart 2012, 9-10). Though institutional details differ between specific cases, according to Lijphart, there are ten primary features of the model, five along the executives-parties dimension: 1) concentration of executive power in one-party and bare majority cabinets, 2) cabinet dominance (vis-à-vis Parliament), 3) a two-party system, 4) majoritarian and disproportional system of elections, 5) interest group pluralism; and five along the federal-unitary dimension: 1) unitary and centralized government, 2) concentration of legislative power in a unicameral legislature, 3) constitutional flexibility, 4) absence of judicial review, and 5) a central bank controlled by the executive (2012). As a result of these features, in a majoritarian democracy, control of the legislature by a single party results in "the maximum potential for policy change," because in order to modify the status quo, agreement is only needed from that one party (Strohmeier 2015, 306, Tsebelis 2002). The tradeoff to the nature of high

potential for policy change is that the majoritarian model has "low potential for policy consensus," and even the possibility of "elective dictatorship" where the policy goals of the minority are ignored completely (Hailsham 1978, Strohmeier 2015, 313).

Figure 1: Lijphart's dimensions of democracy

Dimension	Variable	Majoritarian democracy	Consensus democracy
Executive-parties	*Party system*	Two-party system	Multi-party system
	Cabinets	Single-party majority cabinets	Power-sharing multi-party coalitions
	Executive-legislative relationship	Dominant executive	Executive-legislative balance of power
	Electoral system	Disproportional first-past-the-post system	Proportional representation
	Interest groups	Informal pluralist interest group interaction	Coordinated and 'corporatist' interest group interaction
Federal-unitary	*Federal unitary dimension*	Unitary and centralized government	Federal and decentralized government
	Unicameralism-bicameralism dimension	Concentration of power in a unicameral legislature	Division of power between two equally strong but differently constituted houses
	Constitutional amendment	Flexible constitution that can be amended by simple majorities	Rigid constitutions that can be changed only by extraordinary majorities
	Legislative supremacy	Legislature has the final word on the constitutionality of legislation	Legislation subject to a judicial review of their constitutionality by a supreme or constitutional court
	Central bank	Dependent on the executive	Independent central bank

Adapted from Matthews (2011), Lijphart (2012)

Despite being considered a prototypical example of the Westminster model, in the aftermath of the "most radical programme of constitutional reform" in nearly a century, there has been debate over whether or not the UK can still be considered the foremost example of the

Westminster model – or whether it still fits the model at all (Bogdanor 2001, 143, Strohmeier 2015). The (failed) referendum proposing the UK switch from a first-past-the-post system to an alternative vote system in 2011, as well as the devolution of powers in the UK from Westminster to the constituent nations of North Ireland, Scotland, and Wales have been notable recent shifts away from the majoritarian archetype that the Westminster system is purported to be (Qvortrup 2012). Strohmeier observes that though these reforms, coupled with electoral results, have led to a shift towards greater consensus on both dimensions, both he and Lijphart agree that "the contemporary Westminster system is still a majoritarian one" (Lijphart 2012, Strohmeier 2015, 313).

The second model of democracy identified by Lijphart is the consensus model of democracy, which challenges the majoritarian idea that "majorities should govern and minorities should oppose" (2012, 30). This model is frequently used in heterogeneous democracies, "emphasizes consensus instead of opposition," and is exemplified in the governmental institutions of Switzerland, Belgium at the national level, and the EU at the supranational level (Lijphart 2012, 32). For consensus model democracies, Lijphart identifies ten characteristics along the two dimensions, all of which contrast sharply with those of majoritarian democracies (Ibid.). Along the executive-parties dimension: 1) executive power-sharing in broad coalition cabinets, 2) executive-legislative balance of power, 3) multiparty systems, 4) proportional representation, and 5) interest group corporatism; and along the federal-unitary dimension: 1) federal and decentralized government, 2) strong bicameralism, 3) constitutional rigidity, 4) judicial review, and 5) central bank independence. Unlike the majoritarian system, because there are larger numbers of so-called veto players and "high degree of consensus" is needed for legislation to pass through the policymaking process, there is often less potential to change the

status quo in consensus systems; each individual party acts as a veto player, which is then compounded by the presence of the bicameral legislative system that typically characterizes consensus models (Fischer 2014, 357, Tsebelis 2002).

It is important to point out that the models in Lijphart's typology are not entirely mutually exclusive, and particular governments may have institutions that are a mixture of the two models. For instance, as discussed earlier, many aspects of the UK's model of majoritarian democracy have shifted towards the consensus model in recent years (Matthews 2011, Strohmeier 2015). Another example of mixed institutions is the US, where a strong federal system with a bicameral legislature, rigid constitution and robust judicial review exists alongside a two-party system with a strong executive, single-party majority cabinets, and a first-past-the-post voting system. Using quantitative measurements of the ten variables, Lijphart is able to produce a two-dimensional map of the democratic models, showing the diversity and nuance of democratic institutions (Figure 2). In the figure, the horizontal axis represents executives-parties dimension, and the vertical represents the federal-unitary dimension, where high values indicate consensus and low values indicate majoritarianism, with each unit being one standard deviation from the mean score (Lijphart 2012).

Given the respective features of majoritarian and consensus democracies, conventional wisdom would suggest that "majoritarian democracy is better at governing… [while] consensus democracy is better at representing – in particular, representing minority groups and minority interests" (Lijphart 2012, 274). Lijphart, however, demonstrates that – in terms of economic measurements – there is only a small difference between the performance of the two models, meaning that "the conventional wisdom is clearly wrong in claiming that majoritarian democracies are better governors" (2012, 273). Furthermore, Lijphart finds that consensus

democracies perform better than their majoritarian counterparts in terms of representation and

what he describes as "the kindness and gentleness of their public policy orientations" – referring

to social welfare, environmental protections, criminal justice and foreign aid (2012, 288, 295).

The federalist institutions of consensus democracies, according to Lijphart, also have "obvious

advantages for large countries and for countries with deep religious and ethnic divisions" (2012,

295).

Figure 2: Two-dimensional conceptual map of democratic models[2]

Source: Lijphart (2012, 234)

In addition to the differences in policy outcomes between majoritarian and consensus

democracies, the two systems have varying effects on how their citizens perceive democracy.

Norris observes that democratic institutions, by their very nature, "consistently rule some groups

---

[2] Countries are labelled according to the first three characters of their English names, with the following exceptions: AUL – Australia; AUT – Austria; CR – Costa Rica; JPN – Japan; NZ – New Zealand; UK – United Kingdom; US – United States.

into, and some groups out of, the decision-making process," and as a result, there is a link between electoral success, satisfaction and institutional confidence (1999, 234). Institutional confidence is, in turn, linked to positive policy outcomes, institutional stability, and government performance (Miller and Listhaug 1999, Norris 1999). Accordingly, Anderson and Guillory demonstrate a link between the institutional model and the level of satisfaction amongst their citizens:

> We find that people on the losing side in an electoral competition show lower levels of satisfaction with the system than do those on the winning side. Moreover, there is an interaction between the institutional environment and a person's status as part of the political majority or minority. Losers in systems that are more consensual display higher levels of satisfaction with the way democracy works than do losers in systems with majoritarian characteristics. Conversely, winners tend to be more satisfied with democracy the more a country's political institutions approximate pure majoritarian government. (1997, 66)

This link between institutional model and citizen satisfaction is further investigated by Bernauer and Vatter, who find that the correlation between citizen satisfaction and model of democracy based on Lijphart's dimensions is relatively modest (2012). Consequently, they propose the addition of an additional dimension for analysis, the cabinets-direct democracy dimension, based on the presence of "consensual direct democracy" and varying with cabinet type (Bernauer and Vatter 2012, 459, Vatter and Bernauer, 2009). Based on their analysis, Bernauer and Vatter (2012) determine that an institutional dimension based on direct democracy may play a larger role in satisfaction than either the federal-unitary or executive-parties dimensions.

Types of Referendums and Models of Democracy

The findings that referendums may increase citizen satisfaction in the same manner that a consensus-based democracy does goes against the conventional wisdom that referendums are the "most extreme majoritarian method of decision-making" in a democracy (Lijphart 2012, 221). Since they (typically) only offer a binary choice, referendums are unable to "measure intensities or beliefs or work things out through discussion and discovery… [and can] be more dangerous than representative assemblies to minority rights" (Butler and Ranney 1978, 36). Nevertheless, it is possible, as Marxer and Pállinger observe, for referendums to be used in fostering consensus "when they have an anti-majoritarian character," which typically occurs when the referendum is initiated by "those representing minority views," or if a referendum can be used for "putting a brake on the political decision-making process" (2009, 35). Lijphart agrees, observing that for constitutional amendments in particular, referendums are an opportunity for dissatisfied minorities "to launch a campaign against the proposed amendment" (2012, 221).

In order to delineate in which circumstances referendums act as a majoritarian or consensus based device, and to facilitate their analysis of direct democracy as an additional dimension of democratic institutions, Vatter and Bernauer establish a typology of referendums, ranging from high to low "governmental control" (2009, 338). Plebiscites exist at the high control end of the spectrum, where the ruling government is able to control both the agenda and initiation of the referendum, are called in situations where a decision is sent "to the people to win a new mandate for a controversial policy," and can only be triggered by ruling majorities (Qvortrup 2014, 53, Vatter and Bernauer, 2009). On the opposite end of this spectrum are popular initiatives – "voters' propositions for laws or constitutional reforms" – and optional referendums – intended to "overturn decisions made by the parliamentary majority" – where the

ruling government has control over neither the agenda nor triggering of the referendum (Vatter and Bernauer 2009, 338). Small minorities of either voters or political elites trigger each of these forms of referendum. Between high and low levels of governmental control are mandatory referendums, referendums required by a nation's constitution for certain decisions, and allows the ruling government to "control the agenda… [but] it does not have much control over its initiation" (Ibid.).

Though the conditions by which referendums are triggered are important, the conditions of passage and failure are equally important, as Vatter describes:

> In order to achieve a more accurate taxonomy of the numerous forms of direct democracy, we need to ask not only who initiates the referendum, but also who has ultimate decision-making authority. So far, we have considered the potential influence of governmental majority and non-governmental minorities only in terms of the initial stages of the decision-making process. We therefore need to continue by considering the rights of majorities and minorities during the final decision phase. … [Considering] the substantial difference between referendum decisions requiring qualified majorities, and those which can proceed on the basis of a simple majority. (2009, 129)

Consequently, plebiscites and mandatory referendums are seen as a majoritarian device, because "minorities are excluded from their initiation and belong to the 'losers' in the absolute sense, after decisions have been made" (Vatter 2000, 174). On the other hand, optional referendums, popular initiatives, and other referendums with low levels of government control are seen as a consensus-oriented device, "launched from the bottom-up by a small minority of voters or parliamentarians" for the purpose of either overturning decisions made by a legislative body or to circumvent a legislative body altogether (in the case of popular initiatives) (Marxer and Pállinger 2009, Vatter, 2009, 128). In these situations, when the referendum is combined with the popular initiative, the referendum loses its "blunt majoritarian character" and becomes a consensus-oriented tool (Lijphart 2012, 221).

As an additional precaution, regardless of the level of governmental control, provisions for referendums often qualify the majority needed for passage, which helps mitigate the risk of "potentially tyrannical policy outcomes favored only by a slim majority of the voters (i.e., 50 percent plus one)" (Lewis 2012, 2). These qualifications can take a number of forms, ranging from 'double majority' rules – requiring a majority of voters in a majority of regions (such as states or districts) – to turnout requirements or majorities greater than a simple majority of 50 percent (Vatter 2009).

When the decision rules are taken into account with the level of governmental control, referendums can be classified into a "Majoritarian-Consensus" taxonomy (Vatter 2009, 130). As shown in Figure 3, this taxonomy helps assess the majoritarian and consensus characteristics of various types of referendums – referendums located in the upper left of the table (i.e., high governmental control with a simple majority decision rule) are the most majoritarian, while referendums in the lower right (i.e., low governmental control with a qualified majority decision rule) are the most consensus-based.

Figure 3: Vatter's taxonomy of referendums

Decision rule	Governmental control		
	Government-initiated (high control)	*Constitutionally required (medium control)*	*Initiated by a minority of voters or MP (low control)*
Simple majority	Plebiscite (e.g. UK, France)	Mandatory referendum (e.g. Spain, Austria)	Optional referendum (e.g. Denmark)
Simple majority and quorum of participation	Plebiscite (e.g. Netherlands)	Mandatory referendum (e.g. Ireland, Denmark)	Optional (e.g. Sweden) and abrogative referendum (e.g. Italy)
Qualified majority	No example	Mandatory referendum (e.g. Australia, Switzerland)	Optional referendum and popular initiative (e.g. Switzerland)

Source: Vatter (2009, 130)

Categorizing a referendum based on the governmental control and the majority needed to pass it is only one approach, however. The justifications political elites have for supporting referendums can be grouped into three categories, which can be used to categorize referendums. As described by Gideon Rahat, the first category is *avoidance*, where a referendum is used as a method "to transform decision making and avoid the blame and responsibility for its outcome" (2009, 102). Alternatively, avoidance can be used "when a party attempts to address voters who generally tend to favour… a particular policy that does not fit its own position, the party may try to neutralize this problem by promising to conduct a referendum" (Ibid.). The second category of justification is *addition*, where elites conduct a referendum despite having the majority (or majorities) necessary, in order to "further legitimize a decision," or to empower the enacting party (Ibid.). Legitimization of an issue or policy by voters is perhaps the most common reasoning to enact a referendum across Europe (Hobolt 2012; Kissane 2009; Qvortrup 2014). Rahat's third category is *contradiction*, where a referendum is used to contradict decisions made in other forums, with either a promotional – promoting a rejected policy – or a protective – preserving the status quo – intent (2009, 103). It should be noted that these three categories are not exclusive of each other; a referendum may exist within more than one category. A notable example of this is the 1975 UK referendum on membership in the European Community, where although a majority of Labour Party supported membership, a referendum was called to avoid intra-party conflict and legitimize the decision on membership. Furthermore, the anti-EC minority of the Labour Party supported the referendum in the hope voters would override the majority vote from Parliament (Rahat 2009, 103).

One of the goals of a referendum is to give citizens greater influence in the democratic process. Referendums can be seen in the context of a growing trend of populism across Europe.

Although referendums and other direct democratic institutions are not inherently 'populist' (at least in the sense that populism is defined for this paper), populist groups have increasingly employed referendums to advance their political goals. Bjørklund situates the increased use of direct democracy since the 1970s as part of a larger trend of challenging political elites, particularly through voter-driven referendums, which fits into the populist narrative (2009). Direct input from voters has been viewed as a way to "improve the quality of policy-making," by allowing the people to hold what is effectively a veto over decisions made by parliaments (Funk and Gathmann 2013, 300, Kissane 2009). Furthermore, voters' initiative referendums allow for a relatively small number of citizens to wield a large amount of power. At the EU level, the ECI requires petitions with at least one million signatures (coming from at least seven member states) to be heard by the European Parliament. Kaufmann notes that one million signatures represents merely 0.2 percent of all EU citizens, which can be seen as an excellent opportunity for citizens to have their voices heard, although he also observes that the ECI does not necessarily mean legislation will be proposed in the European Parliament, nor does it necessarily trigger a popular vote on the issue (2012). Referendums can also be used to give minority groups – including political, ethnic or cultural minority groups, amongst many others – a greater influence in political systems, at both national and supranational levels. This can be seen within the frameworks described above, as minority political groups can use referendums in an attempt to block legislation, and interest groups representing minority voters can initiate referendums to influence their social and political position, although Schiller notes that direct democracy represents "only a small part" of factors that can change this influence (2012, 45).

Referendums and Deliberative Democracy

The surge in the use of referendums has led to tension between the principles of direct and deliberative democracy. Although the two systems are not necessarily in conflict with each other, the nature of referendums – which place an emphasis on votes – can put them in conflict with deliberative democratic techniques and institutions – which place emphasis on 'voice' (LeDuc 2015). Deliberative democracy is a theory that promotes public discussion, based on "mutual justification of political arguments," as a central element of democracy, in order to overcome some of the problems of majoritarian democracy (Setälä 2009). Deliberative democracy has been successfully promoted through institutions known as "mini-publics," which are small representative groups of ordinary citizens (Goodin and Dryzek 2006).

Lawrence LeDuc discusses the relationship between referendums and deliberative democracy extensively and identifies four areas that the two theories come into conflict: politics, clarity, information, and participation (2015). Since governments are typically the entities that trigger referendums, and governments rarely trigger referendums without the expectation of winning, the referendum campaign takes on an inherently political character. Whether or not a referendum campaign takes place during an election campaign is also affects the deliberative nature of the campaign; the quality of deliberation is improved when there are not simultaneous campaigns. LeDuc also observes that politics additionally influence deliberation when it comes to referendums in ways that have been outlined earlier in this paper, as a result of internal divisions in parties and second-order effects (2015). The clarity of the referendum question also has an impact on how much deliberation is able to occur in a debate. Although the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe's *Code of Good Practice on Referendums* states that referendum questions should be clear, and simple enough to answer "solely by yes, no or a blank

vote," there is an element of subjectivity to definition of 'clear,' and overly complex referendum issues can result in voters using "short cuts" in establishing a position, impeding the deliberative process (2007, LeDuc, 2015). Another area where direct and deliberative democracy can conflict, information, has some similarities with the above issues of clarity. In post-referendum polls, voters often report that they felt that they were not well informed enough about the issue. This has been an especially salient problem in referendums on complex proposals, such as European treaties or constitutions, and feeds into the issue of voter short cuts and problems of clarity. Information can also impact deliberation when referendum campaigns make use of negative campaigning or disinformation, "particularly in a short campaign involving an issue on which there has been little prior deliberation", since "genuinely deliberative democracy requires that all arguments be heard equally" (LeDuc 2015, 145). The final area where direct and deliberative democracy can conflict is participation. Turnout is likely the most significant participation-based issue, and although some issues surrounding turnout have already been discussed in this paper, LeDuc makes two points regarding turnout not already discussed in this paper: first, he argues that a minimum amount of participation is needed for deliberation, and that turnout is directly connected to the legitimacy of the referendum; LeDuc also observes that turnout quotas have been used in some referendums as a method to achieve this minimum participation, but stresses that high voter turnout is not necessarily the same thing as engagement and deliberation. Secondly, he notes that turnout and participation are not issues that should be considered in a vacuum, and that they are directly influenced by the other factors previously discussed, such as the nature of the campaign, information levels, and politics.

Proponents of both direct and deliberative democracy are able to find common ground in the belief that one of the flaws in modern representative democracies is that citizens "lack

competence and a sense of political responsibility" (Setälä 2009, 3). In order to solve this lack of competency, each group advocates that competency can be improved if the public is given a greater role in governance. The two groups have differences in the role that people should hold, however. Direct democracy advocates argue that the public should hold greater power in decision-making, particularly through referendums, while advocates for deliberative democracy argue that greater public deliberation is a preferred way to make the people more competent. But as referenced earlier, and as Goodin and Dryzek show, direct democracy and deliberative democracy are not mutually exclusive practices (2006).

Voter Choice in Referendums

Proponents of direct democratic initiatives argue that voters are competent, should be trusted to directly make decisions and that doing so would enhance civic education and awareness (Cronin 1989). Conversely, critics of direct democracy state that voters are not properly motivated to reflect deeply on political issues, and thus referendums do not lead to effective participation or outcomes (Setälä 2009). Public support for referendums is high, and correspondingly, the number of referendums is increasing, victories for those who support direct democracy (Schuck and de Vreese 2015). However, voting patterns and the manner in which referendum campaigns are conducted seem to indicate that concerns of some critics may be manifesting themselves in the run up to and aftermath of referendums.

One of the core issues of direct democracy is the idea that voters are competent enough to make decisions in referendum voting. There has been significant growth in the use of referendums since the 1970s. Bjørklund links this growth in referendums to the emergence of the New Politics approach, introduced in the 1970s, which asserted that rising educational levels

16

and expanding mass media led to increased political skills, while simultaneously, new political issues, "such as environmentalism, lifestyle questions, and immigration" has contributed to a trend of voter de-alignment, as increasing numbers of individuals "felt competent to make their political decisions independently of cues from political parties" (2009, 121-122). An additional consequence of the emergence of the New Politics approach has been an increase in single-issue voters; subsequently, despite having greater access to information regarding issues, voters have become more detached from the larger context of political issues, to the detriment of political deliberation.

The increased role of mass media and the growth of single-issue voters have had significant influence in referendum campaign tactics. Media outlets play a role in disseminating information, and therefore also play a role in influencing the outcome of a referendum vote. Marcinkowski suggests that the media, along with campaign groups, can influence the outcome of a vote, by changing the way they interpret and highlight an issue (2007). As a result of this, the focus and context of referendum campaigns can evolve beyond the original issue that a political party or group originally intended. Furthermore, owing to the very nature of a referendum, voters typically eschew party preference during referendum campaigns – Font and Rodríguez note that a referendum where voters exclusively follow party preference would be "wasted" – although the extent to which this is the case is dependent on a number of factors surrounding the context of the referendum itself (2009, 168, LeDuc, 2015). Referendum campaigns can also exacerbate splits within parties, with members of a single party working to campaign for opposite sides of the issue. LeDuc, however, says that this is not necessarily negative, as he argues that referendums are best debated in an arena as free from partisanship as possible, and that while government neutrality is preferable, division within parties is still

beneficial as it allows more voices to enter the conversation and shifts focus towards the issue that the referendum is attempting to address (2015).

Complete government neutrality is not a likely scenario in any referendum campaign, and political parties almost always take a public stance in the run-up to the vote. Sara Hobolt shows that party stances can have a considerable, albeit indirect, impact on voting behavior in referendum campaigns, demonstrating that voters take cues from the parties they support when voting on a policy issue and acting as "pivotal information providers," although it should be noted that voters also take cues from the media and other elites (2006, 642). Party stances are far from the only factor influencing the development of voters' opinions, however, and only in situations where campaigns reinforce previously held opinions do party affiliations play a significant role; discussions and discourse during the campaign play a larger role when referendum concerns an issue that is unfamiliar to voters (LeDuc 2009). Furthermore, referendum campaigns often focus their efforts not on voters who have strong opinions of one party or side of the issue, but instead on 'undecided' voters. The attempt to simplify complicated political issues into a 'yes' or 'no' answer can lead to voters feeling as if they do not have enough information to properly make a decision, which can lead to an inherent advantage to the 'no' side, particularly if it represents maintenance of the status quo (LeDuc 2009).

There is also significant debate over whether or not voter choices in EU referendums represent 'issue-voting' or 'second-order' voting (Garry, Marsh and Sinnott 2005). The issue-voting approach hypothesizes that voter choice in EU referendums is driven by voters' views on the EU or on the EU issue being voted on. By contrast, the second-order approach hypothesizes that voters are less concerned about issues at stake in the referendum question, and instead use their vote in that contest to signal their support – or lack thereof – for the national government

currently in power. Garry, Marsh and Sinnott find that voter choices in the EU primarily follow

the issue-voting hypothesis, although the level of satisfaction with the ruling government does

play a smaller role (2005).

Voter choice in referendums is influenced by a myriad of factors not already discussed,

including anti-establishment rhetoric, party division, ideological division, segmentation of issues,

altered campaign discourse, and turnout (LeDuc 2009). Turnout is a factor worth noting, as

turnout in referendums tends to be lower than in general elections but has been shown to

fluctuate significantly in different referendums. Additionally, the results of referendums can be

influenced by seemingly insignificant factors; Matsusaka demonstrates that in the United States,

ballot order and length can have an effect on the outcome of referendums: although the location

at which a ballot proposition only has a marginal effect on the outcome, ballot length can have a

much more significant impact on results (2016). Other factors have been implicated in

undesirable referendum outcomes, such as the weather – in the case of Colombia's referendum

on a peace deal with the FARC military group (Taub and Fisher 2016). It is worth stating that

none of these factors should be considered in a vacuum; the results of any given referendum

result from an interaction of these and other factors unique to that particular issue, and it is not

possible to determine and quantify all of the influences on voter choice in a particular

referendum.

CASE STUDY: BALLOT INITIATIVES IN CALIFORNIA

The California ballot initiative system dates back to 1911, when an amendment to the

state constitution creating a ballot initiative system was approved, giving Californians "a

powerful tool to bypass the Legislature and Governor" (Bowen 2011, 253). The movement to

approve a ballot initiative system stemmed from a desire to "seize control of a government

perceived to be under control of excessive corporate influences," namely the Southern Pacific

Railroad (Braunstein 2004, 26). The amendment approved included four primary institutions, as

detailed by Lee:

> (1) *initiative constitutional amendments* proposed by popular petition and
> submitted to the voters; (2) *the direct statutory initiative*, statutes proposed by
> petition and submitted to the voters; (3) *the indirect statutory initiative*, statutes
> proposed by petition, submitted to the legislature and, failing of passage by that
> body, to the electorate (repealed in 1966); and (4) the *referendum*, the suspension
> of the enforcement of a law until it has been referred to the voters and approved
> by them. (1979, 69-70)

Since its creation in 1911, California's ballot initiative system has become the gold

standard across the country, with greater use of initiatives and referendums than any other state

between 1964 and 2000 (Braunstein 2004). Between 1912 and 2016, 1,952 petitions for ballot

initiatives were circulated, of which 19 percent (376) qualified for the ballot. Of the proportion

of petitions that were approved for the ballot, 35 percent (132) were approved by voters and

became law.[3] Though some initiatives were passed the first time they appeared on the ballot,

---

[3]A full summary of ballot initiative totals is available at: http://elections.cdn.sos.ca.gov//ballot-measures/pdf/initiative-totals-summary-year.pdf

others, with issues ranging from taxes to women's rights, have been voted down and requalified for the ballot multiple times before ultimately being approved by voters (Bowen 2011).

According to the *2017 Statewide Initiative Guide* published by the California Secretary of State, the state constitution outlines a specific procedure that must be followed for an initiative to qualify for the ballot. First, a petitioner must draft the text of the proposed law, submit it to the state Attorney General and pay a $2000 deposit. For the most part, "any matter that is a proper subject of legislation can become an initiative measure," but each initiative must address only one issue (California Secretary of State 2016, i). After being certified by the Secretary of State, petitions must be circulated around the state and a specified number of signatures from registered voters be collected, totaling 5 percent of votes cast in the previous gubernatorial election for statute initiatives, or 8 percent for constitutional amendment initiatives. Upon collection of the required number of signatures, the initiative is considered "eligible" for the ballot, and after verification of those signatures, the Secretary of State certifies that the initiative has qualified for the ballot. The initiative will then be placed on the ballot during the next statewide general election, and if approved by a simple majority of voters (i.e., 50 percent plus one), the initiative becomes law the day after the election.

The ballot initiative and referendum system in California has produced a great diversity of legislative proposals. While most have dealt with relatively mundane issues from across the political spectrum, initiatives have given proponents of issues from outside the mainstream, such as environmentalists, an opportunity to make their case to the public (Cronin 1989). More recently, the ballot initiative system has been used to push for the legalization of marijuana in California: first in 1972, then 2010, when Proposition 19, "Dubbed the "highest-profile" ballot

legislation in the country," received 46.5 percent of the vote, and again in 2016, when 57 percent of voters voted in favor of legalization (Biggers 2014, 3, McGreevy 2016).

Additionally, though they are relatively rare, numerous controversial and discriminatory initiatives have been approved through the system: in 1920 voters approved an initiative that "prohibited ownership of land by corporations controlled by persons ineligible for naturalization," a proposal targeted at the state's growing Japanese agricultural communities (Cronin 1989, 93). Moreover, controversial initiatives continue to appear on California ballots: as HoSang details, despite the state's reputation as one of the most liberal in the country, during the 1990s several controversial initiatives were passed by California voters, "banning public education and public services for many immigrants (1994), repealing affirmative action programs (1996), outlawing bilingual education (1998), and toughening criminal sentencing for adults and juveniles (1994, 2000)" (2010, 11).

Despite the fact that California's initiative system has allowed numerous controversial and, at times discriminatory, proposals to become law, other checks and balances that characterize the American political system remain. Lee points out that "From 1960 through 1976, only two of the seven constitutional initiative measures approved in California were not struck down by the courts, in whole or in part" (1979, 74).

CASE STUDY: REFERENDUMS IN THE UK

In contrast with the robust direct democratic institutions found in the state of California, the UK lacks a codified, systematic procedure for holding referendums. Despite this, since the 1970s "Referendums have become part of the constitutional tapestry" in the British electoral system, gaining popularity at multiple levels of government throughout the country to settle questions ranging from devolution of powers to regional parliaments, constitutional reform, and local taxation (Qvortrup 2006, 59). Additionally, beginning with Harold Wilson's referendum on European Economic Community (EEC) membership in 1975, British political leaders have utilized the referendum in relation to issues regarding European integration, often at the behest of "those who sought to prevent or limit British involvement with Europe," culminating with the Brexit vote in June of 2016 (Bogdanor 2005, 694, S. B. Hobolt 2016).

In addition to their use in settling issues regarding the EU, British politicians have increasingly used referendums when addressing changes to the UK's unwritten constitution. As a "prototypical" example of Lijphart's majoritarian model of democracy, the UK's constitution is not a single written and codified document, but instead utilizes a "series of statutes, laws and norms that developed over centuries in an evolutionary fashion" (Cotton and Fontana 2018, 3-4). This institutional setup, combined with the principle of parliamentary sovereignty that is central to the Westminster model of government fosters an environment that is permissive for substantial constitutional change (Ibid.). Though the British government is not legally obligated to call a referendum when making changes to the basic statutes underpinning British law, "a vote in Parliament is no longer sufficient to secure legitimacy" when making these changes

(Bogdanor 2001, 145). As a result, since 1997 referendums have become the norm when British

political leaders wish to make changes to the country's basic statues, particularly in regards to

electoral reforms, which are now expected to "be preceded by a referendum" (Qvortrup 2012,

108, Strohmeier 2015). Former Prime Minister Tony Blair is largely responsible for the shift

from referendums only being called to address "unique and exceptional" issues like membership

in the European Community to addressing issues such as constitutional reform (Bogdanor 2001,

144); in 1996 he argued that referendums could be used "to give citizens a veto over proposals to

change their system of government, and to give legitimacy to the changes to which they do

agree" (55).

As a part of the aforementioned changes to the unwritten constitution, proposals for the

devolution of powers from the unitary parliament in Westminster to regional parliaments in

London, North Ireland, Scotland, and Wales have been an issue where referendums have been

consistently used in the UK (Qvortrup 2006). The first pair of such referendums – on the

devolution of power to regional parliaments in Scotland and Wales – occurred in 1979, and both

were defeated (Ibid.). These referendums, along with later (successful) devolution referendums

during the 1990s were part of the Labour Party's – the only party to make use of referendums

until the 2011 Alternative Vote referendum – electoral strategy, designed to help ensure power in

Westminster, quell rising support for the Scottish National Party (SNP), and reduce intra-party

disagreement over the topic of devolution (Cotton and Fontana 2018, Qvortrup 2006).

Because Britain lacks an initiative procedure, Parliament sets the conditions required for

all referendums to pass (in addition to the wording of the ballot text). In many cases, including

for the 2016 Brexit vote, a simple majority with no turnout requirement has been the only

condition of passage; however, in some situations further conditions have been stipulated: for

instance, both the 2011 Alternative Vote referendum and 1979 Scotland referendums required

that a majority representing 40 percent of the total electorate vote 'yes' was necessary for the

referendum to pass (Cotton and Fontana 2018, Qvortrup, 2006, Qvortrup, 2012).

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

Discussion

When comparing the direct democratic institutions of California and the UK, one of the most substantial differences between the two systems is the legal background in each case. In California, the procedure for calling a referendum or placing an initiative on the ballot is prescribed by the state constitution. In line with the American system of government, the California state constitution exists as a unified formal document that requires relatively exceptional circumstances to change – a feature typical of Lijphart's consensus democracy (Braunstein 2004). Contrasting with this is the British system, which has an informal, unwritten constitution and does not prescribe a specific procedure for referendums. As a result, any direct democratic measures must be authorized by Parliament, giving political minorities little opportunity to fight for change.

Direct democratic institutions in California and the UK represent two opposing sides of Vatter and Bernauer's taxonomy of referendums (2009). While the California system, where "a small minority of voters" has the power to propose an initiative, is representative of low governmental control, referendums in the UK, which can only be called by "the ruling majority" are a typical example of direct democracy with a high level of governmental control (Ibid., 338). In this regard, British referendums have served as a majoritarian device, while Californian initiatives function to foster consensus.

Although they differ in the level of governmental control, the institutions in both cases generally utilize the same decision rule of a simple majority, a characteristic typically associated

with referendums that have majoritarian features (Vatter 2009). In California, however, judicial review of statutes passed through the ballot initiative system serves to filter out at least some referendums that might be discriminatory and is considered by Lijphart to be characteristic of consensus-based democracy (Cronin 1989, Lijphart 2012). Though California's ballot initiatives have a number of consensual characteristics, the state's optional referendums, approved by the state legislature and requiring a simple majority of voters to pass, are substantially more majoritarian in nature. Additionally, as mentioned earlier, there have been situations where British referendums have included a turnout requirement – a decision more closely linked to consensus-based features – but these referendums do not represent what is typical in the British case (Qvortrup 2006).

Considering the institutional features of direct democracy in California and the UK in the context of Lijphart's two dimensions of democracy, while there are a number of connections between these institutions and the federal-unitary dimension, there are few connections between the institutions and the executives-parties dimension. The cases presented show that there can be direct impacts on four of the five variables within the federal-unitary dimension: 1) the federal unitary variable, 2) the unicameralism-bicameralism variable, 3) the constitutional amendment variable, and 4) the legislative supremacy variable. By contrast, these institutional features discussed here have little, if any impact on any of the variables along the executives-parties dimension. Consequently, this suggests that, in line with Vatter and Bernauer's (2009) argument, proper analysis of the majoritarian or consensual impact of direct democratic institutions requires treating those institutions as a third dimension of Lijphart's analysis.

Despite their typological differences, the two direct democratic systems share referendum campaign characteristics also seen in other systems of government that utilize direct democratic institutions. In both cases, voter choice is a concern, albeit for different reasons.

In California, there has been substantial research that suggests that "campaign spending is the best predictor of the success of ballot measures," giving individuals and groups with greater financial resources a substantial advantage through the entire initiative process from start to finish (Braunstein 2004, 75). Bowen highlights this discrepancy, noting that "while some initiatives qualify for statewide ballot through heroic grassroots efforts, others are funded almost entirely by a single well-heeled business or individual," as tactics like paid signature-gatherers are used in order to help proposals qualify for the ballot (2011, 254, Braunstein 2004). This discrepancy continues into the campaign, where groups with greater financial resources have greater agenda-setting ability, influencing the debate for or against a proposal and reducing the ability for neutral deliberation during the campaign (LeDuc 2015).

Although the UK's direct democratic institutions do not leave an opportunity for well-financed interest groups to propose initiatives directly, voters' choices during referendum campaigns can be impacted by outside groups in much the same way as in California. Additionally, since referendums in the UK have a high level of government control and are closely linked to the ruling party in Parliament, the second-order voting effects may come into play. Hobolt points out that during and after the Brexit referendum campaign, a "key argument for Leave voters is lack of trust in David Cameron and his government" (2016, 1263). Additionally, second-order effects may have an influence on agenda-setting, as the support of a popular or trusted politician may help normalize positions that were otherwise outside of the political mainstream (Crum 2007, S. B. Hobolt 2006).

Conclusion

After several high-profile referendums in recent years, the role of direct democracy in representative democratic systems has come under increased scrutiny. California and the UK, two systems with markedly different direct democratic institutions were selected as case studies to explore the how Lijphart's majoritarian and consensual models of democracy are impacted by direct democracy (2012). In each system, the institutions had both majoritarian and consensual features, though the British system of government – a prototype of the majoritarian democracy – tended to have fewer consensual and anti-majoritarian features. The presence of referendums did have an impact on the political process in both cases, however the mixed majoritarian and consensual features in the two systems lends support to Vatter and Bernauer's suggestion that referendums may in fact function as a third dimension of democracy (2009).

In both cases, the direct democratic institutions created opportunities for negative impacts on the deliberative democratic process. Although the circumstances are somewhat different, voter choice is an issue in both cases, as referendum campaigns give an opportunity for interest groups to use financial resources to alter the tone of the campaign and influence the debate before the vote. Furthermore, in the case of California, interest groups or individuals with significant financial resources can utilize the ballot initiative system to circumvent the state legislature and place proposals directly on the ballot. Meanwhile, in the UK, second-order voting can impact the results of referendums, with the side of the issue supported by more popular and trusted politicians or parties performing better than side supported by less popular and trusted politicians or parties.

Though referendums do increase political engagement and citizen satisfaction with democracy, they do not necessarily represent a flawless or ideal form of government (Biggers

2014, Bernauer and Vatter 2012). The topics discussed here could be researched further by expanding the scope of case studies used. The inclusion of the UK as a case study presented limitations to the conclusions drawn, as the country makes very limited use of direct democracy in the policymaking process. The addition of a case like Switzerland, which represents a more purely consensual democracy according to Lijphart's taxonomy, in addition to utilizing referendums that fit in Vatter and Bernauer's category of medium governmental control, would allow for more robust conclusions to be drawn from these comparisons. Additionally, further study of the design of various direct democratic institutions and its connections with majoritarian and consensual democracy can be explored, along with a more focused analysis of various aspects of voter behavior before and after the inclusions of direct democratic institutions in order to better assess the impact that these institutions can have on voters.

WORKS CITED

Anderson, Christopher J., and Christine A. Guillory. 1997. "Political Institutions and Satisfaction with Democracy: A Cross-National Analysis of Consensus and Majoritarian Systems." *American Political Science Review* 91 (1): 66-81.

Bailey, Lonce H. 2015. "Introduction: Progressivism and Its Critics." In *In Defense of the Founders Republic: Critics of Direct Democracy in the Progressive Era*, edited by Lonce H. Bailey and Jerome M. Mileur, 1-14. New York: Bloomsbury Academic & Professional.

Bernauer, Julian, and Adrian Vatter. 2012. "Can't get no satisfaction with the Westminster model? Winners, losers and the effects of consensual and direct democratic institutions on satisfaction with democracy." *European Journal of Political Research* 51 (4): 435-468.

Biggers, Daniel R. 2014. *Morality at the Ballot.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bjørklund, Tor. 2009. "The surge of referendums and the New Politics approach." In *Referendums and Representative Democracy*, edited by Maija Setälä and Theo Schiller, 117-135. London: Routledge.

Blair, Tony. 1996. "Democracy's second age." *The Economist*, September 14: 55-58.

Bogdanor, Vernon. 2001. "Constitutional reform." In *The Blair Effect*, edited by Anthony Seldon, 139-158. London: Little, Brown and Company.

—. 2005. "Footfalls echoing in the memory. Britain and Europe: the historical perspective." *International Affairs* 81 (4): 689-701.

Bowen, Debra. 2011. "The California Initiative Process at its Centennial." *California Western Law Review* 47 (2): 253-258.

Braunstein, Richard. 2004. *Initiative and Referendum Voting: Governing Through Direct Democracy in the United States.* New York: LFB Scholarly Publishing.

Butler, David, and Austin Ranney. 1978. *Referendums: A Comparative Study of Practice and Theory.* Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research.

California Secretary of State. 2016. "2017 Statewide Initiative Guide." December. Accessed February 18, 2018. http://elections.cdn.sos.ca.gov/ballot-measures/pdf/statewide-initiative-guide.pdf.

—. 2016. "Initiative Totals by Summary Year 1912 - 2016." Accessed February 18, 2018. http://elections.cdn.sos.ca.gov//ballot-measures/pdf/initiative-totals-summary-year.pdf.

Cotton, Ross, and Cary Fontana. 2018. "Political parties at critical junctures: explaining the decisions to offer referendums on constitutional change in the United Kingdom." *Contemporary British History* 1-27.

Council of Europe. 2007. "Code of Good Practice on Referendums." *Venice Commission.* http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2007)008-e.

Cronin, Thomas E. 1989. *Direct Democracy.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Crum, Ben. 2007. "Party Stances in the Referendums on the EU Constitution." *European Union Politics* 8 (1): 61-82.

Dewan, Torun, and Arthur Spirling. 2011. "Strategic Opposition and Government Cohesion in Westminster Democracies." *American Political Science Review* 105 (2): 337-358.

Fischer, Manuel. 2014. "Coalition Structures and Policy Change in a Consensus Democracy." *Policy Studies Journal* 42 (3): 344-366.

Font, Joan, and Elisa Rodríguez. 2009. "Intense but useless?" In *Referendums and Representative Democracy*, edited by Maija Setälä and Theo Schiller, 162-185. London: Routledge.

Funk, Patricia, and Christina Gathmann. 2013. "Voter Preferences, Direct Democracy and
     Government Spending." *European Journal of Political Economy* 32: 300-319.
Garry, John, Michael Marsh, and Richard Sinnott. 2005. "'Second-order' versus 'Issue-voting'
     Effects in EU Referendums." *European Union Politics* 6 (2): 201-221.

Goodin, Robert E., and John S. Dryzek. 2006. "Deliberative Impacts: The Macro-Political
     Uptake of Mini-Publics." *Politics and Society* 34 (2): 219-244.

Gregorczuk, Helen. 1998. "Citizen Initiated Referendums: Republican Innovation or Scourge of
     Representative Democracy?" *Griffith Law Review* 7 (2): 249-273.

Hailsham, Quentin Hogg. 1978. *The Dilemma of Democracy.* London: Collins.

Hobolt, Sarah B. 2006. "How Parties Affect Vote Choice in European Integration Referendums."
     Party Politics 12 (5): 623-647.

—. 2012. "Citizen Satisfaction with Democracy in the European Union." *Journal of Common
     Market Studies* 50 (S1): 88-105.

—. 2016. "The Brexit Vote: a divided nation, a divided continent." *Journal of European Public
     Policy* 23 (9): 1259-1277.

HoSang, Daniel Martinez. 2010. *Racial Propositions: Ballot Initiatives and the Making of
     Postwar California.* Berkeley: University of California Press.

Kaufmann, Bruno. 2004. "A Comparative Evaluation of Initiative & Referendum in 32 European
     States." In *Direct Democracy in Europe*, edited by Bruno Kaufmann and M. Dane
     Waters, 3-10. Durham: Carolina Academic Press.

—. 2012. "Transnational Citizens' Initiative - How Modern Direct Democracy can make the
     European Union a Better Place for Minorities." In *Direct Democracy and Minorities*,
     edited by Wilfried Marxer, 230-244. Wiesbaden: Springer VS.

Kissane, Bill. 2009. "From people's veto to instrument of elite consensus." In *Referendums and
     Representative Democracy*, edited by Maija Setälä and Theo Schiller, 17-33. London:
     Routledge.

LeDuc, Lawrence. 2009. "Campaign tactics and outcomes." In *Referendums and Representative Democracy*, edited by Maija Setälä and Theo Schiller, 139-159. London: Routledge.

—. 2015. "Referendums and deliberative democracy." *Electoral Studies* 38: 139-148.

Lee, Eugene C. 1979. "The initiative and referendum: how California has fared." *National Civic Review* 68: 69-76.

Lewis, Daniel. 2012. *Direct Democracy and Minority Rights.* New York: Routledge.

Lijphart, Arend. 2012. *Patterns of Democracy.* 2nd. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Marcinkowski, Frank. 2007. "Beyond Information and Opinion." In *Direct Democracy in Europe*, edited by Zoltán Tibor Pállinger, Bruno Kaufmann, Wilfried Marxer and Theo Schiller, 94-107. Wiesbaden: Springer VS.

Marxer, Wilfried, and Zoltán Tibor Pállinger. 2009. "Stabilizing or destabilizing? Direct-democratic instruments in different political systems." In *Referendums and Representative Democracy*, edited by Maija Setälä and Theo Schiller, 34-55. London; New York: Routledge.

Matsusaka, John G. 2016. "Ballot order effects in direct democracy elections." *Public Choice* 167: 257-276.

Matthews, Felicity. 2011. "Constitutional stretching: coalition governance and the Westminster model." *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics* 49 (4): 486-509.

McGreevy, Patrick. 2016. "Californians vote to legalize recreational use of marijuana in the state." *Los Angeles Times.* November 8. Accessed February 18, 2018. http://www.latimes.com/nation/politics/trailguide/la-na-election-day-2016-proposition-64-marijuana-1478281845-htmlstory.html.

Miller, Arthur, and Ola Listhaug. 1999. "Political Performance and Institutional Trust." In *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Government*, edited by Pippa Norris, 204-216. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Norris, Pippa. 1999. "Institutional Explanations for Political Support." In *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Government*, edited by Pippa Norris, 217-235. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Qvortrup, Matt. 2006. "Democracy By Delegation: the Decision to Hold Referendums in the United Kingdom." *Representation* 42 (1): 59-72.

—. 2012. "Voting on Electoral Reform: A Comparative Perspective on the Alternative Vote Referendum in the United Kingdom." *The Political Quarterly* 83 (1): 108-116.

—. 2013. *Direct democracy: A comparative study of the theory and practice of government by the people.* Manchester: Manchester University Press.

—. 2014. "Referendums in Western Europe." In *Referendums Around the World: The Continued Growth of Direct Democracy*, edited by Matt Qvortrup, 43-64. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Rahat, Gideon. 2009. "Elite motives for initiating referendums." In *Referendums and Representative Democracy*, edited by Maija Setälä and Theo Schiller, 98-116. London: Routledge.

Schiller, Theo. 2012. "The Emergence of Direct Democracy - a Typological Approach." In *Direct Democracy and Minorities*, edited by Wilfried Marxer, 33-46. Wiesbaden: Springer VS.

Schuck, Andreas R.T., and Claes H. de Vreese. 2015. "Public support for referendums in Europe: A cross-national comparison in 21 countries." *Electoral Studies* 38: 149-158.

Setälä, Maija. 2009. "Introduction." In *Referendums and Representative Democracy*, translated by Maija Setälä and Theo Schiller, 1-14. London: Routledge.

Stanley, Ben. 2013. "Populism." In *Encyclopedia of Modern Political Thought*, edited by Gregory Claeys, 641-643. London: SAGE Publications.

Strohmeier, Gerd. 2015. "Does Westminster (still) represent the Westminster model? An analysis of the changing nature of the UK's political system." *European View* 14: 303-315.

Taub, Amanda, and Max Fisher. 2016. "Why Referendums Aren't as Democratic as They Seem." *The New York Times.* October 4. http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/05/world/americas/colombia-brexit-referendum-farc-cameron-santos.html.

Topaloff, Liubomir. 2017. "The Rise of Referendums: Elite Strategy or Populist Weapon?" *Journal of Democracy* 28 (3): 127-140.

Tsebelis, George. 2002. *Veto Players.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Vatter, Adrian. 2000. "Consensus and direct democracy: Conceptual and Empirical Linkages." *European Journal of Political Research* 38: 171-192.

—. 2009. "Lijphart expanded: three dimensions of democracy in advanced OECD countries?" *European Political Science Review* 1 (1): 125-154.

Vatter, Adrian, and Julian Bernauer. 2009. "The Missing Dimension of Democracy: Institutional Patterns in 25 EU Member States between 1997 and 2006." *European Union Politics* 10 (3): 335-359.